I move amendment No. 1:—
In sub-section (1), page 5, line 31, to delete "January" and substitute "April".
The object of the amendment is to change the appointed day from the 1st January to the 1st April.
Committee on Finance. - Transport Bill, 1949—Committee Stage.
Section 1 agreed to.
SECTION 2.
I am not opposed to the amendment, but there are certain matters related to it on which I would like to have some information. When the Minister was introducing the Bill, with the intention that it should operate as from the 1st January, he mentioned the £1,500,000 of debenture stock of Córas Iompair Éireann due for redemption in January next. He stated that it was not proposed in the Bill to issue transport stock in exchange for these debentures because of the fact that they were due for redemption at such an early date. The postponement of the operative date from the 1st January to the 1st April leaves the position of these debentures somewhat obscure. I assume that it is intended that they shall be redemmed on the redemption date, the 28th April. I want to know by what means that redemption is to be effected. Córas Iompair Éireann, I presume, have not got the cash to pay off the debenture holders in the large sum of £1,500,000, and, ordinarily, would endeavour to do so by issuing new debentures of a corresponding value. I understand that it is not intended that Córas Iompair Éireann should, in the remaining weeks of its existence, utilise whatever is left of its powers to issue new debentures. At the same time, as the Bill will not be law, the position cannot be dealt with by the issue of transport stock. How is it contemplated that Córas Iompair Éireann will raise the money, or in what manner is it intended that these debentures will be dealt with?
It is provided for in the Vote.
I understand then, that of the money we voted last week, £1,500,000 is intended to redeem the debentures issued during the year. I hope the Minister will communicate that fact to the Minister for Justice. I merely want to direct the attention of the House to the fact that the Minister for Justice stated publicly that £1,000,000 was required to meet the losses incurred by Córas Iompair Éireann. In fact, we are now to understand that of the £4,000,000 no less than £1,500,000 is required to redeem the debentures issued for the purpose of raising capital for expenditure on permanent way, rolling stock and other assets of the company of that kind.
No.
Did the Minister not say that capital sums were required for that purpose?
I cannot agree that the £1,500,000 is to be used entirely for the purpose the Deputy has mentioned.
Anyway, it is on record that of that sum £1,500,000 is due to repay the money borrowed, with the sanction of the Minister for Finance, in 1949.
To repay moneys which had to be borrowed to enable Córas Iompair Éireann to carry on. Otherwise, it would have had to close down.
In 1949?
Yes, but it was arising out of the position which was transferred to us.
That explanation will not hold water. There was a total sum of £4,000,000, and of that sum——
How does this arise on an amendment changing the date?
It does not.
I am raising it because of the change to the new date. The position with regard to the £1,500,000 of debentures, due for redemption next month, arising out of the change in date is left somewhat obscure, and I am anxious to get it clarified.
There is no obscurity, except in the Deputy's own mind, and I doubt if the obscurity is there either.
Then, I hope the Minister will co-operate in removing the obscurity. We are now told for the first time that the sum voted by the Dáil last week includes £1,500,000 for the redemption of these debentures. I asked the Minister that question in the debate on the Supplementary Estimate and he would not answer it. We now learn that that is so. The other £2,500,000 fully accounts for all the working losses to date, for all the debenture interest to date, and provides, furthermore, for the debenture interest payable next year, and provides for working losses anticipated by the company up to April next year.
How is that relevant on an amendment changing the date?
I must admit there is some doubt on that.
I have no doubt.
If the Minister had given me the information, which I have now been given, when I asked for it at the relevant time, that is, when we were debating the Supplementary Estimate—I would not have to ask for it.
This is really outrageous. The Deputy is getting up now and asserting that he did not get that information. That is not so. Not only was the Deputy informed about that £1,550,000 but he and the House were informed as to what proportion of that was for capital expenditure and what proportion of it went towards working losses. The Deputy now asserts that he is getting the information for the first time. That statement is not true. I can give it to the Deputy again if he wants it.
I asked the Minister a specific question, whether any portion of the sum was to repay these debentures.
I stated specifically that it was.
