Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 2 Jun 1953

Vol. 139 No. 4

Vote 56—Defence (Resumed)

Debate resumed on the following motion:—

That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration. — (Seán MacEoin).

Major de Valera

On the last day this Estimate was under discussion, we found ourselves back again at an old argument which tends to become rather sterile, that is, the precise strength of the Defence Force that we can or should maintain. As I tried to point out, the strength that we need to maintainhere—and that largely dictates the cost involved—is simply this. It is the minimum strength that will give the protection or the insurance that we calculate should be given and that will also be sufficient to give a cadreon which to expand. The calculation of that minimum strength must obviously be done by the staffs whose duty it is to do it. They can arrive at their estimates only after a careful survey of the situation and they will almost inevitably find themselves in the position that, from the defence point of view, the optimum will be more than the purse could bear and that in the end they have to cut their requirements to the absolute minimum. Having done that, a point is reached where to cut below the minimum would be to reduce the whole thing to a sham; in other words, to defeat the purpose for which these forces are there at all. When you get to that stage, no further cut is possible and you are faced with a decision as to whether you are going to have a Defence Force at all, because if you maintain a Defence Force at all, you are going to have cost and if you maintain that force below the minimum, you are going to be spending money on a sham throwing money down the drain in annual instalments, as we have pointed out before.

There is really no question, as I think I said on the previous day, as to one group or one particular Party wanting to maintain a strong whole-time Regular Army and pinning their whole faith on that and another taking up the position that we could do with a completely part-time voluntary Army and liquidate the whole-time element completely. These are two opposite extremes which I do not think anybody could support.

The fact is that we are agreed that we need a Defence Force which will provide a cadrefor expanding and that the Army which would meet an emergency here is to be visualised as an embodiment on the skeleton of the permanent force, plus its immediate reserves. I have gone into all this because on occasions it seems to have the appearance that Deputies on this side insist on a strength of 12,000 odd, while some Deputies on the other side pin their faith to the figure of 5,000.Deputy O'Higgins, when Minister for Defence, pointed out that it is not reasonable to deal with figures in this way, that, from the point of view of actual ineffectiveness of mere numbers of men, there is not an awful lot of difference between 5,000 and 12,000, if you look at that number of men armed.

Dr. O'Higgins

I do not think 5,000 ever arose.

Major de Valera

It did in this debate. It was raised by Deputy O'Donnell.

Dr. O'Higgins

I thought you were quoting me.

Major de Valera

No. I am quoting the Deputy only from memory, but I think he once rejoined to me that there was not an awful lot of difference between 7,000 and 12,000.

Dr. O'Higgins

Between 9,000 and 12,500.

Major de Valera

Even if the figures were 5,000 and 12,500, I agree with the Deputy that, if you look merely at a Regular Force of 12,000 and 5,000 and nothing more, from the point of view of effectiveness, you have not gained an awful lot by having 12,000, but that is not the point of the argument. What we have to visualise is a force which will, first, give you the skeleton of such emergency army as you are going to have, if you need it, a skeleton on which you can build your whole military defensive plans; and secondly, a skeleton that will have within itself a certain element available for immediate effective deployment, because it may be a matter of hours. It is on that basis that our attitude has been adopted that we should maintain the minimum establishment which the Staff calculated was necessary.

I am running the risk of repeating things which some of us said in great detail, particularly in 1948, 1949 and 1950, but it does go to the kernel of the whole thing in so far as we are at an argument about the strength to be maintained. It has arisen again on this Estimate because, in particular, of Deputy O'Donnell's interventionand the attitude he adopted. Why do we say that it is unwise to cut below the minimum which the staff said was necessary? Without repeating all that has been said on the matter before from the purely Regular Army point of view, I should like to have it looked at from this angle, in addition. We hear people talking about the inadequate training of the F.C.A., about the inadequate servicing of the whole-time personnel and about the inadequate maintenance of the Reserve and Deputies are now pointing to the serious position of the First Line Reserve. Some of us saw that coming as far back as 1946, 1947 and 1948 and pointed out the grave threat there was to the First Line Reserve. Those Deputies such as Deputy MacBride who mentioned it this year as if it were something new should look back on the records where they will see that these dangers were precisely pointed out as far back as that time under the system we were then operating.

