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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 27 Jun 1946

Vol. 101 No. 19

Supplies and Services (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 1946—Committee (Resumed).

Debate resumed on amendment No. 9:—
To add at the end of Section 6 the following new sub-section:—
(10) No court, tribunal or authority other than the High Court, Circuit Court, or District Court, shall have by virtue of any Act passed before the passing of this Act or by virtue of any Order made by or under the authority of this Act or the Act of 1939 any jurisdiction to hear or determine any offence under this section.

I do not wish unduly to prolong the discussion on this amendment. Last night I made the points that I wished to make in favour of the amendment. I do not now want to repeat those points again; but I do wish to make a comment upon one remark that the Minister rather dramatically made last night in the House when he made his oral testimony bequeathing his advice to whatever successor would be in his office in this country during a future war.

He stated that he would as his last will and political testament bequeath to that Minister the direction that he should employ drastic methods to deal with black marketeers and completely overlook whatever ordinary courts would be in existence at that time. I want, for whatever portion of posterity may take any interest in any remarks I have to make, to register my strong disagreement with the sentiments expounded in the Minister's last will and political testament. I think it is a very bad thing for any country to cast aspersions upon the administration of justice through the ordinary courts. Last night I stated that the Minister, in my view, in the remarks he made really passed a vote of censure on the ordinary courts of this country, and he censured in particular a very large number of people who were appointed to judicial office by his own Government in the last six years.

I take the opposite view. I take the view, and express it again strongly, that our courts have operated well and efficiently and impartially in the last five or six years. I have protested again and again in this House against the policy of appointing temporary district justices. But, even in reference to these, I will say here publicly that, although I take objection in principle to the appointment of these temporary district justices, they have to the best of my belief acted impartially, properly and efficiently. I find no evidence whatever that, during the period of six years, our courts, in reference to the enforcement of the Orders of the Government or of any Minister made under the Emergency Powers Act, have not acted in the way they ought to have acted. Implicit in the statements of the Minister is the suggestion that, because a Department or an official thinks that an individual has committed an offence, every judicial tribunal must give effect to that whether the evidence justified conviction or not.

In other words, the Minister wants some tribunal which will in all cases convict irrespective of what the evidence may be. They want somebody who will do the job and do it not in the way of the ordinary process of law. I object to that principle, whether it is stated expressly or nakedly, as I have stated it, or whether it is stated in the words the Minister has stated it, carrying that implied suggestion. It is an extremely bad principle for any Government to pass over the administration of justice carried out by the constitutional courts.

I repeat what I said last night, that the courts of justice in this country, in reference to all ordinary matters, have been in the last six years and still are effectively working. There is no evidence from which it can be stated that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order in reference to Orders under the Emergency Powers Act. The Minister agreed with me last night that not more than 1 per cent. of all cases under the Emergency Powers Orders came before these Military Tribunals, but he drew from that amazing set of facts an ordinary deduction: that were it not for the Special Military Courts administering criminal cases brought before them under the Emergency Powers Orders it would not have been possible for him to carry out his rationing scheme. I totally fail to follow that argument. Ninety-nine per cent. at least of all cases under the Emergency Powers Act, including black-marketing cases, came before the ordinary courts. Only 1 per cent. at the outside came before the Military Tribunal. How can it be suggested from that state of facts, particularly in view of the Minister's perhaps justifiable boast that this country had the best record for rationing of any country in the world, that the ordinary courts have failed effectively to administer justice and preserve public peace and order?

The setting up of extraordinary tribunals should only be resorted to in the very last resort. During the time when the administration of justice in this country was brought to a standstill in reference to one particular aspect only of the activities of certain illegal bodies, it was necessary to set up a particular type of court, but only for that purpose. I said last night that these courts have a value. Their value is strictly confined in my view, and I submit to the House it is the proper view, to hearing cases of, and I hope deterring, the commission of crimes of violence against the State by armed bodies or by illegal organisations subversive to the State. That is the only value of these extraordinary courts. If other cases that could properly be heard by the ordinary courts are brought before these tribunals, I repeat what I said last night, that the effect will be to create a spurious sympathy in the public mind with the victims of the decisions of these courts or the persons brought before them, and the value of these courts for the purpose for which they ought to exist solely will be undermined.

