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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 7 Mar 1946

Vol. 99 No. 17

Committee on Finance. - Defence Forces (Temporary provisions) Bill, 1946—Second Stage.

I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. The Bill provides for the continued operation of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts until 31st March, 1947. A number of additional provisions have also been found necessary or desirable. Some of these, however, are merely by way of consolidation or amplification of existing Defence Forces legislation and others are already contained in Emergency Powers Orders. The latter are now being incorporated in the Defence Forces Acts because they will still be necessary on the expiration of the Emergency Powers Acts.

The contents of the Bill are explained in the memorandum which has already been circulated and as the memorandum sets out the purpose of each section, it is only necessary for me in this statement to refer to the provisions briefly. Sections 3, 9 and 14 are being introduced in the interests of the members of the Defence Forces to whom they relate. Sections 4, 5 and 15 are rendered necessary by the establishment of the new Second Line Reserve (An Forsa Cosanta Aitiúil) and by the conditions of service in that force which will include voluntary local training and retention by the members of their uniforms and equipment at home. The principles underlying Section 13, which relates to desertion during a period of emergency and is based on the Emergency Powers (No. 362) Order, 1945, have already been fully discussed by the Dáil. Sections 16, 17, 18 and 19 repeat existing provisions of the Defence Forces Acts, with an additional provision, already contained in an Emergency Powers Order, regarding the dyeing or conversion of service textile articles and with a new provision prohibiting the wearing of the uniform of the Defence Forces in circumstances likely to bring contempt on the uniform. Section 21 incorporates the provisions of the Emergency Powers (No. 17) Order, 1939, relating to the wearing of foreign uniforms, with an exemption in respect of theatrical performances. It is the international practice for States to restrict the wearing of foreign uniforms within their territories.

The other sections of the Bill are mainly of an administrative nature. It will, I think, be agreed that, on the whole, the provisions of the Bill are in no way contentious.

In view of the remarks made by the Minister in discussing the Estimate which came before this Bill as to his desire, willingness and anxiety on any occasion to give us a full account of Army policy, the statement we have just listened to is nothing short of amazing. Here we have an Army Bill introduced, with a view to putting it through the House—an Army Bill at the end of a war which lays down the conditions for the times of peace following that war. On the occasion of the Estimate last summer, the Minister, quite casually, and so far as this House was concerned, without any previous notice or discussion, announced that his post-war Army would be at least two and a half times as great as the Army required before the war. He was pressed then to give any reason or reasons for that decision, and I rise now to issue the same invitation.

The reason for a bigger Army is not just asking for the money; the reason for a bigger Army is not just the Minister coming in and saying: "We have decided to have a bigger Army; the general staff has decided to have a bigger Army." Any Minister coming here to look for a much larger Army, an Army 250 per cent. greater than sufficed this country at a time when the Minister, the Taoiseach and his colleagues were denouncing the then Government for having an Army twice too large and twice too expensive, must be prepared to detail the reasons for seeking that bigger Army. Now we are to have an Army two and a half times as great, and four times as expensive, and we are to vote for that Army without any reason whatever being given beyond the fact that the Minister asks for it. Surely we do not have an Army merely for the sake of having an Army. Surely we do not have an Army for the sake of giving employment. It is the most expensive, the most unproductive, the most parasitic type that could possibly be devised for giving employment. A country has an army because it requires it, and knows the reason why it requires it. Either the army is the strength of X or XX or XXX, but if the strength of X goes up three times, then it is because there is some new, some real and more imminent danger.

No country trebles the strength of its army merely because a Minister comes in and casually says: "In our reorganisation we require an Army two and a half times as great as it was before." The most docile Parliament in the world, a Parliament made up of regimented followers, would always get a reason for a departure from what existed previously, and for the placing of new burdens on the backs of taxpayers. In the past, when the Minister's Party were over on these benches, the military policy of this country—and it was stated not once but many times—was that if there was any occasion for an Army Estimate, or for the reintroduction of the Army Bill, there was no side-stepping by the Minister in clearly laying down the Army plan, the policy which the Army was built to uphold. Deputy de Valera, as he then was, Deputy Lemass, Deputy MacEntee, one by one, challenged the Minister's statement on Army policy; why the strength of that Army was 5,000 men, and the cost about £1,500,000. I read these speeches. A number of them were very sound, very helpful, gave evidence of careful consideration and very close study. The gist of every one of these speeches, particularly those delivered from these benches by Deputy de Valera, was that this country could not, and should not, be asked to support an Army that would cost any more than £1,000,000. Deputy MacEntee went much further. His figure was that the maximum expenditure which this country should be asked to put up for an Army was £500,000, while the Tánaiste, as he is now, in his most recent speech on the subject, held that our military requirements and our military establishments could, and should, be met for well under the figure of £1,000,000. These debates went on year after year from 1927 to 1932.

The Minister for Defence in the previous Government stated clearly on every occasion the purpose for which that Army was kept. It was the considered opinion of the Executive Council that that Army should be maintained for a figure of about £1,000,000 a year. The purpose of the Army, they stated, was to meet any general attack on these isles, and if there was a general attack on both of these isles, to have a trained, effective, highly-skilled nucleus, that could act in co-operation with the two other services of Great Britain, if they were attacked, and in addition to reinforce, as every army does, the authority of the civil power. The aim at that time was to have a very small, highly-trained, specialised Army, mainly composed of technical men, whose training would be slow and arduous; an Army so highly efficient and so highly trained that a private in that tiny Army would be capable of becoming a non-commissioned officer if the occasion arose, when it had suddenly to expand. Beyond that tiny Army of 5,000 men so highly trained and so highly efficient that they would be fit for two or three other ranks, there were 1, 2 or 3 lines of reserve, so as to make an Army that could very rapidly expand. There you had a hard core of highly-trained and efficient officers and soldiers. That was the plan before Dáil Eireann at that time. That was the policy clearly and frankly announced to Dáil Eireann. It was sneered at by some, jeered at by others but, in fact, supported by the most thoughtful members of what then constituted the Opposition.

There was general agreement with regard to the scheme, with regard to policy, and with regard to the plan, but there was an acute difference of opinion on two points, the cost and the size. Deputy de Valera held then that the cost, in the neighbourhood of £1,000,000 per annum, was entirely beyond the capacity of this country. Deputy MacEntee held that £500,000 was sufficient. Both of them, as well as every one of their colleagues then on these front benches, denounced the idea of keeping an army as great in numbers as 6,000. Except with regard to numbers and cost, there was general agreement with regard to the outlook, the plan and the policy. The only difference between the Parties at that time was that those who are now the Government considered £1,000,000 too high, and those, apparently, gave most consideration to the matter. I suggest that the speeches that appear to have given it most consideration and study were those delivered by Deputy Lemass. He asked this Dáil bluntly: Why do we keep a standing Army? For what? We are an isle and a tiny isle. We are not going to be invaded by Great Britain. Where is there any power that is going to invade us? If any power does invade us, remember that power has to be mighty enough to burst its way through the British Navy to land on the shores of this country. If such a situation arose, that would mean that it is a really mighty power, a really great power and that, if it is a really great power which has invaded our shores, then it is nonsense to have the greater part of our strength in uniform, modelled on a European army, and attempting to give battle. Our only hope, our only chance of carrying on the struggle, is to have trained soldiers away in the background, not in barracks, not in an Army, so as to make it unprofitable for the invader, after he invades, to remain on the island. But, he argued, if you put all your strength into a big Army against a power that has burst through the British Navy, that can land troops all round your coast, your Army is a besieged Army from the word "go", and all your equipment, all your material and all your fighting men are like rats in a trap. He said, doubtless they will fight bravely; they might fight bravely for three days, I will even say they might fight for three weeks, but then they are broken and the spirit of the country is broken, and that is an end of the country. That was his argument.

Is that a quotation?

Give it to him.

I will give the Minister the quotation. As a matter of fact, I was summarising in order to save the Minister the time it takes to read out but I will give it to the Minister. If he has any reason to doubt it, I will give it to him word for word, and I will also give him the Taoiseach word for word. Deputy Lemass said, column 1177, Dáil Debates, 1st May, 1929—Vol. 29:—

"We are weak in man power. Our population is only 2,900,000, our man power is very low. We have got to take these facts into account, and taking these facts into account certain things are obvious, leaving for a moment out of consideration all questions of the possibility of war or strained relations between ourselves and Great Britain, and considering that the present political relationship between the two countries will continue.

The first obvious fact that faces us is this, that any nation that invades this country will be one strong enough to defeat the British Navy, on the seas, because it is quite obvious that while present relations continue, at any rate Britain will not tolerate any other power establishing herself militarily here without resistance. I hope Deputies from all parts of the House will agree with that proposition. It indicates at any rate that such military opposition as we would have to face is likely to be very formidable. Any nation or power strong enough to beat the British on the seas and likely to invade this country in such strength is one that we could not hope to beat. The policy of the Executive Council, according to the Minister for Defence, is to maintain here an Army sufficiently strong and sufficiently effective to make an invader think twice before he decides to invade this country. Deputy Wolfe has just enunciated the same principle in other words—an Army sufficiently strong that if attacked we could keep the enemy at bay for some time until assistance came to us from our allies no matter where our allies might be.

The consequence of that policy must be fairly fully considered by the Dáil if it is going to express its satisfaction with it. We have, I think, to admit that if we are going to be invaded by an overwhelming force, by some power or combination of powers, the strength of it will be such that we cannot hope for military victory. In fact there is no nation within striking distance of us with whom we could engage in war, with any hope of military victory. I think that is agreed. What would be the effect, therefore, of our offering resistance to the invaders who will come in the strength indicated? Merely to hold them at bay sufficiently long until assistance comes to us from some place. What will be the effect of keeping here an Army strong enough to make the invader think twice before he invades when the invasion has actually occurred? I think it is quite obvious that any damage that we could possibly inflict upon such an invader would be certainly not greater than the damage which the invader could inflict on us.

It is an old maxim of military science, first enunciated by Napoleon, that God fights with the big battalions and God would be with the big battalions against us. Also the war would be fought upon territory of this State and, consequently, the civilian population would suffer just as much as the Army would suffer. The Army would probably disappear altogether after a few battles. We would undoubtedly delay the enemy for a few days, perhaps for a few weeks. We would inflict a certain amount of damage upon him, but on the other hand, we would have so affected the fighting resources, the manpower of this country, that any idea of continued resistance to that enemy's presence in the country would be out of the question for another generation. If we attempted to offer effective military resistance to any invader of the type that we are ever likely to encounter other than Britain, we would be only dissipating our strength by a futile demonstration".

Then he goes on to say:—

"I do not think that it is necessary that we should spend £1,500,000 yearly in order to ensure that that resistance will take place. If the spirit of the people is right, if they want to resist aggression and to maintain their independence, resistance will come..."

From that he goes on to point out what a crushing and unjust burden on the backs of the taxpayers it is to ask for a sum of £1,000,000 a year, and he points out that that is equivalent to a tax of 11/9 per head of the population of this country. He winds up by saying:—

"Personally, I would say that £1,000,000 is the most we are able to spend upon defence."

If the Minister wants further quotations as to matters I referred to, I have them here.

I think, in the Deputy's own interests, if he is going to quote, he should quote from the official document, rather than give colourful excerpts of his own.

