In Committee on Finance. - Turf Development Bill, 1945—Committee.
Sections 1 to 7 put and agreed to.
SECTION 8.
I move amendment No. 1:—
In sub-section (1), line 20, to delete the word "five" and substitute therefor the word "three".
The purpose of this amendment is to elicit from the Minister some idea of Government policy in relation to the constitution of the new board under this Bill, and also, perhaps, he might be good enough to give us some indication of the duties to be performed by the different members of the board, their functions generally, and the number of meetings which they have to attend, so that the House can appreciate the nature of their duties and responsibilities and come to some conclusion as to the necessity for as many as five members. There is nothing to indicate the type of qualification which may be necessary to render a person eligible for membership of the board. It seems to me that the Bill should contain some indication of the technical qualifications which members of such a board should have. The ideal system would be to have a board comprised of experts, persons who, by training and experience, are competent to look after the development of turf.
This board will be constituted as any other business board to run this particular enterprise. It is not intended that the members of the board will have executive duties. The board, as such, will be responsible for the conduct of the undertaking and it will be composed of people with qualifications of such a character as to make a team suitable to direct the undertaking.
I do not know if I understood properly from the Deputy's question that he contemplates a board constituted in some respects like the Electricity Supply Board, the members of which have executive as well as directorial duties. That is not intended. The board will be something like that associated with a private commercial undertaking, in the sense that it will direct the activities of the executive staff employed by it but will not itself discharge executive functions, excepting the managing director, who will be the chief executive officer of the undertaking.
In the selection of the members of the board, the Government will have to be concerned to secure such a combination of qualifications and experience as will ensure a good board, fully competent to run the undertaking.
Section 16 prescribes that the board may exercise and perform any of its functions through or by the managing director or through or by any of its officers or servants authorised by the board in that behalf. That suggests that the board has some particular functions which are likely to be transferred to those officers or servants and for that reason I wanted some information as to the necessity for five members and if there was an intention on the part of the board that its functions should be performed by subordinates.
Section 16 is a general provision. For example, the recruitment of workers for bog development might be entrusted to the bog manager and would not be done by the board. They could delegate functions of that kind to the staff responsible for carrying out the work.
How often will the board meet?
It is not intended to put any statutory obligation on the board in that connection. It will meet as often as it is necessary to discharge its functions.
How often does the board meet now?
It meets weekly ordinarily, but there may be occasions when it might have to meet specially.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 2:—
To add a new sub-section as follows:—
(4) At least one member of the board shall be a person with experience in the trade union movement who will represent the workers engaged in turf production.
The reason for the amendment is that on other boards there are representatives of trade unions and it was suggested that in this case there might be greater harmony and co-operation if you have a representative of a trade union.
I am not in favour of this amendment, but I do not want that to imply any opinion that a person experienced in the trade union movement would not make a worthy director of a board of this kind. I think it is undesirable to limit the discretion of the Government in the selection that it will make. I feel sure that if this amendment were accepted we would, on the next stage, have a number of amendments by other Deputies who would urge that one or more members of the board should have qualifications of another kind. I think it is desirable that the Government should have discretion in the selection of members, its aim being to secure, as I have already stated, a team that will possess between them all the qualifications required. Although I can see the force of the argument advanced by the Deputy, I feel it is undesirable that it should be made a statutory obligation on the Government to appoint one member of the board with the qualification suggested here.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed: "That Section 8 stand part of the Bill."
I notice the word "Government" is used on no less than three occasions in the section and in other sections in the same part of the Bill the word "Minister" is used. Is there any difference between the actions of the Government and the actions of the Minister?
I hope not. Where the Minister is entitled to act on his own responsibility he does not have to consult the Government. In this case it is intended that the Government should have the appointment of the members of the board. That puts the board into a somewhat different relationship with the Minister than it would be in if the Minister himself were responsible for its appointment. The Deputy will appreciate that where the appointment derives from the Government the board is in a somewhat more independent position vis-à-vis the Minister than if it held office at his discretion and on his appointment.
It then becomes a matter for the Cabinet?
In the matter of the ordinary direction of the board. To the extent that the Government will interfere, the Government will act through the Minister in all matters of detailed administration.
As regards the board. will the members be collectively responsible to the Government? That is to say, assuming that a question of policy arises in regard to the operation of the company, if a majority decide on certain action and a minority is inclined to take a different course and if the action taken by the board does not meet with the approval of the Government, would it be possible that all the members of the board would be removed?
That is not quite the position.
Is the position much the same as that of members of the Government?
It is in this respect, that the Government would not ordinarily know the discussion that takes place at board meetings or whatever divisions of opinion there might be. The decisions of the board would be known to the Government, but whether they were unanimous decisions or majority decisions would not be known. At the same time, I should like to have it understood that members of the board would be individually responsible in the sense that if they neglected their duty or acted in an irresponsible manner they could, as individuals, be either removed from the board under another section or not reappointed when their term of office expired.
Or if a particular member was an obstructionist or was acting against the interests of the board?
In that case as an individual he could be either removed if the circumstances were grave enough or not reappointed.
Will all the members be appointed for the same period of office?
I should imagine so. That has been the practice in other cases. We might exempt the managing director who is a whole-time officer and would be given a more formal type of contract.
Question put and agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 9 stand part of the Bill."
Is it the intention that members of the board will hold office at the pleasure of the Government? Paragraph 3 of the section reads:—
"Each member of the board shall hold office on such terms (other than the payment of remuneration and allowances for expenses) as shall be fixed by the Government at the time of his appointment."
The term will be fixed at the time of appointment. He will be appointed for a term of three years, or whatever time the Government may think proper. He would not be liable to be removed within that term except under the provisions of Section 11 which deals with the removal of members.
Can the Minister give any indication of what remuneration members of the board will receive?
That has not been decided. It will be the normal directors' fees in companies of this kind.
I think in other companies the fees are from £150 to £250 a year. The fees are in or about that figure.
Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 10.
I move amendment No. 10:—
In sub-section (2), page 5, line 55, to substitute the word "of" for the word "or" where the latter word first occurs in the line.
This is a drafting amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 10 agreed to.
SECTION 11.
Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 might be discussed together.
The amendments were:—No. 4, Section 11:—
Before sub-section (2) to insert a new sub-section as follows:—
(2) If and whenever a member of the board is or becomes a member of either House of the Oireachtas he shall be disqualified from holding and shall cease to hold office as a member of the board.—(Deputy Coogan).
No. 5, Section 12:—
Before Section 12 to insert the following new section:—
Every member of the board shall, while holding office as such member, be disqualified from being nominated or elected and from sitting or receiving payment as a member of Dáil Éireann or Seanad Éireann.— (Deputy Davin).
I move amendment No. 4.
Amendment No. 5 in the name of Deputy Davin is a good deal different from mine. I consider it undesirable that a member of either House of the Oireachtas should be a member or a director of any subsidiary body which is financed from public funds. The main argument in support of my contention is that if members of the Oireachtas are eligible for such boards, it must be presumed that they got there by reason of their political position in a particular Party, by reason of their influence in that Party and, perhaps, by reason of their influence with the particular Minister in power for the time being. I consider from that angle that it is objectionable that members of the Oireachtas should be eligible for companies of this kind, which are set up by an Act of the Oireachtas and are financed by funds raised by the Oireachtas. The vocational commission went into this matter very fully and recommended very emphatically that persons on boards of this kind should be selected from those with technical qualifications, people whose training, experience and competence render them fit to perform the peculiar technical functions appropriate to the particular board. They considered that it was highly objectionable that members of the Oireachtas should be open for appointment on such a board, on the grounds that such an appointment de facto suggested to the public that it was made, not on the ground of technical competence or efficiency, or technical experience or qualifications, but rather because of political services rendered. This board is not exactly in the position of having to account to the Comptroller and Auditor-General for its administration, nevertheless its accounts will be presented to this House, and by reason of that fact it is indirectly responsible to the Comptroller and Auditor-General. I think that is an additional reason why politicians should not be eligible for the board. There may be cases where a politician has technical qualifications, and might be considered desirable as an engineering colleague, nevertheless I think it is a right and proper safeguard that politicians, generally speaking, should not be eligible for bodies of this kind. In my view the board should be selected entirely of men with engineering qualifications, chemical qualifications and, perhaps, men with experience in fuel problems.
I am going to ask the Dáil to oppose this amendment although I agree with Deputy Coogan that his proposition is in a less objectionable form than that in the amendment of Deputy Davin. I think there are, as a rule, sound practical reasons against the appointment of members of the Dáil on the boards of companies of this kind. I do not think the objections advanced by Deputy Coogan are really valid, but there are others which, I think, make it undesirable as a general rule, that Deputies or members of the Oireachtas should be on this type of board. One practical consideration occurs to me, one which arose in the past and caused some difficulty, associated with the presence in the House of somebody who is in a position to be questioned and to answer questions about an organisation of this kind, other than the Minister who is directly and immediately responsible. That situation, as the House will appreciate, could lead to difficulties and is, in my opinion, a good reason why members of the Dáil should not be appointed to boards of this character, unless they possess very unusual qualifications, which may make them eminently suitable members, in a degree which overrides the other objection to which I referred.
In connection with organisations of this kind, the Government has given very careful consideration to this issue and it is one upon which it has not come to a final decision. In the course of discussion with members of the Dáil and Seanad and of various Parties and sections in both Houses, I found a very deep resentment on occasion of the implication involved in the introduction of provisions of this kind in legislation and I think that there is some basis for that resentment. The practice of the Government, both the present and its predecessors in office, in this respect, has varied most remarkably. I think it is true to say that when our predecessors established the Agricultural Credit Corporation they appointed members of the Oireachtas solely to the board of that organisation in the first instance. On the other hand, when they enacted the Electricity Supply Act they inserted therein a clause which debarred members of the Electricity Supply Board from election to the Dáil and went much further by debarring any employee of the Electricity Supply Board from membership of the Dáil. I do not know that that second provision was altogether water-tight because, in the course of time, an employee of the Electricity Supply Board succeeded in obtaining election to the Dáil as a member of the Labour Party and took his seat here for a time. The present Government has also varied its practice. A provision of this kind appears in the Tourist Traffic Act but does not appear in other Acts establishing organisations of a similar character, such as the recently passed National Stud Act. The view of the Government can largely be summed up by this phrase—we regard the introduction of provisions of this kind in legislation as undersirable but we regard it as equally undesirable that members of the Oireachtas should as a general practice be appointed to boards of this kind. In principle it is against this limitation; in practice it would ordinarily tend to proceed as if the limitation were in the Acts.
