Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 30 Mar 1949

Vol. 114 No. 13

Committee on Finance. - Vote 63—Defence.

Minister for Defence (Dr. O'Higgins)

I move:—

That a sum not exceeding £2,470,580 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1950, for the Defence Forces (including certain Grants-in-Aid) under the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, and for certain administrative expenses in connection therewith; for certain expenses under the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939 and 1940 (No. 13 of 1939 and No. 2 of 1940) and the Air-Raid Precautions Acts, 1939 and 1946 (No. 21 of 1939 and No. 28 of 1946); for Expenses in connection with the issue of Medals, etc.; and for Expenses of the Bureau of Military History.

In moving the Estimate for the Defence Forces for the year 1949-50, I think it is at least demanded, at the very outset, that the Minister for Defence should express his regret at the resignation of General McKenna and express on behalf of the Government, the Army and the Dáil his appreciation of the very, very great services that were rendered by that officer for a considerable number of years. He served under three different Governments and I think his life in the Army was an example of the real meaning of the word "service" because of all the various Ministers, the various phases and changes of Government under which he served, I think it true to say that each and every one of them got the same support and sound advice and loyalty that their predecessors or successors got from him.

In dealing with the Estimate, I propose to deal in the first part briefly with the financial portions in broad outline. The details, of course, are there in the Book of Estimates for all to read. In addition, I propose to deal with the general outlook, the general plan and the general policy of the Army and, in doing so, to see to what extent it is possible to make compatible the views of the Opposition and the views of the Government, because I hold very strongly to the view that in this country it is, if not essential, at least desirable, that the very maximum of degree of understanding and co-operation should be secured behind the Defence Forces of the State. Many years ago—and the evidence is there in the Dáil Debates— we thought we had arrived at understanding and agreement. We thought we had arrived at that understanding and agreement around and behind a motion moved by the present Leader of the Opposition when he was formerly Leader of the Opposition. That policy was adhered to and that plan agreed to by two successive Governments, always with the exception of the type of Army that naturally would be thrown up in a period of war or emergency, but, since the end of the emergency, there appears to have been a deliberate, a very deliberate decision, by the Opposition Party to throw completely overboard the agreement originally arrived at and to throw completely overboard the views expressed and laid down for agreement by the Leader of the Opposition. That is a point we can return to later on and possibly we shall get some explanation as to why the Leader has been unsaddled on this particular phase of policy and less experienced jockeys have got into the saddle. With regard to the financial provisions——

Mr. Aiken

Before we go further, would the Minister quote what Deputy de Valera said on this matter?

Dr. O'Higgins

That is exactly what the Minister announced he would do.

Mr. Aiken

Good.

Dr. O'Higgins

I would not make a statement of the kind I have just made without having bell, book and candle, and bell, book and candle will be placed at the disposal of Deputy Aiken before I have concluded. I was merely giving the order of priorities in which I intend to deal with the Estimate. I said in the first place I would deal in broad outline with the financial provisions of this particular Vote. The Estimate for the financial year ahead shows a decrease of more than £800,000 on the original Estimate for last year. In that connection, it is probably within the recollection of Deputies that, in moving the Vote for the Defence Forces last year I outlined to the House that I was not moving for the full amount down in the Book of Estimates last year, but for a sum of approximately £750,000 less than that shown in the Book of Estimates. Taking that into account the reduction in this year's Estimate as against last year's revised Estimate is slightly over £100,000—£109,000.

The Estimate before us this year provides for the maintenance, pay and allowances, etc., of 1,077 officers and 7,000 other ranks, compared with provision last year for 1,094 officers and 7,500 other ranks. The decrease now proposed is 17 officers and approximately 500 other ranks. In addition to that figure there are 13 chaplains, 124 cadets and 101 nurses. The pay, allowances and maintenance of the number above-mentioned come to £2,367,000. That represents 61 per cent. of the total Estimate before us.

The Estimate also provides an establishment for the coming year of 652 officers and 5,414 other ranks in the First Line Reserve, as compared with 5,078 other ranks in the previous Estimate. Last year the Reserve was not called out for annual training, but this year officers and senior N.C.O.s will be called for 21 days and other ranks for 14 days. Assuming that all the officers respond to the call-out and about 80 per cent. of the other ranks, the estimate for the cost of the calling up of the Reserve will be in the neighbourhood of £118,000. The establishment provided in the Estimate for the Second Line Reserve, known as the F.C.A., consists of 1,202 officers and 38,798 other ranks. This arm also will be called up for annual training during the present year and the estimate for the cost of that training is £155,440.

In this Estimate the number of civilians provided for is 2,159 and their cost £610,859. That particular figure includes the civil servants dealing with the administration of the Army, crews for vessels other than naval ships plying in Cork harbour, tradesmen engaged in the maintenance of barracks and the maintenance and service of Army vehicles and a number of men to carry out what may be described as domestic duties for the Army. The whole purpose of carrying so many civilians in relation to a small army is, of course, in order to relieve the military personnel of these servicing and barrack duties so that they may concentrate a greater portion of their time, etc., on military duties proper.

Converting that figure into percentages, it shows that before providing for stores of any kind, whether ordinary or warlike stores, it will be seen that the cost of the military and civilian establishments alone is £3,250,000, or 84.5 per cent. of the total gross Vote. For ordinary, as distinct from warlike stores, the Estimate provides for a total of £403,000 to cover the cost of items such as drugs and dressings, mechanical and other transport, petrol and oils, camp workshops, educational and ships' equipment and engineers' stores.

For warlike stores, namely, stores intended directly for fighting, the Estimate provides for £117,888. One of the difficulties with regard to warlike stores is the difficulty, not of paying for the goods, but in procuring the goods. There was a question down yesterday by Deputy Traynor, a question which I did not, nor I consider could any Minister for Defence, answer fully and frankly. It was inquiring the quality, the type and the prices of warlike stores purchased by the Army within the previous 12 months. I rather doubt that the Deputy saw that question at all before it was passed in in his name. It is inconceivable that an ex-Minister for Defence in any Parliament, with a world such as we have at present, would address any such question to his successor. My reply was to the effect that it was not usual to give such information, but that, if the Deputy required it personally, I would be very pleased to give it to him in private.

The implication behind that question, I thought, was a suggestion or a fear that there had been a tendency in connection with economies to cut down on the purchase of warlike stores; that in connection with a desire for economy generally and for value for money spent there might be a tendency to starve the Army of warlike stores. I had inquiries made as to the amount of money spent annually on warlike stores in years of peace going back to 1932. I find that in 1932, £32,000 odd was spent on warlike stores; in the next year £36,500; in the next year £67,000; in the next year £64,000; in the next year £98,000; in the next year £142,000. In those years the average amount spent on engineers' stores was £2,000.

Then we come to the war years and after the war years. In 1947-48, £4,000 was spent on warlike stores and £16,000 on engineers' stores. In the year just drawing to an end, £73,000 was spent on warlike stores and £15,250 on engineers' stores. In the year just coming to an end, as a result of a very special effort and the Chief of Staff and other higher officers going over to Great Britain in person, we were able to get a reasonable amount of warlike stores. Not only that, but the list prices of the commodities we purchased were reduced by from 40 to 60 per cent. Therefore, taking into account the reduction in price, the £72,000 expended in the last year represents the equivalent of £140,000 or £150,000 of purchases in the normal way.

I stress that particular aspect of our expenditure by way of explanation and giving the maximum amount of information, because of the fact that I could not reply in detail to the question put down yesterday. The figures I have read out indicate at least that in the way of essential warlike stores and equipment there is no desire whatsoever on the part of the present Government to withhold from the Army anything that the Army should have in order to equip itself to the very highest degree.

There is a difficulty, as some of the Deputies opposite may have experienced, in dealing with warlike equipment and warlike stores. There is the very big difficulty that by the time a small country like this gets the warlike supplies which it orders, those supplies are already obsolete or in danger of becoming obsolete. We, in this country or any country circumstanced as we are, could waste a tremendous amount of money on warlike commodities that are antiquated by the time we receive them. At the present moment, there is an obvious intention that the various Atlantic Pact subscribers will have guns of a uniform and common calibre, and that the only ammunition made will be ammunition to suit those particular types of guns. It may be that the type of light arms which we have will be the type generally adopted. However, assume that it is the American type and that further supplies of ammunition will be made only to suit that type of gun, then every gun that we have at the moment becomes immediately a comparatively useless and worthless antique. No longer will the supplies of ammunition be procurable because we do not make them in this country and we rely on outside sources to supply us with what they have surplus to their own requirements. That is an element which must be taken into account in the equipping of an Army immediately post-war, when the type and design of arms are changing and subject to review. In other words, the desire properly to equip any army cannot, at the present moment, be measured according to the standards of pounds, shillings and pence spent. We have in the past 12 months, made a very big effort to equip this Army according to a scale and standard on which it was never previously equipped.

In the modern sense men in uniform will not create an Army. Armies have become more and more mechanised, more and more armoured and more and more heavily armed. A hundred thousand men in uniform may have been an army 50 or 100 years ago. A hundred men with modern weapons, with machines and properly armoured, would create more of a modern army. We never had a tank in this country of any kind until the last 12 months. Not one. We had plenty of uniforms, but war came and there was starvation in the way of armaments. Before that war sufficient attention had not been paid to the proper equipment of the Army, and when the war came there was a period of comparative starvation. In the past few years there has been some evidence of the release of a certain type, but only a certain type, of articles for the proper equipment of an army. To a very great extent war has gone into the air. In the way of anti-aircraft artillery we are practically as defenceless as we were before aeroplanes were built. Anti-aircraft artillery cannot be purchased even at the present moment. I am stressing those particular difficulties so that Deputies on all sides will appreciate that it is not for want of the will that there may be deficiency in the way of equipment, but it is because the commodities are not available, at least for purchase by us.

I hope the debate this year will proceed along sounder lines than last year. At least, I am entitled to express the hope that the debate will proceed along lines of fact and reliable figures and not along lines of fiction and unreliable figures. Provided facts are squarely faced up to and the figures are reliable ones, I have no objection whatsoever to criticism, no matter how frequent or how lengthy. I had reason to complain in last year's debate because Deputy Traynor misled from the start the whole Opposition Party. I have no criticism to advance with regard to the Deputies who followed his lead. The normal Parliamentary procedure is that one speaker in the Government leads off for the Government and other speakers more or less follow his line, but, at least, they accept the fact that the figures given by him are reliable and that the facts stated have been ascertained to be correct before they are stated.

Last year we had Deputy Traynor misleading the whole Opposition, including his Leader, into a debate that included a statement to the effect that the provision made for the Army last year by the previous Government and by himself was for an Army of 12,500 men. I tried to correct or head-off Deputies opposite from blundering into a completely false position. I asked them to read the Book of Estimates and said that there they would see: "Army establishments, 12,500; deduct for below numbers". In other words, the provision that was made was for an Army of 9,000 odd, less the Construction Corps, which were never and could never be regarded as soldiers. One after the other, each of the Deputies opposite who intervened in the debate intervened on the basis that their policy was for an Army of 12,500 a year and that I was cutting the efficiency of the Army by reducing it to 8,000 odd. The only Deputy opposite who tried to avoid the matter was Deputy Briscoe who, in his own shrewd way, asked me had I never heard of a Supplementary Estimate and could there not always be a Supplementary Estimate moved to provide for more men and to pay them more money. Of course, that was too childish to deceive anybody. Could I not answer the whole of the Opposition by saying: "What is in that book is meaningless. Pay no attention to it. I could always move a Supplementary Estimate". However, the difference between myself and my predecessor in these debates of these two years is that I am standing pat over what I am doing, whether it is right or wrong. Whatever is coming to me by way of criticism I am not going to duck behind any evasion of a Supplementary Estimate. I am moving for so much money, so many guns and so many men and I consider that in view of the circumstances existing in this country—we are not a high-wage country; we are not too wealthy a country—that in asking for that sum for the Army I am asking for as much money for the Army in peace time as any Minister is entitled to ask for. I am asking for over £3,250,000 for the Army alone. That does not include the various pensions and superannuation schemes. I am asking for that much money for the Army. It is an immense Bill to exact from a tiny population and a comparatively poor people, but in asking for that sum of money, and in saying that in peace time the Army asked for is adequate, I am not mentioning that figure without having the experience of years and years of peace-time strength behind me. Deputy Traynor, in referring to this last year when I was looking for 8,000 odd, showed an appalling degree of casualness or ignorance for a man who had been so many years Minister for Defence. In the course of his remarks, he said that, in his opinion, the 8,500 men I was looking for was the lowest figure ever recorded for the permanent Regular Army of this country. Now, leaving out the years of the emergency, and taking Deputy Aiken's period as Minister for Defence and the time when he came before us as Minister, he told us that he was going to see that the people got butter and not guns, that he was standing for a tiny Army and the cry "give our people butter rather than guns." I looked up the full strength of the Regular Army in peace-time, and this strength is for the 31st of March in each year from 1932 onwards. The figure for 1932 is 5,793, all ranks.

Major de Valera

Paper strength.

Dr. O'Higgins

Actual strength with the colours on the 31st March—human beings, two-legged soldiers. The figure on the 31st March, 1933 was 5,823; 1934, 5,763; 1935, 5,582; 1936, 5,799; 1937, 5,885; 1938, 6,519 and on the 31st March, 1939 when the papers all over the world were screaming war, the figure was 7,262. An ex-Minister for Defence—he had been Minister for Defence for some six or seven years— comes into Dáil Éireann and, from the Opposition Benches, he says that 8,500, all ranks, is the lowest strength ever recorded in the history of our Army. I would not mind a back-bench Deputy who had been only a few months in Dáil Éireann making a statement such as that, but for a man who had been for many years Minister for Defence to make a statement such as that when talking about the strength of a peace-time Army in this country, means either one of two things: either that he never looked up the Army strength in order to get some information as to what would be a reasonable strength in peace times, or else he misled the Dáil. The choice of descriptions is his.

The strength that I am laying before the Dáil for this Army is the strength that is there in the Book of Estimates. I consider that in a year of peace I am demanding every farthing from the taxpayers of this country that I am entitled to demand, and I believe that in times of peace a little country such as this, commanding small revenues such as we do, that the maximum amount of our expenditure must be devoted towards production, towards increasing the amenities and making provision for the unfortunate destitute, the aged and the invalided in our midst, and that it is only in the light of war, or in the shadow of war, that we are entitled to demand and extract more from the pockets of our people.

Of course, I am not denying the right of any Deputy opposite to advocate an Army of 12,500, 20,000 or 25,000, but I am suggesting that when any experienced Deputy comes into Dáil Éireann and advocates that we should double the strength of our Army or increase the strength of it by 50 per cent., then there is the responsibility on him to indicate, even roughly, where he proposes to get the extra £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 that is embodied in his proposal. It is easy enough for Deputy Traynor, Deputy Aiken, or Deputy anybody else to come in and advocate an Army of 12,000, 13,000 or 15,000. It is easy enough for them to advocate an Army of that strength and say that is the ideal, but we do not live in an ideal world, and if any of us had the making of the world or our own little share of it completely to ourselves, we might make it in a better way and more to our liking, but we have got to pay for the world that we live in. When they advocate a vastly increased Army, where are they going to raise the vastly increased money? Are we to re-impose the beer and tobacco duties in order to find increased money for the Army? Do they want that? When they had those beer and tobacco duties and those million pounds which they brought in, they had not an Army much bigger than the one that I am looking for. If we are not to reimpose those duties, are we to take back the £2,500,000 that we gave to the old age pensioners, the blind and the widows?

Remember, half that sum that went to the old age pensioners, the blind and the widows, was found by economies in that Army Vote and could not have been incorporated in Government policy if it were not for the economies that were effected in the Army. Are we to reduce their pensions and increase the Army, or are we to reimpose the beer and tobacco duties, the duties on pictures, and increase the Army? Let nobody who is demanding an increase in the strength and cost of the Army be so thoroughly irresponsible as to demand that increase in strength and cost without accepting some responsibility for suggesting where the money is to be found.

In my opening remarks I pointed out that, many years ago, when the present Leader of the Opposition was Leader of the Opposition, and when Mr. Cosgrave's Government was here, we approached something like a healthy understanding between Government and Opposition as to what type of Army we should have and how much we could afford to spend on it. In that particular year the rather unusual course was taken of putting down an amendment to the Temporary Defence Forces Bill. The amendment was quite obviously a well reasoned out amendment—not just a happy-golucky intervention in debate, but a well reasoned out amendment, as a result of full consideration and all the intelligence that the Party opposite could bring to bear on this particular question.

The amendment was not moved by any irresponsible Deputy. The amendment was moved by the Leader of the Opposition himself, by nobody less, in order to give it full weight. That amendment was to this effect:—

"To delete all words after ‘that' and to add these words: ‘The Dáil declines to give a Second Reading to a Bill having for its purpose the continuance of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, 1923 to 1927, but is of opinion that the Defence Forces should be organised before March 31st, 1928, on a volunteer territorial basis with a small permanent training and maintenance establishment.'"

