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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 7 Mar 1946

Vol. 99 No. 17

Committee on Finance. - Vote 63—Army (Resumed).

I really want to emphasise one point that I made last night. I asked the Minister what was the sum for warlike stores to which we were committed and suggested that it would be possible to consider, now that hostilities were not as imminent, whether or not we would be disposed to purchase the same amount of such stores.

The point mentioned by Deputy Dockrell is one of those to which I wish to refer. With perfect propriety and commendable foresight, during the emergency the officers of the Army responsible for equipping the Army, under the instructions of the Department of Defence, made repeated specifications of their ideal requirements and the Government, as I understand it, undertook contracts with suppliers for the delivery of warlike stores. As might be readily expected, the great bulk of these stores had to be ordered on the basis of delivery when available, and, of course, it transpired that much of the stores did not become available so long as warlike operations were being carried on by the suppliers themselves on foreign battlefields. On more than one occasion I directed the attention of the Minister for Defence to this and asked him had he opened negotiations with the other parties to the contracts to arrange that these contracts should, in respect of the balances still outstanding, be cancelled on terms acceptable to both parties. I would hope that the other parties to the contracts would be prepared to waive them without compensation of any kind; but that is a matter as to which we can only assume the Minister will do his best. But the sooner it is done the less burdensome the residual liability is likely to be. I think it is right to say that the Minister need not expect carping criticism in regard to this matter, provided he will act energetically in liquidating the liability, whatever it is, as quickly and as effectively as he know how.

In regard to sub-head Z, I return to a topic which I have mentioned on more than one occasion in this House. The old Army practice was that when surplus stores came to be disposed of, particularly in regard to clothing, they were reduced to waste or some such word as that. In fact, they were put into suitable machines and cut up into rags. In normal times, when supplies are abandoned, on balance, I believe, that is the right course to pursue, because the danger of promoting a "fence's" market in which stolen Army property can be readily negotiated is so great if you dispose by sale of surplus Army clothing that it is better to destroy them and sell them as rags. In the times in which we are living, however, clothing is so scarce that that course could not be possibly justified. But there ought to be on all clothing disposed of some distinctive mark placed so that subsequently the military police, when seeking to establish that stolen goods are improperly held by the person in whose possession they are found, will be able to turn up some part of the garments and, unless the mark is upon them of goods legitimately sold by the Department of Defence, will be entitled to assume that the goods are stolen, and when they prosecute the holder of the clothes in court, will be entitled to expect that the court will accept the absence of that special mark as prima facie evidence that the military article was stolen and that the person in possession of it must accept the onus of proving that he came by it legitimately.

Under sub-head A (4) provision is made for emergency gratuities re-enlistment bounties. This is a Supplementary Estimate the scope of which is restricted. I should like, however, to say that I feel that the House has made, and desires to make, not only fair but generous provision for all those who served in the Army during the emergency. Wisely or unwisely, and I think on balance wisely, in order to strengthen morale and to allow natural enthusiasm to develop, during the emergency there were received into the ranks of the Army a considerable number of enthusiasts who were really older than the Army would have ordinarily considered suitable as recruits. That applies to commissioned and non-commissioned ranks. In the various pensions schemes and employment schemes which have been devised to accommodate the men who are being demobilised I observe a recurring age limit of 28½ or 30 years. I would urge on the Minister for Defence that the number of persons who are going out of the Army, after having served through the emergency, as distinguished from the regular men, who will be over age for pension schemes and things of that kind, is very small. But it would be a disaster if these men, who, prudently or imprudently, rushed into the gap and who now find themselves turned out at the age of 35, 40 or 45, should ever feel that we in this House had consented to their being thrown on the scrap heap because they were too old. We should have thought of that before we let them in, but, once we let them in. I think we undertook an absolute moral responsibility to see that, when the time came for them to go out, they would not be placed at any disadvantage as compared with the younger men who joined simply by reason of their age. I will not develop that further.

It would require legislation and, therefore, it should not be discussed.