I should like to suggest to the Dáil that it is desirable that this whole issue of membership of this House by persons who are ordinarily employed by authorities or organisations supported out of public funds should be examined by an inter-Party committee or some other tribunal of inquiry. Having regard to the different courses adopted in the past, to the fact that no uniform practice has evolved in the course of time and to the obvious implications of the issue, I think we should make an attempt to see whether we cannot get some agreed statement of principles that would apply in all cases.
I am going to resist the introduction of this provision here, but in doing so I would make it known that the Government would welcome a proposal from the House to establish some inquiry into this whole issue with a view to ascertaining whether it is possible to get agreement upon what should be the practice. Clearly, an inquiry of that kind would have to extend over a somewhat wider field than membership of boards of organisations of this character, because in so far as there is a principle involved at all, it clearly applies not merely in their case but in that of any other person who in any case is remunerated out of public funds or employed by organisations that were supported out of public funds. So far as this board is concerned, I am letting it be known that I would in the normal course regard it as good practice to confine membership to people who were not members of the Oireachtas. I do not know whether the Government when they come to make the appointments under Section 9 will consider that there is a case for an exception here. At the same time, I am resisting the imposition of this statutory limitation. I think that before we go further in devising these statutory limitations upon the activities of members of the Dáil, or upon the classes of persons who may be elected to the Dáil, we should have some examination of the principles involved in the wider issue and it is, I think, undesirable that we should proceed in a piece-meal manner. We have proceeded in the past in a piece-meal manner and we have not succeeded in establishing any uniform practice. As I have mentioned, different principles were applied in different cases, for no apparent reasons, by both Governments, and if we are now to attempt to establish a practice, I think we should, before doing so, have a much deeper examination than is possible in this House on the issues that will arise.
I think the Minister said we had not succeeded in establishing uniform practice in this connection. I think we have. I think both Deputy Coogan and the Minister are mistaken in talking about this being a disqualification of members of the Oireachtas. Speaking from recollection, I do not know that any member of the Dáil, as distinct from the Seanad, was ever appointed to a board of this type. I do not know why the distinction was made but my recollection goes back a pretty long way as far as appointments of this kind are concerned and I do not think that on any occasion any member of the Dáil, as distinct from the Seanad, was appointed to a board such as this, certainly to a board where there was any fee, large or small, being paid. I am inclined to agree with the Minister that there is a much wider principle at stake in this matter than is covered by the amendment. I do not agree with the Minister, however, that what he is talking about, that is, members of boards or employees of boards, or employees of public authorities being eligible for election to the Oireachtas, is quite the same thing as an existing member of the Oireachtas being appointed to a particular board. I do not think it is quite the same thing. I do think that there is a case there for examination. Unquestionably, there is a lot to be said on both sides, for and against. I think one safeguard you might have is that, if members of the Oireachtas are to be appointed to boards such as this, they should be drawn exclusively from the Opposition.
I agree with the Minister that we have built up a rather higgledy-piggledy practice in respect of the variety of State-capitalised boards or services which have been constructed here over the past 20 years and that the practice varied so much that there is nothing uniform about the matter, but I do not quite understand the reason for the extent of the inquiries suggested by the Minister. I think the whole public complaint in this matter is that somebody who is well in with the Government that is in power—I am not making any political capital out of this because it was done by the previous Government as well as by this Government—can somehow or other contrive to get membership of some of these boards and it is that type of practice that leaves a taste on the public mouth. This amendment and the amendment in the name of Deputy Davin seek to get rid of that undesirable practice to the extent that it has existed in the past. Both Governments carried out that practice. The Minister knows that and members of the previous Government know that. Probably, under pressure of circumstances at the time, they could not help it but I am sure both Governments would be glad to be disarmed of powers which jockeyed them into that position. I think it is desirable to get rid of that practice. I do not mind what Government it is—I am not saying it in any sense of political bitterness—it ought to divest itself of this power to put a pal who is a member of the Oireachtas on a board of this kind, because I think it leaves a bad taste. I do not think it makes for good administration on the board. I do not think the person who is appointed has the slightest bit of independence in relation to the functions of the board, except such independence as a dog gets when his master lets the lead out. It is to end that practice that this amendment is aimed at and to that extent I think it is desirable. I agree that it cannot be discussed independently of the kind of disjointed practice we have built up in the past. Speaking personally, if the Minister would get an all-Party committee to examine the question of how far members of the Oireachtas should, whilst members of the Oireachtas, be permitted to be members of boards such as the one we are setting up, I would be quite satisfied to have the matter examined in that way, hoping, however, that in the meantime, pending the report of the committee, the Minister would not build up any vested interests by appointing a member of the Oireachtas to this board. I agree that the practice needs clarification. From what the Minister said, I think he realises that the practice needs clarification and, so far as I can judge, I think the Minister is not favourable to what has happened in the past, even though circumstances may to some extent coerce him into doing something which gives the practice a sort of new growth. If the Minister is prepared to have the general question examined by an all-Party committee, I think there would be general public approval for that procedure. In the meantime, perhaps, we could agree to let this matter remain over pending the report of a committee of that kind.
I think the Government will welcome the proposal to establish such an inquiry, but I would like to suggest that if any party or Deputy is going to undertake the task of submitting a proposal the inquiry will want to be somewhat wider in scope than is indicated by Deputy Norton's remarks. I think that if we are to deal with this issue at all we should try to deal with the whole of it and not confine the inquiry to the appointment of members of boards of this character but should extend it to persons employed in any capacity which means that they are directly or indirectly paid out of public funds. I mentioned the requirement of the Electricity Supply Act as an illustration of my point. That Act goes much further than this proposed amendment here, because it debars from election to the Oireachtas any employee of the board. Is it desirable or it is not desirable that the provisions should remain in respect of the Electricity Supply Board's employees or that they should be extended to cover the employees of Bórd na Móna or any similar organisation established by the State? Perhaps there may be even a desire to consider the application of the principle to employees of local authorities or other persons who might have a personal financial interest in the form of legislation here. I do not want to indicate myself how wide the inquiry might go, but I think it is desirable that we should make some attempt to get agreed principles which could be adhered to in all cases in the future and adopted here in the Dáil without discussion when legislation of this kind is under review.
There are two points raised in connection with this matter. The first is the need for a general investigation as to the restrictions that may or may not be placed upon members of this House. That is one consideration. But there is another raised by Deputy Norton and that is whether some restriction should be placed upon the Government in regard to making appointments to boards of this kind because it is possible that a person might be appointed to a board such as this who would be politically very closely associated with the Party in power but not a member of this House. For example, the Government in power might be under a deeper obligation politically to a man who is not a member of the House, possibly a man who has given service to the Party, or who stood down in the interest of a certain candidate. There is a danger that such a person might find favour with the Government in power and thus gain appointment to such a board. That is why I think there should be some restriction placed on the Government in regard to the type of person they would appoint, or, at any rate, that there should be some independent technical body to place on a panel the names of persons who would be eligible for appointments on boards such as this. Therefore, there are, as I say, two general questions to be considered. The first is whether we should place restrictions on members of this House; and, secondly, whether there should be some selection board to nominate persons who would be put on boards of this kind by the Government.
I think the Deputy will have difficulty in devising safeguards against dangers of that kind. In effect the only safeguard there is lies in the responsibility of the Government to the House and to the public. If it does its work properly, it will presumably continue to receive public support. If it makes a mess of its work, because of bad appointments or otherwise, it will not matter what system of selection we devise the possibility of allegations of political influence being at work will always be there. I think it is true to say that not even the Civil Service Commissioners or the Local Appointments Commissioners have always succeeded in making appointments in relation to which allegations could not be made. It has frequently happened, as we are aware, probably without any foundations. But because opinions on the merits of individuals will always be as numerous as those forming the opinions, there is always the likelihood that somebody will say that the best person was not appointed for wrong reasons. I think that in matters of this kind it is inevitable that the Government must be given a discretion. It is equally inevitable that it will be alleged that the Government are influenced by political considerations. The mere fact that the Government propose the establishment of some project in which they believe, which may not find unanimous acceptance in the House but is put into force by a majority vote, means that the Government in seeking to establish that enterprise will naturally confine its choice to those who believe in its wisdom and who are anxious to demonstrate its wisdom by its successful operation. On that account it is almost certain that any Government will be limited in its choice to people on whose whole-hearted co-operation they can rely. However, that is a somewhat wider issue, but in that case I doubt if there is any safeguard possible other than the safeguard of public opinion. On the narrow issue raised by the amendment, it is obviously desirable that we should get a uniform practice. Apart altogether from the desirability of having this issue determined, it would be a protection for Ministers and the Government generally to have a uniform practice.
The House is aware that in the recent Seanad election a member of one of these boards who was elected to the Seanad was disqualified because of a provision in the Act establishing that board which made it ineligible for him to seek election. A member of another board was elected to the Seanad and sits inactive as a member of the Seanad because in the relevant Act there was no such provision. In the case of a board for which I have a certain responsibility, although that provision was not in the Act, when the member of the board was elected as a member of the Dáil I asked him to resign because I regarded it as a bad practice, whatever the principle may be, that there should be in the Dáil a person who, as I mentioned already, could be questioned about the affairs of that undertaking and be in a position to answer concerning the affairs of that undertaking. It is, I think, true to say that members of the Dáil were appointed while members of boards of this kind. I think I am correct in saying that the Board of the Agricultural Credit Corporation was originally composed entirely of members of the Oireachtas.
I do not think so. I think the Minister is mistaken in that.
I have Senator Baxter in mind, but whether he was a Senator or a member of the Dáil at the time, I am not quite sure.
I do not think he was a member of either House.
However, the board originally was composed entirely of members of the Oireachtas.
Is the Minister sure of that?
I am fairly certain of it, but perhaps I should not be so definite because I am speaking from recollection, but from what I believe is correct recollection. However, it is desirable to get a uniform practice, and we could not impose this restriction in this way until we have that uniform practice. When we have that uniform practice, we can enact a sort of general Bill which will apply to all these undertakings and bring them all into line, such as the Electricity Supply Board, the Tourist Board and other boards upon which restrictions of this kind are imposed and all other boards upon which these restrictions are not imposed. That is why I suggested we should have such an inquiry and intimated that the Government would welcome a motion to that effect tabled by any member of the House.
Could the Minister say what are the reasons, if any, for the discrimination as against members of the Dáil in respect of appointment and in favour of members of the Seanad?
I do not think there is any. I could not think of one.
Accepting for the moment what the Minister has said about the first board of the Agricultural Credit Corporation, I think it is true to say that not in the last 20 years has a member of this House, as distinct from the Seanad, been appointed to any such board.