That was the policy laid down by the Party opposite and enunciated through the month of their leader, a man who had been in public life for a considerable number of years, a man who had as much military experience as anybody else in the Dáil, and a man who had been the unquestioned and unchallenged leader of the Irish people for a considerable number of years. That was his plan, that was his proposal, and the spectacular and emphatic way he did it was by means of moving an amendment to the Defence Forces Bill. He made his case and, in doing so, he scoffed at the idea of attempting to prevent invasion of this country through a regular army. He scoffed at our capacity to do it in that way within the limits of our resources. He pointed to many Continental countries financially circumstanced something like ourselves, with a population something like ours. In other words, in his statement he showed close study in the collecting of information as to the strength of armies, the revenues and the population. That was the amendment moved by the Leader of the Opposition and supported by every member of his Party.

Is he to be debunked to-day as the man who was merely a poseur, who was putting forward such an amendment around an important matter like defence purely to embarrass the Government of the day, or is he to be debunked as a person who did not know what he was talking about and that it took younger men to unsaddle him and show him where he was wrong and how unsound were his views?

The way in which that particular amendment was met by the then Government and the then Minister for Defence was to welcome it and to point out how near it came to meeting the views of the Government of the day and that as rapidly as possible a reserve would be built up so as to have an Army in this country of the type outlined and designed by Deputy de Valera, the Leader of the Opposition, and supported by all his battalions sitting opposite.

That was the peace-time plan, the peace-time desire. With regard to cost, that was worked out with the same mathematical precision as the strength in men was worked out. There was nothing left in doubt with regard to the number of men. There was nothing left in doubt with regard to the cost, the finance, and there was nothing left in doubt with regard to Deputy Aiken's wholehearted and enthusiastic support for the plan. The cost was to be not more than £1,000,000. A million pounds were to be the limit. Our defence against invasion was to be an elastic force of territorial volunteer divisions through the country and it was absurd to think we could repel invasion through the medium of a Regular Army, but there had to be a Regular Army of technicians in order to assist the main Army, composed of volunteers.

There, again, we had the mathematical mind and the military genius applied to the plan proposed. The exact relation between the strength of our regular troops and our volunteer defenders was worked out with the same degree of precision as was the cost of that Army. There was to be a proportion of ten to one, ten volunteers to one regular, so that if we had a Volunteer Reserve of 50,000, then we should have a regular Army of not more than 5,000. I wonder was all that plan put forward just in a spirit of youthful inanity? Was all that precision and all that planning merely an exhibition of juvenile folly? Or was it merely a plan not to defend the country against an aggressor but to embarrass the Government of the country? I am sufficiently charitable to believe that there was considerable study and thought put into that plan. Not only was there study and thought put into it, but the plan was carried out during all the period from 1932 to 1939, when the person who formulated the plan became head of the Executive Council sitting over here and the complete and absolute captain of the crew. Deputy Aiken carried out that plan in its very fullest degree when he gave us an Army for the period of his administration averaging 5,000 all ranks, but carried out his leader's plan by building up a Volunteer Reserve that averaged 10,000 and odd. He would, of course, have built up a bigger reserve if the numbers had been forthcoming. But in every detail, as far as it could be carried out, that plan outlined by Deputy de Valera as Leader of the Opposition was put into being and carried out during his period as head of the Government up to the outbreak of war. That plan was accepted by the then Minister for Defence, the late Mr. Fitzgerald, who welcomed and accepted it. We had then agreement on a plan, with the exception of war time, when it was only natural that we should have the biggest army possible. Immediately war was over and before the battlegrounds were cleared we were back again to an army of 9,000 and odd. I am stressing these particular points in order to demonstrate to the Opposition that it is not worth while talking if we have nothing about which to talk. If half as much time was devoted to finding out to what extent we can agree rather than the amount of time that is being devoted to finding out to what extent we can disagree, all would go well with us. Things are serious here and elsewhere and it is not worth while taking up days and days of the time of the Dáil in arguing as to whether we shall have an Army of 8,200 or 9,300. Is the difference worth wasting one's breath on? That is the difference between Deputy Traynor's proposal last year and my proposal this year.

There is one big difference between the Army as administered by Deputy Aiken and the Army at the present moment. That difference is on the side of the Army by which Deputy de Valera swears most extensively; that is the Reserve. At the time he put down that motion the only delay that the then Minister experienced in meeting his proposals was the delay in building up the Reserve. The then Minister said that as soon as ever we could get the Reserve together figures would fall to that; and the biggest Volunteer Reserve that was there between 1932 and the outbreak of war was the Volunteer Reserve of 10,000 and odd. The First Line Reserve averaged something under 5,000; from 1929 onwards it was steady at 5,000. The Volunteer Reserve outside of that averaged 10,000. There, one was getting to something like the ideal type of Army that it was possible for us to equip, maintain and pay — a highly trained Regular Army, small in numbers, but expert at their work and trained to the greatest degree of efficiency both at home and abroad, while being sufficiently equipped in the training sense to be conversant with every type of modern weapon and appliance. Behind that Army there was the First Line Reserve of highly trained exsoldiers, capable of being mobilised at any time, having gained all the training and experience derived by them during their period of training in the Army. Outside of that again, there was the biggest Volunteer Reserve it was possible to get in the country. During all those years we had a standing Army of 5,000 and odd. We had a First Line Reserve of 5,000 and odd. We had a Second Line Reserve averaging 10,000.

What is the position at the present moment? We have a Regular Army of 8,000 and odd; we have a First Line Reserve of 5,000 and odd; we have a Second Line Reserve of more than 30,000—actually 38,000 on paper. The biggest end of it—the end to which Deputy de Valera, the Leader of the Opposition, pins his faith—is the big reserve carrying on their civilian occupations, while being trained all the time week by week and month by month to the fullest extent by the Army. There is where one has the big Defence Force in an emergency; to use the words of his colleague, Deputy Lemass, relying on a central Army but devising a Volunteer Force as our main reliance and not, in his picturesque phrase, "the hard shell of a central Army that is easily cracked." He held that we should rely on the elasticity of a vast Volunteer Force. Now, the nearer we approach agreement on that the further apart we seem to drift. The more I adopt the policy of Fianna Fáil and the Fianna Fáil plan, the more I am denounced; the closer I approach them the further away I seem to go.

In this debate let us first of all realise that the plan outlined—and, as far as I know, never repudiated—by the Leader of the Opposition was to have the tiniest Army possible and the largest Reserve possible, the relationship between Army and Reserve being ten Reserve to one Army; the overhead cost of the Regular Army to be £1,000,000. Allowing for depreciation and so on let us make that £1,000,000 £2,000,000. We have then a plan considered by every member of the Party opposite and enunciated by the Leader of the Opposition to have a tiny Army which would cost—let me be generous— not more than £2,000,000 and as large a Reserve as we could possibly have subject to the provision that the Army will be one-tenth of the Reserve. We have an Army considerably bigger than what was advocated. We have an Army of approximately the same size as he and his Government approved last year. We have a reserve, first line, as big as ever it was. We have a reserve, second line, considerably bigger than ever it was and I have more than doubled the number of regular personnel attached to that vast potential reserve. I intend to increase progressively the amount of regular personnel engaged in that work of training and I am asking, in view of that trend towards agreement on policy, that we should see to what extent these proposals meet the bill.

Major de Valera

The Minister mentioned a figure of 38,000 for the F.C.A. I think he gave me a figure of 48,000 some time ago.

Dr. O'Higgins

I told the Deputy earlier in the year that I was sending the higher officers out every week-end to ascertain, as closely as they could, what we could reasonably regard as the real strength. Now we knocked some thousands off the paper strength and the figure I am giving the Deputy is the figure supplied to me as the real strength, the effective strength.

Major de Valera

Could the Minister say what is the actual strength to-day of the regular forces—officers, N.C.O.s and men?

Dr. O'Higgins

I think I read that out already—8,006. The strength on the 1/7/48 of the Reserve was 4,830, first line, and of the Second Line Reserve, 38,000.

Mr. Aiken

With your permission, Sir, on behalf of Deputy Traynor, I move that the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration. Deputy Traynor is unfortunately unable to be here to-day. If the Minister had not asked for understanding and agreement, and I did not know that, I would have thought, from the tone of his voice, that he was looking for a row. It is all to the good that the Minister is having a little bit of experience as Minister for Defence, and I hope it will stand him in good stead when he becomes a member of the Opposition again. Lest I should forget by any chance, I want to join with the Minister in the tribute he paid to General McKenna. I think every Minister of the last Government will willingly bear tribute to the fine service that was rendered by General McKenna during the emergency. He carried a very heavy burden very efficiently and to the full satisfaction not only of the Minister for Defence and of other Ministers associated with him, but, I think, to the entire satisfaction of both officers and men in the Army. We all trust that he will live long and that he may be as honoured as he is entitled to for his service to the country.

The Minister went at some length into the proposals that were put forward in 1928 by the Fianna Fáil Party when in opposition. That was 21 years ago. Since then the most catastrophic war in the history of the world has occurred, and, if the Lord has not said it, we are on the verge of even a more catastrophic one. The Minister outlined the various numbers in the Regular Army and in the Defence Forces for the years prior to 1939, and he wants us to be satisfied with the same preparations for national defence as we had in that period.

Dr. O'Higgins

No.

Mr. Aiken

Well, practically the same. There is a difference of a few hundred men. We gained experience during the war on all sides of the House. Fianna Fáil as the Government responsible for the defence of the country during the war and for making proposals to the House based on its experience in the war, suggested last year the figure put in the Book of Estimates. We did that following consultation with the men who carried the burden in the Army during the war. They asserted to us that, notwithstanding the fact that we had built up very successfully the Fórsa Cosanta Aitiúla, it was necessary to have, as a nucleus, a regular army of about 12,000 men, if this nation was to make the best defence it could in time of war. The Fianna Fáil Government was not very anxious to spend money on armies if it could be avoided but that was the estimate that was made by the Army two years ago. They said that, in addition to 40,000 or 50,000 members of the F.C.A. we would want this Regular Army of 12,000 men to supply trained cadre for the F.C.A., if they were mobilised and also to have some mobile regular troops who would be available to resist attack. We proposed to provide last year the amount of money that would enable us to carry out that programme. The Minister and his Government in their wisdom reduced that figure.

Dr. O'Higgins

Will the Deputy repeat that statement?

Mr. Aiken

That we proposed last year to spend the sum set out in the Estimate.

Dr. O'Higgins

To pay for how many men?

Mr. Aiken

To pay for the number of men, if we could get them, that was shown on the Book of Estimates.

Dr. O'Higgins

How many did you provide for on page 378 of last year's Book of Estimates?

Mr. Aiken

If the Minister wants to go into detail, he can go into it. I do do not want to go into it. The Minister asked us for points of agreement rather than of disagreement. I am telling the Minister my recollection of the Army recommendations which the Government approved of. We said we would spend all the money that was required to carry out their programme and that we would go as far as we could in regard to recruitment in the year 1948-49.

Dr. O'Higgins

You provided for 8,400 other ranks.

Mr. Aiken

If the Minister says that, I am not in a position to contradict it.

Dr. O'Higgins

I shall give the Deputy the book if he likes.

Mr. Aiken

I am telling the Minister what our aim was. Is the Minister trying to get agreement now or trying to pick a row? In the 21 years, from 1928, we had experience of a disastrous world war and we formally decided as a Government to accept the recommendations of the Army which defended this country during the war. We did our utmost as quickly as possible to build up the Regular Army to 12,000 men and to get as many people into the F.C.A. as was possible. In 1927 across the Atlantic was a long hop which was only taken by very venturous spirits. The last war ended with the lifting of an army division going into land against very vigorous opposition. At the present time you have armies in the world which are able to lift many divisions, not a few hundred miles, but many thousands of miles.

The position that we were trying to attain as rapidly as possible was to establish a Regular Army of 12,000 men, backed by a Regular Army Reserve and by a local reserve force, the F.C.A. The Minister says he is going fairly far in that direction, and that he is asking the people for all the money that they should be asked to afford in this particular year for that purpose. One way of calculating that, or of making up our minds on the matter, is to compare what we are doing here in relation to our budgetary expenditure with what they are doing in other countries. I shall mention the smaller countries first. The Portuguese spent one-sixth of their State expenditure on defence forces last year and I expect that this has gone up as in other countries; that the army has gone up for the next financial year. The Swedes were spending one-fourth; the Swiss were spending one-fourth; and Spain was spending nearly one-third of the total expenditure. Over in England they are spending £14 per head for the £1 per head we are proposing to spend here. I calculate that we are spending less than one-twentieth, as against the one-fourth and one-third which other people are spending.

Dr. O'Higgins

Do you want us to spend a lot more?

Mr. Aiken

I feel that we should spend more.

Dr. O'Higgins

Where will we get it?

Mr. Aiken

The Minister can consult his colleagues. Personally, I would be delighted to see the time arrive when we would have no long debate here, or any great trouble over the amount we spend on the Army or how it is spent. If the Minister wanted to bring in a special Budget and say: "We shall have a political debate about other Government expenditure, but we are going to spend this amount on the Army and we are going to provide it by such and such means," I think he would get agreement from all sides of the House on that particular Budget.

I think the Minister was rather unfair to me when he said that I made the plea that we should have butter instead of guns. That was a phrase that he himself used, to my recollection, before the last war when he was denouncing the amount of money we were spending on the Army. He did it actually up to 1940, when the catastrophic situation arose a few hundred miles away. The attitude of Fianna Fáil was that we should spend a reasonable amount to protect ourselves against the possibility of attack. It was lucky for the country that we did spend before the war, notwithstanding very severe criticism from the "butter-instead-of-guns" people, sufficient to give us the nucleus both in the Regular Army and Volunteer force upon which we could build and with which we did successfully defend our rights during the war.

As I say, the estimate and the minimum requirements of that defence altered. With our experience, and as a result of our talks with experienced men who had to carry the burden in the Army during the war, we decided that a certain minimum Regular Army was required and that we should do our utmost to develop the F.C.A. I want to say how pleased I am that the Minister announced to-day that he is going to give the F.C.A. their annual training. I think it was a disastrous policy for the Minister last year to cheesepare on the sum of money required to give them their annual training. That force is one of which the country has a right to be proud. It is a force which all Parties on all sides of the House can combine in promoting, because the F.C.A. comprises men from all Parties who have declared their willingness to defend the country in time of danger. I was very glad to hear the Minister saying that he is going to give them their annual training this year and I trust that they will all turn up and that the effectiveness of the force will be much improved as a result.

I referred to the percentage of the budgetary expenditure of other countries spent on their army. The Minister to-day referred to the international situation and said that things were serious enough. Things seem to be pretty serious. The Taoiseach, when in Canada, said that he was speaking to them "in the midst of the menacing crisis of the present day". The crisis appears so menacing to other countries that they have taken very active steps to increase their effectiveness for defence. The situation last September was such that the British Ministry, in spite of the opposition of the Party caucus, decided to extend the national service period for a further three months. Men who were to be demobilised after the year for which they were called up were kept on for three months. The British Government did not do that just to spend money. They are as anxious as the Parties in this House are to do the best they can for their people and not to waste energy on preparations for defence that could be properly used and spent on the development of national production. In spite of the fact that the British are gravely short of manpower for their productive industries they decided solemnly that the situation was to grave last September that they extended the national service period for a further three months. They did that in spite of the fact that the period of call for national service was one of the questions which caused the greatest criticism in the ranks of the Government's own Party. Deputies will remember that a year or two ago there was a very grave crisis in the Labour Party in England over that exact question as to how long the men should be called up for. The Government changed and they cut down the period of training.

However, the situation was such that last September they decided to increase the training by a further three months, notwithstanding its cost and notwithstanding any possible opposition they would meet in the ranks of their own Party or any other Party. We all know what has happened in recent months in regard to pacts that have been made in Europe and in particular in regard to the North Atlantic Pact. The situation appeared so serious to the Americans and to other countries that they were prepared to drop their previous outlook and enter into commitments with other countries against a war. They solemnly decided that they would come together to defend themselves. That was not done by some of these countries, in face of the opposition that their Governments were likely to meet in pursuing that policy, without the situation appearing to them as it appeared to the Taoiseach last August when he said that he was speaking to the people of Canada "in the midst of a menacing crisis". If the Minister for Defence and the Government agree with the Taoiseach that we are "in the midst of a menacing crisis", I think it is unwise for him in the national interests to stress what we could do with the money which we are spending or could spend on the Army. Everybody approves, of course, of the money that is being spent on the various social services but the expenditure on social services and the proper expenditure on the Army are not exclusive. As a matter of fact the modern State, both from the point of view of peace internally and national security, must spend a great deal of money both on social services and on defence services. My criticism of the Government to-day is that, in what the Taoiseach called "a menacing crisis", they are not paying sufficient attention to national defence.