I am referring to all sorts of regulations made in regard to examinations and other things stipulating that a man must be under a certain age to enter. I understand the difficulty is that if you inject a man of 45 into a pensionable service you upset the whole actuarial balance of the service. I think it would be a thousand pities if the House did not say: "Very well, if we do upset the actuarial balance of the pension scheme by injecting a man of that age into it, we are prepared to appropriate a sum of money sufficient to make a Grant-in-Aid to the fund to restore the actuarial balance created by the man's excessive age". I believe there will be very few cases, but I think it would be a humiliating thing for us all if there was a single individual in this country who had the right to say to us: "I was not too old when you wanted me; but now that it is a matter of making full provision for me——"

I do not think there is anything about pensions in this Estimate.

"Emergency gratuities and re-enlistment bounties". I suppose the emergency gratuities are for men going out.

One of the schemes is——

I thought the Deputy was advocating the admittance of these men of a certain age to a pension scheme.

We have gratuity schemes to help men to get into the Civil Service, the Excise, etc. One of the difficulties is that the regulations which are being made for these special examinations for outgoing men——

For admittance to the Civil Service?

——are leaving the old men out on the ground that, because they are over the maximum age for admittance to a pension scheme, they will upset the actuarial balance of the scheme. Where a man of 40 or 45 passes an examination for a service into which he can be fitted but for this actuarial difficulty, I suggest that the Minister for Defence should have the right to say: "If you can fit him in on every other ground, then we will appropriate £100, £200 or £400 and pay it into the fund as compensation for the number of years by which this man exceeds the maximum at which a person ought nominally to be admitted to the fund".

I will not go further than to invite the Minister to consider that and to make representations to the Minister for Finance. I think he would find in this House a pretty unanimous view that, if he had any difficulties with the Minister for Finance in getting that view accepted and had to have further recourse to this House, the Minister for Finance would find a unanimity of feeling which would compel him to make the concession which in this case, I think, fair justice demands.

Are we to assume that this sum of £707,000 odd represents the transition cost from emergency conditions to a peace-time basis? I do not believe that it does. Therefore, I think the Minister should tell the House what further sum he is likely to require to cover the transition period. Undoubtedly, further sums will be required for emergency gratuities, enlistment bounties, warlike stores, engineering stores, fuel, light, water, etc. I suggest to the Minister that he should tell the Dáil what further sum he anticipates he will require to put an end to the conditions brought about by the emergency.

Deputy Dockrell asked a question about warlike stores. The provision for them in the Estimate is £169,729. I assume that sum is required to cover purchases already made. Will the Minister say if the Department is definitely committed to the making of further such purchases, and, if so, what amount of money he will require?

Is the Minister fulfilling definitely and absolutely all his undertakings for the purchase of war material during the war years? It seems to me that he would be well advised to adopt Deputy Dillon's suggestion, namely, to try to get out of some of those undertakings or contracts that he entered into during the emergency. It is quite conceivable that, by the time a lot of this material is supplied, it will be regarded as obsolete for modern warlike purposes.

There is an item of £59,537 for fuel, light and water in kind and fuel oils. In regard to fuel, it was rather difficult to understand the explanation which the Minister offered to the Dáil yesterday. He said that, on account of the reduction in the personnel of the Army, men could not be set aside to produce hand-won turf for the Army. The Minister still has an Army of 23,000 men, and surely enough men could be set aside for this work, thereby reducing to a considerable extent this sum of £59,000 odd. Part of it is required to pay the contract price of the turf required by the Army. I think the Minister would find it very difficult to convince the Dáil that, with an Army of 23,000 men, it was still necessary for him to spend a large sum of money on contract turf. He could have saved the unfortunate taxpayers a good deal of money if he had followed the practice pursued in the last three or four years of getting the men in the Army to produce the hand-won turf.