That is true, I think, so far as statutory boards are concerned, but there certainly are cases of boards of companies constituted——
Is it a matter of deliberate policy?
No, it was not. In my capacity as Minister, I ordinarily follow the policy of not appointing members of the Oireachtas on these boards for the practical reason I mentioned. I have no objection to it in principle, and if I thought there was a member of the Oireachtas with outstanding qualifications or experience, I would regard them as overriding the practical objection I mentioned, but the only case I can think of in which I did in fact appoint a member of the Dáil on a board was in connection with an enterprise which never came to fruition, in respect of which the Government had the right of nominating a director for the purpose of holding a watching brief in the undertaking which was to be started primarily as a private enterprise. That particular Deputy is dead and the undertaking with which he was associated is dead also.
In view of the Minister's suggestion that an all-Party committee should be set up to investigate the whole principle of appointments of this nature, I withdraw the amendment, with this reservation, that I do not think the terms of reference of that committee should be so wide as to be calculated to deprive any citizen, whether a public official or a local official, of his constitutional rights to seek the franchise. I gather from the Minister's remarks that the intention might be to consider the whole question of the eligibility of local authority officials.
The Deputy is aware that there are people who hold divergent views on that matter and that all of them urge their views strongly. I think we should try to get an examination of the principles involved, as well as the practical consequences of applying those principles.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed: "That Section 11 stand part of the Bill."
What exactly is the Government as set out in sub-section (1) of Section 11? How does one address a letter to the Government?
If you address it to "Government, Dublin", and put a 2½d. stamp on it, I think it would arrive.
Suppose a letter is addressed to the Minister for submission to the Government, does it conform exactly to the procedure laid down? Suppose a director of this board resigns and does not address a letter to the Government, or thinks he is addressing a letter to the Government in addressing it to the Minister, does he comply with the sub-section?
It would probably have the same effect.
It might, but it might be that the election or co-option of the director to take his place would be improper on that account. It is very difficult to know what the Government is. We know what the Government does.
It is a corporate body, with a seal, which can act as a unit and generally does act as a unit. It can sue and be sued as such.
Would one address the letter to the Taoiseach or to the Secretary?
There is a Secretary to the Government.
Would it not then be better to set out in the section that the letter must be addressed to the Secretary of the Government?
I think that is the correct form. The member is appointed by the Government and, therefore, presumably, his resignation, if he wants to resign, should be addressed to the Government.
If the Minister is satisfied that the arrangement is watertight, I am satisfied.
Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 12.
Amendment No. 5 not moved
Question proposed: "That Section 12 stand part of the Bill."
What exactly constitutes "any interest in any company or concern with which the board proposes to make any contract"? It is possible that every member of a board might have a few shares in some company with which the board would be dealing. Would that constitute an interest?
It would. If a member of the board was a shareholder in a company with which the board proposed to make a contract, that member would be required to disclose to the board the fact of such an interest and the nature of it and take no part in any deliberation or decision of the board relating to such contract.
And in the event of all the members of the board having shares?
I think the board could not do business with that company, and it is probably right to say that they could not.
If a member of the board was a director of a particular company, does such directorship constitute an interest?
It might hold the board up completely.
Of course, if they were all shareholders in the railway company, they would certainly have to make some contract with that company.
Question put and agreed to.
Sections 13 and 14 agreed to.
SECTION 15.
I move amendment No. 6:—
In sub-section (2), line 51, after the word "servant" to add the following words: "on prescribed grounds of incapacity, inefficiency, or misconduct."
Section 15 (2) sets out that the board may at any time remove any officer or servant of the board from being such officer or servant. In other words, the officers and servants of the board appear to hold office at the pleasure of the board. There is no restriction imposed on the board to suggest that they should even give some grounds for removing an officer or servant. Certainly the tenure of office appears to be most precarious, and I have put down this amendment to ensure that the board will not have power to remove officers or servants, except "on prescribed grounds of incapacity, inefficiency or misconduct". It is rather unusual that, without reason assigned, a board of this kind, set up under an Act of the Oireachtas, should have such arbitrary and dictatorial power as to be able to remove any officer or servant without cause assigned, without giving a reason of any kind.
The Deputy will understand that an individual officer of the board may only accept employment with it on the basis of a contract which would protect him against summary dismissal or dismissal without cause, but the board will frequently employ people for a specific job and will terminate their employment when the job is finished. In fact, it is probably true to say that a number of the servants of this board will be employed for limited periods of time, for seasonal work or for temporary purposes. Clearly, we cannot put upon the board the restriction that they cannot dismiss anybody whom they have taken into their employment, except on the grounds of incapacity, inefficiency or ill-health. They must be in a position to dismiss them if they have no work for them to do. That would be the normal relations between employer and employee. In the case of technical staff, people who are normally employed on the basis of contract, there would be a protection for the individual employee in the terms of his contract. If he was employed subject to six or 12 months' notice, the board could not ignore the contract but would be obliged to give him notice or compensate him in accordance with the terms of the contract.
A considerable percentage of the officers and servants of the board will be permanent employees. I do not know whether it is intended eventually to provide a scheme of superannuation or pensions for those employees on the lines of the Electricity Supply Board scheme.
There is an amendment dealing with that.
What I had in mind was that permanent employees of that kind should have some fixity of tenure in their office.
The Deputy will remember that, in the case of the Electricity Supply Board, the legislation empowering them to operate a pension scheme was not enacted for some years after the board was established. I hope that this organisation will get over its teething troubles and will be working in such a manner as to justify confidence in its operation in the future, in which case I would agree that there should be a pension scheme. However, I think it is much too soon to put upon the board a statutory obligation to have a pension scheme, as it is still very much in the same position as the Electricity Supply Board was in in its early years, when the financial results of its work could not be calculated and it was undesirable to place upon it a continuing liability of a kind which it might conceivably not be within its power to meet when it arose. To the extent that I hold the view that all industrial enterprises of this character should, once they have become established, make provisions for retirement pensions for their permanent employees, I should wish to see the proposal made effective. There is nothing in this Bill to prevent it, but I would not think it desirable to put in the Bill at this stage a statutory obligation to establish such a scheme. As soon as their teething troubles are over and they are in production on a profitable basis and likely to stay that way, they should do so and probably will do so.
What amendment are we discussing?
This point really comes under amendment No. 9.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 7 not moved.
I move amendment No. 8:—
In sub-section (4), line 4, to delete the words "may, if it thinks fit" and substitute the word "shall".
Section 15 (4) prescribes that the board may, if it thinks fit, request the Local Appointments Commissioners to recommend a person for appointment. My amendment seeks to delete the words "if it thinks fit". Having regard to the fact that public moneys are being expended by this board, we should have some safeguard as to the type of person who may be appointed by the board and we should at least restrict them to the extent that all appointments, apart from ordinary casual labour, of officers or administrative personnel should be carried out through the offices of the Local Appointments Commissioners.
I think I can say that the board would be inclined to adopt that practice where the circumstances permit it. The effect of the Deputy's amendment would be to require the use of the Local Appointments Commission for all posts, even as labourers.
I understand that, but even in relation to clerical posts and supervisory grades, it is necessary to remember that the machinery of the Local Appointments Commission works very slowly. Normally, it would take three or four months, from the time these organisations would decide that the vacancy should be filled, before a recommendation would come from the Local Appointments Commission, which must go through a definite procedure involving the advertising of the post, the lapse of a certain period of time within which all applications have to be made, the establishing of an interviewing board, and so forth. For a commercial organisation, that procedure would be much too slow in the majority of cases, but there may be cases where permanent staff would be required, where the need for that staff can be foreseen at some time ahead and, in such cases, the board would ordinarily utilise the Local Appointments Commission. That is why they are given power to do so. It would be impracticable to require them to do so in all cases, as staff may frequently be needed for work of that character at much shorter notice.
Would the amendment not preclude the board from making promotions?
The Local Authorities (Officers and Employees) Act does permit of promotion, in certain cases.
If this amendment were accepted, it would prevent promotion by the board.
Would the Minister consider restricting the amendment to officers?
Even in the case of officers, the Deputy will understand it may not be possible to wait until the slow-moving machinery of the Local Appointments Commission has operated. This section need not have been in the Bill. We put it in because it is agreed between ourselves and the present Turf Development Board that the machinery of the commission should be used where it is practicable to use it. I think the Deputy need not be apprehensive that there will be any attempt to avoid it where it can be used.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 15 agreed to.
SECTION 16.
I move amendment No. 9:—
Before Section 16 to insert the following new section:—
(1) The board may and, if so required by the Minister, shall prepare and submit to the Minister within such time as he may direct, a scheme (in this section referred to as a superannuation scheme) for establishing on a contributory basis a superannuation fund for the benefit of the employees or any particular class of the employees of the board.
(2) Where a superannuation scheme is submitted to the Minister under sub-section (1) of this section, the Minister may refer the scheme back to the board for reconsideration and fresh submission or by Order confirm the scheme either without modification or with such modifications (whether by way of addition, omission or variation) as the Minister thinks proper.
(3) The board may whenever it thinks proper prepare and submit to the Minister a scheme (in this section referred to as an amending superannuation scheme) amending (whether by addition, omission or variation) a superannuation scheme confirmed by the Minister or amending (whether by addition, omission or variation) or revoking an amending superannuation scheme for the time being in force, and the provisions of sub-section (2) of this section shall apply and have effect in relation to every amending superannuation scheme.
(4) Before confirming any superannuation scheme or amending superannuation scheme, the Minister shall hear all parties desirous of being heard and appearing to him to be interested therein.
(5) No superannuation scheme or amending superannuation scheme shall become operative unless and until it has been confirmed by Order of the Minister but, upon being so confirmed, shall come into operation on the date specified in that behalf in the Order of the Minister confirming it and shall as on and from that date have the force of law in the form in which it was so confirmed.
(6) A fund set up for the purposes of a superannuation scheme shall be deemed to be set up under an irrevocable trust.
I move this for the purpose of getting clarification as to what is in the Minister's mind. He talked about the original pension provisions of the Electricity Supply Board and of the incipient teething difficulties of that body. Those difficulties were given as a reason why a superannuation scheme was not introduced speedily by the board. One can understand that point of view from the Minister. I think the board was pretty long in the tooth before it introduced a pension scheme, because it got authority to do it in the 1926 Act and nothing was done until 1945.
I do not think it was clear that they had not authority to do it under the 1926 Act.
