Committee on Finance. - Vote 56—Defence. – Dáil Éireann (13th Dáil) – Tuesday, 18 Apr 1950

Committee on Finance. - Vote 56—Defence.

Minister for Defence (Dr. O'Higgins)

I move:—

That a sum not exceeding £2,651,140 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending 31st day of March, 1951, for the Defence Forces (including certain Grants-in-Aid) under the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, and for certain administrative expenses in connection therewith; for certain Expenses under the Offences against the State Acts, 1939 and 1940 (No. 13 of 1939 and No. 2 of 1940) and the Air-raid Precautions Acts, 1939 and 1946 (No. 21 of 1939 and No. 28 of 1946); for Expenses in connection with the issue of Medals, etc.; for Expenses of the Bureau of Military History, and for a Grant-in-Aid of the Irish Red Cross Society (No. 32 of 1938).

In moving the Estimate for the Department of Defence for the coming year I would like, as far as possible, before getting down to the details of the Estimate, to try to clear the air in so far as I can with absolute candour, placing everything before Dáil Éireann, recognising that every Deputy in an Irish Dáil bears on his shoulders the same degree of responsibility as a public representative as I do as Minister for Defence, to face up to this question, not in any heavy political way, arguing like so many petty politicians as to whether the strength of our Army should be 9,000, 8,000 or 8,500, not arguing one with another as to whether we are spending so many thousands in any particular direction or so many thousands plus one extra £1,000, but rather trying to reach something like general agreement around general principles with regard to defence.

We are, in the world sense, a very young State, scarcely reached the use of reason, and anyone listening in to defence debates for the past three or four years would say that it will be many years before we reach the use of reason. We are living in a world emerging from a war of mighty combinations, a war of many millions on one side and many millions on the other side. Ours was a tiny island, detached, divorced, isolated, neutral, in the middle of that world blood bath. According to many people inside and outside the Dáil, the world is facing another war situation similar to the last.

The main part of our Army debate has turned in recent years on whether our Army strength will be Deputy Traynor's strength of 9,000 or Deputy O'Higgins's strength of 8,000 odd. Surely with that background the whole thing is silly, futile, unrealistic, nonsensical? I have been asked in previous debates, since I became Minister for Defence, would I take the House into my confidence, would I give the Army plan, would I give the Army scheme, would I give Government policy. I have been accused of many things, perhaps with a certain amount of justice in the accusation, but one accusation to which I will not plead guilty is lack of candour with Dáil Éireann.

Since I came over here I introduced clauses to reinstate deserters; I introduced cuts in the Army bill; I introduced reductions in the Army strength; I introduced a number of things that nobody could say were going to be palatable hearing or popular in their reception. But I gave them out and I have endeavoured since I came over here to take the Dáil fully into my confidence with regard to defence matters, defence difficulties and defence delicacies in this country. Before entering into the details of this year's Estimate I want to jog the recollections of Deputies, particularly those sitting opposite, with regard to statements made time and again over the past two and a half years since I came over here, and repeated as recently as last February, asking time and again for replies that have been given over and over again on every occasion when it became part of my responsibility to stand up here and discuss Army and defence matters.

As late as our debate on the Temporary Army Bill on the 28th February last, we had Deputy Traynor, an ex-Minister for Defence, asking, for instance, if we had any policy with regard to other nations in the world which are confronted with similar dangers to ours. He asked: "Is there an assurance from some of the people whom he—that is, myself—regarded as our protectors? Is there any alliance or what is the reason why we are to-day so complacent?" We had that line of argument followed up by other Deputies opposite: the kind of suggestion, the kind of thrown-out suspicion that there was some kind of a secret alliance, some kind of a sinister tying-up of this country with some other country unnamed with regard to our defence position. Emphatically, categorically and in the very clearest way that was possible for a man not having the command of language that others may have, I made our position clear time and again since 1948 in that respect, and still as late as February last we had that question asked.

The question does not matter, but the effect of the question does matter. The mere fact that an ex-Minister for Defence puts such a question into a speech conveys to a great percentage of our population that there is some reason for the question, and that there is some suspicion with regard to the activities of the Minister or of the Government. The Deputy opposite was a member of the Government that framed the Constitution under which we all live at the present moment. As a member of that Government and a Deputy of the Dáil, it should be within his knowledge that any such arrangement, any such alliance or any such contract could not be made without it being brought here in the broad light of day for approval or disapproval to Dáil Éireann.

We had, in the course of that same debate, other Deputies following the lead that was given, asking the same question, asking if we had given bases in this country to any other power, asking if there was not some secret arrangement to give bases either to the American forces or to the British forces. Surely to goodness in this year of 1950, there should be enough trust in the honesty of our elected public representatives appointed to responsible Government positions to know that, if there was anything of that kind, there is enough contact between the Government and the Deputies in an Irish Dáil to have the thing discussed and to have the information given without this kind of taking the subject matter of one's speech from any sensational journalistic pen either in a home paper or in a foreign paper.

We, in this country, like a great number of other countries, are living in a very difficult time from a defence point of view. Things are not just as simple as they were ten or 14 years ago. The Leader of the Opposition, in the course of that debate, asked what provision we are making with regard to the accumulation of armaments and military supplies as against the next probable or possible world war. In the course of that discussion I did endeavour to give to the Leader of the Opposition, and to the members of his Party, some kind of an insight as to what is the position of this country and of other countries, in this post-war world in which we are living, and of how very, very different it is from the world in which we lived either before the last war or during the last war with regard to the supply of arms and of armaments.

In the course of that statement by the Leader of the Opposition, he pointed out that, on the eve of the last war, we found ourselves in the position of having ordered our armanents and our military supplies from European countries and of the transport of those arms being interrupted by the war. I only wish to God that we were living in those days now where it was possible even to order arms and armaments from European countries even at the risk of their delivery being interrupted by war. He talked of massing arms and armaments as against the next war, while Deputy de Valera, junior, has addressed questions to me time and again with regard to the amount of money which we are voting or spending on warlike stores and armaments.

I think this is the fifth speech I have made in this House, since I became Minister for Defence, in which I have pointed out every time that the whole world situation has changed with regard to the supplies of arms and armaments or with anything that has to do with the equipment of the Army. We are isolated here. The world is formed up into two mighty combinations with appendages. We are not either in one combination or the other, and we are not an appendage to one combination or another. Both of those mighty combinations are busily arming and producing arms for all that are inside of the combination, and, after that, the appendages. We are not living in a world in which we can order arms as in the past from Czechoslovakia, from France, from Germany, from America, from Britain. We are not living in a world in which these countries will even accept our orders. Since the end of the last war, we have been getting driblets of supplies from one country, and one country only up to date, that is, Great Britain. With all our quarrels with her, with all our difficulties and with all the sense of soreness on different points which may exist between Britain and ourselves, it is nevertheless due to her to say that, but for the driblets of supplies we are getting from her, we would not have equipment even for the small Army we are keeping at the moment.

That is a situation which I want Deputies opposite in particular to face up to meeting with me. It is not a situation which is the choice of any of us, but it is the situation which exists. We do not produce anything in this country—not a rifle, not a bullet, not a pop-gun. The day when armies consisted of marching men and muskets went by 50 years ago. The smallest part of a modern army is the man— equipment is the thing that matters. If a modern brigade passed down O'Connell Street nowadays, a brigade equipped in the modern way, it would have passed by and none of us would have seen scarcely one human being. An army equipped nowadays in the modern way is equipped heavily and armoured. It is the heavy stuff that matters. I am asked by the Leader of the Opposition to build up military supplies, armaments, against the possibility or the probability of a coming war. If I could do it, I would not want to be urged, and if the Leader of the Opposition could do it, I would be behind him all the time in doing it. Everything in the way of warlike equipment, protective material, to put into the hands of the defence forces of this country will be bought and will not be stopped for want of money. If there is a certain figure down in the Estimates, it is there merely because there is honesty and candour in presenting the Estimate and because we place before the Dáil the amounts we hope or expect to get within the financial year. I could lull into quiescence all the uneasiness of Deputies at different points of the House by multiplying the figure, by putting down ten times as much, but in the end getting only the same quantity. At the end of the year, would I be honest? A Budget is supposed to be framed on the sound, honest estimate of the expenditure you reckon to incur during the year and the Army Estimate is framed definitely and firmly on the honest reckoning of our expenditure in the year ahead. I will give the House later on a description of the machinery that exists at the moment—cumber-some, difficult and delaying machinery —with regard to supplies of arms and armaments.

I am asked by Deputies opposite with a note of interrogation in their voices: have we entered into any alliances and is there any secret agreement with any Great Power? With regard to the national situation, I think it will be conceded by this time that, irrespective of Parties or of places, we have all the same national outlook. If we had no difficult history behind us, if we had no political difficulties at the moment with regard to neighbouring countries, the natural thing for any Minister for Defence or any Government in a little island such as this, with the potentialities of an adequate ground force without a navy and without the necessary equipment or material for the arming of that Army and for protection from sea and air, would be, living in a world of great combinations, such as that in which we live at the moment, to look for alliance with the country which could provide sea and air protection and the quid pro quo for that sea and air protection would be the food supply that we could give to that country.

That would be as simple as A.B.C., if it were not for sentimental reasons, for historical difficulties and for the political difficulties that make it impossible at the moment. We would supply the land and the material to defend the soil of this country and protect the left flank of Great Britain by producing, during war, food for her and she would supply the air and sea element. As things are, that is utterly outside the realm of practical politics. It would be as impossible to conceive any Irish Government entering such an alliance as it would be to conceive an English Government allying itself with a country which occupied portion of Britain. As a result of that occupation of part of our country, we are forced, willy-nilly, into a position of neutrality in a war-like world. Armchair critics sneer at us and say: "Do these fools in Ireland think they can defend themselves against the world or against the forces of the world?" We are not fools. We do not think we can do that, but we know that we have a sacred responsibility or two such responsibilities, if you like: to do our utmost, be that very much or very little, to defend the territory rightfully belonging to our people and not to sell our soul or our heritage by entering into a combination with a country which has grabbed, and continued to hold, portion of our territory.

The whole position is difficult, delicate and dangerous, but that is no reason why we should shy at it. All we can do is to adapt ourselves to the circumstances that exist and to face facts. You will never get rid of facts by pretending that they are not there or by thinking that, by circling around them or turning the blind eye to them, they do not exist. The facts are that we are here alone, living in a world of danger, with no supplies of our own. Production, food supply, agricultural and industrial production, are as important to a nation engaged in war, or even living in a world engaged in war, as are armies. We must aim at having a nation prepared for the worst, without disorganising the life of the nation or interfering with production. Some day we must arrive at some agreed defence policy.