There were a few criticisms of detail that I wanted to make on this Estimate. The Minister has replied to some of them before they were made. The cutting of £26,000 on general stores, which includes expenditure on items such as aircraft, is too much if we can get the stuff. Also, I think that in the present situation the cutting of warlike stores by £118,000 is too much.

Dr. O'Higgins

Does the Deputy understand the present system? A year in advance we get notice of what we can be supplied with. The figure here is all we can get.

Mr. Aiken

I hope that we mean the same thing by "all we can get". The Minister has condemned here rather roundly the procuring of warlike material that was tending to become obsolete the day it was purchased. That criticism could be made about the equipment of every army in the world at every moment of time since the beginning of history. It could have been made particularly since modern scientific development when people can change one form of material into another and make all sorts of weapons and instruments. The Hurricane with which the British fought the Battle of Britain was obsolete before it was off the drawing-board, in the Minister's indicated definition of the term. There is such rapid development that before a weapon or an aircraft can be put into production a better weapon and a better aircraft has been conceived, calculations have been made and it is in the process of going on to the drawing-board. It is the same way with all the weapons. It may be that we would have to purchase at the present time equipment that is not as up to date as some of the equipment that is available to large industrial nations like America or England who are spending a lot of their energy upon war production. However, even if we could not get the very latest types and designs, some of the more recent types and designs would be an improvement upon what we have at the present time and would certainly add to our defence effectiveness.

One other aspect is that an army must either go forward or backward. It must be improving its technique, its training and its equipment or it loses its morale. I think the cut-down on these things is very bad for the morale of the Army. Notwithstanding that it is 150 years or so since Napoleon is alleged to have said that morale is to material as 3 is to 1, it is as true to-day as it was then. If we want to have an economic expenditure of public money upon defence for the purpose of providing ourselves with the most effective defence forces we shall have to spend money every year on getting some considerable additions to the modern equipment. Now, without knowing any details of the equipment that is available to the Minister for Defence or his purchasing officers, my guess is that we could add considerably to the amount of equipment in the Army and that the equipment that is procurable would be important even though it is not up to the second or up to the latest designs that are coming off the production belts in other countries. For instance, the 600 miles an hour jet American fighters produced in America during the last 12 months have made the 500 miles an hour fighters already there very old-fashioned indeed, but it would be very useful to us if we had the 500 miles an hour fighter instead of what we have. It is the same with guns and with other equipment, radar and so on, and with every piece of equipment that a modern army uses. I would not only urge on the Minister, but on the Deputies who sit behind him, to urge him to add to his purchases, both for general stores and for warlike material in the coming year. If the Minister does that and comes in here with a Supplementary Estimate to meet the bill, he certainly will not be refused from this side of the House. Neither do I think he will be criticised by Deputies in any part of the House who realise the sort of world that we are living in.

Captain Cowan

I was very pleased with the approach to this problem that Deputy Aiken has just made. I think that he has responded to the appeal which the Minister very wisely made to the House of endeavouring to get as many points of agreement as we can on this problem of defence. I agree entirely with the conception of the Defence Forces which was planned by the last Government with the agreement of the whole House, the plan which is being adopted by the present Government. As the Minister has indicated to-day, he has taken very wise and very sound steps to see that the F.C.A. is converted into the most efficient force that we can possibly make it. Now, as to what size the Regular Army should be, as one of the components of our Defence Forces, that undoubtedly must be a matter for the Government, who will get their advice from the Council of Defence, and who will consider the problem in relation to the finances that are available.

I agree with the suggestion that was made by Deputy Aiken that, if the Minister considers the world situation so serious that the Defence Force must be increased in strength or that more money must be paid for it, and if he comes to this Parliament with a proposition of that kind, he will receive the co-operation and the full support of the House.

Last year, the Minister told us that he could not make a statement to the Dáil on the effective strength of the F.C.A. The Minister mentioned the figure of 38,000 to-day. I take it that that strength has been checked up. I am glad to know that because, last year, I think we had a strength on paper of 50,000 or thereabouts. It is well that the House should know that we have an actual strength in the F.C.A. of 38,000 personnel.

The size of our Defence Forces will depend on what mission they have. As I understand it, it is the declared policy of the Government and the declared policy of the Opposition that, in the event of a conflict in the near future, Ireland would maintain its neutrality. I think that is the declared policy in so far as it can be ascertained, and that that policy is agreed upon by the Opposition. That being so, the Council of Defence have the problem of building an effective force that will endeavour to maintain our neutrality in the event of a world conflict. I may be entirely wrong, but my view is that although there are alarms of war there will not be a war, certainly not in the immediate future. The aftermath of World War 1914-18 was somewhat similar to the aftermath of the last war, and after a considerable period of alarms the world settled down to what it considered was going to be a period of peace. That period of peace was, unfortunately, broken, and we had the last disastrous conflict. I hope that my ideas in regard to a possible world war are correct, because another world war would be a disaster to humanity. The world might never recover from the effects of another world war fought with atomic weapons and with other weapons that we hear have been invented.

Dr. O'Higgins

May I interrupt the Deputy for a moment to correct a figure that I gave him earlier? I think I said that the strength of the F.C.A. was approximately 38,000. This is the exact figure of effectives: officers, 1,187; N.C.O.s, 2,754; men, 26,392; making a total of 30,333. When I gave the earlier figure I was speaking from memory.

Captain Cowan

The important thing, anyway, is that we have made this important advance since last year, and that the figure which the Minister now gives is a real figure. That figure represents the men who are there and who are available. It is important from that point of view and we know where we stand. I am quite sure that it is the intention and the desire of the Minister that that force should be three times as large, that if the F.C.A. can be developed and built up to a force of 100,000 there will be no objection from the Government, and that that would be the desire of the Minister and of the Council of Defence.

I was glad to see during the year that the Government have apparently reverted—at least I hope they have— to the old idea in regard to the Council of Defence, that the members of that council would serve a period of three years and at the end of that period there would be a change. I have advocated that since I came into this House on the grounds that it was beneficial to the Defence Forces. I think that every officer who has served in the Army and every officer still serving will agree that it is very wise, both from the point of view of the Government, the Minister and the Defence Forces, that there should be this infusion of new blood into the supreme Army council.

There are a few other matters that I feel should be mentioned. I understand that there is great difficulty in building up the Regular Army even to the estimated strength. I understand that there is substantial discontent in the Regular Army. The Minister, I think, will agree that the rates of pay in the Regular Army are insufficient. We have the Minister's assurance that he is considering the matter. I appeal to him to increase the pay for the Army at the earliest possible date. While there is discontent in the Army it will be impossible to build up the regular force that we would like to have.

The soldiers have many things to complain about. I have heard complaints about the arrangements for the supply of food to the soldiers. It is a primitive system which has been in operation there for the last quarter of a century. I know there have been some efforts made to improve it, but the system is what I might term still Boer war. I think we should get away from the idea of the soldier having to go up with his plate and mug, away from the idea of a handful of salt thrown on a bare table, away from the cold and miserable appearance of the diningrooms. I think our soldiers deserve better than that.

I want the Minister to understand that when I am speaking in this way I am not in any way critical of the Minister. He has had only a year in office and I certainly do not expect him to bring about all these improvements within the short space of a year. There have been many tributes paid to our soldiers, well deserved tributes, but I think the best tribute we could pay them is to make their conditions reasonably good, make them at least as good as we can make them.

Barrackrooms are not what they might be, either. In many cases they are antiquated, they are cold and they are miserable. There is no reason why our soldiers could not each have his own comfortable billet. If we are providing for a Regular Army of 7,000, 8,000, 9,000 or 10,000, then for that particular body of men we ought to be able to provide decent living accommodation. Every facility that can be given to them in the matter of passes should be given. I think I am right in saying that there has been a substantial improvement in that direction during the past year. When a soldier is not required for duty, there is no reason why he should not be free to go where he likes. So long as he is available for his first parade in the morning, there is no reason why he cannot go wherever he wants to go. The Army is not on a war footing and while, in the different barracks, the guard is on duty, the sentries at their posts, there is no reason why the rest of the soldiers should be brought in at 10 o'clock, 11 o'clock or midnight, as the case may be.

Again, there is no reason why a soldier should be in uniform after his duty is done, if he does not want to wear uniform. There should be no question of having to receive permission to wear mufti. That should be there as a right for the soldier when his duty is done.

This matter of the improved billets and the provision of better facilities in the diningrooms or refectories is something that can be done without enormous expense and without any considerable degree of trouble. The granting of permission to soldiers to be absent from barracks when they are not required for duty is also something that can be done. So long as the soldier is there for morning parade he should be permitted to spend his leisure hours anywhere he likes. All these things would make for a better spirit of contentment in the Army and would help in the recruiting of personnel into the Army.

The Minister knows that there was a very costly advertising and propaganda campaign to induce men to join the Army. The best inducement men could get would be a happy and contented army. One thing that the soldier is looking for is an increase in pay. I would ask the Minister to deal with that matter as soon as he possibly can. The cost of living has gone up. In most barracks there is no provision of any kind for a meal from half past four in the afternoon until eight o'clock the next morning. Some provision ought to be made. I know that some commanding officers did make provision enabling soldiers to have a mug of hot soup when they came in at night. But that is purely a matter of local arrangement. It is only done in some places. From half past four in the afternoon until eight o'clock the following morning is too long a period of fast. The result of this arrangement is that the soldier is compelled to spend a substantial portion of his pay in providing himself with a meal during this phenomenally long break.

The cheapest way in which the Minister can build up the Army is by making it a happy and contented one. He will do that if he brings about the amelioration I have suggested in the conditions. Subject to that, I take it that the broad lines of our defence policy have been agreed by all Parties in the House. I sincerely hope that the lead set by Deputy Aiken, when speaking on the position, will be followed and that all of us will approach this problem in a constructive way in an effort to serve the best interests of the nation.

Mr. Colley

The Minister spent a good deal of time in his introductory statement in suggesting that we on this side of the House had got away from the plan for the Army and the defence of the country which was propounded by us in 1927. He admitted that that plan was strictly followed up to the outbreak of war. On the outbreak of war new steps had apparently to be taken. When the war ceased a new plan was put forward. Is there anything wrong in that? Is there anything wrong in men learning from experience? Would not the wrong be a greater one if we were to stick our heads in the sand like ostriches and refuse to learn the lessons of the emergency? Taking the facts as adumbrated by the Minister, I cannot see on what basis the plan was made. It was quite evident that the course of events during the emergency created a new situation. A new plan was drawn up by the Army experts. Let me quote from Deputy Traynor speaking on this Estimate last year. At column 725 of Volume 107 of the Official Reports Deputy Traynor said:—

"It was not necessary to have the second manoeuvres and we do not know what the result would have been, but we are certain that, with an army of 6,000 men, it is quite impossible—and we should all realise this fact—to carry out the dual work which is required, that of providing necessary guards for the barrack posts, equipment and so on and at the same time reducing a highly trained and efficient defence force capable of achieving the things for which we were looking. So far as I can see, the only solution to that difficulty is the peace time army which was strongly recommended by the Army staff after very careful examination and which was accepted and approved of by the Government."

That shows that there was nothing of a Party nature about this proposition. It was the considered view of the Army chiefs put forward by them with sufficient data and proof to convince the Government. The Government realised that it would involve considerable extra expenditure. They did not want to face that, any more than the rest of us. I do not think that in the situation in which we find ourselves anyone can say an army of 12,500 men is not the proper army for the country in order to carry out our defence policy. I think we are all agreed that we need a small highly-trained nucleus around which to build. That is the considered view of the military experts. I do not think we can contradict that view. None of us likes facing the cost, but it would be foolish not to spend £4,000,000 a year to build up an efficient army capable of expansion during an emergency. Would it not be foolish for us to spend £4,000,000 a year and not get any value for it? Would that not be £4,000,000 wasted? Would it not be wiser for us to pay the extra cost and have an effective army there to meet the situation?

I will admit that I, at any rate, since I came into the House have been gravely doubtful as to the attitude of the Minister for Defence on Army policy. I heard him, when in opposition, tell us that the Army should only be an adjunct to the police force and be retained for ceremonial purposes. I do not agree with the maintenance of an army on that basis at all. Either this country is worth fighting for or it is not. Some of us have given our best for it. Our history proves that our people will always give it and I think it would be a shame for us in the Dáil if we did not decide that to the very best of our ability and resources we would defend this country should the necessity arise. I think we are getting nearer to that ideal and I am very glad of it. Having adopted that principle, it is only a question now of working out the best ways and means within our resources. While we may have difference of view, I think that if we all accepted that principle we shall be able to arrive at a reasonable policy of defence and decide on what is a reasonable expenditure on our Army. I do not think myself that money should at all be the chief factor. I would say that last year I got the impression from the Minister that the money involved was everything and that the question of defence was a secondary matter.

The Minister also made a statement to-day about Deputy Traynor. He did not give the reference or the quotation for the statement which he attributed to Deputy Traynor but, as I understood him, he said that Deputy Traynor set us on these benches off on the wrong foot in this debate last year by saying that the number for which the Minister was catering in the Army was the smallest ever provided for. That was my understanding of what the Minister stated but I have looked through the whole speech of Deputy Traynor last year and I cannot find any such statement. If the Minister were here now I would ask him to give me the reference for the quotation. The Minister developed that for fully five minutes or more—I have the figures he gave us for Army strength from 1932 to 1939—pointing out that the figures were only 5,000 to 7,000 men. I should be glad to have the reference for the statement which the Minister attributed to Deputy Traynor or, failing that, I think that the reference to Deputy Traynor should be withdrawn. I understood the Minister to refer to this debate last year but I certainly cannot find the statement. The Minister said that Deputy Traynor put us all astray by giving us wrong facts.

I see that there is a reduction of £36,000 in the figures given here for civilian employment and that the numbers of tradesmen and helpers are reduced by 217. By a question to the Minister in December last I elicited the fact that up to that date from the 1st August, 186 civilians had been dismissed. We are now providing for a further reduction of 217. Of the 186 formerly dismissed, two had 1916 service only, 18 had 1916 service and Old I.R.A. service, and 35 had Old I.R.A. service only. I hope the further reduction contemplated does not mean the further dismissal of 1916 and Old I.R.A. men.

Deputy Collins, in the debates on the Vote on Account the other day, referred to this matter after I had made reference to it and, after saying a number of complimentary things about myself, he said:—

"Like him, if there was any real truth in the statement, I should regret, and acutely regret, that any 1916 men should become the victims of the axe."

Further on, he said:—

"In supporting this Government, I realised that the debt due to our heroes is as deeply appreciated and understood by this Government as it was by any Government in the past, and that any debt of gratitude due to them will be adequately and properly discharged."

That is a quotation from column 1543, Volume 114 of the 25th March. Deputy Collins appears to me not to have realised that 55 men who took part in the fight for freedom, whether in 1916 or in the Tan war, had already suffered under the axe. I think, in view of that, I am perfectly justified in asking that we shall have no more of that. I think the least that these men, particularly at the age which they have now reached, should get is some consideration. If it is necessary that somebody has to go, I do not think it should be 1916 men or the Old I.R.A. men. There are others to whom the axe could apply and not to them. That is a question which should never have arisen at this stage. There is no country in the world that I am aware of, which has achieved its freedom through revolution, that does not honour the men who took part in that revolution and do everything they can to secure their material comfort during their lives. I hope that I shall not have to refer to this matter again. It is not a nice thing to have to refer to at this stage of our history, but the facts are there.

I notice that there is a rather big reduction—£118,800 I make it—in warlike stores. The Minister did say that it is not a question of money in connection with warlike stores but the difficulty of obtaining them. I am prepared to admit that. I do think, however, that it would be an unwise policy in the present situation in the world if we did not do everything we could to secure warlike stores wherever we can get them. As we know, they could not be got except with great difficulty during the war. With the way things are tending now, it will be harder still as times goes on to get them. We should try to take advantage of anything that offers in that direction. We hope that we shall never have to use them, but as an insurance it would be well worth anything it would cost. If we are not in a position and ready to defend ourselves, it is only an invitation to other Powers if war breaks out to come in here and that will immediately put us into the war, whether we like it or not, on one side or another. I suggest to the Minister that, in spite of this reduction, he should take advantage of anything that offers in the way of warlike stores and general military stores.

I hope that this reduction in tradesmen and helpers is not going to mean that the barracks are going to be allowed to go back into the desperate state of disrepair in which they were when the emergency broke out. When some of our young men, who had been patriotic enough to join the volunteers, were called up, the conditions in which they were put were most appalling. That is another lesson to be learned from the emergency and we should take steps to see that that does not occur again. It is not fair, it is not right, that decent young Irishmen, who are willing to train voluntarily to defend this country, should be thrown into such conditions when called up. Mullingar was an outstanding example. I hope that that will be one of the items that the extra staff which the general staff want to provide for will deal with. I hope that this reduction both in men and material is not going to mean that the barracks are going to be allowed to go back into their former condition.