In any case, nothing was done for 19 years. To have teething difficulties for 19 years is a pretty hefty dental process and I do not want to see this Turf Board jog along for the next 19 years, always wailing that its financial teeth are paining it and that it is not in a position to introduce a pension scheme for those serving it. There is some substance in what the Minister said, that this is to some extent an experiment, that it may be found to be an experiment which, in the light of results, is not justified and it may be necessary to alter the character of the appointments, to soft-pedal in certain directions and take on a new type of activity. All that raises a very large national question mark, as to whether this undertaking can take on the liabilities which may be imposed on it. Allowing for those possibilities, which must be guarded against, can the Minister say, in relation to time, what he has in mind regarding the introduction of a pension scheme? It would obviously be unfair if the board were allowed to get away with putting a pension scheme on the long finger, like the Electricity Supply Board.
I would say that when the time has arrived when it would be possible to declare, with some degree of definiteness, that the board is on a profit-making basis which ensures its continued operation, and when the staff of the board could be regarded as reasonably fixed in character, that proposition could be considered. At the present time, one could not say when the board will be working on a profit-making basis and one could not say, with any degree of definiteness, what staff it will require. We would require definite information on both points before we could fix a date upon which a pension scheme could be inaugurated. However, the Deputy may be sure, so far as I am concerned, that the board will be encouraged to establish such a superannuation scheme for its permanent employees as soon as it is reasonably practicable to do so.
I take it the Minister agrees that the board ought to provide a scheme of pensions for its employees at the earliest possible date?
As soon as it can be said to be out of its initial difficulties.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 16 put and agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 17 stand part of the Bill."
On Section 17, I want to raise again a point that I referred to on the Second Reading, relating to our problem in Kilkenny. I should like to know whether it will be possible to find any way out of the difficulty that we have in the matter of coal for household consumption.
Will the Deputy indicate how coal arises on Section 17?
The Deputy presumably is referring to the emergency control over coal.
I wonder whether the Minister will give us any concession, ours being a coal area.
I wish I could feel that we could keep up the present distribution of coal.
Does the Minister not consider it unfair that people who, from time immemorial, have gone to that coal pit, are now deprived of its use? We are in a hopeless position there.
We should be getting from Great Britain at least twice as much coal as we are getting, but I am afraid there is nothing I can do about it. However, the issue hardly arises here.
Would it be possible to give a small household ration to these people? There are people there unable to get any firing.
Although the issue does not arise, I may say that only this morning I had occasion to examine in detail our coal situation and it seems that it will be a matter of extreme difficulty to keep up the present supply of coal to the essential users, without bringing into the picture at all the people who would like to get coal and who have not been receiving it for some years.
Does that mean that the coal position is actually deteriorating instead of improving?
To some extent. The need for coal in certain quarters has increased. The requirements of big consumers like the Electricity Supply Board and the railway undertakings fluctuate according to certain circumstances.
We can take it that the Minister has made every effort to get coal?
The Minister will not put any obstacle in the way if we in Kilkenny, of our own volition, seek the coal where we are free to seek it?
I could not undertake that at all.
Where we have a right to look for the coal, I hope the Minister will not stop us in any way. I hope that he will give us every facility to get the coal. We will get it if he does not impose any impediment on us.
Question put and agreed to.
Section 18 put and agreed to.
SECTION 19.
I move amendment No. 10:—
Before Section 19, in page 8, but in Chapter I of Part III, to insert the following new section:—
It shall be the duty of the Minister from time to time to furnish to Dáil Éireann on the request of any member thereof such information regarding the policy or the finances of the board as shall be necessary for a proper understanding of the performance by the board of the functions and duties imposed on them by this Act.
There is provision made in this Bill whereby a report is to be furnished by the board as to its activities in the course of the year. That report will be laid on the Table of each House of the Oireachtas and Deputies may get from it such information as is contained therein. While that is all right in its own way, we have here and in the Electricity Supply Board legislation a situation developing in which, although the representatives of the people here are asked to vote very substantial sums to capitalise undertakings such as this board and the Electricity Supply Board, they are precluded from asking questions about the activities of the board and many aspects of the board's policy.
I am not in favour of putting the Minister in a position in which he has to answer for everything the Electricity Supply Board does, nor do I want to put him in the position to have to answer why the Turf Board did not do this or that. I do not think it reasonable that the board should be subject to any inquisition about its day-to-day or routine activities, and, whilst not favourably disposed towards nagging at the board in that way, at the same time I think that any Deputy in the House is entitled, when we are investing £3,750,000 in an undertaking of this kind, to ask from time to time such questions on the general policy of the board as, in the opinion of the Deputy concerned—the presumption being that he is a responsible Deputy—are reasonable in order to get information.
At present one cannot get information as to what is happening in various activities undertaken by the sugar company; one cannot get information on the policy of the Electricity Supply Board, except one raises the matter by means of a question when the annual report appears. Here we are continuing a similar and rather objectionable practice, namely, throwing, as it were, a kind of security silence over the activities of this board, unless one has the patience to wait to ventilate a grievance when the annual report of the board is produced. I think there ought to be a right, so far as the Oireachtas is concerned, to ask the Minister to procure from the board information on broad matters of policy in which the House is interested and in which a considerable number of citizens may be interested. It is only proper that that information should be made available to Deputies.
It may be the Minister fears that if you open the door in that way a Deputy might ask any number of questions about the most trivial details. I do not desire to see a situation of that kind developing, but neither do I desire to see an equally objectionable situation arising, namely, one in which the House will merely have the privilege of voting the money, and Deputies will have to keep their tongues in their cheeks for 12 months, notwithstanding how keenly they may feel that information should be made available. This amendment is put down for the purpose of placing the House in a position in which it can from time to time require the Minister to get from the board such information as one might reasonably expect.
I think the Deputy can rest assured that, in so far as it is desired to get information concerning the policy of the board, there will be no difficulty created. The issue that arises here, however, is where the responsibility of the Minister should begin and where it should end. Taking the case of the Electricity Supply Board, that organisation was established by statute with certain powers which it exercised independently of the Government. In 1927, when that Act was being passed, there was, I think, in the Dáil a general feeling in favour of making the board as independent of the Government as it was possible to make it. To the extent that the legislation succeeded in that aim, it is clear the Minister cannot be questioned about activities for which he is not responsible and certainly he could not be put in the position of defending here activities for which he is not responsible. That is the difficulty which has arisen in this connection in the past, where questions were asked which appeared to place on the Minister responsibility for what the board was doing.
Now, it is a different matter to ask the Minister to procure information from the board that the Dáil might reasonably expect to have. I do not think there has been a refusal to do that, but there has been a refusal on the part of Ministers to accept responsibilities which are not legally theirs. In the case of this particular board, it is desirable also that within the limits laid down by the Bill it should be free of Ministerial supervision. If we are to make the Minister responsible, the Minister must have power to ensure that the board will act in a manner that he is prepared to defend. That applies to the Electricity Supply Board, this board and other statutory authorities. Clearly, it would be unfair to make the Minister responsible without giving him power to see that things are as he desires them to be, and that the policy and activities of the board are such as he is prepared to defend. If you want to leave the organisation free of the Minister, and to give him no power to interfere in the administration, and in the determination of policy, then, clearly, you cannot make the Minister responsible for what it does. It is desirable that he should have the fullest possible information concerning the policy of the board in the general sense, of the commercial activities of the board and, particularly, concerning the financial consequences. We propose to provide that the Dáil will have the information in the annual accounts.
I think the House will agree that the report published this year by the Turf Development Board is a very valuable document, and gives all the information which members of the Dáil might reasonably require on the general results of its work. I can assure the House that, as far as it is desired to get from the board information of a general character, which the Dáil might reasonably ask for the purpose of knowing whether the board was properly discharging the functions given to it by legislation, there would be no difficulty. In so far as it might be desired to get information of the day-to-day affairs of the board, I am sure that will not be requested and, as far as it is desired to make the Minister responsible for the mistakes of the board, he must resist that tendency, except to the extent that the board is in fact subject to his supervision and direction. The Government will have the ultimate responsibility of saying: "we appointed individual members of the board and if they do not do their job properly then presumably the blame must come back to us". When they are appointed they are established in their posts and cannot be removed except for stated cause, or if they proceed to develop along lines of which the Government would not approve, it would not be within their power to reverse it until the question of reappointment arose. Although there are advantages and disadvantages in both courses I think the balance of the advantages lies in making those persons responsible to the Government.
This amendment, as the Minister realises, is not placing on him responsibility for the wisdom of the policy of the board, nor does it make him guarantor for the rectitude of the board's financial procedure. It merely puts on the Minister the obligation to furnish from time to time to the Dáil, on request, such information regarding the policy and the finances of the Board as would be necessary.
As far as the finances are concerned the Deputy wants an annual statement.
This amendment is drafted in such a way that it does not ask the Minister to stand sponsor for the board's wisdom or lack of it. It merely asks that any time a member of the Oireachtas wants some information regarding the finances of the board there is an obligation on the Minister to furnish it. I do not want to put the Minister in the position that he could say: "we are not going to set up this board and have not power over it". This merely asks the Minister to get the information we want.
I think that has been done.
It is just because it has not been done that we had a case like the sugar company.
The sugar company is in a different position. That company was established under the Companies Act and there are private shareholders. It is not like a statutory board such as the Electricity Supply Board.
I want to ensure that if we want information the Minister will get it from the board and furnish it to the House. If he says that he is satisfied that it can be provided by question and answer, if that is a convenient way to get such information as is asked, I am quite satisfied.
As far as getting information of that kind on questions of policy I undertake that will be done.
Supposing the board goes on to particular bogs and that they are closed down with the consequent disemployment of a number of people, surely the Minister should be entitled to ask why they were closed down?
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 19 agreed to.
SECTION 20.
I move amendment No. 11:—
In sub-section (2), lines 21 and 22, to delete the words "exercise its powers under paragraph (a) of sub-section (1) of this section" and substitute the words "manufacture for sale any plant, machine, apparatus or appliance".
This is a drafting amendment. As the section stood the board could not manufacture any plant or machinery for its own use.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 20, as amended, agreed to.
Amendment No. 12 not moved.
Section 21 agreed to.
SECTION 22.
I move amendment No. 13:—
Before Section 22 to insert the following new section:—
(1) The wages paid and the conditions of employment observed by the board shall be not less favourable to their employees than those required in the execution of contracts made with a Minister of State.
(2) The wages paid and the conditions of employment observed by a contractor, in the execution of any work performed by him for the board under a contract made in pursuance of the provisions of Section 21 of this Act shall be not less favourable to his employees than if the work were carried on under a contract between the Minister and such contractor containing a fair-wage clause similar to that for the time being contained in contracts made by Ministers and Government Departments.
(3) Any person who contravenes the provisions of this section shall be guilty of an offence under this section and shall be liable on conviction thereof to a fine not exceeding £100.