I do submit to the Minister in all seriousness that he ought to resolve firmly that he will not come to an understanding with the Attorney-General like the understanding, which in my view was an illegal understanding, with the Attorney-General of the time during the last six years in reference to offences under the Emergency Powers Acts; but that he will at least exercise the greatest possible control over cases that will be sent under this Bill, when it becomes an Act, to any court other than the ordinary courts of the country.

I think the Minister ought to accept the amendment. I am influenced very largely in appealing to the Minister to do that by his own statement last night. I am satisfied that the Minister was justified in taking all the necessary steps during the emergency period to see that black marketing would not become rife in this country to the disadvantage of the citizens as a whole. But the experience he has gained indicates, as stated by Deputy Costello, that 99 per cent. of the cases were dealt with by the ordinary courts of the country. Yet we are able to say that we had the most satisfactory results of any country in the world in administering a rationing scheme.

I was amazed to hear the Minister talk about half-crown fines imposed by district justices. I have never heard or read of any such fines in these cases. Throughout the country, district justices have imposed salutary fines in very small cases. I can recollect of fines of £3 and £4 being imposed for charging an excessive price for a packet of Woodbines. That does not seem to square with the half-crown cases that the Minister has in mind.

Taking it by and large, the Minister must admit that the scheme was administered successfully although 99 per cent. of the cases were heard in the ordinary courts. Out of the 1 per cent. which went to the Special Court, a certain percentage was appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. I think that the Minister might rest easy in his mind that the courts are competent to deal with this particular class of offence. There is no general sympathy amongst the public with people who try to black market goods and no case has been established for sending these cases to the Special Court. I do not think that the Minister, or any of the Deputies on his side of the House, any more than Deputies on other sides of the House, ought to have any special leaning towards the establishment of this Special Court to the exclusion of the legitimate courts. I think we should all look for as much freedom as we can and for providing the best services we can possibly get for the public. In medical difficulties we look for specialists and we should also look for specialists in legal cases.

Nobody has confidence in the military courts and they should be resorted to only in extreme cases. If they can possibly be avoided, they should be avoided. They are not competent, in the opinion of the ordinary man in the street. In my opinion, they are not competent. They should not be resorted to except in extreme circumstances. In view of the Minister's statement that 99 per cent. of the cases were dealt with by the ordinary courts and 1 per cent. was not satisfactorily dealt with by the other court, seeing that the decisions were upset on appeal, there is no case left now for the existence of this court. The emergency has practically passed and the Minister would be perfectly safe in entrusting these cases to the ordinary courts and leaving them to the sense of justice of the citizens. Jurymen have not failed, except in very grave and exceptional circumstances.

It would be a gracious gesture, and an indication of confidence in the courts and in citizens, if the Minister would accept the amendment. We have passed out of the emergency. We have come through it satisfactorily and I think we can confidently rely on the ordinary courts to give everyone justice. If black market cases are brought before the ordinary courts, the citizens acting on juries there will deal with them on their merits. It would be a gracious gesture on the Minister's part, and a mark of gratitude for satisfactory services rendered during the period of the emergency, if he would say that the Government will not use these Special Courts in the types of cases that have been under discussion.

I would not disagree with Deputy Costello's statement that special tribunals should be used for the trial of offences against Emergency Powers Orders only as a last resort. The House is aware that when rationing and other forms of control necessitated by the development of scarcities were instituted the trial of offenders against the regulations was always taken to the ordinary courts. The position developed in which we had to have serious regard to the ineffectiveness of the ordinary courts in disposing of these offences. Not merely were the members of the Government and the officers responsible for the enforcement of the regulations seriously perturbed at the consequences of the very nominal penalties imposed by the courts, but equal perturbation was expressed by many members of the Dáil.

Deputy Keyes said he never heard of half-crown fines in a case of this kind. Perhaps he will allow me to quote an authority he will not dispute. On the 13th November, 1941, Deputy Norton, the Leader of Deputy Keyes' Party, said:

"Having issued a Maximum Price Order, it is the Minister's duty to endeavour to secure compliance with that Order, respect for his authority and for the authority of the Government. The trader should be made aware that if he charges prices in excess of those fixed, his action will be punishable by severe penalties. Fines imposed in cases where proceedings were instituted have been perfectly farcical and have not acted as a deterrent to traders against the exploiting the needs of consumers."

Deputy Norton went so far as to suggest that some of the district justices should be interned. His speech on that occasion was similar to speeches made by a number of other Deputies who were equally perturbed, as I was perturbed, at the manner in which these black market offences were being treated by the District Courts.

