In moving the Second Reading of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) (No. 2) Bill, 1949, I think a word of explanation is due to the House. When this matter was before the House last session I gave Deputies to understand that the permanent Bill would be in their hands within a very short period. The permanent Bill has been in the hands of the parliamentary draftsman since some time early last month. Owing to the fact that it is a rather lengthy Bill, containing a couple of hundred sections, I have been informed that it will be the middle of next month before it will be released from that department. As Deputies are aware, the present measure before the House must be passed before 31st March each year in order to continue the Army. I would ask Deputies to take into consideration the fact that there is nothing new in this Bill this year. It is a small Bill containing only two sections for the purpose of continuing the Army until the permanent measure comes before the House. The first Estimate which we shall take will be the Army Estimate. Later on, the permanent Army Bill will come before the Dáil. I mention these facts in the hope that the Deputies might consider letting this continuing Bill through without discussion, under the circumstances.
Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) (No. 2) Bill, 1949—Second Stage.
In view of the extraordinary lack of information which the Minister has given us in respect of the Army and in respect of the question of Government policy in regard to defence, I feel it necessary to ask him if he can give us an assurance that the Second Stage of the Defence Bill, 1949, will be taken, say, before Easter. In the absence of any assurance that that can be done, I think it is desirable and very necessary, in view of the world situation at the present time, to discuss at the earliest possible moment the question of the Army and the question of national defence as well as Government policy in regard to that particular phase of affairs. Can the Minister, then, give us an assurance that the permanent Bill will be before the House, say, before Easter? Am I to assume that the Minister cannot give an assurance in that regard?
Does the Deputy want me to interrupt at this point?
Yes. The question of this debate will, I feel, result from whatever answer the Minister can give in that respect. I do not want, for instance, to debate the whole question of the Army or Government policy or anything else if we can be given an assurance that in the near future—say round about Easter—the Bill will be made available and that the discussion which might take place now could be deferred, say, to that particular period.
I think I put it to the House last December that my only object in introducing this temporary Bill now is so that the permanent Bill can be discussed in a comprehensive and leisurely way without tying the Dáil down to any date such as the 31st March. I am as anxious as the Deputy to get the permanent Bill introduced and disposed of. However, I cannot govern the parliamentary draftsman's office and I cannot give or be expected to give any assurance governing another Department over which I have no control. When I get that Bill back from the parliamentary draftsman's office I shall come, at the very earliest opportunity available to me, to this House for its Second Reading. If the Deputy, on the other hand, wants to discuss the Army three times —this evening, in two or three weeks' time on the Estimate and in five or six weeks' time on the permanent Bill —he is within his rights and I cannot object to his doing so. I am only asking for reason in a matter of this kind.
I feel that in the absence of any assurance that we can have this Bill, on which I certainly would prefer to discuss the general line of policy, it is desirable that we should now discuss the question of defence generally. The attitude of the Minister makes the discussion of this question very difficult. He comes in here and does not give the slightest information, good, bad or indifferent, in respect of the Army or its strength or its weaknesses or of what its future policy is likely to be. That makes it very difficult for Deputies on this side of the House to regard the Minister in a serious way or to believe that he regards the present situation in a serious way. While the rest of the world is at present considering the serious menace which concerns it, we in this country appear to be taking up the attitude that all is well and that there is no necessity, good, bad or indifferent, to worry very much over the international situation. I should like to know the cause of the Minister's complacency in this respect. Has he, for instance, any policy in respect of other nations of the world which are also confronted with these dangers? Is there an assurance from some of the people whom he regarded as our protectors? Is there any alliance or what is the reason why we are to-day so complacent in this country in respect of our defence situation?
General Mulcahy, when he was speaking on the question of our defence in 1947, stated that if we are going to be involved in a major war, our circumstances are going to be what they were, in relation to Great Britain at any rate in the last war, that is, that it is Great Britain's power of defence both by air and by its navy that will protect us. I should like to know if the Government has been impressed by that reasoning; and, if so, if we can now sit back in the full knowledge that in any difficulties which are likely to arise in the near future we are going to have, not only the protection of the second greatest fleet in the world, —to which the Minister himself so often referred —but assistance from the air as well. If that is so and if we can get an assurance that that is so, then we can well understand the easy manner in which the Government appears to be viewing the present world situation.
On the same occasion, speaking on the Defence Forces Bill, Second Stage, General Mulcahy also said that the reason for putting down an amendment to the Minister's motion was so that the Government would tell the House for what purpose the Army was being kept and in the light of that purpose what its strength and its equipment ought to be. We have received no information whatever from the Minister in regard either to the equipment or to the strength of the Army.
The Minister is entitled to presume that the Deputy can read.
I am entitled to ask the Minister these questions. They have been asked by his own colleagues and, when he was in opposition, they were asked by himself. But when his colleagues asked these questions, they were not met with the same insults which the Minister likes to hurl at his opponents when they ask similar questions. I am going to continue to ask these questions even though they appear to cause a certain amount of pain to the Minister.
The questions occurred to the Deputy in the last two years.
It is extraordinary that when the Minister assumed office the first thing he did, apparently, in regard to Army policy was to stop recruiting. Not only did he stop recruiting but he stopped the advertisements inviting recruits. Of course, it was fair to presume that if recruitment was stopped the Army would gradually be depleted. I referred to that situation in the course of a speech and I suggested that if recruitment had been brought to an end—the recruiting campaign was certainly brought to an end—whatever casual recruitment may have occurred—we know what it would be, one or two or half a dozen recruits at the most per week—would not in any sense make up for the natural wastage which took place in the normal way in the Army. Therefore, it was reasonable for me in the course of my statement to suggest that the Army of 8,500, which was there when I left office, had been depleted in the course of 12 months or so to a very low figure and I suggested that that figure was perhaps the lowest on record. But how did the Minister deal with that statement? This is what the Minister said on 30th March, 1949, referring to that statement:—
"An ex-Minister for Defence—he had been Minister for Defence for some six or seven years—comes into Dáil Éireann and, from the Opposition Benches, says that 8,500 all ranks is the lowest strength ever recorded in the history of our Army. I would not mind a back bench Deputy who had been only a few months in Dáil Éireann making a statement such as that, but for a man who had been for many years Minister for Defence to make a statement such as that, when talking about the strength of a peace time Army in this country, means either one of two things: either that he never looked up the Army strength in order to get some information as to what would be a reasonable strength in peace times or else he misled the Dáil. The choice of descriptions is his."
On Wednesday, 14th April, 1948—that was more than a year before that statement was made—in the course of a speech I said:—
"The Army Vote for 1931-32 was £1,437,000 odd. For that sum you had an Army of 500 officers and 6,000 men odd."
In other words, I made a clear reference to the fact that in that year the strength of the Army was 6,500. Yet the Minister deliberately misleads the House as to the statement which I made when I said that the Army was perhaps the lowest on record. He puts into my mouth a statement that an Army of a strength of 8,500 was the lowest strength on record.
"Perhaps."
Now I leave it to the House to judge who was doing the misleading.
"Perhaps" is the key-word.
What is much more important at the present time is: what is the strength and what is the morale of the Army to-day? That is, perhaps, the most important question we have to consider when we are discussing the question of the Army being given, as it will be given by this Bill, the right to exist for the next 12 months. Surely we are entitled to all this information asked for in the past but which, for some extraordinary reason, is now being withheld. We want to know the Army strength. We want to know what Army policy is and we are anxious to know what the Government defence policy is. Surely, if the Minister failed to give us that information in his opening statement, which was, perhaps, the briefest on record, he should at least give us that information when he is concluding? As I said in the beginning, I would very much prefer that this question would be debated on the permanent Bill. We can get no assurance as to when the permanent Bill is likely to be introduced or whether it is to be introduced at all. If the question of its introduction is one which depends entirely on the draftsman, I can see no reason why the Bill could not have been introduced last December. When the Minister was introducing the Bill on that occasion, he must at least have known whether it was likely to be ready at some particular period. He must surely have known, if it had received Government approval, that it was only a matter of putting it into proper legal phraseology in order to have it produced here in the House. Therefore, I feel that the occasion which the introduction of this Bill provides is a fair opportunity for the House to discuss in general terms the question of defence.