The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the board in relation to its employees should observe the fair-wages clause which is inserted in Government contracts, and where the board gets a contractor to carry out any work, that contractor should be likewise bound to observe the fair-wages clause, and to observe the conditions which he would be liable to observe if the contract were being carried out, not between the board and the contractor but between the Minister and the contractor. The Minister will agree that if we are going to have a satisfactory turf development scheme, one of the best ways to get a reasonable degree of satisfaction is to ensure to the staff employed by the board such rates of wages and the observance of such conditions of employment as will produce a contented staff.
Many of our national activities have not been blessed with a terrific amount of intelligence so far as handling of staff is concerned. We are all familiar with the Shannon scheme. It started under a cloud as dark as one could wish to see so far as its wage rates and conditions of employment were concerned. In the early days of the turf camps, as the Minister knows, there was considerable complaint about the wages and quality of the food supplied. Reasonable sagacity on the part of subsequent managers of the turf scheme ensured that the wages were increased and the standard of the food improved and, consequently, a greater degree of satisfaction permeated the work of exploiting our turf deposits. The object of this amendment is to ensure that in its relations with its staff the board will recognise the principles of the fair wages clause and shall feel itself all the time bound to act as a reasonably good employer and will not place itself in the position of offering rates of wages which are dictated by the pagan law of supply and demand, but that it will conform to a Christian concept of wage standards and pay rates of wages which are considered good on their merits and which take cognisance of the human requirements of the workers concerned. I feel sure that the Minister will have to acknowledge that in a national undertaking of this kind it is not desirable that it should be characterised by frequent disputes regarding low rates of wages, and I hope the Minister can see his way, therefore, to accept the amendment.
The Deputy will remember that a similar amendment to the Electricity Act of last year was resisted on the ground that it was undesirable to impose upon the Electricity Supply Board in that case or upon Bord na Móna in this case a statutory obligation that does not apply to employers generally. I do not think there is the slightest need for this amendment. If I thought there was I would certainly accept it. I feel a certain resentment of the suggestion that the board, in fact, would be a bad employer unless we make it a statutory obligation upon it to be a good employer. I think it is desirable from the point of the board's relations with its staff that it should be clear that to the extent that it observes good conditions and pays decent wages it is doing so because it regards it as good policy to do it and not because the law says it must do it. I would urge that this amendment should not be pressed. I think I can assure the House that the board will be a good employer and that it will ordinarily require those who are working for it under contract to observe what are recognised to be the standard rates of wages prevailing for the work involved. It is, of course, to be understood that in so far as the board's own work is concerned it will in fact be the only employer of labour doing that work in the country and consequently a basis of comparison with wages paid by other employers will not exist. In so far as contract work is concerned, the board is not likely to be contracting for constructional works of any kind; it will ordinarily do such works itself and most of the contracts it will enter into will be for the provision of manufactured machinery and equipment generally, in relation to which it is obviously impracticable to have the fair wages clause because the board could not be put under statutory obligation to inspect the conditions of employment in the firms manufacturing the machinery and offering it for sale in the ordinary way of commerce.
I urge that the amendment should not be pressed. I think I can assure the House that the introduction of the amendment in the Bill would make no difference to the practice of the board, that the practice of the board would at all times be such as to make it possible for it to say that it had carried out the letter of the law as prescribed in that amendment, if inserted in the Bill. I think, however, there is a real advantage in having the board in a position to say that its conditions of employment and general relationship with its workers are due to the fact that it desires to have good conditions of employment and good relations and not because we make it a matter of legal obligation upon it.
And is that the Minister's desire as well?
It is certainly my desire and I think I can assure the Deputy that in so far as my influence will operate in the matter it will be directed to ensure that this board will have the reputation of being a good employer.
Having had that written into the records of the House, I am satisfied.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 14:—
In sub-section (1), line 44, to delete the word and figure "sub-section (2)" and substitute the words and figures "sub-sections (2) and (3)".
This is a drafting amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 15:—
In sub-section (1), lines 49 and 50, to delete the words "powers and duties" and substitute the word "functions".
This is also a drafting amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 15a:—
Before sub-section (3) to insert the following new sub-section:—
( ) Where the board intend to construct, in exercise of its powers under this section, any works interfering with a public road or bridge or a railway or an inland waterway or a bridge over an inland waterway, the board shall, before commencing to construct such works, give at least one month's notice in writing of their intention to—
(a) in case the proposed works will interfere with a public road or bridge, the local authority charged with the maintenance of the road or bridge, or
(b) in case the proposed works will interfere with a railway, the company by whom the railway is operated, or
(c) in case the proposed works will interfere with an inland waterway or a bridge over an inland waterway, the person by whom the inland waterway is operated.
The purpose of this amendment is to require the board to give at least one month's notice in advance to the local authority or other authority responsible for a road, bridge, railway, canal, or the like, when the board proposes to interfere with such an undertaking.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 16:—
To delete sub-section (3) and substitute the following sub-section:—
(3) Where the board, in exercise of its powers under this section, erect a bridge over an inland waterway, the property of a canal undertaker, within the meaning of Chapter VI of Part VI of the Transport Act, 1944 (No. 21 of 1944), the following provisions shall have effect:—
(a) no compensation shall be payable under this Act or otherwise to such canal undertaker in respect of any loss of traffic suffered or likely to be suffered by such canal undertaker after such bridge has been erected by reason of the erection thereof;
(b) if such bridge is a movable bridge, the Minister may make regulations in relation to its user and the board shall comply with such regulations;
(c) if it appears to the Minister that such inland waterway has sustained damage by reason of the existence or user of such bridge, the Minister shall require the board to make good at their own cost such damage and the board shall comply with such requisition.
This is an alternative to sub-section (3) of the original draft and it gives better effect to the object of the provision, which is to prevent a claim by a canal undertaking for loss of traffic due, not to interference with the canal or damage to the canal, but to the fact that there is a better means of transport available by road. As the section was originally framed, there was a possibility that there might be a claim by a canal company on the ground that it had lost traffic by reason of the fact that there were better bridges and better transport facilities by road and that, consequently, traffic was tending to go by road rather than canal. It is quite clear, I am sure, to all Deputies that it is undesirable that a canal company should have a claim for compensation on that ground. It has, of course, full rights of compensation where it suffers loss by reason of interference with the canal or by damage to canal works or matters of a similar character.
I take it the Minister's attention has been drawn to the annual general meeting of the Grand Canal Company where the chairman expressed concern at certain provisions of this Bill. I think this is the section he referred to in his speech. I wonder is the Minister satisfied that the insertion of this section will ensure that the company will not be at a disadvantage as a result of the enactment. Sub-section (1) of this section gives the board very wide powers. It can erect bridges or interfere in any way with a canal or an inland waterway and, while there is a proviso in sub-section (2) that these powers will not be exercised except with the consent of the Minister, I take it that in the event of the board having to interfere with the canal that it would not prevent the canal functioning, at any rate permanently, that it would so erect the bridge or whatever else was being done that the canal would be able to continue. I am sure the Minister realises that the canal, particularly during the emergency, has been of considerable assistance. It has carried a certain amount of traffic. I do not know whether the company are satisfied or not but concern was expressed at the meeting that this Bill might interfere with the future of the canal.
In so far as there is any interference with the canal, any damage done to canal property, any obstruction of traffic on the canal, there will be a right of compensation. It is intended that there should be no obstruction of canal traffic but, if it should be contended that as a result of work done there was obstruction, there will be a right of compensation. There is, however, the idea among some of the directors of the canal company that if bridges are constructed in a certain place or if roads are constructed, then the canal may lose business because the traffic that formerly went to the canal may go by road. We could not compensate on that basis.
The local authorities may erect a bridge at any time.
Yes. In so far as there is any interference with the canal itself, or any work done which may obstruct traffic, there will be a full right to compensation. The intention, however, is that no work will be sanctioned that will obstruct the canal and that there will not be any work done by the board which would operate to prejudice the canal as a means of transport.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 22, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 23.
I move amendment No. 17:—
In sub-section (1) (a), line 23, after the word "traffic" to add the words: "and before giving his consent, the Minister for Local Government and Public Health shall consult the appropriate local authority or authorities."
I think amendments Nos. 17 to 21, inclusive, may be taken together, as the others are all consequential on the first. The purpose is to ensure that whenever the board interferes with a public road or bridge by way of alteration of an existing road or bridge or the construction of a new road or bridge eventually handing the new road or bridge over to the local authority, facility will be given to consult the local authority at the proper stage; that in addition to getting the consent of the Minister for Local Government, the Minister should, before giving consent, consult the local authority. Eventually any works of this kind performed by the board will be handed over to the local authority for maintenance and they will have the job of maintaining them afterwards. Therefore it is only right and proper that they should have an opportunity of discussing the matter in advance.
I think it is reasonable to assume that in matters of importance the Minister for Local Government will consult with the local authority concerned. In fact, this section was framed to ensure that the interests of the local authority would be fully protected in these matters. It was precisely to ensure protection of the interests of a local authority that the consent of the Minister for Local Government was required before these things could be done. I should think that it will ordinarily be the practice of the Minister for Local Government to ascertain the views of the local authority before conveying his consent or withholding his consent. But it is a different matter to put upon him the obligation to undertake a statutory consultation which might not merely involve delay but considerable argument as to whether, in fact, it had been carried out or not. The Deputy need have no apprehension. This section was framed to ensure that in these respects the interests of the local authorities would be fully protected by the Minister for Local Government.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments Nos. 18, 19, 20 and 21 not moved.
Section put, and agreed to.
Sections 24 to 28, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 29.
I move amendment No. 22:—
At the end of the section to insert the following sub-section:—
"( ) Nothing in sub-section (1) of this section shall be construed as affecting the operation of Section 130 of the Transport Act, 1944 (No. 21 of 1944)."
Section 130 of the Transport Act, 1944, to which reference is made in this section, prohibits the compulsory acquisition of land which was the property of a railway, canal, or other transport undertaking except with the consent of the Minister. It is desirable that that section should apply in respect to the power of compulsory acquisition given to this board.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 29, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 30.
I move amendment No. 23:—
In sub-section (3), to delete paragraph (b) and substitute the following paragraph:
(b) exercise any easement or other right or interfere with any right or property under this section without giving to the owner of such easement, right, or property at least one month's previous notice in writing of their intention so to do.
This is really only a drafting amendment and is intended to make it correspond more closely to the complementary provisions of sub-section (1).
Amendment agreed to.
Section 30, as amended, agreed to.
Section 31 agreed to.
SECTION 32.
I move amendment No. 24:—
In sub-section (5), line 21, to delete the words "the board or"
I am not clear as to whether this precludes an aggrieved person, a person dissatisfied with an award of compensation, from appealing to the courts.
