I was referring to the type of training in the Army during the emergency period. I indicated the very harsh courses that officers and men had to undergo at that time. I mentioned that to show that the Army have scrapped that line of training and have adopted a new one without any sound reasons for so doing. During the emergency period the tactical training for troops and F.C.A. was excellent. The key words for the training exercises were "cover", "crawl" and "observe". On the command, "cover", all troops immediately took cover, whether behind a furze bush, wall, cliff or by lying flat on the ground. The next order was "crawl". They had to keep their heads down so that there would be no loss of manpower. The third order was "observe", so that when they would move they would be able to pick out the position of enemy machine-guns or snipers. These were routine orders, and troops were trained to carry out those commands quickly and efficiently.
Committee on Finance. - Vote 56—Defence (Resumed).
What about the fourth command?
The fourth was "fire". We now have the position that orders are given to march forward. You ignore the enemy's machine-guns; you ignore the artillery of the enemy because, according to the rule book, your own artillery and heavy machine-guns have laid a big barrage on the enemy position, and the enemy positions are being blasted out of existence; and that, in addition to the heavy artillery on your rere, you have hundreds of aeroplanes divebombing the enemy troops.
That type of training has been adopted in Ireland because it is in operation in Britain and America. Our officers were sent over to Britain and elsewhere to study the latest tactics and have come back with a new idea that the solution is firing-power and that you march forward irrespective of loss because the enemy is pinned down with the heavy fire that your supporting troops can bring to bear on him. That type of training, no doubt, is excellent in America and Britain, where they have unlimited quantities of armaments, the most modern heavy artillery and the finest of divebombers, heavy bombers and fighter planes, but I submit that that type of training is not suitable for the Irish Army. One of our objects is to contain the enemy or drive him back and in so doing to conserve our manpower because we have little enough men without wasting them. Apart from that, we have not got the artillery, the aeroplanes and the heavy armaments that these countries have. Our training, therefore, should be based on the material at our disposal.
These are the reasons why I subscribe to the view that both the Regular Army and the F.C.A. should get a first-class training in guerrilla warfare. Methods of war have changed. There is no need for me to elaborate on the fact that in case of war, everybody to-day is in the front line. There is no question to-day of merely recruiting battalions of men and sending them to the field to fight for us. The man at home, the woman of the family, the worker in the factory or the field, must all play their part if war should come in future. I think it is the duty of all able-bodied men to be trained to the utmost in order to be able to help if necessary in the defence of the State. It is unfair to suggest that the brunt of the battle should be borne by purely volunteer elements, such as has been the position in the past. This must be one of the few countries in the world to-day that depends entirely on voluntary efforts for our defence. I am not going to suggest to the House that you could have immediately compulsory military training. I do not think it would be practicable, to begin with, and I think the cost of it would be prohibitive, in view of the limited resources at our disposal, but I do think that the position should be examined with a view to ensuring that every able-bodied man in the country is fit to take his place in the front line, is fit to fire a rifle, to use hand grenades, and is capable of erecting a road block. I think that that responsibility should be imposed on every able-bodied citizen.
To my mind we have an ideal Army or the nucleus of it in the F.C.A., but again I do not think the F.C.A. are getting a fair chance in this respect. It is all very fine to take these boys and give them a fortnight's training in the year and then send them back to the rural areas to their work on the farm or in the factory, whatever their usual avocations may be. They are not getting suitable training in modern methods of warfare. I wonder how many of the F.C.A. to-day would be able to lay anti-tank mines? How many of them are able to fire submachine guns or even to handle them? I think that our Army officers or those in charge of the defence policy should make the F.C.A. familiar with all types of weapons at the disposal of the Army. There seems to be a feeling in this country that it is dangerous to allow out rifles and ammunition to the F.C.A. in general. I think that is a wrong spirit. It shows a lack of confidence in the leadership of the F.C.A., by either the Army authorities or those responsible for defence policy. I should like to see the F.C.A. getting. a better chance and a greater effort made to induce men to join the F.C.A. There are various methods by which more men could be induced to join the F.C.A. without actually paying them. The question of attendance at meetings and parades should receive further investigation. Even if a small gratuity were paid to good attenders at parades and training meetings, it would induce many more able-bodied men to join the ranks and it would be cheaper than taking them into the Regular Army. You would have part-time soldiers available in their own localities and that is the ideal arrangement in regard to the F.C.A.
I presume that the Minister will answer some of the arguments put forward by various speakers in regard to the Regular Army and that he will say that it is not intended that the 12,000 men of the Regular Army should constitue a purely attacking force against whatever enemy may land in this country. I take it that the Minister's idea is that the standing Army should be increased in the event of a crisis, within the shortest space of time, by men drawn from the Reserve and the F.C.A.
In my opinion it would be advisable to retain the F.C.A. within certain areas in the event of mobilisation. If you have battalion commanders and several F.C.A. captains and lieutenants with the rank and file in a particular county, they know that county inside-out. They know every road, every ditch and every point of vantage in it and they are vital to the defence of the State if an attack should be launched. These men would be most useful in the localities with which they are familiar and, when things became tough in any particular county, the Regular Army could be brought in to assist and reinforce the F.C.A.
Before concluding I should like again to draw the Minister's attention to the question of establishing factories here for the production of small arms. I should like him to elaborate to the House the difficulties involved, if there are difficulties to be overcome, but I am sure he would have the support of the House in setting up such factories. The Minister must now realise that it is waste of time asking some of the outside nations to provide us with these necessary means of defence.
The previous Government as well as the present Government have time and again sought from foreign Powers warlike materials. I understand that a number of our Army officers have been frequently abroad asking for assistance in that regard and that their efforts have not been as successful as we had hoped for. In view of these circumstances, how can we ever hope to get sufficient material here to defend the nation? Is it not essential, therefore, that we should take all possible steps to try to provide the necessary materials within the State? That is what I am asking the Minister to do if it is feasible and, if it is not feasible, to give us the reasons which prevent it being done. They must be very strong ones indeed and I hope he will give the House the benefit of his views when concluding this debate.
I want to make a few remarks, mainly in relation to the F.C.A. force. I agree with the previous speaker that more encouragement should be given to that force because for a number of reasons I think it is the type of army which this country can best afford, as an F.C.A. member costs just a fraction of what a regular soldier costs the country in the year. Another reason which the previous speaker referred to is that if our Defence Forces have to undertake guerrilla tactics in the event of our being attacked, the F.C.A. would be the eyes of the Regular Army, as they would have intimate knowledge of the terrain over which they might be fighting. In addition, the F.C.A. enables every man of suitable military age to equip himself for the defence of the country if the need arose, and not every man can join the Regular Army. If this country were called upon to defend itself tomorrow it would need the assistance of every man of military age. In the F.C.A. there is an opportunity to train the personnel, even in an elementary way, in the rudiments of warfare.
The previous speaker thought that the system of training adopted by our Army during the emergency was not the one best suited for this country. While I agree that in the last resort any defence in this country must necessarily be one of guerrilla tactics, at the same time no one could expect a well trained Army not to be versed in every particular sphere of military tactics. Even though they may be taught things which they would not be called upon to put into practice, it is necessary that they should know what tactics are adopted by those against whom they may be fighting. For that reason it is necessary that the Regular Army should be trained in all kinds of tactics, so that they may be as up to date as any Army in the world, and I believe they are.
So far as the F.C.A. is concerned, there is great difficulty in attracting young men to it who should be attracted to it. During the emergency, when things were more exciting and danger was more imminent, it was quite easy to get a full attendance on parade of the L.D.F., as it was then known. When the clouds of war cleared away they lost interest, although we might expect that the opposite would take place. The people of this country seem to be more ready to fight when danger looms ahead. That certainly applied to the various struggles which have taken place in the past.
As was proved in the last war-despite all the modern weapons which science has brought into being, the principle weapon is the service rifleand it is likely to remain so for years to come. If we can train the F.C.A. in the proper use of the ordinary rifle we will be achieving much. During the emergency we were told that one of the first necessities required of a good solider was to be able to shoot straight. If the F.C.A. are to be properly trained in the use of the ordinary service rifle, more ammunition will have to be placed at their disposal for training purposes. We found it difficult to train a large number of men on the limited quantity of ammunition allowed per man per year for range practice. I understand that that position has considerably improved. I think that not merely should the men have the annual range practice, but that they should have shooting contests for trophies during the year which would not merely teach them to use the rifle properly, but also stimulate interest in the force and attract others to it. That can only be done by placing at their disposal a good quantity of live ammunition and giving them the necessary facilites for practice by taking part in shooting competitions.
Uniforms have been mentioned on a number of occasions. If there is any thing which mitigates against the success of a force like the F.C.A. it is the badly fitting drab uniforms that are sometimes issued. Battle-dress has never been an attractive uniform. Young men who are interested in soldiering are taught to be very careful about their appearance. The present uniform issued to the F.C.A. has not even got padding in the shoulders. It invariably looks slovenly, and the members of that body do not take the pride they should in it. They frequently wear it during their day's work. It makes the force look somewhat ridiculous when one meets a man dressed in F.C.A. uniform hauling a load of turf. Admittedly these uniforms are made of excellent material and cost the State a considerable sum of money and it is not right that they should be abused. Their abuse tends to discourage others.
I think the Minister should consider giving certain facilities to brighten up the social life of the F.C.A. in every parish. This force is an important adjunct to the Regular Army. The members of it have knowledge of the local terrain. That would be very important in the event of hostilities, because guerrilla tactics will require local geographical knowledge.
The Minister is to be congratulated on the success of the recruiting drive. A highly-trained small army will always be the nucleus of a more expansive force should the necessity for expansion arise. Our Army at the moment is a nucleus capable of expansion at the shortest possible notice in order that we may put our most effective strength into the field to defend the freedom we won so dearly at the expense of so many lives.