It is true the decision of the Government to schedule these offences under the Offences against the State Act did not mean that all of them were transferred to the Military Court; but the mere fact that some such cases were disposed of by the Military Court and salutary penalties were imposed there had a very beneficial effect and did more than anything else to secure respect for rationing and price control Orders. I am quite certain there is no Deputy who was not asked to make representations on behalf of some constituent detected in a black marketing offence to urge that his case would not be sent to the Military Court.

There were two main factors which helped to secure the position in which there was general compliance with rationing and price control Orders. First was the trial of the more important cases by the Military Court and the salutary penalties imposed there and, secondly, there was the withdrawal of trading licences following convictions for such offences in any court. These two factors ultimately secured a general compliance with the regulations and every Deputy knows, as I know, that traders, when detected in these offences, were far more concerned to avoid trial before the Military Court or the subsequent cancellation of licences than they were by the possibility of the penalties which might be imposed by the ordinary courts.

I do not agree that we can afford to place ourselves in the position that the same procedure cannot be followed in the future. I think Deputy Keyes is fundamentally wrong in his belief that the emergency is practically over. So far as supplies are concerned, it might be far nearer the truth to say that the emergency is now beginning. I do not know in what world some Deputies are living. They must have seen the newspapers and they must be aware that in Great Britain, the country closest to us, many rations have recently been reduced and a scheme for the rationing of bread is being prepared. These facts do not indicate that the emergency is over, so far as supplies are concerned.

We had to withdraw the margarine ration recently. We may have difficulty in maintaining the soap ration. The position is safe for some months ahead, but I could not guarantee it for more than some months. The situation may well develop in which supplies of wheat from abroad will be conditional on our imposing certain restrictions on its consumption here. In other directions future supply difficulties are to be anticipated and, as I stated yesterday, it may be necessary not merely to strengthen existing rationing schemes but to extend rationing to commodities not now rationed.

If these circumstances arise, we will have in the future precisely the same problem in the initial stages of each new rationing scheme, in securing the compliance of the traders and the public with the regulations involved, as we had in connection with existing rationing schemes. It may be necessary that exceptional methods will have to be adopted in order to get that compliance generally and expeditiously. I am not attempting to forecast the decision of the Government under this Bill, whether it will schedule under the Offences Against the State Act offences committed against regulations made under this Bill; but I am anxious that the Government should retain that power so that it can be used if the public interest requires it, or if it should prove to be the case that the ordinary courts are not effective in securing the proper administration of justice in respect of these matters.

I would not at all agree that there is any more serious crime against the community than the withdrawal from trade of essential supplies with a view to their disposal on the black market at exceptional prices. The special types of crimes for which the Offences Against the State Act was passed are serious. Crimes of this kind are equally serious and would, in certain circumstances, produce far more widespread consequences for the people than crimes of the other type.

It is possible that the supply situation will improve considerably, that many of the difficulties we foresee now will not, in fact, emerge. If so, the powers given to the Government in this Bill will not be utilised and many of the existing regulations can be withdrawn; but nobody examining the conditions throughout the world and noting the problems facing other countries can be certain that we will not have in the next 12 months to face difficulties of supply as serious or more serious than any we faced during the war.

In these circumstances it would be in my view bad policy to withdraw from the Government the powers which were used during the emergency, used sparingly but nevertheless effectively, in stamping out serious black-marketing activities here.

I am afraid that all I have said last night and to-day has not brought home to the Minister the real point of all this matter. He says it will be a serious thing to deprive the Government of a power to send cases to a Military Tribunal. That is not the point. The point is, will the courts break down in the administration of the law, because it is only when the ordinary courts break down in their duty of administering the law that the Government is justified in scheduling these offences. Underlying the Minister's whole attitude in this matter is that the Government can do this at any time they like in order to create what can only be described as a terror court. That is what the Minister says helped to avoid offences against rationing in the last five or six years—the threat of being brought to the Military Tribunal. I say that is a bad principle because it is not the threat that ought to be used for the purpose of administering the law; the law ought to be administered by the constitutional courts, and it is only when these courts break down that these special courts should be invoked. The very fact that that is a sort of threat is in itself a denunciation of these terror courts because it means this: the judicial people who are appointed, who are made by the Constitution independent in the exercise of their functions so that they will do justice between the community and the individual charged, are, according to the Minister, being subjected to censure here for what they have done and there is the suggestion that that court—the terror court—will do what it is told. That is why it will impose what is called a "salutary" fine—an outrageous fine I would call it —as against what a district justice would do. Why is it to be assumed that a district justice or a circuit judge or a High Court judge, for that matter, will not do his duty in these matters? I cannot see it.

