861 miles. When I asked the question whether that would cause any unemployment, I was told it would mean about 1,000 men. Later, there was a correction with regard to that figure. We were informed there might not be the unemployment that was stated at the meeting; that there might not be any unemployment at all, as it was possible that substitute occupation might be found for those people. What reliance can be put on that statement may be judged from this, that at the first meeting in June there was a proposal to cut back maintenance, and the cost of that in unemployment was going to be 2,500 men. Could anybody here find where suitable substitute employment could be found for the 1,000 men who would be put out of employment if the branch lines were closed?
There was a proposal put forward that over the whole system the charges should be raised, but while they thought that fares could be raised over the whole system they were not too sure about raising charges unless the fourth thing could be done. They expressed their view that the private motorist, with his private car, taking potential passengers, was not so much a trouble as the trader carrying his own goods in his own lorry and their proposal was that unless these people were put off the road altogether, or very seriously restricted by allowing them only a short run or tying them to deliver only certain types of traffic belonging to themselves, or a mixture of all three of these, they did not think they could increase freight charges. If private haul could be very seriously restricted—and they proposed that that should be done—then they said they would raise fares and rates over the whole system.
In June there were four proposals— to dislodge 2,500 men by cutting out maintenance work; to close down every branch line and dislodge about 1,000 men; to restrict the private haul of goods in some of the ways suggested and, if that was done, to raise rates and fares all over the system. They were requested to indicate what saving would be effected if all these things were done and they said it would be about £1,500,000, but they added that that was a guess. In those days they were forecasting a loss of £1,250,000 on the system.
The case may be made that they did not suggest these things all together, that they were suggested merely as alternatives. Let me point out that in their own opinion there would be a saving, in certain circumstances that I have outlined, of £1,500,000, and any two of the proposals would, it was estimated, mean a saving of at least £1,000,000 against a loss of £1,250,000. They put up the whole lot of those proposals to us, and let nobody gainsay that, because the files are full of letters from the then chairman of Córas Iompair Éireann. At one time he talks about the 2,500 men to be dislodged because of a cutting out of maintenance. At another time he talks about branch lines. At another time he talks about raising fares and charges. But all three were useless. It is right to say that at an early date he had written in terms which would indicate better maintenance, more money to be put into maintenance and more people to be employed in maintenance. But in between that there had been wages awards given and there were new wages awards in the offing. Now, it is not for me to speculate, but I think that is what caused the attitude adopted by Córas Iompair Éireann and the stockholders' directors when they came to see us in June, 1948.
The shareholders' directors issued a memorandum to their holders of common stock later. In that memorandum they definitely speak of the demand for increases in fares and the reduction of staff. They go all out for the closing down of branch lines. At the commencement of this brilliant document they start off by saying that they are satisfied that losses are fundamental to the transport system at present in operation and that exceptional circumstances, such as the fuel shortage, strikes and wage increases only accentuated the losses. They tell us at one time that if it had not been for the Government they could not have met their debenture interest. Finally, they say—and Deputy Lemass might ponder this—that the railways paid in 1944-45 despite their fuel difficulties because, and only because, cars and lorries were off the roads. They are hesistant to ask in the next sentence for a complete monopoly or that all citizens should be coerced off the roads, but there is a clear indication that this railway company had made good in earlier years only because private cars and lorries were off the roads. That is the situation that existed in 1948.
That situation can best be clarified as follows. I first knew of Córas Iompair Éireann, as a could looming on the horizon in the early days of March, 1948, when I had been about three weeks a member of the Government. The information conveyed to me was that the then chairman of Córas Iompair Éireann, Mr. Reynolds, having visited the Minister for Industry and Commerce, told him as his best summing-up of the position: "We are now at a stage where, if we were an ordinary company, the debenture holders would be putting in a receiver." That is how we started off our relations with Córas Iompair Éireann, in the month of March, 1948. It cannot be said that Córas Iompair Éireann has improved very much from that point, except in so far as we have been able to get certain things that were included in their programme dropped from that programme.
We are now asking the public to provide money. A vote has already been taken and part of it is carried forward into this Money Resolution. Somebody used the expression that this was a sort of "inquest." An inquest should not be long drawn out. It is also a sort of funeral and if I could hope that this was the only money we would be called upon to spend on the obsequies of Córas Iompair Éireann, I would be very happy. It is not going to be the last money. That company will, I think, face a loss for some years to come; and that position arises and will arise because the ill-considered scheme that the Transport Act of 1944 established has left its marks on the entire transport of the country. Some of these marks we may get rid of in time. Others are just there. We cannot put back the hands of the clock and those marks will hamper transport development in this country for years to come.