It is all very well to pursue a policy of increasing the size of the Army but it is unfair to the men to continue so increasing it when we are not in a position to equip them properly. That approach is wrong. I would like the Minister to examine the possibility of compulsory military service for all youth between the ages of 18 and 20. Boys are then leaving school. They are physically fit and they have not lost the art of study. They can apply themselves to military strategy and military technique. I think they are eminently suitable at that age for any army training. In that way the State could build up successive drafts of effective soldiers should the necessity arise to put a large army in the field.
I want to draw the Minister's attention to a defect in the present Army Pensions Acts. Certain sections of the Army are exposed to greater hazards than are others. The Air Force is a more hazardous occupation than that of the ordinary man who stays on the ground. If the engine fails while a pilot is instructing new personnel he has very little chance of saving his life. Admittedly, his crew is in the same position, but in most cases the pilot will be a married man with a wife and family. The scale of compensation for his dependents compares very unfavourably with the standard of living to which he and his family were accustomed. Therefore I would like to see the Army Pensions Acts altered.
The Deputy cannot advocate amending legislation on an Estimate.
I presume I am entitled to refer in a general way to compensation for Army personnel.
That point might be raised on the next Vote.
It might be possible to devise some kind of insurance scheme which would provide cover, if that cannot be arranged in the normal way, so that compensation could be paid.
As regards our policy, I think it should be to ensure having an adequate number of professional soldiers who would be capable of leading the Army. Our Army has, I think, more of the rank and file type of individual than of those who would be leaders in the event of an emergency. For that reason I would prefer to see the youth of the country trained so that they could go into service under the guidance and direction of professional soldiers. The prospect of promotion for the rank and file is very limited. If men were encouraged to go into the Army and take it up as a profession I think it could be more effective.
I believe myself that the F.C.A., in the event of an emergency, would be our real defence. It is on those men we would have to depend. We could only depend on our Army to guide the members of the F.C.A. It is the F.C.A. which would provide the numbers we would need if the necessity for defence arose. For that reason I think we should pursue a policy of exploring all possibilities in the matter of organisation for the F.C.A., training, and so on, so as to enable those men to be effective if called upon. I will ask the Minister to examine the possibility of improving the facilities to be made available to the F.C.A. in the matter of training and organisation. There should be encouragement in that direction. I do not propose to say any more on the Estimate. I hope at a later stage to get an opportunity of asking the Minister about this question of compensation.
It is perhaps only on small points that Deputies differ in their discussion of this Estimate. All of them, I think, approach the defence of the country from the same point of view. When discussing this Estimate and the amount of money involved, not only this year but in the year that has passed, the first thing that I think we should consider is the treatment of N.C.O.s and of privates. A number of Deputies have referred to the fact that at the end of the emergency a large number of men were most anxious to leave the forces. We know, too, that even during the emergency a number of young men who were trained in the Army and became excellent soldiers left and went across the Border to wear the uniform of another country— a uniform which the majority of us do not wish to see Irish nationals wearing if at all possible.
I believe that our aim ought to be to have an army here which we can say we are proud of. In order to get that, we must have contented men and contented N.C.O.s. If those who join the Army find that the conditions are such that they are satisfied with them, then we can say that those in the Army are happy and proud to be with the Colours. We know quite well that when men left the Army after the emergency, and even during it, they had complaints to make. When their neighbours heard those complaints they began to wonder why it was that such complaints should be so freely mentioned. I believe, myself, that many of those complaints were justified, and that many of the complaints were due to the fact that the senior officers in the Army, very excellent men against whom I have no intention of saying anything, had got into a certain groove, and were inclined to follow a set-up such as you will see amongst officers in a certain foreign army. I do not know who was responsible for that, whether it was the Minister at the time or those directly in charge of the Army.
There is that danger, I am sorry to say, that the top-rankers in our Army are inclined to follow that type or that set-up. For many years we saw those officers of a foreign army down south. They were in occupation here, unfortunately. We know what their autocratic bearing was. We realise, however, that the officers in our Army, while they are plain and democratic, are obliged to keep up a certain high standard. For example, if an officer is travelling on duty in the country and requires to get lunch, he is compelled to go to a first-class hotel. We must understand the type of men who gained for us whatever measure of freedom we enjoy to-day. We have to consider, too, the younger generation who at all times have been ready to give their services to the country. I wonder is it necessary that we should oblige those men to maintain those high standards to which I have referred? We accept the fact that these men had a certain code of honour and discipline, and that they never set out to ape the standard of conduct set by the armies of other countries. For that reason, I feel it ill becomes our Army that these views should be changed to the extent that they have been changed a while back. Senior officers have complained to me in this regard.
When we place the figures available at the present time against those for 1938 and 1939, we can honestly say that our Army is completely top-heavy as regards ranks. There are more colonels lieutenant-colonels and commandants in the Army at the present time than was the case in 1938 and in 1939. While it is true that, owing to an expanding Army during the emergency, it was necessary to have large numbers of officers, that does not hold for the present-day Army. Unfortunately, it is just the old system of not wishing to get back to normal conditions. Time and again in this House and outside it, we hear the viewpoint expressed that we should try to get back to normal conditions. As far as the Army is concerned, it is my view that they are the body least desirous of getting back to these normal conditions. If we compare the figures set out in the Appropriation Accounts in 1950-51 for Army pay with the sum allocated for this purpose for the coming year, we will see that there is an increase of £449,362. That in itself indicates, as the Minister will tell us, the increased number of personnel. If we were to examine that sum, I wonder how much of it would be allocated to the privates and N.C.O.s in comparison with the amounts given to the higher ranks? As I said at the outset, if we are to make a success of our Defence Forces, and if we hope to get young men to join up, we must realise that it is not going to be very beneficial for them to know the number of colonels, lieutenant-colonels and commandants has increased, and that they have got proportionately more increase in pay than the rank and file. I am not blaming the present Minister for that. I believe that the present Minister is just continuing the policy which was in operation. Deputy Major de Valera told us that that policy was more or less inaugurated in 1936, and that no Government since has varied very much in their approach to it. Yet it is true that every Government and every Minister for Defence is prepared to see the ordinary private and N.C.O. going up the ladder at a much slower pace than the higher ranks of the Army. This is bound to create discontent, and to bring about the situation where these men would be comparing their pay with the pay given to armies in other countries. We must realise that there are a certain percentage of our countrymen who are prepared to join the army of any country in Europe, some of them because of a spirit of adventure. Men who are trained here are prepared to join other armies because of the better conditions operating in them, and this country is at their loss.
I should like to mention a few points about married officers living in official quarters. It is the custom that such officers should be entitled to an orderly. In my view the work set by the officer for such orderly should be such as would be completed in a matter of a few hours. Instead, what is happening, unless I am misinformed, is that the officer and his family are making a male servant of the orderly. In many instances, these men are even expected to till the officer's garden. That, in my opinion, will bring us to the position where there will be a greater gulf between the rank and file and where a superiority complex, on the part of the officers, will be seeping in, as has been the case in other countries.
There have been complaints about the conditions operating for pensioned Army personnel. I do not know whether it is correct or not, but I have been told that those who get employment from local authorities are in danger of losing part, at any rate, of their Army pension. It is interesting to note that that does not apply in the case of officers or ex-officers switching to the Electricity Supply Board, to Bord na Móna or to other State concerns; they are entitled to their full Army pension. Why should that not be so in the case of Army personnel employed by local authorities? Why is it that their pension will be reduced if they get such employment? If such a state of affairs is in operation, I feel it should not be allowed to continue. In my view, there should be no discrimination between the men employed by local authorities and those employed in State organisations, such as the Electricity Supply Board and Bord na Móna.
That point would be relevant on the next Vote—the Army Pensions Vote.
I bow to your ruling, Sir. I will not touch on it now.
There are a few other points in connection with this Estimate to which I would like to draw attention. The Minister has set himself the task of increasing the Army. His ambition is to bring it up to a strengh of 12,000 men or over. It is interesting to recall the actual position which resulted from the 1946 recruiting drive. The Minister said in this House, in reply to questions, that he was very satisfied with the results of that recruiting campaign. According to reports at that time, he said that it even exceeded his expectations. I should like to know from the Minister what were the reports at that time submitted by the recruiting officers? Why was it that these recruiting officers were asked the reason why the recruiting drive was not a greater success? I would like to know if it is correct that there were reports from these recruiting officers stating that the various complaints mitigated against the recruiting drive, such as I have already mentioned, about unsatisfactory conditions in the Army. These reports were made. There were reports of certain political victimisation. I am not trying to bring politics into this debate. I am drawing attention to reports of which I have been informed. If the recruiting drive was not satisfactory at that time, it is better that we should realise why it failed.
While we are hoping to have a larger Army. I notice that in respect of marriage allowances the estimated figure, as compared with 1951, shows an increase of £40,019 14s. 8d. Having regard to the cost of living, we should be prepared, if possible, to increase that figure, at least in the case of the ordinary soldier, taking into account his present pay.
In regard to the item in the Estimate for transport of troops. I notice that the increase is £9,591 6s. 3d. During the emergency more money was squandered on Army vehicles and motor-bikes parading around the country than on any other Army activity. Time and again, empty lorries were driven around the country when there was no need.
We are told, and I believe it to be true, that the Department of Defence officials, like the officials in all Departments, do their utmost to see that expenses are cut down to a minimum. In respect of the transport of troops. I consider that the Estimate could be cut down, because the so-called barracks in many parts of the country are so obsolete that it would be better not to transport troops to them at all. Some of them are death traps.