I think that we are very near to some agreement on this question of the Army. I would suggest as the basis for agreement the basis put forward by the military staff. If possible, we should try to bring our Army up to 12,500 men. It was not possible to secure that number even when the previous Government had decided that it should be taken as a basis. It may be that some further inducements are necessary, something like Deputy Cowan has suggested, some further improvements in the conditions in the Army. These, however, are questions of detail to be worked out by the staffs of the Minister's Department. If we can come to an agreement on that basis —it is not a Fianna Fáil idea; it is an Army idea—I think we could get on with the rest of the work very satisfactorily.

Mr. Byrne

I want to congratulate the Minister on his efforts to improve Army conditions and to join with the other Deputies in expressing the hope that he will make an effort to improve the conditions in the barracks. Barrack life, I am told, can be very cold and, in spite of the numbers, can sometimes be very lonely. I have knowledge of cases where men feel that they are tied down too much. I drew the Minister's attention to the case of one young soldier during the year and I have had a second case brought to my attention. While the Minister was very sympathetic, nothing was done in that case for this young soldier of 19 who ventured into matrimony on a single man's pay. That young soldier, because he was not of the prescribed age and had not the prescribed service, has to live on a single man's pay. I know there are regulations and I do not suggest that regulations should not be enforced strictly. But, if there is an odd case of that type, I think the circumstances ought to be considered sympathetically and that such a young soldier, even if he did not get permission from the Army authorities to get married, ought to be placed on a married man's pay. It is one of these little hardships which arise in most armies. I think there should be an officer of the Department of Defence to grant approval of the marriage and allow the young soldier to get a married man's pay when he accepts the responsibility. I would ask the Minister if it is not possible to allow soldiers to engage in some useful employment while in the Army. They are, of course, engaged in useful employment so far as their army service is concerned, but is it not possible for them to be engaged in some employment in order that their services on coming out of the Army could be utilised and would be sought after? Men leaving the Army after 21 or 25 years' service ought to have something better to look forward to than the service pension which is given to them after those years in the Army.

I come now to an old point which I know has worried the Minister, because I have seen his Department's letters in the corporation. That is the question of the married soldier whose time is completed and who is living in the married quarters. His rent is doubled because he is no longer a soldier. The unfortunate man cannot get out of the married quarters because at the moment there is no place to go. Rents in Dublin City, outside the houses built by the municipality, are appalling. The unfortunate man cannot leave the married quarters when his time is up and take a small flat on his pay. I would earnestly appeal to the Minister to put forward to the Government, in the near future, a proposal that the Government themselves should encourage the municipality to take the men out of the barracks. If they cannot take the men who have served their full time and in that way helped the Government, then the Government themselves should set to and establish a fund to build houses for their soldiers or get some authority to give the grants for the purpose in the same way as the British Government, through the Soldiers' and Sailors' Trust, built a number of houses after the first great war in all the big cities of Ireland, England, Scotland and Wales. When a man has served his country faithfully and well he ought not be given the threat of eviction from his home, whether it be in the Army or civilian life. I would ask the Minister seriously to consider giving a lead to all big employers in the city, to follow the lead of Guinness's who have built houses, and are continuing to build houses, for their employees. The Army authorities ought to do the same. It might encourage the big employers in Dublin who employ 400 to 500 men to put some of their reserves into a building scheme for their employees.

I rose not to criticise in any severe way. I rose to pay a word of tribute to the Minister for his efforts in trying and succeeding, I believe, to build up a contented Army. I join with other speakers in saying that they have their eye on what is going on outside. A young soldier in a barrack hears that rents have gone up in price and that the bus fares have gone up. A soldier from Arbour Hill or Portobello goes down town most evenings. If he goes to the cinema and leaves it early enough he will walk back. If he does not leave it early enough and has to get in by a certain hour his penny bus fare is now doubled.

An Ceann Comhairle

We are not dealing with bus fares.

Mr. Byrne

I agree. Maybe I should not give that as a special item but should talk generally. The single and married soldiers' cost of living has gone up the same as everybody else's. I know that the Minister can reply to me, and very properly, that most of them are living indoors and that the cost of living may be borne by the Army authorities. The soldier's expenses however have increased within the last few years the same as anybody else's and I would appeal to him to give the soldier an increase in his pay. He should not forget to have regard to the fact that the Labour Court made an award of 11/- increased pay in February, 1948 for the people. The married soldier now feels that he should share in that increase in order to meet the increased cost of living. He is not associated with an organisation which could demand the increase from the Government. The Government ought not to give way only to people who are in a position to demand. If it is fair to give they ought to get it unasked. The Minister, and the Government as a whole, should say to those they have charge of, "We recognise your services and your ability. We recognise that the cost of living has gone up and we make an award." If the soldier is living indoors the award may not be the same as to those who are meeting high costs outside. I put it to the Minister that in order to continue having that contented Army he ought to improve their conditions. Another Deputy has drawn attention to the fact that the barracks of to-day are the same as the barracks 25 or 30 years ago. The Government ought to aim at improving the lot of the soldiers generally. With other members I pay tribute to the Minister for what he is doing and I hope that he will succeed.

Mícheál Ó Cinnéide

Bí athas orm a chloisteáil an Teachta Dála Harry Colley ag cur síos ar cheist na mbeairicí go mór-mhór ar cheist Beairic an Mhuileann Cearr. Tá súil agam nach gcaillfear an méid airgid atá caite ar na fallaí, ar na seomraí agus eile agus nach leigfear na rudaí seo dul i léig arís. Ba mhaith linn a chlos ón Aire cad é beartas an Rialtais ar cheist na bhFórsaí Cosanta Aitiúil. An bhfuilid chun an Fórsa a ligean de léig? Ní raibh tréineáil ag an bhForsa seo an bhliain seo caite. An mbeidh aon tréineáil acu an bhliain seo, nó an bhfuilid chun coigilteas a dhéanamh ar an vóta seo. Sin iad an cheist atá agam agus ba mhaith liom freagra d'fháil orthu.

I do not agree at all with the last speaker in that the barracks are the same as they were 25 years ago. That is nonsense. The barracks are greatly improved and a great deal of money has been spent on them in making them modern. I join with Deputy Colley in making a plea that where so much money has been spent in making a barracks, like Mullingar barracks, up to date it should not now be wasted. The repair and equipment which have been carried out there up to the present should be maintained.

Deputy Colley dealt with the dismissal of 1916 and Old I.R.A. men who were engaged on maintenance and repair work in the various barracks throughout the country. He expressed the hope that, during the financial year in which it is proposed to save a considerable amount of money on this maintenance and repair work, the 1916 men and the Old I.R.A. men would not be the first to be dismissed.

It is quite possible that an emergency may arise during the coming financial year—I sincerely hope it does not—but if it should, these barracks will have to be fully occupied again and a maintenance staff put in. I hope that the men who have been dismissed, the 1916 men and the Old I.R.A. men, will be the first to be restored to the temporary positions which they have occupied since the commencement of the last emergency.

There is another matter with which I am particularly concerned, and that is the attitude of the Government towards the F.C.A., which used to be the L.D.F. That force seems to be dying. Whether that is due to the attitude of the Government or to the aftermath of the emergency or a combination of both, I will not express any opinion. I will say, however, that by abandoning a certain course of training last year the Government did a disservice to this force and discouraged its enthusiastic continuation. The Government should do something to build up this force and encourage recruiting for it, to give every inducement in the way of training, as well as novelty in training, to keep the force alive. I do not subscribe to the doctrine, or whatever one likes to call it, advocated by some Deputies of having a ceremonial force in the form of an Army. I believe that every country, big and small, will live by the valour of its men and their desire and willingness to sacrifice their lives, if necessary, that their country may live. It does not matter what development you have in the way of weapons for war, if you have that willing service from the manhood of a country, then that country will live. It is on a force like the F.C.A. that we, if this country were invaded, would eventually have to depend to make the life of an invader an impossible one. I hope to hear the Minister, when he is replying, say that this force is going to be encouraged, and that every effort is going to be made to bring it up to the strength it had during the emergency.

Captain Giles

We are living in doubtful times and it is right that a reasonable Estimate should be put before us for an Army. I am one of those who never stood for a standing Army in this country although I am an ex-Army man myself. I am satisfied that the nation is so small and so insignificant that it is only right that a vast amount of our resources should not be spent on having idle men standing around, and an army in peace-time is an army of idle men. To my mind what we want is a citizen Army, something like the F.C.A. If we had a standing Army at all, it should be a bare foundation, the nucleus on which you could build. I think that at the present time 5,000 or 6,000 regular soldiers would be quite enough. If you had a small, compact, well-equipped Army, with modern ideas of war instilled into the minds of those who composed it, then you could build around it in a short time if the necessity arose.

My idea about the Army has not changed. Our military prowess during the last couple of hundreds of years does not impress me very much, because, after all, our squabbles for our freedom hardly ever won us a battle. I do not think we ever won a battle. Our main strength was in the loyalty of our people through the country and in the few men who responded to the call. Had it not been for the heroic sacrifices of our farmers and workers throughout the country our fighting would not have lasted 48 hours at any time. It was not the cold steel facing the enemy that won us what we have to-day, but the loyalty and courage of our people which blended nationalism and religion into one. That, to my mind, was our real strength and it will be so in the future.

We have far too much talk about armies in this country. I am satisfied that if we had far less armies we would have more freedom and would have progressed to better freedom. We have far too many tin-pot soldiers in this country, all with their own little ideas. That has gone on right through the last four or five hundred years. I do not think that we have seen much happiness come out of the adventures undertaken in those generations. I know that a nation will always assert itself in every generation to right itself —to get its freedom—whether you have armies or not. People will rise and revolt and will do their best to throw off the slavery under which they are held. I am satisfied that we have too much of that in this country. It is time that we got away from it. I believe that in this country we have too much make-believe. We believe that we have great military strength and that great empires would quake when they heard that we were about to shake our mailed fists at them. We said the same during the last war, that we were neutral by the might of our Army. That is bare-faced hypocrisy and humbug. Those who say that know that during the past war, if it suited Britain or America to land their armies here at any moment, they could do so with impunity and at very little cost or expense to themselves as regards their armies, their aeroplanes or their ships. If there was any heavy cost it would fall on the poor little Irish Army which was there to bear the burden in an unequal battle, a battle which it was unnatural to ask it to undertake.

I am satisfied that during the last emergency 25 warplanes or bombers of the latest type could do terrible destruction and could absolutely clear the way for any army that wanted to come in here. They could take the field without having to fire a shot. I think we should all realise that. I think that we should build on the idea that I have indicated and not on the idea of the heroic fight that we would have made. We have seen heroic fights over the last couple of years.

We have seen the heroic fight that Finland made, that Greece made and that Belgium made. We have seen the sacrifices made in these countries while the big powers behind the scenes smiled and said: "Fight on, gallant soldiers, you are doing great things." In the meantime these small countries suffer and to-day they are the prey of everything evil in this world. The same could happen to our own country.

I am one of those who went through the rigours of the Anglo-Irish war and I suffered imprisonment. I know the Army inside and out. I was in the Army and in the Republican movement. I am satisfied that we fooled the people right through from 1916 to 1921. We hear a great deal about the sacrifice made in 1916. I agree it was a great and heroic sacrifice. The men who made the supreme sacrifice should be honoured forever more, but I am satisfied that so far as military power is concerned it was only a squabble; it was only an attempt to resurrect the people.

It was the same from 1919 to 1921. Had it not been for half-a-dozen militant types of men, one here and there or three or four scattered throughout the country, the I.R.A. would have been broken up in the first six months. The heroic sacrifices of a few men—a Dan Breen, a Seán MacEoin, a Mick Collins and a Tom Barry, a few scattered here and there —inspired the others. By their efforts and their sacrifices they inspired a few hundred men here and there to respond to the call, but as far as fighting was concerned, with the exception of the City of Dublin and, perhaps, Cork, Tipperary and Kerry, the whole thing was just a complete fiasco, and I speak as one who comes from the Midlands and who was out in that fight. We had true and tried men to carry on, but to think it was a big fight and that we were out night and day, up to our necks fighting, is the greatest of rot.

An Ceann Comhairle

The Deputy is now giving a review of Irish history. Let us hear something about this Vote.

Captain Giles

I am endeavouring to show why we need very little expenditure in connection with our Army. Most of those men in the fight were having a fair good royal time. They did very little of the spade work. The people who suffered most, and at great cost to themselves, were the farmers and the workers, who got out of their beds, opened their purses, and stood on sentry duty night after night to shelter the boys while they were having a sleep. Many of those boys should never have been sheltered because they never fired a shot and would not fire a shot.

I want to show that we have in this country a horde of men hanging medals and getting pensions for work they never did, and the State is paying for all. The people who made the real sacrifice, the farmers and the workers —they are the people who put up meals and gave the others beds—were not recognised at all. They are sneered at to-day.

While I agree that we must put up a certain type of defence, we do not want a strong standing Army. Every young man should be in the F.C.A. if he has any spirit at all. We should have a voluntary army. We should not train men so much in the use of arms; we should train them to have a better civic spirit, to have manliness and courage, to be self-sacrificing and patient. All these things are things we lack very much to-day. If we train our young men along those lines, whenever the day comes that they have to respond to the call then they will respond.

I do not believe in strong military forces for such a small nation as ours. I do not believe in a vast amount of the people's money being spent on big guns and bombers. If there is an emergency, I believe we will fit into the western military pattern and there is no use in blinking that fact. Our place will be cut out for us, and if we do not fit in we will be told that we can starve. I know what we will do. As the world advances, it is not a case of the old imperial wars of long ago. It is now a case of paganism versus Christianity, and every nation can see on which side its duty lies. There is no one in this country who does not realise on which side his duty lies if there is a war.

Those who ask us to put up money for a strong army should think twice. The people have not much money to spare. The sacrifices they have been making for a long number of years have been too heavy. It is all very well to have pageants in the City of Dublin, to have drums, horses, motor-cycles and guns. Down the country the ordinary man is little concerned with the parades in Dublin. What the average man thinks of is how best to earn his bread and get a reasonable way of living. The people have not got a reasonable way of living since we achieved national freedom. We never gave them much of a chance. In this country we have many tinpot soldiers. That is what we all are, little tinpot soldiers, thinking along big military lines.

I must congratulate the senior officers, the older officers from 1921 to the present day, who have carried on the Army tradition so well. They did their work well and I hope the nation will treat them generously, because they deserve that. If you build up a big army the time will come when you must disband it, and the unfortunate soldiers, when they are disbanded, never get a fair chance. We tell them that they have first right and must get employment, that they must get back to the work they left. I saw many men disbanded in the past 25 years and very few of them got their posts back. Some of our best N.C.O.s and sergeants who were disbanded after ten or 15 years' loyal service had to emigrate almost immediately they left the Army to earn a living in a foreign country. They deserved more than that from the Irish people. There is no use in giving a disbanded soldier £50, £60 or £80. That money is of very little use to that type of man; it lasts only a few weeks. It would be far better if we had a national scheme to absorb these men in reproductive work, where they would earn good wages and be able to settle down in their own land. That is why I do not like to see great armies being built up. After a few years' service the soldiers are disbanded and thrown to the winds. There is more disillusionment in this country at the moment because of the treatment meted out to our soldiers in the last eight or ten years. Their plight is a pitiable one. Some of them were single men when they joined the Army. While they were soldiers they married and they now have wives and children to support. Their service has expired. They have no homes. Some of them cannot even get labourers' cottages. Most of them are in the pits in England hewing out a living for themselves and their wives and children. That is what has happened in a little country like this. An army is all very well if one has the resources and the manpower. We have not got them. The Minister has a reasonable foundation for an army under the present plan. The Reserve can be expanded and turned into a people's army with very little expenditure. Our soldiers must be trained along lines which will bring back decency and honour to our nation without imbuing them with grandiose ideas of military victories. Every man in the country will respond to the call when it is made. In every war in Europe during the last 100 years Ireland always gave more than her share.

An Ceann Comhairle

Would the Deputy come to the Estimate? We do not want European history.

Captain Giles

We had it before I started talking. I do not want to wander too far. The Estimate is a reasonable one. It is one over which we can stand. It is one which is sensible while the war clouds gather over the world. I do not believe the situation is quite as precarious as some Deputies would have us believe. We are situated in one of the safest positions in the world. Major de Valera may laugh at that and say that it is not. But I would not like to be situated as Finland, or Greece, or Belgium are. We are out on the Atlantic. We are really only a floating dock. We may be a pivotal point for Britain or America. Whether we are or not we must fit into our pattern.

An Ceann Comhairle

The Deputy has told us that before.

Captain Giles

I will conclude by complimenting the entire Army from the Higher Command right down to the men. They all responded to the call as our men have always done. We should be grateful that we will no longer be required to pay through the nose for all the military displays and nonsense that took place in the past.