I thought, many years ago, on a motion moved to the Defence Forces Bill by the present Leader of the Opposition, that this Dáil of ours had reached something like an agreed defence programme, when we had an Army of approximately 7,000 men, all ranks, and when he, and the man who was subsequently his Minister for Defence, considered that such a Regular Army was beyond the financial capacity of this country to bear and that our defence plan should be based on a small Army, highly trained and expansible, with the maximum number of territorial volunteers outside barrack walls. The then Minister for Defence welcomed that proposal and agreed to work towards that particular objective. It would appear to anyone that, on the main principles of our defence scheme, agreement had been reached.

The Government changed. The present Leader of the Opposition became Taoiseach; a member of the present Opposition Front Bench became Minister for Defence, and that plan was immediately put into being and a Volunteer force alongside of a tiny Army was the order of the day. From 1932 up to 1939, the strength of the Army never reached more than 6,000 men, all ranks. It was 5,823, then 5,763, then 5,582, then 5,799, 5,885, 6,519; and in 1939, the year of the war, it was 7,262. Outside and above that Army, outside the barracks, a Volunteer force was built up which became the second line of reserve in the event of war.

Then the war came. Naturally, during the war years, we had, as every country in the world had, an Army of great strength, immense force in comparison to the population, at immense cost. Most of the Deputies responsible for the type of speeches to which I have been listening for the last three years had little or no Army experience outside the war years. Of course, it came as a shock to them when, after the war, the Army contracted to something like its normal strength. I was an Army man during the war years and I remember thinking after the emergency years, in the twenties, when the Army was reorganised down to peace-time standards, that the Army was a joke, that they might as well liquidate it. After some time I found that it was all right, that it was the central training cadre around which a reserve could be built like flesh on to bone; with the Second Reserve at that time, the "B" Reserve, added in case of emergency.

Now we are again in the post-war years and I am presenting to Dáil Éireann a Regular Army very considerably greater than that of a peace-time period. It is 50 per cent. greater in numbers than ever was held in peace years by either the Fianna Fáil Government or the Cumann na nGaedheal Government. I am presenting also to Dáil Éireann, in this Estimate, for approval, reserves far greater in strength of numbers than this country ever had in peace years heretofore. At the same time, I am asking the Dáil to take the decision that our only life-line and our only hope, from a general defence point of view, in the military sense, is to get the maximum number of the manhood of this country trained in the Volunteer Reserve. If half the words that are spun here in Dáil Éireann year after year, on Estimates, on Temporary Defence Forces Bills, were used outside in asking at meetings for a half-a-dozen men to join the F.C.A., then I would say that Deputies were contributing something to the country's defence. You are contributing nothing to it by lambasting the Minister for Defence, whoever he may be, by criticising his Estimates, whatever they may be. If you are sincere, if you are genuine, if you are really anxious about the defence of this country, you will see about getting our manhood into some kind of an Army-controlled organisation.

The F.C.A. is not an organisation built up by this Government. The F.C.A. was designed by my predecessor. I want to give it a chance. It is only on trial. It may be a success. It may be a failure. There is no effort on my part or on the part of the Army that will be spared towards making it a success. It was a short time attestation service. The period of attestion falls in this year. We have devoted the best part of two years to trying to get down to the hard core of what is really there in the event of an emergency. Numbers on paper are meaningless. We tried to get down to what is really effective within those great numbers. We find that there is quite a considerable force, a worthwhile force, a force that, if it were adequately trained, would be a very useful and valuable force.

We have multiplied the number of regular personnel attached to the F.C.A. We have multiplied the number of N.C.O.s. We have practically doubled the number of officers. If we can get refills of those falling in, if we can get the members to believe to what great extent this country has to look to the manhood of that civilian army as a protective screen in time of emergency, then there will be an injection of enthusiasm into that force that will ensure that a higher percentage would turn up for training than have turned up in previous years.

The other side of the picture is: you have a force; you have a nominal roll; you have membership. Of that huge nominal roll you have 10 or 12 per cent. turning up for training. A little all-out effort would ensure that that 10 or 12 would be 20 or 40 per cent.

Is it too much to ask Deputies in Dáil Éireann for real co-operation in the direction of trying to make the best of what we have, of trying to make more out of it than has been made out of it up to this? Is there any useful purpose served by merely standing up and criticising, by merely saying: "You have not this"—and I admit we have not it—"you are not getting that"— and I admit we are not getting it. There are difficulties in the way of supplies. There are difficulties in the way of training. What we have is a loyal, disciplined, highly-trained Army, each man more or less an expert in his own job, officers probably more highly trained in the theory of war than officers in any country in the world, N.C.O.s of long service, well trained, recruits—privates—of a good brand. We have, outside of that, these large numbers but not turning up for training in any greater percentage than I have indicated. Surely co-operation and interest in defence lie along the line of trying to stimulate greater interest and greater enthusiasm in the manhood of the country for equipping themselves towards the responsible task of defence.

This country won its liberty, its freedom—the part of the country that is free—by the voluntary effort of generations, without expert guidance, without the assistance of any central, highly trained, expert, regular army, just by the enthusiasm of the membership, by the stimulation that was given to membership by the public men of the time. Having secured that liberty and that independence, is it too much to ask that the public men of our time should keep up the enthusiasm for the defence of the liberties already won?

I must point out, in the first place, to the Dáil that the framework of this Estimate, as regards the strength or numbers of Army personnel, is the peace establishment of the Army, which is substantially the same as that adopted as far back as November, 1946, and consists of 1,356 officers and 11,572 other ranks. As there seems to be a considerable amount of confusion on this point, it should be remembered that, during the emergency, no details regarding numbers or stores were given to the Dáil, and the whole expenditure on the Forces was given in one total sum under one sub-head. That method of presenting the Estimate obtained down to the financial year 1945-46. In that year, the total amount was again actually printed in the Estimates Volume, but at a later stage and before the Estimate was taken in the House, the Department substituted an Estimate under the normal peace-time sub-heads. Regarding numbers, however, as the peace establishment had not been fixed at the time, the numbers of personnel given represented only the estimated average strength over the year. This also obtained in 1946-47.

In 1947-48, the peace establishment again was used as the framework of the Estimate and has continued to be so used ever since. But the Dáil is not asked to vote or to approve or to provide money for that establishment. The numbers are only given for the information of the Dáil and what the Dáil is asked to vote is money to pay and maintain a proportion of that establishment. Hence, at the end of each of the relevant sub-heads, after showing what the cost of each establishment would be, a deduction is made in respect of numbers being below strength during the financial year. What those numbers are is not shown in the Estimate but is always indicated by the Minister in his opening statement introducing the Estimate. Thus, in 1947-48, against an establishment (including the Construction Corps) of 15,330 all ranks, provision was made for only 11,122 all ranks (including 1,482 for the Construction Corps), leaving an Army strength of 9,640.

Against an establishment of 13,079 we provided in 1948-49 for only 9,358, and in 1949-50 for 8,077 all ranks. It will be seen, therefore, as regards numbers, that since 1947 the Defence Estimate has always been presented to the Dáil within the same framework of the peace establishment, less deductions.

The present Estimate for 1950-51 proceeds on the same lines. Under sub-heads A, E, and P (2), there is shown the peace establishment of 1,356 officers and 11,572 other ranks, but at the foot of each of these sub-heads certain deductions are made in respect of numbers being below strength during the financial year, so that, in effect, the Dáil is asked to approve and to vote the pay and maintenance not of the peace establishment, but of an average of 1,081 officers and 6,750 other ranks. In addition, provision is made for 13 chaplains, 130 cadets and 98 nurses— that is a total establishment of 8,072 all ranks and services. The total gross cost of that force in pay and allowance is £2,661,353, or approximately 64.42 per cent. of the total gross Vote.

For the Reserve, First Line, there is no establishment, and the Estimate is based on the average anticipated strength during the year with deductions in respect of both officers and men who do not attend for annual training. The estimated average is 644 officers and 5,337 other ranks. The total gross cost of that line is £140,319, but, allowing for the fact that the attendance of officers will probably not exceed 90 per cent. and that of men 70 per cent. a deduction has been made of £32,526, leaving the cost of pay, grants and maintenance at £107,793 or 2.61 per cent. of the Estimate.

For the Reserve, Second Line, which consists mainly of the F.C.A. with the small naval component, there is again no establishment and the Estimate proceeds on the basis of the average estimated strength with deductions in respect both of non-effectivity and of non-attendance at annual training. With a voluntary force such as the F.C.A. it is impossible to forecast with any degree of reasonable accuracy what will be the average effective strength for the year. For instance, when this Estimate was framed, the effective strength of other ranks was taken as about 30,000, but since then a complete departmental audit of the rolls, etc., of all units during the past two months showed that the units were carrying about 8,540 non-effectives. This makes the effective strength something in the region of 21,500 all ranks, and in estimating the cost we have to consider what proportion of that number will attend for annual training. Here the best line to take is the numbers attending in 1949, and they were 13½ per cent. in the case of other ranks and 27 per cent. in the case of officers. Making due allowance, therefore, for the two factors of non-attendance at annual training and ineffectivity, the gross Estimate of £298,837 for the line has been cut by about 35 per cent. to, approximately, £191,441. To this must be added £16,000 as Grants-in-Aid to the force, so that the estimated cost of this line will be £207,441 or 5.02 per cent. of the Estimate.

Finally, as regards personnel, a fourth heavy item of expenditure is that for civilians. The present Estimate provides for about 2,050, including 520 civil servants engaged in the administration of the Department and about 1,530 others attached in various professional, technical, skilled and unskilled capacities to units throughout the Army. The cost of this civilian body is £632,226 or 15.30 per cent. of the Vote. In previous debates some critical references were made to the high numbers of civilians attached to or in attendance on our technical corps, transport corps, air force, etc. It is a very unsatisfactory position. Our naval service, air service, transport service and engineering service are all to a very great extent serviced by civilians. Civilians are not mobile in the event of war and it means that if these particular services move away from their base they move away from their service personnel. That is the position not only in our Army I think at the present moment, but in the British Army. It was a direct outcrop of a war decision in both armies regarding a readjustment of pay on the star system. Heretofore technical men were paid especially high rates of pay and they were attested as soldiers. Since the alteration in the pay system here a man was paid according to the number of stars he had earned joining as a recruit on the lower basis and getting up according to time and standards to a high rate of pay and we have found—and I believe the same applies across the water—that you just cannot recruit tradesmen. That is a position that has to be looked into.