That, I am perfectly prepared to do. I am thinking of the Minister's time and the time of the House. I am prepared to read out the statement of Deputy de Valera, from beginning to end, driving home the same points that were made there, that an Army costing £1,000,000 a year is unthinkable and an unjust burden on the people of this country and that the plan of having a standing Army is not a plan suitable to the defence of this country.

What is the date of the quotation the Deputy has read from Deputy Lemass's speech?

1st May, 1929. The date of the other that I referred to is the 16th November, 1927. In 1927 the Army Estimate was £1,900,000. Deputy de Valera's contention was that that expenditure had got to be reduced by at least £1,000,000.

Column and volume, please?

Column 1453, 16th November, 1927, Volume 21. He was speaking to an amendment to the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) (No. 2) Bill, 1927. The amendment which he proposed, and which was supported by every member of his Party in the division lobby, was to this effect:-

"To delete all the words after ‘That', and add the words: ‘The Dáil declines to give a Second Reading to a Bill having for its purpose the continuance of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, 1923 to 1927, but is of opinion that the Defence Forces should be organised before March 31st, 1928, on a volunteer territorial basis, with a small permanent training and maintenance establishments.'"

That was the view of Deputy de Valera. That was the view of Deputy Lemass. That was the view expressed by every member of the then Fianna Fáil front bench who is a member of the Government or of the Government Party at the present moment. The view was that £1,000,000 extracted from the pockets of the people of this country, was unjustifiable, that the retention of an Army of a strength of 5,000 or 6,000 men was fantastic and suicidal, that a volunteer force, with a tiny maintenance corps as the centre, costing between £500,000 and £1,000,000 was the only reasonable defence policy for this State. Those speeches were made at a time when they were denouncing a Government that presumed to ask the Dáil for authority to maintain an Army of 6,000 men at a cost of £1,000,000 a year.

Now I want to ask the Minister: is there any sincerity in the game; is there any honesty in the game? Or is it that you were all so many stupid nonentities a few years ago and that you have come to the use of reason since? Or was this some cheap political play-acting in order to embarrass the Government responsible for the safety of this State at that time? When denouncing an Army of 5,000 men as being the height of extravagance, as being suicidal nonsense, did you deliberately mean to strip this country and leave it naked in defence? Or is it that you come of a race that would only reach the use of reason in the 40's or 50's and that you had not reached the use of reason at the time when these were given as considered statements and when Deputy Lemass, as he was then, went so far as to say: "Remember, we are not talking without giving this very full and very careful and very anxious consideration. When we are talking here we are talking from the book; we are talking as a result of study"? As I say, at that time their view was that a cost of £1,000,000 for an Army was too heavy to call on the taxpayers to pay, that the maintenance of an Army of 5,000 or 6,000 men was only inviting swift defeat and that the cost should be less and the strength less.

Now we are asked for a standing Army of 12,500 men or two and a half times the strength that was denounced. We are asked to grant the money and approve of that Army without getting any reason whatsoever, without its being stated that the Army which had been denounced as too large and too costly would be insufficient for the postwar years ahead; without giving any reason why it is necessary to increase the strength by two and a half times and, presumably, the cost by three or four times. We have the Minister introducing this Bill for the 23rd time, a Minister belonging to a Government which denounced the previous Government for having the audacity to introduce a Bill year after year, and which asked in the noisiest way for an assurance each time that it would be the last time they would be asked to re-enact that Bill. We had the Bill introduced in the speech you have just listened to, without any reference to policy, without any reference to cost, without any reference to plans; but just telling us the few extra things that are in the Bill, such as making provision for solicitors' apprentices to get some period off their apprenticeship and for county managers to do the work of the Army in dealing with offenders; making provision that in peace times this extensive Army of two and a half times the strength of the pre-war Army will not even face up to the soldier's task of dealing with deserters, but will call on the various county managers to ensure discipline in the Irish Army.

We are providing for the handling of deserters for the next seven years and providing for solicitors' apprentices for an unknown number of years ahead under an Army Act that has only a life of one year, according to the terms of the Act itself. We are making provision for longer terms of enlistment. My lay mind would prompt me to the belief that the legality is doubtful of attesting people for ten or 12 years under an Army Act that itself has only a life of one year. What contract can you make with any one of these men that you attest for 12 years? The Act under which you attest them has only a life of one year. You are attesting them for 12 years. You are proposing to build barracks that will take years to build, and you are proposing to spend money by the million as if the rivers of this country were running with gold.

Will the Minister in this debate follow up his expressed desire to give the House a full statement of Army policy? Was there not some common-sense in some of the speeches that were made from those benches many years ago? Was it all nonsense? Was there one grain of common-sense in what was enunciated as the considered judgment of Deputy de Valera; was there any common-sense at all uttered by Deputy Lemass; was Deputy MacEntee uttering cheap nonsense when they all expressed their considered views as to what we could afford to spend on defence and what type of defence we should have?

Let us go back with positions reversed. Let us start by trying whether we can find agreement, not whether we can find disagreement. We have had the experience of the last five years when Britain went through the greatest war that the world ever saw with all kinds of difficulties and embarrassments; when her greatest danger was her Atlantic lifeline; when at times she was hopelessly trudging along, and when the greatest optimist could not see the slightest sign of light or any hope of success; when the temptation to invade us, so as to protect her lifeline and have greater control of her surplus stores and her great production, must have been very great. However, all these years of strife and difficulty passed and we were left alone. There was no suggestion of invasion from there. As a result of that new experience gained since these speeches were made then, I would agree absolutely with Deputy Lemass, as he then was, that we are a tiny island with a small population, unfortunately even smaller than at the time when he made these speeches; that the likelihood of invasion from that quarter is most unlikely, and that anybody else that attempts to invade us has to be strong enough to burst its way through the British Navy, and, consequently, has to be a great power. Any power strong enough to carry out with success the operation of bursting through the British Navy would unquestionably be a strong, formidable power, one of such dimensions and of such equipment that even the greatest Army we could throw up, could not meet it and defeat it in pitched battles; that our Army policy should be a policy of a very tiny Army costing in the neighbourhood of £1,000,000 a year, very highly trained and very specialised, with the youngest soldier sufficiently trained to be a senior N.C.O., with reserves of one kind and another outside, so that the Army could be rapidly expanded if the necessity arose.

So far, we have agreement, at least between the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste and the rest of us over here on the assumption that those speeches were not merely roguish bits of political dishonesty, but were sincere and honest speeches made, as was stated, as the result of close study. The Taoiseach, the Minister for Local Government, the Tánaiste and ourselves over here are in agreement, but the present Minister for Defence disagrees totally with the whole lot of us. He comes along asking for four times the sum that was required pre-war, four times the sum that was denounced as an unfair and unjust burden of taxation on the backs of the people. He asks for two and a half times the strength of an Army that was denounced as twice too great. He does that without giving any reason for the change of front, without pointing out any real danger and without giving us any plan. Surely, every Minister for War in the whole world in coming along with his Army Act, and in outlining the strength of his permanent force, has some idea as to why it has so many divisions. It is because the army across the border has twice that number, and he is prepared to point out, if the situation arose, where the army is likely to be called upon to operate, who it is likely to be called upon to operate against, and who it is likely to co-operate with.

Military policy, as well as foreign and external policy in every country, are so closely related that they cannot be divorced. Is it because the Minister and his executives have not made up their minds with regard to external policy; is it because they do not, in fact, know what their foreign policy is, that there is such a marked reluctance to outline the military policy? The Minister can take this assurance in advance—the last five years should have taught it to him if he had any doubts about it—that whenever a sound military policy is put forward with the intention of safeguarding this State, its independence and safety, and the security of the homes and lives of the people living in it, it will get wholehearted support from the Opposition Parties in this House, and from the particular Party that I am now speaking for. The Minister need not have any hesitation in announcing his policy, if he has one, through fear that it will be opposed over here. He has got every assurance and pledge that that has never been our attitude since we went into Opposition. We have never approved of spending money merely for the sake of spending money, of taxing the people merely for the sake of doing so, or having at any time, in peace or war, an unrequired large Army. That is bad for young men. They could be more usefully employed outside learning a trade. It is bad for them to have them clicking heels and forming fours around a barrack square. That sort of thing eats into the lives of many young men, and expenditure of that sort is entirely unproductive. In nine cases out of ten it is a type of employment that leads nowhere.

We are not going to support an Army two and a half times the strength of the pre-war Army, merely for the sake of having an Army two and a half times as great. We are not going to support such an Army merely to spend four times as much money as we spent heretofore. We are not going to approve of an Army of these alarming dimensions, purely for the sake of increasing taxation on the people, at a time when you have crying destitution and absolute want. You have people, faced with black despair in their hearts and tears in their eyes, border jumping and boat crossing every time a boat leaves Dun Laoghaire. You have them going among strangers, many of whom regard them as their traditional enemies. That is not the type of emigration that we had 20 years ago when our people went out to a greater Ireland beyond the seas, out to join their own people, their own friends, their own county men, and people of their own religion. One could say that almost every time they went out they met a relative, a friend or a Catholic priest. The emigration in recent years has been such that the people have not gone away with hope and joy in their hearts. They did not go out to join friends or relatives or old-time neighbours. Our emigrants went out with black despair in their hearts because economic circumstances drove them from the homes they loved. They crossed over to mix with black strangers so that they might be able to send home 10/- or £1 a week to keep the roof over the heads of their parents.

You have that kind of black destitution and that economic drive from the country. Perhaps a lot of it could have been avoided by the expenditure of £1,000,000 or £2,000,000 a year to improve wages, stimulate industry and increase production, thereby uplifting the low maintenance rates in many homes. When those cases are brought before Parliament, when there is a demand for £3,000,000 or even £1,000,000 a year, we have crocodile tears from the Government Front Bench—they have all the sympathy in the world with those poor people, living in those houses, half starved, inadequately clothed, and with every form of disease running like a rampant cancer through their families as a result of malnutrition and want. As I say, we have those crocodile tears from the Government Front Bench, but every one of the statements they make wind up with the remark: "We should like to do this, but we have not the money, and if we were to meet your claim, it would mean that we would have to put an extra tax on the butter, the bread, the sugar and the tea of the people"—the same old litany every time. When, however, it comes to expanding the Army to two and a half times the force that was considered by the military intellectuals to be aping Imperial power, when it comes to expanding the Army to over twice what was required in this little island in pre-war days, then there is no talk about taxing tea, bread, sugar and butter.

I remember, in the early days of Fianna Fáil, before they reached the age of the use of reason, a Ministerial colleague of the present Minister boasting from the Front Bench over there that certain other countries were buying guns instead of butter, but that we in this country were going to give our people butter instead of guns. Is it too severe to remind the Minister of the considered views expressed by his own colleagues? Is it too severe to remind him of the considered views expressed by his own Leader; and is it in any way unorthodox or unusual when we find the Minister departing completely from the views that were then expressed, trampling on the past of his own Party, trampling on the policies preached by his own Leader, and doing a sudden somersault that is going to send the hand of the tax-gatherer into the pockets of even the poorest people in the land? Is it anything unusual to ask the Minister, in those circumstances, what is the reason for this? Would he be kind enough to give the Dáil the reason for this, or to tell the Dáil what is the new danger that was not there all the time, or what is the new menace to our liberty? Will he tell us why the barracks that housed our soldiers cleanly and decently, six, seven and ten years ago, are not adequate to provide housing for our soldiers in the future? Are we to build barracks for phantom armies, or to build playthings for ceremonial armies—particularly at a time when another Minister tells us that we cannot build a cottage for people who are living in lean-to shacks up and down the country?