All these points are made on the one hand and on the other, the point is made that we are maintaining too strong a force. The answer is very simple and it has been given a number of times. The effectiveness of all your Defence Forces, their standard, their maintenance and even their strength, depends very largely on the effectiveness of the Regular Force which is the skeleton for the whole lot. If the strength of that Regular Force is not maintained at least up to the minimum I have tried to indicate, its effectiveness is impaired and with it everything else suffers. In fact, it can very nearly go altogether.

In the history of the Defence Forces here, we can find some salutary lessons and we should look at them absolutely objectively and without worrying very much as to who in the past was to blame, who made a wise decision or an unwise decision. The fact is that, after the demobilisation in the '20's, in a very different set of circumstances, admittedly, and particularly different world circumstances, the Defence Forces were depleted to a point where they rapidly became ineffective, in the sense of being a Defence Force at all, as various officers on the staffs at that time pointed out. The first effort to supplementthem with voluntary reserves was made by the Cumann na nGaedheal Government and the second by their successors. These efforts, whereas they were, in part, successful, brought out a number of valuable lessons of which one was that there is a limit to the size of the voluntary force you can maintain and that that limit is very definitely posed by the size of the Regular Army you have.

Quite apart from that, there is the whole question of the training of the Regular Army itself. At the risk of repeating what I said here in 1948 when, I think, I gave a very thorough and very accurate resumé of the history of the Army on the first Estimate of the Coalition Government for Defence, I may say that we pointed out that during that period the strength which was round about the 5,000 mark that Deputy O'Donnell is talking about was so low that it was impossible to train at all. Quite apart from equipment difficulties, men were absorbed in guard duties and routine duties. They could never be got together for training. It was possible to give battalions annual training at that time only because certain reserve battalions were mobilised for annual training and did garrison work in the city. Do you see what that means? It means that at that time things were so bad that when you got your reserve battalion for annual training all you did with them was to make them do garrison duty and you tried to get a little bit of field training for the regular battalion instead. When the voluntary elements were provided, there were not the troops, the facilities and the officers available to train them, notwithstanding the fact that in the case of the Volunteer force experiment a number of officers were specially recruited for the purpose.

All that is the experience of that time which in itself very definitely points to the fact that the figure mentioned by Deputy O'Donnell is just not workable. It is not a question of opinion. It is a question of something proved by the fact and by the record of that period. At that time we were spending a considerable amount of money, even by standards in thosedays, on the Defence Force and it meant that you were spending £1,000,000 to £2,000,000 every year on the Army with a very serious risk that when the Army was needed it would not be able to answer the function for which it was provided.

Those of us who were through the emergency of 1940 realise that, I think. The General Staff realise it. We realise that by a great combination of good fortune and good luck we were able to meet the 1940 emergency, through the fortunate situation that you had the so-called phoney war period to condition people and to get them accustomed to maintaining a bigger Army, that we had a first mobilisation eight or nine months before the actual emergency of 1940, that we had been trying to make up for lost time in the previous 18 months. Notwithstanding all that, the situation was so bad that if there had been any real pressure put upon us beyond the point to which it had been put, I doubt if the machine could have borne the strain.

If anybody should care to do a calculation, he will find very quickly that when you try to provide for all the elements that are necessary it is not, on first look at the problem, 12,000 you will need; it is 15,000 or more. Look at it this way: First of all you have to make an estimate as to what emergency force you could reasonably hope to have when an emergency would come. You go to build for that. That of necessity, must be largely composed of part-time soldiers—Reserves and F.C.A. You cannot leave it all or beyond a certain percentage to emergency recruiting when the time comes. To maintain these part-time elements you will find that you need a certain regular skeleton for each unit and for each formation.

Take, for instance, the case of an ordinary infantry battalion. If you look at the organisation of an infantry battalion even as it was during the emergency—I should imagine the argument would apply even more strongly now than then—you will find that it is futile to think of it in terms of being completely part-time personnel. That was all right in the days when the riflewas your only armament, when it was only a question of rifles and men but now, with the various relatively complex armaments that you have and with the difficulties that are brought into the situation by air power and complications in transport, and so forth and so on, you will find that if you are going to have an effective battalion, even an effective Second Line Reserve battalion, you will have to allot to that battalion certain whole-time administrative personnel. If it is going to be a battalion at all, it is going to have equipment which will be relatively complex and will take some time in minding. That pre-supposes whole-time personnel on the quarter-master's side to look after that equipment.