This problem has worried me for quite a while and I think Deputy Traynor was quite right in the attitude he has taken to this particular measure. I was very hopeful, when the Minister got leave to introduce the permanent Defence Bill, that we would have seen that Bill before to-day. I am aware, of my own knowledge, that the preparation of that Bill has been going on in the Department of Defence for years, and I should have imagined that, when the Minister came in here and asked for liberty to introduce the Bill, the draft would have been completed as far as the Department of Defence was concerned, that it would have received the general approval of the Government and that it would be printed in the ordinary way and circulated as soon as possible.
That is correct. It had gone through the Government.
As far as I am concerned—and I think this applies to every Deputy—I am anxious that defence should be kept completely outside the scope of ordinary Party politics and that there should be no serious issue there between the Government and the Opposition. Last year, when the temporary Bill was introduced, the Minister did make me a promise in this House that that was the last Temporary Provisions Bill that would be introduced, that the permanent Bill would be introduced and that the Dáil would be given an opportunity of passing it into law before the following 31st March. I am quite sure that that was within the Minister's intention. If he came before us now and said: "That was really my intention, but the draftsmen and the Department have run into difficulties"——
Might I interrupt the Deputy? What happened was this. I assumed, in sending a Bill to the parliamentary draftsmen, who are professional colleagues of the Deputy's, that ample time would be two or three weeks for them to prepare the Bill. To my amazement, I learned when I returned to this country last week, that they would not give me the Bill for three months, even though they had given priority to it. That was completely unexpected as far as I am concerned.
Yes, I can understand that; but almost a year ago that Bill was under discussion. I feel that the parliamentary draftsmen should have had it long ago. Certainly, they should have had it when it was introduced here.
They had it two weeks after that.
From 1923 to 1950 is 27 years. For 27 long years there has been an effort to get this permanent Bill before the House. In that long period of time, many Deputies have endeavoured to have that done—and it is not before the House yet. If the Minister had said: "When I undertook last year that no more Temporary Provisions Bills would be introduced, I believed they would have been able to get this permanent Bill ready for circulation; I have been unable to do that and, therefore, I am asking the Dáil to give me a further Temporary Provisions Bill to bring me up to June or September, or even to December." But the Minister asks us, in this temporary Bill, to give him until the 31st March, 1951; in other words, he is asking for the same period of time he would have asked if the Defence Forces Bill had never been promised or if it had not reached the stage that it has reached now. If the Minister had adopted that attitude, the House would probably have said to him: "Without discussion or debate, we can appreciate these difficulties and we will unanimously give the extra time asked for." I think the Minister should not have asked for a whole year.
The Minister has said that the permanent Bill rescinds this Bill at whatever date it is passed.
That is clear. It will rescind this Bill, but there will be no obligation on the Government to ask this House to pass the permanent Bill into law prior to the 31st December, 1951.
There is no obligation on the Government to curb Deputies when a Bill is under discussion and I do not want to curb them and put them up against a date. I want to let them discuss the permanent Bill as long as they like. It is certainly not Government Ministers who take up the time of the House.
I am sure we are grateful to the Government for that. I am afraid the Minister is misunderstanding what I am trying to put before the House in as calm a manner as I possibly can. The Defence Forces Bill will undoubtedly require time for examination and discussion, since the whole law in regard to our defence forces has never had an opportunity of a full discussion in Parliament. Now, this Bill, whenever the parliamentary draftsman gives it to the Minister, may be circulated or may not be circulated. As I understand the position in regard to Public Business before the House or that will be before the House, it will be next autumn before there is an opportunity of taking the Second Stage of the Defence Forces Bill. Eventually we will find ourselves with very little time to discuss it and pass it into law before the 31st March, 1951.
There will be serious disappointment in the Army that the permanent Bill has not been brought before the House. There will be very serious disappointment that the Dáil has had no opportunity of discussing the machinery that controls the Defence Forces. Deputy Traynor has referred to the strength of the Army and the morale of the Army. None of us ever would say that the morale was not high, but there have been many grievances amongst all ranks. I believe that those grievances could be removed if the machinery under which the Army is administered and controlled were changed. That can be done only when we get an opportunity of discussing the new Defence Forces Bill.
This opportunity might have been taken to make a very short statement in regard to policy. What is the defence policy of this country at the moment? Are the Regular Army, the permanent and non-permanent forces, strong enough to carry out that policy? Are they equipped as they ought to be? We would all have welcomed a statement on those lines from the Minister. What is the defence policy at the moment? Is it a policy of taking sides in the event of a world war being sprung upon us or is it still a policy of neutrality? If it is a policy of neutrality, are the defence forces at the moment strong enough, properly organised and adequately equipped for the purpose of maintaining neutrality in the face of any threats from any nation? A statement on those lines from the Minister would be helpful to the Dáil, to the Defence Forces and to the country.
There is a matter that arises in connection with that. Has any country, other than Britain, military bases within the six occupied counties? Have the American forces bases in the six occupied counties? Have they received a lease of those bases? Are those bases available for them in the event of war? If they have bases, and if they occupy those military bases, in the event of war, will they do what they planned to do and what they prepared to do in the last war, namely, move out from those bases and occupy our territory, in spite of our Army, in spite of our Government and in spite of our policy of neutrality? If they were to attempt to do that, is it the policy of the Government and of the Army to stop that invasion or, at least, to do everything in their power to stop it? These are serious matters, on which the House and the country should have some information and a declaration from the Minister.
It ought to be made perfectly clear to every country that, no matter what the cost may be, this country will maintain its neutrality in the event of war in the near future and that it will defend its territory against any enemy that may endanger it or may attempt to occupy it. A clear, specific statement on those lines is necessary and must do good. A clear, specific statement on those lines must increase national morale and help all of us to defend our position.
In another realm, statements have been made in regard to the line of action that we might take in certain eventualities—in other words, if America were able to bring sufficient pressure upon Britain to induce or to compel Britain to vacate the Six Northern Counties, that we would take our place with one of the belligerents in a war that may come in the near future. When those statements were made, were they made with the authority of the Minister for Defence? Do they express our defence policy in that particular eventuality? In other words, would we as a nation sell our rights for the purpose of getting possession of the Six Northern Counties that are held from us and kept from us by force?
The Deputy is widening the discussion now. The Minister for Defence is hardly responsible for all that policy.
I think he must bear the responsibility, Sir.
He is bearing enough.
I think he must bear that responsibility. That is part of our defence policy, in my respectful submission to the Chair. These are serious matters. They are matters that ought to be dealt with as early as possible. I would invite the Minister to make a clear and specific statement on these matters when he is concluding.
In regard to the Bill that the Minister has introduced, it is essential that our defence forces be maintained. It is essential that they should exist under statutory authority. Therefore, it is necessary that the Bill should be passed. No Deputy could take it on himself to oppose the Bill or even to limit the duration for which the Bill will operate. It did happen on one occasion in the Seanad that a Senator endeavoured to limit the period of operation of a Defence Forces Bill. I think the action of that particular Senator at the time was unnational and unwise and he has disappeared from public life since.
I hope that the Minister will get from the parliamentary draftsman, within three months, the Defence Forces Bill and that when he gets it he will circulate it, so that the many Deputies who are anxious to contribute from their experience and knowledge to the improvement of that Bill will have sufficient time and opportunity to do so. We have waited for 27 years for such a Bill. I hope the Minister's statement here to-day, that he will have it within three months, is correct. I ask him to give us ample time to examine it and study its provisions. If this debate will give the Minister an opportunity of making a statement along the lines that have been suggested already to him, I believe a very useful purpose will be served.