The pay and maintenance of the personnel thus outlined constitutes, as pay always does, a primary charge in the Vote, and from what has been said it is clear that the first cost of the Army, including reserves and civilians, as covered by this Estimate, is £3,608,813 or 87.35 per cent. of the Vote.

For general, as distinct from warlike stores, the sum of £323,603 is provided and covers a miscellany of items such as medicines, mechanical transport, petrol and oils, horses, equipment for workshops and for training, tools and plant for engineers, and the maintenance of barracks. The cost represents 7.83 per cent. of the Vote.

For warlike stores, there is provided £33,100 under sub-head O and £94,871 under the regular sub-head P—a total of £127,971, which is £10,000 more than the corresponding figure for 1949-50. This total is, however, only 3.10 per cent. of the Army Vote, and may seem to compare unfavourably with the amount other countries are spending on their armaments. But here we must face facts. We are now in a seller's market and we cannot get even the modest items we require and are willing to pay for. In former years it was possible to arrange for the purchase of equipment direct with the supplier, but now we have to work direct to the Ministry of Supply, who, when they have ascertained what stores are available, distribute them in an order of priority among several nations who are seeking the stores.

I referred to the fact earlier on that Great Britain, America, France and countries that it is possible or might be possible in the normal way for us to buy from will only sell to us after they have supplied countries that are in alliance with them and countries that are more or less tagged on to such an alliance. Therefore, with regard to the supply of materials of this kind, we have gone very much back. Moreover, the procedure is complicated. First we have to send early in the financial year a list—called a "forecast"—of all our requirements, but that forecast binds neither party to the transaction.

At a later stage the Ministry sends us a list of available stocks, and from this we make what is called a "firm demand." But here again the demand is not a contract, for at a still later stage the Ministry, having decided what quantities of our firm demand will be made available, sends us a "sales agreement" which, when signed, constitutes a contract, but again gives no guarantee as regards the date of delivery. A good illustration of the whole procedure and the difficulties inherent therein is afforded by the Estimate for 1949-50. The forecast for that year totalled £125,788 and provision for that amount was, accordingly, made in the Estimate. At the "firm demand" stage this was reduced to £48,890, and after conferences between officials of both Governments in London in December, 1949, "sales agreements" were promised for mid-January, 1950, but in mid-March, two weeks before the close of the financial year, "sales agreements" have materialised only to the extent of about £3,800. In pointing out these difficulties, we are not making any charge of unfair discrimination or bias. We have always been facilitated in every possible manner. But the fact is that the articles are in short supply, and we must take our place in the queue of 22 other countries seeking to get them.

As regards the proposed Grant-in-Aid to the Irish Red Cross Society, I should explain that most, if not all, of the sum of £10,000 which is provided will be used to recoup to the society the money which it is expending in caring, at the request of the Government, for the refugees who landed at Cork from Sweden last September. They were accommodated at Rockgrove Military Camp where they have since been looked after with the utmost care by the Cork branch of the society. A number have already left for Canada and the majority of the remaining refugees have secured visas and will proceed to Canada in the near future. I am happy to have this opportunity of paying tribute to the work done by the Red Cross Society which is in accordance with the high principles of the Red Cross.

The financial implications of the Defence Vote may, therefore, be summarised under the following general headings:—

	£
1. Cost of Regular Army (including Naval Service)	2,661,353
2. Cost of Reserve—First Line	107,793
3. Cost of Reserve—Second Line	207,441
4. Cost of Civilians	632,226
5. Cost of General Stores	323,603
6. Cost of Warlike Stores	127,971
7. Cost of Incidental Stores	71,135
Total	£4,131,522

The Dáil is aware that during the last financial year the pay and allowance scheme for the Army was altered. I take it that Deputies are familiar with the new rates of pay and allowances. I think the only other thing that remains for me to report to the Dáil is the result of the recruiting drive that lasted for approximately three months from January to the end of March. The number of recruits who presented themselves up to the 31st March, 1950, was 2,109. The nnmber accepted was 1,104, or approximately one half the number who presented themselves. That leaves the total strength of the Army, all ranks, according to the latest figures given to me, at 8,113. Recruiting is still continuing but only in the normal way. Actually, I think since the 31st March 57 others have been accepted. If there are any other points arising out of the statement, I shall be happy to deal with them. Most of the figures I have here are merely a repetition of what is in the Book of Estimates.

Mr. Traynor

I move that the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration. In doing so, I want to say that I am not criticising the items contained in the Estimates, but rather am I concerned with its omissions. The Minister's speech has made it abundantly clear that the old maxim of the poacher turned gamekeeper is very true. Rarely have I listened to such audacious effrontery as I have listened to from the Minister this evening. If anyone thinks my language is exaggerated I would refer him to the discussions on the Defence Estimates which took place in this House when I was Minister for Defence. In those days I had to listen to the abuse hurled at me by the Minister who now appeals to the Deputies in opposition for honesty, for fair and reasonable criticism and so on. Indeed, I can emphasise the fact by telling the House that a member of one of the Parties, now a Minister in the Coalition group, dissociated himself from the remarks that were made.

I have heard Deputies make appeals from time to time to keep the Army clear of politics. I think I can reasonably say that during my period as Minister for Defence I have no complaint to register in respect of any Deputy endeavouring to link the Army directly with any particular political Party. But so long as this Estimate must be discussed here, and I know of no other place in which it can be discussed, so long will there appear to be an attempt to link the Army with politics.

To my mind a most dangerous situation has developed. It is dangerous to the Army at the present time and dangerous to the future of the Army. I refer to the fact that if, on every occasion there is a change of Government, there is also a change of policy in respect of the Army then there can be no future for the Army. It cannot develop along any particular line. Suppose, for instance, a Government decided on a particular line of policy and suppose that shortly after that decision a change of Government takes place and that policy changes with the Government, then there can be no future for the Army. It would be well for us to examine the position that developed before the present Government came into office. It was a development that was not accepted by the present Minister. Round about the time of the change one had the impression that the Minister could hardly contain himself and could hardly wait until he occupied the ministerial seat before he would change the policy then in operation. Probably that was because that particular policy came into being during the period of office of the Fianna Fáil Government. The position as far as that policy was concerned was that in 1945 I was presented by the Chief of Staff with a scheme to which he asked me to give serious consideration and, if I were satisfied with it, to present it to the Government. I examined the scheme and in due course I submitted it to the Government. The Government considered it at a number of meetings over quite a long period. Having examined it to the extent that laymen could examine it, the Government then decided to set up a sub-committee of the Cabinet with the then Taoiseach as its chairman in order to meet the Army specialists responsible for the scheme and to discuss it with them. Again a number of meetings took place.

This scheme was not a scheme of the Fianna Fáil Government. It was a scheme put up by men who have devoted their lives to service in the Army—men who have studied military science, who have undergone military courses and who, in addition, have had experience of a condition of affairs in this country that never existed before. These were the gentlemen who produced this scheme. They produced it as a result of the experience through which they had gone during the period of the emergency and, trying to foresee the future, they hoped no other General Headquarters Staff would ever have to experience a similar state of affairs.

Who, then, were these officers who conceived and placed this plan before the Fianna Fáil Government? I think it will be agreed by every Deputy in the House that the officers of the Army have no affiliations with any political Party. I think that that will be agreed by everybody. It is true enough to say that they are entitled to think politically if they wish to think politically and to vote. However, every section of the community is entitled to do that and they are exercising their rights within the Constitution when they do that. I want, however, to emphasise that during the civil strife each and every one of these gentlemen was on an opposite side to the members of the Government to whom they had submitted the scheme. That did not affect the judgment of the then Government. The then Government did not say: "Which side were these fellows on in the Civil War?" They knew these men were specialists in their profession and, because they were specialists in their profession, they decided to examine carefully the scheme which was placed before them. Having done so, they, after consultation, produced this modified example of the scheme. That was the scheme which was then brought in here by me, through the medium of a Defence Estimate, in 1946. I introduced it then in the hope, as the Army itself had that hope, that the scheme would be acceptable to the House. Instead of being accepted by the House it was met with the most virulent type of opposition imaginable. Not only did those Deputies who ordinarily discussed this particular Estimate oppose it but the present Minister for Finance, then Deputy McGilligan, who very rarely participated in debates on the Defence Estimate, was brought in as a special reinforcement. In a speech, which covered no less than 13 columns of the Official Report, he had this to say—Volume 100, columns 644-45: "If we are to have a real Army to defend this country, it is not £4,500,000 we need but £10,500,000. Are we going to spend that?" Continuing, he said: "Can this country afford the equipment which is necessary to give us what I may describe as a real Army, as opposed to a sham? If the Deputy wants to argue the question"—he was referring to a speech by a Deputy from the Government side of the House—"as to whether the country could have been occupied in 1939 or 1940, I ask him to think of a couple of things. Knowing well, as he must, the state of the Army at that stage, and could it have kept out anything?" That was what was running through Deputy McGilligan's mind.

The answer I would be inclined to give to the question which the then Deputy posed as to whether the Army of 1939 and 1940 could have kept out anything is that any army of considerable force attempting to occupy this country in 1939 and 1940 could not have been defeated by the Army which we then had. However, I should like to add that it certainly would, if the Government had decided that it should defend the nation, have defended the nation with all its might and courage and skill and, when it was defeated, as it probably would be defeated, the people, in the traditional style to which a tribute was paid by the Minister a few minutes ago, would have continued their defence of the nation as all the generations before them had done and the occupation troops would have known very well that the fight had not ended when the Army was defeated.

The answer to the question posed by the then Deputy as to whether we were to have a real army or a sham army would be somewhat as follows. I should say, first of all, that the only alternatives I know to a sham army are a real army or no army, and it is dishonest for any Government—I do not care whether it is a Fianna Fáil Government or the present Government— to preserve in this country any army that could be regarded as a sham army. If we are to have an army in this country it must be an army that will be regarded by the nations outside these shores as capable of providing sufficient protection against another outside nation's coming in here and attempting to use our territory as a base for attack on some other nation. Naturally, if a nation cannot be assured that that is the position, it is almost certain that we shall find ourselves occupied in due course. I say, as I have repeatedly said, that were it not for the troops we had in the field during the emergency this country would have been occupied. I do not think that at any stage during the emergency—at one period we had as many as 42,000 Regular Army men in the field—the Estimate ever reached £10,500,000. It is quite possible that the same Army to-day would cost much more than it cost from 1940 to 1946. However that may be, the fact of the matter is that, at the time the Deputy was talking, £10,500,000 would have given us an army even greatly in excess of the Army we then had.