The organisation of the unit itself is more complicated than formerly. That pre-supposes that if it is going to be run efficiently somebody will have to be whole-time and you need someone on the adjutant's side.

Then there is the training, which is much more complex for every individual man in it. When you work that out you find that you need a number of N.C.O. instructors and officer instructors, at least one or two officers and N.C.O.s for sub-parts of that battalion. These will need for various purposes an odd private soldier here and there. When you reckon the whole thing up you will find very quickly that, although this is to be a battalion of 800 or 900 men, say, of the F.C.A. or of some other Reserve, in order to make it effective, to make it worthwhile maintaining you will have to have a number of whole-time personnel allotted. When you work out the essential allotment of whole-time or Regular personnel, you will find that you have a substantial number to account for.

If you do that over every unit that you will have in your Defence Force you will find straight away, before you do anything else, that you have made a significant hole in your establishment; you will find you have absorbed a considerable number, a significant number of the 12,000 allowed by the Staff.

That situation is aggravated by another fact, that in modern times there are a number of units, in the specialist end particularly, where the proportion of whole-time to part-time could be very high because of the nature of the work, that is, if that unit is to be effective at all.

Apart from that, there are certain complete or nearly complete units of the Regular Army itself required to meet an emergency occasion. As some of us have pointed out, you may have a pre-emergency period or you may have the opening stages of an emergency where you want something available straight away while you are mobilising, if for nothing more than the protection of vital points or vital garrison duty. If you are to be able to supply that immediately, that pre-supposes certain regular units as such.

Then, again, in the case of specialist arms, having regard to the long time it is likely to take a purely voluntary or part-time organisation to get effective in these circumstances, you will have to supply, to make the remainder of your forces effective, a certain number of part-time or virtually part-time special units of various classes. You can proceed with your calculation along these lines and you will come to the figure. When you come to that figure, you will probably find that it is a great deal in excess of the existing figure. The next problem is to reduce that to the minimum. That is, in fact, what the General Staff did when it was arriving at these figures. There was more or less that kind of approach to see what was the barest minimum that could be got without making the whole thing a sham.

There is another aspect to it, too, and that is the interest and the effectiveness of the personnel. I should like to deal with that separately. I have not by any means put the argument for maintaining the establishment completely or thoroughly, because I feel that has been done on other occasions, particularly in the debate in 1948 and in 1949, and it is hardly necessary to repeat it again. But there are some other aspects on which I might touch. One of thedesperate things that happened back in the late '20's and the very early '30's was that the strength was so low that people were absorbed in routine duties so much that they could not train. Officers were killed with the routine duties and they had no men to train, nor had they the time, because their time was occupied in long terms as orderly officers or in guard duties. It has a desperate effect on morale. It prevents Defence Forces from preparing or keeping themselves fit for the purpose for which they are there. In fact, one who saw it at that time can only wonder that they were capable of the effort they were capable of after such a demoralising experience.

Now there was inevitably bound to be a tendency towards the same type of demoralisation after the emergency. There was a contraction of numbers after the emergency as men went out, and so forth. But I think that the strengths were let go too low and did, in fact, go dangerously near the position that you had in those times to which I refer. From 1947 onwards the strength fell sharply and that was bound to have its repercussions on the morale of the Army. Significantly, with the increase back to a workable establishment it makes it much easier for men to be interested in their job and to carry out their duties efficiently.

Apart from that, there is the whole question, shall I say, of opportunity. Some Deputies said that we did not pay our soldiers or officers enough. Personally, I subscribe to that view. But one must also look at it from the point of view of the community as a whole and realise that this service is in the nature of an insurance; that there are other things that must, from day to day, be regarded as in priority to it; that in our circumstances we cannot afford to pay more; and that that is the situation which you have. One of the very important things in such a situation is that there should be as many chances as possible for advancement to personnel in this force and, of course, the larger the force the better the opportunities.

One of the deplorable things that results from any policy of cutting down the size of the Army is that you immediatelyrestrict the future of good men in that force. At the moment, if your establishment is, say, 12,000 and you are keeping up to it, there is a certain prospect for any good officer, N.C.O. or man to go a little bit further. In other words, there are so many potential vacancies, so many niches, if you like, for higher appointments, whether to the higher grades of N.C.O. or commissioned rank, or even in the higher establishments where there is extra pay for the private category. If you halve that, you automatically cut down the opportunities for promotion and with it the stimulation to interest.