There is another matter which the Minister will probably explain with reference to the question of clothing and equipment. There is a large increase there—£261,367 12s. 3d. The Minister may say that these figures are due to the anticipated increase in the Army as a result of the recruiting drive, but on examination of the Appropriation Accounts one sees that in many cases orders were late or were not delivered in time, that materials were not available. That seems to occur every year. There is no sense in having in the Appropriation Accounts year after year items that should have been expended and which were not expended because the equipment or material was not available or was not delivered in time.
Therefore, although there are many figures in the Estimate that I would support in normal circumstances, because I believe the responsible officials will not overestimate, it is quite obvious that there are many items being carried over because the materials or equipment, although ordered, are not available. There is certainly something wrong in the procedure.
There is the item of general stores and warlike stores. It was interesting to read in to-day's paper about some of the new equipment we have got from Sweden and Belgium. Of course, we do not know at this stage what amount we will be able to get. In present conditions it is difficult to judge. I know that it is impossible, from an accountancy point of view, to estimate the full amount that will be available to us in a given year. There must be a certain amount of overlapping, but when we realise that in the case of warlike stores, within two years there is an estimated increase of £805,222 11s. 4d., that is something that we must question. I question it because, when we read the Official Report of the debate on the Estimate for Defence in 1948, we notice that members of the then Opposition, perhaps in good faith, stood up one after another and pointed out the danger of the policy of the Government at that time. I believe that they meant every word of what they said. They expressed the view that there was a danger that within six months of that time—which was 1948—war might be upon the world.
Major de Valera
Who said six months?
Mr. O'Higgins
Deputy de Valera, senior.
Major de Valera
No.
Mr. O'Higgins
He said it was around the cornor.
I do not want to be hard. If Deputies want the reference, it is quite easy for me to quote it. It was said by members of the then Opposition, whose views I respected.
Major de Valera
What is the reference, please, Deputy?
It was said by them that we were living in such a period of the history of this world that it was fantastic for us to assume or to be so hopeful as to expect a 12 months' peace. Again in 1949 they had the same worry. Again, perhaps, they were justified in their view which some of us considered to be a pessimistic view. Times have changed. From 1948 to 1952, thanks be to God, we were lucky in having peace in the world.
If we were to adopt the financial policy of the then Opposition Party and to spend the amounts of money which the then Opposition wished we should spend, we would have spent in the last four years an extraordinary amount of money on the defence of this country. The irony of it is that when we ask for recruits, we paint glowing pictures of Army life in the national newspapers while at the same time, some of the barracks which we use to house these troops are veritable death traps. There are certain forts in Cork harbour which I have known from boyhood, not that we got very near them when there was another flag flying over them, but we know that it would be totally unfair to put Irishmen into some of these forts unless we are first prepared to spend an extraordinary amount of money in improving them. When we are told of the necessity of recruitment, we should remember that it is essential to have decent barracks to house our recruits. I might mention that in one of these old obsolete forts in Cork harbour, there was machinery in the workshops second to none in this country and that during the emergency years it supplied valuable materials to various posts and barracks in the country. Yet at the end of the emergency, before there was any thought of a change of Government, the machine shop was scrapped in that fort. I do not wish to go back on old sores, but these remarks are all coupled with our approach to the general question of defence. There is little use in speaking of the necessity for recruitment unless, first of all, we have buildings suitable to house recruits.
There are a few items to which I should like to call the Minister's attention before concluding. One of these items I have already mentioned, the question of barrack maintenance and minor repairs. Under that heading there is an increase shown of £14,951 13s. 4d. There is a note in the Appropriation Accounts to the effect that certain costs were incurred for dredging at Haulbowline and it states that this was offset by saving on repairs, renewals and maintenance. I should like to stress in the strongest possible manner the importance of avoiding that particular phrase in the future—"savings in connection with repairs, renewals and maintenance". I believe, from what I know of some of these places, that that policy in the past has been a policy of a penny wise and a pound foolish. It may look all right from the financial point of view or from the point of view of satisfying responsible officials, who like to think that they can work well within their estimates in the case of repairs and renewals, but if these officials were to go around and see some of the places on which their cheeseparing policy had been carried out, I know they would be the first to admit that it certainly is not a satisfactory policy.
Another heading to which I should like to draw attention is that of incidental expenses. When we consider that there has been an increase of £33,959 as against the 1951 figures, I think it must be admitted that it does not represent a satisfactory state of affairs. Even though we may be told that the numbers in the Army are such that incidental expenses are bound to be very high, I still believe that items such as I have mentioned could easily be cut down. Again while the Minister may be able to offer a satisfactory explanation for it, when we realise that £41,407 2s. 8d. more is estimated for the office of the Minister in salaries, wages and allowances comparing the two years, 1951, as given in the Appropriation Accounts and the 1952-53 figures given to us in the Estimate, it certainly does seem an enormous increase.
There is no need for me to repeat what has been said by so many Deputies about what is due to those who have served in the Army, in the L.D.F and in the present F.C.A. I consider that even if we can only have a small Army, a full professional Army, if we are prepared to make it a life-time job, to provide decent conditions and a decent standard of living and decent pensions on retirement for those whom we propose to recruit, then we shall get better types for our Army than we are likely to get if the conditions are not satisfactory
What I propose to say now I am not saying by way of disparagement, but it is our duty to give expression to what we think. I know of young lads who have joined the Army as a result of the recruiting drive. Many of them are very decent boys just coming into manhood, who have come from decent homes. But we all know that mixing with various types in this world tends to make changes in young men, which very often we would not desire if they belonged to our own families. I have seen young lads belonging to the Army knocking around the streets in Cork. It may be that they will develop into fine soldiers yet. If these young men make the Army their career they will have the advantage of the military training and discipline which is essential in an army. They will have advantages which will help them in later life. But I see a danger in regard to those who have only joined for a few years, and who when they leave the Army will be looking for employment. There is the possibility that when they leave the Army they will not be willing to adopt the standard of life attaching to employment in rural Ireland. There is therefore the danger that the wanderlust may take possession of them, that they may join the army of another country or seek employment there, just because the environment in our Army was so different.
After having been trained in the Army here they may leave the country where they may be needed, and be of a benefit to another country after the training they received here as soldiers. I therefore consider that in order to make a success of our Defence Forces it is important for us to try and make such service a full period job with a decent pension at the end. In my opinion that would be a better approach to a satisfactory Army, especially from the point of view of the strength of the Army, than any other approach.
I should like again to draw attention to the necessity for making life in the Army a little more comfortable and a little better financially for the soldiers and N.C.O.s. We could do with fewer "brass hats" in the Army, fewer of those who are always ready to tell us and to write articles in newspapers about the dangers of war in other countries. We do not know whether war will come or not, but the men who fought for freedom in 1920 in this country had very few "brass hats" to tell them what they should do, very few colonels and majors to direct operations, very few lorries and motor bicycles to take them around the country. They depended on the old type of guerrilla warfare. If there is another war, even with all the modern equipment, all the anti-tank guns and the various other appliances which we are so anxious to get in the international market at present and for which we are being forced to pay prohibitive prices when we can get them, I believe that in the long run the only defence possible for this country is a defence which proved successful against an empire and which will again prove successful against any invader in the future, whether from the West or the East, namely, guerrilla warfare such as was carried out in the 1920 period.
I do not know why it is that the policy with regard to the defence of this country is not clearly understood and an approach made with regard to how the Department of Defence shall, so far as is possible, implement through its activities the policy of the nation. Deputy Desmond made many references to details and, in conclusion, expressed his own policy, his policy in a sense being that, in the event of this country being invaded by a nation of much greater strength, in spite of the ability of the people within the territory to attempt to defend it such equipment as we have would be useless because it would be obsolete or outweighed by the equipment used against it. I conclude that the suggestion was that we should not waste money on these expensive items of equipment.
For a nation such as ours which has paid such a heavy price over so many years to re-establish itself as a free nation I cannot see why there should be any doubt as to the wisdom of our manhood being trained as far as it is possible for us to do so within our means. The first step in that direction is to have a specialised force, as large as possible, of trained regular soldiers properly officered, including "brass hats," to whom objection has been raised, so that in the event of a conflict these trained people would be the technicians to train larger numbers of those who might have had no training at all and so be able to master the situation in a comprehensive manner. No one, I take it, believes, if we had an Army of from 12,000 to 20,000, that in the event of this country being involved in war through invasion our soldiers would to the limit of their numbers strike a blow and, if they went under, that would be the end of our attempt at resistance.
There is either fear of the possibility of war or there must be an assurance that there will be no war. When we discuss the position here, seeing as we do the portents and omens elsewhere, and when Deputies put their opinions and their conclusions before the House, we invariably discover that those opinions are either misunderstood or deliberately misinterpreted. Deputy Desmond suggested that Fianna Fáil in 1948 criticised what they described as lack of development in Army matters and in the policy of the then Government in relation to the Army. It was suggested that spokesmen of our Party believed that war would definitely take place within six months and that the Coalition Government was deliberately ignoring the situation.
Nothing of the kind was said and I think it is only fair that I should read from the Official Report what was said shortly prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. At column 849 of Volume 110 of the Official Report, Deputy Major de Valera said:
"We can say, however, that there are two definite blocs of Powers in this world who, to say the least of it, are not on the best of terms and to that extent we find ourselves in a situation comparable with the situation from 1936 to 1939 rather than the other. How long there is before us is anybody's guess. I want carefully to refrain from anything like alarmist statements. I should like to hope that it was not there at all, but we have to be realists. Therefore now is the time to profit by the experiences of these years, to accept the recommendations of the General Staff which examined this problem with care and with, I assure you, due regard for economy, knowing the force and importance of the economic factor."
