Tairgim:—
Go ndeontar suim ná raghaidh thar £20,220 chun íoctha an Mhuirir a thiocfas chun bheith infoctha í rith na bliana dar crioch an 31ú lá de Mhárta, 1947, chun Rannioca i leith Costas Chumann na Náisiún.
The sum of £20,220 provided in this Vote represents two years' contributions to the League of Nations—£8,726 in respect of the year 1945 and £11,494 for the year 1946. As I pointed out last year, this is the last time the Dáil will be asked to vote moneys in respect of our membership of the League of Nations. As Deputies probably know, negotiations have been going on for some time between the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation with a view to the transfer to the latter of the remaining assets, functions and activities of the former. The assembly of the League of Nations was called at Geneva last April to discuss the proposals resulting from the negotiations, and, on 19th April, the League Assembly passed a resolution approving of the proposals made and bringing the existence of the league itself to an end. The League Assembly set up a board of liquidation to carry out the transfer arrangements. The contribution which the Dáil is now being asked to vote in respect of the year 1946 covers, therefore, the expenses of the League itself up to 19th April and the expenses of this board and of the remaining machinery of the league up to 1st August, 1946, or such other date as may be decided upon for the definite transfer to the United Nations Organisation.
I do not think I need go into the details of the arrangements made between the League and the United Nations Organisation. The relevant documents have been placed in the Library for the convenience of Deputies who wish to consult them. Briefly, the position is that the assets of the League, including the buildings at Geneva, furniture, office equipment and so on, to a total value of some 45,000,000 Swiss francs, or £2,500,000, at the time of the meeting in April, will be taken over by the United Nations Organisation. Each of the members of the League, to the number of 43 in all at the time of the meeting in April, will be credited with a share of the transfer value of the assets proportionate to the amount paid by that member in contributions to the League during the period of its membership. In other words, we would be entitled to an amount which will bear the same relation to the sum of £2,500,000 which I have just mentioned as the amount we have paid in contributions to the League since 1923 bears to the total of the contributions paid to the League by the 43 States who still remained members of that body at the time of the meeting in April. The amounts due to be refunded to individual members have not yet been determined by the board of liquidation and cannot be determined until all outstanding contributions and arrears due up to the end of 1946 have been paid. In the event of the board of liquidation not having completed its work by the end of the present year, its continued existence will be provided for out of the various League funds which it has to dispose of, the credits of the surviving members of the League being abated pro rata.
The disappearance of the League of Nations brings to an end one of the or, perhaps, the greatest, experiment in international co-operation the world has ever known. I think it may fairly be described as that. It is rather the fashion nowadays to decry the League of Nations and to speak as if at no moment of its existence had it any hope of success. I do not quite agree with that view. I think that, up to 1931, the League might be said, on the whole, to have justified the hopes of its founders. At that time, its prestige was still intact and its influence was, I think, considerable. The League Covenant was still regarded as affording, or as capable of affording, a substantial guarantee of security to its members.
The failure of the League to cope with the attack on China, however, dealt a fatal blow to the authority of the Covenant and to the general confidence of the nations in League methods and machinery. It lessened whatever hopes of success the Disarmament Conference may otherwise have had and it encouraged other States in the belief that they could proceed without fear of having to reckon with the League as a serious factor. The attack on Abyssinia showed that the belief was only too well-founded. When all 50, or so, members of the League, led by three of the most powerful countries in the world, failed to protect the freedom and independence of one of the weakest of their members, it was clear that the guarantees contained in the League Covenant were a dead letter. The guarantees contained in the League Covenant and in the system of collective security, upon which the smaller States particularly had to rely, were at an end. In this series of tragic events, which one after another followed the League, the League as such was unable to play any important part at all. It was reduced to the role of a mere spectator of the terrible drama gradually unfolding itself around it. There would be no point in instituting an inquest on the League of Nations now that it has gone. It would be well, however, that the lessons of the failure of the League should not be lost and the same mistakes repeated. There were great weaknesses and defects in the structure of the League and in the provisions of the League Covenant. There were, for example, the association of the League with the 1919 Peace Treaties; the fact that membership of the League did not include all the great Powers; and there were significant gaps in the all-important security provisions of the Covenant. It was not primarily by reason of these weaknesses and defects that the League of Nations failed.
In spite of the unanimity rule, the non-membership of some of the great Powers and the serious defects in applying the security provisions of the Convenant it should have been quite possible, to my mind, to check the aggression in Manchuria and the later aggression in Abyssinia if only all the members of the League had a uniform resolution to put the machinery of collective security, which was available, in full operation. It was because of that lack of resolution on the part of the individual members of the organisation and not primarily because of the weaknesses in the structure of the League itself, that the experiment made at Geneva failed. It is, perhaps, easier for small countries, especially if they are not close to the likely theatres of action, to be bold in such a case than it is for the great Powers on whom, if military action results, the brunt of the struggle will fall. Making all due allowances for that, both as regards Manchuria and Abyssinia, it was the hesitant action of the great Powers that was directly responsible for the League's failure.
It is of the utmost importance that we should realise the implications of this experience. It would be a tragic mistake to think that, whatever was wrong with the League, could be set right merely by setting up now a new international organisation with a somewhat different drafting of the provisions of its fundamental charters. There is something far deeper than that involved. The League failed because the individuals and the Governments who were members of it were not prepared to fulfil the fundamental obligation, which any system of world organisation for peace and security must involve. They were not ready to face war and to wage war in order to prevent war. They did not accept in their own minds the essential idea that, if one of their members became a victim of armed aggression, then each of the others, even if their own national territory were untouched and even if the aggressive State was a friend, must be prepared to go to war in defence of the State attacked with the same energy as if they themselves were invaded. Unless that fundamental idea is grasped and accepted as a principle by every nation, big and small, no international security organisation, whatever its structure and covenant, will succeed. If that principle is fully grasped, however, a true foundation is laid and success is possible. I am afraid we are still far removed from that desirable position.