I hope, in conclusion, that when this Bill is passed we will have seen the last of these temporary measures and that, for the first time in 27 years, Parliament will soon get an opportunity of creating machinery that will give us a satisfied, a contented, and an efficient defence force. Under tremendous difficulties a defence force has been maintained that has been a credit to this country.
The Minister is, of course, sure of this Bill, but I think in all fairness to the House he should have given some statement, when introducing it, on what the policy of the Government is in connection with the Army. When the Minister was in opposition, he was constantly looking for that information himself.
And never getting it.
He was looking for that information on this type of Bill and at every other opportunity he could get. We have, I think, more reason for looking for this information, because the Minister, when he was in opposition, never made it very clear whether he thought we should have an Army for defence purposes or not. At one time he said that it ought to be only an auxiliary police force. It is very necessary for us, in present circumstances, to know the Minister's intentions with regard to the Army. I hope he will give us some definite information in his concluding statement, but even that will not be very satisfactory, because we will have no opportunity of discussing it.
I should like to know from the Minister the present strength of the Army. So far as I can follow matters from outside, it has fallen very low. I would also like to know if anything is being done about the defence of the civil population—civil defence—in the event of war. So far as I can see, nothing seems to have been done in that regard. I may be wrong in that and, if so, I welcome correction.
I understand that recruiting was renewed some time ago. Will the Minister tell us what has been the result? Will he give us information as to the number and type of men who have been brought into the Army and what are the prospects for the future, judging from the present recruiting figures? At the present moment the world situation presents serious problems for every country. When one sees what the big powers are doing in the way of defence, the money they are spending on defence—although some of them can very ill afford it—it makes one believe that the danger of war is not far distant. So far as I can judge, we are taking no steps at all to defend ourselves properly. Is it the Minister's view that, in the event of war, this country is to be defended, or are we to carry on in the way we seem to be carrying on—in such a way that if war came it would be an invitation to some of the belligerent powers to come in here?
I would like the Minister to deal with these few points. As Deputy Cowan said, nobody with any national spirit will oppose the carrying on of the Army, but at least we are entitled to some information.
Mr. de Valera
We on these benches would very readily have agreed to give this measure to the Minister without much discussion if the permanent Bill were immediately in the offing, but the Minister cannot promise. I understand quite well the difficulties that arise in the draftsman's department occassionally, because of the number of Bills Even though it gets priority, this particular Bill will necessarily have a large number of sections, as the Minister has indicated, and it will take a considerable time to prepare. That means that there will be no suitable opportunity given to Deputies to discuss what is at the moment a matter that is causing great concern to very many of our citizens; it certainly is causing grave concern to Deputies on these benches.
We have had the experience of a major conflict breaking out when we had very inadequate forces for our defence. We were fortunate in that a considerable period elapsed from the outbreak of the war until it became an immediate threat to us here. During that time, it was possible to reorganise our forces; it was possible to build up a fairly substantial voluntary force and it was possible to give a certain amount of training to these forces. That was a favourable accident which we have no right to hope for again. Were it not for that favourable accident, we would indeed have found ourselves in a very bad way in this country. The permanent portion of our Defence Forces on which our whole defence was to be based was allowed to become so small that it was not sufficient to train the body of volunteers that were recruited for emergency purposes. Another thing which favoured us too was that several years before the emergency we had tried to introduce the volunteer spirit again and build up a volunteer force. Although that force was not built up to the extent we had hoped when it was initiated, nevertheless, it was of tremendous value to us when the emergency broke out.
Although we did get that year or so in which to make amends for what might be regarded as our neglect in the previous years, nevertheless, the position in which we found ourselves was anything but an enviable one. Before the war broke out certain equipment had been ordered in various places and when the war started we were not able to secure it. If there is to be any question of neutrality for the future, we must make provision to get now the necessary supplies. We must make provision to get the ammunition and so on which is necessary. The amount of ammunition that even a small army requires under modern conditions is tremendous and it is extremely difficult to have stocks in hand that would be sufficient to tide you over a considerable period of war. The situation, as has already been pointed out, is a really dangerous and serious one and if we feel a proper sense of responsibility at all, we ought not go on as we have been going, acting on the principle which the Taoiseach mentioned, legislating and acting simply for peace. There is not a nation in the world that would not wish to be in a position of that sort; no country wants to spend, if it could avoid doing it, a considerable proportion of its revenues on maintaining defence forces, but they all do that because they realise that if they did not do it, their very independence would be at stake.
We have been talking of the independence that has been achieved in this part of Ireland. If we value that independence we should do everything in our power to see that it is maintained. We, on this side of the House, have grown more and more anxious recently about this whole question. What are we doing to act up to our responsibility to maintain this independence of which we are so proud?
In the case of small nations like ourselves, the problem of defence is always a difficult one and one of the chief difficulties in it is the view that must be fairly general among the population of such a country that even their utmost efforts would not be sufficient if a major power attacked. We had to meet that argument many times in the past. It was the argument that was used in the first instance to beat down any effort that was being made to secure our independence, the argument that it was quite impossible to do so. It was also used as a reason why expenditure on the Army should be cut down. It was argued that that expenditure was not productive; it would not yield immediate dividends and therefore it should not be incurred; particularly it should not be incurred inasmuch as it would not produce even ultimate dividends in security. That argument, in my opinion, is a completely wrong and fallacious argument for us to follow or accept. It is our duty to do our utmost whatever that utmost is. We may differ as to what is the extent of our utmost, but at any rate I think that each one of us should agree that our utmost should be done in order to defend ourselves and maintain our independence.
When the war was coming to an end certain questions were put up to the Government by the Army, and it was suggested that answers should be given. In the main they were: what is to be the defence policy of this State? Were we to envisage a position in which we would be acting alone or a position in which we would be acting with others? If we were going to act alone, what kind of defence should we have? Should we as, for instance, in Switzerland, have a very big volunteer force in which practically every citizen of the State would be a trained soldier? If we were not to have compulsory training, what provision were we to make to have a substitute on a voluntary basis?
I think the final reply was to the effect that we were to have an Army based on a certain permanent force with reserves to be brought up to the greatest extent that our manhood could, by voluntary recruitment, give to us. The purpose of the permanent force was, during peace time, to be there to repel any sudden attack and to ensure that the Parliament elected by the people would be supreme and that its power would not be contested by any other army or group that might try to constitute themselves an army. Its purpose also was to be there for expansion in case of emergency. The conclusion we came to, I think, was— at least the figure remains in my mind —that at least 12,500 officers and men would be required as a nucleus around which you could have this expansion. It was reduced somewhat afterwards following the emergency when a very large number of people were going out. The idea we had in mind was that the Army, certainly in times of threatened emergency, should amount to 12,500. I am talking about the figure that should be aimed at certainly if there were danger of war, the figure that would give you the nucleus which could take control and thoroughly train and command the volunteer force which might be recruited and might be available.
I think that we cannot act to-day as we might have acted in the '20s. The position to-day is very different from what it was in the '20s. The world position is very different. Everybody must realise that the danger of another great war is there. We all hope and pray that it may not come actually, but the danger is there, and every country in the world that regards its independence of value is envisaging such a possibility, and is doing its best to provide for its safety in such a possibility. We here do not seem to be facing this question at all. We are just drifting along.
The reason why we on these benches are speaking on this, and why we are using this occasion to do so, is because we think that the time has come when we cannot shelve this question any longer. We here on these benches had the anxieties of war in which there was the possibility—I will put it no farther than that there was the possibility any-how—that we might possibly be attacked from either of two sides. It is one of the great difficulties for us in the case of neutrality. If our problem during that period was simply the problem of facing one side, well our resources could be used very much more effectively than it was possible to use them when we had to consider the possibility of attack from either side— particularly if there was a possibility of attack by the side based actually upon our own territory, that is in the Six Counties.