There is the sum of £39,000 for the purchase of military lands. I presume that the intention is to purchase land for the erection of aerodromes. I would imagine that we have sufficient accommodation for aerodromes at the present time and that the Minister could very well afford to defer this until conditions had become more normal: until he had an opportunity of adjusting his policy to normal peace-time conditions. The Minister has made no attempt to justify the expenditure of that money. In conclusion, I would like the Minister to give the Dáil an indication of what further sums of money he will require for the purpose of meeting the expenditure under the different sub-heads in the Estimate. Will he require another £707,000, or another £1,000,000 or £2,000,000? Does he expect to have to approach the Dáil with further Supplementary Estimates, or is it his intention to make provision for all his expenditure in his main Estimate and to set out the details in the Book of Estimates?

I observe that there is no sub-head in the Supplementary Estimate for the resettlement of demobilised men.

As the Deputy has said, there is no sum set aside for that purpose. Therefore, that matter may not be raised.

It arises really on Army conditions. I would be obliged if something could be done about it.

I had a better case than, I think, the Deputy has, and I was not able to get away with it.

The difficulty, as I said before, is that if one Deputy were to stray in one direction there would be several straying in other directions. There must be the same law for all.

In the statement which the Minister made last night, in presenting this Estimate to the House, it was quite erroneous for him to suggest that the Estimate presented at the beginning of the year was based on a plan to reduce the Army during the year. There was, at any rate, the suggestion in his statement that an Estimate was presented which contemplated that the Army would be reduced by certain numbers as from July last, and that this Estimate is being presented because, for one reason or another, the Army was not reduced in the way contemplated. The Estimate that was presented to the House in the beginning of last year was based upon the fact that the Minister and the Army authorities considered that the emergency, so far as the Army was concerned, would last for the whole of the 12 months that the Estimate was to run. The Minister, when presenting his Estimate to the House on 21st June, 1945—the reference is column 1437—said:—

"When last November the Estimate for the Army Vote for the financial year 1945-46 was being prepared, it did not seem unlikely that the emergency, so far as the Army was concerned, would last another year and, accordingly, the Estimate was compiled and printed in the form with which Deputies have become familiar for the past four years."

It was also printed for the amount that it was estimated would be required to continue the Army in circumstances in which the emergency lasted over the 12 months. According to the statement made by the Minister, as reported in the Irish Press of to-day, his words were as follows:—

"Moving a Supplementary Estimate of £707,141 for the Army and Army Reserve, in the Dáil yesterday, Mr. Oscar Traynor, Minister for Defence, said that in the annual Estimate it had been pre-supposed that demobilisation would begin in July, but that, in fact, it did not begin until November, with the result that 23,616 soldiers were now being maintained instead of 22,249, as anticipated."

There was no suggestion at all in the Estimate, as prepared, that a reduction would take place like that, but when the Minister was introducing the Estimate, he indicated that a certain reduction would take place, and we now find ourselves presented with a Supplementary Estimate, the effect of which is that in respect of sub-head A —pay of officers, cadets, N.C.O.'s and men—the Estimate presented to the House in June last, and prepared at the beginning of the year, was short by three months' pay for the whole of an emergency Army. One would have imagined that an Estimate prepared for an emergency year for the Army would have something left to spare out of the Estimate for the payment of officers, men, and so on, who have not yet been demobilised; but we are now being asked to vote three months' pay: that is, we are being asked to vote one-fourth of the amount that we have already voted for that purpose; we are being asked to vote one-sixth of the amount, that has been already voted, for marriage allowances, and one-sixth of the amount already voted for the pay of civilians attached to military units.