I wonder does Deputy O'Donnell realise that a direct consequence of what he has suggested would be to cut out the possibilities for promotion? If I understood him aright, his proposition was to cut the number down to 5,000 and pay them more. Very good. From the purely personal point of view of the soldier, I suppose there is something to be argued there. But, even from that point of view of cutting down the size of the force, you are cutting down the opportunities for promotion.

Mr. Hickey

I put it to the Deputy that as all the great military Powers are almost equally balanced, are we not emphasising too much about our Army?

Major de Valera

Let me finish my point. I will come back to that. The second point is that, of course, that proposition does not involve any saying. Deputy O'Donnell is not suggesting saving money on the Army obviously if that is his point, except in so far as you save it in equipment. But, remember, equipment is needed not so much for the immediate Regular Army, but to have it available in a time of emergency. I take it that he is not coupling a saving in equipment with that. I think I can leave Deputy O'Donnell at that. The proposition does not seem to be without its objections.

Before I come to what Deputy Hickey has suggested, there is another point. Deputy MacBride, amongst others, has pointed to the decline of the Reserve. I am sorry he is not here, because I should like to tellhim that it is just that decline we were afraid of five years ago when his Government was in office. That was one of the consequences that was inevitable from the policy of cutting the Army, that not only were you impoverishing yourself by cutting down the Regular Army, but under the system which we have—I am perfectly open to any suggestion for altering it —for feeding the Reserve, you were not only cutting down the Regular Army but the Reserve. What we are facing in regard to the First Line Reserve at the moment is the result of the postwar policy. It was the inevitable result, as some of us pointed out at that time. The worrying thing is just precisely how to tackle it. I am not satisfied that with the terms of service as we have it, even if you maintain the Regular Army strength, that you can maintain your First Line Reserve.

Deputies appreciate, I suppose, that the theory of the business is, and the practice as it works out is, that a soldier joins the Army for a certain period. If he does not continue soldiering as a regular soldier for 20 years or so he automatically goes on the Reserve and comes up for annual training. As he gets certain payment for coming on, the State has a lien and can call on him. That "A" Reserve element was a most important part of our Defence Forces up to and during the emergency. It was in many ways to be equated in value to regular personnel, and that was brought out very strongly during the emergency, where the "A" Reserve N.C.O.s were indispensable and the old officers and old Reserves were extremely useful. I would nearly go so far as to say indispensable, too.

At the time the establishment was being worked out, I remember, from personal recollection, that calculations were made as to what the inflow would be and that various calculations were made to see what was the position of the Reserves. If my memory serves me right, one of the big objections, from the military point of view, to reducing the establishment from the 15,000 first proposed by the General Staff to 12,500, which was suggestedfor financial reasons, was the adverse effect on the Reserve. It is a pity that although Deputies are alive to this problem to-day, Deputies were not alive to it at the time when such a situation could have been stopped.

I am not at all satisfied that we will be able to maintain a satisfactory strength of "A" Reserve—what I mean by Reserve "A" is that type of Reserve that has got fairly full-time Army training for at least a couple of years and is called up annually. I think when Deputy Dr. O'Higgins was sitting on these benches I pressed him to look into this question, particularly of officers of this Reserve type, that is, officers who would get a pretty thorough training as officers, something more than can be given to the F.C.A. officer, to supplement the regular officer corps, and also the question of N.C.O.s and men. With adjustment you could probably get back the Reserve to approximately the same strength as the Regular Army under the present system, but the question is whether that is sufficient. I would like to urge on the Minister that that problem be examined.

Circumstances are constantly changing and some of us are too long away to add something useful in the way of detailed argument—at least I would hesitate to do so because I probably would not have all the relevant facts before me which the Minister would have—but it is apparent from the figures as they are going that there is an immediate necessity for building up the First Line Reserve. It will be needed particularly in the first stages of mobilisation. It will be needed to fill up regular units which may need to be deployed straight away. It will be needed to fill up certain gaps in the organisation where experience is required immediately; and it may be even needed to fill staff and administrative positions. Briefly the problem appears to be this: we have got to the stage where we are prepared to maintain Regular Forces at the establishment which the Staff has recommended. We have now the problem of that Reserve, which is a threefold one.