We, therefore, having passed through all that period, will do everything in our power to assist the Government to provide adequately for the defence of this country. We ask them to be frank with the House and to tell us what their policy is. Having experienced ourselves the difficulties of a Government that was responsible for national defence in such circumstances, the Government need not be afraid that we will face this question in any narrow spirit.
One matter has been suggested here which is of the greatest importance to us. Our position could be more readily determined were it not for the fact that six of our counties are occupied. That is a fact, and it is a thing that we must all the time, in connection with our defence problem, take into account. The Government have indicated that it is one of the principal difficulties they have at the moment in settling a defence policy. Well, we cannot get rid of these facts. If war were to break out to-morrow, that would be a fact and we would have to take cognisance of that fact, but there is no use in our trying to say, because that fact exists, that we will do nothing. We cannot do that.
We have a very serious responsibility. I do not think there has been any question which has come before the House since the change of Government, important though some of these questions were, which merits on the part of every Deputy such close examination and such diligent attention. On account of the way in which the Minister had previously referred to this matter, I did not expect that he was going at this stage to give a full explanation and indicate what the Government policy was. I concluded what appears to be a fact, that he expected to get this Bill lightly and intended to postpone discussion on defence policy to a later time. We would all co-operate with him in that were it not for the fact that we believe the situation is urgent, and that we cannot go on as we have been going, drifting in this particular matter. Remember, if there is any truth in the rumours which are fairly common that the Army strength is deteriorating, and that some important officers have gone or are going out of the Army, some young men with whom one might hope to build the officer force of the future: if there is any truth in these rumours, it is a very serious matter.
There is not a word of truth in them.
Mr. de Valera
I am very glad to hear that. It has been suggested that there were certain young officers who, ordinarily, might be expected to stay in the Army, who were looking for positions outside, and were trying to get out of the Army. If that were so it would be a very serious position because an officer is not trained in a day. You do not get young people like them, who had some experience during the emergency, reproduced in a very short period. Is it true that the Army strength has deteriorated to such an extent that it is quite incapable of doing the work which our Regular Army must do to form the permanent core around which you must build your volunteer force?
It is higher than when I took over.
Mr. de Valera
I am glad to hear that. It is right that these things should be stated, because quite a contrary view is held generally in and around the city in so far as I have been able to hear gossip.
And even in certain newspapers.
Mr. de Valera
The fact is that if the Minister is in a position to give us the facts and a statement we will have something definite to go upon, and will not have to depend on the rumours that are current. But the rumours have been disturbing. They are disturbing, as far as I am able to find out, not merely to the ordinary representatives like ourselves here, but disturbing also to members of the Army.
If the Deputy will co-operate with me in dealing with the source of these rumours, we will be doing something.
Mr. de Valera
I will be very glad to assist anybody in dealing with anything that is untrue because things like these that are untrue can be very damaging and a source of danger. If the fact is that these things are untrue, the sooner they are exposed the better. The Minister is being given the opportunity now. As I have said, I did not expect that the Minister would be ready to do that at the moment, but I would have liked that if it were possible. The matter is a serious one, and we are anxious to co-operate. I would prefer if we could have that discussion in connection with this Bill. I am perfectly certain that the Minister will get the Bill, but what we want to get, and what is of very great importance is that we should get here a discussion on defence—policy and measures. The sooner the Minister gives the House an opportunity for that the better. I do not know to what extent we could discuss that on the Minister's Estimate. If we could discuss it on the Estimate then we could forgo the discussion for a month or so, but I think the earliest opportunity ought to be taken by the Minister for that discussion. I would like if we could have it on this Bill. The Minister himself may not be prepared to do that.
I do not care. You can have it any time you like.
Mr. de Valera
That being so, I think the Minister ought to help by having an informed discussion on this whole question of national defence at the present time. If he can help in that he will be doing a service not only to the members of the House but to the people in the country who are very seriously concerned about this whole matter. This is the opportunity for doing it. That is why some of us have intervened in this particular way and anything that the Minister can say to reassure us will certainly be received with pleasure as far as we are concerned.
I should like to impress upon him that we are very seriously concerned about this matter. First of all, we do not know what is likely to be the defence policy. I admit that it is not an easy thing to state it in advance of the particular circumstances, but what is the Defence Force policy, if I may put it that way without coming down to the general defence policy? What is being done, for instance, to build up the organisation of the civil community which would be necessary in case of modern war and attacks from the air? There was the old problem which was a subject of concern during my period of office—that of evacuation of the civilian population from the cities. Suppose a city like this were to be subject to aerial bombardment, what was to be the policy with regard to the civilian population? We did the best we could to build up a scheme for the evacuation of our people from large centres of population like this, a scheme which I was very anxious about as to whether it would really work in case of need.
These are matters to which we shall have to attend in the position in which the world is to-day. Just like insurance against fire, the fact that we take precautions does not necessarily mean that we are certain that the things will happen. It only means that we take what would be regarded as reasonable precautions. We cannot do that if we are not prepared to spend some money on the doing of it. It would certainly be very poor economy if, for the sake of expenditure on a defence arrangement for a year or two, we should find that an emergency came upon us in which we would lose 100 times as much. It is a question of reasonable assurance. Each of us is in duty bound to see that that insurance is effected. The premium may be high, but when there is danger I think that reasonable people will have to make up their minds and that they will be prepared to pay the necessary premium.
If he thinks he is in the position to do it, I hope the Minister will enlighten us on the question of the general defence policy, the Army strength which he thinks should go with that and the arrangement for civil defence which should go with it. Do not forget also in connection with civil defence that one of the means by which we can defend ourselves is by producing here as much as possible of the necessaries of life. We ought not to put ourselves in a position in which we could be squeezed, because that is what it means, through lacking some fundamental necessaries of life.
We ought not to invite attack, as we certainly will if we have an open space which it could be suggested there was nobody to defend. We, at least, ought to be able to answer to anybody who talks in that way about the position in this part of Ireland which we have under our immediate control: "We are able to defend it. There is no need for you to come in." If you have not a Defence Force here sufficient to enable you to say that, the temptation for other States to use that excuse for occupation will be very great. I ask the Minister to bear that in mind and to see to it that the Defence Force will be of such a character that at least the excuse cannot be given by one side that there is a vacuum here which invites attack from the other side. We may have another occasion for discussing this once the Minister has heard our views, but it would be preferable if he were prepared to do it now in connection with this Bill.
The Minister is in the happiest position that any Minister for Defence in time of peace has been for a long time in this House. Before the last war, the then Minister for Defence, who was trying to build up the Army and the Volunteer force, was attacked by the then Opposition. The only people who would attack the Minister now for spending a reasonable amount of money on the Army would not come from this side of the House. Indeed, I do not know how the Army would stand if the Government gave a free vote of the House and the Opposition members were not to support the Minister's proposal that there should be an Army for another year.
The Minister said here by way of interjection to Deputy Colley that they had never been informed about Army policy before the last war. Not only were they informed about it on every occasion on which there was a defence debate in the Dáil, but they were asked to co-operate. They refused to co-operate, however. They did their utmost to prevent any force been built up here which would be effective in enabling the Dáil to choose its own policy and to defend that policy. We have quite a different situation to-day.
Is the Deputy looking for an alibi for the position in 1939?
In spite of the then Opposition, we succeeded at least in maintaining our position and defending this part of the country against allcomers.
Whom have you to thank for it?
The Army and the Volunteers and the people properly led.
That is gratitude.
We want the Minister to give an indication of the Government defence policy in a situation in which most of the countries in Europe are spending 25 per cent. and some of them 30 per cent. and 50 per cent. of their exchequer income on defence. What does the Government propose in the line of building up the Army and the auxiliary defence forces? In 1934 we did our utmost to build up a Volunteer force to support the Army and we got the bitterest opposition from the then Opposition. In 1948, there was in this country the F.C.A., which was comprised of 70,000 or 80,000 of the best young men in the country of all shades of political opinion. Since that date I have hardly seen one occasion on which the Minister took any particular interest in the activities of that organisation. The standing Regular Army may carry on under its own steam and without much official encouragement, but a Volunteer force such as the F.C.A. will not be a success unless it is given the daily attention of the Minister responsible for the Army, and all the other Ministers.