Now, I do not want to go into a general discussion on this Supplementary Estimate, although there are things in it that would warrant a general discussion. However, I do not want to have a general discussion on the matter now, in view of the fact that we will have a Defence Forces Bill coming in shortly, in which we will have the whole question of the Army under dission, but I do ask for some statement from the Minister that would be more in relation to the actual facts than has been given so far, particularly with regard to the under-estimation that has occurred here, and the additional expense that took place during the year. Again, I would ask the Minister why, when it was clear that the Army could be reduced after the 31st July last, the reduction did not take place, and I would also ask why, in a year in which the world war was just over, we should, without any discussion of defence policy of any kind, be buying lands for additional military barracks or additional aerodromes that we were able to get on without during the years of war. In that connection, I would also ask the Minister whether the moneys that are estimated for here for additional military lands—£29,605— have been already paid, or has he any explanation to give to the House as to why he paid that amount, involving commitments in the buying of lands for the Army, or why, in our present circumstances, he did that without referring the matter to the House here? If these sums are not already paid, then I oppose their payment. The question of the provision of warlike stores has already been raised, but I submit to the Minister, in connection with any application he made to other countries for arms during the emergency, that if these arms were not supplied during the emergency, there is no contract binding on us to take them now.

During the week, I and other Deputies asked questions about men being discharged from the Army as medically unfit and who expressed their dissatisfaction about the findings of the board.

Perhaps the Deputy would postpone that matter to the next Vote, which is the Vote for Army Pensions.

I thought, Sir, that it would come under this.

No; it would come under Army Pensions, which is the next Vote.

I thought that this had to do with provision for additional medical men as officers.

What part of the Supplementary Estimate is this, Deputy?

Only under the heading of additional pay of officers, and so on, and I thought that that might include additional medical officers coming in. That is why I wanted to refer to it.

I thought that it would mean additional men coming in, who might be able to deal with the cases of men who were crippled by rheumatism or other diseases, contracted as a result of their service. I shall not press the point now, but I would ask the Minister to give reconsideration to the question of appointing a further board, before which these people can go with a view, if possible, to having such cases reconsidered.

I think, Sir, that the best way in which I can approach the subject of the discussion here to-day is to take the Deputies in the order in which they spoke, because a number of Deputies more or less repeated the same type of argument or made the same type of complaint. I feel that I am not expected to speak on Army policy on a Supplementary Estimate. That can be more appropriately and more effectively done on the annual Estimate, and therefore I shall deal with the questions as they arose. Deputy Cosgrave appeared to have some difficulty in respect of the use of the Grant-in-Aid. He appeared to think that the Grant-in-Aid was also some form of gratuity. The Grant-in-Aid is that sum of money which was allotted to the L.D.F. when it was initiated, and it is divided into two sums: one, I think, of 15/-, used for the provision of boots, and the other of 5/-, used for administrative purposes. There is no question of a gratuity in respect of the L.D.F., which is a purely voluntary defence force and which, I sincerely hope, will continue to remain a purely voluntary defence force.

Deputy Cosgrave also raised the question of the apparent falling down in the matter of the demobilisation of the Army. In my opening statement I explained that we did hope to have begun demobilisation in July last, but we were unable to do that by reason of the fact that the Army authorities were endeavouring to make plans whereby they would be enabled to recruit a large number of men who were already serving in the emergency forces. They were unable to complete these plans before November and from November, when the demobilisation of the Army began, the average number of men demobilised exceeded the figure which we estimated: that is, the figure of 2,000 per month. It exceeded that figure; in some months it almost reached a total of 3,000, but, on an average, I think it can be safely assumed that 2,000 per month was exceeded. My statement that we would endeavour to demobilise at the rate of 2,000 per month was, more or less, adhered to, with the exception of a couple of months which were lost while the Army were making their plans to deal with the enlistment in the regular forces of men who served during the emergency.

Deputy Cosgrave and some other Deputies referred to the Soldiers' Club. That club is not run for profit. It has, of course, to ensure that its running expenses will be secured. Generally speaking, the goods, which are of the type which could be purchased outside, are sold at a lower price than would have to be paid in outside establishments, so that there is no question of the Soldiers' Club being run for profit. It is run in the interest of the comfort of men who have either to spend a short time in town or who are passing through town to some other centre. It is also of service in securing that men will not get into wrong hands during the period of their stay in town and it has done very valuable work in that respect.