Not by the wildest stretch of imagination could that be interpreted by anybody as a statement forecasting war within six months.
In the same debate the present Taoiseach, then Leader of the Opposition, said, at column 921:
"Obviously that is a matter which ought to engage the attention of the Government. I would urge that in the actual position of world affairs, as it seems to me now—I do not think I am an alarmist, but we have lived through one crisis during which I think no imputation could be made upon us that we lost our heads, just as I do not think it likely that we shall lose our heads in any crisis that may arise in the future—it would be very bad policy on the part of the Government to ignore that which other nations think is threatening. It would be very foolish on our part to adopt that policy.
Anybody who studies world affairs must realise with a great degree of certainty that there is even now a situation which can very easily develop into war. To use an old phrase, it is not wise to wait until the drums beat to sharpen one's tusks. We must have a long-distance preparation, if you like, so that if there is a war in which our interests are affected and our principles are threatened the nation will find itself in a position in which it can defend itself to its utmost. It may find itself on one side or the other, or it may be neutral. In any case, the foundation of all defence is that you will set out to defend yourself to the utmost of your power."
These are two statements made by two important members of the Fianna Fáil Party, by persons who had actual experience, in one case over a long number of years, and in the other case in the immediate situation through which we had just passed. I think everybody will agree with that. They could not be regarded as people who did not know what they were talking about.
What is the best thing to do in present circumstances? I have always understood the policy of this Party to be that we must have a certain number of our people so trained that they can study and improve on military technique and strategy in order that they can be the teachers and the leaders of our people in the event of actual strife. We have heard a certain amount of criticism as to the manner in which our Army appears to operate. Deputy Desmond spoke about empty lorries careering around the country for no obvious reason.
If we have an army and if that army has certain equipment, that equipment must be used so that the personnel will be familiar with it when occasion arises and they must use it. It would be very foolish to have a fleet of lorries in some barracks with a notice: "Do not touch until war breaks out." We could go from one extreme to the other. I do not believe that there has been this waste. Indeed, I think criticism could be levelled in the other direction. The funds at the disposal of the Department of Defence are not wantonly dissipated, and I have yet to meet any member of the Army who would admit that it is easy to dissipate Army funds. There is a strict control over all the moneys placed at the disposal of the Army. I believe that any equipment that is being used is being used with the full knowledge and consent of those who have responsibility for ensuring that those under their control are trained in the use of such equipment for the ultimate benefit of the nation as a whole.
Suggestions have been made that some items in the Estimate are misleading because there has been a refund to the Exchequer of moneys not spent. The reason why such moneys were not spent is because equipment was either unprocurable or was not delivered within a particular financial year. We all know that one of the difficulties we have had to face since the end of the last war has been the difficulty of getting supplies. We had even greater difficulty during the war. We are now living in a period in which nations all over the world are spending huge sums in a rearmament race—such a race as has never been witnessed at any time in the history of the world. We enter that race as a small nation. We find it difficult to get supplies. Therefore we can only provide the money so that when supplies become available to meet our requirements in whole or in part we will proceed to look for them and be in a position to take delivery of them. I notice that we have paid in whole or in part for certain items in advance in order to try and secure delivery.
I do not think that any criticism can fairly be levelled at the Defence authorities in that regard. We are all agreed that they are doing their best to get these items. It has been impossible to get them and it would be unfair of me to say that the three years which preceded the present change of Government was the cause of that. It was not. It was due to world conditions. I believe that if our predecessors had been able to get supplies they would have taken delivery of them. Our predecessors may not have had the same policy as this Government. I am satisfied, however, that Deputy Desmond expressed a view with which we all agree, that the Army is the Army of the nation and not of any particular political group in power at any time. I hope it shall always remain so.
With regard to the delivery of materials, we have to take what is available to us and what, in the opinion of our experts, are most suitable to meet our requirements in connection with training, and usable in the event of conflict. We have also to arrange for taking into our regular forces and auxiliary forces the largest number of people we can get, so that at least they will be trained. When we look across the water, or across the Atlantic, we see countries joining together. They have their mutual defence arrangements with understandings and agreements and with subsidies from each other for the production of warlike stores and materials. What we must ensure is that our people, in the event of a conflict, will not be hamstrung in any way, and that, if necessary, they will be prepared to go out and offer themselves in defence of their country. It is all very well to say that we should go back to guerrilla tactics, or that we should not adopt the policy which has been adopted since this country recovered its freedom. I heard an aside not far from me: "Is there somebody who wants us to go back to the bow and arrow?" We must go forward and bring ourselves up to the level of other peoples, with the knowledge, equipment and training necessary to understand how to meet a particular kind of force.
It would be a good idea to let the Headquarters Staff devise the plan, and if they do not do it, sack them.
The Headquarters Staff are responsible for designing the plans. Of course, I once said, not here in the House, that it was very difficult to know when your Headquarters Staff is doing the right thing or the wrong thing. We do know that when the last war came many headquarters staffs, en bloc, were dismissed because when war started it was discovered that they did not have the know how. Men who had been critics before came in and tried to repair the mistakes they had made. I do not think that anyone can criticise our Headquarters Staff. Speaking generally, I believe they are doing their best. I do not believe that much better could be done, no matter how much we searched.
Not even by ourselves doing it?
I am not standing up here as an expert on military matters. Deputy MacEoin could certainly claim to have a great deal more knowledge in that respect than I have. We do concede, however, that we have a Headquarters Staff composed of men who are able to make up their minds as regards our plans and requirements. It is up to the Government and the House to make available to them the means to enable their plans to be implemented. There is no criticism here of plans or arrangements. We can discuss, of course, the type of uniform our soldiers wear, the housing of them, their rates of pay and pensions and so on. But we have got to make available to our Department of Defence a certain amount of money, so that they will be able to implement their decisions with regard to their plans for training and for defence generally.
I would like to mention to the Minister for Defence a system which was tried out some years ago, and which, in my opinion, was one of the greatest successes ever attempted in our Army. For no reason that I can understand it was dropped. There was the intake of men to the Army under what was known as the sergeant pilot scheme. Up to the advent of that scheme, only the officer class were trained in the piloting of aeroplanes. This sergeant pilot scheme was on an experimental basis, organised from a limited number of carefully selected candidates. In time it was shown that some of these ordinary men who went in as noncommissioned officers proved their worth in the world of flying, not only here but throughout the world. Some of them are in employment abroad, and are bringing credit to the country.
I cannot say why that scheme was abandoned, whether it was due to bad planning or bad decisions by the commanders-in-chief. I see no reason why the sergeant pilot scheme should not be reintroduced. In every country in the world you have, side by side with the officer class, a sergeant pilot scheme, enabling ordinary men of the rank and file to become pilots. The ordinary members of those armies can volunteer for this service. Both in war and in peace they have shown themselves to be equal to the best that can be found in the officer classes.
That is a matter that I feel very sore about. I think no explanation can be given as to why it was abandoned. The explanation cannot be that there is a shortage of the necessary training and equipment. I do not think any excuse can be given that will stand examination. I think that if our Army is to have an attraction in certain directions this training should be available to our ordinary people first in the Air Force Services and afterwards as a means of livelihood. I think it would be most undemocratic if vast numbers of our people were to be deprived of it.
I would like to ask, in conclusion, whether there is anybody here prepared to say that we have reached a stage of affairs in the world where wars are forever over and forgotten. I think that, in the present state of affairs, one would be taking a very serious risk, either here or elsewhere, by adopting the attitude that at last civilisation had overtaken human beings and that we are living as we should live. We must face facts. Whether it is to-day or whether it is to-morrow, or whether it is six months or ten years' time, it is quite obvious that the clouds are gathering, and one must conclude that before these clouds can be dispersed, whether it be local outbreaks or localised outbreaks such as we have in Korea, ultimately a great war is bound to follow. We must, therefore, be quite clear in recognising our responsibility to this nation. If we were to conclude that there is no fear and that there is no danger of war, and that even if there is a war nobody is going to interfere with us and that we are not going to make even a token resistance, then we would be committing a grave error for which future generations would not forgive us.
I feel we must be prepared to have our position made quite clear to whatever Powers may be engaged in a world conflict if and when it should arise. We will not enter into war of our own choice and if we are dragged into war, due to the occupation of any part of our territory by any outside Power, then we are going to resist that Power as far as we can. Let the world then know that, small as we are, we are determined, and the only way in which our determination can be translated, so that we be understood by outside people, is by our willingness to make available materials in the shape of equipment and training for our young men so that the best and the greatest number of our people will be able, if such occasion should arise, to do their part, not without knowledge, training or direction, but with understanding, proper guidance and proper plans.
I would like the Minister to have this question of the sergeant pilot scheme examined. I do not expect him to give me a reply this evening or to-morrow. I would like the Minister to find out the numbers that were taken into this service and what has become of them. It will be found that there are a few who served this nation in our own air services and it will be found that there are a few who served abroad. As I said before, they served foreign countries and foreign air services in a manner which made people inquire where they got their training. It is a great credit to our little Air Force that it was able to train these young people to such an extent. I assert that if the scheme is not reintroduced we are denying to the finest types of our young people an opportunity of training in this particular sphere of modern life, and we are denying them the opportunity which, as the result of their training, they would have of getting proper and suitable employment when their time comes to leave the service of the nation.