It survived lack of attention by the Minister during the emergency.
The people have not got such short memories as that, and neither have the men who were in the Army. If the Deputy is now supporting the Minister for Defence in lack of attention to it, let him get up and say so.
I am merely pointing out in connection with what the Deputy has said that that was the experience of both the Volunteers and the F.C.A. during the emergency.
It does not seem to be very relevant, anyway.
We would like the Minister here to-day to give some encouragement to the young men of the country to join the F.C.A. and be diligent in carrying out their duties in that organisation. We know that a year ago the Government were so parsimonious that they would not spend even a few thousand pounds in bringing them up for annual training. It would take a lot of visits by the Minister and other members of the Government to even up that grave discouragement, but we want him to give more attention to the F.C.A. than he has been giving it up to the present. It is alleged that there are certain parts of the country where they cannot get even boots. The Minister might not be able to get all the weapons we would require, but at least he would be able to get boots and proper uniforms for them and to see that they are supplied in time and in proper quantity.
Another auxiliary force that is being built up and given great attention to in nearly all European countries at present is the air-raid precautions section. That is an organisation that can be built up without the spending of a great deal of money on equipment and we should at least do our utmost to see that the civilian population throughout the country are properly protected against such evils of air attack as we can protect them against. Over in England, for the past year or so, they have started a widespread campaign to reconstitute the civilian air precautions service in every town and village. I cannot see from the papers, at any rate, any sign of any such activity here and we should like the Minister to let us know whether the air-raid precautions section exists to a greater extent than on paper, whether it is active in getting information from outside as to what other countries are doing in the matter of precautions against air-raids, and whether he proposes to impart that information to the people who might be affected. During the war, we had a very big air-raid precautions organisation widely scattered throughout the country. All sorts of people made great sacrifices in time and energy in keeping the organisation in being and in getting training, and if the most up-to-date information were conveyed to an organisation of that type, we could at least see to it that we would be able to do almost as much as any other country in protecting our people from the effects of air bombardment.
The Minister said that they never got any indication of defence policy from the Government before the war. As early as 1934, it was laid down by the then Taoiseach that the basic element of our defence policy was that we were not going to allow this country to be used as a basis of attack against our nearest neighbour. Is that the Government's policy? Is it their intention to ensure that all proper steps will be taken to make that policy effective? We know that some members of the present Government had widely different views as to what we should do in the event of our nearest neighbour becoming involved in war and we would like to know whether there is in fact any agreed policy between members of the Government and what that policy is. Does it differ widely from the policy pursued by the Fianna Fáil Government before the war and during the war? If it is in any way different, we should like to know about it and to know also whether it has the approval of the members supporting the Government and whether, in fact, while the Minister is asking the people through taxation to support an official Army, there is any other section of his Government supporting, through sweepstake tickets and other things circulating throughout the city, an army to attack it.
The people clearly knew where Fianna Fáil stood in regard to defence policy before the clouds of the last war gathered to any great extent. We did our utmost to persuade the Dáil and the people to organise themselves so that we would have some chance at least of coming to our own decision in relation to the war which we feared would come upon the world. We succeeded to the extent that, when this Dáil made up its mind to be neutral, the Army was able to organise its Defence Forces to the extent that that decision was respected. If to-morrow a war broke out, this Dáil would have to make its decision and its decision would be largely affected by our power to defend ourselves. If we have no Army, nothing to fight with, if we have not got a reasonable amount of the essentials of life within our shores, or being produced within our shores, the decision will be made by somebody else and we will be kicked around. It will pay our people to bring home to the Government that it is their duty so to arrange not only the national military defences but our economic defences that we can make our decision and have a reasonable chance of sticking to that decision during the war, in spite of what anybody else may say.
Before the last war, every penny the Government proposed to spend on the Army was opposed. We will not oppose any reasonable expense on the Army, and if this Government, instead of increasing taxation by £7,000,000, had decreased it by £10,000,000, as they promised they would, we could keep quite a respectable Army without any additional taxation. The Government has been squandering money in all sorts of ways. Notwithstanding the fact that they cut down very severely on the Army, they are collecting another £7,000,000 off the people. We hope that in the coming Estimates we will see some indication that the Government are aware of the type of world they are living in and that they will carry out their duty to the Irish people to build up a Defence Force here within the State that will enable the Irish people to take their decision and keep it if war should come.
Major de Valera
One would have thought from the papers circulated to the House that this Bill would have been a very transitory matter and that we would have had the permanent Bill before us. I understand that that Bill is not likely to reach us for some time. We are, therefore, in the position of dealing with the question referred to the House of determining whether we will continue with the Army for a year or perhaps less, or whether we will not. That question seems wide enough to embrace the whole question of defence. One difficulty, however, arises and that is the fact that defence nowadays embraces all Departments of State and it is hardly sufficient in dealing with the problem merely to relate oneself to the armed forces. One finds oneself very quickly dealing with practically every aspect of the economic life of the community when considering the matter. For debate purposes it is rather difficult to make all the considerations relevant to the problem actually relevant to the debate itself. Certainly, this much is relevant: in all matters of defence one is concerned not merely with the maintenance of an armed force, but also with the problem of ensuring that adequate preparation is made in advance to enable the Government and the Parliament of the day to make a proper decision in the interests of the people in time of crisis. Ultimately that is the real question which is involved here.
In any possible or probable crisis the Government and the Parliament of the day should be in a position to make an independent decision in the interests of the people. Unless preparation is made in advance to put the Government and the Parliament in a position to make such decision, then no choice will be left open. Accordingly, therefore, every time the Defence Vote comes up that question comes up with it. What we are faced with here is ensuring that in such a crisis, if such should come, the people through their Government and their representatives here will be in a position to make a choice and not find themselves in the position that they are virtually compelled to bow to the inevitable; not find themselves in the position, for instance, in which the Minister for Finance found himself when devaluation broke. Nothing had been done. Things had been left drift. Devaluation came and we were presented with a magnificent statement as to why we should bow to devaluation.
That is not relevant at all.
Major de Valera
It is relevant for the purposes of illustration. I am pointing out that one should have the opportunity of exercising freedom of choice. Explanations, when no such choice is open, are of no value. There is another lesson which can be learned from the past. The events which took place here in the development of our Defence Forces prior to the war put us in the position of making a free choice in 1939. One cannot consider this defence problem on the narrow basis of merely regarding it as a question of armed forces. One must look at the broad issues involved in order to get a proper perspective. From that point of view we may legitimately ask: what are we doing in regard to defence? What prudent preparation are we making to face a possible crisis? Are we carefully anticipating such a crisis? It is equally relevant to ask: what is the possibility of a crisis? One has only to read the newspapers to see what the position is. Right through the past 12 months, to go no further back, practically every country in the world has been preparing for war. The signs are all there. Let us hope that war will not come. Providence may prevent it. We believe in the power of Providence. Even in the rush and intensity of the preparations there are hopeful signs; perhaps war will not come. Nevertheless, it would be very foolish and imprudent to ignore the portents. It would be very foolish to bury one's head in the sand whilst other nations consider the situation sufficiently serious to warrant the expenditure of enormous sums of money on defence. Britain and the United States of America are spending huge sums on defence. Consider the amount that the United States is spending in an effort to build up Western Europe. Consider the armed might of Russia. The latest information is that Russia is developing in quite an unexpected direction in regard to naval activities. Norway is spending £137,000,000 over a six years' programme. Norway is a little country comparable to us. She paid the price of lack of preparation in the last war. Apparently she still thinks it worth while to prepare for a crisis. Holland and Switzerland are going all-out in their defence programmes. Every country is intensely active. Yet, we apparently drift along quietly complacent and without paying any attention to this problem that may confront us.