With an Army of 12,500 men, we could have, at the end of two years, about 5,000 men going into the Reserve ranks every year. In five or six years there would be at the back of the Army a Reserve of from 20,000 to 30,000 men. Can anyone realise the peace of mind it would be to a general officer commanding, who knew that within 72 hours of the start of an emergency, such as that with which the late general headquarters staff had been confronted, he would have behind him an Army of 30,000 men, according to the strength of the Reserve? In addition to that, he would also have the knowledge that he had the Volunteer force the Minister has been emphasising as so necessary to the nation.

What that does is this. In a period of emergency England, or any other nation that is interested, as England would be, in the territory of this country, would feel assured that there was within the four shores of Ireland an Army capable of preventing another nation from coming in here, occupying its territory and using it against herself. That is all we are asking for in making our demands for an Army that will provide these safeguards for the people.

There is a sum of £78,000 on the Book of Estimates and that goes to do many things, but in respect of the Army it does practically nothing. So far as that tremendous increase of £12,750,000 is concerned, it does practically nothing with regard to the Army. The money will be expended in various directions, probably in directions that we would all support, but the words of Deputy Dillon—as he then was; he is now the Minister for Agriculture—still remain, that if we have not got an Army here that will provide the protection necessary, an invader will come in, the money will be gone, and your Army will be gone. That is the position we want to insure against.

I will quote the Minister. He quoted me, and it is no harm that we should have a throw-back. The Minister, as recently as last February, had this to say—he was speaking on the Temporary Provisions Bill and he was reported in Volume 119, column 884:

"...as things are, we have to rely on our own strength to hold this island against anybody who may be an aggressor."

I thoroughly agree with these sentiments, and every member on this side of the House thoroughly agrees with them. These are the things we have been saying all along; these are the things we are prepared to back up. We are going to support anything the Minister will do to provide an Army that will be prepared to meet any aggressor, whoever it may be.

Dr. O'Higgins

But you will not support the Army your leader wanted in 1932.

Mr. Traynor

I did not catch what the Minister said, but I want to tell the House that the present strength of the Army, plus the present strength of the Reserve, is only a few hundred in excess of the figure we are asking for the Regular Army. The combined strength of the Regular Army to-day, plus that of the Reserve Force, the First Line, is only a few hundred in excess of the 12,500 Army we are appealing to the Minister to bring into being.

The Minister has referred to the critical situation which exists in the world. Perhaps there was never a more critical situation. It is even more critical now than the situation which confronted the world in late 1938 and early in 1939. Already we have lost two valuable years in which we could have been producing from the Regular Army a strong Reserve. These two years can yet be made up if common-sense is used and if the Minister and the Government will not try to regard this recommendation of the General Headquarters Staff as something that was conceived in the minds of the Fianna Fáil Government. It was not conceived in the minds of the Fianna Fáil Government; it was conceived in the minds of the Army experts. We, believing in the ability of these men to appreciate the situation, provided them with the minimum—not the maximum—of their demands and it is this minimum that we are asking the Minister to give consideration to.

There is very little use in twitting me about the 9,000 men in the Book of Estimates or laughing at the 12,500 Army that is only mythical as far as the figures go because they were never reached. They were never reached for the simple reason that the change of Government brought about a change of policy. I regard that as a very serious state of affairs. I have said that £78,000,000 will be expended on various services. Of that vast sum something like £270,000 will be utilised as an additional amount for the Army. When we examine the £270,000 we find that £231,000 will go into additional pay for certain Army personnel, leaving the residue of £39,000 to be utilised under other sub-heads for similar increases in pay for other personnel. In effect it means that no extra provision, good, bad or indifferent, has been made for the Army in this financial year. That serious state of affairs ought to be altered and I appeal strongly to Deputies on the other side of the House to regard it as their duty to impress on the Minister that he should provide for the nation the safeguards that the Army authorities feel the nation should get.

I was rather concerned, as I was going through the Book of Estimates, when I found, under one sub-head—I think it is sub-head A, dealing with the pay of officers, cadets, N.C.O.s and men—figures indicating the Air Corps flying pay. There is a decrease there of £1,375. I take it that when dealing with an Estimate such as this that decrease might be described as infinitesimal. No one is going to worry too much about the smallness of it, but it indicates a decrease. That is the point that I want to drive home. Deputies who have regularly participated in the discussion on the Estimate for the Department of Defence will recall that of all the corps and services in the Army, the Air Corps was the one in respect of which appeals were made to me as Minister, year after year, to increase the strength of it.

As I have said, the decrease may be infinitesimal when compared with the total Estimate. There may be some reason for it. It may be due to some readjustment of pay or to a readjustment of one kind or another. That, however, is not explained in the Book of Estimates. The ominous thing, as I have said, is that it is a decrease. I should like if the Minister, when concluding, would give an explanation of what the decrease does in fact mean.

Under sub-head J—Mechanical Transport—there is a reduction of £13,000. Everybody knows that armies to-day do not march on their feet or their stomachs. They are carried by mechanical transport. This is the age of speed, and so I regard it as a retrograde step that we should have this reduction of £13,000 in the way of capital expenditure on vehicles. Under sub-head P —Warlike Stores—there is also a slight reduction. I am well aware of the difficulties to which the Minister has referred. They are there, and they have got to be overcome. I know that orders for warlike stores have to be put in by a certain date, and that if they are not in by that date they do not receive consideration and are not put on the list for supplies for the coming year. I suppose it is not necessary to urge the Minister— I take it that he is doing his best—as regards the amount to be spent on the warlike stores that are available.

Under sub-head P (2)—Naval service—there is a monetary increase, but, strange to say, while that is so there is a decrease in the personnel of something like 151. Now 151 individuals constitute two crews for corvettes. I am sure Deputies are aware of the fact that the training of a seaman is a very much more difficult task than the training of an ordinary soldier. Under normal peace-time conditions, you can turn out a soldier inside 12 months.

The period for a highly trained soldier will perhaps take longer. It is quite impossible, however, to turn out a seaman, to give him all the experience that is necessary by bringing him to sea and by putting him through the various phases of drill on board ship so as to produce an efficient seaman, in less than three years. Therefore, it seems to me a pity that this decrease of 151 should be taking place at a critical period such as this. It means that two crews for two corvettes would not be available if the corvettes were available to-morrow. We should have, and always did have, plans for crews in excess of the number of vessels which we held. If what appears in the Estimate is correct, it would appear that we will have two crews less than the number we actually require. That, to my mind, is a very serious thing.

Under sub-head P (1)—Air-Raid Precautions—there is a very small reduction. In fact, the total sum allotted to this particular sub-head is very small— something like £1,000. In this respect we appear to be doing little or nothing. It looks as if we are doing practically nothing. Again, I would urge on the Minister to ensure that there are skeleton organisations in every large town in the country. Deputies who take an interest in defence forces will know that in England, at the present time, there is a high-powered campaign of publicity in the case of air-raid defence. That, again, only goes to show that in England they are preparing for the worst while, no doubt, hoping for the best. They are doing the logical common-sense thing in preparing for something that they see coming. I feel that in every large centre, such as Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Galway and the rest we, at least, should have a skeleton organisation of air-raid precautions so that if there is imminent danger the members of these skeleton organisations, like the regular soldiers in the Army, will be there to give the necessary training, as a result of their own experience, to the people who will come in to link up in that particular defence service.

I was also sorry to see that under sub-head C—Civilian Employment— something like 98 individuals are having their services dispensed with. I have come to the conclusion that these individuals must be some of the Old I.R.A. who were brought in to give service in the various barracks from time to time. I have come to that conclusion by reason of the fact that the sum of money in question is roughly equivalent to the amount of money which these men received in pay. If there is to be some curtailment in that service, I think the last people to suffer such an infliction should be those men who, in the main, were responsible for the establishment of this State.

That is all I have to say on the Estimate. I will conclude by making an appeal to the Minister not to take the criticism which comes from this side of the House as personal criticism of himself. He seems to adopt that attitude on every occasion when he is replying. He replies as if he, himself, had been attacked, whereas we, on this side, are simply urging him to do something which I, as an ex-Minister for Defence, would have dearly liked Deputies on this side to do when I was Minister—that is, to support me in my desire to produce an Army, a Reserve force and a Volunteer force that would be capable of giving to the people and to the nation the safeguards that both are entitled to.

In conclusion, I want to say that the only alternatives to the sham army to which Deputy McGilligan referred are a real army or no army, and I seriously suggest to Deputies that we want a real army. We cannot do without an army. We do not want an army merely to act, as the Minister said when in opposition, on ceremonial occasions or as an auxiliary to the police force. We want an army here in the same position as the army of every nation which exercises its own liberty and its own functions in regard to that liberty—an army capable of providing the necessary protection for ourselves and the necessary safeguards to other nations that the territory of this nation will not be used for attacks against them.

Mr. S. Collins

The Estimate for Defence is, in its very essence, something to which this House must address itself in a very serious way and I hope, in a spirit that is non-controversial, to try to help the Minister and to inform the House and, through the House, the country, with regard to the extraordinary situation—in the main, one over which we have no control—in which this country finds itself. I am going to say some things during the course of this debate which I feel are going to be deliberately misconstrued and, possibly, deliberately twisted, but I am going to say them because tonight, in a very serious way, on to the records of this House I intend to put a warning which I feel it my duty to issue to this Government and this Dáil and, through the Dáil, to the country.

We are in a position of jeopardy and there is no use in our seeking to minimise it or arguing about the number of personnel in any army when dealing with the problem. Defence, as I think even Deputy Traynor will readily agree, while it may be in a limited, basic way related to man-power, has in the modern world drifted to a considerable extent into the realm of higher physics and chemistry, of which Deputy de Valera has more knowledge than I have, and the wars of the future will be wars in relation to which we, as responsible people, will have to face the problem of rapidly and immediately educating, by any method in our power, not alone soldiers but the entire civilian population of the country in regard to a new and completely different type of aggression. If the next war is to come, none of us can deny that, in the main, whether it be the atom bomb or the hydrogen bomb, it will be a war of unique maniacal destructiveness. Never more true will Shakespeare's words ring than in the event of another world war because it will be a matter of: Cry havoc, and let loose the science of war.