Mr. O'Higgins
It is proper that this Estimate should be availed of by Deputies to pay tribute to the Army, its personnel, its tradition and its outlook. This opportunity has been availed of by Deputies over a number of years on the discussion on this Estimate. It is gratifying that we should find the expression of opinion given to-night by Deputy Briscoe from the Fianna Fáil Benches. Our Army is the Army of this nation, and it is due to the Army that, despite the vicissitudes in the past, we have retained our nation and that we are discussing here to-night the annual Vote for the Army. Apart from the personnel of the Army which we are necessarily discussing, we are also discussing the policy of the Army to-day and its future policy. Our discussion should not be confined, as Deputy Briscoe seems to suggest, to the types of uniform that the soldiers should wear; that is a matter for the soldiers' girl friends. Our concern is with the policy the Government should enforce in connection with the Army, and it is in that connection that I want to express my concern that we did not hear from the Minister any clear expression of policy so far as the defence of this country is concerned.
I do not think it is good enough for a Minister for Defence to introduce this annual Estimate on the basis that: "We are providing for an Army. That is the Army and that is that." I think this Estimate should be availed of by the Minister to express the Government's policy in relation to defence. A policy of defence indicates the action to be devised by any country in complete isolation or insulation from the circumstances occurring outside the country; a policy of defence has to take into consideration the general trend of world events and matters of that kind. I feel it is important that the people of this country should be told for what purpose the Army is being maintained and provided for in this Estimate. If it is to be a purely defensive force, the people should be told against whom it it is to defend this country. Is it to defend the country against possible invasion from Britain, from America, from France, from Germany or from Russia? These are circumstances which should be discussed here calmly and deliberately by the Minister and by Deputies of this House. There is a remarkable aversion to anyone mentioning either America, Britain, France or Russia. There are vague references from time to time to certain foreign Powers. I think that is absurd. We had the appalling spectacle here ten days ago of the Minister for Defence making reference to vague threats from a foreign Power against, apparently, the independence of this country. On examination, it transpired that he was not quite certain what Power was involved or what threat was used.
In relation to defence, it is important, particularly in world circumstances as we know them to-day, that the people of this country, through the Minister for Defence, should be informed of Government policy. We know, of course, that the Government, the Minister and the Army have no doubt at all with regard to the situation that they have to face. In this morning's newspaper, the people were able to see Swedish arms being tested by Army personnel under the inspection of the Military Attaché to the American Ambassador to this country. That, of course, is as it should be. It is proper that, in the present situation, things like that should take place. Why should there be any secrecy about them? Why should we refrain from discussing these things openly? It is well known that the Irish Army personnel avail of training facilities from the British Army and, again, why should not that be discussed here? I do think that the country is entitled to know on this Estimate exactly what plans and arrangements are being made in relation to the broad question of defence policy.
With regard to the general question of defence, there is no one on any side of this House who has any doubt that we should, to the best of our ability, maintain a force that will enable the country to defend itself in the event of attack. But we should not do that on the basis that we are the only country in the world. We should not do it on the basis that all the world is ranged against Ireland. That is not so. We know that if we were to be attacked the most probable source of danger is Russia. That is a fact that is known to all of us. Many Deputies, apparently, are not prepared to state that but that is a fact which is accepted, I think, by almost all Deputies.
Approaching the question of the defence policy on that basis, we must consider what kind of force we should maintain, assuming that our role in the event of war is to be purely defensive and that our Army is to be maintained purely for the purpose of protecting this country in the event of any attack from the other side of the Iron Curtain.
From that point of view, I think there is a major difference in policy between the present Government and the Opposition. The major difference that I see is that we in Fine Gael do not and cannot dissociate the major requirements of this country in relation to its economic and general situation from the question of defence. I do not think that we can isolate the country's defence policy from its other requirements. We in Fine Gael believe, as we believed when in Government, that the primary concern of this country in time of peace or in times such as we have experienced since 1948 is production; that, subject to that, we must maintain a defensive force but that whatever Defence Force we maintain must not impede or retard the production which we require should any new emergency come upon the country.
Accordingly, in the last four years, despite the suggestions of imminent war and imminent danger, the Government at the time ensured that young men were available on the farm and in the factory and generally so as to enable greater production. That continued for four years and undoubtedly added considerably to the economic strength of the country. That was done at a time when we were told—I want to make this quite clear —by members of the present Government, in 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951 that a new war was then around the corner.
Major de Valera
Would the Deputy give a quotation?
Mr. O'Higgins
In 1948, after the change of Government, Fianna Fáil Deputies, inside this House and outside the House, endeavoured to convince the then Government that war was removed from us by merely a matter of months.
Major de Valera
Would the Deputy give a quotation to substantiate that? Quotations have been given substantiating other points.
Mr. O'Higgins
It is very easy to select quotations.
Major de Valera
Well, select them.
Mr. O'Higgins
In addition, in 1948, the Leader of the present Government expressed his opinion to be that a new European war was just around the corner. In 1949, 1950, 1951 Question Time in the Dáil each day was largely concerned with questions from Deputy Vivion de Valera with regard to our defensive measures. The atmosphere created by the then Opposition was designed to convince the country that a new European war was almost upon us and that we had to go into a huddle, to design some panicky emergency measures and generally to inflate our Army personnel and build a new Army. That was the policy and propaganda indulged in by the Opposition from 1948 to 1951. They may have believed that but the belief was not shared by the then Government. The Government in office at that time and most sensible people in the country realised that there is no one in this particular country or, indeed, in Britain or America who can express himself as being definite with regard to the imminence or otherwise of a new war. People just do not know. It is impossible to be definite and it is impossible to lay down any time limit.
That being the position, while great Powers like Britain and America may, to use the old saying, while hoping for the best, prepare for the worst, and while that is a particular policy that their resources enable them to indulge in, unfortunately, it is not a policy that a small country can afford to follow. We cannot accept as normal the maintenance of an emergency Army. We cannot, year in and year out, regard with equanimity preparation for war. If we did that the country would suffer considerably. It is far wiser for the Government to have the courage to decide that war will not come this year or next year or that at least we will act on the basis that it will not; that this year we will turn every man on to the land and into the factory in order to produce as much as we can, so that if a war comes in 18 months' time we will have sufficient to carry our people over some part of that emergency period. That is a policy more suitable to this country than the policy at present being followed.
Since the change of Government there has been a reversion to the idea of preparing for a war just around the corner. There has been a reversion to the idea of recruiting young men into the Army, taking them from employment that would have been of benefit to the country, taking them from the land and, indeed, from the factory, turning them into barracks, keeping them there. That is a net loss to the country. It is a bad policy and it has meant a considerable loss to the country in the last 12 months.
I do not want to repeat what has been said by other Deputies in relation to the recruiting drive. I should like merely to say that the criticism expressed by Deputies from country areas with regard to the recruitment of potential agricultural labour is merely symptomatic of the effect of the policy being followed by the present Government. It points to the difference between this Government's policy and the policy pursued by its predecessor, because prior to this Government coming into office the men at present being recruited to the Army would have been available for the production drive. As the result of the recruiting drive, they are not available, and criticism is being expressed by country Deputies in that connection.
I want to join with other Deputies in referring to the position of the F.C.A. I regard the F.C.A. as potentially the greatest weapon of a defensive kind that this country possesses. I regard it as a force completely in keeping with Irish history and tradition, a force completely in keeping with Irish requirements to-day. In my view the Government and the Minister would serve this country far better if they devoted more time and attention to the F.C.A.—to its development, to its planning, and to designing a proper policy for using the F.C.A. in future. I do not think it is possible to have a local Defence Force of a voluntary kind, such as the F.C.A. is, if at the same time there is concentration on a standing Army. I think the maintenance of both forces is not possible simultaneously. The Minister expressed the view that the F.C.A. would be used, and should be used, in times of emergency as some sort of force auxiliary to the Army itself. I think that is wrong. I think it would be far better and far wiser if the Minister concentrated on the development of the F.C.A. as a local Defence Force, as the framework of a force spread throughout the country and available to the country in time of emergency.
We cannot maintain a standing army and I do not think we should. I think that would be quite outside our ability, quite contrary to our traditions, and certainly present conditions would not make it possible. We can maintain an entire nation of riflemen. We can maintain throughout the country, scattered in different parishes and in different towns, a force that would be available in time of emergency if we set about doing it now. The former Government undoubtedly did considerable work in building up this local Defence Force. I know in doing that they did experience a certain antipathy from the Regular Army personnel towards the F.C.A. That particular feeling of suspicion has been experienced over a number of years back by people associated with the F.C.A., but I think that it is dying. I think that even the most conservative Regular Army officers in recent years came to recognise the need for a force such as the F.C.A.
It is a pity that in the last 12 months the F.C.A. seems to have been put into a back seat again. That changed outlook has undoubtedly been responsible to a certain extent for the very marked decrease in the available strength of this force. I think it should be a matter of major concern to the House that the actual strength of the F.C.A. in the last 12 months has dropped by some 12,000.
Where did the Deputy get these figures?
Mr. O'Higgins
I just have not them available now but I think the Minister gave a figure of 33,000 as against 20,000.
That is not for the last year. That is over a period of years.
Mr. O'Higgins
I understood the Minister, in introducing the Estimate, was dealing with, as he should have been dealing with, administration for the past 12 months.
Major de Valera
In March, 1950, according to the then Minister, the figure was 25,000, while it was 30,000 in March, 1949. It goes a couple of years back.
Mr. O'Higgins
The Minister for Defence, in introducing this Estimate— I am quoting from column 332, No. 3, Volume 132—said, in relation to the F.C.A.:—
"In this arm of the force there has been a decrease in strength from 33,000 to 21,000 all ranks."
It seems clear that the Minister is reporting to the House that, in the past 12 months, the F.C.A. has been reduced in strength by over 11,000. I regard that as a matter of major concern.