The Minister said that we have to be realists, and Deputy Lemass opened that speech, to which I have referred, with the very same words: "We have to be realists". I am afraid that the time has come when every one of us will have to be realists. The time is coming when the false kind of diseased prosperity that reaches some countries as a result of a world blood-bath—that kind of temporary prosperity that reaches some countries because of the misfortunes of others—will cease. That kind of false prosperity will not last for ever, and I prophesy this—and it is not safe, generally, in politics, to be a prophet—that we may be reckless with regard to millions of pounds to-day, that we may just think of a barracks and build it, that we may think of a sum and double it, that we may walk blithely through those Lobbies here and vote glibly on whether an extra £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 of the people's money should be spent, but before this Parliament has reached the end of its legal existence, a sum of £100,000, or even £50,000, is going to cause as much heart-burning both inside and outside this Parliament as £2,000,000, £3,000,000, or £4,000,000 does to-day. If we commit ourselves to expenditure on the magnificent scale now demanded by the Minister then it will not be even rational to face up to a debate in this House as to whether old age pensioners are or are not getting a livelihood out of 10/- a week: it will be nonsense to attempt to discuss such a subject in two or three years' time, if we fire away money in this way—lashings of it—without any reasons being given, without any increase in our population being demonstrated, without any increased strength in our area being shown or any increase in our territory, and without its being shown that there is any new danger to be faced, and when it seems to be evident that this new expenditure is merely for the sake of pomp and ceremonial.

The Minister says that this is the considered opinion of the General Staff. Now, the General Staff is doing its duty; it always did its duty; but does the Minister, who, it seems, is breaking down on this matter, realise what is the function of the General Staff? The General Staff in this country, as is the case with the General Staff in every country in the world, and as is the case with every officer in any army, wants more and more men and more and more supplies of stores and equipment. There was a time when I resisted conscientiously, in doing my job, any reduction in the corps for which I was responsible, but the Minister above me who was not the representative of the taxpayers, had to go to his colleague, who was responsible for taxation, and ask for money for that service—money which had to be got out of the pockets of the people —and he laid down for me and for others the sum to which we would have to cut our cloth. Now, supposing that that Minister came to the House and said that it was the considered opinion of the General Staff that that money should be provided, what would be the reaction of the House in normal times? The General Staff of any army of any country in the world always wants to increase the strength of the army, but that kind of mumbo-jumbo, that kind of talk about invisible phantom armies, that kind of cheap talk about defending our country against all comers, will not carry weight with the people in a time of peace.

The Minister hesitated to mention any "comer" that we might have to face, and even if he had named that "comer" he refused to lay down what we would require in order to defend ourselves. Now, that kind of thing is out of date. The Minister cannot do as he did in the past when, under the shadow of an emergency, the Dáil patriotically agreed, whether they believed in it or not, to allow expenditure on the Army to go on unchecked, but depending all the time on the Minister, as head of the Army, to safeguard, in time, the interests of the ordinary people and to endeavour to work back to pre-war conditions. Certainly, if there is to be an increase in the Army and in Army expenditure, we want to be given the reasons, and very full reasons, for that, and we want a free and frank discussion on the matter, and not this kind of penny-book that we can read for ourselves but which tells us nothing as to what is in the Minister's mind or in the minds of the Government.

Notice taken that 20, Deputies were not present; House counted and, 20 Deputies being present.

I thought it better to ask for a house. The Minister is introducing the Second Reading of the Defence Forces Bill. In November last, I put a question to the Minister for Defence. The answer gave the Defence Acts as the excuse for, I might say, not giving me information. The question was put on the 14th November, 1945. I asked the Minister for Defence "if he will state whether steps have been taken to appoint a large number of new officers to the permanent Defence Forces; and, if so, if he will say how many such appointments it is proposed to make, and the intended date of appointments." The then Minister for Defence replied:—

"As indicated in the White Paper on Demobilisation and Resettlement of Members of the Defence Forces, it is proposed to appoint approximately 600 officers to the permanent force. At this stage, however, I am not in a position to give specific information about the date or dates of appointment.

General Mulcahy: When is it proposed to ask for Parliamentary sanction for the expenditure involved?

Mr. Aiken: Estimates come up every year.

General Mulcahy: Is not the Minister aware that he is now offering, as it were, a career to an additional 600 men by inviting them to join the Army and does he not consider it would be advisable and necessary to get Parliamentary authority for such a plan before these young men are actually given their commissions in the Army?

Mr. Aiken: The legal authority to do it is provided in the Defence Acts."

Deputy O'Higgins has dealt with certain aspects of the proposal to have an Army two and a half times greater than it was pre-war. I think it is time that we came to discuss, as from to-day, our defence policy. The Army, as we have it, has grown up in a way which was dictated by events. The officers who have had, at any time, the responsibility for organising, maintaining and directing the Army have had a very difficult job. The Minister, by his attitude on Army policy to the House, is making their position absolutely impossible. He is degrading and demeaning the Army and putting it in a position in which, in the eyes of the House and of the people, it cannot but be prejudiced. We want whatever Army we have to be regarded as an indispensable institution of the State, serving a definite purpose and indicating a definite plan. At this hour of the world's history, we are told that we want an Army two and a half times greater than the Army we had before the war. The Minister gives us no information with regard to the arms, organisation or equipment of the Army or in regard to defensive policy in pursuance of which the Army would be used.

The Dáil, which regards itself as the custodian of the interests of the country, ought to take a serious interest in this question. What is the position to-day and what are likely to be our defence requirements in the coming five, eight or ten years? These are considerations that call immediately for consideration by the House and by the people of the country, directed in whatever way the Government, on one side, and the discussions in this House, on the other side, direct them. We have seen the world pass through a war in which it was made perfectly clear that not only the arms but the whole economic strength of a country are required if it is to defend itself. We have seen ourselves unable to support our normal population during that war because of the weakness of our economic resources. Thousands of our people went abroad to earn a living. They could have been fed here, but they could not procure occupation because of lack of resources or lack of an organised economic structure. Our man-power had to clear away. We found ourselves completely unable to equip our Army for anything but almost primitive defence purposes because we had not the resources to make the arms; we were dependent upon people outside for them. Thanks to Providence and to the strength of the two great Powers which were allies in their military operations and which flanked us, we were kept entirely free from the impact of war, except when it came from the air. In the development of that war we saw ourselves pass into a completely new world in which the whole outlook of even the biggest military Powers on army organisation, defensive measures and equipment was changed. None of them knows to-day what force they would require to have organised, or what equipment, offensive or defensive, they would require if the world got immersed in a war as widespread as was the last war.

We are not likely to be threatened by military invasion or attack of any kind for five, six or eight years. Put it at three years. Surely we ought to regard this as a period of pause when we can sit down and examine our defence problem without committing ourselves to any military organisation save the Army at present in being and the equipment we have. We could examine the problems of a defensive nature that are likely to come our way in future and see what kind of organisation we require to meet them.

It is, as I say, simply degrading the Army for the Minister to tell the Dáil that he wants an Army twice as big as that which we had before the war and that that is all he is going to tell us about it. We cannot afford to have the Army degraded in this country and in the light of the various points of view of which Deputy O'Higgins spoke, we cannot afford to have the Army regarded simply as an expensive ornament. Surely the Minister knows that, if we are attacked by a warlike enemy in future, we could not resist that enemy by the very small arms about which the Taoiseach spoke so lovingly some time ago at the Curragh. The Minister has only to consider the developments that have taken place in aerial warfare, both in bombers and fighters, apart from the developments that have taken place as a result of the discovery of the atomic bomb, to realise that the Army we have to-day would not be the slightest use in preventing our country being destroyed by the warring forces that another country might let loose on us. At such a period of our history, what is the Minister doing? He is clearing the older officers out of the Army, the men who have been there for years, and he is taking in young men who, just like many of the young men who left this country to get work, were not able to get work in this country in present circumstances. He is inveigling them into accepting commissions in the Army, mortgaging their whole future for some years in the Army without any hope of an economic future for many of them.

Deputy O'Higgins gave figures with regard to the Army of the past. If Deputies would look at the figures given, say in the 1931-32 Estimates, they will see that we had then an Army of 477 officers, 5,700 men and 750 short-time recruits, a total Army of 6,927. The Minister has stated now that he is taking in 600 young men as officers to the Army. Surely the Minister is acting terribly unjustly to many of these men? Surely he is acting terribly unjustly to many of the older men he is putting out of the Army under the regulations framed in 1938? An officer came to me a day or two ago. He had been in the quartermaster-general's service for many years as a quarter-master-sergeant. Having been in the Volunteers before, he joined the National Army in 1922. He served as a non-commissioned officer up to 1940. As he was in the quartermaster-general's service he was always anxious to be an officer and he became a lieutenant about 1941 or 1942. He was induced to do that because he felt that he would, as an officer engaged in quartermaster's work, have the extra ten years that the regulations then allowed him to have. He has been put out of the Army now at 45 or 46 years of age to maintain himself and his family on a pension of something like £2 a week.

I think the Minister has lost complete control over his judgment, and has lost any balanced outlook that he had on the Army. He told us here to-day that the reason why an Estimate was put before us for such an increased amount was that there was a delay in drafting forms to enable the emergency men to be enlisted in the Regular Army and that the difficulty in drafting forms and settling some technical matter in connection with them lasted for four months. The administrative control of the Army seems to have absolutely broken down. If there was any scrap of administrative control left, the Minister would not be asking the House to-day to consider a Defence Forces Bill without any statement of Army policy except the mere statement that the Government had come to the conclusion that they wanted an Army two and a half times as big after this war as they needed before it.

It would be a very disastrous thing if the Army or any matter connected with the defence of this country were drawn into the maelstrom of Party politics. There is absolutely no reason why it should. As Deputy O'Higgins said, anything that in a considered way may be required for the defence of this country, this Party, as well as every other Party in the House, will support. That has been absolutely and completely demonstrated during the emergency, more completely demonstrated than many people realise, and if there is any person or any Party who wants to suggest that Party considerations are going to be brought into defence matters by any Party in this House, now is the time to say it so that we can, in the calmness of the present moment, fully discuss it, but I suggest that for the next five years, no expenditure on Army organisation or Army equipment should be required or should be entered on except expenditure actually ensuing from the Army commitments we have for ourselves at the present moment.

A war has been fought which has exhausted the whole world. Great Britain and the United States have come militarily victorious out of that war. There is no possibility of their power being challenged in arms by any country in the world, within the next five or six years at any rate. There is no possibility of our being called upon to defend ourselves in any way during that time. The biggest countries in the world are endeavouring to make plans to provide an international force, subscribed to by the greatest countries, to maintain peace in the world. I do not think there is anybody who need despair at the present moment about that. Even if we tend to be isolationist in spirit, surely we should thank Providence that we are in our present position, when we see the political circumstances in the countries immediately around us and likely to affect us? Surely we should concentrate on our real needs and see where our country's real strength lies?