What I want to refer to in a very serious way is the responsibility that we may be cloaking ourselves in the matter of our attitude to the partition of this country. Nobody in the House realises more firmly than I how unjust, how unsustainable and how odious is the occupation of part of this country by a foreign Power and it is true that this Government and this entire united Dáil have voiced their protest against it; but are we allowing ourselves for a moment, in our immediate concern with that situation, to jeopardise, as we may well be jeopardising, the future of the complete country in that game? The Minister for Defence was right in one thing he said, that in a future world war we shall have to be somewhere—not in between. Are we being completely wise in our attitude and would it not be wiser for the Minister, as I propose to urge, to bring into this House some day all the implications of the Atlantic Pact and all the implications of the modern defence schemes which are being conceived in the world and to let the House deliberate upon them in a very serious way, because we may be casting away, in our anxiety to meet an immediate urgent political problem, the whole future of this nation?

I have said that I feel that what I say will be distorted, but I am going to take that chance because I feel the time has come when some voice in this House should be raised to ask that in a very deliberate way we inquire into the line we are taking, because there is no doubt that even with the best brains and the best intentions of the best soldiers in the world—and our own Army officers, N.C.O.s and men will rank with those of any Army in any part of the world—without modern equipment, without the knowledge of modern defence methods and without the knowledge of how to counter potential attacks, these unfortunate men, officers, N.C.O.s and men, are like the civilian population, completely in the dark and in a completely new situation in which all their training is going to be of but little avail.

I do not want to approach this debate in anything like a controversial spirit. I want to try to get the whole of Dáil Éireann facing up to what is an immense responsibility not only to ourselves, to our children born already, but to untold generations of this nation, if it is to survive, who may some day be our judges and our taskmasters and who may ask why we, in 1950, facing the gathering world war clouds again, did not examine in a deliberate way as responsible individuals, where we were drifting. I will offer no criticism of the Minister. He is in a cleft stick and cannot stir. I firmly believe that this House would be unanimous in giving him all the money he wanted, if he could get the material and the warlike stores we need, but we have to face this fact, that, outside a certain type of alliance, we are not going to get that material and that equipment, and not going to be in a position to enable this nation to face any future aggression.

We have to face, once and for all, an issue that I believe is already knit across the breadth of the world. The next war will be a war of ideologies, the Christian ideology against that of the new, pagan, materialistic Communism. In that particular situation, we cannot stay neutral. We must realise here and now that no neutrality will be possible. I am, in an earnest and responsible way, raising my voice to ask the Minister, and through him the Government, to bring into the forum here for discussion the full implication of the present situation, so that in a deliberate way, not clouded by any immediate issue, we, as responsible Deputies who will have to answer for the stewardship of this country for which we are temporarily responsible, may have an opportunity of analysing the situation.

I know perfectly well that officers from our Army in the course of the last few years and, indeed, in the years when Deputy Traynor was here as Minister for Defence, went into the military schools of foreign armies all over the world and there merited credit for themselves and distinction for their country. We know they are very good and it ill behoves any of us to criticise them, but they might well find themselves in the position that, good and all as they are, they have only outmoded and outworn tools. This generation and this Dáil may, in subsequent generations, be indicted and rightfully indicted, for not having had the courage to face this very real issue now. No one admires more than I do the fact that the Government did take the view that we would join no Atlantic Pact while Ireland is partitioned. It was a manly and a noble gesture, but in the present ominous situation, having made our protest, we should carefully examine the position that too rigid adherence to that attitude may leave us in.

We do not want the British in Ireland—we never did—but at least there is one thing I earnestly appeal for, and direct the Government's mind to: we want to ensure that no wilful omission or neglect on our part may bring about a situation in which there will be no Ireland for anyone to live in. I am sure other Deputies who, like myself, are ex-members of the Defence Forces, interested in the development of modern warfare, interested in the theory of modern defence, interested in the theory of the inevitability of the coming war, realise how changed equipment is, how changed warlike stores are, even in a period of 12 months. We realise that many of our units are equipped with the rifles of the first world war. What purpose the Lee-Enfield rifle may serve in the future age of strato-cruiser atomic bombing I do not know, but I desire to direct attention to the fact that we may be unconsciously, through force of circumstances, shirking from action that, though it may have the stigma of momentary unpopularity, may have its vindication in the courage of men and women who were straight enough and honest enough to sink whatever may have been political advantage or the advantage of the hour to ensure that this nation of ours had a future.

When I think of our young officers coming back from the latest type of tank courses and radar courses, when I think of our pilots coming back, having merited distinction in the handling of new super-sound speed jets, I feel appalled that that knowledge, so hardly acquired and so creditably displayed, is to be dissipated through lack of equipment to train further personnel —and that lack of equipment being due to our allowing the immediate view of the present situation to cloud what may be the destiny of this country.

I know, of my own knowledge, going in and out of the Army to meet many of my former colleagues and still friends, that the Army does feel that its best intentions are falling short through lack of equipment. We can send our good young officers abroad to learn modern methods and modern technique, but how can they impart the knowledge to anybody at home when they cannot get the type of clothing or the anti-gas equipment to demonstrate their knowledge in a practical way to the civilian population?

I wish to say quite seriously that, no matter how bitterly I resent the partition of Ireland, I would take the responsibility here of urging that, even if we had seemingly to condone it by taking part in an Atlantic Pact to come within the defence zone of the Atlantic, we might then be showing more courage than by standing in deliberate isolation that might mean ultimate annihilation. The time has come for somebody—somebody more responsible possibly than I, somebody riper in experience and knowledge than I—to face the issue that we are gradually ticking away the valuable weeks, months and years, if years it is to be, before we find ourselves plunged into another world catastrophe, into a cataclysm, into another blood-bath, another mass extermination of nations, and we are wilfully ticking away those hours if we do not face the fact that it is essential to the future of the country that we should have both up-to-date knowledge and equipment if we are to survive at all.

I appeal to the Minister and to his colleagues in the Government to come in here some day to this deliberative assembly and let us—and the people of Ireland whom we represent and who are our masters—judge the full implications of our present position, so that we may take a solemn and responsible decision, in the light of the present circumstances, which are fraught with so many dangers. I want to make that appeal in a very earnest way because I think we do not at times realise how sinister, how ominous, how far-reaching are the tentacles of the new materialism under the guise of Communism or how increasingly necessary it is for this small nation, bulwark of Catholic philosophy, to gird itself with all the defences that the modern Republic of the great Americas can place at its disposal to ensure that, an outpost once, the island of saints and scholars, the seat of learning of a dark Western Europe, will remain a bulwark and ensure that the future world will see the light of a Christian ideal and a Catholic philosophy.

To come down to the question of the Army itself. Sometimes I feel terribly sorry for the Army, sorry that ex-Ministers for Defence, like Deputy Traynor, Ministers for Defence, like Deputy O'Higgins, or ex-Army officers, like Deputy Vivion de Valera, Deputy McQuillan and myself, in the heat of our own political aspirations, make arrows to fire at each other, while men toil fearlessly and unashamedly, doing the best they can within the framework of the Department of Defence and within the framework of the money they are given to spend.

I am very sorry that we have not a stronger Army. I will answer the Minister for Defence straight. He has indicated that there are ways in which responsible Deputies can help to strengthen and enlarge the F.C.A. I say to him quite straight: tell me what to do and I, certainly, for my part, will do my best to do it. I feel absolutely certain that Deputy Traynor or Deputy Colley would do the same. There is no difference, I think, between any of us on principle. There may be difference as to method.

I firmly believe—and I emphasise it again—that until we face up to the question of where our destiny lies in a future world war, we are only toying with the question by arguing as to whether it is 8,000, 9,000, or 12,000 men, because we will still be in the position that we will not have the modern instruments, modern equipment, modern technique that it is essential to place at the disposal of these men. We will not have it. We will not be able to train them in it. I am talking for a generation that was called upon, not to fight, but to come to the colours. I think Deputy Traynor will say manfully in this House at any time that well and truly, throughout the length and breadth of this country, that call was answered. The same blood is flowing through the veins of the people of this country. The same spirit activates them. I am firmly convinced that that call will never be made in vain from any Government in this country when this country is threatened.

I am oppressed, in fact depressed, when I feel that with all that wealth of voluntary effort, all that bank of goodwill, all that intense, sincere patriotism that is traditionally ours, we may find ourselves in the position of sheep for slaughter in a new and terrible situation. The position is that there is nobody in this country at the moment competent to instruct us in, or who has knowledge of, many of the new and terrible instruments of war.

At some time we will have to realise that, if we are to have an Army at all, we must analyse and take a firm decision on the first question first. Deputy Traynor closed on the note of a sham army or no army at all. I do not believe you could ever have a sham army in Ireland. I do not believe you could ever have no army at all because, deeply within us, no matter to what political sect we owe allegiance, our sense of patriotism that is fundamentally Irish, fundamentally national, will rise in any hour of trial or tribulation, to bring back again into the fields and the hillsides the younger men and the older men, still ready and willing to battle for a liberty hardly won and hardly kept.

We must realise—I think Deputy Vivion de Valera will possibly realise it with me—that the difference between 10,000 or 12,000 men is microscopic unless we are in the situation that we have some knowledge of the technique and new instruments of war and can have an army fit not only to defend itself but to train the civilian population in the new methods of air-raid precautions, unless we can have an F.C.A. equipped to deal with a new situation, and unless we can have all the voluntary services trained and equipped in modern methods and technique to the latest and highest degree. Unless we can have that, then I say, in a serious way, that well indeed may posterity indict the 13th Dáil as failing in its real obligation.

Mr. Colley

It seems to me, as far as this debate has gone, that we have made some advance on last year. There seems to be now a general realisation that the modern position is critical and that, of necessity, we must take our share or suffer our share in the conflict that seems to be coming on the world. Let us hope that we are wrong, that we are very wrong in that view and that things will not turn out as they seem at the moment to be about to turn out. It is a wise man surely who tries to do his best according to his lights to meet a threatening situation and if it does not happen such a man is all the better pleased to be able to say "Thank God, it never happened." Having that situation in mind we have been trying to draw attention here to the matter for the last few years. It seemed to be realised, yet when one comes to the Defence Estimate not one step has been taken as far as one can see to prepare for that situation beyond what was done last year and the year before. The total increase in the Estimate of about £270,000 seems to be accounted for by the rise in pay to personnel. No realisation of the position appears in this Estimate.

I heard Deputy Traynor quoting the Minister for Finance of some years back about a real or a sham army. I for one will never stand for a sham army. I think it would be outrageous deceit of our people to let them believe they had some sort of defence force if it were not capable of doing all possible, at least to the extent that we with our small population and small resources could expect. Again, it would be sheer waste of money. I think we should all agree on that. I think that the only thing for us to do is to get our real army within our resources of men, money and materials, an army which would be at least able to deal with the situation where we might be attacked.