When I said that, the Minister interrupted to ask me to what period I was referring. If the Minister says now that the F.C.A., in the last 12 months, has not decreased by 11,000 or any figure of that kind, I shall be very happy to hear it. As the Minister has not intervened, I must assume that that is the position—that, in the last 12 months, this country has lost 11,000 volunteer soldiers who were members of the L.D.F. I think those have been lost because the Regular Army mentality is in the saddle. Once again, under the chairmanship of the present Minister, people are controlling the Defence Forces, who believe, rightly or wrongly, that what this country should have is a standing Army. They can see no use whatsoever in the local fellow down in the village parading around as a soldier; they regard him only as a nuisance. That is a pity, because, if any danger should come to this country, if we were invaded—I take it that is the only danger we have to discuss—the local "village nuisance" who is wearing a uniform will be a very important addition to our Defence Forces. In a time of emergency, no matter what kind of standing Army we may have, be it 30,000 or 40,000, if we were invaded, this country would revert automatically to the type of warfare which, through hundreds of years, enabled this country to make occupation by a foreign Power a very uneasy business.
There are Deputies who are far better equipped to talk about that kind of warfare than the younger Deputies are. But the warfare which was waged in the movement which led to the formation of this House was not a warfare of one standing army fighting another. It was a fight carried on by men who had formed a local defence force available at all times for any situation that might arise which could never be contained or engaged or wiped out as a standing army might be. It was a warfare waged by a small trained personnel that had the support in every village, hamlet and parish of the people of the country. That is the type of defence that will be available to us and can only be available to us if an invasion or occupation did take place.
It is a pity that the Minister should be neglecting the F.C.A. I can see no sense in anyone suggesting that because our standing Army is now some 2,000 or 3,000 more than it was 12 months ago therefore we are better able to defend ourselves. That is nonsense. From the point of view of the standing Army it is absurd to be discussing whether an army of 8,000 or 12,000 is the better defensive weapon. If we had to defend this country with a standing Army we all appreciate that we would be looking for hundreds of thousands of personnel. We cannot afford a large standing Army. We can afford a large force scattered and based on the different areas throughout the country. It is a pity that we should be so obviously neglecting that, and I therefore suggest that more attention should be paid to the F.C.A.
I should also like to refer to the question of promotions in the Reserve. I am told that there is some criticism by officers of the Reserve with regard to that. I am told that some members who went on the Reserve from the Regular Army find on reporting for annual training each year that they are in a particular groove. They never get promotion, while younger officers who joined the forces long after them are promoted over their heads. There is a certain amount of criticism of that, and I ask the Minister to investigate that particular complaint.
May I say in conclusion that we on this side of the House welcome any effort to build up our Defence Forces? We differ from the Government as to the manner in which they should be built up. Our policy is not any different in principle, but merely in regard to method. We think that there should be a greater concentration on what used to be called the L.D.F. rather than trying to build up a standing Army which is still far short of the strength required from the point of view of a standing Army for the defence of the country. In holding that view we realise that the recent recruiting drive has undoubtedly hampered to a certain extent production in the country. That might have been excusable if the F.C.A. had not been reduced in strength.
In the last 12 months the defence position of the country has deteriorated. On the credit side, the Minister can point to an increase of some 3,000 or 4,000 in the standing Army. On the debit side, he has to report a reduction of 11,000 in An Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil. In addition, he has to contend with the fact that people throughout the country, who 12 months ago were beginning to look on the F.C.A. as a thing they should like to join, have been discouraged. That should be a matter of major concern to Deputies. The Minister should ensure in the coming 12 months, if he is there for that period, that there will be a drive made to build up the F.C.A. It is in the L.D.F. that the real defence of this country will lie, and if we neglect that then undoubtedly our defensive position will be weakened. We in the Opposition, particularly in the Fine Gael Party, will give the Minister every possible support because we would like to see in every parish a local company of the F.C.A. We would like to see our young people joining that body, getting there the training it provides, and playing their part in the Defence Forces of the nation without hampering the drive for production on the land or elsewhere. If we can establish a strong L.D.F. of that type the country would be as well defended as it could be within its own resources should the necessity arise.
The general principle with regard to defence has, of course, been accepted by us. We do not oppose the Estimate. We have certain criticisms to offer in regard to the methods adopted by the Minister but, apart from that, we support the Estimate. We suggest the Minister, now that he has recruited his standing Army, should concentrate in the coming months in recruiting for the F.C.A.
Major de Valera
From one point of view there is much in what the last speaker has said, but to some extent I feel that there is a misunderstanding. Perhaps the last speaker is closer to the Government in his view on defence policy generally than he might suspect. I am sorry to say—perhaps it was not intentional—that the objectivity in his approach to this matter was slightly marred by a sense of political consciousness. Nevertheless, it is welcome to find that we are agreed in principle at any rate.
Deputy Dr. O'Higgins referred to a number of matters which I shall deal with in due course. There were several remarks in his speech, particularly with reference to the F.C.A., that I think we could study with profit. I shall come back to them in some detail later on. It was a happy omen to find his approach to this Estimate when he was on these benches, with perhaps some exceptions, identical with the approach we had.
Because of some statements that were made, I think it is now opportune to consider once more the situation we have to face. Some Deputies blew hot and cold. We must face the fact at the outset that we must make our estimate of the situation in relation to defence and abide by that estimate thereafter. Some of us have been trying to do that for some time past. The first question that arises is how much attention does defence need from the Government, from the House and from the country? That may be a hard question. It is a serious question. It is a question affecting, if you like, a problem in national insurance. It is not sufficient to look casually at a paper and jump to one conclusion or the other, or rely on a hunch. One must try to assess the position. I have tried on other occasions to make that assessment here. I am sorry to say now that attempts have been made to completely misrepresent that assessment. But that is neither here nor there. It is unimportant as to whether or not I have been misrepresented. It is not unimportant to try to get as accurate an estimate as we can of the situation before we embark on any policy, just as a board of directors will try to assess the economic factors before deciding on a particular line of conduct in relation to their firm's business.
What is the position? Up to 1948— and we can give chapter and verse— it looked as if there might eventually be a return to peace, but towards the end of 1947 nations began to get restless. There were certain signs on the horizon. Those of us who spoke at that time spoke from a simple appreciation of the news as we read and heard it coming in every day. Perhaps we spoke fairly vigorously because the inter-Party Government in 1948, or at any rate some members of that Government, were making a point of economy in the Army. If the battle had not been fought by us on behalf of the Army then, the Army would have suffered more seriously than it did. I am compelled to make that remark because of the twist that has been given to certain of my statements. I would prefer to deal with this Estimate in an objective way.
The facts are that early in March 1948 the Scandinavian countries sounded the alarm. There were conferences between the Swedish General Staff and the other Scandinavian countries. That was the first positive and definite action indicating that we were heading into a situation of crisis or difficulty. That was followed by Britain's action within a few months. If Deputies want to attack us for the attitude we adopted at that time let them look at the record. Within a few months Britain had to reverse her policy. Deputies will find proof of that by reference to Hansard, Volume 456, which records the debate that took place on 23rd September, 1948, and a statement of the then Minister of War in the British Cabinet. A number of other quotations will be found at column 2010 of Volume 114 of our Official Report. At that time the British went into reverse. They went all out prepared for war again. Mr. Eden, at that time, said:—
"I thought that there would be difficulties and I thought there would even be sharp disagreements at times, but I did not anticipate that our relations would have deteriorated so far and so fast. That is a melancholy fact, but it is one of which we have to take account."
He was talking in opposition. It was the then Government in England which had taken over. If one traces the records one will find the situation sometimes, apparently easy, and sometimes apparently menacing. As Deputy Dillon pointed out, and as I think I pointed out myself a couple of years ago, that is a feature of all such situations. There is that uncertainty about them. There is a steady trend and a steady pressure characterised by two things: unrest, and the expenditure of money and effort on armaments and warlike preparations.
These are the infallible signs that tension is there, the political signs if you like. Sometimes they look threatening and sometimes they look as if they had eased. Sometimes, when you look over the papers for a period you feel inclined to say that things are all right, but to-morrow when you look at the paper you feel that you may have war soon. But underneath there is this hard current of expenditure, of effort and of money on armaments and preparations for war. There is that essential tension in the areas concerned. That means that there is a certain danger at any time, and that situation will ultimately result in the cost of lives.
Following on from that we had the development of the Korean crisis. Incidentally, there is one thing that we had better get clear now. Let us face this defence situation on common ground. Where are we? Sometimes people will say that they agree with the Government in their defence policy while others will say that the Government are alarmists. They will say that the speaker does not believe there is any danger, that, in fact, if the speaker was pressed he would say that he did not think there was any danger at all, and that we were wasting our time and money. I think it has even been suggested that we forced the last Government into taking action on defence. Well, I think that would be an extraordinary situation if a Government was going to be forced against its judgment into doing something merely by pressure of that nature. It would not speak very well for the Government concerned.
However, the fact is that at the time of the Korean outbreak there was a certain economic difficulty here. It was the Taoiseach in the last Government who himself, I think, at Wexford—I have sent for the reference—painted a very alarming situation. It was in these latter years that Deputy O'Higgins and Deputy MacEoin agreed that the situation was sufficiently serious for action to be taken. I am merely referring to these matters in the hope that, not so much Deputy O'Higgins or Deputy MacEoin, but that certain other Deputies can see that we were pretty definite on the basis on which we faced this. It will help us all to know just precisely on what basis we are facing it. We have had, however, that steady development in the position and who can say that things have eased? I think it was two years ago in the debate on the Estimate—the reference will be found in Volume 120, Nos. 4 and 5, of the 18th April and the 19th April, 1950—that some of us went into considerable detail in regard to preparations and expenditure by foreign Powers. I do not intend to repeat all that, but the fact is that even at that time there was a considerable amount of energy and money being expended. I have here the data relating to the various countries which I then gave, showing the reactions of such countries as Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Britain, Portugal and Spain. All these countries were straining themselves to the limit, quite apart from the big armament programmes of the principal Powers of the world and those which were actually committed in Korea.