The scheme is that if there is disagreement there will be arbitration under the Land Clauses Act. It is intended that the rights of the person whose property is acquired will be determined by the arbitrator without subsequent appeal to the courts. It is intended that the arbitration will be final.
The arbitrator is appointed by the Chief Justice?
Appointed by some committee, I think.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section put and agreed to.
SECTION 33.
I move amendment No. 25:—
In line 30, after the word "Chapter" to add the words: "and all such claims shall be discharged by the board within one year from the date of their receipt by the board".
The purpose of this amendment is to fix some limit of time within which claims can be discharged by the board. We fix a limit of time for the presentation of a claim by the person whose land is acquired or interfered with, but we do not impose any time limit as to when the board may pay the compensation.
Is it not dangerous to fix a limit of time? As the Deputy will know from legal experience, there is often difficulty in proving title, and if you put a limit of time in, you are not quite sure what will happen if the title could not be established within 12 months, or that the board could pay subsequently when the title has been established.
I am only concerned with having some time limit.
I agree that the board should pay as quickly as possible, but there is a danger in having a time limit if there should be difficulty about title, or some other difficulty. What would happen if the board could not get a legal determination as to who is the owner of the property within the year and consequently could not make the payment within a year?
There were complaints in the past of delay.
There have been delays in cases where title was concerned.
There should be some time limit. I do not care whether it is one year or three years.
The Deputy appreciates that interest will be payable from the date on which the land was acquired. It is desirable that there should be the least possible delay in these cases. I have not always been satisfied that the lawyers could not have moved more quickly.
Could not the Minister have a provision that arbitration should be instituted within a certain time?
We are applying the corresponding clauses of the Acquisition of Land Act. It is a general Act. I think that at some stage the provisions of that Act could be revised in relation to modern needs and practices. It is obviously desirable that we should have some general Act which could be applied in all cases of compulsory acquisition so that we would not have to be re-enacting the same provisions again and again. It may be that the provisions of that Act should be revised and improved, but that is a matter upon which I would hesitate to express an opinion, as the Deputy can understand.
We had the same problem in connection with the National Drainage Act and, as well as I remember, we put in some provision that arbitration proceedings should be instituted in 12 months. Such a provision would get over the difficulty which the Minister raises, that if a limitation is set to the period within which compensation should be paid and if the individual who had the claim was not able to establish title within that period, he might not be able to pay him.
If there are to be provisions of that kind, they should go into the Land Clauses (Consolidation) Act and apply to all cases in which that Act is used as the machine, rather than in the form of a special provision in each Bill.
I can only undertake that I will instruct the board to have the least possible delay in bringing matters to arbitration where it is obvious that agreement will not be reached. The natural tendency is always to postpone bringing an issue to arbitration, in the hope that agreement will emerge.
If there is a considerable property—it may be a small area of land, but may be considerable from the point of view of the owner—in respect of which the owner's income is substantially affected and if he has to wait for compensation in order to invest the money in other land or other property for two or three years, it might very seriously inconvenience him.
I agree that it is unjust to delay arbitration proceedings.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Sections 33, 34 and 35 agreed to.
SECTION 36.
I move amendment No. 26:—
To delete paragraphs (b) and (c).
The purpose of the amendment is to direct attention to the present policy, where land is acquired by the State, of requiring the redemption of the annuities, which in practice means that the holder of the land very often has to suffer a considerable loss. The price is fixed, and the annuities are redeemed and set off against the price, and in the ultimate the landowner gets a very poor price for his land, particularly where the entire holding may have been taken over. There is a certain amount of grievance in the country arising out of this practice. I know that, from the State point of view, it is quite desirable, but I can see cases arising in which an entire holding, or the greater part of it, may be taken over. The holder is left with virtually nothing, and if the annuities on the holding are redeemed and set off as against the purchase price, he is left in a very bad financial position. My purpose is to direct attention to cases of this kind so as to ensure that injustice is not done. If the portion of a holding left is uneconomic for working purposes, or if the entire holding is taken over, the owner is faced with the problem of finding a holding elsewhere, and is left with very little capital to purchase that new holding. Cases have been brought to my notice of distinct grievances in this matter, and I should like the Minister to look into the point, because people have been left in a very bad way in cases in which the entire holding or the greater part of it has been acquired and the annuities redeemed.
It seems to be a matter affecting the basis on which compensation is assessed under the Acquisition of Land Act. In so far as these provisions are concerned, I do not see any objection, once the board has permanently acquired the land, to the board having the right to redeem the annuity, or the Land Commission having the right to require the board to redeem the annuity. I take it that the Deputy's point is that, because the land is subject to annuity, the amount of cash the owner gets on its transfer is less than it would otherwise be, and is sometimes insufficient compensation for its loss. That could well be, and I can understand the Deputy's point more clearly because of a certain recent experience of my Department in that regard. But it is a matter affecting the provisions of the Acquisition of Land (Compensation) Act, the basis upon which the compensation is determined under that Act, rather than a matter affecting the redemption of the annuity under this section.
I should not like to offer an opinion upon the merits of the basis upon which compensation is now assessed. I know that in a recent case, where the most expert advice as to values was obtained by my Department, it still produced in certain cases a figure which, in my opinion, was unfair and there was no reason to think that a higher figure would have resulted for the persons concerned as a result of arbitration. There was a settlement on a higher basis subsequently, but it seemed to me to be clear that there were limitations upon the factors which could be taken into account and that due importance was not attached to the element of disturbance. That is a personal opinion and perhaps those more familiar with the history of legal practice in that regard might disagree with it entirely, but if there is a desire to change that basis of compensation, it would arise in connection with a possible amendment of the Acquisition of Land Act.
I agree with the Minister. There are peculiarities about this whole problem, because I believe that where land is vested—and land which is vested ought to be more valuable than land which is not vested—the amount which would be stopped because of redemption would be greater and the actual amount paid in compensation for vested lands would be less than the amount paid for non-vested land. It is a problem which has given rise to a large volume of opinion in the country that the basis is unfair, because people find, when they become the real owners of their land, when they own a vested property, that the compensation paid in such cases is less than what would be paid if the property was not vested in them at all.
In every case in which I was concerned with this matter, I could be shown that the price actually fixed was above the price at which land of a similar character in the same locality had been voluntarily sold at some time not so far away.
The disturbance element would not enter there.
The disturbance element is the factor which it is so very hard to assess accurately.
Would the Minister consider an amendment of the Acquisition of Land (Compensation) Act to meet such cases as these? I know that there was great dissatisfaction with the compensation paid in respect of disturbance at Poulaphouca, and while the disturbance under this Bill is not likely to be as great, disturbance will take place in respect of the Erne scheme.
The amount of land which will be required in connection with the Erne scheme is small—very much smaller than in the case of Poulaphouca. I should not like to offer an opinion upon the provisions of that Acquisition of Land (Compensation) Act. We are merely taking that Act as a whole and putting it into this section.
Who is the appropriate Minister who would have to amend the Land Acquisition Act?
The Minister for Justice, I should imagine, but do not take me as offering an authoritative opinion on that point, either.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Sections 36 to 39, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 40.
I move amendment No. 27:—
In sub-section (1), line 17, to insert the word "draft" after the word "such".
This is a drafting amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 40, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 41.
I move amendment No. 28:—
In sub-section (2), line 29, to delete the word "Article" and substitute the word "section".
This is to correct a misprint.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 41, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 42.
I move amendment No. 29:—
To delete sub-section (1) and substiute the following sub-section:—
(1) (a) Where an application is made to the Minister for a transport works Order, the Minister may, if he thinks fit, direct a public inquiry to be held into such application in the locality in which it is proposed to construct the transport works the subject of the application.
(b) Where the Minister directs a public inquiry to be held into an application for a transport works Order, he shall appoint an officer of the Minister to hold such inquiry, and the board, every owner, lessee and occupier of the land on or over which it is proposed to construct the transport works the subject of the application, every local authority within whose area such works are intended to pass, and every other person who, in the opinion of such officer, is substantially interested in the subject matter of such inquiry shall be entitled to appear and be heard at such inquiry.
The object of this amendment is to give the Minister a discretion as to whether or not a public inquiry should be held into an application for a transport works Order. As the section stands, the inquiry must be held in every case, but it will be appreciated that some minor works might be contemplated in connection with which a public inquiry would be an undue elaboration of the procedure.
There is an amendment by Deputy Coogan.
It is to the original section which I am proposing to delete. The Deputy might hold his amendment over to the Report Stage.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 30 not moved.
I move amendment No. 31:—
In sub-section (2), lines 49 and 50, to delete the words "if such officer so requires".
The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the evidence before the officer appointed to hold the inquiry shall always be given on oath and that it shall not be left to the discretion of the officer. I think it is essential that, in a public inquiry of this nature, all evidence elicited should be given on oath. It is as much in the Minister's interest that it should be so at it is in the public interest.
This section is in standard form, as the Deputy knows.
Usually, in an inquiry like that, the evidence is given on oath.
That is true, but it is at the discretion of the officer holding the inquiry. It is he who decides on the spot. I think it would be preferable to leave it that way, as I would not be sure what the departure from the accepted procedure would involve.
At most inquiries of this nature, the evidence is taken on oath.
Yes, but they are held under provisions precisely the same as this. I have not examined the consequences of what a departure may involve. We have taken this section from corresponding Acts dealing with similar matters and we are enacting precisely the same provision. It is true that, in most inquiries of which I have knowledge, the evidence is taken on oath, but it is a matter which might always be left to the discretion of the officers holding the inquiry.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 32:—
After sub-section (2) to insert a new sub-section as follows:—
The report of the officer appointed by the Minister to hold a public inquiry in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of this section shall be published to the board and every owner, lessee, and occupier of the land on or over which it is proposed to construct such transport works and to every local authority within whose area such works are intended to pass and to every other person who has shown that he has a substantial interest in the subject matter of the inquiry.
This amendment is designed to ensure that the report of the officer holding the inquiry would be published to the interested parties, in the case where an application for a transport works Order was refused. It is quite on the cards that a difference of opinion may arise, as between the board and the Minister, in matters of this kind and it is only right and proper and in the public interest that, where an application is rejected, the grounds for the rejection should be given, and the report of the officer holding the inquiry should be published to the interested parties.