To-day.
I gave the whole breakdown of the £4,000,000, and the Deputy knows that, including the £1,550,000.
May I get in on a point that is relevant—the question of the date? After the experience we have had over five years in regard to Córas Iompair Éireann, I suggest to the Minister that he should bring this new undertaking into operation on some day other than All Fool's Day.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 2:—
In sub-section (1), page 6, between lines 7 and 8 to insert the following:—
"the expression ‘substituted transport stock' means transport stock mentioned in column (3) of the Third Schedule to this Act;".
This is merely a drafting amendment, adding the definition of "substituted transport stock".
Amendment agreed to.
Section 2, as amended, agreed to.
Section 3 agreed to.
SECTION 4.
Question proposed: "That Section 4 stand part of the Bill."
Will the Minister give some indication as to what expenses are likely to be incurred by him with reference to his functions under the Act?
I do not think they would be very much, if any. If the House agrees to certain amendments that I have submitted in relation to the setting up of the tribunal, there may be certain expenses to be met, but otherwise I do not think they will be very much.
Question agreed to.
SECTION 5.
I move amendment No. 3:—
In sub-section (2) to add after the word "property" in line 39 the words "for the purposes of the board".
I tabled this amendment for the purpose of getting an explanation from the Minister as to whether there was any definite purpose in leaving these words out of the section. The section relates to Section 9 of the Transport Act, 1944. That section authorised the company established by it to purchase, take hold and dispose of land and other property for the purposes of the company. These words "for the purposes of the company" do not appear in this section. Is there any reason?
I am advised by the draftsman that they are not necessary. The Deputy will find, for instance, in Section 5 (2) that it provides that the board should be a body which purchases, takes hold and disposes of land and other property. The Parliamentary draftsman does not consider the amendment necessary. The compulsory acquisition of land under Section 15 (1) is limited to land required for the purposes of the board.
I can understand the Parliamentary draftsman saying the amendment is not necessary, but perhaps the House might consider the words necessary.
I am advised that the words proposed to be inserted by the Deputy are not necessary and that the omission of them does not limit the operation.
But should we limit the operation of the powers of the company in this regard? Admittedly, they can only acquire land compulsorily for the purposes of the company, but apparently they are authorised to spend money on land and other property which is not required for the purposes of the board and I am not sure that it is desirable we should extend their powers in that regard. There is in some section a slight suggestion that the board might go into other activities than the operation of a transport service. If there is any intention of that kind, the Minister might say so. I will not press the amendment, but it seems to me there may be good reasons for limiting the powers of the company.
I can assure the Deputy I am guided entirely in this matter by the advice I have got. I have no personal point of view and I am merely going on the advice that it is not necessary to have these words there. There is no ulterior motive so far as I am concerned.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 4:—
To add the following sub-section:—
(3) For the avoidance of doubts it is hereby declared that the use or occupation by the board of any hereditament or tenement, within the meaning of the Valuation Acts, is not use or occupation of a public nature or for a public purpose, within the meaning of Section 63 of the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act, 1838, or Section 16 of the Valuation (Ireland) Act, 1852, or Section 2 of the Valuation (Ireland) Act, 1854, or any other enactment conferring exemption from a rate leviable by local authorities generally or by a particular local authority or class of local authorities.
The object of the amendment is this. The Bill proposes that Shannon navigation should be transferred to the board. Shannon navigation, because it is under the Board of Works, does not contribute to the rates. The amendment seeks to ensure that the new board shall, in respect of Shannon navigation, be liable for rates.
I was going to raise the question later as to the effect of the transfer of Shannon navigation to the board on the board's finances. It seems to me the board must lose money.
Not much.
But they will lose something, and the effect of the amendment, in my opinion, is to increase the amount they will lose.
The Deputy will agree, in principle, that it would be wrong that the board should not be responsible for rates if the Shannon navigation is transferred.
I suppose that is right.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 5, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 6
I move amendment No. 5:—
In sub-section (1) page 6, (a) in line 43, to insert "not" after "shall," (b) in line 46, to delete "does not exceed" and substitute "exceed."