That situation has not essentially eased. The various programmes for the development of forces in the European countries, large and small, continues at a high pressure. The expenditure on defence in these countries continues. Let anyone take, for instance, the British Estimates for this year. It is significant that the Opposition in England, having been a Government, as well as the Government, are at one on this: that it represents a very big strain on the British economy. The expenditure and effort in the United States is certainly almost of a disturbing nature. While we read about that in the newspapers we know that the international tension has been masked by certain features. The first factor that tends to be masked is that there is no very significant change anywhere. The mere repetition of the deductions to be drawn from the development of the armament drive is not news in the sense that it is merely repetition and does not attract the people's attention. Consequently you have the peculiar factor of an economic situation in the world which at the moment is attracting a certain amount of attention and which, in some respects anyway, has the appearance and the dimensions of a slump. These factors are masked behind all that.
You have, as we have read in the last few days, an unresolved situation in Korea, a threatening situation in Germany, a steady development in regard to Western defences as far as that can be achieved, and the upsurge and continued development of armaments with requests for larger and larger sums in the principal manufacturing armament countries. I have taken at random a week's file of an English newspaper. You find there a variety of opinions. There is a note in it about an increase in the reserve strength of the British reserve forces. It is just a small paragraph but it shows a substantial increase. Within that file I also find a reference to the development of civil defence, a reference to and a photograph of atomic explosions, on the one hand, and of atomic military tests in America on the other.
Now, from all these varied facts, one thing seems clear—there is an underlying tension and, to use the words I used in 1948, when that tension will reach breaking-point, if it does, is anybody's guess; but it is there. There is unrelieved effort and there is a situation in regard to the relations of the two blocs which is certainly not normal and has all the appearance of being in danger of a military rupture. That particular estimate is borne out by the fact that the small countries and the neutral countries, as well as the countries that you might regard as the active members of the bloc, have all found themselves constrained to spend proportionately large sums of money on national defence, for instance, Switzerland and Norway, and at the same time to put a strain on their economy, which it undoubtedly is, the type of strain that we have heard mentioned here, but which is not felt here to anything like the same extent as the strain on countries in which compulsory military service has been introduced. I could tell the House, as I have done on previous occasions, but I do not see the sense in repeating it— it has been said on a number of Estimates when I was on the other side of the House, and I see no reason for changing my point of view now that I am here——
Except that war did not break out over the last three years.
Major de Valera
It has not yet broken out, but let us hope it will not. It would be a very rigid thing to commit oneself in this respect. It is merely a personal estimate. I may be completely wrong in that but I will deal with the time factor in a moment, if the Deputy will allow me. I have a purpose in saying this which, admittedly, I am a long time coming to, but I would like to substantiate my allegations. If you consider for instance the extension of terms of conscription, the introduction of wider conscription in countries all over Europe, you will agree that the estimate that things are not normal and that there is a certain tension is a reasonable one.
Now let us look at what we are doing about defence. One would think, to hear some of the things that were said in this House, that we were making an extraordinary effort in money, in energy and in the commitment of our national resources towards defence at the present moment. The hard, solid fact is that we are probably unique amongst the nations of Europe at the moment in merely making what one might call the normal peace-time effort of a country under normal peace-time conditions, because that is all we are doing. Do not let us fool ourselves that we are making an extraordinary all-out defensive effort. We are doing nothing more than making what one might call the ordinary provisions for defence, the ordinary insurance provision that a country would make under normal peace-time conditions such as obtained in the early 1930's. Look at the ratio of our defence expenditure to our national income or our budgetary effort. It is big to us, I agree, but examine that ratio—I have given the figures for the years I mentioned—in regard to comparable ratios for other countries at the present moment where they are making an extraordinary effort; for instance, the case of Spain which is around the 30 per cent. mark. There are others, but I have taken that one at random from memory.
With regard to the forces we are providing and their equipment, we are actually doing nothing than would be, as I have said, normal peacetime insurance. It has always been accepted, the world being as it is, that even in peacetime as we used to know it in the days of the 1930's, one of the duties, or responsibilities if you like, of an independent nation was to make some provision towards its own defence. It was usual in those days to reduce that provision to the minimum necessary. In fact, in our case we reduced it very much below the minimum. I have asserted, and I repeat and reiterate it, that we are doing nothing more than making normal peacetime provision, and let nobody remain under the illusion that we are spending money excessively on a special effort in regard to defence, in the light of the particular situation threatening at the moment. We are merely making a normal effort —an effort that we would nearly have to make and should make if there was no immediate threat or tension there at all.
I would like Deputies to appreciate this. I can speak with a certain amount of personal knowledge—and Deputy MacEoin, having been in headquarters and having been Minister, as Deputy Dr. O'Higgins was before him, will know the details of this history as well as I do now—when I say that the situation was this: that in 1944-45 the General Staff was told to prepare for peace. I was a member of that staff engaged on that particular work at the time. We thought we were preparing for peace and the direction of the Minister and the civil end was that it would have to be done as economically as possible. The Army knew that and that the task was to provide a normal defence insurance under ordinary peacetime conditions. That requirement was worked out; it was threshed out with the civil department, with the Department of Finance, and ultimately at Government level. The establishments that were brought out after the war are still the establishments. The establishments that resulted from that situation were the establishments, as I say, for normal peacetime and there has not been any alternation, even in face of the most serious threat and tension that is there at the present moment.
I have thought it necessary to emphasise that, because the way some people are talking you would think the Government here—and when I say the Government the same remark could be applied to the last Government sitting here—was making every effort to strain the economy of the nation to make extraordinary provisions for defence. Admittedly, the provisions were greater than pre-war. Why were they greater than pre-war? During the emergency we were very favourably placed; we met a crisis in a situation and under certain circumstances which proved to be extraordinarily favourable and the repetition of which could not be counted upon in any similar emergency in the future. Even under those conditions the provisions made for defence pre-war were found by experience to be totally inadequate. What we advocated in 1948—and this was on the record, and if Deputies are interested objectively I would suggest that they read the record—was objectively to learn the lessons of those days in the spirit of thankfulness that we could learn such lessons so painlessly.
However, in the nett, I might summarise it thus. Taking a standard of normality—if you like a rather difficult thing to define; it is, perhaps, in the long run very hypothetical—and equating our position to something like that in the very early 30's or any normal peace time, we have certain facts emerging—that the present international situation and more locally the situation in the part of the world in which this island is situated is one of tension, be it great or little; but there is indication of considerable tension when measured by the measuring sticks I have mentioned—expenditure of effort, the development of armaments, the expenditure of money and so forth. In that same situation we in this country are only making a normal effort towards defence. Let us be clear on that. I am not going to go any further on that road at the moment. If I were to advocate more. I could very well imagine what some people would say about me. It is time enough to consider the other matter afterwards. Let us bring our normal defences to the highest possible pitch of efficiency. It is there, I think, we are all fundamentally agreed that the provision should be made. Deputy O'Higgins has suggested that there is a difference of viewpoint between us in regard to the distribution of forces. He suggested that we were prepared to see a strong standing Army and F.C.A., and that his outlook would be to forget about the standing Army and concentrate on the F.C.A.
That is slightly exaggerated.
Major de Valera
All right. It is an exaggeration to say that that is the Government's view, if it is exaggerated. The fact is that it is a mistake to try to isolate the three elements in the forces and deal with them separately. We have got to regard our forces as an integral unit as I will try to demonstrate in a moment. In order to be logical and to attempt to deal with the development of our Defence Forces at the moment, I propose to deal with strength first and armament afterwards and then other things. If I deal with any particular isolated matter I want to guard myself against being just taken in an isolated manner. I want it to be realised that equipment and all these things are essentially tied up in the end with one another.
I would like to say that I was very glad to see Deputy Dr. O'Higgins's appreciation of certain factors in regard to our strength and also the fact that we have largely in this country to rely on what he called individual strength. At column 357 of the Official Report, Volume 132, No. 3, he said:—
"I want to give a reality to the force and I think the situation is sufficiently serious and sufficiently permanent to impress on the Minister, on the Army and on the Dáil that we are never going to have an Army equipped as a modern Army is and should be and that we have got to rely on numbers."
In other words, I interpret that as a certain emphasis on the importance of the individual and with that general sentiment I would, to a large extent, agree. I also want to say that by way of qualification—and here I agree with General MacEoin—that I think it is a mistake if we try to become technical experts. I want to try to guard against that completely as far as I can myself.
First of all, we have not got the information. We have not got the facilities of a staff. We have not the up-to-date information in regard to methods, weapons and so forth. In other words, we are not equipped to do the staff work. I think it is a mistake for us to go too far into detail and to pontificate on what way the Army should be organised and what way the Army should do that. I think that is a matter on which the Minister or the House will get more sure advice from the Army.
In certain general terms I think it is good for us to discuss and to appreciate some of the wider ideas involved if we are careful just not to fall into the trap of becoming altogether what is sometimes called an "armchair soldier".
Let us look at the position with regard to strength to see actually the three elements you need. You need the permanent force for reasons that I will outline in a moment. It is absoluately indispensable. You need the First Line Reserve for reasons I will outline in a moment. Then you have the major part of the voluntary force in the F.C.A.
I will agree that, perhaps, sufficient emphasis has not been laid in the past on the training and development of that element and that, in fact, it will be a very large element in the Defence Forces of the country but if you have not the First Line, too, you will find it impossible to organise the F.C.A. One has to ask oneself, therefore, what are the proportions?
