The position is this. A Government is there to govern. In such matters, the Government, while it is the Government, has to take its decisions and has to deal with such matters and, consistent with the public interest, disclosures should be made. But a motion of this nature can do nothing else but produce a lot of red herrings and a lot of uninformed talk and I think can do no good at a moment such as this.
To come to another aspect of it, I should like to refer to General Mulcahy's opening speech. The Leader of the Opposition was at some pains to point out that there is always a certain lack of clarity in a defence situation at the end of a war and that there must be, so to speak, a certain amount of holding things open. With that, everybody will agree. Perhaps it is for that very reason that it is premature at this stage to commit oneself to a hard and fast and irrevocable line of action in respect of defence. To take the matter of equipment alone, during most wars, and I think it applied to both of the recent big wars, the armies started off with a certain type of equipment which was judged, all things taken into account, to be the most suitable equipment for the army in question. Now, a war develops. One belligerent or the other, and all of them, usually, in turn, develop novel weapons or novelties in the design or modification of existing weapons, with a view usually to securing some surprise advantage. That surprise element in war inevitably brings about a development and a progress in the army in which it is adopted, but that development is always constrained by the tension of the war situation existing when the development takes place. Time is pressing. Therefore, experimentation has to be rather rapid. Not only is time pressing, but existing machinery, existing plant, have to be used with the least possible modification so that constantly there is a conflict going on, on the production side, between the weapon which is wanted and which is ideal, on the one hand, and existing weapons, production machinery and productive capacity on the other. The solution is generally a mean solution.
However, the situation changes when it comes to peace time. In peace time the great Powers and the big Powers generally are in a position to exploit more fully the ideas that occurred to them during the war or new weapons that have been either born or developed during the war. They are not hampered by the same war situation and, consequently, they are at liberty to develop something, which may be new, but which certainly is a very much improved form of weapon or weapons, as the case may be.
In a situation like this, a small country, or any small army, must pause at the end of a war before it commits itself to a wholesale purchase of equipment. If it buys up existing equipment at the end of a war, it runs the risk of having inferior stuff at a later stage. I need not pursue the argument very much further on that line, but I think it is quite clear, and most reasonable people, especially anybody who has had any dealings with the question, will realise that it would be better to press the Minister at the moment to defer committing himself to an equipment programme, for the present, rather than to press him to formulate a policy or a programme at this moment.
For that reason, I oppose that portion of the motion. It is impracticable and it is immature. Even if one were to admit the doubtful principle, I think the wrong principle, that such matters should be thrown open, I think by far the better procedure to adopt is that which all Governments in this State have adopted up to date in regard to defence disclosures and, in time of crisis, there is always the solution that was adopted in the last war for informing the responsible members of the Opposition. I think that is much the safer and much the better procedure. But, even if you do run riot and say: "Let us have these all out on the table, let us have the bone for everyone to pull at and everyone to fight about"—and really I do not think that is intended—the question of formulating a policy or a programme in regard to equipment is, in my humble opinion, premature, that at the moment no useful purpose could be served and, worse, if the Minister were weak enough—I sincerely hope he never would be—to yield to such a thing, that we would be committed to a certain amount of foolish dreaming and exercise with figures and hypothetical situations that would completely paralyse the usefulness of our Defence Forces if and when they were called upon to perform any of their proper functions.
If you come to that conclusion in regard to equipment, I fail to see how you can formulate a hard and fast and definite programme in any other sphere of Army activity. Unit and combat organisation will depend largely upon the equipment that you have adopted and the equipment that you have available, among a large number of other factors. So, I fail to see that a motion of this nature can bear any fruit.
To come to what is required in regard to defence at the end of a war: I for one would urge the Minister— and I am sure he has done it already— to consider that at the end of a war is the time to sit back and take stock. It is at the end of such a war as the last, where we were so singularly fortunate, thanks to Providence—because we can put it no other way—that the first thing to do is to sit back and see what lessons are to be learned from the information at our disposal and from our own experience. I find myself in a rather difficult position in a debate of this nature in that, as a person who has served in certain places, I may have information that it is not proper to make any use of but I think I am in no way abusing the knowledge which I gained in another situation when I say that I am certain that the Minister for Defence caused a careful examination to be made of our existing situation as far as can be seen—that is as far as you can go—and likely future situation, and our past experience, when he was preparing for the establishment and the carrying on of the Army through this difficult interim period.
Now I have only to deal with matters that are public knowledge. Let us look back and see what these were. After 1924, you might say the Army of this State became established in the sense in which we know it now. The Government of that day had to face up to a problem, just as I almost feel General Mulcahy is putting it up to us now to face up to it. The problem is this: Does a country of our size need an Army at all or is it a special police force that is required? If we are to get down to brass tacks on the question of defence, let us ask ourselves fairly and squarely, is it simply a police force you want or is it a defence force? That question was asked at that time and, of course, we know the answer that was given.
I have heard nobody, despite the criticism of numbers or anything else, say that we do not want an Army at all, that we want only an augmented police force. I am stressing that point because, if that is any Deputy's point of view, I say: "That is the end of the argument. There is a certain amount to be said for your point of view but, if you stick to it and I stick to my point of view, that is the end of the argument." I can quite understand that attitude, but, if the answer to that question is that we require a defence force, then we have to look at the matter from another angle. If it were merely a matter of local social security, the prevention of crime, or the maintenance of ordinary civil order within the borders of the State, then by all means have your police force. But do we require to do anything else?
Rightly or wrongly, it was decided, even in the time that the present principal Opposition Party were the Government, that an Army should be maintained here and, as far as our resources at the time permitted, an effort was made to equip it as an Army. That policy was continued when the present Government came into office and an effort was made, as far as our resources would permit, to build up an Army. Why? For the good and simple reason that we have got here a certain geographical unit of territory. Unfortunately, we have not the whole island; if we had, the defence problem might in some ways be a simpler one for us.
Quite apart from offensive action and defensive action in the absolute sense, there is the consideration of garrisoning it. We could not just lift the anchor, float the island to the Antarctic, and remain safe if a war broke out involving Europe. When you could not do that, the territory of this State would be of importance to some belligerent, and that territory had to be accounted for, so to speak. When you take into consideration the fact that that piece of territory is adjacent to one of the big Powers likely to be involved in a war, the matter becomes clearer still and, without going into any question as to association or anything else, the fact remains that that piece of territory has to be accounted for and has to be garrisoned.
There is this further question, is it in the interest of this State and its people that we should, as far as garrisoning the country from the defence point of view is concerned, undertake that duty ourselves or adopt a completely passive attitude, with, of course, the corollary that somebody else must garrison it in time of war?
That was the general argument and it remains a valid argument, irrespective of the fact that that garrison may not be able to put up an absolute defence. In the case of a major set of operations that might involve us, they would invariably involve others who would be hostile to the people attacking us, in which case the ultimate defence responsibility might rest elsewhere; but that does not take away at all from the important role of garrison troops, troops to take the first shock; that duty would devolve on our defence forces.
I know that in attempting to deal with a matter like this and trying to deal with it fairly, it is very easy to say: "Oh, the idea of a handful of men in this country defending it against a major Power," and start to ridicule things that way. That is not the point at issue. I am talking about the necessity for a garrison. The choice, therefore, is between garrisoning your own country and at least keeping yourself intact during the pre-operational period, or throwing the thing open, in which case you will have to be garrisoned by somebody else. What I am trying to do is to recapture the attitude of two Governments with regard to maintaining a defence force here.