There has been rather an emphasis upon the operations of the District Court in this matter. Most of the cases where what the Minister calls "salutary"—and I put that in inverted commas—punishment has been inflicted by the Military Tribunal have been tried on indictment. They have not come before the Military Tribunal, as it is popularly called, as a case that would have been tried by a district justice. They have been tried on indictment, as a case would be that would be tried by a judge and jury. What I pleaded for last night was that trial by jury should be tried in serious cases and there has never been an effort made to see if a jury in this country would convict in black market cases. I believe juries throughout the country would convict in black market cases and I believe, as I said last night, that one conviction by a jury in a black market case is worth 40,000 convictions by the terror court.

When I had some responsibility for the administration of the criminal law in this country it was frequently put up to me by responsible people that juries throughout the country, in country districts, were not convicting in cases where they should convict and my attitude invariably was, during the six years I was charged with that responsibility, "I do not care; it is not my duty; it is the responsibility of the people represented by the juries. Leave these cases with them and ultimately it will become known to the community that it is the local community themselves that will suffer and when that is brought home to them then the local people, through their juries, will see that those people are not let at large. It would be far better in the public interest that that could be achieved rather than have the cases brought to Dublin." I am glad to say that that policy was amply justified because, throughout the country, juries are now doing what is called their "duty"— in other words, they are fulfilling the oaths that they take to try the case in accordance with the evidence.

I see no reason why that should not have been tried in black market cases. Why should a case be brought before three military gentlemen and not brought before a local jury? If there is any trouble about the local jury, then it can be brought before a Dublin jury. Is there any suggestion that a Dublin jury will not be equally astute to get after black marketeers as the three military gentlemen who constitute the Military Tribunal?

I have no doubt whatever that if a proper case was brought, properly presented, on proper evidence and conducted in accordance with the law and in accordance with the justice which even accused persons are entitled to get, that there would be as ample justice meted out by a Dublin jury or by a country jury as is supposed to be meted out by the Military Tribunal.

In England; as I think was pointed out last night, the rationing system worked well. English juries had no difficulty whatever in bringing in verdicts in black marketing cases. English judges had no difficulty in handing out severe sentences in these cases. Why should it be suggested that our Irish juries will not do the same and our Irish judges will not carry out the oath that they have taken under the Constitution? I do think that the whole of this discussion on the part of the Minister is a serious blot upon the attitude of the Government towards the judiciary in this country, a serious vote of censure by the Government on the judicial system of this country and the judicial personages administering it—quite undeserved, in my opinion. I do again say—I hope for the last time— certainly on this amendment I do not propose to speak any more—that so far as I am concerned I will endeavour by my voice and whatever influence I may have, to protest against increasing the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunal over what I believe was their proper function. I do that for reasons of principle. Whatever value this tribunal has for the work it was intended to do will be completely undermined by the policy of the Government in reference to this matter.

Amendment put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 19; Níl, 41.

  • Blowick, Joseph.
  • Cafferky, Dominick
  • Cogan, Patrick
  • Corish, Brendan.
  • Cosgrave, Liam.
  • Costello, John A.
  • Dockrell, Henry M.
  • Dockrell, Maurice E.
  • Donnellan, Michael.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Finucane, Patrick.
  • Giles, Patrick.
  • Hughes, James.
  • Keating, John.
  • Keyes, Michael.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • Morrissey, Daniel.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • O'Reilly, Thomas.

Níl

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Blaney, Neal.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Brady, Brian.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breathnach, Cormac.
  • Breen, Daniel.
  • Breslin, Cormac.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Butler, Bernard.
  • Carter, Thomas.
  • Colley, Harry.
  • Crowley, Honor Mary.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Skinner, Leo B.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Humphreys, Francis.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kilroy, James.
  • Kissane, Eamon.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Lydon, Michael F.
  • McCann, John.
  • Moran, Michael.
  • Morrissey, Michael.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Loghlen, Peter J.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • O'Rourke, Daniel.
  • Rice, Bridget M.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Mary B.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Walsh, Richard.
Tellers:— Tá: Deputies Doyle and M. E. Dockrell; Níl: Deputies Kissane and O Briain.
Amendment declared lost.
Sections 6, 7 and 8 agreed to.
SECTION 9.