There has been a great deal of talk about a particular figure of 12,000. As I pointed out before, that figure is very simply resolved. Having considered the potentialities, proportions and requirements, the Government, on the considered recommendations of the General Staff and having threshed out with the civil Department the ratio for a workable Defence Force which would be largely dependent on the F.C.A.—the bulk of the total Defence Force was to be composed of the F.C.A. and an efficient F.C.A. was a sine qua non to an effective force in the long run—decided that the minimum establishment of the permanent force would have to be 12,000. That is the whole, simple story.
I am sure that Deputy General MacEoin, as Minister, read the relevant memorandum which was prepared by the Government at the time. He will have read all the documents. Having been previously a Minister, he knows, as well as the present Minister himself does, what the factors were and what the basis of that recommendation was.
The first point is that our Defence Forces, from the viewpoint of general defence, are ones composed of these parts, and these parts are interdependent on each other for their efficiency and effectiveness. One part is largely futile without the other. To that extent, Deputy O'Higgins is perfectly right. A force of 12,000 men, with nothing more, may have a certain value in a particular locale. However, from the point of view of national defence, it would mean relatively little. It is equally true that a force of 100,000 F.C.A. men could not be effective unless there was an adequate cadre of regular force to supply certain wants in relation to them and in relation to defence generally—wants which I will outline in a moment. Therefore, do not let us get confused or sidetracked by the suggestion that we are facing the Defence Estimate on the basis of, say, one side of the House advocating a large volunteer force of F.C.A., and on the basis of another side of the House advocating a small standing Army and no F.C.A. force. There is no such issue involved. The issue involved, if there is any issue, is the actual minimum strength of the standing Army necessary to support the F.C.A. and to meet the other requirements which I indicated that I would outline. The General Staff, after due consideration of certain conditions which I roughly outlined a few months ago, and which the Minister, when in Opposition, and others in Opposition who are in the know have reiterated over a period of years, to the extent that they do not need reiteration again, arrived at the conclusion that there should be a certain minimum standing Army. That minimum was accepted, on the civil side, not only by the Department of Defence, but also by the Department of Finance and by the Government.
How did you get the Department of Finance to agree to it?
Major de Valera
The Deputy knows as well as I do the answer to that one. The fact is that it did, as it very properly should. I mentioned the Department of Finance to show that the matter was very thoroughly examined, as that Department is very efficient in such matters.
There are great staff experts there.
Major de Valera
Do not lead me up an avenue other than the one I wish to follow. That is the best answer I can make. Another point has been made here, and there is a certain amount in it when put one way but, when related to the actual over-all position, it does not mean anything. I do not want to misquote Deputy Dr. O'Higgins, but I think I heard him saying: "What is the difference, does it matter whether it is 12,000, 10,000 or 8,000? What is 3,000 in the difference?" I heard Deputy MacEoin making the same suggestion at one time.
No. That is not correct.
Major de Valera
If we were talking about a standing army as an isolated factor and there were nothing more to it, there would be a lot in that point. When we have to face the issue as the General Staff and the Government had to face it on the basis of: "What have we got to provide for defence?" it is another matter. Having answered that question and finding that they have a local defence reserve of so many units and so much equipment for them, they have to find out how many whole-time maintenance men, and so on, will be required. After that, it is desirable to have a certain minimum to perform certain jobs, which I promise to outline in a moment. When we know the numbers that perform duties methodically, we establish a certain figure as a minimum. If we go below that particular minimum, we have to scrap the whole scheme and get a more economic and restricted one. The scheme having been decided and, as far as I know, approved by both Governments—the inter-Party Government, during their period of office, made no show or attempt to alter it—we have got to have a minimum force of permanent, whole-time personnel to make the scheme a reality.
That is the reason for having the permanent force at the strength at which it is. I will come to the details which will make definite the idea I am trying to put over. I am not dealing with peacetime; we have got to base our efforts on the fabric of an emergency, but even in peacetime a certain force is required. Having agreed to the F.C.A. Force which Deputy MacEoin wants, it is necessary to maintain that force effectively, as Deputy Dr. O'Higgins pointed out, speaking from his own experience. There are certain passages of his speech on this Estimate with which I am in agreement. I agree with him that to maintain that force a certain number of regular, whole-time personnel is necessary. One of our big difficulties in the past was that we were never allowed to have sufficient whole-time personnel attached to our volunteer reserve.
That was the case, even during the emergency.
Major de Valera
I agree, and for that reason I say there are certain points as regards this matter on which I am in agreement with Deputy Dr. O'Higgins. I was a member of an equivalent force—the Volunteer Force —and one of our great difficulties was that it took us a long time to make it felt that such assistance was needed, and we did not get that assistance until towards the end. I am speaking from my experience in the Volunteer Force from 1934 to 1939. On a number of occasions in the past, on the opposite side of the House, I tried to point out that there is a limit to the size of the volunteer force that can be maintained and that that limit is set by the strength of the permanent force. If my recollection serves me correctly, I went into that matter before. If an effective force of 100,000 F.C.A. men is to be maintained it must be considered whether it should be supervised by a certain number of regular officers and N.C.O.s, both for training and for administration purposes.
If we are serious about the point that the F.C.A. is to be the effective force Deputy MacEoin wants it to be, we must commit ourselves, straightway, to a substantial number of personnel. In other words, to make all such reserve units effective, particularly Volunteer Reserve units, a certain cadre of a permanent force is necessary. My own personal opinion is that we have always been in want of that in this country and that we have always been prone to underestimate the strength of the cadre required and to underestimate the demands that would be made on it, both for administration and for training. Not only that, but we have the whole question of the supply; that is, the local units. On top of that there must be a superstructure. Look into it and you will find that it will be impossible to supply that superstructure in the ordinary way on a voluntary basis, the nucleus of that superstructure, anyway, planning staffs, supply staffs, maintenance staffs, etc.
When you go into that requirement you find that you have committed yourself to a substantial number out of your establisment, but that is not all you want out of your defence force. Visualise what can happen on the outbreak of an emergency or when danger threatens. You have the question of local security, of installations, of communications, and over all the question of mobilisation. The question of local security first of all means that you must have certain regular units. It will take you a time to mobilise your volunteer units, even locally, into their positions. If the State is to have any measure of protection it must have a certain amount of immediate protection and that can only be provided by a certain number of regular units. Take the City of Dublin, take Government Buildings, take the protection of important installations like Poulaphouca or Ardnacrusha; you need a certain number of regular troops who will be always ready to be called upon. In addition, it is highly desirable to have a small force available for immediate action anywhere in the country. I do not want to go into too much detail because this is really a technical matter for the staff, but the fact is that some fighting forces are immediately necessary, however they are to be distributed. That presupposes a certain strength in the Regular Army.
Actually, if you sum up all the requirements you find that you are committed to a lot more than the number in the regular establishment. That difficulty will be overcome by the First Line Reserve. You must have regular units under establishment with vacancies to be filled immediately on mobilisation by reservists. You then have those units ready made and formed in all their parts provided they are of sufficient strength and that again puts a minimum to the establishment you can maintain. If you have a First Line Reserve they can quickly and easily be brought in and their units are much more highly trained and mobile than local units. By means of the First Line Reserve device you can make the regular Army go a lot further than it could if you have not this First Line Reserve.
As I have pointed out on previous occasions on this Estimate these Forces are required and it is surprising how they can be absorbed. Take 1940. We had an Army of 14,000 men but that Army had absorbed a good deal of the Reserve. We obtained that number because we mobilised 19,000 men in the previous September. Some had been exempted but the balance had been incorporated for nine months afterwards and were virtually regulars by that time. When the 1940 emergency came, when local security requirements had been met, when the cadres had been distributed to mobilise the emergency army, out of that army of 14,000 men there were only approximately one or two company columns left for what you might call general combat duty. The others were committed to local protection, mobilisation and garrison work. When sufficient men had been found for those purposes out of that army of 14,000 men in the end there was only a company column or two available for operations.
With that lesson in mind, it is quite obvious that our number of 12,000 is insufficient. The only justification is that that Army of 12,000 brought up by an adequate Reserve would give you a better hope than in 1940 and, from that position, would enable you to form your Second Line Reserve into what would be an effective First Line Reserve. I am pointing that out because the sine qua non for efficiency both in the Regular Army and in the Reserve—and when I talk of the Reserve I mean the F.C.A., which is the major part of the Reserve nucleus and is of equal importance with any other element in the Forces—is that you have a nucleus, a cadre, of the Regular Army up to strength and able to fulfil its duty. It is the skeleton upon which the whole framework of the defence body is built and upon which its efficiency depends. Then there is the question of the First Line Reserve. Its primary importance is that it must fill up the Regular Army and bring it up to a ready-formed sizable strength. You might also have a number of First Line Reserve units as we had during the last war. Certain battalions, I think, were mobilised which were practically all Reserve units at the beginning of the last war, and the country owes something to them. I can think of one Regular Reserve Battalion, the members of which were not young, but which did trojan service at Portobello in 1940, the 7th Reserve Battalion; the 11th Volunteer Reserve Battalion was another. I mention those because I had a certain amount of personal acquaintance with them. There were others in the country, I know, in the South and in the West which had an equally creditable performance. If we had enough reservists there is a lot to be said for that type of unit.
The first thing, however, is to fill the Regular units, but our First Line Reserve is falling. Why? Our First Line Reserve was fed from our Regular Army. As I pointed out three years ago, the flow to the Reserve depends on the flow to the Regular Army, which, in turn, depends upon the terms of service and on our effort to keep the Regular Army up to strength. Deputies opposite saw that the Reserve was falling. As early as 1948 I, myself, warned the Minister who then sat on these Front Benches that the danger of the Coalition policy of cutting down on defence was a drop in the strength of the Reserve. Two factors were involved. I would not say that the drop in strength was completely responsible because the terms of service were involved as well. I move to report progress.