We have the experience of the last war, the experience of what our Army in 1939 was able to do and there are very big lessons to be learned. Our Army staff tried to learn that lesson and they put up their proposals at the end of the emergency for what they believed to be the minimum—they could have done with far more—for safety and for a proper attempt to defend the country in the event of an invasion. We have been jibed at both when we were in office and when we were in Opposition for trying to bring about an Army which the Army staff believed to be the minimum. Anything less, I say, is a sham Army. None of us over here wants to spend money any more than anybody on the other side if it can be avoided, but why should we waste practically £4,000,000 a year if it is a sham Army? That must be the view of the Army chiefs when the very minimum they suggested was not accepted. Even if we accept it we cannot get that position to-morrow I admit, but we could do a lot if we were all agreed to build up the Army to that mininmum strength. Having built it up, if we were given some years, with the development of the Reserve and the enthusiasm that would probably be generated thereby in the voluntary force, we would have an Army which we could in all reason say would be able to do the best this country is capable of doing if it should be attacked.

If I have the figures correctly the Army to-day does not seem to have changed very much from last year even with the recruiting campaign which has been going on since the beginning of the year. If it were not for that our strength would be even less and last year's figure was something over 600 less than the figure in February, 1948. I hope that the present critical position in the world will be taken to heart and that we will set about doing the best we can to meet whatever may come from it. One thing certain is that if we do not do so we will have no choice if the crisis comes. If we do not build up our forces and reserves to a minimum strength we will just have to do as we are told by the bigger powers and we will have no choice whatever in the matter. I do not think that that is a situation that any of us would like to see and I do not think it is a situation which we should allow to develop. With our history and with the number of gallant lives that have been lost to achieve the freedom of this country we would be failing in our duty surely if we did not take all steps to see that this country would have the right and the power to act as it thought fit in a world emergency and that its freedom would not be put in jeopardy by our delinquence in providing what we could provide even in spite of the meagreness of our resources.

I want to refer to a couple of points of detail in the Estimates. Under sub-head C—Engineer Services—I notice a decrease of 78 in the personnel of tradesmen, helpers, etc., estimated for this year as against last year and a reduction in the amount provided of £14,481 which works out over the year at an average of approximately £3 10s. per man per week. I may be wrong, but I take it that it will be the lower paid men, the helpers, who will be affected and that will again hit the Old I.R.A. and 1916 men employed in the various barracks.

Mr. Davin

Are you sure of that?

Mr. Colley

Unfortunately, a few years ago when the economy axe fell a number of these men were dismissed and the first four men who got notice were 1916 men. I do not think it is creditable to this House that men who risked all to found this State and who have found employment in these barracks when they are getting on in years—none of these men had a large pension; one of the conditions of their employment was that their pension should be a small one—should at this stage of their lives be the first victims of the economies. That happened during the first year of office of the present Government. I hope those figures here do not mean that there will be a further reduction in the number of these men employed. Surely this House is not going to stand for that. There is no country in the world which achieved its freedom by revolution but has honoured the men who took part in that revolution. Apparently, the way this Republic is going to honour them is to throw them on the scrap heap when they are getting on in years and cannot find other employment. I raised this question when it happened before. If it should happen again, I hope I shall get more support from the people who have claimed to be such strong republicans in the last few years.

Mr. O'Leary

You let down a lot of the Old I.R.A. men. They had to go to the Dublin Union.

Mr. Colley

I should like to see some steps taken to re-establish the various services found necessary during the last war in connection with civil defence and try to make the people conscious of the position that is developing. So far as I am aware, all these services have ceased to exist and I think steps should be taken to re-establish them. That is being done in other countries and a great deal of money is being spent on it. These services are a necessary adjunct to the military side. I hope that the Minister will take his courage in his hands and provide the services that are necessary both in the military way and in the civil defence way. A beginning should be made in establishing the civil defence forces again. The Minister will get the support of this side of the House in any efforts he makes in that direction and in connection with any necessary money he asks for. We have already lost two years which may be vital years judging by the way things seem to be developing. I ask the Minister to lose no further time, to get his advisers around him immediately and take the first steps to put us on the road to safety.

Major de Valera

I may confess to the Minister that I came in prepared with a number of arguments to convince him and, in particular, a certain amount of evidence with which I had hoped to convince him that a point of view which I was advocating had something in it. But largely from the Minister's own remarks, the necessity for using my ammunition is gone and he will be spared that, because I am glad to see that the Minister does apparently realise now that we have a serious defence problem, that there is a serious situation here, and that that problem should be tackled. Thus far we have got and I think that is a good thing. I, for one, will be glad to accept the Minister's invitation, as I have tried to accept it, and most of the Deputies on this side of the House have tried to accept it in the last two years when he extended it, to approach this Estimate objectively and sensibly. But, in so far as the Minister has made any suggestion that a detailed analysis of the figures or anything of that kind is not being objective, I do not think I will agree with him on that. I think the only way in which one can keep one's feet on the ground in a matter such as this is by taking hold of the concrete facts and basing one's arguments on them. In that way one keeps much nearer to reality.

First of all let me say that a small country like this is always faced with the problem as to whether it should provide for its defence by way of an Army or whether it should merely provide something in the nature of an auxiliary police force. That matter has been raised in the past. I have raised it myself. With one exception, we are now all agreed that an Army is essential and we can approach this Estimate now on that basis.

Secondly, it appears to me that we can take also as an agreed basis that, not alone is it desirable but it is our fundamental duty to provide for our own defence to the maximum extent possible. I took a note of what the Minister said. He said it was "a sacred responsibility to do our utmost to defend our territory."

Thirdly, we are agreed that the situation is sufficiently dangerous to warrant our giving serious attention to it and to warrant our making every effort towards practical achievement in defence preparations. As the Minister himself has pointed out at column 884 of Volume 119 of Dáil Debates of 28th February, 1950, in relation to the Defence Forces Bill, a problem does arise because of Partition, but we must nevertheless prepare our defences for a possible emergency. The Minister said on that occasion:—

"Those who can read and have brains to understand words, can read into the sentence what the policy and what the outlook is—that, as things are, we have to rely on our strength to hold this island against anybody who may be an aggressor."

Deputy Seán Collins raised a point, I do not intend to pursue it very far, as to whether we should adopt a policy of neutrality, as the Minister defined it, or a policy of active co-operation. May I repeat once more what I have already said on at least two occasions: having regard to the present actual position in regard to defence, whether it be civil, military, general or particular, and having regard to the general over-all situation, the steps we should take and the policy we should pursue would be the same in either contingency. In other words, the general policy and the general plan for its implementation can and should be so framed as to fit either situation over a considerable phase of its development. It is not necessary, therefore, to resolve that problem before undertaking the actual organisation of our defences. There is then no reason to make the fact that such problems—admittedly vital and urgent —arise, the excuse for doing nothing. We can do a considerable amount to prepare ourselves to meet and successfully survive another emergency at the present moment without involving ourselves in any way. Even if that particular problem is posed, broadly speaking, we should put ourselves in the position to tackle our defence problem without any distraction and without finding excuses in our present difficulties for not tackling it.

I think those are the general surrounding circumstances which condition this debate. It seems to me that the surroundings are more or less agreed between us. It remains, therefore, for us to deal with this debate on the basis of the specific problems of defence on the basis that we must do the best we can to defend our own territory. We are agreed that the situation is dangerous and warrants a serious effort. It is agreed that we must do our best to undertake our own defence to the fullest possible extent. The question then arises as to what we can do in regard to our own defence. We are a small country. It may be said by some that the problem of defence is such a big one now that we can do nothing about it, but I think most people would agree with the Minister that it is our sacred duty to defend our territory and not to sell it. I think those were the Minister's own words.

What then have we to face? What is our position? A situation exists in the world at the moment which is fraught with danger. It is difficult to estimate how dangerous the situation is. Sometimes it looks very threatening. Sometimes there are hopeful signs. Sometimes people say the threatening danger will be averted. To-day it is "It will"; to-morrow it is "It won't." That is the kind of thing which makes the position so difficult. But we must remember that that was almost precisely the picture from about 1934 to 1939. There is a disheartening resemblance in the present-day oscillations between "it will" and "It won't" and similar oscillations in those critical years leading up to the Second World War. There is, however, one difference as between the two periods. Nations are to-day steadily working on the hypothesis that war may come. There is hardly a country in the world that is not preparing itself. The hard test of that is the expenditure in effort and in money that is being devoted to rearmament and defence programmes. You have that constant emphasis on expenditure running as a substratum, so to speak, right through these surface oscillations of probability to which I have referred. That is hardly a hopeful sign. There is the type of world we live in. However, the very fact that such a pessimistic view is being taken, the very fact that Governments abroad are preparing for the worst may be the ultimate insurance that the worst will not happen—just as it was very largely the failure of Governments to prepare for the worst in the pre-war years that contributed to the ultimate calamity. But be that as it may, I think a sober estimate is that in this present-day world there is a grave danger of war, that no one can say for certain that it will come but that the danger is such that any prudent man or people would take steps to prepare themselves for it. I think that is a sober estimate. If that is so and if it is applicable to the people of practically every country in the world, there is very good reason to believe that we, too, should adopt that view and prudently, not extravagantly but nevertheless sufficiently, prepare for what may come. In that, there is nothing of a scare or any intent to incite people—as I think Deputy O'Leary accused me of doing on a previous occasion.

In so far as this part of the world is concerned, you have a big Power in the West facing a big Power in the East and threatened from the East. The centre of the Western forces opposed to Russia is in the Continent of America. But along the fringe of Western Europe are to be found the outposts' line, so to speak, of that vast Western Power which is presently menaced, as we know. Trace that line. From Turkey to Italy, from Italy and Switzerland to Spain and Portugal, by France to Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway—and Sweden and Finland, along the curtin's line you have those outposts, and the island of Britain just on that line too, and if anything happens it will be along that general line and some particular areas on it that considerable activity will follow. And where are we? Let any Deputy look at the map. There, practically along that line, our island lies. It lies behind the island of Scotland and England, right across the communications of the North Atlantic, with potentialities in respect of the air, and, generally, in such a position that leads one to conclude that if the catastrophe which many fear should come, our geographical position is such that we could not ignore the storm breaking. In other words, in that situation we would have a serious defence problem. That serious defence problem, having regard to the dangers of the situation which I have already mentioned, require us now to take a sober but nevertheless energetic and practical approach to deal with such a contingency if it arises.