This is merely a drafting amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 6:—
In sub-section (1), paragraph (b), line 46, to add after the word "six" the words "or, for any period longer than four weeks, is not less than four."
This is much more than a drafting amendment. I mentioned earlier to-day that as the Bill stands the board to be set up may consist of any number under seven. The Minister, it seems to me, can appoint one, two, three, four, five or six members to the board. There is no minimum number prescribed. I admit there are certain practical difficulties in operating the minimum in so far as the death of a member or a member's unexpected resignation may impede the working of the board if only the minimum number has been appointed. I have endeavoured to meet that point by providing in this amendment that the board shall consist of not less than four for any period longer than four weeks. If there are four members appointed, and if one should die or resign unexpectedly, the Minister must fill the vacancy within a period of four weeks. The practical difficulty can be met in that way. The House should insist on the principle of a minimum membership and not leave the Bill as it stands, so that whatever the Minister intends he or his successor is authorised to operate this concern with one director only.
There is no minimum in the Tourist Act or the Turf Development Act and in the Electricity Supply Board there is a minimum of two. I have no objection to prescribing a minimum number, but the Deputy's period of time is far too short.
I will not fight over the period of time.
I do not think the amendment is necessary. If the House thinks it is, I would be prepared to accept the principle, but I shall have to insist on three months as against four weeks.
I will withdraw the amendment, on that understanding.
Amendment No. 6, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 7:—
To delete sub-section (2).
This amendment has been put down to ascertain from the Minister the necessity for the provision of this particular sub-section. I can think of nothing that the general manager can do as a member of the board that he could not do as an ordinary general manager. From experience in another place where there is a general manager, I can see no necessity for promoting that particular individual to the board. I can, however, see certain disadvantages in making the general manager a member of the board. He is the chief executive officer and the chief administrative officer of such a concern. It is to be presumed that he will be taken into consultation at board meetings. It is our experience that he is. It is good business that the general manager should be present at all meetings of the board. He is the individual upon whom the directors must rely for guidance. If, however, he is placed on the board, in the light of this particular provision, I can quite see circumstances arising where, by reason of his being a member of the board, he might prevail upon other members to take responsibility for actions for which he should be solely responsible as general manager. I think that is undesirable. I have put down the amendment to ascertain the Minister's viewpoint. I hope it will be the practice of the board that the general manager will have, as a matter of right, liberty to be present at all board meetings to give the board the benefit of his particular knowledge.
Would it be in order to discuss amendment No. 8 simultaneously with this because it seems to me that what arises here is the type of board the Minister has in mind? I have considerable personal sympathy with the point of view put forward by Deputy O'Sullivan.
The two can go together for discussion.
There is a different point involved.
They are linked in any event. If the Minister contemplates a board consisting entirely of directors who will not be personally concerned with the administration of the company, then I think Deputy O'Sullivan's view is correct. If, on the other hand, he has in mind a board like the Electricity Supply Board, the majority of the members of which are executive officers of the concern in charge of clearly defined departments, then I think it is obvious that the general manager must be a member of the board. I favour the former type. I cannot say from experience that the Electricity Supply Board has not worked satisfactorily, but my knowledge of difficulties which it encountered convinces me that it was a mistake originally to have the board consist of a majority of people who were departmental heads. I am sure that everybody has some idea of the rivalries that may and can develop between different sections of a large organisation; and it is obviously undesirable that these rivalries should find expression in the form of conflicting advice given to the board when matters of policy have to be decided. It is much wiser that the views of departmental heads should be channelled to the board through some officer, or some section, in a position to vet such views, analyse them and put them before the board in a form which permits of a decision without reference to the personal offence which such decision might give. Nobody likes to be turned down in relation to a certain recommendation upon technical matters by a body of which he is a member. If the chief mechanical engineer, the traffic manager or the road freight manager puts forward a proposition with which the other technical officers of the company do not agree, if they are all members of the board, that will certainly not make for harmonious work.