We have got into the habit of considering that our national strength lies in the military strength of our people. After the first World War we had to defend ourselves in arms against aggression from outside and at that time we had, through arms and through sacrifice in arms, to declare our determination to be free. That fact has become emphasised in the minds of people who are not associated with arms, who had not the chance to realise how much any real man hates to have to resort to arms to defend himself, or to attack anyone else. Our people generally have allowed themselves to be persuaded, very often in a masquerading kind of way, to believe in arms and in our martial spirit. In our gratitude to Providence for bringing our country safely through our difficulties during the shocking clash of arms in the world in the last six years, we ought to decide, in a systematic and in a contemplative and prayerful kind of way, where our country's strength lies and what purpose our arms are to serve.

Even if we have to bear arms to protect our country, are there not other things on which it is more necessary we should spend money at present? Our whole economic position has been shown to be weak during this war. We have shown that we can feed ourselves but, outside our agricultural community and the small number of our industries, we are very dependent on the outside world. We have shown how much we are dependent on education and skill and how much education and skill in many directions is lacking. We see the countries most deeply involved in the war realising that in education their strength will reside primarily in the future. We have problems to deal with both in industry and in education and in the aspects of our social life that are much more urgent than the building up of an Army two and a half times greater than it was pre-war.

I suggest to the Minister that his treatment of the matter here is very unfortunate, certainly unfair to the Army and, being unfair to the Army, is unfair to the country. I ask him to realise that this is an occasion upon which he should have indicated our general defence problem in a very broad way. No matter what view we may take of the Government, he should have told us what the Government thought our present Army should be, why they thought it should be as big as he now suggests and why in the form he now suggests—although he has not given us details about it. These are matters which are his responsibility and this is the time to do it. He will be presenting to us soon the Estimates for the Army for the coming year. The matter should not be left until those Estimates are presented, to outline to us the Government's outlook on Army organisation and equipment and on our defence policy.

Almost every year there has been introduced into this House what is called a Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill and it has often been requested that, at some time or other, something in the nature of a permanent Defence Forces Bill should be put through the House and made part of the Acts of the Parliament of this country. We have just listened to the Leader of the Opposition approaching this particular Bill to-day from a rather extraordinary point of view and I find it very difficult to follow his approach. On the one hand, he takes the responsibility for assuring us that, so far as he knows, this country never will be confronted with any form of aggression from outside and that, consequently, we do not require an Army or Army equipment. He relates that view to the fact that we escaped being drawn into the recent war through Providence looking over us—neglecting to say, however, that there was a certain direction by those in power which helped us also to stay out of this particular war. He says we do not need to take any consideration at all of the future as far as an Army of this State is concerned. Any person taking the most elementary view of government in any country must recognise that an army is required based on what the nation can provide and maintain and on what is reasonable in all the circumstances.

Deputy Mulcahy further confused the issue by stating that the introduction of a certain number of new officers is related to getting rid of some other officers in an unfair manner. Surely he knows that individuals get on in years, get older, even if new scientific developments do not make those people less effective than they were before such developments came into being. If the Deputy had said that the method of pensioning officers or men who have served this State is, in his opinion, a niggardly approach to what they deserve, I would say he would find general consent in all parts of the House. However, it is entirely wrong to say that the putting of those men on pension is unfair. I suggest that, when the Estimates come before us, we can discuss many other items and some of us on this side of the House will have a variety of criticism to offer. If we could induce the Minister for Defence to be a little bit more defensive towards the Minister for Finance and try to secure for his Army and for the pensioners of his Army, both men and officers, a better standard of recognition, we would be doing something that would be found agreeable to all people, including the members of the Army.

I do not know where Deputy Mulcahy gets the idea that, because certain equipment is now antiquated and outdated and there is such a rapid development in the creation of new forms of war materials, we should not equip ourselves with any kind of material at all. In our lifetime, this country has had the experience of men fighting for this nation's freedom almost with their bare hands and with small arms only, against what was then the most up-to-date and most scientific material that a big nation could bring into play. The spirit of the people, as exemplified by the men who struggled for this country's freedom, showed that it is not only implements of war that count. You have the men, the material; you have the spiritual approach to a thing. Deputy Mulcahy talks as if this country should wait until the atom bomb has been perfected and we will get our share of the atom bombs for our defence from the big nations that will be producing them.

My approach in this matter is that I welcome this new development on the part of the Minister for Defence. I would like to see the cream of our manhood given an opportunity of being brought into the nation's Army and that it will have a place to play in warfare and also in peace time. You need an Army in a country not only to defend the country against an outside force, but to defend the people against any body that might rise up without the authority of the people to try to take over control of the country. You would then see how quickly an Army could be formed, as it were, from nowhere if there was not already an Army serving the nation, irrespective of whatever Party might be in office. But they must be trained. We have an opportunity now of getting young men in peace time into an Army where they can make a career for themselves. I would like to see, in connection with that matter, that they would be given a reasonable standard of living through whatever payment would be made to them, that they would have a reasonable prospect of not having to worry when the age for retiring would come round.

I have heard talk of equipment and I would suggest to the Minister that, besides equipment, he should consider accommodation for the men. I think the time has come when we should try to get rid of the barracks that we have inherited from another power. These are situated all over the country and we should get rid of them. We should build for our officers and soldiers accommodation more suitable to their better well-being. That could be called an expenditure and it could be regarded as not quite equipment.

As regards the defence of this country and our defence forces, I think we are now reaching the stage when the matter should be examined from the point of view of creating something—it could be designed by the experts who have had experience of the past and have knowledge of what is happening in other places—so that this nation can be given an opportunity of placing its Army on a permanent basis and so that those who will go into it will know to what end their careers will bring them and what safety they will have in their later years. If that is done, we shall not have to discuss this thing year after year on the basis that we cannot do this and we cannot do that because we have only a temporary measure.

I will not delay the House very much longer, because there will be an opportunity of discussing the Army generally on the Estimate. We can then discuss administration. There is, however, one suggestion I would like to make to the Minister. I think the difference which is developing between the officers and the men, from a social point of view, is due to the great difference in the uniforms they wear. When he is considering equipment, both for warfare and for drilling, he ought to remember that the men who join our Army should not be paraded along the streets as if they were second-rate citizens, when compared from the point of view of dress with the officers. While it is necessary to have discipline and some distinction on parade in the barracks or outside, this difference of social caste which is now developing should be stopped for all time.

I welcome this new departure. I think the House will appreciate that it is not a case of getting rid of servants of the State, men who have served it loyally and well. While many of us might disagree with the things they do or the ideas they may hold, from the point of view of loyalty to the State there can be no question attaching to these people. This Bill should not be approached from the aspect that this is inducting 600 new officers purely for the purpose of getting rid of older officers who have served the State well.

I ask the Minister if he could not, in bringing about the retirement of older officers, see that something better might be done for them in the shape of pensions and that this niggardly business of cutting down pennies and halfpennies from men prepared to give a life-time in the service of the State, and even to give their lives if necessary when the State is in danger, should be stopped once and for all. Let us see that these people are properly taken care of financially while serving and when they have finished serving.

The House approaches the consideration of this Bill under a very great disadvantage, inasmuch as the Minister did not consider it wise to give the House any information as to the future policy of the Government in regard to defence. This House is a deliberative Assembly. We are all anxious to co-operate in formulating the best possible laws for the State and putting forward the most constructive suggestions of which we may be capable for the assistance of the Government and to ensure that our legislation shall be of the best possible kind.

Here we are presented with a Bill which purports to continue our defence regulations for another year and we are not informed why we should pass this measure or what is the nature of the defensive proposals which will be submitted to us during the coming year. We have been informed that it is the intention of the Government to increase the Army from 5,000 or 6,000, as the numbers were in pre-war days, to 12,000. We are entitled to have from the Minister a clear statement of the reasons that influenced him in coming to the decision that an Army of 12,000 is desirable. We are entitled to have an explanation of the line of thought which led him to the conclusion that an Army of that strength is essential or desirable.

Some Deputies might consider that a bigger Army is desirable and other Deputies might think that a smaller Army would be sufficient. The Minister has not given the House any guidance as to how we are to decide the question. He has associated with him the experts of our Defence Forces and I have no doubt he has discussed with them proposals for the future defence of our country. I think that Deputies, regardless of Party, will approach this question with due humility, having regard to the extraordinary changes which have taken place in defensive and offensive equipment during the past few years.

It is very hard for anyone to lay down a definite law as to what is best for our defence requirements and we are entitled to some guidance and assistance from the Minister who has been appointed to look after the country's defence. If, as somebody suggested, the consideration that influenced the Minister to increase the Army to such a degree above its pre-war strength was to relieve unemployment, I think that might be ruled out right away as being absurd, because there is definitely no more expensive method by which one can seek to relieve unemployment than by drafting men into an army. It is expensive particularly when we consider how much useful work could be done by these men, if directed into industrial, agricultural or other employment. It is worthy of note that one of the ablest officers in the Army was recently appointed to the control of one of our biggest industrial concerns. That would seem to indicate that he at least believed he could serve his country better by strengthening our economic fabric, by making the country more productive, and I am inclined to think that unless the Minister can advance stronger arguments than he advanced when introducing the Bill, it is by strengthening the economic position of the country that we can put ourselves in a better position to defend this nation from outside aggression. A small efficient Army will be necessary as a basis on which to build and expand our Defence Forces, if any emergency arises.

Deputy Briscoe controverted the assertion of Deputy Mulcahy that this country is in no danger from outside aggression at the moment. I do not propose to decide as between these able military strategists, but I think it was unfair on the part of Deputy Briscoe to assert that our safety during the period of emergency was due to a certain extent to the direction of our military forces, without pointing out at the same time that that direction was afforded not by the Government Party alone, but by all Parties, and that all Parties co-operated during the emergency in the defence of this country. He possibly overlooked that particular aspect. Since all Parties co-operated so well during the emergency, it would be desirable, in view of the very uncertain present and the perhaps more uncertain future, if there were co-operation between all Parties with regard to the defence of the country, and if our Army were not made the plaything of Party politics. We are too small a nation to indulge in the pastime of making the defence of this country a Party matter.

I said that keeping the country out of the war was mainly the Government's job and that they succeeded in doing it.

I quite agree, but I think that the Deputy should not have omitted the fact that the Government had the co-operation of all Parties, in making that reference. If the Government wish to secure the co-operation of all Parties, they ought now in this House, because this is the place in which the matter should be dealt with, to take all Parties into their confidence and the Minister should say how he arrived at the figure of 12,000 men as being the number required for our Army in the future. If he has strong reasons for fixing the strength of the Army at that figure, it is most desirable, in the interests not only of the country but of the Army, that he should give these reasons, because if he has arrived at the decision in a haphazard way, the future of every young man joining the Army to-day is very precarious.

If we can all agree that an Army of the strength he has outlined is desirable and necessary, and if there are strong reasons for maintaining the Army at that strength, we can build on that basis a permanent Army in which every young man can look forward to a fairly secure future; but if we are simply to have a position in which the Minister says: "I have decided on an Army of 12,000 men. I do not intend to justify that decision. I have 77 Deputies behind me to support me and I do not propose to go any further," there will be very great uncertainty and that will not make for the efficiency or general welfare of the Army.