There is the general picture of what we have to face. Can anyone deny, in face of it, that we have a definite defence problem to cope with? On the other hand, if that is our situation, what can we do about it? There was one thing that disturbed me about the Minister's speech. What disturbed me was the complete emphasis on what I might call our apparent helplessness, the Minister's attitude—at least he conveyed the impression to me—that things were so difficult and what could he or anybody else do about it. I find that disturbing and I think many Deputies will, because there is a considerable amount that one can do in regard to such a matter of defence, as I hope to show in a moment. What is more, there is an old proverb which says that God helps those who help themselves, and it has frequently happened in history, and it happened in our own case during the last war. We did try to do the utmost that we could to meet it in the years immediately preceding the war and during the emergency. Everybody knows that that utmost, if tried by a direct assault, might perhaps have availed not as much as we would have hoped but, nevertheless, coupled with what we did try to do for ourselves, God helped us the rest of the way. In this regard, the fact that, even in respect of the most you can do, there will still be a risk that you have not done enough, is no justification for not trying. In fact, your best hope and your best guarantee of getting through is to do the best you can, even though that best might in absolute value be relatively little. What can we do? In either event, whether we were involved in the war or whether we were neutral, as we were in the last war, if war should come our people have to be fed. Life here would have to be organised to meet such an emergency and to survive it. Protection would have to be afforded for our civilian population. Arrangements would have to be made for passive defence such as medical services, civilian evacuation and so forth. All these would have to be done in either event and, what is more, could be done if we prepared adequately and in time. But that preparation must be made and made in time.

We know from our experience in the past not only that we can do that much at any rate but that in doing that much we have quite a good chance of survival. The fact, as I think many of us have mentioned in previous debates on this Estimate, that we were independent in that sense and able to cater for ourselves during the last war, to the extent to which we did, was responsible for our getting supplies which we might not have got so readily had we been in a weaker position. That we can do for defence.

Now, for the question of defence in its more narrow aspect. What can we do? Well, everybody will concede that absolute defence against any aggressor is out of the question. Nobody suggests that. But there is one thing that we can do. We should be able to provide a garrison here for this part of our island and so prevent anybody having an excuse to occupy the country because it is not garrisoned, and also to provide a deterrent against anybody who might be tempted to interfere with us by force. You can supply that garrison and your own local security in such a way that any aggressor, whether you are involved or not, will find it costly in men, material and time—so costly in fact that the temptation to come may be removed from him. For instance let us suppose that a situation should break out in the morning something similar to that obtaining at the outbreak of the last war and that we had the necessary force here—and we could have it—to garrison the country, to provide our own local security and then have a sufficient force to meet an aggressor to the extent of delaying him and making it costly for him. Consider that situation. Then if some Power were tempted to try to come this way to attack our neighbour, where it would be very easy and open to him if we had made no dispositions for our own protection, if he finds that we are ready to look after ourselves to that extent, particularly if you can delay him even for a few hours, then the temptation to come this way at all is removed and he would find some other route more attractive to him. The net result would be that he would leave us alone. Similarly, the excuse to anybody, no matter how friendly with you, to come in, because you are not able to protect yourself and so leave a vacuum, is removed and you are not interfered with from that quarter either. We can go that far and if we can, surely we have the duty so to do.

Now with these necessary preliminaries, let us look at the situation in regard to strengths first and then in regard to expenditure under this Estimate. Before the last war and before the emergency we maintained a force here of approximately 5,000 to 6,000 of a regular Army with reserves generally to make a total available defence force of about 20,000. That was the Army before the war—20,000 first line, of which 5,000 to 6,000 were permanent or regular personnel. Coming up to the war, we strengthened the proportion of our regular personnel. In March, 1939 it was, as the Minister stated, about 7,200 and on mobilisation in September, 1939 it was about 7,500. That plus your reserve, first line of all classes, left you an army of about 20,000. That was our pre-war position. Incidentally, I have traced that history in detail in Volume 110 of the Official Report in which appears the debate on this Estimate two years ago. If Deputies are interested in the details as to how I arrived at that figure, they will find it in that Volume. It is sufficient to say that to meet the war situation in 1939 we had a regular Army of approximately 7,500 men with reserves bringing the total force that we theoretically could mobilise in September, 1939 up to the region of 20,000. In September, 1939 as a matter of fact we mobilised over 19,000 men, quite a respectable percentage of our available 20,000.

During the "phoney" war period there were certain exemptions and when the situation became critical in the early summer of 1940 you had in effect a regular Army of 14,000 men, 7,500 of whom were your normal permanent force. During the months from September until spring of 1940 the first Line Reserves—and they were First Line Reserves, A and B Reserve and the Volunteer force—had been trained and assimilated as regulars. The A Reserve were in all respects equal to the Regular Army. The Volunteer Reserve and the Volunteer force were also trained up to a first line standard. These were absorbed into the Regular Army during that "phoney" war period, so completely absorbed, in fact, that it is legitimate and correct to say that you faced the acute emergency of 1940 with a regular Army of 14,000 troops, who had for a considerable period before, experience and intensive training facilities that the Army would not have got normally in any peace time.

In addition to these 14,000 men, you had 6,000 odd who had been exempted in the period, less a few essential civil servants and people like that who could not be allowed back to the colours because they were wanted in essential jobs. You met what might be easily in the future your first problem, with so many months' preparation with a regular Army of 14,000, with a further reserve equal, approximately, to the first line we have to-day available. Both the Government, the Army and the country found that when you had provided for garrisons, protective duties and the training of the emergency Army, and everything else that was involved, that that force was barely sufficient to do the job. During the period of raising the emergency Army there were very few mobile forces available. Anything that was available was more or less tied up with local security or garrison duties. That was the experience at that time and we were starting the situation so favourably that we were not committed to hostilities then. Now it is with that lesson before their minds that the General Staff approach this problem of post-war reorganisation.

In 1944, when it was apparent the war was coming to an end, the then Government gave directions that the problem of defence should be examined for the post-war years and a report presented to them. During those last two years an intensive study of the situation was undertaken for the former Chief of Staff by a staff under his vigorous guidance. We have heard a lot of talk in this House about brass hats and I think it is about time that a certain mirage was dispelled. The recommendation made to the Government at that time was not made by a few brass hats at General Headquarters. The recommendation was a carefully considered one, drawn up at Headquarters, but in consultation with the senior officers of the Army. The recommendation, to my recollection, was submitted as the considered opinion of the General Staff and the senior officers in the Army. That is by way of an aside, but I make it because of the frequent references here to brass hats.

With the lesson of 1940 and with the experience gained during the war vividly before our minds, the necessity was apparent for dealing with civil defence problems, with the co-ordination of industry and supplies, military requirements, transport and other things. With all that before their eyes, the seriousness of the situation was brought home to the Government of the day. The opinion was that anything less than the peace establishment proposed would be wasteful and not worthwhile. In fact, if you were forced below that figure you might as well be properly economical and simply have an auxiliary police force.

There have been many things said about the 12,500 Army. It was simply this, that on any showing, no matter how you were to raise and prepare a defence force, a minimum regular Army of that number was necessary. As a matter of fact, the staff considered you needed a few hundred more which you might add to the 12,500 as a minimum. If you had that minimum you could make a serious attempt at building the defence force that this country could afford; that would be a practical and realistic approach to the defence problem in so far as a country like ours could approach it. That figure has been so bandied about that I think that explanation in regard to its genesis is necessary.

It was undoubtedly a pity that the strength of the Army ever fell below that figure during the demobilisation years, but it did. The previous Minister and his Government did intend to work towards that figure. To this day the peace establishment, as the Minister mentioned in his opening statement, remains at that figure. It is quite obvious the peace establishment remains at that figure—we have it both from the Book of Estimates and what the Minister said.

If we are serious about our defence problem, and if we find a situation where the General Staff consider that to go below a certain figure will mean that you are only toying with the problem and wasting money, why do we not try to build towards a proper establishment? On various occasions the excuse was that we could not get the men. There is a very interesting commentary on that. We were getting some recruits when the recruiting drive was stopped some years ago. What has been the history in regard to Army strength since?

It might not be any harm if the House adverted to the situation in regard to Army strength over the past two years, not so much by way of criticising the Minister, but rather from the point of view of a sober approach to the strength problem. So far as I can piece together the figures the Minister has given at various times, and with such information as we have had available previously, when the Minister took over in 1948 he had approximately 1,060 officers, 2,400 N.C.O.s, 40 cadets and about 5,172 privates. All these figures are estimated, but they tally with the actual figures the Minister gave when he came into office.

In February, 1948, we had a total Army of 8,672. A year later—and these are the actual figures given by the Minister, not an estimate—there were the same number of officers, approximately, 1,057, approximately the same number of N.C.O.s, 2,387, 4,562 privates and the total apparently included cadets. I do not know how many cadets there were, but they numbered at least 40. The Army had then fallen by 600 men to 8,006. There had been in that period a net decrease in the strength of the Army—that is, adding recruiting and subtracting wastage —of about 600 men. The Army was wasting at that rate and the wastage was occurring mostly among the privates. Apparently this wastage went on. Having regard to the figures given by the Minister, the officer and N.C.O. strength apparently remained constant, but the private strength continued to fall. You had during that period 134 cadets. In September, 1949, the total strength was 7,849 and in December of the same year it had fallen to 7,491.

Mr. O'Leary

It was all officers then and no men.

Major de Valera

That represented the total strength then. In other words, in December last, notwithstanding the fact that the Army was taken over with a strength of approximately 8,672, it had fallen to 7,491. That is a serious decrease. There is no use trying to pretend that we are merely arguing about a few hundred men. There were more than 1,000 men less in that period. I am very glad to see now that the number is rising again, thanks to the recruiting campaign. The figure at the moment is 8,113. Over these years you had a loss of about ten or 12 officers. The N.C.O. strength remains the same. The decrease in strength has been largely at the expense of the other ranks. As I have said, the reason why we are pressing the Minister to try and get the strength back is that our experience in the past was that any less strength than the peace establishment strength is a futility. You are hardly warranted in having an Army at all if that is all you are going to do.