Another significant feature from our point of view is the fact that Great Britain, quite an insignificant distance from us under modern conditions, is preparing for the defence of her civilian population. Under modern conditions, where atomic warfare may play a part, very careful advance organisation is necessary to ensure any degree of protection for the civilian population. With proper organisation and preparation a certain degree, indeed a high degree, of protection is possible. That preparation largely depends on the training of personnel to organise and direct that activity. That training is of a very specialised nature. It takes time. It has to be itself organised before any civil defence organisation can be set up. One may justifiably say that all that preparation is taking place on our own front door. Yet, as far as one can judge, here we are doing absolutely nothing.
What civil defence had we in 1939?
Major de Valera
The position in 1939 was very different. I will tell you what civil defence we had in 1939.
Nothing.
Major de Valera
First of all, in 1939 the position was very different. The development of air power and of what one could contemplate from air power was not what it is to-day. It was then believed that a gas threat was imminent. For the two years prior to 1939 a gas school was established in Griffith Barracks which was attended by consecutive and continuous classes of people from various local authorities and hospitals, and from other places, who were being put through intensive courses. That was stepped up and hurried during 1939. To-day you have no such organisation at all. To-day you have practically scrapped the technical departments in the Army. Such technical departments as were in the Army at the end of the emergency are now, according to my information, ineffective. I understand the laboratory in the Army no longer functions as such. There is the difference between now and 1939—if Deputy O'Higgins wants to know it.
The important thing for our people to realise is that there is a defence problem facing them; that, fundamentally, what is involved is that if a crisis comes, and particularly if a state of hostilities comes near them, provision will have to be made for their living and survival. Apart from any question of fighting, and in order to meet that problem of living, preparation must be made in advance and in a particular way. It will be too late to organise if you wait until the crisis is on you. Modern war, for instance, will necessitate careful regional organisation in case any particular area is put out of action or in case communications with the central Government are disrupted. That regional organisation must be such as will enable those in the relatively unaffected parts to carry on. Transport, communications, food stocks and all that sort of thing are all tied up with defence and yet nothing is being done about it.
What was done about it in 1939?
Major de Valera
Prior to 1939—if the Chair will permit me to answer the question——
The Chair is of opinion that it is not relevant. However, the Deputy may answer the question if he wishes to do so.
Major de Valera
The answer, in the case of 1939, is just like the answer in the case of the gas schools. The work had gone on. Turf development had been organised and, therefore, we were in a position to be independent in respect of the threat of lack of fuel. Owing to the policy adopted by the then Government and by the then Minister for Agriculture, we developed our own resources to the extent that we could resist any threat to cut out our fuel and food supplies. The country was able to feed the people. The Articles of the Treaty, which would give a juridical excuse for interference, were gone.
Oh now.
Major de Valera
Because of these things, the Government of the day was in a position to make a free choice. As I have remarked on another occasion, paradoxically enough, because they were in a position to make that free choice, they got things easier than they would if they had been merely in the position of bowing to the inevitable— like the Minister for Finance recently in respect of devaluation.
Do not embarrass Deputy Aiken by referring to the subject of devaluation any more.
Major de Valera
Nobody is going to be embarrassed by references to devaluation except the Minister for Finance, who made what was an excellent professorial statement, but who did nothing. To return to what is relevant, whatever the lessons of the past—and their importance is that we can learn from the past—every indication of the present situation is that we should prepare to put ourselves in a position to make an independent choice, to make a decision that will suit our people and that will be in their interests; to make preparation so that life can be carried on for the benefit of our people and not for the benefit of anybody else. To do that, the prudent thing is to prepare now and not permit ourselves to drift so that should a crisis unfortunately break, you could do no better than bow to the inevitable. That is the importance of all these considerations.
On this question, more narrowly, of defence, the Government and this House has, firstly, a responsibility not only for the welfare of the people at the present moment but also to do all prudent things to secure the welfare of the people in the immediate future and, more important still, not to, by default or otherwise, allow a situation to develop to the disadvantage of our people. In other words, it is our duty and the duty of the Government to exercise adequate forethought for the benefit of our people. It is for that reason, as I have said, that this Bill is of such importance. It is a corollary to that that our people should be told the factual position dispassionately, without minimising it on the one hand or without anything savouring of alarmist rumours or alarmist activity, on the other hand.
They should be told soberly and quietly the factual position—what the potentialities of the situation are. They should be given reasons as to why such an opinion is expressed or as to why these facts are. They should be told what is going on in other countries. They should be, in other words, conditioned morally to face the problems which, through no fault of their own, or of this country, have to be faced in these unhappy times. Our people should be told all these things. Having told them, the Government should survey and prepare prudently, not extravagantly but not inadequately, for any likely situation—and that is always a difficult problem for any Government. It is normally a particularly difficult problem for a Government where defence matters are concerned because usually the Opposition in Parliament will be such as will tend to defeat them at every turn on the plea of economy. But the present Government and the present Minister have not that situation to cope with. They have the advantage that the present Opposition are composed of people who themselves had the experience of Government and who are exercising a responsible attitude in this regard. Therefore, as I think Deputy Aiken remarked, the Minister and his Government are in the very happy and unusual position of being able to command co-operation, all reasonable co-operation, in this important matter. It is all the more reason then why they should diligently attend to it.
As I have said, the question so depends on the attitude of the people ultimately, that they should be informed of the situation. Therefore, I think that a considered and reasoned estimate of the situation and a statement of the Government's policy in this regard would now be most opportune.
Let us move on to consider more specifically what is involved in this Bill. Again, I must emphasise, however, that defence is not a matter of toy soldiers or merely armed forces. They are an adjunct, a necessary part. They are, ultimately, one of your fences or hedges, so to speak, to your power of making a decision. However, when all is said and done, the vital problem is that of enabling the nation and the people to survive during an emergency and to take the best course that can be taken in their interests at such a time. Where does the Army come in? It comes in firstly as necessary to securing and implementing such a decision—to securing a favourable stand, so to speak, when a decision is forced upon you. That fact arises largely from geography. Let any Deputy look at our geographical position and that will be abundantly clear. It is obvious, as so many other speakers have said, that unless you are in a position here to supply your own security force, and initially at any rate to defend your territory, and to deter anybody else from interfering with you, your possibility of free choice, when a choice becomes necessary or when it is desirable to make one, becomes very prejudiced by the absence of adequate forces and organisation. That is the case firstly for the Army. That is the case why this Bill should be passed and why we should exhort the Minister to get ahead with the organisation of these forces as quickly as possible.
The second reason is that we are a small country. We cannot afford overheads in organisation and administration beyond what are necessary. It, therefore, largely falls on the Army to cater for the organisation and planning of such matters as civil defence. On the Minister's Department will largely fall the responsibility for making the necessary initial recommendations and very probably the duty of preparing a detailed plan for such things as emergency supply services, casualty clearing, air-raid precautions, etc. If all these things are to be properly handled, it presupposes adequate strength, proper organisation and proper facilities in the Minister's own Department. It presupposes that the Army itself will be able to supply the necessary information, the necessary plans and the necessary key personnel to handle and direct such activities. Are we in that position to-day? The Minister could very well tell us what, if anything, has been done in the matter of co-ordination of the purely military aspect of the situation with such additional aspects as evacuation, transport, regional organisation supply, etc. Can the Minister tell us whether anybody in his Department has any liaison with any other Department, or whether any provisions have been made in respect to such important matters as storage, even for food and materials, which proved to be a big problem in the last war?
What is the situation of our forces, or such forces as we can have, in regard to the supply of materials, during such an emergency, which we could produce at home? There the whole question of industry and the co-ordination of industry comes up. Has the Minister got a Department actively attending to that, or again will some officers at a late hour find themselves trying to organise emergency services of that nature? There are many lessons we could have learned from the past emergency, coupled with the picture which we can now have of what is likely to break in future. What are we doing on foot of these lessons? These are all things about which the Minister could tell us. Some of these matters will arise again on the Estimate and questions of detail perhaps may as well be reserved.