I think everyone will agree that it will be a rather difficult matter to secure the number of men, 12,000, he seeks to secure for our Defence Forces. This is due to a variety of causes, one of which is that there are opportunities to emigrate and to join the armies of other nations, and young men of adventurous spirit who are the best types for any army are inclined to seek wider fields than are available here. If we propose to build an Army of the strength outlined, it would be very expensive, because, as it is to be on a voluntary basis, it will be necessary to raise the standard of remuneration, of living conditions and of other circumstances connected with the Army to even a higher level than prevails in other countries, because other armies, offer a wider field for adventure and for seeing the world.

Deputy Briscoe advanced one very extraordinary reason for our maintaining a large standing Army. He said it might not be necessary for defence against external enemies but it might be necessary for internal defence against any force which might rise up here to overthrow the Government of the State. I cannot tell, or attempt to forecast, what section of the community Deputy Briscoe fears may rise up against the Government of the Irish Republic here.

Blueshirts.

Does the Deputy know that the Blueshirts were not an armed organisation?

It was not their fault.

I wonder, if there is a rising, will they find someone to sell arms to both sides?

The Deputy will please make that clear. The Deputy has been for a long time looking for an opportunity to cross swords with me.

Deputy Cogan is in possession.

Deputy Dillon intervened to imply that I sold arms to two contending sides. He will withdraw that.

Deputy Cogan must be allowed to continue.

I will deal with Deputy Dillon elsewhere, if I cannot get satisfaction here. I will teach him manners.

The Deputy provoked him by his reference to Blueshirts.

Deputy Cogan asked me a question.

It was not the Deputy's business to reply.

Deputy Briscoe requires a strong Army of 12,000 men in this country to teach Deputy Dillon manners.

I did not say that, either.

It is rather a poor future to offer to the young men of this country to suggest that they are going to be drawn into the Army to serve political purposes. There is at present no section of the community in Ireland disloyal to this State. There is no political Party which does not recognise and accept the Constitution under which we live. There is not the slightest danger that any section is going to rise up to overthrow the constitutionally-elected Government of this State as long as it governs according to the Constitution. The idea of building up a huge Army should be abandoned, as well as the idea of having an auxiliary police force. That would be distasteful, not only to Deputies but to the young men being asked to join the Army. We should appeal to the best of our manhood to come into the Army. We should offer them good prospects in the Army and security of employment in the Defence Forces. But we should be absolutely sure, before we invite men into the Army, that we are not going in one or two years' time to cut it down drastically again, and to throw them out into other occupations for which they would not be altogether fitted.

There is one section in the Bill to which I wish to refer briefly, the section which enables the Minister to impose penalties on men who left the Army during the emergency. These penalties are not of a military kind. They are not imposed by the military authorities, but are to be enforced by local authorities, and by ordinary business concerns which are under the control of the Government. It is undesirable that brave men—because men of this type were brave—owing to the fact that they violated the military code by joining other military forces in a time of war, and even faced death, should be treated in that way. They should be treated as brave men, and in a dignified way, and the penalties should be imposed by the Army with which they were associated. They should be tried, if trial is necessary, by the Army and under the military code. That is all brave men would ask. Instead of that, we have these men being victimised in every way, not for one or for two years, but for a period of seven years. In this connection, the Minister dwelt on the fact that the section might not affect very many men. He made the point that it might not affect any of the men on the ground that many of them, on the transfer of their services to another Army, would be rewarded by those who sympathised with the nations which they served.

Even if we take that view, is it desirable that men should be sent out of this country with a sense of grievance, of whom it could be stated that their own Government, as far as it was in their power, refused to give them any employment and was prepared to starve them? That would not be a desirable situation, and was not one that would make for better relations between this country and other countries. It is not justice. There is another aspect of the question to which I wish to draw the Minister's attention. It is possible that a man affected by this section might come back to this country and find suitable employment in an industrial or commercial concern which would not be financed by the State. It could happen, however, that after two or three years that firm might be taken over by some larger firm which was controlled by the State. Such a man would then find himself in the position of being thrown out and would lose secure employment because of the operation of this unjust section. That is a petty and rather spiteful way of dealing with the matter. I think it unworthy of any Minister for Defence, unworthy of this House, and unworthy of any army. We want our Army to be looked up to as a dignified Army, as an Army of brave men, as an Army that treats its soldiers with respect, and as one that treats them severely if they deserve it, but not as an Army of old women, spiteful and mean. We want it to be an Army of soldiers worthy of our country.

This annual Bill provides an occasion for reviewing Army policy as distinct from the type of debate appropriate to the main Estimate. When we hear that we are supposed to maintain a larger standing Army postwar, than we had pre-war, it seems to be contrary to common-sense. Before the discovery of atomic energy and its application as an instrument of war, the old classical theory of war, propounded by Von Clauswitz remained true, that the conclusive element in war was not the capture of territory, not the winning of battles, but the destruction of the enemy's army. Therefore, every State, large and small, was tempted in time of danger to draft as large a section of the population as it could afford into the armed forces, so that it would have the largest possible reserves of armed men to resist the attempt of any foreign enemy to destroy its army. But can anyone, student of military affairs or layman, doubt that the development of atomic energy as an instrument of war has completely destroyed that conception? If it be true, and it now seems to be substantially true, that a small atomic missile hurled on a considerable city can completely destroy it, can we doubt that, with the passage of very few years, larger and larger atomic bombs of that character will be evolved and the devastation of which they will be capable baffles human imagination? In that situation, were we unhappily to become involved in war, who can contemplate a Government of this country maintaining a belligerent position while area after area of the country was reduced to complete desolation by the impact of atomic bombs, when we had nothing whatever at our disposal which would enable us to prevent the national enemy from dropping these upon our territory?

I do not think anybody in this House imagines that the resources of this country will permit of building up an air fleet sufficiently formidable to repel the attack of any Power whom we can think of as a potential aggressor against this country because, to build up an air fleet, we must not only build it up in the first instance, but we must keep it up to date, and it is common knowledge that the aeroplanes purchased to-day are obsolete before their date of delivery. Does anyone suggest here that the finances of this country will extend to equipping and maintaining an air force which will effectively resist a determined attempt by any potential aggressor to devastate the territory of this country with atomic energy? Does any responsible Deputy imagine that were an aggressor so to assail us, a Government truly representative of our people and conscious of the responsibility of trusteeship could or should maintain such a position of belligerency as would justify the retention in the field of an army while the whole country and the population were being extinguished by the use of atomic energy against them? If that plain fact is faced—and we have a duty in this House to face facts—I think it becomes abundantly clear that the proposal greatly to enlarge the standing Army which, in the nature of our resources must be primarily an infantry Army, with whatever artillery resources we can afford to place at its disposal, is the merest self-delusion and foolish extravagance. If it were only that, it would be bad enough, but it is more than that: It is the creation of a situation in which those who serve in our Army must for ever be underpaid because we cannot afford to pay a large Army wages which are comparable with the wages that might be carned in other callings in life if those who join the Army engaged in other activities. Far then from ambitioning the maintenance of a larger Army than this Bill envisages, I should like to see our Army very substantially reduced and the conditions under which the men serve revoluted.

When we come to ask ourselves if sustained participation in international war is excluded virtually from the functions our Army would be called upon to discharge, what then is it meant to do? I feel bound in passing to say that matters of this kind could be and should be discussed without acrimony. If any Deputy now or hereafter, by implication or interjection, suggests that the late General O'Duffy or any of the distinguished public servants with whom I had the honour to be associated for so long, ever contemplated the overthrow of the legitimate Government of this country by force, he will receive from me such an answer as will shut his mouth effectively and I will have little respect for his more delicate feelings.

Even by lies.

If any Deputy chooses to bandy charges like that about this House, they will be countered vigorously.

On that, I have no more to say.

No, and a good job.

Except to fix everybody with that notice, wherever they sit or whatever their record may be.

Now is the time.

What do you mean, now is the time?

Anything you have to say, say it out.

I have said it.

Have you anything more to say?

That closes that.

It does not close it as far as I am concerned.

If anyone wants to re-open it, and I am present, I will be very glad to re-open it, on any terms they desire to re-open it. Now let us examine what function an Army of our country may properly be designed to discharge. The legitimate Government of this country is entitled to the obedience of all its citizens. There will on occasions be individuals or groups of individuals who for one reason or another conceive themselves justified in eschewing constitutional methods for the redress of their grievances and resorting to violence. The first sanction that would ordinarily be invoked by a democratic Government such as ours is are the police forces of the State, and I believe in this country in 100 per cent. of cases, in the times that lie ahead, that force will be more than competent to deal with any crucial situation that may arise. But the very essence of effective government is that all parties in the State should have fixed notice that in the last analysis, if they choose to evoke it, the Government commands a greater force than any other combination in the State, and that in the last analysis they will use it, and that to resist it is hopeless from the beginning because, if such a position does not exist, and if there is not standing notice to all elements in the community that that is so, and irresistible and constant evidence that that is so, there is a standing temptation to irresponsible people, very often young, ardent and enthusiastic people, to launch themselves into movements which bring them into conflict with the central authority, in the vague kind of hope that there is an off-chance that they may pull it off and that what would be called treason, had it failed, will be known to posterity as revolution in its success. Thus, for the protection sometimes of the very best elements in the community—those most ardent, those most easily moved by specious appeal— the Government must maintain a force which by its character is standing warning to all reasonable men that they have nothing to hope from a challenge to the legitimate Government, freely elected by the people in this country.

If that be the prime function of our Army, it is the duty of this Legislature to realise that it is not a function that can be discharged by everybody because it may involve tedium, it may involve a standing temptation to allow standards of conduct and discipline, without which no army can survive, to deteriorate. Therefore, you have to realise that you are asking of men the discharge of an extremely exacting duty, the maintenance of morale and discipline over protracted periods when intervention or positive action by them is not called for, and when the ideal you aim at is that their very bearing and reputation will be sufficiently in terrorem to prevent the very event which might evoke their action. The more efficient they are, the more impressive they are, and the more effectively they do their job, the better guarantee it is that positive action by them will never be called for. Anyone who has had any experience of foreign countries will know how readily that condition tends either to a rapid disintegration of the army itself or to the fostering of unhealthy cabals within the army concerned for matters with which they were never intended to deal. I therefore suggest that, far from increasing our Army, we ought to make up our minds that we are going to have a skeleton Army, every individual in which would, in the time of emergency, if it became necessary to expand the Army, be capable of stepping up several ranks and accepting the responsibilities of a much higher rank than that which he normally holds, and constitute in himself part of a framework on which the larger force which an emergency might render desirable could be built around.

I think that in the early stages of our Army we had what was called the first battalion, and it was the pride of our Army that that first battalion accepted as part of its duty a somewhat higher standard of discipline, morale and conduct generally than were considered indispensable for the Army as a whole. Not without justice, we were able to think of our first battalion as something which, with the passage of time, could be compared with the Guards' Brigade of the British Army, or with the crack regiment of any army in the world. That was a high ambition for a young country with a new Army which had its own traditions to build. For various reasons, into which it is unnecessary to go, at a certain point our Army policy turned away from that, and the first battalion was scattered over the rest of the Army, and that esprit de corps and cohesion were squandered for the purpose of some consideration which then appeared to the authorities to be adequate value for that with which we were parting.