Either type of organisation is practicable. We have already had experience of both kinds in this country and I think that experience justifies the appointment of a board of directors, the members of which have no executive functions to perform and are free to give the whole of their time to the general type of supervision of the activities of the concern which such a board should exercise. There is, of course, a compromise arrangement possible, one which to some extent does exist in the Electricity Supply Board, in so far as there is one part-time member still remaining there and one further member who does not at present, I think, carry out any executive functions. I think that arrangement is the least satisfactory of all because the non-executive members are very often put in the position of being arbitrators between the executive members. My feeling is in favour of a board with no executive function, exercising a general supervision. If that is the Minister's intention, I agree with Deputy O'Sullivan's amendment. If it is not the Minister's intention and if it is proposed to have a board consisting in whole or in part of the executive officers of the concern, then it seems to me the general manager must be one of them.
He must be on the board.
If there are other executive officers on it.
I think this amendment is a very wise one because the board may from time to time have to consider either the competence or the efficiency of the general manager. If the general manager is a member of the board, it might be very difficult for the board as a whole to consider that particular aspect. Sub-section (5) of Section 7 says that where the general manager of the undertaking of the board is for the time being a member of the board, the board may, with the consent of the Minister for Finance, remove him from office as a member of the board. Obviously, then, occasion might arise when the board might have to hold a kind of caucus meeting in the absence of the general manager for the purpose of discussing his competence or otherwise. The general manager of such an undertaking as this ought to be a person of responsibility. I think it would tie the hands of the board considerably if the general manager is appointed a member of the board and if there is provision for his removal from the board on the board's recommendation to the Minister for Finance.
I think that is an entirely unsatisfactory position and that it is better that the executive functions should be carried out by the general manager and that his attendance at board meetings should be required whenever it is necessary for him to be there. If the board is doing its work properly they will be considering very often the steps taken by the general manager to implement their policy. For that reason I would be strongly in favour of the amendment proposed by Deputy O'Sullivan and I would recommend it to the Minister.
It seems to me that we cannot deal with the amendment which stands in the name of Deputy O'Sullivan unless we have regard to the matters which were raised by Deputy Lemass. If we are going to have a position where any administrative or executive officer would be a member of the board it seems to me that automatically the first person to hold membership should be the general manager. That is almost selfevident. I suggest that we first decide whether or not, in principle, we feel that executive officers should be members of the board. On a number of occasions I expressed the view that, where we are dealing with boards charged with matters of wide public policy, it is preferable to have membership of those boards confined, as far as possible, to those free from executive responsibility in so far as the carrying out of that policy is concerned. When it comes to matters of policy related to economic, social and industrial questions I have no special veneration for the technical expert. I feel that his technical knowledge has to be drawn through the sieve of the minds of men and women who have acquired, in actual life, a broader and deeper understanding of social, economic and industrial problems than, possibly, is available to him who must, of necessity, be immersed in his narrow field of activities.
So far as transport is concerned, one of the problems already raised in regard to the nature of the Bill, and which the Minister dealt with already, is that, in the setting up of the board, we are going to charge them with the responsibility of advising the Government on very grave issues of policy. Therefore, from that point of view, we should decide, in principle, that the board will be constituted as far as possible, I think to be preferable, of whole-time members charged with the responsibility of dealing with policy and that the membership of the board should not be open to those who will then be charged, when policy is decided, with the carrying out of that policy on a technical basis.
Deputy Lemass referred to the Electricity Supply Board. I do not want to criticise him in any way but, at the same time, I think that if the balance on that board had not been so weighted in the direction of technical experts we might have had, on many occasions, a broader approach to problems they had to deal with.
Before deciding on Deputy O'Sullivan's amendment we should have an indication from the Minister as to what his approach is in regard to this matter. I urge him to confine membership of the board to those who will have to deal with policy.