Deputies who were in this House in 1944 will remember the high hopes and the brittle promises with regard to the efficient transport that would be supplied under that Act. The new company was a strange one. Members of the Dáil commented on it as the various sections went through. They pointed out how anomalous, and at times how novel, the situation was. Deputy Lemass will remember that, as Minister for Industry and Commerce in these days, he achieved what he described as a capital reconstruction of the company. That is a nice phrase for knocking down 9/10ths of the property that the common stockholders had in that concern. He reduced the ordinary holdings to 1/10th of what they had been. He consolidated the assets—the good assets—of the Dublin United Tramways Company with this new concern. He gave the monopoly that to play with; he threw all public transport into one group and, by doing so, he consolidated the workers in transport into the most powerful labour group in the country. Later the employees in this transport undertaking were given access, on the one hand, to the Labour Court and, on the other hand, to the Joint Industrial Council. But neither of these two groups had terms of reference which at any time directed the minds of these two groups to the ultimate solvency of the company.
Deputy Lemass, who was then Minister for Industry and Commerce, established a board under the Act. At least it was called a board, but it was a monstrosity of a board. It was presided over by a chairman who could be a quorum on his own and, without him, there could be no quorum. Under the Act no decision was a decision of the company unless the chairman assented to it. If the chairman wanted a decision to which the other members of the company did not assent, he could call a meeting of himself and he could have his own way. Mr. Reynolds was appointed chairman of that board. May I say now that, at the time when that appointment was made, I considered it an excellent appointment? I think most people, particularly in Dublin City, thought that from the point of view of business ability and from the point of view of everything, except one thing, that went to make a good chairman to a transport company, Mr. Reynolds had all the qualities. But the one thing he lacked was railway experience. He had none and many people in those days were apprehensive, and I heard the apprehensions voiced, because not merely had he no railway experience but the experience he had before he went into Córas Iompair Éireann had made him unfavourable to rail services. He was given a general manager who had no experience of railways and very little experience of transport.
The directors found themselves, as they expressed it later, merely an advisory body. I think they were rating themselves rather highly when they said they were even an advisory body when one remembers that their presence was not necessary to form a quorum, and the chairman could do what he liked, irrespective of whether or not they liked it. According to the Milne Report, meetings of this board were held fortnightly. But we also know that there were certain technical staffs and we know that one technical manager was never appointed, and one, who was appointed, remained for over a year with no deputy appointed to him. At the directors' meetings, as we now understand the situation, there was no agenda furnished. The directors did not know what they might be required to discuss prior to entering the boardroom. In the boardroom the only agenda issued was in front of the chairman and, if they could gather what he was aiming at as he went down the items, then they might perhaps be allowed to voice an advisory opinion. We also learn from the Milne Report that no formal reports were made to the board, even when the matters under consideration required a technical report, or a report from technicians. We all know that there were technicians on the staff of Córas Iompair Éireann. There were no such formal reports presented. So you had your single man, the chairman, not technical, and the general manager also far from being technical; some of the technical men were not appointed and those who were there were not used; no formal reports were presented. Those are the circumstances under which the board of Córas Iompair Éireann operated.
It is said that they made money in their first two years. They did. Judge Wylie gave the reason why. It was because cars and lorries were off the roads and the travelling public were at the mercy of Córas Iompair Éireann —and little mercy Córas Iompair Éireann showed them. They were huddled around anywhere; they were taken when Córas Iompair Éireann liked to take them, and no provision was made for exceptional times. The money was made. The people had to travel, some of them, and the only means of travel they had was by whatever buses or coaches Córas Iompair Éireann put at their disposal—and the company made money.
Then bad times developed. But the bit of money they had made and the bit of success they had had in the years when success was almost thrust upon them went to their heads—and they reduced their charges. Then they found themselves faced with things that any director of a transport concern in this country must have anticipated—a strike here and there; a hold-up with regard to weather conditions; bad conditions with regard to fuel that the engines had had; bad conditions of different types—and they ran into the storm. They immediately behaved like any company behaves that sees bankruptcy ahead. They defaulted on their debenture interest; they defaulted on their appropriations to the pension fund. They defaulted on these. They used the moneys. The result is that they have now left the present Minister for Industry and Commerce with the task of putting these into one huge bill and of presenting it to the public. They were brought to the position that, I think, can most spectacularly be indicated by what the Minister for Industry and Commerce said here on an earlier occasion.
Imagine the condition of a manager of a big company when he finds himself with about £430,000 worth of cheques solemnly written out and the items put down in the stubbs of the cheque book—and the cheques stuffed into a safe and the officials of the company warned that only if somebody such as a petrol supplier, or somebody important like that, threatened an action were they to pull out the cheque from the bundle of unissued cheques and pay him, and that, if they did do that, some other cheque, drawn and on the point of being issued, had to be stopped.
Now let me deal with the company's overdraft in those days. They were entitled, under the Act, to an overdraft of about £500,000. They had very nearly the whole of that £500,000 drawn. If the accountant in those days had released those cheques, their overdraft would have reached something short of £900,000. Let me remind the House that the statutory limit of their overdraft, under the Act, was £500,000. I do not think that outside the criminal courts one could get a worse display than that. One can hear stories from officials of the company of the devices they had to adopt to escape the people who had got beyond the stage of 'phoning up Kingsbridge and who were hanging around the premises to see if they could get the cheque for the three or four months' supply of petrol or kerosene or anything else that was essential for the running of Córas Iompair Éireann.