A number of Deputies referred to the question of warlike stores. It seemed to me that Deputies assumed that all the intelligence of the country was in this House and that there was none in the Army. When it became fairly clear that the war was coming to a conclusion, the Army cancelled all the orders they had placed. They did not wait to be told to do that. They used their intelligence and common-sense and they cancelled large orders, placed during the war years, which they would have been very glad to have had executed during those years. Certain stores were still urgently required and those are the stores mentioned in the Supplementary Estimate. I mentioned, in the course of my statement, that they consisted largely of armoured vehicles, guns and carriages, generator sets, parts for universal carriers, parts for rifles and machine guns, motor cycle parts, and miscellaneous small items. There was no question of purchasing obsolescent or obsolete material. The material we purchased was badly needed and we were glad to secure it.

I want to tell the House, whatever they may feel regarding the purchase of warlike stores in the future, that the Army is at present under-equipped. If we are to have an Army and a Local Defence Force, we shall have to equip them. The alternative is for this House to tell the Government that it does not want an Army or that it wants the Army to be greatly reduced. If we are to equip the Army, we must equip it with the most up-to-date weapons we can secure. That is why we cancelled the orders which we had placed. We knew that, while the equipment we were seeking was the best available at the time, with the cessation of war, minds would be turned to the manufacture of more up-to-date equipment. That is why we held our hand. The Army is sadly under-equipped and we shall have to see to it that it is properly equipped if we are to continue to maintain an Army.

Deputy Morrissey spoke of the building of new barracks at Limerick. Deputy Cosgrave referred to the purchase of land at Baldonnel and Fermoy. In that connection, I should state that it was not correct for me to say that the land obtained at Fermoy was for the purpose of an aerodrome runway. It was for the purpose of extending the present encampment at Fermoy, which is the training centre for the units in the South. It is correct to say that the land at Baldonnel was purchased for the extension of the runways. That has become vitally necessary by reason of the fact that we have machines now which require a greater extent of ground when they are landing and when they are taking off. That is because of the size of the machines. Deputy Cosgrave asked what the cost per acre was. At Baldonnel, the average cost was £63. At Fermoy it was, I think, £104. As regards the building of barracks outside Limerick, the position is that we have a small barracks in Limerick which is very antiquated. It needs a number of modern improvements. During the emergency, we had about 20 different establishments in the Limerick area. These were private property which we had to take over. A number of these houses were ill-fitted to house human beings at all.

I felt rather ashamed of the fact that we had to house men in such establishments but, in the course of time, the men converted these establishments into something which was reasonably comfortable and reasonably habitable. Yet they were far from the type of establishment that any Deputy here would suggest as good enough for men who had offered their services—and many of the men who had offered their services came from decent comfortable homes. I feel that, while there might be some good reason for men having to suffer in such circumstances when we were passing through a severe emergency period, there is no reason in the future why we should continue to ask them to live under conditions in which none of us here would be prepared to live. That is why we purchased the land in Limerick for the purpose of erecting a barracks in the near future. Unfortunately it cannot be done for some years, I understand, but the money which is being expended and which is referred to in this Estimate, has been and is being used, for the purpose of introducing sewerage and water on the site. At present we have erected quite a number of huts for the purpose of housing the men whom we have taken in from these outlying buildings.

Am I to take it that the barracks to which the Minister referred as a small barracks, is Sarsfield Barracks?

Yes, it is a small barracks and it is generally understood to be small. It is generally understood not to be equipped in the way we would like it to be equipped. I am not saying that it is ill-equipped because, even in the case of the houses to which I have referred, before the military left them we had installed in some cases not only water and a sewerage system but even a lighting system. The same applies to Sarsfield Barracks in Limerick. I think Deputy Morrissey will agree with me—I do not want to misrepresent him—that while we all have our own views in respect to ordinary civilians whom we are anxious to rescue from slum conditions, we are just as anxious to see that our soldiers are not compelled to live in slum conditions. Unfortunately—I say unfortunately because the circumstances were there and we could not overcome them at the time—a very large number of those who had been living in decent comfortable homes had to exist in conditions which must certainly have shocked them. I am suggesting that we must ensure that that will not happen again.