I think every one of us is anxious, in regard to membership of this board, that it will be a type of board that will get away from anything that has happened in the recent past. I may say that we can block out of our memory, for that purpose, the discussions that have gone on here on the cause of the failure. The expression "general manager" means, as far as I am concerned, and from my limited knowledge of the working of public service corporations, the chief executive officer. I do not know of any public service corporation where the general manager, as such, is a member of the board. We have had in this country many instances where the chief executive officer is a member of the board—where he is there as managing director, with the right to attend all meetings of the board and, in many cases, he is regarded as the person next to the chairman in some of our public service corporations. I think it would be no harm if Deputies were to look back a little bit on the distant past and examine the situation for themselves. Many Deputies know—and Deputy Lemass, in particular knows—that from time to time the old boards that worked the transport system of this country conducted their business in a satisfactory manner. Even under the railways, before the amalgamation scheme, the framework of the administration then was a board appointed by stockholders, with the chairman selected by that board and with a general manager whose duty it was before every board meeting to summarise the proposals and suggestions that came to him from the departmental heads—information that came to him and proposals that came to him for the purpose of getting a policy decision from the board. That system worked very well and particularly from the point of view of the service given by the railways in those days to the trading and travelling public.
I agree with Deputy Larkin that, at this stage, the members of the House will be at a disadvantage in discussing this matter in the way that it should be discussed until we hear from the Minister concerned the kind of board he has in mind. I should like to hear from the Minister, before saying very much more about this matter, whether this is to be a full-time board consisting of experts or alleged outside experts or whether the board is to consist of the senior officers of the company in charge of the different departments—in the same way as it was worked fairly successfully, before the nationalisation of the British railways, by the different regions that now make up the nationalised system in that country. There is nothing wrong with four or five chief executive officers, if they are so styled, going in with the chairman, or the president, if you like, and arguing questions of policy and arriving, if necessary, at a conclusion by a majority vote. That is democracy in action and there is nothing wrong with it. The decision on policy that is finally given by a majority is a democratic decision and certainly a safer decision from the public point of view than the decision given by one man.
I do not understand the reason why the expression "general manager" is included here and it is very difficult for me to understand why the general manager, as such, and as is understood generally in relation to public service corporations, should have the right to be a member of the board. I do not think the general manager, as properly understood, should have the right to come to a meeting and decide policy because, from past experience, the general manager attends the board meetings. He used always attend the railway board meetings, at any rate, and gave advice but he had no vote and he was responsible afterwards for carrying out the policy of the board whether it was in agreement with his views or not.
We are at a decided disadvantage in discussing this matter, however, until the Minister gives the House and the country his views in regard to the type of people whom he considers should constitute this board.
I find myself in this difficulty that I conceive that the new board has to tackle problems and that advice actually by way of a board consisting of departmental heads might be the very wrong type of advice. The position is that a broad national issue will ultimately have to be decided before the board can come with really concrete proposals to the Government as to how best this new transport board can work with the minimum amount of loss. I conceive that if you mix up policy matters with executive administration you are going to run into serious trouble. Initially, you have arising the perfectly normal human reaction, that if the general manager as such becomes a member of the board, by virtue of his executive position, he gets a weight and significance on the board that may not be in the best interests of the board itself. I, like Deputy Davin, urge on the Minister to indicate to us what type of board he conceives. To my mind, it has to be one or the other and it cannot be a mixture of both. I think that we are tackling a problem now which is a difficult problem and, leaving the heat of controversy out of it, it is a vital problem nationally. I think the Minister will have to conceive of a board that will be, as Deputy Larkin suggested, a full-time board mainly responsible for the evolving and direction of policy and to see that that policy is implemented by the employees of the board. I think it is not going to get the best results unless it is completely free and has control of all its executive officers up to the most senior executive officer, because the difficulty that arose with Córas Iompair Éireann was that, for some unknown reason, too much power was vested in an individual. The board, in consequence, had no right to challenge the decisions of this individual. I think the Minister will have to face up to the fact that it would be better that this board should be a controlling directing board, having at its disposal at all times the technical experts and senior officials for the purposes of advice and, therefore, in a position, in its daily administration to formulate policy and to have people within its ken to see that that policy is carried out.