Mr. Ormonde

Last year, when the Minister was presenting his Estimate to the House, he was in the fortunate position of being able to say that the Estimate was not his, and he was able to offset any criticism made by the Opposition in regard to economies by misrepresenting that the Estimate was one prepared by Fianna Fáil and that the responsibility was theirs. He is not in that happy position now. He must take responsibility for any economies which adversely affect the country. It is recognised that it is the duty of a Minister to economise in order to reduce the burden of taxation. Such reductions are generally acceptable, but when they are brought about through disregard of the nation's safety they must be rigorously opposed. No effort must be spared in endeavouring to dissuade the Minister in that respect.

It is proposed to save £860,000 on the Defence Forces this year. That saving is to be effected in the pay of officers, men, civilians attached to the Army, in the pay of the Medical Corps, on mechanical transport, on clothing and equipment and on the Reserve. I think, too, on warlike stores. In the absence of any authoritative statement by the Government in regard to Army policy, and in view of the cessation of recruitment, one is forced to the conclusion that the Government is convinced of the continuance of peace. Surely, that is a wrong outlook in face of the world situation to-day.

Every nation at the moment is increasing its armed strength and entering into defensive pacts. We hear a good deal of talk about our non-entry into the Atlantic Defence Pact. That decision of the Government is due to the partition of our country. For that reason it must be acclaimed. One is forced to wonder, however, whether the participating countries are in any way perturbed because of our abstention. Apart from our strategic position in the Atlantic, it is doubtful whether we could continue for any length of time to carry out our commitments under this agreement in view of the fact that it would take so little in materials and manpower to conquer the country, should it ever be expedient to do so.

Captain Giles referred to our neutrality during the last war. He said that England could have taken over the country at any time. I do not subscribe to that view. I think England was deterred from doing so because of the strength of our armed forces during the war. The effort would have cost them too much in money, time and material to make it worth their while. In my view we will not be able to maintain neutrality in any future war because of the present feeble strength of the Army and its general unpreparedness, together with the impossibility of turning it into an effective fighting force. We have lost our selfsufficiency—that self-sufficiency that was built up so carefully during the last war.

Thinking over the present Minister's views when he was on the Opposition Benches one is led to the conclusion that the Government only intends to maintain an Army something better than a police force. That was his view in the past. The Government has appointed him Minister for Defence. One can only conclude that is why he has been made Minister for Defence. If a police force is sufficient, one wonders why the Government wants any Army at all. An armed police force could do the work that the present Army is doing. The recruiting drive which was inaugurated by his predecessor, now Deputy Traynor, has been stopped by the Minister. The reason he gave for stopping it last year was that the spring time was not the appropriate period during which to recruit men; that was the time when the maximum number of men could be employed on tillage, and so on. I agreed with the Minister on that occasion, but, in view of the absence of any recruiting since and in view of the fact that no provision is made in this Estimate for recruiting in the future, I am forced to the conclusion that the Minister had some other reason in his mind. The Minister also held the view that we had available a highly-trained and semi-trained group of men in this country who could be recruited rapidly and from which we could build up an Army in a short time. I agreed with the Minister on that. But are those men available now? The men who came to the defence of this country in time of crisis should have a special claim on the State and should get a preference in regard to employment. There are many men, ex-members of the Defence Forces, who are now unemployed, looking for work daily, unable to find it and leaving the country. If the Minister and the Government really thought that these men were deserving of the consideration which they should get, they would not have introduced and passed a Bill during the year giving equal opportunities to deserters where there were jobs to be filled.

Dr. O'Higgins

That is not true.

Mr. Ormonde

You provided an opportunity for the deserters.

Dr. O'Higgins

Stick to the truth.

Mr. Ormonde

Yes. In any case, the Government would be well advised now to start recruiting and to absorb some of these men or to make a special effort to provide employment for them because, owing to their knowledge and military training, they would be a decided asset to the country in time of emergency. The attitude of the Minister in regard to the F.C.A. is altogether despicable and incomprehensive.

Dr. O'Higgins

In doubling the number of officers?

Mr. Ormonde

No. These men are ready, willing and anxious to avail of the training which was to be established by the last Minister for Defence in summer camps and week-end camps. They have been denied the opportunity of fitting themselves to take their part in the second line of defence, should they be called up.

Dr. O'Higgins

Is it last year's Estimates or this year's Estimates the Deputy is discussing?

Mr. Ormonde

The sooner the Minister gets down to making an announcement of what he proposes to do with this branch of the Defence Forces the better.

Dr. O'Higgins

I did, but the Deputy was not hear to listen to it.

Mr. Ormonde

All these people are thoroughly disgusted and disappointed owing to their treatment by the Minister.

Mr. O'Leary

By the last Minister or this Minister?

Mr. Ormonde

This Minister. When the Minister does come to a decision as to what he proposes to do with them, in regard to putting them on a sound footing, he will be very surprised at the lack of numbers he will have for the purpose.

Dr. O'Higgins

I hope the Deputy will be here to listen to me.

Mr. Ormonde

Before concluding, I would ask the Minister to state when he proposes to issue certificates and medals to the L.D.F. This is a matter on which information has been asked on a number of occasions and there has been no definite reply.

Dr. O'Higgins

There was a definite reply given last week, but apparently the Deputy did not listen to it.

Mr. Ormonde

The Minister might deal with the matter in his reply to the debate on this Vote.

Dr. O'Higgins

If I cannot teach the Deputy to listen, I shall not undertake to teach him to read.

Mr. O'Leary

I would not have intervened in this debate were it not for some remarks which have been made by Deputy Colley and the Deputy from Waterford who has just spoken. I heard these Deputies asking the Minister what he proposed to do for ex-servicemen, but I have here in front of me a letter which I am sure these Deputies will be surprised to hear, from a discharged soldier who served in the Army from 1940 to 1944 and who was then discharged medically unfit. The letter comes from a district in my own constituency, Monbeg, Ballindaggin, Enniscorthy. He writes:—

"A Chara, —I am a married man with a wife and children and I am receiving only 15/- national health insurance benefit since my discharge as being medically unfit. I would be very grateful to you if you would be able to get me some little help or relief from the Irish Army Benevolent Fund."

There is a man who was discharged medically unfit and who served the State from 1940 to 1944 and that is the treatment he received from the last Minister. Do Deputies opposite call that justice? I am sorry that Deputy Major de Valera has gone out of the House because that is only one of many letters I have received showing that several men who were discharged from the Army as medically unfit are now forced to exist on national health insurance benefit and home assistance. Does that offer any encouragement to our young men to join the Army? I cannot see how it does. I know the man who wrote that letter personally and so do other Deputies in County Wexford.

Reference has been made to deserters and a great deal of propaganda has been made out of a few words I said here on a former occasion, but none of the Deputies on the far side has been frank enough to tell the country why these men deserted. I shall tell you the reason now. Many of these young men who joined the Army in various towns in the country got married after a short time but, because they were not two years in the Army, they would not be given married men's pay. What option had they, when they had to maintain their wives, only to go to some other country where they would get higher pay? Let some of the ex-Ministers try to defend that treatment of soldiers. That is a fact that cannot be denied.

Deputy Colley spoke here to-night of the treatment meted out to Old I.R.A. men but what did he and other Fianna Fáil members do when a Bill was introduced here to improve the conditions of these men? They went into the Lobbies to close the door for I.R.A. pensions to men who had been left outside. I am glad to say that the present Minister has received a number of deputations in regard to this matter very favourably and that he has given an understanding that he will try to bring in a Bill to amend the Act which the Fianna Fáil Party passed by a majority vote when they were in power.

If we want to have a contented Army, the first essential, naturally, is to pay the men properly. To my mind, the soldier was never paid sufficiently in this or any other country because, in the last resort, it is on the Army we have to rely to defend the nation. Again, unless we have a sufficient air force to co-operate with the Army there is very little use in having an Army. We had experience of that here when a large portion of the city was destroyed in an air raid. Even in the North of Ireland, where there was a much stronger defence, a great deal of destruction was caused by aeroplanes. We need to develop our air arm if we are to have sufficient protection in wars of the future. Of course, all these threats about another war may be more bluff than anything else because the whole world is sick of war. We have seen two in our own time and we do not want to see any more. If the Minister is to keep our Army content, he will have to give the men as much as the State can afford so far as their pay is concerned. Another matter to which I should like to refer is the inadequate pensions given to certain soldiers who have been discharged from the Army and who have wives dependent upon them. They have got no increases like other sections.

An Ceann Comhairle

The Deputy will have an opportunity of dealing with that on the next Vote.

Mr. O'Leary

I welcome the information that we got from the Minister when he met deputations on behalf of the people who are left outside the Pension Acts. I say that any ex-soldier discharged as medically unfit should be called up for re-examination, especially cases like the man I referred to who had to depend on national health insurance and home assistance after having served in the forces. I do not see what Fianna Fáil have to talk about. When they were the Government they had an opportunity to do these things and they did not do them. We are called a Coalition. I think we are the only Nationalist Government which has been in power since the State was formed, because all sections of the people are represented in the Cabinet; there is not one Party or anything like that. I know that these men, like myself, are in constant contact with the Army and with the men who served and who were let down by the last Minister and his Government.

Mr. Kitt

In introducing the Estimate, the Minister said that it was essential and desirable that there should be agreement between both sides of the House on this vital matter of defence. So far this debate has not been contentious. We are all in agreement that the defence of our country is a most important problem and all sides of the House wish to see it carried out in the best possible way. The Minister quoted figures for the years preceding the emergency to show that the strength of the Army now is equal to what it was in these years. Since the emergency we know that the military experts, from the experience they have had, have advised that we should have an Army round about the 12,000 mark, with a First Line Reserve and a Second Line Reserve, the F.C.A. I wish to add my voice to that of the other speakers who asked the Minister to maintain our Army as near to that mark as possible. The Minister said that the figures for last year were 9,300 and for this year 8,200, and that the difference was not worth talking about. But, if each year we are going to come down by 1,100, we shall soon be down to having practically no Army at all. I, therefore, suggest that we should keep as near as possible to the figures that the Army experts advised for a highly-trained regular standing Army and, in addition to that, to have a First Line of Reserve and a Second Line of Reserve, the F.C.A. I notice in the Book of Estimates that under sub-head Y (2) the amount provided for the Reserve has been cut down this year by £172,181, and for the Second Line of Reserve, the F.C.A., the Grants-in-Aid are being cut down from £25,000 to £19,250, a reduction of £5,750.

I am glad that the Minister has stated that the Reserve are to be called up this year and also that the F.C.A. will be called up for annual training. I am not alone in holding the opinion that our Defence Forces are not up to the numerical standard required, because in the Irish Times of Saturday, 19th March, there is an article under the heading of: “Defence Forces Seem to be Under Strength”, by their military correspondent, which states in the first paragraph:—

"The St. Patrick's Day military parade in Dublin has provided an interesting comment on the condition of the Defence Forces of to-day. Particularly obvious was the small size of the contingent...."

Later on it goes on to say:—

"At a time when the regular forces are far below a strength sufficient to undertake active defensive measures and when such trained reserves as do exist have been without annual training since 1947, the F.C.A. provides the only reserve of partly-trained troops upon which the State can call in time of emergency. Its nominal strength is some 50,000, but its effective strength cannot be assessed at anything like the same number, due to a variation of training standards and to fluctuations in attendance."

The figure we got from the Minister to-day for the F.C.A. was 30,000-odd. After pruning it down, 30,000-odd is supposed to be the effective strength now. As I said, I am glad that the annual training is going to be provided for the F.C.A. and also that the reserve will be called up again this year, because, undoubtedly, last year when there was no training for the F.C.A. the morale of the men was broken and the officers in charge of the local units had great difficulty in getting them out to train. They had not an opportunity of sending their potential officers away for training in order to keep them up to the proper standard. That was a big drawback. I hope that the training will be a long and extensive one this summer and that the money for the training will not be stinted so as to bring them back to the standard which they had attained during the emergency and to which we would like to see them kept up.

If there is another emergency, there is no doubt that if we are not prepared to defend ourselves in this country we shall not be left undefended. We all know that somebody else will step in to defend the country for us if we are not prepared to defend it ourselves. We have had experience of foreign armies being in occupation in this part of our country before, and I am sure we do not want to have a repetition of that. I would, therefore, ask the Minister and the Government to see that there is no stinting in this vital matter of defence and to carry out as near as possible the advice of our Army chiefs. In this matter of the F.C.A., this voluntary army, I would ask the Minister to encourage them to get as good a training as possible and to do everything to keep up their training and morale in order that they will be ready if required, to answer the call.

Dr. Brennan

Frankly, I was rather disappointed that the Minister did not further cut this Army Estimate in the matter of Army personnel. If we view this objectively, sanely and rationally and take a proper estimate of our Ministerial requirements, we can and must come to the conclusion that an Army of such numbers as the Minister proposes to keep established is an expensive luxury. It would, perhaps, be better if the Defence Forces were organised more or less on a voluntary basis with just a colonel or an established personnel to organise and to train every man in the country. That ideal was reached, to some extent, by the last Government in its establishment of the L.D.F. and the L.S.F. It seems to me to be a great pity that the L.S.F. was ever disbanded, because the effect of its organisation was to establish an excellent civic spirit. The people realised that if there was a demand for the defence of our country nothing was more important, and nothing is more important, than the maintenance of a spirit such as prevailed during the years between 1916 and 1922. If the Minister could consider this question from the point of view which I presume to advocate I think he will realise that the suggestion which I make is the only one which would be effective if this country were ever attacked. Speaking with some experience of war, it has been proved beyond question that the only successful undertaking this country ever organised from a military point of view was that which prevailed between the years which I have already mentioned, 1916 and 1922. We had a similar Defence Force, but in addition to that we had a very effective underground movement, an underground movement which was universal and in which there were no holes or breaches. It was the only one which we could use to establish our independence. I suggest to the Minister that, instead of providing for the establishment of a large army of artillery forces and all their impedimenta of every aggressive description, he should consider my proposal in the light that the only defence we can have in this country against any enemy, no matter what it is, is guerilla warfare.

Our people should be trained to become efficient in that kind of warfare. It does not matter who the enemy may be; that seems to me to be the only way in which we can counter the invasion of our land by any enemy. The opposition naturally is that a defence unit may take on an aspect in the future of which we may have had no experience in the past. It is possible that under certain conditions our country may become allied to others in defence of our own obligations if these countries are associated with us. If that be so, I hope our country will never descend to the level of the sufferings which the neighbouring country has undergone by making it a brothel for the invading forces. I consider that is one of the things which foreign soldiers in our land may try to effect. In considering the defence of our country I hold, and very strongly hold, that the maintenance of our civic spirit will depend on our underground movement and on guerilla warfare rather than upon large units of men who will become easy targets for modern warfare. I said at the beginning that I was rather disappointed that the Minister had not reduced the permanent strength of the Army. I hope that he will do so and that instead of having a paid Army he will introduce legislation which will encourage the natural development of military resources which are the only effective methods we would have to combat the invasion by any hostile country.

Major de Valera

Before dealing with this Estimate I should like to join in the tribute to General McKenna. I personally had the honour of serving on his staff during my last year in the Army and I can personally testify to the work that officer did for the country. Not only did he steer us through the emergency but, in his foresight and thought for the future, he left the ground ready for such developments as we might need in regard to defence. I think this House and the country owe him a debt that can hardly be acknowledged adequately by mere expressions in the House. I should like to join with the other Deputies in wishing him great happiness in his retirement. I feel that the country has lost the services of a very able officer at a very critical time.

Now to come to this Estimate. I want to take it in exactly the spirit that the Minister mentioned, namely, of hard facts and fair facts. I think it is very important that this problem of defence should be faced in the light of the facts that are available, and that Deputies should not merely express opinions, but that they should be careful, with cogent reasons and facts, to ground any expressions of opinion to which they give utterance. It is on that basis that I would like to approach the Estimate. In order to avoid being unduly long, I would like, briefly, to refer to what I said on this Estimate a year ago. The references will be found in the unrevised reports of the Dáil debates on the 14th and 15th of April, 1948, Volume 110, column 756 continuing and column 822 continuing. I merely refer to them now in order to avoid repetition. I should like to assure the Minister and the House that the facts and figures which I set out were given after careful research, coupled with personal knowledge. I think that the history of the strengths and the history of the Army which I give there is in all respects substantially accurate. I have rounded my figures, so to speak, to make them readable, but I think they will be found substantially accurate. It is in the light of these figures that I would now like to proceed to this Estimate.

This Estimate is an extremely serious thing for the country if only for the reason, as other speakers have pointed out, that we are voting £3,750,000 for the Department of Defence and that we can hardly afford to throw that sum of money away. If we are going to vote a sum of that amount yearly, it is incumbent on us to see that the purpose for which it is voted is adequately served. It is, further, our duty as public representatives to see that no moneys are voted futilely and that such a large sum as this is not to be voted merely as a token. If we find that the end for which it is voted cannot be adequately served by that Vote, it is, I take it, our responsibility frankly to approach the people and tell them the facts, to tell them: "We cannot do the job that is supposed to be done with this sum of money and we had better save it or else find more money." I think that, in all fairness to the people, we must take that approach so that at the outset we are back again to the problem that a number of us have mentioned in this House before, which is: Do we need a Defence Force here at all in the sense of an Army and general provision for defence in time of war, and if we need it can we afford it, and if we do not need it or if we cannot afford it, can we do with a force for internal security purposes, namely, an auxiliary constabulary or a special constabulary or auxiliary police force?