Before we pass from that, I think we should be told by the Minister whether the building of a decent barracks has any connection with a post-war defence policy.

We can debate the question of policy any time the Deputy likes.

When we get the new Army Bill, I hope the Minister will.

I shall take that question any time the Deputy wishes.

We expect the Minister to tell us what the post-emergency policy is.

I certainly thought we had enough military barracks in the country anyway.

Does the Deputy or any of the Deputies over there—I know Deputy O'Higgins has already expressed the view that the post-war Army which we propose, 12,500 men, is too large——

Far and away.

Well, if that is the Deputy's view it is not the Government's view and the Government has the responsibility of ensuring the safety of this nation. While Deputies may believe that their view is correct and that the Government view is wrong, it is the Government's view, with the majority in this House behind it, which will have to stand.

I should like to ask the Minister is it part of the Government's post-war policy that is being implemented by the building of new barracks and the acquiring of land for which money is being asked in this Supplementary Estimate?

Partly, yes, because we shall have an Army that will be almost twice as large as the pre-war Army and we shall have to ensure that there will be living accommodation, suitably to house these men. In Limerick I understand the military authorities were foolish enough in the past to hand over barrack sites to the civil authorities. I know that the same thing has happened in several other provincial towns. The military authorities regretted that very much during the war but they could do nothing about it. When I say that it is partly part of the post-war policy, I mean that we believe we must maintain an Army of 12,500 men.

In fairness to the Minister, may I say that I did not intend to oppose the Supplementary Estimate but if this Estimate is based on a post-war policy of an Army of 12,500 men, then I oppose this Supplementary Estimate? The Minister should understand that. I mention that now so that the Minister may address himself to any aspects of the Estimate that he may consider important.

Am I to understand that the Deputy says that because we are to have an Army of 12,500 men, he is opposing this Estimate?

If as part of the Minister's policy he is building new barracks in Limerick or planning to build new barracks and that he is asking money for that purpose in this Supplementary Estimate as part of a new policy that the House has not heard of, then I oppose this Estimate.

That would not be a correct assumption.

The Minister was called upon to conclude.

He is only beginning. He has only let the cat out of the bag now.

We are looking for information.

I am not objecting to imparting information genuinely asked for.

It is usual to put questions to the Minister when he has concluded.

May I say that questions may be put to the Minister any time that the Minister is gracious enough to answer them, as he has been in this debate? Questions put to the Minister in that way can be a help to the Minister and a help to the House at the same time.

All I can say on that matter is that the actual building of the barracks has nothing to do with post-war policy but it is to ensure, as I said a moment ago, that the larger Army which we intend to have and which we hope to have, will be properly accommodated and housed. Deputy Norton referred to rumours which he had heard about recruitment. Unfortunately, recruitment is not as satisfactory as I, or the Army authorities, would like it to be. I think the Deputy referred to the fact that a very large number of young men were leaving the country, going up to the North or across to England to join the army there, the suggestion being that conditions were more attractive or something of that kind.

I said that a substantial number were leaving, whom I should like to see staying here and joining our Army.

It is my personal opinion that these young men are going abroad in a spirit of adventure. It is not that they do not want to serve Ireland or anything like that. Some of the rumours—I hear rumours like the Deputy—are to the effect that numbers of these young men are men who had given service to this country throughout the emergency.

And the adventure they want is work.

No, they are not looking for work. They want to join the army. The allegation is that they are joining the British Army. It may be that they will get more work in that army than they get in ours. The allegation is not that they are looking for work but that they are going away up north and joining the British Army. The British Army can provide that type of adventure, which we cannot—they can send these young men abroad, so far afield that it probably has some appeal to them. I do not know if the conditions to which I was referring a few minutes ago may have had anything to do with the failure of our own Army to recruit them. I do not think so, because the conditions improved considerably as the years passed during the emergency. I do say that conditions in the Army in the future will have to be improved still further. I do not want to forecast anything, but while I am acting as Minister for Defence, for whatever period that may be, however long or however short, I will do everything possible to impress on the Government the necessity to make a soldier's career at least as attractive as that of an ordinary working man.