I think Deputies ought to advert to the fact that this sub-section is merely permissive. It enables the board, if at any particular time it conceives that it would be to the advantage of the board that the general manager should be a member, to appoint, with the permission of the Minister, the general manager a member of the board. I think there is a lot to be said for that. It is quite clear that there are advantages in having the executive head of a particular concern, if he is a man of outstanding ability, a man who may not only have technical knowledge but also great administrative experience, as a member of the board. It is desirable that the board should be permitted, if they consider it well so to do, to appoint that person a member of the board. There is nothing new in this and there is not very much point in saying that the general manager is equivalent, if you like, to a managing director. I know and several Deputies know that throughout various companies—and I may say in particular transport companies—in all the countries in the world, the chief executive of the board has on many occasions been also a member of the board. Deputies should keep in mind that the board will consist of not more than six members and, if we accept Deputy Lemass's amendment, of not fewer than four. Say that four, five or six members of the board sit down around the board table, and with intimate knowledge of the general manager, decide whether it would be in the best interests of the board to appoint him, with the consent of the Minister, to a seat on the board. I think there is everything to be said in favour of it. I can see no serious objection to it at all. I can see that it could be of very great advantage to have that close link between the board and the managerial or executive side of the organisation.
Is it not obvious that the general manager would always be at the board meetings?
It is not.
It is the practice, anyway.
Supposing it is, what is the objection to making him a member of the board?
Because he would be in a position to argue policy and then he might be compelled to carry out a policy with which he did not agree.
Mind you, general managers are very often compelled to do that. Whether he is or is not a member of the board he may have to do that, but surely if the board decides on a particular line of policy, after having the advantage of the advice of the general manager of the board, that makes the decision all the healthier rather than that a decision should be come to by the board without having the advantage of the general manager's point of view.
Is there any advantage to be got by putting the general manager on the board that could not be got if he were not a member of the board?
I was going to remark that I thought that this amendment was a case of much ado about nothing, and I think the Minister's remarks have confirmed that. Under this section we are setting up a board and that board is going to run the company. We must leave it as free as we can along certain lines. They will know their general manager and they will decide whether the best interests of the company are to be served by having him on the board or keeping him off it. I think it is one of the matters which we cannot decide in Parliament. We cannot decide whether it is good or bad to put general managers on boards. That must be left to the wisdom and discretion of the board itself. A Deputy has asked what are the advantages to be gained by his being a member of the board. He would be there all the time if he were a member of a board. If he were not there, he would presumably be called in to deal with such questions as the board wanted him to deal. I think the best course is to leave the matter open to the board. If we leave it at that they can appoint any executive officer including the general manager. We may tie their hands in a way we would not like to do and that they themselves would not like to have done. I think, in the best interests of all, the section as it stands would meet ordinary business practice and custom.
I am not satisfied with the explanation given by the Minister as to why the general manager should be a member of the board. He states he would have outstanding qualities, but I think that if he has outstanding qualities it would be all the more reason why he should be left away from the board. He might have very advanced ideas about transport which the other members might not have and in that case he would be going against the majority. If he is left as general manager only it will be better for them and for the transport of the country. I would be surprised if a board constituted of four or six persons could sit down and discuss the question of transport without having the general manager and engineering and technical advisers at the meeting, but it would be much better to have them free to do their executive work with the board as dominating factor than to absorb the general manager as a member of the board.
I think that there is a lot to be said for both ideas, but it very largely depends on the character of the general manager, if he were invited to the board. There will inevitably be a clash in the future between rail and road freight and between bus and rail services if any of the proposals of Sir James Milne are adopted by the new board. It may be desirable that the general manager should carry out the orders of the board without being responsible himself for having made those orders. I think we could make up our minds about the sub-section if the Minister would go further and tell us the character of the members of the board. Will they be full-time servants, experts in a business capacity and will they be expected to give most of their time to the work of administering Córas Iompair Éireann? Quite definitely it is more than possible that the general manager himself may be prejudiced as either a road or a rail man and it would be eminently desirable that the board should be able to meet without him so as to overcome his prejudices, without the disadvantage of having a prejudiced person present.