Now, at the outset that seems to me the problem which we must face, and these are, roughly and generally speaking, the questions which we must answer. As I have said already, they can be answered only in the light of an estimate of the situation based both on the past and the present. I shall take it that way. Where are we for the present? It seems to me that the situation can hardly be described as a situation of settled peace. It is unnecessary to refer to it in detail, but the negotiations going on between various Powers, and the hostility between two blocs, notably between Russia and the Western World and the activities of nations in defence matters, all point to the need for defensive measures in the world as it is to-day.

In other words, we cannot make a comparison with conditions say from 1925 to 1930. During those years there was a certain fluidity. There was the League of Nations and various other activities holding the main stage in international affairs, but there were no definite blocs of powers crystallised into alliances or groups at that time in such a way as would lead one to say that war was proximate. During the latter period, that is to say from 1936 to 1939 onwards, you had a situation which was crystallising, where you could see opponents emerging, and you could make a fair forecast that war lay ahead. Now, comparing these two periods with the present, it seems to me that we must take it that a fairer comparison is to be made with the period 1936 to 1939 rather than with that from 1925 to 1930, and if that is so it behoves us, at least, to pay some attention to defence as we did in those years, and to exercise ourselves at least, to that extent rather than bank on a continuing peace.

Now, on what do I base that estimate? I have said that the papers generally will tell us the story about the so-called "cold war," pacts, negotiations between States with regard to defence, and conferences between chiefs of staffs.

These are commonplace matters in our daily papers, and then, to come to something more concrete, we have only to look across the water to see what our neighbours are doing. That is a certain guide, for this reason, that the United Kingdom was very hard hit after the war and is not likely to indulge in extravagant defence expenditure or defence activity without very good reason. If we find that they were compelled to take special precautionary steps during the past year and up to the moment, then I think, having regard to their situation after the war, we must take it as an indication that the position, internationally, is serious. The question, therefore, is, are they taking extraordinary steps? If one turns to Hansard, the official debates of the House of Commons for the 14th September, 1948, one finds that a statement was made by the Lord President of the Council, Mr. Herbert Morrison, in the course of which, referring to demobilisation, he said:—

"In any process of demobilisation after a great war there is bound to be a certain lack of balance owing to the rapid outflow of skilled personnel and the slow build-up of trained cadres to take their place. In the circumstances then existing, the Government felt justified in accepting those risks."

He was referring there to a demobilisation programme which the British Labour Government had under way up to last September. Then he continued:—

"Unhappily—and I wish to stress that word ‘unhappily" as the way in which, I am sure, we would all wish to express ourselves—the state of the world makes some change of plan inevitable, and, in the present circumstances, his Majesty's Government have no choice but to take certain precautionary measures."

He then referred to the precautionary measures, notably the holding back of men due for release and matters of that sort. Later, but only shortly later, in the same volume of Hansard, Volume 456, on the 23rd September, 1948, the Minister for Defence, Mr. A. B. Alexander, moved:—

"That this House takes note of the statement made by the Lord President of the Council on the 14th September relating to defence."

He commenced with his motion in these words:—

"The statement made by the Lord President on the 14th September was made necessary by circumstances which the House well knows, and on which I need not dwell at length. It is the fact—the sad fact which we cannot, even if we would, deny—that our hopes for the early return of peace and orderly conduct in the world have not been realised."

Later in the same speech he went on to say:—

"We observe in many quarters of the globe conditions of unrest, riot and strife. I do not propose to weary the House with any long recital of these numerous trouble spots."

Later again he referred to his plan and he said:—

"Our plan, therefore, was to have defence forces which would be sufficient to meet our anticipated commitments and, at the same time, would be so organised as to be capable, in due course, of rapid expansion, should the need arise. This was the conception which underlay the promise that men called up for service before 1st January, 1947, would be out of the forces by 31st December, 1948, that those called up between 1st January, 1947, and 31st December, 1948, would be released by 31st December, 1949."

He then went on to say, in effect, that that had to be reversed, that they would have to be held on and, later in the same debate, Mr. Eden, who had considerable experience, as everybody knows, both in foreign affairs and as a Minister in England, expressed himself as follows—he was referring to the post-war period:—

"I thought that there would be difficulties and I thought there would even be sharp disagreements at times, but I did not anticipate that our relations would have deteriorated so far and so fast. That is a melancholy fact, but it is one of which we have to take account."

I could delay the time of the House with further quotations, but I will not do so. Not only have we what we read in the papers, but we have responsible members, both of the Government and of the Opposition, in the United Kingdom, who were in a position to know the facts, taking a serious view of the situation.

Mr. Corish

Their view was not reflected in the amount they provided this year as against last year.

Major de Valera

It is.

Mr. Kennedy

The Parliamentary Secretary is wrong.

Major de Valera

I am sorry for putting it that way, but the Parliamentary Secretary is actually wrong. The actual position is reflected in their estimates. I will give you now their defence estimate. It is published in a statement on defence for 1949-50. It is a White Paper of the British Government, and the comparative figure which I am giving will be got in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, referring to this paper. Here are the figures:—The net financial provision for defence purposes proposed for 1949-50 is as follows: £759.96 million. The comparable figure for last year, for 1948-49, was £692.60 million, and that embraces Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Ministry of Supply and Ministry of Defence.

They are the actual figures. The army figure in England was left roughly as it was, the air force and navy were increased. Perhaps that is what my friend was thinking of. There is the situation, and undoubtedly there is a state of tension abroad, and because there is we must, in common with others, look to our defence problem, if a defence problem we have. What defence problem have we got? I submit primarily that our defence problem is posed by geography. If one looks at the map and sees the position of this island, having regard to the present set-up—that is, having regard to the Western Powers with America as the strongest and greatest of them, as against Russia, the centre of the opposing bloc and by far the major part of it—if one looks at that geographical picture, one will see that this island lies in a position which makes it comparable to an aircraft carrier in the Atlantic Ocean from the point of view of the Western Powers. To use a phrase of Deputy Captain Giles this evening: "a floating dock"—that also rather aptly describes our position. You have then lying east of you an island composed of England, Scotland and Wales, a kind of barrier, so to speak, which gives you a certain amount of protection in your rôle as a potential aircraft carrier. You are close to the northern end of Western Europe. Generally speaking, I do not think you can afford to ignore your geographical position. As a consequence of that, you must conclude that anything directly involving Western Europe will also involve you to some extent, either directly or indirectly, as we were, to some extent, involved in the last war on matters of supply and so on. That is not an altogether new situation. Traditionally, this island has always been of strategic importance—the southern coast in relation to France and the eastern coast in relation to England.

Without going into detail I think I am warranted in concluding that from a geographical point of view alone we are posed with a defence problem. The question is as to what is its nature. The best way of approaching that, in order to avoid controversy in the future, is to look at our position in the last war. We are situated on the flank of England. I still adhere to the view that had an invasion of England been attempted and had "Operation Sea Lion" been projected we would have come into the picture at least as a theatre of diversionary attacks, if nothing else. It was essential then that we should account for this unit of territory. From England's point of view it was essential that there should be some protection in order to protect her flank. From our own point of view it was essential that if any such attack were made upon us, whether directly or as a means of bringing England to heel, we should be in a position to resist. We achieved that during the war. I think the fact that we achieved it was largely due to a number of providential factors into which I do not propose to enter now. We were fortunate in many of the things that happened.

Because of our geographical position and because of the nature of the set-up in the world to-day, it seems to me that this island must necessarily enter into the defence picture and some provision must be made for defence. If we do not make that provision somebody else will. The next question then is, upon what basis is that provision to be made if we are going to make it. Before answering that I think it would be as well at this stage, having arrived at the conclusion that some provision must be made for our defence, to ask ourselves whether we are going to do it ourselves or whether we are going to leave it to somebody else. I think it has been pointed out on previous occasions that if we do not do it ourselves somebody else will do it for us. What is the consequence? The consequence is the wholesale occupation of our country with all the disadvantages that accrue therefrom. The consequence is that you would lose your freedom of action. Immediately you make that decision and proceed to deprive yourself of freedom of action in international affairs when questions of defence arise, in the long run you will pay and your people will pay for that defence. When the problem is put in that way I think most people will agree that we should provide our own defence. It may be expensive but it will at least leave us in the position of maintaining a certain freedom of action to mould our own lives and make our own decisions. We were able to do that in the past. We were able to preserve our people and our country as a unit. When all the factors are reckoned up the cost in the long run will probably be less than if we abandon our defence to somebody else. This has been debated before. I could repeat the arguments in detail.

When I challenged the Government I got only one Deputy who opted in favour of a police force only. Last year I approached this Estimate on the basis that we were all agreed on providing our own defence and that an auxiliary police force was not the solution. I mentioned it again now, because I was not quite clear from this debate whether or not we had disposed of that problem.

That is the first problem to be faced, because we cannot afford to throw away £3,750,000. If we are only going to maintain an auxiliary police force, then let us do it in a direct and cheap way. Let us recruit a couple of thousand special constabulary and arm them with submachine guns and a few armoured cars and organise them for a police job primarily. Let us cut out the trimmings. We shall save a lot of money in personnel, maintenance, equipment and everything else. If you, however, make up your mind, as most of us have, that we want a defence force, then the problem must be faced on a different basis. It is going to be a more expensive one. If we are going to face it, let us face it as realists. It is no use having an Army, or a force that appears to be an Army, which cannot do its job. Spending £3,750,000 on an Army of that kind would be unjustifiable waste. It is for that reason I am pressing the Deputies to face this problem of defence in the broad manner in which I have outlined it. The Deputies must have the courage to make up their minds as to what they will recommend to their constituents. Are we going to face this defence problem seriously or are we going to be content with a police force and leave our defence to somebody else? That is a simple straightforward question. It cannot be shirked. We cannot talk about this Defence Estimate with any degree of clarity until we dispose of that problem. I invite Deputies to consider it and to decide for themselves. If we decide that we shall cater for our own defence, then let us be realists and face up to and implement the consequences of our decision. That is surely a reasonable thing to ask.

For the rest of this debate I go on the assumption that we intend to provide for our own defence, that that in the long run is going to be the best thing for us, that it is preferable for us to preserve our integrity whether we are involved in hostilities or not, than simply to throw ourselves open to the occupation and dictation in detail of any foreign power, no matter how friendly. Let us proceed to the discussion of the Estimate on that basis. In the more narrow sense, what is the problem we have to face in that regard? Perhaps there are people in this country who would argue two ways on that. There are three possibilities, as I see the situation. You are either on one side or the other; the third is that you are neutral. So far as the great majority of the people in this country are concerned, I think we can leave one of these out and then we are left with two. In other words, the possibilities are that we carry on or try to carry on to implement a policy of neutrality, such as we had in the past, or that we become active and participate with the Western Powers in any future conflict. I will admit that there are probably people who at this stage would have two minds about meeting one or other of these definite alternatives at the moment. There are others who would like to wait longer before making a decision.

What I want to point out, in approaching this, is that, whether you are going to be neutral, as we were in the last war, or whether you envisage co-operation with the Western Powers, whether firmly or flexibly, on either showing the approach to our defence problem is the same. There is so much to be done. The opening phase of our problems, so to speak, remains the same, no matter on which basis you approach it, so that we can avoid controversy in approaching this defence problem here by simply assuming either of those, and for the purposes of this debate I shall leave the question completely open.

What can a defence policy for us mean in practice? Perhaps I can answer that in a negative way first. Every one of us realises that in modern conditions absolute defence against any aggressor is out of the question for a small nation like ours. We will all agree, too, that absolute resistance, with a chance of ultimate success, against any major or even second class modern power, is beyond the resources of a nation of our size. It is, therefore, futile to think of defence in such terms. We must rather think of defence objectives in a more limited way. As I can see them generally, these objectives should be, firstly, that in case of war or serious emergency such as the last, we should be able to provide our own local security and local garrisons. That is, from the local security point of view, we should be able to guard against espionage and to provide for the protection of installations, communications and so forth. We should be in a position to supply the elements necessary to ensure such security in time of stress. Secondly, we should be able to dispose of certain tactical forces distributed over the country that would fulfil the rôle of garrison troops, so to speak, and deal with anything like light incursions of a belligerent, activities of enemy agents and so forth. That is, local tactical forces should be available to garrison the country at such a time.

Thirdly, we should then have such a force as would compel any belligerent, who is going to interfere with you to deploy relatively large forces against you; which could inflict sufficient damage to make the cost both in men and materials relatively high for him. If you have a sufficient force to do that, you make it a fairly serious problem for him to interfere with you and therefore you are deterring him from interfering with you. You should have that force there in order to inflict certain delay on him. Not only must it cause him to deploy large forces, not only must it be costly to him in men and materials, but it must be costly to him in time. The advantage of that is twofold. If you impose as large a time factor on him as you possibly can, you take away from him the element of surprise. In so far as he wishes to secure surprise against his main enemy through interfering with you, if you have forces able to delay him, to that extent you take away the advantage of surprise from him and so further deter him from interfering with you.

Suppose we had been interfered with in the last war by German forces, it would have been vital, both from our own point of view and from the point of view of the opponents of Germany, that we here should have been able to put up a resistance for a considerable length of time in order to enable them to deploy in this particular area. If we have in the future forces that will imply such a time factor, it immediately operates as a deterrent to anyone interfering with us. Therefore, briefly the objectives should be: to garrison your own territory, supply your own local security with the necessary local tactical forces, and then have a sufficient central reserve—let me call it that for want of a better name—to compel any intending aggressor, no matter who he is, to deploy considerable forces against you at a likely heavy cost in manpower and material and a substantial time factor.

These are, I think, the objectives that we should have in our immediate defence policy. As I say, it is obvious that the set-up is compatible with a policy of neutrality, but it is equally compatible with a policy of cooperation because, in the geographical set-up, this island will have to be garrisoned in any event, and it is better that we should do the garrisoning ourselves. Even if we are to cooperate with somebody else, it is much better that we should afford the contribution to garrison our own country and minimise the necessity for occupation by foreign troops, no matter how friendly. Lastly, if you are in active co-operation you can be much more helpful to your friends if you are organised than if you are disorganised, and exactly the same type of organisation will fit both bills. That is why I say that controversy can be avoided by taking the picture generally on that basis.

Therefore the question is: is it feasible for us to implement such a defence policy? In my humble opinion, it is. But, if we are going to examine that defence policy, we should not fall into the mistake of examining it merely from the localised point of view of armed forces. A defence policy of that nature involves a large and broader view of the State. Although it is out of place on this Estimate, perhaps the Chair will permit me to mention them by way of correlation. It presupposes that you organise your communications, your food supply, your fuel supply, with a view to meeting the emergency situation. It presupposes organising your armed forces. It presupposes co-ordinating all these together. That is an aspect which, I am afraid, we have neglected to a certain extent to date. During the war we were fortunate in that a number of factors conspired to give us that co-ordination. The policy before the war of growing wheat, of developing turf and a number of these things fitted into the defence picture, along with the development of the defence forces from 1937 onwards. I think that in the position we have to face in the future some such co-ordination must be looked after. I mention it now as the most appropriate occasion on which I can mention it, and I mention it particularly in order not to lay myself open to the charge of looking upon this defence problem from the narrow point of view of the forces. It is, however, in that narrow point of view that we are engaged in this Vote. We might follow it on that basis.

If then we are to have that policy that I have attempted to outline, what do we need? It seems to me that local security requires the F.C.A. There is a rôle for that immediately. Next garrison and tactical troops. There you need both a certain regular element and a First Line Reserve element, for reasons which I shall develop in a moment. It seems to me, therefore, that on that basis we must face the problem as demanding that we have three elements, each with its own specific rôle. We cannot confuse these and we cannot adequately make one rôle do another. We need the permanent forces, we need the First Line Reserve and we need the F.C.A. more than ever in present times. The question is, what is to be the proportion, what is to be the equipment, and what is to be the strength of these components and, of course, what is the cost going to be? So much for the general picture.

I should like to feel that we can take it from the point of view of unifying this debate, and I should like it to be agreed that we could take it that way, that this defence problem must be provided for on the basis that we will provide for our own defence to the greatest extent that we can. That is the first point of agreement that I should like to feel we have. The second point of agreement that I suggest is that the only rational policy for us is a policy of the nature I have briefly outlined. That policy is equally adjustable to a policy of neutrality such as we had in the past or a policy of cooperation such as I have mentioned, and so all controversial issue is avoided. If we could feel that we were agreed on this matter, I think that we cannot escape the conclusion that the three elements, the Regular Army, the First Line Reserve and the F.C.A., are essential elements of the Defence Forces, all related, of course, to the broader aspects which the Minister himself has mentioned. I think he mentioned it in this debate; he certainly mentioned it last year. It must be taken in conjunction with that. If we got that far, then we have the basis on which we can take the facts that the Minister referred to and keep strictly to these facts.