Increase the married quarters.

If we can make it as attractive as that, we will be getting somewhere, but I can still feel that there may be strong objections raised in this House to the added expenditure which will be incurred as a result. We have to be realists in this and the fact remains that, if we want to attract the right type of intelligent young man to the Army, we will have to ensure that his conditions will be as good as the conditions existing outside.

He wants to get married. Will the Minister increase the married quarters and pay him better wages?

Deputy Norton raised the question of the marriage establishment. We made a very great advance during the emergency on the conditions that existed formerly. The Deputy knows that himself, as he was a member of the Defence Conference at the time, and was one of those advocating that particular policy. We advanced to the stage where we reduced the age from 26 to 22 and we asked that the man would have at least two years' service before he would be given permission to marry. I do not think there was anything wrong in that. It was a rather generous gesture, but I know what Deputy Byrne has in mind. The type of people who go to Deputy Byrne are those who cannot come within the regulations. They appeal then to his sentiments, and he brings the matter up here. If a man takes the risk of marrying outside the regulations, he will have to take the risk—that is all there is about it. We have made it very clear that any young man, from the age of 22, who has two years' service, is entitled to go on to the marriage establishment. That is an emergency measure, which I hope to incorporate in the post-war regulations, though I have not got sanction to do it yet. I believe it is as far as we will be able to go. We will have the matter examined, to see if we can go even further than that, but I cannot make any statement on that question at the moment.

I had a talk with Deputy Dillon on the subject matter which he discussed here to-day. I promised him then, and I promise him now, that we will bring the matter to the attention of the Minister for Finance, in the hope that the Minister may accede to his request. However, as I informed the Deputy on that occasion, the decision was a Government decision, and one which neither I nor the Minister for Finance could overrule without the sanction of the Government being sought and granted.

I am not too sure as to what was in Deputy Roddy's mind when he was talking about these sums being repeated. The sums we are asking for in this Supplementary Estimate are the sums we deem to be sufficient to carry us through this present financial year. Some of those sums will have to be repeated; for instance, the question of gratuities will have to be carried on probably into the next Estimate. The sum we are asking for here will not have to be repeated, but if additional sums are required before the end of the financial year—and I cannot see any possibility of that happening—I will just have to come here again and ask for another supplementary sum.

Deputy Mulcahy spoke about the large sums of money here. I have to admit frankly that there was failure to estimate accurately; in other words, there was an underestimation in a large number of items. When you are dealing with matters of this kind, with very large sums involved, it is very easy to overestimate or underestimate. Very often, it is largely just a guess, getting as near as you can go to what you require. In this case, undoubtedly, there was a number of items underestimated.

What about the Medical Appeal Board? The Ceann Comhairle allowed me to refer to it.

That is a statutory body, and I cannot interfere with it. As I mentioned on a former occasion, the board consists of a civilian chairman and two medical referees.

But is there not a further board, a higher court, to which an aggrieved person can appeal?

No. I presume that the person the Deputy has in mind failed on the first occasion to produce sufficient medical evidence to induce the board to believe that the wound, injury or disease was caused through military service. If he failed on that occasion and can produce now additional medical testimony to say that, in the opinion of whoever is writing the medical testimony, this illness was brought about as a result of service, it will be reconsidered and examined on appeal.

The Minister said that four months were lost between July and November, while plans were being made to deal with the enlistment of emergency men in the permanent forces. Can the Minister say what the difficulty was?

The difficulty was largely in respect to the drawing up of forms which the individuals would have to sign. It was a kind of secondary contract. There were, I am pretty certain, numerous other difficulties which arose as well, but that was one of the chief difficulties which, when I inquired, was mentioned to me.

Was it one of the chief difficulties that causes us to be voting £1,000,000 now, that it took the Army four months to draw up some forms?

That is not correct. The Deputy is forgetting about other items that are there.

The explanation is not very voluminous.

Vote put and declared carried.
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