The first problem is how you are going to supply officers. We areactually, in one sense, worse off than in 1939 because there was a fairly large number of officers immediately available at that time for whole-time mobilisation with a certain amount of intensive training. There were the officers of the General Reserve as it was then called, and most of the officers of the Volunteer force had got a pretty intensive training also. Then there is the question of N.C.O.s. In 1939, you had a considerable number of them training in the Reserve. I do not think there is the same number available now. Then, of course, there is the question of soldiers.

This question of the First Line Reserve needs careful and vigorous examination and attention to the F.C.A. will not fill that want alone. The F.C.A. will be needed, and the more I see of it as things are developing, the more I think we have to look on the F.C.A. as the First Line Reserve, no longer as we looked on it at the beginning as something corresponding to the L.D.F. As things have developed we will have to regard the F.C.A. as we regarded the Volunteer Reserves of the past, that is the old Volunteer Reserve or the Volunteer force. Whether the terms of service permit of their being regarded in that way I do not know, but if the terms of service do not permit that, or if those men are not available for mobilisation, in that sense then, we are very definitely much worse off than we were in the past.

A little bit of clear thinking is needed at this stage to see how we are developing our Defence Forces, what we want them for, and precisely how we are going to dispose them; what the rôle of the F.C.A.—which in its name, Forsa Cosanta Aitiúil, is a local defence force—will be, and whether it is to be considered, as first contemplated, or whether it is to take the place of the Volunteer Reserve. We should have a clear idea as to what rôle we want that force to play and some clarification is needed as to whether part of it may be included in the First Line Volunteer Reserve and part of it used as a local Reserve. That is getting perilously near the old idea of lines as they were in the conception of the Volunteer force.

However, whatever it is there is need for our General Staff to sit down and be quite clear as to what the rôles are and, in the meantime, in some way to correct the position in regard to the First Line Reserve which is definitely disquieting and which is, I fear, only the logical result of the trend that was there, which some of us tried to point out and wanted to have stopped. The results are there as well as the trend and I think something has to be done about it.

Another remark made by Deputy MacBride was that he thought—as usual he was not very definite about anything—and insinuated that a certain deficiency was immediately attributable to emigration. It may be that there is a factor there and we do know in the past that a number of reservists have always been employed in England and have usually, come back. I take it the Minister will check on this. I have no figures to show whether there is any difference in general from the position as it was in the past but in 1938-39 there was a large number of reservists employed in England and still the mobilisation figure for that Reserve was exceptionally high. I have not the figures before me—my memory is getting a little dull on these things—but I would be surprised if I am wrong in saying that the mobilisation figure for the old Reserve was between 85 and 90 per cent. If we take that in conjunction with the fact that a substantial number of these had permission to be employed abroad and to be out of jurisdiction and had returned, then the indications are that a very substantial number of those in that category at the present day are still available and likely to be available. I do not know what Deputy Hickey wants but I think what he suggested was that there is no use in having any Defence Force.

Mr. Hickey

May I explain what I was trying to convey. I pointed out that all the Great Powers were almost equally balanced and I suggested that we should try to exercise our moral force rather than depend solely on a military force. Mind you, the moral leadership of a small nation can be asgreat as that of a big nation. If we joined with other nations in a crusade against poverty, ignorance, sickness and the fear of want, we would be just as effective, if not more so, than in talking about building up an Army as we are.

Major de Valera

I do not quite follow the Deputy's argument. I am all with the Deputy in so far as he talks about the setting up of a moral standard of our own, to try to improve conditions for our people here.

Mr. Hickey

And for the world as well.

Major de Valera

Here is the trouble about our defence. We are not by any means spending an exorbitant amount on it.

Mr. Hickey

Do not misunderstand what I said. I stand for an efficient Army but not for a very big Army.

Major de Valera

I think we all stand for that. I can put it this way. We all stand for a small Army, the smallest that we can possibly have, consistent with efficiency.

Mr. Hickey

Yes.

Major de Valera

I do not want to catch the Deputy out. You see the way I am putting it—the smallest Army that can be efficient. As I tried to point out, we do come to a certain point of smallness where you are not efficient any longer. What does "efficient" mean? Efficient for the purpose it is there. Efficiency does not mean that every man in the Army is a good shot. It does not mean only that every man in the Army is a first-class shot, that we can enter into international competitions and win prizes. That efficiency is not being efficient for the purpose for which it is there.