I want to ask the Minister one question in relation to this amendment. My reading of Section 6 of the Bill—I may be entirely wrong and I want to get it clear in my own mind—is that, if the amendment is passed and sub-section (2) is deleted, will the position be that the Minister, without the limitations imposed by sub-section (2) of having to obtain the advice of the board, could under sub-section (1) of Section 6 be entitled to appoint the person who for the time being is general manager as a member of the board if he wanted to. I may be reading it wrongly, but sub-section (1) (a) provides:
"The board shall, subject to sub-section (2) of this section, consist of such number of members as the Government may from time to time appoint."
Sub-section (2) provides for the appointment as an additional member of the person who is general manager with the consent of the Minister. Assuming that sub-section (2) went out, is there anything to prevent the Government from appointing the person who for the time being is general manager as a member of the board?
In answer to Deputy O'Higgins, if the Government did that they would have a vacancy and this person would be a member of the board and no longer general manager. That is, assuming that what the Minister has in mind is a board that will not be technical in the sense of being a board of experts in the services of Córas Iompair Éireann. That question has been put to the Minister by Deputies Larkin, Davin and Childers and he has not answered as to what type of board he visualises appointing under sub-section (1). I think it would help in further discussion if the Minister indicated clearly what type of board he has in mind and what type of people he believes will be appointed to this board and if they will be full-time or part-time. Here is a situation that can arise. You may have a board of six; the chairman and two members may have one point of view and three other members may have a different point of view. In which case, as I see it, the chairman would have a casting vote, in other words his viewpoint would prevail. If the general manager, who is really the executive officer of the board, is on the board, in that set of circumstances his vote can decide the issue. That is a very important position in which to place an executive officer. In the event of an equality of views the general manager would decide the issue, so not only would he carry on the administrative functions imposed upon him by virtue of his duties and responsibilities—because I take it that if you have a general manager in a concern such as this his duties would be laid down by agreement—but he would decide the policy in his own way. If you have a very strong-minded general manager—as you might have—he will inevitably use his influence with the members of the board to bring them round to his point of view, and as a result the position may arise that arose in the American navy not long ago when they simply had to get rid of a particular admiral.
We are taking over the canals.
We may be floating. That situation would be undesirable and completely unsatisfactory. The situation may arise where the other members of the board will have to go into a back room because they dare not meet in the board room and petition the Minister to remove this obnoxious person. The Minister should not allow that condition of affairs to continue. If the general manager is such a wonderful person, let the Government decide to get rid of a member of the board who is not so satisfactory and make the general manager a member instead.
That is my point.
But when he becomes a member of the board, as I understand it, he would cease to hold any executive position under the board.
Not under the Bill as it stands.
I think so. That is my view.
The general manager visualised by this sub-section may be a genius and a gentleman, and probably will be both, but he cannot be a Jack-of-all-trades, as understood in the world of transport. I would appeal to Deputy Childers and to Deputies who are thinking like him to get their minds clear of the imaginary conflict there is going to be between certain people on the board as representing road and rail or any other interest. If Deputies clear their minds, they may be able to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. I am personally at considerable disadvantage in pursuing a discussion on this amendment, until such time as the Minister states whether it is going to be a board of outside experts or a board of inside experts or executive officers. If it is a board of outside experts, it will meet some day after the 1st April, 1950, and the first meeting will be a fairly long one. In any case, in their wisdom, they will demand returns and particulars and proposals from the different sections making up Córas Iompair Éireann—the financial side, through the accountant; the commercial side, through the commercial manager; the operating side, through the operating superintendent; the civil engineering side and the chief mechanical side.
These proposals will come along to the general manager, as properly understood, and his job will be to summarise them and submit them for consideration at the next board meeting, and for the views of the members of the board on the proposals. I venture to suggest that, if you have men who will study the position, as they would be bound to study it, they are not going to accept the summarised proposals of the general manager without bringing in the chief mechanical engineer, the chief civil engineer, the operating superintendent, the commercial superintendent and the accountant. They will hear all those officers one by one, so that they may give to the board in greater detail the meaning of their proposals and so that the board may, as it is bound to do, take a policy decision on the merits of these proposals. If the general manager is present there, it is quite possible that his point of view may be in conflict with that of the operating superintendent. The general manager may be a man who has never associated with the operating side of the transport concern and, with great respect to him, whoever he may be, may know less, because he has no experience, than the man who had come up to the position of operating superintendent because he had been trained in the hard school of experience.