I move amendment No. 10:—

In sub-section (1), line 19, to delete the words "and every direction".

The principle embodied in Section 9 is one with regard to which I shall have a few words to say on the section. It goes very far indeed to dispense with proof in criminal matters, as well as other matters, of all Orders made under this Act. They are supposed to be judicially noticed. I do not know how a direction is to be judicially noticed. A direction can be given orally and how a judge is to know, out of his own bosom, that a direction has been given by a Minister passes my comprehension; but, under this section as it stands, every judge is presumed to know every oral direction given by a Minister, official or inspector under the authority of all Orders made under the Act.

I agree that it will be necessary to amend the section to make it quite clear that it does not apply to oral directions. An oral direction could not be judicially noticed.

Or even a written direction. Perhaps I had better say on the amendment what I would say on the section. The section deals with Orders and instruments of every kind made under this Bill when it becomes an Act, and every judge is presumed to know that all these Orders, instruments and directions have been given, without any proof.

No proof is brought before him at all, but he is presumed to know all about it. Of course that is an extremely bad principle. It is both bad and impracticable. The ordinary statutes of this Parliament are, to use the phrase in this section, which is a technical phrase, "judicially noticed". In other words, every judge is supposed to know the contents of the statute law of the Parliament by a polite fiction, and his memory is refreshed by bringing before him a particular type of copy of the Act.

The basic reason for that rule of evidence was due to the fact that public statutes were supposed to be notorious, because of public discussion of them while they were being enacted through Parliament. That is the whole basis of judicial notice being taken of the statute law of a country. There is no precedent for Orders made by virtue of statute, Statutory Rules and Orders, as they are called, being given the same status from the point of view of value as these statutes, because these Rules and Orders are multitudinous in modern circumstances. They pass the wit of man to keep track of them even in this country. Now, everyone is supposed to know all about Statutory Rules, Statutory Orders and directions.

I appeal to the Minister not to press this section at all. The origin of this section arose from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal setting aside a decision of our old friend, the Military Court. The prosecution in that case failed to prove the Order under which a person was being prosecuted, and the Court of Criminal Appeal held that it was a fundamental principle of the administration of criminal justice that every fact necessary to establish the guilt of the accused person had necessarily to be proved by the prosecution. That had not been done and, therefore, the prosecution had failed. I direct the Minister's attention to the basis of the decision in that case, that it was a fundamental principle of the administration of criminal law that every fact necessary to establish the guilt of the accused person should be proved by the prosecution. Hot-foot on that decision an Order was made by the Government, under the Emergency Powers Act, providing that all Orders, Rules and so forth should be judicially noticed.

I put down a motion objecting to that Order and calling for its annulment. The Minister for Justice defended the making of the Order. The real ground on which he defended the making of the Order was, that if the Government did not make that particular Order a number of other cases in which convictions had been had would be set aside and something in the nature of chaos would ensue. That defence was a rather reasonable de fence at the time. Of course, if something had not been done every person who was convicted, in a particular case where the Attorney-General had overlooked the formality of proving these Orders, would have to be released. It was a reasonable thing at the time to meet existing difficulties. No such difficulties would arise under this Bill when it becomes an Act.

All that is required is to have a Stationery Office copy of the Order under which a person is being prosecuted. All the prosecution has to do is to lean about three feet across a table with a 2d. Order, to put it on the table and to prove it. It proves itself when produced. This section is being enacted in order to save the prosecution the trouble of having the necessary Order in court, and handing it to the registrar to have it marked. I appeal to the Minister to say that it is not worth putting in this section, to abrogate what the Court of Criminal Appeal called a fundamental principle in criminal prosecutions, that the prosecution must prove its case to establish the guilt of the accused. I appeal to the Minister not to have this unnecessary inroad into that fundamental principle. It will cause no difficulty in the conduct of prosecutions under these Orders. It must, inevitably, happen that these Orders are in court. The court must know under what Order the charge is made. The prosecution must have the Order in court in order to frame or to state their case. The charge is based on the Order, which costs only a few pence and is in court.