I should like to see an Irish Army which was small and inspired with exactly the same spirit and amibition that the First Battalion had during its halcyon years. I should like to see men joining the Army feeling that they were not entering employment analogous to that of a common labourer, but that those who joined the ranks were entering an honourable trade in which, in the course of time, they might expect to graduate to a standard of decent comfort such as might be enjoyed by a skilled artisan in any craft in the country. I cannot see how we can hope to maintain the kind of Army we should have in this country unless, by offering the men who join it in peace times conditions of that character, we can draw into its ranks persons of the type who would, but for the fact that they joined the Army, have become the skilled craftsmen of our trades. Until we can create for the Army an atmosphere in which those who wear the ranker's uniform will be recognised by the community as having a social standing equal to that of any highly skilled craftsman, we cannot hope to get the class of men into the Army in peace time and on a permanent basis who would be suitable material for the creation of the morale and character which I feel should be the hallmark of an Irish soldier.

Furthermore, if we are to achieve these things, we must have officers who will be capable of appreciating the kind of thing we want, and competent to give effect to the ideal which the Minister will set before them. Whereupon, you are merely brought up against this problem. If a young man enters our Army now his prospects of a future are virtually nil. We have had that problem up before. When the Army was established here in the early days, large numbers of the officers were young men-generals were men in their forties, colonels were men in their thirties—with the result that, for the ensuing 30 years, you had men who graduated to the rank of captain and who recognised that, for the remainder of their service in the Army, there was no prospect whatever of their ever securing substantive rank materially higher than that. How can you hope to get into the service of the forces of the State the kind of men we must have if the Army is to be the sort of Army this country can be proud of, if we fix them with notice on the day they enter the service that they can never hope to get from that service anything like adequate remuneration for the talents that they are expected to employ; that the highest aspiration they can have is to get out on pension in time to enable them to acquire from some commercial enterprise the reward and preferment that it should have been the privilege of the Army and the State to give them? Therefore, I would bespeak for the officers of our Army a prospect equal to that which they would enjoy had they entered any of the professions in the State. Unless we do provide it, the professions will get the cream of the men and the Army will get the lees, because, if my thesis be true that the prospect of the normal possibility of active engagement in war is virtually removed by the development of modern science, we have withdrawn from the attraction of the Army career that appeal of excitement and valour which in past centuries drew into the ranks of every army a certain body of men, indifferent in greater or lesser degree to the material reward that their labours would command, but irresistibly drawn to the adventure and to the dangers that military life might be expected to connote.

If, then, we can get by reasonable treatment the right men we ought to face this fact that, in the event of war, the only basis upon which such an enterprise could be contemplated by a responsible Government in this country would be by means of an alliance with some Power that would be in a position to furnish our forces throughout the duration of war with the materials wherewith to fight. We have not got them, we cannot make them and we must be for ever depending on external sources of supply. No army, however valiant, can fight without weapons, and no war can be long prosecuted without a virtually complete replacement of the equipment with which the battle was begun. If, then, it is true that participation in warlike activity can only be contemplated in alliance with a State from which warlike stores would be available for the duration of the encounter, I think we are bound to face the obligation that is imposed upon us of ensuring that the officers of our Army will be capable of co-ordinating their efforts with those of whatever the inevitable ally must be. That involves having in contemplation the establishment of a staff college in this country. Otherwise we are simply not facing what the responsibilities of creating a real army are. You cannot create a staff college out of nothing; you must have men competent to run it and teachers competent to give instruction in it. The only way that these men can acquire that competence is by experience of strategy and tactics in battle, or by contact with those who have had that experience and who are in a position to impart it to those who come after them.

It is manifest that our Army has not had any experience in the practice of modern war. The mechanisation of armies, I should imagine, has completely changed the whole staff picture of armies and, therefore, the sooner we make up our minds to avail of the services of the staff college of some other country where our officers may go to acquire the highly specialised knowledge requisite effectively to officer our Army the better it will be. We can choose the British Staff College or we can choose the Staff College of the United States of America. I am not sufficient of an expert on these matters to know whether it would be practicable to avail of the hospitality of both, or whether that would merely create confusion. I am not at all sure that it might not be a good thing if it were practicable, from the technical point of view, that half the officers should be officer trained in the Staff College of Great Britain, and that half should be trained in the Staff College of the United States of America. Ultimately, our aim should be to establish a staff college of our own. I cannot doubt, however, that even if we had arrived at the stage when it would be useful and practicable to do that, that it would be a good thing to maintain contact with the staff colleges of each or both of the countries I have mentioned, so that in the event of our being engaged in belligerent activities our efforts could be effectively co-ordinated with whatever ally stood at our side: so that we would have at our side modern information and experience on which to draw for the instruction and training of our own troops.

That seems to me to be a very much more rational policy than the policy of building up a far larger Army than we have at present and burdening the community with the expenses thereof—and that is not all—but of drawing a large body of unskilled men into the extremely difficult life of a peace-time Army. It is only a man of considerable character, it is only a man who has intelligence to appreciate that those who stand by can also serve, and who realises that his everyday exertions are making him a better public servant than he was, who can, without serious moral danger to himself, remain a rank and file soldier in a peace-time Army over a protracted period when there are no moral duties of policing the world such as would accrue to the Army of an Imperial Power like England, or a great Continental Power such as the United States of America, or the great Powers, if you like, of France, or Germany that was. I think we have got to face the fact that the real effective belligerent instrument of the future will be the aeroplane. This country can never provide them, and, therefore, what is the use of blinding ourselves to that fact? Were we to marshal the whole of the revenues of the State we could not maintain an effective Air Force in perpetuity in this country, and if we cannot maintain a good one then we should not mantain any one at all. It might be necessary to have some token force, but it should be recognised as a token force. There should be no pretence made to our own people, and no foolish posturings to foreign countries, that we looked upon it as anything other than a token force intended for no purpose other than the flying of the Flag. There is, however, a real service, an honourable service, and an indispensable work awaiting the right kind of Army. It will largely depend on what we will do here: as to whether we get the kind of Army which will be a credit to us and into which every parent in the country will see his son go in confidence: that his son will be leading a useful life in surroundings which will not be a standing menace not only to his morals but to his morale as well.

I might be charged with daydreaming in aspiring to so high a standard for the Irish Army of the future if I were not in a position to look back on the reputation that the First Battalion built up for this country and, indeed, abroad, in the first years of the existence of this State, because it is something to be proud of that a non-commissioned officer of that First Battalion could walk into any regiment of the British Army and they would be glad to have him; and it must be remembered that the British Army have had a long experience of armies, and that they do not lightly grab at non-commissioned ranks, who might prove to be bad soldiers. That was a tribute to the old First Battalion. Now, I should like to see our Army built up on those lines, but built up under conditions in which the British Army would not be in a position to out-bid us for the services of our men.

There are a number of points of a Committee character that might be raised now or on the Committee Stage, but I think that Deputy Cogan, with great moderation and reasonableness, has put forward a view that the Minister ought carefully to consider. I do not think that anybody, anywhere, at any time, suffers seriously through showing magnanimity. Now, a number of young men in this country entered the Army in the first flush of enthusiasm, when they were warned that this country was in danger. We all know that the country was then in danger. We all know that in those days we did believe that there was very real danger of this country being invaded by forces armed with armaments which we could not dream of commanding, and we knew that it would be the hateful duty of the leaders of our Army to sent into battle men whom they knew to be inadequately equipped and who would have to stand, comparatively unarmed, against a formidable continental army. Yet these young men came and joined our Army. They came into the Army at that time, not for pay, not for a job, but, firstly, because they thought it was a kind of a national duty—and in that they were right—and, secondly, because, being young and ardent, they longed for adventure and for participation in something that was almost cosmic; the battles that were proceeding in the world at the time. Things so transpired in this country that we were never called upon to fight, and there is no doubt that a great many of these young men, who wanted to take part in these cosmic battles, felt that they would be more at home fighting on the side of a system of government that was more analogous to our own system of government than with the system of government with which the others were embroiled. It was not to avoid any of the obligations that they had undertaken here that they left our Army and joined another army. I venture to swear that the vast bulk of them, if they thought of these things at all, felt that in going to fight where they were going to fight, they were doing a man's part, not only in the defence of this country, but in preventing the tide of war from flowing to this country. In that, they may have been right or they may have been wrong; I shall not enter into that. I do not deny that in a time of danger you have got to mark down mutiny or anarchy; that it does not matter under what circumstances a soldier allows himself to be led into a mutinous act, before extending the quality of mercy his act must be marked, recognised and arraigned as mutiny, because, if it is not, no army could maintain its discipline. Similarly, I agree that if a man, acquainted with military law, knows what desertion means, and knows that it must be put upon the record that what he did was desertion in a time of danger, he must suffer the appropriate penalty. Having established that fact, however, surely our Army and this State are now in a position which enables them to display magnanimity to those who have been convicted of what might be called technical desertion. There is no more tragic sign of weakness in authority than the authority which is afraid to reprieve. Woe betide the Government which finds itself in the position that they must say: "We would like to mitigate that penalty, but we dare not do so, because to do so would let loose the flood." Far better would it be for a Government to impose the ultimate penalty than that the day should come when they are no longer strong enough or secure enough to do justice without regard to how it may look to those who wish the Government ill. When that occurs, it means that the Government has become so weak that it can no longer survive, and the Government that we have here now is in that position.

We are faced with no danger at the moment that there will be such widespread desertion as would shake the foundations of the State or of the Army itself. Why, then, should such men be found guilty of desertion in the sense which the ordinary soldier understands? Who ever heard of desertion in order to fight? Who ever heard of desertion in order to get into the battlefield? When the penalties and sanctions for that crime were devised; when those who wrote the Military Code drafted the section to deal with deserters, they thought of men who had promised to hold the fort; they thought of men upon whom their comrades were depending for their lives—men who had left their posts and who had thrown into jeopardy the lives of their faithful comrades. Are men of that character to be compared with these so-called Irish deserters whose reason for desertion was to leave neutrality in order to engage in war? Looking at it purely from the military or from the soldier's point of view, is there anything shameful or dishonourable, or anything that involves discredit to the Army which they have left or the uniform which they formerly wore, in that they deserted because they were too avid, too anxious, to engage in conflict, too imprudently impetuous, if you like, to be about the business for which they originally joined the Army? Is it unduly generous thus to interpret the action of men who left our Army in order to enrol in the forces of the British Crown? There may be mean, narrow-minded little men who, because they chose that service, will desire to asperse their motives, but honourable men, broadminded men, reasonable men will know what sent them on their way. Is it becoming, now that the captains and the kings are gone, now that the shouting and the tumult has died down, to follow them vindictively with Section 13 of this Bill? Look at the number of the section. Thirteen. It is unlucky. There are many public buildings in which there are no rooms number 13; it is thought to be unlucky. Let superstition, for once, affect the mind of legislators in this House. Let them frame a Bill with no Section 13. Nobody will miss it. No vital interest of this community will be injured by its omission. It will be a monument to magnanimity and an instrument, I dare to forecast, in healing past injuries and removing many misunderstandings. The omission of this clause might make it a very lucky Bill.