The first problem is the strength of the Regular Army and the strength of the Reserve. There the Minister at the opening was at pains to point that out, apparently, agreement had been reached in the past on this matter. I am not going to controvert the Minister on anything he said, save to this extent, that times have changed and, with respect, I would suggest that we have got to study this problem specifically in the light of events in 1948, 1949 and 1950. We have got to have regard to present events and the general lesson of history which teaches that if something which was decided in the past is to be qualified then we must qualify what was decided on in the past. I have tried to outline generally heads of defence policy. I have actually done no more than outline what was the general policy of this State from its inception. Last year I referred to an agreed policy and Deputy Cogan, I think, said:—

"Look here, the mistake that fellow is making is that he is talking as if we should have the same policy as we had for 20 years."

I want to draw a distinction. A broad general policy, yes, remains substantially the same, for the reasons which I have given. These reasons are largely imposed by geography. Of course, "policy" in the restricted sense of implementing the general policy must change from day to day. The general policy in regard to our Defence Forces appears to have been agreed by three Governments.

However, if I read the record aright, I would say that the Cumann na nGaedheal Government, at one stage, anyway, had the idea of relying on the efficiency of a small, highly-trained force of permanent personnel to offset the lack of numbers and also of relying on them as being a cadre on which to expand in an emergency. I gave reasons last year in the debate to which I have referred why that policy was not realisable in practice and why results could not be achieved. Briefly, it was for the reason that, first of all, you could not get an Army where every soldier was a potential officer on the terms of pay, recruitment and so forth. Only a percentage of the force could live up to the ideal of being a leader upon which a little unit could be formed. Secondly, some units of the regular force must inevitably, as such, be disposed of on mobilisation. In other words, you cannot split it up into single individual men and say: "I will form a little unit round each man." Some units of the permanent force must be held as such on mobilisation, leaving only a fraction of the permanent force as a skeleton upon which to expand. Thirdly, under modern conditions more than ever certain units are highly technical. These highly technical units demand for efficiency not only skill on the part of the individuals which compose them but a degree of collective skill and that degree of skill and efficiency can only be achieved by keeping the unit together. Then there was the question of guard duties. I went over all that last year and I do not intend to repeat it. However, for that reason it is not practicable to rely purely on a small permanent force, no matter how efficient. In any event, it would be very hard to achieve especially in the light of experience as to conditions of pay, promotions and so forth.

Another view which was expressed by other people was that of having practically no permanent force or of regarding your permanent force purely and simply as a cadre on which to expand and having a very large voluntary army. Experience shows that you can go too far in that direction also. First of all, the experience with the voluntary reserves which we have had in the past and especially the volunteer force, is that to every unit a cadre must be provided. In other words, no volunteer unit will completely run itself if it has not a certain nucleus of regular personnel permanently associated with it for administration and training and to fill certain key positions. That is definitely a lesson of the past, both in the pre-war period and on the 1940 mobilisation. You must provide the cadres for that force. Further, as has been already pointed out, there is a limit to the size of any voluntary army which you can maintain and that limit is imposed by the size of the permanent force which you maintain.

In addition to these general reasons all of which have been given already there is a further factor governing that. This is directly relevant to the quotations the Minister made in his speech. From the Boer War to 1914 a large part of an army was composed of infantry men, the principal weapon being the rifle. There was no mechanisation. During that period it was more feasible than it is to-day to rely on the voluntary reservists like the Territorial Army in England, provided they had been trained to shoot. In fact the experience of 1914, 1915, and 1916 shows the value of that Territorial Force in England. These ideas were carried on even after the Great War of 1914-'18. Sight was lost of the fact that mechanisation was in the offing, that soldering was becoming a much more complex matter, that new weapons were intruding on all branches of the service and that the degree of efficiency and training required was correspondingly greater. These factors were not quite apparent until close to the last war. We had apologies from various people as to why they did not foresee the tank or this, that or the other thing and the result of such lack of foresight. The fact is that the lessons of the 1914-1918 war were not learned until a comparatively late date even by those who took part in that war. The few, like General de Gaulle and some other officers, who did see the contents of the lesson were more or less discredited until the stress of action proved them right.

In these circumstances, as long as armies remained as they were during that period there was a lot to be said for the view that you could rely largely on a voluntary army. I think that that day has gone for ever for this reason. Firstly, to get efficiency, as I have already mentioned, with modern units the collective efficiency has to be taken into account and to develop that takes a certain amount of time. Consequently, no voluntary army will be available immediately on mobilisation. On mobilisation you are going to have to depend on your permanent force and your First Line Reserve—mainly on your permanent force.

Captain Cowan

On a point of order. If we are paying a General Staff for discussing and dealing with this are we to listen to this row?

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

You are not forced to listen to it.

Captain Cowan

Bunkum!

Major de Valera

The point I am trying to bring on a logical basis is the relative strength, the proportion of that strength, and the reasons why these forces are necessary. The lesson of 1939-40 is that before the war we had a Regular Army of insufficient strength. That is the first lesson. The second lesson is that it takes time to incorporate a Reserve, even if you get a good mobilisation figure as we did on that occasion. The third lesson is that you need a First Line Reserve, that it will take you longer to incorporate your Second Line Reserve than it will to incorporate your First Line Reserve. Now, if before the war—we have learned this lesson in regard to a regular force—7,500 odd of a Regular Army personnel were insufficient in September, 1939, to mobilise the Reserves then available, and if a certain amount of chaos resulted even when we were under no immediate pressure, is it wise to leave our permanent force at approximately the same level?

With regard to the First Line Reserve, immediately on mobilisation that reserve is needed for security purposes, for immediate garrison purposes and so forth, and they should be pretty well trained. In 1938, the A and B Reserves were absorbed immediately for guard duty and nothing over was left during the period until the Volunteer personnel got accustomed to military training. The lesson to be learned from that is that the First Line Reserve in 1939 was insufficient. By May, 1940, as I have already mentioned in other debates, we had, in effect, a Regular Army of 14,000 odd. In other words, by the absorption of the First Line Reserve and the Volunteer force, which was reckoned first line even though they were voluntary—by the absorption of them during the previous six months you had, in effect, when the emergency broke in the spring of 1940, a Regular Army virtually of approximately 14,000 men, all ranks. When it came to mobilising the emergency recruits that flocked in at that time it was found that this force, double your peace time Regular Army strength, was hardly sufficient to deal with it. I assure Deputies that the situation then was very difficult. We had to provide for local security duties and for the mobilisation of these emergency recruits, so that we had nothing left to talk about in the tactical sense. In other words, we were barely able to take in those recruits and barely able to supply our local security requirements, but, as regards the other requirements of our defence policy, we were without anything at all.

At that period we got plenty of time. What is our position, facing the future, if the time factor were against us? It seems to me that the lesson is this that you want to increase the permanent force, and that you want to increase the First Line Reserve whatever about your Second Line Reserve. Apart from that, there is this to be considered, that under modern conditions, the F.C.A. will be wanted in its own local areas. It is a mistake to think that the F.C.A. is a force which can, so to speak, be completely embodied with your permanent force so as to give you a mobile force to be disposed of. Without going into details, it will have its own local rôle to fulfil. What are we doing in that regard? The Minister gave us certain figures and frankly they perturbed me. I do realise that he would have difficulty, perhaps, in getting recruits, but still here are the facts he gave us to-day compared with the figures that he gave us last year. The dates are not strictly comparable, but they are near enough for comparison purposes. Last year, he said, the strength of the Regular Army was 8,672, and this year, he said, it is 8,006. In other words, the strength of the Regular Army has fallen. The First Line Reserve last year, according to the figure which he gave at the end of September in answer to a question, was 5,748, and this year, he says, it is 4,830. In regard to the F.C.A. the figure is 48,000 as against 30,000. I would not quarrel about that, and I can sympathise with the Minister in the adjustment of that figure to reality.

In other words, therefore, we are drifting back, as far as our permanent force is concerned, to a position comparable to our pre-war position, and that pre-war position was not sufficient to meet our defence requirements. It was very much by grace and good luck that we got through with the provision that we had made before the last war. Our First Line Reserve is only the same as the reserve of last year. If I read the figures aright, it is approximately the same. What would happen if we were faced with an early mobilisation without the time factor that we got in 1940? I think that is a question for very serious analysis and consideration. I would again recommend it to the Minister, because on that I feel there is a certain danger that we are wasting all the money we are spending.

It was in the light of that history which is now on the records of the House, it was in the light of these figures and with due regard for all economy, that the General Staff recommended to the previous Government a certain minimum figure for the permanent force. The last Government, just as the present Government, were quite unwilling to spend any more money than was necessary on defence, but the argument put up by the General Staff at that time was such as to be, in the opinion of the then Government, irrefutable. It is for that reason that I think we should try to get recruits and work back to that figure. I understand and realise the difficulty in getting recruits. I would not quarrel with the Minister because he could not immediately fill his establishment at once, but I do think that, in regard to the permanent force, and having regard to the fact that the General Staff, having analysed all the factors, past and present, in a situation that was looking more peaceful than the present situation looks— having examined that situation, the history, the facts, figures and everything else—were constrained to make a recommendation after careful sifting, and that the Government were constrained to accept it.

The Deputy who interjected a few moments ago said this is a matter for the General Staff. I would like very much to know whether the General Staff will say that this force of 8,000 men will meet their bill, or whether they can modify their minimum requirement from the minimum requirement which was worked out. For that reason, having regard to the present situation, to the difficulty of getting recruits, and making all due allowance in that regard, it is my opinion that we should try to build a regular force to the strength recommended by the General Staff.

That is the first essential so far as the armed forces are concerned, because everything else hinges on them. We had ample evidence in the past that the Reserve hinges on the strength, the morale, and the general condition of the regular forces. The whole pace is set by the conditions of the regular forces. It is for that reason I stress that point so strongly and perhaps a certain amount of weight may be added to that by the fact that I, in common with others, was a member of a voluntary force and was very anxious to make a complete success of that force and thought many things could be done, to learn, in the light of experience, that certain things could not be done. We learned that the Regular Army is the skeleton upon which the whole structure is built. It is the kernel, the nucleus, the brain and everything else, of your armed forces and we must give it priority and consideration.

I will press to have that figure examined, to see what we can do to build up to a figure that will make our Defence Force a reality and not leave us as we were during the war. If we try to repeat history again we may not get away with it and we may simply be throwing our money down the drain.

With regard to the First Line Reserve, before the war the strength was insufficient. It is obvious that strength is declining.

Dr. O'Higgins

I should like to take this opportunity to correct a mistake I made with regard to the First Line Reserve. I gave a figure of 4,830. In giving that figure, the officers were omitted—652.

Major de Valera

It is approximately the same, then. There is a slight decrease in the Reserve. In my opinion, that First Line Reserve is not sufficiently strong. It will take time to embody your Second Line Reserve. A large proportion of them will be tied down to their own local areas. You want the First Line Reserve to be filled by regular and mobile units and I think some effort should be made to fill it. The normal way in which it is being filled is simply by the outflow from the Regular Army. I take it that it corresponds to what the A Reserve was. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong. The Cumann na nGaedheal Government found that while that was the best trained and most satisfactory portion of the old Reserve, in numbers it was not sufficient, and they tried an experiment and their successors tried another experiment.

It seems to me, in any event, that First Line Reserve must be supplemented, and the question is, how to supplement it. Under modern conditions, where the training of the soldier is relatively so complex, the old B Reserve, if we are to have a voluntary system, must be reintroduced. That means that you take a man for a short whole-time period of training, shorter than the A Reserve. That is the man who serves for a number of years in the regular forces and goes on Reserve. We take him in for a short time, make the best soldier we can out of him, let him out and take him back again later. Some such system will have to be tried if we are to make a success of this. The local reserve can carry on with a few weeks' training every year without an intensive basic course.

I would like to say a few words about the F.C.A. I do not know what their present terms of service are. The only point I would like to make in this regard is that an attempt was made with a purely voluntary force, particularly in the Dublin area with the old Volunteer force. After the experience of two or three years certain lessons were learned. These were that you must, to every unit of that reserve, supply a cadre; that is, a certain fraction of the regular personnel who will be available for training and administering it, and they are absolutely necessary to make a success of it. Secondly, you will not be able to train complete units to the extent that you can rely on them immediately on mobilisation. The men will turn up promptly, but in order to say you have an effective unit it will take a little time. These factors are there with that type of reserve. It is inherent in it and there will always be a certain weakness as long as we proceed on a voluntary basis.

I have already expressed my own opinion and I am more than ever convinced of it now. It is this, that in order to meet the defence problem of any modern country, including ourselves, some scheme of compulsory military service is necessary. Such a scheme is probably the cheapest in the long run. It is probably cheaper when compared with an efficient voluntary scheme. It actually requires less regular personnel to run it; in other words, you can have a smaller Regular Army with some scheme of national service than you can effectively and economically have with a volunteer army. It also has the advantages of a proper age group distribution. It provides equally for First and Second Line Reserves and always gives you an immediate pool of men available, practically already mobilised.

There are a large number of reasons why such a scheme would be productive. I know the difficulties here, but, if we are to be serious on this problem of defence, some such scheme will ultimately be broached. Whether it comes into force through an emergency or not I cannot say, but it will probably be cheaper in the long run than any other scheme. In the meantime we shall have to do the best with what we have.

I have tried to give some reasons, by no means complete ones, to-night, why we should work back to a greater regular force and build the First Line Reserve. I sympathise with the Minister in his efforts to make the effective strength of the F.C.A. correspond to its paper or attestation strength. Anybody who has had dealings with the Force in the past realises the difficulties involved. Disquieting as it may be to find the all-over strength of the F.C.A. down, I do not really draw any conclusions from that. To my mind the serious thing is the situation of the First Line Reserve and the Regular Reserve. If we have 30,000 F.C.A., and if we can train these to give a good account of themselves, I do not think we are doing too badly vis-à-vis other matters.

I come now to the question of equipment. It has been dealt with on previous Estimates. I realise there is a problem of balance there. One has to decide what equipment to get; one has to avoid the buying of equipment which is obsolete. One has to make sure at the same time that the necessary equipment is there. We waited too long before the war and we could get no equipment when we needed it. I can see that it would be a mistake to rush in and buy equipment wholesale. That is a problem the Minister must solve. Having regard to the small amount we spend on equipment and warlike stores I would suggest that all the moneys provided should be used. We can purchase standard equipment if we can get it. The mere idea of saving should not be a reason for not getting equipment. The money is available and it should be used.

I would like to give a few figures for the benefit of Deputies so that they may approach this Estimate in a more objective way. I shall give these figures without drawing any conclusions from them. I have already drawn my own conclusions on a previous occasion. I want now to substantiate some of the figures I have already given. They are taken from the Appropriation Accounts and they give a picture of the defence situation. When we have those figures we can compare our situation with that of other countries in so far as the comparison is a legitimate one. Examining the Appropriation Accounts for the years before the war an interesting comparison can be made as regards our expenditure on defence purchases during those years. Having regard to the fact that it was inadequate, I think we can draw rather interesting conclusions in regard to the present. Deputies will recall that on previous occasions I have emphasised the amount of money voted and the amount saved on that. If one takes the years 1924-25 to 1938-39 and subtracts from the annual Vote the actual expenditure the result is a saving for the year on the Vote. I shall simply give the percentages, since the figures are fairly comprehensive. In the year 1924-25, 23 per cent. of the Army Vote was saved; in 1925-26, 8 per cent.; in 1926-27, 7 per cent.; in 1927-28, 10 per cent.; in 1928-29, 2 per cent.; in 1929-30, 13 per cent.; in 1930-31, 19 per cent.; in 1931-32, 13 per cent.; in 1932-33, 22 per cent.; in 1933-34, 7 per cent.; in 1934-35, 8 per cent.; in 1935-36, 11 per cent.; in 1936-37, 10 per cent.; in 1937-38, 5 per cent., and in 1938-39 11 per cent. On these figures there was an average saving of 11 per cent., over the period from 1924 to 1939, amounting to £3,250,000. It was a relatively small saving every year. It is significant, however, that when the situation was examined before the last war the Army was found deficient in equipment; that £3,250,000 would have gone a long way towards equipping it but we could not then get the stores. The lesson to be learned from that is that it is a mistake to save somewhat small percentages on the Vote every year. The money is voted. We are prepared to spend it and we should spend it. The best way in which to spend it is by getting all the equipment we can for the Army.