It seems to me that what is involved here is that the officer appointed by the Minister holds an inquiry and it is proposed to give him a status higher than is contemplated. He is an officer appointed by the Minister to hold the inquiry, in this case to decide whether this transport works Order is, in fact, justified, whether the board may not be proposing to interfere unduly with the rights of other people or with public highways or other facilities. It is for the Minister, as defender of the public interest, to decide whether the works Order is required by the board or not. The Minister has to make up his mind on the basis of the report and minutes of evidence from the officer and it is the Minister who ordinarily would convey to the board the extent to which an amended application or changed plan might meet with his approval. The officer could not give that information to the board, and it is not desirable that the officer should be put into such a position independent of the Minister that the board would get his specific report and not the Minister's decision.
The Deputy must not mix up that case with other cases already argued in the Dáil. This is not a case where one is deciding how a public authority has carried out its functions. In this case, the Minister, as protector of the public interest, is deciding to give certain powers to a statutory authority, which may interfere with public amenities. In this particular case, it is clearly the Minister's duty to have regard to the public interest, the interest of persons whose land or rights may be interfered with. He stands in a different relationship to this board from that of the Minister for Local Government and Public Health, say, in relation to a public authority into whose activities he is inquiring.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 42, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 43.
I move amendment No. 33:—
Before Section 43 to insert the following section:—
Where the Minister, after consideration of an application for a transport works Order and, in case an inquiry was held, under Section 42 of this Act, into the application, the report of the officer who held it and after consultation with the Minister for Local Government and Public Health, is of opinion that the application should be granted, he shall make an Order authorising the board to construct, maintain and operate the transport works specified in the Order in such manner, subject to such restrictions and provisions and on such terms and conditions as the Minister thinks proper and specifies in the Order.
This is consequential on the amendment we have made to Section 42, by which public inquiries, instead of being held in every case, may or may not be held, at the discretion of the Minister.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 34 not moved.
Section 43 not moved.
SECTION 44.
I move amendment No. 35:—
In page 17, between lines 44 and 45, to insert the following new sub-paragraph:—
(vi) such Order may fix the period within which the construction of such transport works is to be completed.
The object of this amendment is to enable a limit to be placed on the time within which transport works may be constructed under a transport works Order. It is undesirable that there should be no time limit.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 44, as amended, and Sections 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50 put and agreed to.
SECTION 51.
I move amendment No. 36:—
In sub-section (1), line 37, to delete the figures "494" and substitute the figures "293".
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 37:—
In sub-section (3), line 51, to delete the words "those Orders" and substitute the words "the Orders to which this section applies".
This is a drafting amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 51, as amended, stand part of the Bill."
I think that the section in this form is undesirable because the Emergency Powers Orders to which it refers would in the normal way lapse on the expiration of the Emergency Powers Act. These Orders at any time are difficult to get, but, if the Act under which they operate expires, I think the particular Orders may be unprocurable. Will the Minister consider the advisability of incorporating the actual terms of the Orders in this Act?
It would elaborate the Bill considerably.
I admit it would. I do not know whether these particular Orders affect many people, but in the event of litigation or trouble of any kind, which might require people to read the provisions of the Orders, these Orders after a short time might become unprocurable. They will just find themselves having the force of law and people will not be able to ascertain what the law is as it affects them.
I agree that there is something in the Deputy's point and I will look into it. The effect will be to continue the Emergency Powers Orders after, the Act is repealed. It makes them the permanent law as far as this Bill is concerned.
The point is that the Orders may not be available.
The draftsman must have had some reason for adopting this procedure. I will look into what the Deputy has stated.
Question put and agreed to.
Sections 52, 53 and 54 put and agreed to.
SECTION 55.
I move amendment No. 38:—
In sub-section (1), line 42, to insert the words "Subject to Section 57 of this Act," before the words "The board".
This is a drafting amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 55, as amended, and Section 56 put and agreed to.
SECTION 57.
I move amendment No. 39:—
Before Section 57 to insert a new section as follows:—
(1) The following provisions shall apply in respect of any advances (in this sub-section referred to as the said advances) made to the board under Section 53 of this Act during the period (in this sub-section referred to as the quinquennial period) of five years commencing on the establishment date, that is to say:—
(a) no interest shall be payable by the board on the said advances in respect of any period ending on the day immediately preceding the date on which the Minister for Finance makes an Order under paragraph (c) of this section,
(b) the Minister for Finance shall, immediately after the expiration of the quinquennial period, examine the finances of the board,
(c) after such examination, the said Minister shall, having regard to the existing state of the finances of the board and its future financial prospects, either—
(i) by Order (in this sub-section referred to as the exemption Order) exempt the board from the liability to pay interest on the said advances in respect of the period during which the exemption Order is in force, or
(ii) by Order declare the board liable to pay interest on the said advances in respect of any period commencing on or after the date of the Order,
(d) where the said Minister makes the exemption Order, he may at any time thereafter by Order revoke the exemption Order.
(2) The Minister for Finance shall before making any Order under sub-section (1) of this section consult the Minister with regard to the proposed Order.
This is a recasting of Section 57. As the section was framed originally, it was proposed that after five years the Minister for Finance, in consultation with the Minister for Industry and Commerce, after examining the financial position of the board, could waive the interest upon the advances made in respect of that five years' period. On the other hand, he could decide that interest would be payable, and payable in respect of that five years' period. It is proposed here that, in fact, there will be no interest paid for the first five years after the advances are made.
I explained, when introducing the Bill, that if this were a normal commercial undertaking, the capital invested in the development of the work would be subscribed at risk upon ordinary shares and the subscribers would not expect a return in the form of interest or dividends until the profit-earning stage had been reached. It is not ordinarily the practice of the State to finance activities of this kind on that basis, but it is obviously desirable that this undertaking should not be put at a disadvantage on that account and that its liabilities in respect of capital should be no heavier than they would be if private enterprise was undertaking the task. It is proposed that the company should get its capital free of interest for five years, that being regarded as the reasonable period which the non-remunerative development work will require for completion. At the end of five years it is assumed, or hoped, that the company will be in the position of having remunerative activities in progress and will be able to earn, from the sales of its products, a sufficient amount of money to recover its expenses and pay interest upon the capital to the Minister for Finance.
There is provision here which enables the Minister for Finance, at that stage, if, for any reason, the results of the company's activities are not as satisfactory as we hope, to waive the interest on capital for a further period but it is contemplated that at the end of five years the company, having been going well, will be in a position to pay interest upon the capital advanced. The difference between this amendment and the original section is to make it clear that the company will not be obliged to pay interest for the first five years. The advantage of the change is that the board can proceed to plan its activities on the basis of knowing that that charge cannot arise. There is no element of uncertainty. As the Bill was originally framed, there was an element of uncertainty, as the board could not know for certain that it might not have to pay interest in respect of advances over the five years' period.
The fact that it would have to face the possibility of having to pay interest would necessarily involve it in certain financial arrangements designed to meet the liability if imposed upon it. Now it is clear that that liability will not arise and that it will be enabled to work during the five unremunerative years with a view to getting to the stage when it will be able to meet the interest charges dating from a period which will be five years after the coming into force of the measure.
I think there is a very substantial difference between the proposed new section and the section as it stood originally in the Bill. The section as originally in the Bill gave power to the Minister to forgive the board, in certain circumstances, if he thought it necessary, the payment of interest for five years. Now we are going further. We say that no matter what the circumstances, the board shall not be liable for interest for five years, and that for the second five years they may be free of interest. Is not that so?
I am not quarrelling with that. I think there is a good deal in what the Minister said about handicapping a board, setting out on a scheme like this in the first five years, to such an extent as would not be put on an ordinary commercial company. I have to link up with that the remission of 50 per cent. approximately of the liability carried over from the Turf Development Board. It is as well to discuss that now on this section.
There is no remission of liability under this section. The exemption from interest only applies to advances made under this Bill.
I do not want to go into that, but to link it up. By way of reply to the Minister's reference to the difference between a commercial company and this board we are giving something substantial. I take it that along with the liabilities, somewhere in the neighbourhood of £100,000 of the Turf Development Board, there were certain assets.
Very definite assets. It would be no harm if we had a rough idea of what these assets are.
That comes into the report.
I have not come to it. We are starting off this company and giving them every facility and every advantage. We are definitely relieving them for the first five years of any interest whatever, and providing for the second five years that the Minister may remit or forgo interest on the capital. On top of that we are going to forgive the new company repayment to the Exchequer of £50,000. I notice that in the Money Resolution there was a sort of qualification, and that in certain circumstances the Minister may do that. I think that is giving them every reasonable facility, having regard to the fact that we are dealing with a ten years' scheme, as far as the greater part of it is concerned. In effect what we are now asked to do by the Minister is to give him power to forgo all interest for the whole ten years.
It is not a ten years' scheme in the sense that work will proceed for ten years.
It is based on ten years' production.
Ten years to this extent, that the board is to be producing 1,000,000 tons a year at the end of ten years, and that may continue only for 25 years or 30 years more.
Perhaps I am not putting my point as clearly as I should. The Minister is taking power now not to charge the board any interest until they are in full production. I do not think a case has been made for that. The Minister made a reasonable case for five years.
It is not a further period of five years. It is for such period as the Minister for Finance may consider reasonable.
That is much worse from my point of view. I was more or less mistaken by what the Minister said. I thought he said the second period of five years. If the period is indefinite my objection is all the stronger. I think a case could be made that this is a national scheme and that it is one about which the community are concerned. I would be inclined to meet the Minister on this point, that no interest should be charged for the first period of five years and, at the end of that five years, if further relief was needed, he could come back to the House.
There is a substantial difference between this board and the E.S.B. The E.S.B. was given a monopoly in relation to the sale of electricity, and was instructed to make such charges for electricity as would cover operating costs and the interest due to the Minister for Finance and no more. You cannot say to the Turf Development Board that they must sell turf for any price. They are given no monopoly. They will have to sell turf in competition with coal, hand-won turf, timber, electricity, fuel oil, paraffin oil or any other fuel which could conceivably be used under any circumstances as an alternative. They will, therefore, have to charge such a price as will, in fact, ensure the sale of the turf, and they are being put under no obligation in that regard and can charge different prices in different areas, the aim being to recover the operating cost, and the obligation to the Minister for Finance. You cannot say to them that they must maintain any definite price, because they may not be able to do it. It is very desirable that the position should be reviewed at the end of the five years' period when interest would become payable with a view to seeing whether it is reasonable to require the board to pay from that date. If they cannot pay, they cannot pay, and it really means that a charge is accumulating which might never be remitted. It is desirable, having regard to the general circumstances, that there should be that review at the end of five years or a decision taken as to whether in the general circumstances it might be reasonable to expect the board to obtain to prices which would enable them to pay.
The difference between the Minister and myself is that the Minister wants power given to him to review the position at the end of five years. I say that the House has met the Minister and the board if they are not going to ask for payment of any interest for five years. If at the end of the five years' period, when they are more than half-way towards full production, as envisaged in the Bill, then if they cannot pay the Minister of the day ought to come back to the House.