Then the question of reserves comes up. I understand, having gone through the figures which the Minister gave in answer to a question last year, that what I might call the first line reserve is quite inadequate to bring such a Defence Force as we have up to any workable strength should mobilisation be necessary. I have myself for three years now tried to hammer home the lesson that we were completely below any workable strength in 1939 and that it was only because there were six months in which to incorporate the then reserve so as to bring the Army up to the region of something like 14,000, that we were able to handle the situation in 1940.
In other words, you were not prepared.
Major de Valera
Surely there is a lesson to make sure that that does not happen again. On the figures which I got last year the total strength which can be mobilised, including ordinary reserves, would not much exceed that figure. However, the Minister may have got in a substantial number of recruits during the year. He will tell us the present strength. The situation may be somewhat better at the present moment, but, even so, the total strength to be mobilised, without the guarantee of a time factor that would afford an opportunity of organisation them, would not very much exceed the 1940 figure, I believe. Therefore, the question of building up the Reserve arises.
There is also the F.C.A. One hears complaints in regard to that force. I have heard complaints, for instance, as to lack of facilities, complaints that they have not been able to get equipment and boots. I put these points to the Minister. I understand that it is only very recently, after a considerable delay, that the Minister has made available training personnel. Having regard to the present strength of our total forces, that force assumes an importance that one might describe as paramount. You have there excellent material and excellent enthusiasm. But if they are to be effective they need encouragement and facilities, attention and organisation. Anybody who has experience of a Volunteer force in peace time knows that a certain minimum number of regular or whole-time personnel are necessary if efficiency is to be attained. Not only are personnel necessary to train them but whole-time personnel are necessary to enable the administration and organisation to work smoothly. Is the F.C.A. receiving these facilities at the moment? In other words, is there a sufficient number of whole-time personnel attached to enable the force to reach any degree of efficiency as a body? These are matters of importance which should be looked into. These are matters upon which the Minister could very well outline his policy and say where we stand.
Then there is the question of specialists within the Army itself. I think it has been remarked on more than one occasion that in the case of an Army, it is not only necessary and essential that the individual specialists should be highly skilled and trained, but it is also necessary that the unit as a whole should be equally skilled and trained. In other words, the training of specialists, while necessary and essential, is not sufficient. You need adequate training of the unit as a whole if that unit is going to perform the duties which they may be called upon to perform. Adequate training and adequate efficiency in that sense are very largely dependent on numbers. Have we a sufficient number of men in specialist units to do collective training and to reach that pitch of efficiency? What policy are we adopting in regard to specialists? Specialists nowadays embrace practically the whole gamut of military activity — artillery, cavalry, these are mechanised troops nowadays, signals and any corps you care to name. They need numbers for efficiency. What specialised corps have we got and what are the strengths of those corps? It is not enough to tell the people that we have so many men all round in the Defence Forces; if they are merely maintaining barracks or guards or doing routine work, they cannot be put into the class of the essential specialists. Thinking people want to know where we stand regarding specialised corps and they would be glad to have the Minister's answer. I have heard — I may be wrong and would be glad to know definitely what the facts are—that trained men of the specialised class have actually left the Army and have been re-employed as civilian personnel for some reason or other and that many of our specialised corps, such as cavalry and artillery, are being maintained in many ways by civilian personnel who are not soldiers at all. If that is true, I do not think that position is satisfactory. It would be interesting to have information on the point.
In these days, there can be no question of high secrecy in such matters— generally, anyway—and some statement could be made. It would be reassuring to the people to know exactly where we stand. It is only in that way that the Minister will get the co-operation of the people in doing what should be done.
From specialists is a very short cry to another type of Army specialist which is very important. What is the position in regard to our medical services? Is the Army Medical Service in a position to supply and direct certain key personnel in default of their being supplied elsewhere?
Their pay is not cut in half, anyway.
Major de Valera
Are they in a position to cater for problems that may arise in an emergency? For instance, is there any section or corps to deal with chemical research or production problems of that nature? Where do we stand in regard to specialised officers? Is there any Department in the Army making provision for emergency production of materials which might be required in an emergency? Is there any liaison with industry, particularly productive industry, whether engineering or chemical in this country?
This Bill before us now is of an old type—one we have been asked to reenact again and again. It provides mainly for discipline, but in so far as it contemplates the development of the Defence Forces it largely pictures the type of force that was carried on in the days before total war, before people generally were wholly involved and before the multitudinous problems which now arise in connection with arimes arose. We have no indication that the essential matters I have mentioned are being looked into and provided for. Judging by the strength of the Army, it would seem to be very tight to provide for them. If they are not provided for, it is high time that we did something about it.
In the net, we are asking the Minister to tell us the factual position and the Government's policy in regard to defence. We are asking him to tell us what the estimate of the situation is and what he and the Government propose to do about it. We ask him to reassure us that all the broad aspects of defence have been properly co-ordinated, and that steps are being taken now to ensure that, if it should be necessary to make national decisions that might have a bearing on defence, we are in a position to make a choice in the interest of the people and that we are not driven into a position where, by default, we will be left with no choice and must bow to the inevitable. The Minister is being asked these things in a spirit of co-operation. Our difficulty is that the very silence and apparent disinterest of the Government Parties in this problem leave us not knowing where precisely we stand.
Somebody referred to statements of policy before 1939, but the important thing is that prior to 1939—and, if my recollection goes back aright, particularly at the time we got back the ports —there were, on more than one occasion, made by the then Head of the Government and by other Ministers at the time unequivocal statements as to where we stood, that we were prepared to look after ourselves in time of war or crisis, that we were voluntarily and knowingly undertaking that responsibility and were prepared to discharge the onus of that responsibility.
There were unequivocal and definite statements that this country would be organised and all proper steps taken to see that it was not used, in particular, as a basis for attack on neighbouring countries. These things were stated. It was apparent from the steps taken at the time that that policy was being implemented. On the economic side, the whole development of our economy was towards self-reliance, enabling us to take an independent decision free of economic pressure. On the political side, the move was the same, with the rejection and abolition of all clauses in treaties or elsewhere tying us to give facilities to anybody outside. We organised, in spite of opposition and misunderstanding at home, a voluntary reserve on top of the Regular Reserve and Army and we trained them. Civilian defence organisations were brought into being and the Civil Defence School in Griffith Barracks was developed. Provision was made by the Minister for Industry and Commerce for stocks of foodstuffs and anyone who wants to check it up can go to the statistics and see how the imports of essential fertilisers and so on rose prior to the war in contemplation thereof. All these steps were taken quietly. The political situation was difficult because of the attitude of some people then sitting on these benches.
It is entirely irrelevant here.
Major de Valera
In any event, all these things were done, and there was an opportunity for a free choice, which was taken, which could not be taken if you were not in that position. All we are asking the Minister to do is, while time is left, to see that we will try to keep in as favourable a position as we possibly can to meet any future crisis. What time is there? Who can tell? Many people are pointing towards a five-year interval. Again, the crisis may never come, but is it prudent to bet everything on that? If the crisis does come, there are indications that the next five years will be a critical time and one can come to that conclusion whether one approaches it from a military point of view or looks at it purely from an economic point of view on the basis that a war will ultimately be avoided. In any event, the time in front of us looks like being difficult. Therefore, we should prepare and take adequate precautions. That is all we ask the Minister to do and, what is more, he is getting the offer of co-operation in any steps that can be taken for the benefit of our people, who are the paramount consideration. That is all we are asking the Minister.
It is time enough to bid the devil goodmorrow when you meet him.
Mr. de Valera
That is the policy, is it?
You will keep us out of it. You kept us out of it before.