All this section is doing is preventing the prosecution having the trouble of taking it out of the desk in front, handing it to the registrar and saying "That is a Stationery Office copy of the Order under which the prosecution is brought." That may seem trivial but this section, if passed, will be a complete inroad into a very vital and fundamental principle of criminal law and I ask the Minister not to press the section. It is not worth the trouble. It is eating into a vital principle, and I think that would be a bad thing for this House to do, particularly in cases where there is no real necessity for it. There was a necessity for the Emergency Powers Order. I recognised that at the time, although I objected to the Order. I recognised that that defence had some substance. It has not now. All it has to do is to produce a copy of the Order costing a few pence and handing it to the court. It is not worth while abrogating in this small way that vital principle of criminal justice which is, that a man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved by the prosecution to be guilty.

I confess I am unable to see the fundamental and vital principle to which Deputy Costello referred. If there is a principle involved in this matter at all, it seems to arise under Section 10, which provides that Orders and directions will have the force of law. If Section 10 is passed and Orders and directions are given the force of law I cannot see why they should not be judicially noted. Deputy Costello is moving an amendment to Section 10. I had assumed that his amendment to Section 9 was consequential.

I gather from the trend of his remarks that the Deputy sees them as separate matters.

Yes, certainly.

I cannot see that there is any principle involved at all in requiring a court to take judicial notice of Orders and directions which have the force of law. I agree that the judge may not always remember the details of every Order; but, as the Deputy said, his memory will be refreshed by the registrar of the court, or whatever court officer is responsible for seeing that all the documents necessary for the trial of a case are before the judge. How the principle is affected is by no means clear to me. If the process is as simple as the Deputy has suggested, it can make very little difference to the person who is accused of an offence whether the court reads a document, because it has judicial notice of it, or because the document is submitted to the court by the prosecuting counsel and proven in the ordinary manner which the Deputy mentioned. Frankly, I am not able to follow the force of the Deputy's argument at all. I regard it as important that Orders and directions made by Ministers should have the force of law. If they have the force of law, it seems to me to follow, as a natural corollary, that they should be judicially noted. There is no principle involved in that. It is merely a device for ensuring that the effect of Section 10, which gives these Orders and directions the force of law, is reinforced.

I regret that the Minister has not been able to follow my remarks. I tried to make the matter as simple as possible. Section 9, with which we are dealing, and Section 10 have nothing whatever to do with each other—nothing whatever. When we come to Section 10 I shall have a few remarks to make which may perhaps illuminate the Minister's outlook on Section 10. But the Minister may take it from me at the moment, whether these Orders have the force of law or not has nothing whatever to do with what I am talking about now. Whether these Orders have the force of law or not, they are law. They are a species of law. If Section 10 is passed and these are given what is called "the force of law," they still get only a little additional legal veneer upon them, but very little further effect by being given the force of law. I can refer the Minister to a legal decision of the British House of Lords on the effect of a statutory rule getting the force of law; but I am quite sure the Minister does not want to hear a lecture on the legal aspect as to whether a statutory rule, which is given the force of law, is ultra vires or intra vires. I might just state, for the Minister's information, the principle laid down in that case— the title of the case is Yaffe's—it is a peculiar name—the Minister may possibly have heard of it. In that case it was decided that, even though a statutory rule or order made under a Statute was given the force of law, it could still be held to be ultra vires. That has nothing to do with what I am talking about here. The first fundamental principle of criminal law with which we are concerned here is that a man is presumed to be innocent of an offence until he has been proved guilty by the prosecution and found guilty by a judge, or a judge and jury, as the case may be. That is a simple proposition to which we all pay lip service, but which quite frequently is more honoured in the breach than in the observance. But, at least, we all pay lip service to it—a man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. At all events the Court of Criminal Appeal in this country—and the Court of Criminal Appeal in this country consists of a Supreme Court judge and two High Court judges— has laid it down that that principle is abrogated if in any single particular the prosecution fail in their proofs of a particular person's guilt.