The keynote of the speeches this evening from the Opposition Benches is, to my mind, a spirit of undisguised fatalism. Keep, if you like, a skeleton or a token Army, and throw yourselves, in case of sudden emergency, on the tender mercies of a merciless world. Evidently, the advent of the atomic bomb is to terrorise and stupefy us, to make us unconscious and unmindful of our duty to defend the State and support its institutions should the call come to that service. The development of atomic energy and the desperate weapons of to-day are held up to us as a reason why we should not keep an Army of a certain reasonable strength, but those who so advise should remember that weapons just as mighty and as terrifying were devised through the hundreds of years that have passed. Yet, mighty nations and military despots and avaricious empires have not crushed the small nations of this earth. That was because they stood on their own legs, had men who were willing to fight and women who were prepared to stand behind them. Their spirit was indestructible. That is the spirit that will make this nation survive through the years to come, under Providence, just as it did in the past. We were told in the past that, before we could be invaded, those who wished to attack us would have to pass through the navies of two great nations. On the one hand, they tell us of the development of present-day armament and equipment. On the other hand, they tell us of the mighty navies on the sea, but they did not point out how those armies might come in hundreds or thousands from the skies. If we had sufficient force available, we could deal with them, and deal with them pretty rapidly, as was done in the lifetime of all of us after another great war in the past, when not only the regular armies, but Black and Tans and Auxiliaries, and all the rest, were let loose to bomb our cities, to pull people from their beds and try to destroy and brow-beat the spirit of this nation.

What is the use of talking about leaving it to other nations of the world to defend us? Such military alliances will not be for our defence but will bring us into their wars and disputes for the purpose of their aggrandisement. We are told to be merciful to those who leave our Army and join the Army of another nation. What return did those who did so get from the nation for which they risked their lives? When they were finished with them, they threw them back to us. These people have to take the risks of their own deeds and put up with them. Surely those who stood by us should have first consideration. Let the others take the risks which they foresaw when they were joining. Let them depend on the nation for which they were prepared to make sacrifices. Nobody is going to be vindictive towards them. Let them take their chance here.

The Minister and those advising him in this matter have the best interests of the country at heart. It would be well for some of the amateur tacticians of this House to leave the question of tactics to the Army and the question of the need of military defences to those who are in charge of the Government of the country. I, for one, have confidence in them. I have confidence in this little nation. I hope to see it survive through all the world's troubles, just as many other small nations have survived. Having a certain vital strength, behind which the forces of the nation may rally, we shall pass through the future, with God's help, with the same spirit and the same unfailing courage as our people did through all the generations that have passed.

Like other Deputies who have spoken, I am staggered at the prospect of an Army of approximately 12,000 men, and not only by the size of the Army but by the cost of its maintenance, having regard to our present high rate of expenditure. No one in this House would suggest for one moment that we should reduce our Army to a mere token, but it is an entirely different matter when we propose to keep an Army in this country two and a half times larger than that which we had pre-war. Without attempting in any way to prophesy or even give an opinion as to what may be the future condition of the world, it would be reasonable to expect that the Army in this country might be reduced at the end of five years of an emergency period. During that period, efforts were made to increase and to keep at peak point the strength of that Army. It is reasonable, now, I think, when with one possible exception, all the armies of the world are being drastically reduced, to expect some reduction in this Army of ours.

Leaving that angle entirely out of consideration, I wonder do Deputies realise that during the five years' emergency over seven thousand men deserted this Army—that very nearly a quarter of the total strength deserted. Again leaving out of consideration the attraction which a fighting force offered to young men who found themselves in an Army that over a number of years had not been in action, I think it reasonable to assume that most of them left the Army because they looked for and got better conditions elsewhere. I do not think that we can blame ourselves because we were not in a position to give them similar conditions here. This is a small country with slender resources, but I entirely agree with the view that whatever may be the size of the Army maintained in this country, it should be maintained in a good condition and that the conditions of service should be such as would warrant young men of spirit remaining in it. If in future we are to expect a rate of desertion comparable to that which took place during the emergency, we can assume that after four or five years the Army of twelve thousand will be reduced by two thousand.

In dealing with this matter, I think we should consider seriously the burden placed on this country under the stress of an emergency in which everyone was resolved to bear his share as patiently as possible so that as strong a defence force could be maintained here as our resources would allow. But when we realise that last year the total Army Estimate presented to this House was £8,900,000 odd, I think Deputies will have seriously to consider, if we are to go on talking in terms of millions to support an Army in peace time, how we are going to get the revenue to deal with the various productive works which I need not enumerate but which everybody realises must be undertaken and at the same time reduce taxation. I think that whatever the defence policy in this country is, we should have had a better statement than that merely outlined in the White Paper and in the Minister's remarks.

Coming to the end of the emergency period, we find ourselves with an Army far in excess of that which we had before the emergency, and we find further that demobilisation is slower than was anticipated. When one finds that the vast bulk of those who are being demobilised are migrating, because no work is available for them here, when one finds that the Government want to expand our Army to two and a half times its pre-war strength and to fit into that Army a vast number of recruits, officers and men, I think it is pertinent to inquire as to the future policy in regard to recruitment and the type of training which it is proposed to give the Army personnel.

Without in any way wishing to interfere with the normal training which soldiers get, and which it is to be expected they will get in the future, I think the Army authorities will have to consider the question of providing courses of technical instruction for Army personnel over and above that required for military purposes, so as to ensure that when men leave the Army they will be equipped with knowledge and experience which will enable them to secure employment elsewhere. At the moment men who leave our Army and join the British Army are highly skilled, so far as military training goes. In fact they are so well trained that the vast majority of them become N.C.O.s certainly within six months. I think that is a tribute not alone to the men themselves but to their instructors. I think, however, something further than Army training must be provided if employment is to be available to these men when they leave the Army. That is one aspect of Army policy regarding the training of personnel with which the Army authorities might concern themselves.

I do not want to dwell on the many aspects of Army policy which have been already dealt with, but I should like for a moment to refer to the terms of Section 13. I think that Section 13 is too drastic. I do not suggest that these people should receive the same consideration as Army personnel who served for the entire period of the emergency. It is regrettable that many of them deserted, and it is regrettable, from whatever cause, that we should have to enact punitive measures here, but I think the measures are too stringent and too severe on these people. It would be unfair, I think, to attribute ulterior motives to men who left.

I think that the majority left because of economic circumstances, but from whatever cause they left, it is unfair, I suggest, that they should be penalised so severely as Section 13 proposes. I understand that no such punitive measures are contained in legislation elsewhere. Although I understand it is proposed in the near future to enact legislation to deal with deserters, I think that very few of these deserters will return here, but even if the entire number did return a less severe form of punishment would be ample. One obvious way to deal with them is to give preference exclusively to men who have full service or who would have completed their service, if they had not been demobilised for health reasons.

In regard to the board set up to recruit officers, it is significant that the re-enlistment has not come up to expectations. I would like the Minister to outline the qualifications required of officers applying before that board and the qualifications deemed necessary before they were regarded as suitable for recruitment to the permanent force.

I would like to deal with one aspect of Section 9, amending Section 57 of the No. 2 Act of 1940, the section which governs resettlement, or the right of a man to get his employment on leaving military service. There have been no complaints to me as, in the main, employers are taking back those employees who were in the forces during the emergency. While that obtains, however, there is something else keeping men out of employment, and I would like the trade union leaders in this House to take a note of it. Men have gone back to their employers and the employers have told them they would be given back their jobs. The trade unions, however, have refused cards and the men have been penalised. I have cited one case to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, where a man left his employment to join the Army and had actually paid a sum of money in excess of his ordinary contributions. When he came back, after five and a half years' service, the union refused to give him a card to go back to his old job.

Would that be a craft union?

With an English constitution?

I know another case of a particular union in which Deputy Everett is interested. That is why I would like the trade union leaders in the House to take note of it. I was informed by the general secretary that the branches had autonomy in these questions; in other words, they could decide these questions on their own. I think the trade unions should review the whole position of giving men who served throughout the emergency the right to go back to their work. There are some aspects I cannot touch upon now. I know there is the right of permanent employment and also what may be called quasi-permanent employment, and that is where the real crux arises. While the employer is prepared to take the man back, the union will not give him his cards, though it gives cards to men who have been working in England during the emergency and who probably have kept their cards clear while they were in England or possibly were members of an amalgamated union with a branch here. That is a very serious aspect of the resettlement of our demobilised men and I would ask the Minister seriously to consider bringing in, on the Committee Stage, an amendment to cover it.

As one who has served in the Army for a number of years, I think it is only fair to pay tribute to the regular Army for its loyalty during the years 1921 to 1940. It has obeyed loyally the commands given to it by two successive Irish Governments and that is something worthy of our Irish soldiers. I also want to pay tribute to the Minister in charge of the Army during the last eight or ten years. I believe he looked after the soldiers faithfully and well and that most of them gave a very good account of the careful way in which he looked after their needs and did everything he could within the regulations to make them comfortable and happy. It is only fair that this tribute should be paid, especially from the Opposition. It is not always that a Minister in charge of an army can be decent to the army, as generally there are not enough funds at his disposal to look after their welfare. The present Minister has done everything possible to give us a peaceful and happy Army, which can look back on happy days and which, I hope, can look forward to a future of happiness also. I also pay tribute to the L.D.F. for its loyalty during the years of the emergency, for giving faithful service and being prepared to make sacrifices. They spared no end of time to equip themselves to give a good account of themselves, if necessary. Therefore, the Army, the L.D.F. and the Minister deserve a tribute.

I am not at all satisfied that we can afford at this stage to keep an Army of 12,000 men. I believe 6,000 or 7,000 well-equipped men in a compact Army would be of more service to our nation. Everyone knows that, for the last ten or 15 years, we have trained a vast number of young men, rough-trained them and broken them in, to find they become recruits in foreign armies, so that this is nothing more than a training ground for those other armies to which our men are lured. They give proper and efficient service there, and get ranks, and we know that some of the most bloody fighting on the battlefields of Europe was led by valiant young Irishmen who were trained here. It is hard on us that we have to do all that training at great expense to the taxpayer and find it is for foreign armies. That is one aspect of the matter I would like the Minister to look into. I would rather see a small and compact Army, as I know that at all times we will give a good account of ourselves—not alone our soldiers, but the wives and children, who will stand loyally to fight and die for faith and fatherland. That is a tradition handed down, and I hope it will always be so. At the same time, we need to pay more attention to a compact Air Force, as an Army is useless without an umbrella over it. I would rather see more money spent on that than on a ground Army.

Deputy McCarthy spoke in a more militant strain, like one of those who has the memories of the past in his mind still. We should let the past bury itself. I went through the past and had bitterness in my heart, but there is no use in having it, there is no use in trailing our coats. We should remember that we are in 1946.

Congratulations, Deputy.

I went through the Black and Tan period, but I know we could have gone through far worse. There is no use in lauding ourselves about all that we did. I remember that when we were out on the hills, or suffering penal servitude, there were very few of the people who gave us any help.

Speak for your own area.

I am speaking for all areas. A very small number of men fought and suffered in this country and it was that small band who carried our country to victory. That was no thanks to the majority of the people, many of whom stabbed us in the back. We had not two dozen men, perhaps, in every parish to go out and fight and die for our native land. There is no use in making ourselves think we were a mighty, patriotic host.

I would recall to the Deputy his own words, that this is 1946.

Better let the past bury itself and let us look to the future.

The Deputy was grand until he was interfered with by the interruptions of Deputies opposite.

Our geographical position is fairly good. We know where the pot always boils over, and that is in the centre of Europe or in the Balkan countries. Even if it boils over there in the future, our geographical position is ideal. We will always be far away from the battlefields of Europe. We were invaded at one time, but the conqueror failed later and they never tried again. I do not see much likelihood of this country being brought into any war. In these circumstances, I do not think there is any need for a strong military force to meet any emergency. I cannot foresee any great emergency. Possibly an atomic bomb might alight on us, but we cannot help that. I cannot see armies landing all over our country over-night.