Major de Valera
The Deputy says it is time enough to bid the devil goodmorrow when you meet him. Let me tell the Deputy that usually when you meet the devil is when you are looking in the door of hell. Out of hell there is no redemption. When you meet the devil you will be in hell and no way out.
There is not a word about it in this Bill.
Major de Valera
What business man, what ordinary person in ordinary life, would take up such an irresponsible attitude of letting things drift?
You are trying to create a scare in the country now.
Major de Valera
I am not trying to create a scare in the country. I have carefully prefaced my remarks on every occasion by stating the necessity for a sober approach to this. That is all we ask. It is for that very reason that we think that should come from the Minister and the Government. They will get the proper co-operation. There is a problem. It can be faced with the unanimous, calm deliberation of this House. It can be faced without any minor considerations. The Minister and I can discuss it in a friendly manner across the House. I hope we are all fundamentally agreed that the welfare of our people is the paramount consideration, that we have a duty to try to arrange now that, if a crisis breaks, the welfare of our people can be provided for to the maximum extent possible. That, I hope, is the view of everybody here. We are merely asking the Minister to enable all people to co-operate in that. One reads and studies the news of the day, in particular the economic journals. Read the Economist, for instance, regularly and see what you will get out of it. One feels there is a serious problem. That problem is such that steps should be taken. They are best taken with the co-operation of the country as a whole and, in order to get the co-operation of the country as a whole, some such statement or help from the Minister or the Government is necessary.
Before the war there were definite statements, so that we knew where we stood. Since the present Government came into office, we have had no definite indication as to where we stand or what our attitude is on this important matter. Up to the beginning of this year the whole emphasis was on economy. The whole attitude on this vital question up to January of this year was that we were going into an era of peace; the Government worked on a hypothesis of peace, that we must save as much money as we can. That was the only indication that we got. There has been a recruiting drive initiated. I hope it has been successful and that the Minister has received a good response. I am sorry that two years have been lost. Nevertheless, I hope the Minister has had a response to that drive and I take it, having regard to the previous attitude, that this has some significance. It would be good for the country, good for the Government, good for this House, if we got some help in that regard. That is all we are asking for.
I am rather hesitant about speaking on this matter after the learned discourse we have had from Deputy Major de Valera, who has gone into every aspect of defence and high policy with regard to the Army. I am sorry that the permanent measure is not before the House. I am prepared to accept the Minister's assurance that he will introduce it in the shortest possible time. I shall not be misled by the sudden interest in our defence position on the part of Fianna Fáil Deputies. Their solicitude in regard to the permanent Bill has arisen within the last few hours. It is extraordinary, having regard to the fact that many Deputies failed to get that measure introduced in the last seven years. The anxiety of Fianna Fáil on this matter has only been made public in the last few hours. The measure that the Minister is about to introduce should have been introduced years ago. It sounds very hypocritical when Deputy Major de Valera tells us that there is danger of war and rumours of war. I am not prepared to accept Deputy Major de Valera as an authority on when we are going to have war. Neither will I accept him as an authority on our defence measures because I am very much afraid that the type of mentality portrayed in his speech is the mentality that existed in the senior element of the Army for a number of years past. I am afraid that under the brass hats there were a lot of brass heads. I am afraid some of them have come into this House.
I had hoped that this debate would be kept on a high level but Deputy Aiken and Deputy de Valera have gone to great pains to establish the fact, mar dheadh, that this Government is responsible for the small size of the Army to-day. The responsibility for the size of the Army lies with the ex-Minister opposite. When the emergency was over, young men poured out of the Army in their thousands. They are not in this country to-day. I remember seeing queues of fine young men who had been in the Army outside offices in Dublin, trying to join up the British services or to get work in British mines. In other words, after giving the best years of their lives in the service of this country, they got a miserable gratuity and were tossed out on the labour market, while at the same time men who did not join the Defence Forces during the emergency, but carried on outside, received promotion in their various occupations. The few ex-Army men who did get work when they came out had to start again at the bottom.
That is remembered to-day by the men who left the Army, and the advice is given by ex-Army men to every likely recruit: "If you have any sense stay out of the Army or you will get the same treatment as we got." That is the reason why there has been little or no response to the recruiting drive started approximately two years ago. The morale of the Army had gone down considerably in the years between 1943 and 1946. In this debate I will not go into the various reasons that caused that decline in morale, but it is well to remember that the responsibility for the small size of our Defence Forces to-day does not lie with this side of the House, but does lie with the men who occupy the Opposition Benches. It was their short-sighted policy in dealing with the Army personnel that has left a bad taste in the mouths of those men who came out of the Army.
I hope the present drive for recruits will be successful. Like Deputy de Valera, I hope that young men will answer the call. It is the duty of Deputies on both sides of the House to encourage a good type to join our permanent forces. When we discuss policy with regard to defence, I think we should have a look, first of all, at our position on the map of the world. It would be well for some Deputies opposite who have spoken to remember, when they make a comparison with Norway or other small countries in Europe, that geographically we may appear to be in the same circumstances from the point of size, but our position on the map is far different from that of Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden or Belgium and we must take into account, when we are preparing a defence plan, where our island stands on the map.
The next problem we must face is, in the event of war, are we going to take sides? Let us say that we do not intend to take part in a war on any side, that we intend to adopt a neutral attitude. If that is the position, I have no hesitation in saying that we must have adequate ground forces to enable us to remain neutral. I would like to emphasise that. I do not want to see a large standing Army; I want to see a small regular force, a highly-trained Volunteer force, something in the form of the F.C.A. When Deputy de Valera talks about specialists in the Army I think it would be still more important to have these specialists in the F.C.A. The best form of defence this country can ever hope to undertake is something along the lines of mobile or guerilla warfare. In the past it seemed to have been in the minds of the General Staff that they could sit down at tables and play about with regiments, divisions and armies, the same as if we had three or a few Rommels or a few Eisenhowers. We can never hope to take part in warfare of that type.
We must face realities. The best we can ever hope to do is to put up a defence in various localities throughout the country, and the most effective force for that is the F.C.A. The expert training of Army personnel should be passed on to the F.C.A. I am afraid the position of the F.C.A. to-day is anything but good from the point of view of training. Undoubtedly a great number of them know how to use small arms, such as rifles, revolvers and hand-grenades. Outside that their experience is limited.
I advocated before that the F.C.A. should be taught signalling and demolition work. I have made it my business to check up on the knowledge of the F.C.A. in the rural areas with reference to demolitions, and I found in the majority of cases they are a bigger danger to themselves, when it comes to demolitions, than they would be to any invading forces. The F.C.A. has existed quite a long time under different names. At this stage they should have had an opportunity of receiving practical training in demolition work.
I want to get back again to some of Deputy de Valera's remarks. He said that during the war we had laboratories established for research purposes, for investigating various possibilities of warfare. I hope he is not serious in suggesting that we should start more laboratories here and have scientists working again in this country on something—this must have been in his mind—in the nature of a hydrogen or an atom bomb. If he is serious in his suggestion, I would like to know what possible use we can get from such laboratories here when we have at our disposal the findings of other countries in their research laboratories. If he is serious about going into this research business, is he prepared to ask the Minister to spend millions in so doing? In my opinion it would take more to establish a research laboratory and maintain it than it would to keep a standing army of considerable strength. I think that point raised by Deputy de Valera is very foolish indeed.
If we decided to remain neutral it will be necessary to have adequate ground forces. The F.C.A. could be trained in all aspects of warfare and they would provide all that could be required. In order to have the F.C.A. and the Army in a position to enforce our neutrality, we must have a certain amount of ammunition and other war material available. I agree with Deputy de Valera that it is no use shelving the question of purchasing war material. I know the Minister will say that each year something new comes out, some fresh invention, some new weapon, and the possibilities are that if we invest so much in buying guns of a modern type, they may become obsolete within 12 months. We have to take that chance, and I think that nobody is going to blame the Minister if he invests a certain amount of money in suitable war equipment. I move the adjournment of the debate.