Unfortunately, efficiency for the purpose for which it is there demands a certain minimum strength. In other words, you have to go back right to the beginning and decide whether you are going to provide for defence. If you are going to provide for defenceyou have got to provide efficiently in that sense, and providing efficiently in that sense involves the spending of a certain amount of money, unfortunately. We have in this country actually been spending less on defence than most other countries—a great deal less. In fact, we are spending so little that Deputy Dr. O'Higgins at one time—I hope I am not paraphrasing him wrongly but he is here and he can correct me if I am wrong— used to chide me with not being a realist. He used to say to me: "You talk about the amount we are spending on defence. Even if we were to spend double that amount do you think that would give you complete defence?" Of course it would not. A small country such as ours cannot ever provide absolute defence but it can go a certain distance to meet its defence problem and meet it efficiently, and if it can I think it should. Generally that is the way the argument more or less lies.

After all is said and done, all that we can really hope to do in regard to defence is first of all in an emergency period to be prepared to garrison our own territory. The advantage of that is that in such a period any vacuum is dangerous. The big Powers about whom the Deputy spoke will be under pressure and any vacuum would be dangerous.

The first consideration that jumps to mind is if there is an area such as this, an island, or even the partitioned part of it we have, the Twenty-Six Counties, which is completely unprepared, there is a vacuum there to be filled and if no preparations have been made for that portion of the country in an emergency period, there is a certain temptation to other people to say: "That will have to be looked after." Therefore you are up against the fact that if we do not do that job ourselves and provide for the garrisoning of this bit of territory, even if any future war does not come any nearer to us than the last war did, the question will inevitably arise: "Who is going to garrison this country?" Is it not better that we should be prepared to garrison it ourselves? Therefore when we mentionthis word "efficient", it should be remembered that it is not enough to keep young men together to garrison the country. We must in addition have a certain amount of organisation, preparation and readiness.

Mr. Hickey

I know that.

Major de Valera

That is why we have to incur the annual expense involved. Apart from the mere question of immediate garrisoning, we have the problem that if an emergency came any closer, close enough to involve us in any way, you have a second consideration. Would it be better that our young men should be involved, in that by being drafted singly into somebody else's army or that they should be involved in it, in units of their own in their own Army.

Mr. Hickey

We would always have our young men to fall back upon.

Major de Valera

The ultimate answer is that we should provide our own Army and that involves a certain amount of expense. There would be no argument in regard to that, were it not for the amount of money involved.

Mr. Hickey

We are not concerned about the money but we are concerned about the futility of our talking about an Army and forgetting the very small part our Army can play in a military way while as a nation we can exercise a big moral force if we wish to do so.

Major de Valera

We are talking on this Estimate and I should not like to take advantage of the discussion on this Estimate to discuss wider issues which might arise on a general debate. We are talking now on the Estimate for Defence and it all boils down to one thing. We are all apparently prepared to do what we can with regard to defence but some Deputies start talking about the cost and that is the trouble. There has been a certain amount of criticism in regard to the cost of equipment. Here again is a load that has fallen suddenly upon us. Personally I would be prepared to have seen the bill for equipment spread over a number of years. There were three years of the Coalition Governmentwhen we got practically no equipment.

Dr. O'Higgins

Why? Did you ask the Minister?

Major de Valera

I am coming to that. The answer given to me was that we could not get it at the time. All right, but we need equipment and it is unfortunate that the circumstances are such that we have got to get it. It is something that we are able to get now and surely we ought to avoid ever getting ourselves, if we can get it, into the position in which apparently the Coalition Minister was, where he could tell me that he could not get equipment.

Dr. O'Higgins

There was none there when he went to get it.

Major de Valera

Yes, he was told that. There had been exactly that situation in the '30's. In the early 1930's we had not got sufficient equipment; when we tried to get it in the late 1930's we could not get it and we were deficient in equipment right through the emergency.

Mr. Hickey

And if an emergency comes again we will not be able to get the equipment.

An Ceann Comhairle

Deputy Hickey is making his speech by way of interruption. Deputy Hickey will have to be orderly.