The Minister should reconsider this matter and give the farmers, and the people generally, half a chance. They have carried a huge burden for some years past. It was really too big a burden; not alone were they carrying the upkeep of the Army, but the farmers had to feed the people as well. If the Minister knew how hard it is on the farmers to till, plough, sow, and mow in all types of weather and carry the huge burden they have had to carry, he would realise that it is not fair to ask them to continue doing so. They are a loyal people, but they should not be asked to carry this huge Army in the future and at the same time feed the nation.

The Minister should consider the establishment of a compact, foundation Army. I would rather see a better police force, a more mobile, better-trained police force. The police force at the present time is getting rather slack and flabby. I do not think they are doing their duties as well as the R.I.C. did them in the past. I would rather see more money spent paying a proper police force that would be engaged in more vigorous duties and that would take over more of the type of duty we now expect from the Army. I do not think there is much need for a big Army. I could understand a few thousand extra police, better equipped, better paid and more mobile.

Like Deputy Dillon and others who spoke here, I think the Minister should cut out Section 13 altogether. We cannot say that in the real sense of the word these men were deserters. If I were a young man, I believe I would find myself anxious to go to the battlefields of Europe, not for the love of Britain or America, but purely for the love of adventure. I always liked the life of a soldier. I found it a nice life. Adventure is the spice of life to every young man. I believe most of these men went away purely for adventure, not through hatred of this country, and I do not think they can be accused of cowardice. We can see the account they have rendered of themselves on different battlefields. They fought bravely, and many of them died. Some of them are maimed for life. We cannot say that they would be guilty of cowardice.

Let the past bury itself and let us look to the future. As time goes by, people here will begin to realise that they have a country and a flag. It takes a long time for people who have had the experience of a revolution to become patriotic and loyal. I do not believe they will be really loyal to our flag and our Government for at least 50 years. We are in the transition stage. We are coming out of a revolutionary period when everything was topsy-turvy. Half the people do not properly know where they stand. With the reading of history, the history of comparatively recent times, our people, in my opinion, will be more banded together and more loyal. Fifteen or 20 years from now I believe you will have no such thing as men deserting and going into other armies, because loyalty to this country will be ingrained in their hearts.

When you come to think of it, up to recent years nothing was taught to the people but disloyalty. First of all, they were taught to be disloyal to the British in order to get them out by hook or by crook. We had to do many things in those days in order to hide our comrades. That type of feeling is ingrained even in our children and it will take time to get shut of it. Even in the period after we got the British out, we had to do some conjuring among ourselves, trying to get loyalties to the old Republican Army on one side or the other. These things were bad for the nation, but now all that has passed. There is very little prospect of any civil strife in this country. I think that has gone for ever. We may have our political tussles here and there, but generally we will all be loyal to our country and our Army, no matter what side we take. In that respect one side of this House will be as good as the other.

Times have changed. Now we must cut our clothes according to our measure. Our people are not able to afford a big Army and they cannot carry taxation as they have done in recent years. It is unfair for the Minister to ask this generation to carry 12,000 soldiers on their backs. Peace in the world will come and it is not fair to ask our people to carry what I consider is an unnecessary burden. A small foundation Army, well trained and equipped and well paid, will be able to rally in a very short time all the young manhood of Ireland behind it in proper fighting trim.

This is not a vast country and, from the point of view of military equipment, we are not very advanced. We are not able to produce a .22 bullet or even a shot-gun cartridge. It is terrible to think that all the equipment that our soldiers used in past years came from across the water. All the leather and web equipment, the boots, shot-guns, rifles and everything else, came across. It shows you how dependent we are on the other side. You could have 50,000 men, fully trained to the highest pitch, and we could not put a shot-gun cartridge into their hands, not to mind a shot-gun, were it not for our neighbour across the water.

That is one of the aspects we should consider. We are wholly dependent on our nearest neighbour for the equipment of our Army. Even if they were sour and sulky, they made sure to equip our Army fairly well, because they knew that if "Jerry" came here we would fight him and, in fighting him, we would be fighting Britain's battle as well, whether we liked it or not. That is why our men were equipped. They sent us everything for that purpose—petrol, rifles and big guns. With that phase passed, and a chance of our people getting back to a normal, healthy and quiet life, the Minister should cut the Army down by 50 per cent., down at least to 6,000 or 8,000 men. That would be quite enough for our needs.

I must congratulate the Minister on all that he has done during the period in which he has been in charge of the Army. I believe he treated the soldiers well. They like him and I like him for it. I think he gave them more consideration than some of the men who were over me in the old days here gave their soldiers.

The type of discussion which was initiated by Deputy O'Higgins was, I am afraid, rather slavishly followed by many of the Deputies who followed him. He rather seemed to suggest, and I think Deputy Mulcahy supported him later on in the suggestion, that there was something mysterious or something extraordinary in respect to Army policy. There is nothing very extraordinary about Army policy. I am afraid that Deputy O'Higgins, and perhaps Deputy Mulcahy as well, are mixing up external policy with Army policy. They want me to dilate on one as against the other. Well, I do not propose to do that. All I propose to do is to deal with Army policy in a very simple manner, by saying that the Army policy of to-day is practically the same policy as that which has existed since the Army was established; in other words—in fact, in the words which Deputy O'Higgins himself used—to have a small Army, highly trained, a hard core around which other organisations could be built up and made efficient.

That is the policy which operates to-day and there is nothing extraordinary about it. There is nothing to elaborate on. I cannot elaborate on it anyhow, because the policy is too simple. If they disagree with me, as they do, in respect of the strength of the Army, that is another matter. It is a matter upon which we can agree to disagree, if I may be paradoxical. The position in respect of our desire to have an Army of 12,500 men is based on the fact that the pre-war Army, which was a little over the 6,000 mark, was doing 24 hours' guard duty out of 48. In other words, when we talked about these men being highly trained, highly efficient and highly skilled soldiers, we were not talking facts, for the simple reason that the only skill these men had, with the exception of the skill derived from a short period during the summer when they were brought out for a week's or a fortnight's manoeuvres, was in respect of doing sentry duty on the various posts around the country.

If we want to get what I presume the former Government were aiming at and what, in my opinion, they failed to secure, but what we are now aiming at and what we hope to secure, we must, so to speak, double the strength of the Army, in order that we may not have that abominable practice of men doing guard duty for the whole period of their army careers. The only solution is to increase the strength of the Army. We are doing that, and it is not based on any haphazard methods, as was suggested by Deputy Cogan. It was done in conference with the Army authorities after careful examination and approved by the Government, also after serious consideration.

Deputy O'Higgins made remarks in respect to the speeches made by members of the present Government when they were in Opposition and he went out of his way to compliment the particular Deputies—they were then Deputies—who made those speeches. He pointed out that they had talked sound commonsense. Of course, I know that he was using these phrases to suit his own purpose, but what Deputy O'Higgins fails to realise is that he appears to be living in the past. The speeches to which he referred were made from 15 to 20 years ago and the country at that time was well out of the period of the Great War. There was at that time throughout the world a belief that there would not be another world war in that generation, and it may or may not have been reasonable to have made the statements which were then made; but surely Deputy O'Higgins or any other member of the Opposition will not suggest that speeches made 20 years ago are strictly applicable to the situation which exists to-day. I do not believe for a second that any Deputy opposite will insist on that.

We are living to-day, unfortunately, in the aftermath of a world war, an aftermath completely and entirely different from that of the previous world war, and we know that every nation in the world is deeply concerned about the possibilities of the future peace of the world. I think it will be understood, and generally agreed, that the peace which we are enjoying to-day is a very uneasy peace, and I feel that as a Government we are justified in taking the necessary precautions, the precautions which we deem to be necessary, to safeguard, so far as a small nation like ours can, the rights and liberties of our people. That, in fact, is all we are doing. That is my answer to the case made by Deputy O'Higgins in respect to the speeches made from 15 to almost 20 years ago.

Deputy Dillon in his speech, which savoured much more of a lecture than of a Second Reading speech on this Bill, suggested that if we thought that this Army would be of any use, we were suffering from self-delusion. I am prepared to back our opinions against Deputy Dillon's. If we had accepted Deputy Dillon's opinions ten years ago, we would not be growing our own foodstuffs to-day. We would be trying to depend on foodstuffs brought into this country, as was suggested by a Front Bench member of the Opposition during the emergency, in American bottoms. Everybody in the House knows as well as I do how frivolous that statement was, and how hopeless it would have been for this nation to have relied on any foodstuffs which could have been brought into this country during the period of the emergency.

He also seemed to me to be slipping because when I hear a man talking of the halcyon days of the past and of the glories of the First Battalion, a battalion which existed, I presume, about 20 years ago, and suggesting that the Army of to-day should be built up on the First Battalion, all I can say is that I am afraid he is behind the times. I imagine that the soldiers of to-day would be rather amused by that suggestion.

With, I suppose, practically only one exception there has been no criticism of the Bill itself. It is quite possible that it may come on the Committee Stage, but the only section which has been referred to in a critical way is Section 13. I regret very much that it was necessary to take the action we had to take in respect of these men who deserted this nation in a period of crisis. There is no use in saying, as Deputy Dillon suggested, that these men went out to fight and to die, if necessary. The Deputy pointed to the bravery and courage that that called forth. Deputy Dillon does not know, any more than I do, whether these men went to join a foreign army or went to England to secure employment.

The fact is that they deserted this nation, and deserted their comrades in a moment of crisis. I do not think— and I say this in all seriousness—that we did anything that could be regarded as vindictive in bringing in the Emergency Powers Order which was brought in. Indeed, if these men had been tried by court-martial and dealt with through the medium of courts-martial many of them would have received very severe sentences. It was not deemed feasible to hold courts-martial on the large number, even if they could be apprehended. A question would arise as to whether they could be apprehended, or be apprehended for a long period of years. Pressure was being put on me by Deputies to remove the existing restriction which prevented these men entering this country. In deference to the demands which were made that was the only alternative. We operated that alternative rather than prevent these men returning to this country. They are not being prevented from earning a living. That should be clearly understood. What they are being prevented securing is employment, either under the State or any of the organisations subsidised by the State. Whatever number of vacancies exist will be held for the men who served this nation loyally. The others are perfectly entitled to secure work if they can get it on their merits. I do not think there is anything very drastic in respect to the section.

Deputy Cosgrave, I am sure unintentionally, made a gross misstatement when he said that a quarter of the Army had deserted. I do not know on what ground he based that statement. It is certainly an error or a misquotation, because it could not possibly be true. At his request I gave the Deputy the figures some time ago, and I think they were between 3,000 and 4,000. I am not quite sure what the figures were, but the strength of the Army was 35,000, so that when the Deputy stated that quarter of the Army had deserted he said something that was not correct.

The Minister is understanding the figures.

I do not think so.

I think the Minister will find that he is.

I am quoting figures which I have been given. I will be quite prepared to admit it openly if I did not give the figures as correctly as I should have given them. The figures that I have been given are roughly around the 4,000 mark. I am sure it is not going to be suggested that one quarter of the 35,000 men deserted from the forces, because it would not be correct.

Question put and agreed to.
Committee Stage ordered for Wednesday, March 13th, 1946.
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