It is true that in the demobilisation years the strength fell well below the peace establishment figure. It is also true that Deputy Traynor, when he was Minister, and the general Staff were trying to get recruits, and that after a war, on an emergency period such as we had then, you may expect a decrease, and so we expected a fall in strength and a difficulty in getting recruits. Nevertheless, the policy then was to try and get back to that figure and so offset the waste. It is a pity that the Minister let two years pass in which there was no increase because these two years could have been used to build up the strength of the Army. We know that with his recruiting drive he got 1,104 men. If he could get that number in three months, he certainly could have got 1,000 men in the previous two years. If he got 1,000 or 1,200 men in the 18 months previous to starting the recruiting campaign last December, he could have kept the strength up against wastage. If he did that he would be in the happy position of being able to come to the House to-day and of saying "I have now got 1,000 nearer my peace establishment since last Christmas." If he got the number I have mentioned in three months, it is not, as I say, too much to expect that he would have got the same number in the 18 months that went before.

Anyway, I do not want to cry about spilt milk, but I do want to point out, on that showing and on these figures, that if we want to be serious about it we can achieve our peace establishment strength. It is still our peace establishment strength. We have not been told that the General Staff have in any way modified their view, or that anyone can say that we can usefully subsist with a lesser strength than that of the peace establishment. What I want to say is that we should do our best to try and build towards that. For my part, I would like to say to the Minister "go ahead with the good work, now that you have started with the recruiting drive, fill your establishment." I have only gone back on the past to demonstrate that it can be done.

The other argument that was advanced was that in getting people for the Army you are taking them away from the pool of productive employment. Well, as only two or three thousand men are involved for the Army, I will be forgiven if I say that that particular argument is "poppycock". As long as we have the unemployment and emigration figures that we have, there is no use in people talking about the Army running away with men from the pool of productive employment. The plain fact of the situation is that what I suggest can be done. That has been demonstrated by the recruiting drive. I hope that the Minister will keep that up and will get more and more recruits and so build up the strength of the force. It has been adequately demonstrated that if we are serious about it and go after it as the Minister did since Christmas, it can be done. I say also that the situation is sufficiently serious to warrant us in doing that.

The next question is that of the Reserves. According to the latest figure which the Minister gave us, we have, approximately, First Line Reserves between 5,000 and 6,000, all ranks. That is, approximately, the same strength as the First Line Reserve, A and B categories, before the war. At that time we had about 5,000 in the A and B Reserve and from 7,000 to 8,000 in the Volunteer Force. Actually, we had about 12,000 as a First Line Reserve in 1939. We have only half that First Line Reserve available to-day. In other words, in last December, before the recruiting drive started, we were in a worse situation as regards First Line troops than we were in 1939. These are the facts. In December last our Regular Army was below the strength in September, 1939, and our First Line Reserve was only approximately half the First Line Reserve available and mobilised in 1939. On the other side of the sheet, of course, I should say, in fairness to the Minister, that he had his 20,000 to his 30,000 F.C.A. I shall deal with that later. That adverse situation has been adverted to by Deputy Colley and others.

I should like Deputies carefully to note these figures. They have been given in previous debates over the past two years and have not been contradicted. I am giving them again with the conviction that in what I say I am accurate. The fact is that last December you had an Army and a First Line Reserve that was notably of considerably less strength than you had in the year 1939, just before the war broke out. The Regular Army was a couple of hundred less than the Regular Army of 1939, and the First Line Reserve was only about half that of the 1939 Reserve. In other words, if you had a mobilisation in December last the only troops you would have would be the 7,500 plus the 5,700 making in or about 13,000, so that you were somewhat worse off on that showing not only as compared with the 1939 mobilisation figures but, more so when the comparison is with the 1940 mobilisation figures. These are the hard facts of the situation, and it is these facts that compel some of us who know them to stress them not with a view to scoring over the Minister but rather with a view to trying to help the Minister by adducing arguments as to why he should secure the filling of his existing peace establishment.

I mentioned the F.C.A. In a general way, that is tied up with some of the more detailed matters on the reserve that I want to refer to. We must guard against confusing the rôle and potentialities of the F.C.A. with those of the First Line Reserve. When I say that, I want most carefully not in any way to disparage the F.C.A. In fact, in many ways they are bound to have perhaps greater reserves of human potentiality than the Regular Army or its First Line Reserve can ever have, because they are a much more representative cross-section of the whole community and can call on the best brains and the best physique in the community in a way in which the Regular Army or a voluntary First Line Reserve cannot hope to. The fact is nevertheless that, because they are a local force which will do only a certain amount of local training and cannot afford to do whole time training, they can never get the standard of training necessary in modern times for a First Line Reserve.

The next difficulty is that because many of them will be required to maintain their civilian employment, which is equally essential in peace and in war, and because they will have other rôles to fulfil, they must be regarded essentially as part-time soldiers, even if war should come. That limits the amount of training they can be given and limits their availability, so that they cannot be considered to be a First Line Reserve. Thirdly, the development of modern war is such that there is an exalted and important rôle for them in conjunction with the proper regular forces—when I say regular forces, I mean the mobilised forces—a rôle alongside and in conjunction with the regular forces, a rôle which is equally honourable and at least as important as, if not more important than, the rôle which any of your regular troops will be called on to play—a more specialised rôle, a rôle for which these intelligent and enthusiastic men who also have to look after their everyday duties are best fitted.

That situation is a new one and I propose to deal with it at some little length for the reason that I feel there has been a certain amount of confusion. There is, I feel, a certain amount of confusion in the Minister's mind because he has been talking about a voluntary force and I fear that we are tempted to look on these members of the F.C.A. as taking the place of the First Line Reserve, as absolving us from doing anything about the First Line Reserve and equating them to the First Line Reserve pre-war and expecting them to fulfil the same rôle. That is not so. The men would not be available in peace or war to do the necessary training and to be mobilised whole-time. We know a great deal with regard to that from our experience in 1939-40 when many men had to be exempted because of their employment but who, nevertheless, served vitally and honourably in the L.D.F.— equally honourably with those who served in the forces—contributing to the welfare of the country in its productive and civilian aspect as well as contributing in their spare time as voluntary soldiers to the defence of the country.

That situation arose because of the peculiar developments in warfare which have taken place in our generation. I do not want to appear pedantic in going into some of these matters which are really matters for the General Staff, but there are nevertheless some things which we must face and which we must assimilate and one of these is the fact that up to our time war was a two-dimensional affair. The boundary between yourself and outsiders, potential enemies and so forth, was a line on the surface of the land, and, while that situation existed, it was sufficient to have regular armies with their mobilised reserves and a line of outposts. Everything behind that line more or less took care of itself, if the outpost line was not penetrated, and the need for citizen soldiers each in his own area doing local protective garrison work was not the same as it is now.

The aeroplane changed all that and made war a three-dimensional affair. Your mobilised forces cannot now shelter behind a line on the ground and a line of outposts, because the enemy can come in from the top. The result of that, whereas chains of outposts would give protection in the past, you have to afford local security and local protection at every spot now. That was accentuated by the advent of tank warfare—the mobile type of armoured warfare. The net result is that it has become necessary in modern times to have not only your Regular Army, your permanent Army with its First Line Reserve mobilised to do essential work, garrison duty and so on, but in every town and village, at every important bridge and railway junction, practically every townland and every parish, a group of men armed and ready to deal with what might come from the skies, to garrison their own little area and to co-operate if anything was happening in the area.

In other words, a rôle for a local defence force, a local territorial force equally important with the other elements of your forces, arose and the necessity for supplying troops to fill that rôle arose. There is the position with regard to the F.C.A. Even if you were to achieve a position of minimum satisfaction with regard to your Regular Army and First Line Reserve, you would still need your F.C.A. There is, therefore, a problem for us to look into in that regard, a problem with which I will deal later.

Our strength situation on that showing is not very satisfactory. It is, in fact, most unsatisfactory. What is our position then in so far as expenditure is an index? It is very interesting to tabulate some of these items in the various Votes over the years and make a comparison. If one takes the Estimates for 1937-38, 1938-39 and 1939-40 and compares them with the Estimates for 1948-49, 1949-50 and 1950-51, one gets a very interesting picture. We are expending to-day approximately £4,000,000 where before the war we were expending from £1,500,000 to £2,000,000, that is to say, about double the amount. We all know that from 1946 onwards, to say nothing about devaluation, money values have changed practically everywhere, in every business, in our own Estimates, and so on. You could expect that where you were expending £1 on something pre-war you would spend £2 or £2 10s. 0d. now. Roughly speaking, therefore, as far as money is concerned, we are not doing any better now in preparation for defence than we were doing before the war.

In the details, there are some unsatisfactory aspects, with which I wish to deal. I think it was Deputy Colley who pointed out that the bulk of the increases have been inevitable and long overdue, in pay, but that there has been no corresponding increase on equipment. I know what the Minister has said about that, but let us look at the figures. In 1937-38, on pay, under sub-head A, we were spending nearly £550,000. That had risen to about £687,000 in 1939-40, in the original Estimate for that year. Financial adjustments were made in that year, but I think the Supplementary Estimate, in the net, was only about £10. That figure to-day has become three times as great, £1,535,000. It was at £1,320,000 in 1948-49 when the Minister took over, it had already doubled itself when he took over, and it has increased since then.

Marriage allowance shows a corresponding trend, again almost three-fold increase. Pay of civilians attached shows something more than a three-fold increase, pay for the medical corps, the same. The Office of the Minister, covering the cost of the civil administration of the Army, has increased from £67,000 to £200,000 again approximately a three-fold increase. If you go through the Estimates in that way, you will find that over these years the increase in the amount of money that we are spending now is due to the change in money values. It more than corroborates—certainly as far as strength is concerned, and in regarding to everything else, too, as I will show —what I have said already, that is, that our situation in regard to defence to-day is no better than it was in 1939 and in the two years immediately prior to that, and that, if anything, the situation is worse.

Mr. O'Leary

They are better paid.

Major de Valera

In the last year, it was only £97,000 and this year it is to be only about £95,000 for those essential materials. Those figures show that the position is most unsatisfactory. It means that, bad as we were pre-war, we are not now making even the inadequate provision then made in spite of all the experience we have had before us in recent years. Whatever the difficulty in getting equipment, we should certainly take these facts and figures to heart.

That dispassionate analysis of the figures published in the yearly Estimates and in the Appropriation Accounts which go through the Auditor, show that picture. If it means anything, it means we are getting less than we ever got—and the Minister now says that that is true. The Minister may suggest that we are going unnecessarily into figures. He has glibly talked about figures on previous occasions. When one makes an analysis, one finds that his recollection is not very accurate. He made a mistake as regards the Army strengths. I move to report progress.

Progress reported; the Committee to sit again.

The Dáil adjourned at 10.30 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 19th April, 1950.

Dáil Éireann debate - Tuesday, 18 Apr 1950