I do not think it is unreasonable to ask that an Order made by the Minister for Finance could be annulled by the House.
That goes some distance. I do not agree that we are not giving this board a monopoly. If we are not giving them a complete monopoly we are giving what is tantamount to a monopoly. Remember that the board, for the greater part of the period in connection with the payment of interest, will have very little turf to offer for sale, having regard to the amount consumed in the power station. For the first five years the amount will not be more than a couple of hundred thousand tons, but they will have a monopoly in this sense, that as far as I can see, they will be the only body producing machine-won turf and, therefore, will have no competition there.
That is true so far as the supply of machine turf is concerned.
Therefore it is not altogether accurate to say that there will be competition with hand-won turf and that it will have to compete in price with it. If the Minister's figures are realised for the cost of production of machine-won turf, then not only would they have the advantage of having it as machine-won turf but, so far as the sale generally of that turf would be concerned, they will even from the price point of view, irrespective of quality, be able to meet hand-won turf on a fairly close basis because the intention is that this machine-won turf should be sold as near to the point of production as possible. Is not that so?
And therefore I say it is tantamount to a monopoly. I am not making any bones about that, but I am making that as an additional reason why we ought not go beyond the five years. However, the Minister has suggested a compromise which I would accept.
I think it is not unreasonable to give the Dáil power to annul such an Order when made or if made.
Very well. Is the Minister amending the new section now or will he amend it on Report?
Amendment agreed to.
Sections 58 to 63, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 64.
I move amendment No. 40:—
Before Section 64 to insert the following section:—
(1) If it appears from the balance sheet of the dissolved company, as certified by the auditors of the dissolved company, that, immediately before the establishment date, the liabilities (including the State debt) of the dissolved company exceeded its assets (the amount of which excess is in this sub-section referred to as the deficit), then, the Minister for Finance shall, with effect as on and from the establishment date, release the board from so much of the State debt as equals the deficit or £50,000, whichever is the lesser.
(2) In this section, the expression "the State debt" means the sum which, immediately before the establishment date, was owing by the dissolved company to the Minister for Finance.
The position of the Turf Development Board at present is that as a result of its activities to date it has a deficit on its profit and loss account of approximately £50,000 and the purpose of this amendment is to wipe out that deficit. I may have misled the Deputy in a remark I made in connection with the Money Resolution by referring to the sum of £50,000 as being approximately half the amount due. It is half the amount of interest due by the board to the Minister for Finance, roughly speaking, but in addition to interest there is a capital sum of £374,500 due by the Turf Development Board to the Exchequer. In other words, there is a total liability at present of approximately £489,000 due plus an as yet unascertained amount in respect of interest up to the 31st March. The position of the board, however, is that while it owes to the Exchequer approximately £489,000 its assets are insufficient to cover that amount fully. They are insufficient to the extent of £50,000 and it is that deficit of £50,000 only that it is proposed to remit. The balance of the amount due by the board to the Exchequer can be paid and will be paid and the board has at present the resources with which to pay the amount.
In justification for this remission of debt, apart altogether from the wisdom of doing so in view of the new obligations which are being placed upon the board, I would advance the fact that during the emergency the board has been acting as an agent for the Government in the operation of the turf camp scheme, and carrying out that agency activity without remuneration. If the board had not existed and the Government had to embark upon the turf camp scheme it presumably would have had to employ contractors to erect and manage these camp schemes and supervise the production of turf by means of them. Because the Turf Development Board existed we did not have to employ private contractors and the Turf Development Board did the job and did it free of charge. They might have argued that they were entitled to some fee as contractors for that job and I think, if they had so argued, it would have been difficult to resist their claim. In fact, the point was not raised because it was obvious that any money the board would get from the Government in that regard would just come back to the Government in respect of moneys due by the board to the Government. Now that we have reached the end of that period and are starting the board on a new and a different basis, it is desirable to take cognisance of the state of their accounts and to give them some credit for that work which they did during the emergency because, to some extent, it could be argued that the deficiency on their account is attributable to the fact that they were not free to devote the whole of their attention to their own particular work during that period because of their preoccupation with this turf camp scheme. We find, however, that they are in this position, that of the total amount of practically £500,000 which they owe to the Exchequer they have only assets equivalent to £450,000. There is a deficit of £50,000. We are proposing to remit that. The board will, therefore, start off with balanced accounts. It will be entitled to draw from the Exchequer new advances up to £3,750,000 and it will have no obligation in respect of interest on these new advances until the end of five years, at which stage it should be in production on a profitable basis and able to meet its obligations both in respect of interest and the repayment of advances. It is clear in this case that there is full justification for putting upon the board an obligation to repay the advances.
It is argued that that was an unreasonable imposition in the case of the Electricity Supply Board when they were providing for the creation of a depreciation fund at the same time as they were repaying the advances but the Electricity Supply Board was not, as Bord na Móna will be, working on a vanishing asset. The board will be working on a disappearing asset and they should have recovered in full the capital expended on its exploitation by the time the asset has fully disappeared. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect them to repay in full the amount advanced and to pay interest as from the date upon which interest becomes due. The particular proposal here is that the deficit created to date and which to some extent can be attributed to abnormal emergency conditions, should be wiped out. That deficit is, roughly, £50,000. The total amount due is £500,000.
I should like to say I agree entirely with the Minister's tribute to the work performed by this board during the recent emergency and I fully appreciate that that was a difficult and uneconomic job that had to be done, in the sense that you could not measure it in the same way as you could measure an ordinary business and cost it in that way. But, as I now understand it, the board owes between principal and interest £487,000 plus an unascertained further amount for interest up to date—let us say £500,000.
The Minister says that the £50,000 which we talk about is interest.
No; the £50,000 we are talking about now is the deficit on their profit and loss account. They have liabilities to the Exchequer of £500,000 but they have assets on the other side and the deficit is £50,000.
The Minister certainly did mention the word "interest" in connection with the £50,000. That is beside the point. I take it that the position now is that on the valuation of the existing assets of the board—I should like to know, by the way, when that valuation was made—it was found that the value of those assets was short by £50,000 of the total amount due. The assets, valued at £450,000, roughly, are to be passed over to the new board. Is not that so?
Yes. The new board takes over all the assets of the present Turf Development Board and all the liabilities of the present Turf Development Board except, we hope, this £50,000.
What are the liabilities, outside the £50,000?
They will still owe £450,000 to the Exchequer.
But they have assets to meet that.
I think the Minister used the phrase that they were in a position to meet it right away.
As a matter of fact, on the balance sheet published recently, they have in cash £147,000, so that it is quite clear they could pay their interest forthwith. It may be that some of that money has been spent since on new equipment, but their cash position was quite strong on the 31st March, 1945. I cannot tell you what the position is to-day.
I am told it is better now.
I am very glad to hear that. I do not want to widen this or to prolong it, but I think we will have to have this related to the cost to the taxpayer and the consumer of turf, when we take into consideration that we have 64/- per ton in Dublin plus the amount of the subsidy, and so on, most of which went to this board —is not that so?
Oh no. Let me explain that. The turf produced by this board is not being sold at 64/-. All the turf at present being produced by this board, mechanically produced turf, is being distributed free, as a matter of fact, under the Government's free fuel scheme. The cost of production of this turf is not anything like 64/-. It is set out here for the different bogs embodied in this report. The turf produced by the Turf Development Board through its turf camp scheme which it is carrying on at the Government's request during the emergency is based upon a cost plus basis. There is again no profit to the board arising out of that production. It is Fuel Importers Limited who get that turf and who get the county councils' turf, and charge 64/- per ton and get a subsidy.
It was not my intention to confuse the issue. It is not easy to follow the finances between the county councils, the Turf Development Board, Fuel Importers Limited, and the other boards. But can we take it that the net loss to the State from the operations of the Turf Development Board is £50,000?
The net loss to the State from the operations of the Turf Development Board, but that does not include the turf camp scheme.
Mr. Morrissey
That is a different matter. At any rate, the operations of the board cost this State £50,000.
That is true. To an extent it could be said that there is expenditure on experimental work well in excess of that. The board is in fact producing turf at a profit. I do not want it to be understood that the Turf Development Board is producing turf at a loss. The deficit on the account would be reduced if the board were confined to their present scale of activities.
Having regard to the amount of pioneer work which had to be done by the board, I think the State has got good value for the £50,000. I think, however, that it is only right that we should get the picture clear in the minds of the public as well as Deputies.
The Minister said that the assets of the board amounted to approximately £450,000. Could he say how these assets are valued?
At their depreciated value.
I take it that most of them are still useful?
Is any proportion of the assets included at scrap value?
No. These assets are all in use at the moment—buildings, machines, and bogs which have been acquired, etc.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 64, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining sections agreed to.
SCHEDULE.
I move amendment No. 51:—
In paragraph 2, page 25, line 1, to delete the words "transfer date" and substitute the words "establishment date".
This is a drafting amendment only.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 42:—
In paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (1), line 4, to insert the word "appointed" before the word "date".
This is also a drafting amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 43:—
To insert at the end thereof, the following new paragraph:—
4.—(1) In this paragraph the expression "the appointed date" means—
(a) in case the establishment date falls on the 31st day of March, the establishment date,
(b) in any other case, the 31st day of March next following the establishment date.
(2) The dissolved company shall, on and after the establishment date, continue to be liable under the enactments relating to corporation profits tax to prepare and deliver any statement, return or particulars required for the purposes of those enactments for any accounting period ending on or before the appointed date.
(3) Assessments to corporation profits tax for any accounting period ending on or before the appointed date may be made on or after the establishment date on the dissolved company and corporation profits tax in respect of any such assessment so made, which shall have become final and conclusive, shall, when it becomes due and payable, be deemed to have become due and payable before the establishment date.
(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph, the chief officer of the board or other officer performing the duties of chief officer of the board shall be deemed to be secretary of the dissolved company or other officer performing the duties of secretary of the dissolved company.
(5) In this paragraph references to corporation profits tax shall be construed as including references to excess corporation profits tax.
This is intended to make good an omission in the Bill and provides that the dissolved company, that is, the Turf Development Board which is being wound up under this Bill, shall continue to be liable to corporation profits tax and to excess corporation profits tax, etc.
Amendment agreed to.
Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Title agreed to.
Bill reported with amendments.
When will the Report Stage be taken?
Next Tuesday. I understand the Dáil is meeting on Tuesday.
Are we meeting on four days?
If it is not taken on Tuesday, it will mean Wednesday. I understand there is a proposal to meet on four days in the week.
Report Stage ordered for Tuesday, 26th March.