If I were a member of the board in such circumstances, when the operating superintendent was putting a positive point of view, and if I knew he was putting it because it was based on knowledge and long experience, I might, as a member of the board, vote against the point of view of the general manager and in favour of the point of view of the operating superintendent in regard to particular proposals because of the knowledge and experience of the man who had put proposals which were opposed, let us say for the sake of argument, by the general manager. However, if there is going to be a body composed of inside experts, I would put forward a different argument. Before the discussion goes further, as there are other amendments on this whole section, the Minister should now give us more information. We are entitled as Deputies to be told, here and now, or before this section goes through, whether the new board is to consist of a body of inside or outside experts.
The main argument in favour of the retention of the sub-section is that it is permissive and that the balance of advantage lies in the form in which it is now presented to the House. The case was made that, if the Board found they had an excellent general manager, they should be free to appoint that particular person to the board. I think that the House would agree that, if there were circumstances which warranted it, that there was that type of person available and the board felt it was in the interests of the concern that that should be done, and if liberty were taken to make provision of that kind, the House would be satisfied. That is, provided of course—and this is all based on the assumption that the board is going to be a full-time board—that if the individual is to be promoted from general manager to the position of a member of the board, he would cease to hold his position in an executive capacity.
I want to turn the House to the main objection that I saw in connection with the proposal which is in the Bill, that is, that the moment you make the general manager a member of the board, he being the chief executive officer of the whole concern, responsible for the administration and carrying out of the directions of the board, you will, at that moment, give him a certain shielding within the board, in respect of the members of the board, on matters affecting his own personal administration. That is my submission. Occasions are bound to arise where he has taken certain executive action which may be the subject of condemnation at the board meeting and he is in a rather peculiar position. Other members of the board would also be placed in a peculiar position, if he is a member. Some members of the House apparently favour the idea of a new board as a set of technicians. Quite frankly, that is not my view. If it were to be a board of technicians, it might be all right, provided that they detached themselves immediately from the departments to which they are attached and were going to give their whole-time services to the board. If they are to be placed on the board for their technical qualifications, that would be all right, but it should not mean merely having heads of sections coming onto the board. I suggest that the best type of board would be one composed of persons who would have knowledge of transport in some form or another and who would be in a position to evolve policy along the lines that they feel this House desires for this national concern.
It may not be possible to get people of that type, but any suggestion that we should have a board of technicians is not a sound one. There may be necessity for a technician, or two or three, but we must be clear that the new board will be a whole-time one, giving full service to the Minister and to the House.
While there may be difficulty in discussing an amendment of this kind in the absence of information as to the type of people going on the board, we are still free to arrive at a conclusion that the Minister's argument—when he says the transport interests would be served the better by having the general manager a member of the board—is, so far, not too convincing.
The section as it stands is, I think, an ideal one. The Minister states it is permissive and, although I may not be an expert on railway work, I have the commonsense to know that we are not dealing with a normal position but with a very abnormal one. For years we have had the spectacle of successive Governments trying to make the transport of this country pay. Various actions were taken and various people were appointed, but the fact remains that the railways as they stand to-day are bankrupt. There is no use in talking hypothetically about what may happen if certain directors disagree. If the members of the board so desire and think it is in the interests of the undertaking—and, mind you, it will require great care and attention on the part of every member of the board and the general manager to bring back the railways to anything approaching a solvent position— Deputies need not be splitting hairs about what will happen at meetings of the board.
I have no illusions in regard to the work these men will have to carry through when the board is set up on the 1st April, 1950. Deputies should recognise that fact, that it will require the best of luck and the co-operation of everyone to put the railways back in the position in which they will give some little return for the millions that are to be expended on them. I move to report progress.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again.
The Dáil adjourned at 10.30 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 7th December.