The position in regard to warlike stores calls for comment, too. I would like to give the actual figures. In 1924-25, under sub-head P of the Vote, 72 per cent. was saved; in 1925-26 and 1926-27, there was a substantial over-expenditure on equipment. I think that must have been equipment ordered during the civil war period. In 1927-28, 35 per cent. of the moneys voted was saved; in 1928-29, 37 per cent.; in 1929-30, 50 per cent.; in 1930-31, 32 per cent.; in 1931-32, 26 per cent.; in 1932-33, 38 per cent.; in 1933-34, 35 per cent.; in 1934-35, 35 per cent.; in 1935-36, 10 per cent.; in 1936-37 there was an increased grant but there was a saving of 39 per cent.; in 1937-38 there was an over-expenditure. In other words, we were then trying to catch up on lost time; but in 1938-39 there was a saving under that sub-head of 15 per cent. due to the fact that we could not get stores. On an average 14 per cent. was saved under sub-head P of this Vote. I think there is a lesson to be learned from that. If one examines the percentage of the total Estimate devoted to warlike stores one finds that it comes to something a little less than 5 per cent., or thereabouts. We were voting a certain sum for the Army. It was generally in the region of £1,500,000 to £2,000,000 before the war. Although we were spending only about 5 per cent. of that on warlike stores, of that 5 per cent. we saved, on the average, 14 per cent., and during most of the years from 1926 to 1936 we were saving about one-third of it, or thereabouts.

Mr. Madden

Would the Deputy tell us how stores can be secured that are not available?

Major de Valera

Let me deal with the finances for the moment. That was the position then. Obviously, it was totally inadequate and when we proceeded to mobilisation and required equipment we did not get it. When we went looking for it it was no longer there. What is the lesson? The lesson is that if we are serious about maintaining an Army, a reasonably substantial portion of the Vote should be devoted to warlike stores. I grant the Minister that it is a difficult task to avoid the pitfall of (1) getting obsolete stores and (2) of being too late in looking for them. There is the further fact that he was finding it difficult to get equipment. That may very well be but we ask him and press him to try to get as much as he can, subject to the advice of his own expert advisers. I have put these figures down now purely from the point of view of having them on record, so to speak. Let them be a warning against the traps into which we fell in the past and which we should avoid in the future.

To conclude, as far as I am concerned on this Estimate, I should like to make a few comparisons further to those of Deputy Aiken in regard to the defence bill. We are not carrying an excessive bill in this country. The lighter it could be, of course, the better assuming that a limit is placed by the fact that once you go below a certain minimum, you are really running the risk of throwing away the money because you are not getting anything substantial in return for it. Deputy Aiken gave figures in regard to the percentage of total expenditure that a number of countries were devoting to defence. The British position, on the figures I have already given, was that taking their Civil Estimates and their Defence Estimates—that is the Army, the Admiralty, the Air Force and so forth—they are spending roughly one quarter of their total expenditure on defence. We are apparently only spending from 5 per cent. to 6 per cent. —5.8 per cent. on this year's Estimate. That is not a big figure; in fact it seems in comparison with the figures which Deputy Aiken has given to be comparatively small. The United Kingdom is spending £14 per head. We may discount that certainly having regard to a large number of factors, but the fact remains that there is a big discrepancy between £14 per head of their population and something over £1 per head of our population. In Switzerland, the expenditure on defence works out at a little over £5 per head.

I give these figures purely for comparison so that it can hardly be suggested that we are paying a big bill for defence. The question is whether our defence policy is to be a reality for us or whether we are simply indulging in make-believe. We would be as anxious as the Government to save money but the facts and the figures are there. I feel if we spend less, and particularly if we maintain a force of a lesser number than the General Staff recommended, then we are running the risk of not only repeating the history of past events but of finding that when we need our Defence Forces they will be quite ineffective for the purposes for which we want them. Now is the time to look into that problem. People will be very quick to blame us for not looking at these things in advance when it was our duty to do so. We can only look at this problem on the basis of the facts but we do owe a duty to the people that, having examined the position and having come to a definite conclusion, we should face up to the implications to be derived from the facts as disclosed by our examination.

Dr. O'Higgins

I have no complaint to make with regard to the general tone or line taken in this debate. I think it is definitely encouraging that the general tone was that of a helpful spirit. I, no more than any other Minister, have any objection whatsoever to criticism provided criticisms are well-directed and well-intended. I was never formed in the mould of a person who had any particular tip about myself. I happen to be in this post at the moment and the more assistance I get, whether by suggestion or in any way else, with regard to the development, control and direction of the Army, the more I welcome it. I think it is not only advisable, but essential, that any Minister for Defence should get all the advice that Deputies may feel inclined to tender to him. It is a matter for the Minister, the Government and staff after hearing that advice to give it very full and deep consideration and to decide, in the light of ways and means, what is best to do.

We in this country, civilians and soldiers, may have certain ideas, certain knowledge with regard to the art of defence, the management and control and training of Defence Forces but, very fortunately for the whole of us, we lack the experience of combat. Even our General Staff, highly trained in the manipulation and direction of technical instruments, etc., highly trained in the theory of war, lack the experience that can only be gained by combat. Rather than deploring that or regretting it, I say it is one of the blessings of Providence showered on us but even allowing for that deficiency, our staff is not without contact with the staffs of other armies, with staffs, who not only understand very fully the theory of war and the principles of defence, but have been saturated with combat experience and the advice that I am acting on is represented to a great extent—I do not say to the fullest extent—in the Estimates and the outline of our defence policy which I am putting before the Dáil is influenced, coloured and directed by a highly-trained staff of my own, in consultation with others.

There was a suggestion made that, either in the past or in the present, the Army was being starved to a certain extent with regard to warlike stores. I do not think that is correct either with regard to the past or the present, although the Deputy believes it to be so, because I have just got a return here of the annual sums expended on warlike stores since 1924, and that goes back a very considerable distance. I find that from 1924 up to 1939 14 per cent. of the moneys voted for warlike stores were unexpended each year. They were unexpended each year, not because of any difficulties with regard to financial sanction or the will or desire to save, but because the goods could not be delivered and were not delivered.

Major de Valera

Because of late orders in those years.

Dr. O'Higgins

Not because of late orders, because with regard to a late order your order would stand and you would have the carry-over until next year. It was non-supply of the goods and, on some occasions, as a result of investigations, not being satisfied with the type of goods available. But, one way or the other, the general position was that, on the all-over, we failed to spend 14 per cent. of the money available over that period of nearly 20 years when there was full authority to spend and when orders were placed.

My experience in the short time I have been in my present position was, perhaps, not exceptional, but I mention it in order to reassure Deputies and others on that particular point. We took the extraordinary step last year of sending over to England the military head of the Army and, so that there would be no delays or no misunderstandings and so that the goods would be delivered, he was accompanied by one of the highest financial civil servants. They not only had authority to spend the full sum that was provided for in the Estimates, but they had authority to flow from one sub-head into the other for the purchase of warlike stores. They went over there determined to get what was provided for in that year's Vote and everything that it was considered advisable to buy, drawing in from other sub-heads of the Army Vote from the right hand to the left. With that special effort, and with the Quartermaster-General of the British Imperial General Staff bringing them about and helping them in a genuine way, we did not succeed in spending more than £76,000 of the money voted by the Dáil last year, although they had authority to spend 100 per cent. of that and as much of other sub-heads as they could get material to balance. That is the position. It is not a case of money. It is a case of the supplies not being there or of the supplies being directed in some other direction. It is the very same position as many people found themselves in with regard to various commodities during the war. They could not get the commodity, not because they had not the money to buy it but because the commodity was not there for them. Whatever economies there may be, there is one economy which has not been tried, and that is economy at the expense of proper equipment for the Army.

The policy of the present Government is a small Army as highly trained as it is possible to train them by competent instructors here at home and, in so far as there is any deficiency or lack of experience with regard to competent instructors here at home, to send our students abroad to get adequate experience and knowledge so as to act as instructors at home. Number two is that with regard to the up-to-date, scientific machines of modern war, irrespective of the cost, and including the very latest articles available to armies, we will at least have sufficient of such appliances, such arms and such instruments to train our men in the use of such arms, appliances and instruments. That policy is being pursued regardless of expense. But, if any sensible administrator has to spend in one direction, then he has to pull in slack in another direction and, while the situation is that great armies are marking time as to what developments will take place even within the short period of 12 months, the best advice we get is not to spread ourselves too much in a buying market. We have blundered time and again in our purchases. Armies are always anxious to dispose of surplus stores. Armies are always anxious to dispose of the articles that are going out of modern use. But, when they are disposing of such articles or tendering such articles for sale, they are not going to tell you: "This is becoming an antique". I could quote very, very many instances where good money was spent and the article, by the time of delivery, was in fact out of date.

Anybody in the position I hold at the moment has to act on the advice of experts, advice honestly given, with regard to the equipment of an army. That is my attitude and that is my position. That amount that is in the Book of Estimates this year is a considerable percentage higher than they hope or expect to get delivery for within the financial year just beginning. That is the position.

On that side of Army activities we even put down more than Army men tell us we are likely to get. The Deputy referred to not purchasing in time. A very intricate and elaborate machinery has grown up post-war with regard to the purchase of arms, armaments and other such materials. At the beginning of a financial year any of the bigger armies or armament concerns will take an order but they will not give you any assurance that they will supply any part of that order. That is merely a provisional order and it is merely a provisional acceptance of the order. After three, four, seven or eight months they point out the things on your list which they are not prepared to supply and the things on the list which they may supply. They then ask for a firm order for any materials you require in the latter group. Even when you get the firm order you do not get any assurance or guarantee that the goods are going to be delivered. In other words, when we are discussing this particular matter and even possibly criticising one another we are discussing a matter that is almost entirely from under our control.

The strength of the Army could increase, with more facilities for training that Army but there is no point in increasing an Army merely for the sake of milking the taxpayer or for the sake of having so many ornaments in uniform knocking sparks out of any barrack square. Your Regular Army can be whatever strength you are able to handle at one time and to train competently with modern weapons and with the availability of modern instruments of a highly scientific kind. I was amazed in the course of the year to get a verbal illustration of what it costs in the modern sense to equip fully even two battalions. The cost of equipping a couple of battalions in the modern sense would be something like the total sum we have for the Army Estimates this year. We have to put that alongside our resources and the capacity of any Government to get the money out of the pockets of the people and we have to consider the people. The Army had its trying experiences during the war but the general mass of the public had their trying experiences too. They found it hard to pay their way. The women found it hard to meet the bills at the end of the week. In any kind of idle irresponsible manner, purely to meet creditors or just in a weak spirit of being carried with the popular tide, if any Minister for Defence was to look for 5,000, 6,000 or 8,000 more soldiers, as I am told to do by some of the Deputies sitting opposite, that is all very well. However, will they stand beside me in getting the other £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 out of the pockets of the people to pay for that extra 8,000 or 10,000 soldiers? Having got that money, will they examine it and see if there is a better manner of spending it on behalf of all our people than to have soldiers cavorting in barrack squares? Rightly or wrongly, we are all entitled to our own opinion. We are all capable of reading. We have reached the use of wisdom—most of us, at all events, I hope—and we are able to form an independent judgment of our own. We have different contacts of different kinds. The Leader of the Opposition and his colleague on his right have travelled far and wide. The further they travelled the more and more they shouted back to us that we were on the eve of war, right on the very edge of it. Some members of our Government travel too and the Government has the machinery for contacts with various parts of the world. At all events, rightly or wrongly, we made up our minds when we became a Government that we had got to administer the affairs of our country on the basis that either we were going into war or we were going into peace.

None of us can argue with the other with regard to the future. Each one must only rely conscientiously on his own judgment. Our judgment and information directed us that it was reasonable and that the fairest line of policy we could honestly adopt with our population, whose nerves were already torn and frayed from the years of tension and expectancy and fear of war—whether it was right or wrong— was that we were facing a period of peace and not a period of war. It was in the light of that decision and in the light of that judgment that one of the first fields of economy was in the Army. Twelve months ago I said here that that economy would be effected without jeopardising the position of any single individual from the Chief-of-Staff down to the youngest recruit. That promise has been fulfilled and those economies have been secured. The benefits of these economies are being felt in every house and every hamlet where there is an old age pensioner, a blind pensioner or a widow. Had the money been better spent the way we are spending it now or would we be better advised to deprive them of the little bit of assistance they have got and have an extra 4,000, 5,000 or 8,000 men quarantined in barracks. I believe we are going the right road. We are going the road of insisting, as far as we can, that money or lack of money will not stand between the soldiers whom we are training to the very highest extent in their career. However, we would rather have a small number of officers, N.C.O.s and men trained to the very nth degree as far as the Regular Army goes than to have three times that number inadequately trained for the want of having the machinery and the appliances to train them. That is the general attitude with regard to the Army. I agree with Deputies who assert that there is a danger mark, that there is a minimum below which it would not be safe to go. I agree with that. That is being constantly watched. There is nobody in any part of the Army, at G.H.Q. or elsewhere, who is asleep in regard to his responsibilities. They are all pulling their weight competently, doing their job seriously and facing up to their responsibilities and watching not only the present but the future as best they can.

Charges have been made that recruiting was stopped. Recruiting was never stopped. The big, noisy, expensive recruiting campaign was brought to a close. I believe, from the results of that recruiting campaign, that you would have saved money and got more soldiers if you gave a £20 note to every recruit accepted for the Army. That would have been cheaper, and I believe you would have got more. That was a campaign that, in my opinion, was initiated at a most unsuitable time. It brought in a certain number, but the campaign—the big expenditure in that direction—was stopped. Recruits have been coming in all the time, month after month. The Deputies opposite know that it is easy enough to get recruits here and in other countries when times are bad. The better you make conditions outside the walls of barracks in any country the more difficult it is to get a voluntary army.

If you look back through the years over various phases of big recruiting and slack recruiting, you will find that you can get recruits any time by blowing a whistle when economic conditions outside are definitely bad, but when economic conditions outside are reasonably good, then it is reasonably difficult to get recruits. We cannot think at the moment of blowing a whistle. There has been a wastage, not too big to give rise to anxiety or uneasiness, but there has been a slow wastage month after month for nine months of the year. Towards the end of November and in December and January, which are the difficult months outside, the months when there is the greatest hardship and the least employment, during those months recruiting passes discharges, but for the other nine months of the year the discharges per month were greater than the number of recruits presenting themselves per month, the average being about 30 per month.

We may reach the point when it may be necessary to take some more active and energetic measures in order to keep up our strength, but the factor that is of importance in such matters is the timing of the effort. Now the Army pay comes up for review in the middle portion of this year. Taking into account the importance of proper timing, the timing should be when the new rates of pay are being approved and publicised rather than before it.

There may be other matters which were raised in the course of the debate which I have overlooked. I can give Deputies from all parts of the House a confident assurance that the different points raised by them will be very fully studied and examined in the Department, and that so far as suggestions of a helpful nature can be adopted they will be adopted, and if not it is not because I did not regard the suggestions as being honestly and helpfully made and in the best interest of the Army.

Captain Cowan

Did I gather from the Minister's last few words that there will be a revision of pay about the month of June?

Dr. O'Higgins

I did not say the month of June, but there will be a revision of pay terminating on or before the 1st September at the latest.

Mr. de Valera

It was my intention to say a few words on this Estimate, but unfortunately the Minister was on his feet before I understood that the debate was concluding. I will have to content myself now by asking a question. I want to refer to the difficulties that we experienced when the emergency began in the matter of having sufficent accommodation for the troops. The question then of barracks is important. Has the policy been adopted of more or less giving away these barracks? I do not know if the Minister has been informed of the difficulties we had in regard to accommodation when the emergency began. I am anxious that he should be very careful in alienating any barracks.

Dr. O'Higgins

What the Deputy says is quite correct. I think he will agree with me that there is probably not a country in Europe that has sufficient permanent barracks to house the whole of a fully-mobilised army. The question of giving away barracks was fairly well and fairly adequately discussed here last year. I outlined the position that if a person is faced with a situation where on one side the question is the possible or even probable difficulties of housing an army if and when such a situation might arise sometime in the future, and on the other side of the picture is the immediate position of 400 or 500 tuberculosis cases without a roof over them, then I think the Deputies opposite would take the same decision as the decision that I took. The only barracks that has gone out of my possession is the Hibernian School.

Mr. de Valera

I was not speaking in reference to any particular one. I was speaking in general terms, and I was suggesting to the Minister that he should be slow about giving up any of these barracks, because even though, in an actual campaign, a lot of the troops would be under canvas, still there may be a considerable waiting period and therefore it is desirable that there should be housing accommodation for them.

Dr. O'Higgins

I think the Leader of the Opposition was long enough Taoiseach to know that no Government Department will ever be accused of speed.

Mr. Sheridan

I want to ask the Minister whether the question of compulsory military service has been even considered by the headquarters staff or whether it is likely to be considered in the future so far as this country is concerned.

Dr. O'Higgins

It has been considered and I would say it is unlikely to be adopted.

Motion to refer back withdrawn by consent.

Vote put and agreed to.