One of the proofs is the Order under which the offence is supposed to have been created. If the prosecution fail to prove that Order, they fail to prove their case and they have, therefore, violated one of the fundamental principles of criminal administration. I think I have stated the decision of that court, not merely accurately but very nearly in the words of the judge who pronounced the judgment of the court. Therefore, what I am saying is not my interpretation of the matter, but the law as laid down by the courts. Perhaps the Minister would prefer the law as laid down by the Special Criminal Court in this matter. But that is the law laid down by the ordinary courts. This section is abrogating that law and overriding the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in this country in a matter, as I suggest to the Minister, of no importance to the prosecution, or to the Government, or its administration, but of vital importance in connection with the maintenance of that principle. There is no doubt that these Orders will have to be produced in court. Why bring in this statutory provision which eats into that principle, even in a small way, where there is no practical difficulty in the way of the prosecution in proving these matters? The situation may arise that a prosecuting counsel or solicitor may come into court and say: "I have forgotten the Order under which this prosecution is brought; the court knows all about the Order," and the court says "Yes, I know all about it." The unfortunate prisoner says, "What on earth am I being prosecuted for?" He is told, "It does not matter—we know all about it." That may happen. It has in fact happened that a man was executed in this country on an Order which neither his counsel nor his solicitor could procure and which he himself never saw. That Order was not procurable and the man was executed on foot of an offence created by that Order.

I think we are still wandering from the main subject.

I am not; you may be.

The law is as declared by the Oireachtas. In the particular case, which gave rise to the Emergency Powers Order, a man was charged with a serious offence against rationing regulations. He was found guilty of the offence. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal and in that court the decision was reversed on the ground, as I understand it, that the Order creating the offence was not proven before the Special Criminal Court. The Special Criminal Court had the Order before it. Everybody participating in the trial had a copy of the Order. It was frequently referred to during the course of the trial, but the formal act of proving the Order did not take place and on that technical point the decision of the Special Criminal Court was reversed by the Court of Criminal Appeal and a man, who had been found guilty of a serious black-marketing offence before the Special Criminal Court, escaped punishment.

Pardon me interrupting. In order to complete the recital of the facts—the defending counsel in the course of the case objected to the fact that this Order had not been proved and made the point before the court; his objection was overruled and the court proceeded without the Order being proved.

The prosecution were asked for the Order and they refused to hand it in.

That is a very relevant fact to add to your recital.

I know. If I may say so, without offence, from a lawyer's point of view it is a relevant fact. From my point of view, as the Minister responsible for bringing the prosecution, the important thing was that a man, who on the evidence relating to the offence had been held guilty by the court, escaped punishment.

Because the necessary proofs were not given.

Because of the fact that the Order had not been formally proved in court. What was provided by the Emergency Powers Order and what is provided for here is that the court will be deemed to know that the Order has been made—the Order having the force of law. In any event, copies of the Order will be before the court. It seems to me that there is no principle involved there. It is a tidier and a simpler method of ensuring that cases of that kind will be determined in relation to the law to have these Orders and directions judicially noted.

It is a tidier and a simpler method of excusing the prosecution from doing the work which it is supposed to do. That is the plain fact of the matter. It is merely making the prosecution lazier and it is doing nothing else.

I do not agree with that.

There is nothing else to it but that. The Minister may take that to be the fact and the Minister has not answered the point I made that a man was done to death in this country under an order of the Military Court, on foot of an Order which he was not able to get and which the judge, who heard the habeas corpus application on his behalf, was not able to get at the time he made the Conditional Order. That was the fact at the time. This is now going to make that legal.

If the Order at the time was judicially noted then that principle was not interfered with.

That did not matter. The man could still be executed. It did not matter to the unfortunate follow. He was shot. It does not matter to him that, in fact, at the time when he was charged with the offence under an Order which he never got—even during his trial—it does not matter to him whether that was judicially noted or not. That is of no importance to him because he never saw it. I think from the point of view of the administration of justice this is an outrageous section.

Speaking as a layman, if we give these Orders the force of law the court should know what the law is.

Apparently I cannot convince the Minister, so I shall not put in any more time endeavouring to do so. Is the Minister going to consider the question of the direction?

Of the oral direction, yes, certainly.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put: "That Section 9 stand part of the Bill."
The Committee divided: Tá, 46: Níl, 21.

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Blaney, Neal.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Brady, Brian.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breathnach, Cormac.
  • Breen, Daniel.
  • Brennan, Martin.
  • Breslin, Cormac.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Butler, Bernard.
  • Carter, Thomas.
  • Colley, Harry.
  • Crowley, Honor Mary.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Furlong, Walter.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Healy, John B.
  • Humphreys, Francis.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kilroy, James.
  • Kissane, Eamon.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Lydon, Michael F.
  • Lynch, James B.
  • McCann, John.
  • McGrath, Patrick.
  • Moran, Michael.
  • Morrissey, Michael.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Loghlen, Peter J.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • O'Rourke, Daniel.
  • Rice, Bridget M.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Mary B.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Skinner, Leo B.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Walsh, Richard.

Níl

  • Bennett, George C.
  • Byrne, Alfred.
  • Commons, Bernard.
  • Corish, Brendan.
  • Cosgrave, Liam.
  • Costello, John A.
  • Dockrell, Henry M.
  • Dockrell, Maurice E.
  • Donnellan, Michael.
  • Finucane, Patrick.
  • Giles, Patrick.
  • Heskin, Denis.
  • Hughes, James.
  • Keating, John.
  • Keyes, Michael.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Morrissey, Daniel.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Norton, William.
  • O'Higgins, Thomas F.
Tellers: Tá, Deputies Kissane and O Briain; Níl, Deputies Bennett and McMenamin.
Question declared carried.
SECTION 10.

I move amendment No. 11.

In line 26 to delete the words "every direction" and to delete all words after the word "law" to the end of the section.

Will the Minister explain why it is necessary that every direction shall have the force of law? Why does he want it to have the force of law? It is a new principle. Am I right in saying that this principle was not in the old Emergency Powers Act? How can a direction over the telephone have the force of law? Why should it?

It is not the direction over the telephone so much as the operations of an inspector to whom power is delegated that is important. In the case of the Department of Industry and Commerce—and I speak of that Department because it is the one of which I have most knowledge—the power to give a direction was used where goods were detected in transit or in store which were obviously associated with black market transactions. A stop Order was given at once to prevent further movement of the goods or their disappearance pending an investigation relating to them, or there might be a further direction for the disposal of the goods to legitimate traders or Government authorities, like the Army. I mentioned also a direction given to a trader to produce his records and books so that the inspectors can investigate the manner in which the trader is observing the regulations.

There are two things in this amendment. One relates to giving the direction the force of law. The instrument most commonly used in enforcing rationing regulations is the Ministerial direction. It is used not merely in relation to the transfer of goods as required from one trader to another in order to ensure equitable distribution of supplies, but it has been adopted also for the control of profits of manufacturers. Originally manufacturers' profits were regulated by means of agreements entered into with the manufacturers, but at a subsequent stage, when it was found these agreements were not always being observed, the terms of each agreement were embodied in a direction to the manufacturer, which made it an offence for him not to adhere to the agreement.

The second point is that the direction or Order can supersede any legislation which has a contrary effect. I will give an illustration why that power is necessary. One of the devices adopted by the British Government in connection with the bread situation was to reduce the size of the loaf. Possibly we may decide to adopt a similar device for a period. An Order or direction requiring that reduction would be contrary to the terms of a law concerning the weight and size of the loaf. There is no power in this Bill to amend a statute. Effect could not be given to the Order or direction unless it was supported by amending legislation, which it is desired to avoid. It is necessary, in the special circumstances under which this Bill will be operated, to provide that a Ministerial Order or direction will be given effect to, even if it is contrary to an existing Act.

The only real objection I have to this is that I do not see the necessity for it. I do not see where it gets the Minister. If an Order under this Bill enables the Minister to give a direction, that is a lawful direction and has the force of law, why is it necessary to say in the section that it has the force of law? It is a direction authorised by the law. I will leave it to the Minister to think that out.

I shall have to get advice on that.

Amendment No. 11, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 10 put and agreed to.
SECTION 11.

I move amendment No. 12:—

Before Section 11 to insert a new section as follows:—

This Act shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Constitution and no Order, authorisation, direction, regulation or subsidiary instrument shall be made or be continued in force by virtue of this Act which is in any respect repugnant to the Constitution or to any provision thereof.

This is an effort to re-establish the Constitution, which has been invaded —if I am not mixing up metaphors too much—for the past six years. At all events, the Constitution, if it has not been invaded, has been put on the shelf for the past six years. I think we have reached the stage where the Constitution should be allowed to operate again.

It will. My answer is that the amendment is not necessary. The Act will be subject to the provisions of the Constitution.

I thought the Bill did not come within the provisions of the Constitution—I think it is Article 28 (3) (3º)—and was not framed to meet the provisions of that Article. I was not too sure.

This is ordinary law and is subject to the Constitution, and every Order made under it is subject to the Constitution.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 11 agreed to.
Amendment No. 13 not moved.
Sections 12 to 16, inclusive, and the Title, put and agreed to.
Bill reported with amendment.
Report Stage fixed for Wednesday, 3rd July.
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