Major de Valera

If we can get the equipment now we should certainly purchase it. It would be illuminating to have some figures as to what equipment could have been purchased at certain times in the past and what could not. Deputy Dr. O'Higgins said that he could not get the equipment. That was the position when he was the Minister for Defence. To-day the position is different. To-day we can get the equipment. Ought we to complain about that? To some extent the bill is a great deal higher than it was but, as the Minister for Finance pointed out in his Budget statement, we have been spending less on equipment in recent years than we spent before the war, and what we werespending before the war was completely inadequate in view of our requirements.

The only policy the Minister can adopt is to get as much equipment as he can. The type of equipment available seems to be suitable, and it is obvious that we have been very deficient in two particular types of up-to-date armament. We are practically devoid of any kind of armament to deal with armoured vehicles. We have made good that deficiency in the best way we could, namely, by the provision of a mobile type of weapon that can be put into the hands of any foot soldier. We are also deficient in anti-aircraft, but I think some effort is being made to supply that deficiency. I do not know whether, remembering air development and the manufacture of jets and so forth, ground anti-aircraft defences can be very effective. I do not know what the value of such defences is but some defence must be provided; otherwise one leaves oneself wide open to old, cheap methods of destruction.

The only plea I make is that we accept expenditure on our Defence Forces generally as reasonable. In present circumstances it is unreasonable to suggest reducing our Defence Forces or abstaining from the purchase of equipment having regard to past history. Looking objectively at the history of the recent past, without any desire to score political points, a very simple lesson can be drawn; the Minister should maintain the minimum establishment that his staff advises him to maintain, and get all the equipment possible for the forces at his disposal. That is a very simple formula, but it is the most effective formula.

There is another aspect of defence which is a little bit perturbing. It is difficult to know what the prospects are. Expressing a purely personal view I would not say that prospects at the moment are such as to offer a guarantee of peace in the future. At times during the past five years things have looked threatening. At times it has appeared as if everything was lovely in the garden. In the over-all situation, the more one thinks of things the more depressing in someaspects the future appears to be. That does not necessarily mean an armed conflict at the end of the road but it does mean trouble in some form or another.

There are two big blocks. Occasionally an apparent rapprochement takes place. At other times there is a flare up and all the time there is a steady building up of strength on both sides. There has been a good deal of talk of peace but we learn of the perfecting of fighting aircraft in Russia and the development of atomic field artillery in America simultaneously. We see no likelihood that either potential belligerent is willing to take the risk of being the first to disarm. There is a steady tension all the time, economic as well as general.

Recently we had a statement by the President of the United States which was interpreted as an "olive branch," but there were conditions and one of those conditions was that there would be inspection. What is the likelihood of that condition being accepted? If that condition and all the other conditions are not accepted, what is the interpretation to be put on the statements that have been made? What is the interpretation to be taken from a situation that is daily developing? Even if there are difficulties in Europe and the unification of armies, and so forth, is not going ahead as rapidly as some people might wish, is that a good sign? Might the position not be more hopeful if one saw strength being built up on one side or the other without any obstacles in its way? Might not that be a better guarantee in the long run? Every Deputy can assess the situation for himself. I do not think we are out of the wood yet and the time is past when we should consider the problem of our defence as something that may be important at a future date and all one need do now is make a token provision and wait until things "hot up" to make preparation for it.

We have not reached that situation and, since we have not, there are a number of defence problems I believe we have not really tackled. First and fundamental in the whole thing is food. I wonder have we yet got to thestage where that problem is thought of actively in relation to defence—the provision and the distribution of food, the provision of a transport organisation and the provision of other essential goods and services? These are undoubtedly tied up with any defence problem we have. While we have been largely occupied to date with training to get to the position where the Defence Forces should be up to strength, there is a still larger area to be attended to in relation to these matters.

There is the question of civil defence. I know the Minister is making certain moves in that direction and I think his predecessor actually initiated some training at the end of 1949 and that is being pressed forward now. But have we got beyond the stage of training personnel? What kind of a problem will cities like Cork, Limerick and even Galway be likely to face? These matters were not attended to before the last emergency. On that occasion we had time to get used to a situation which providentially did not develop. The problems are still there. These are subjects that I can recollect dealing with in previous years and I do not feel I should repeat them in detail. I would like, however, to stress again a number of things I said and which I tried to advocate to Deputy Dr. O'Higgins when he was on this side of the House. I would like to advocate the very same things to the present Minister.

It is always a question of balance and of how urgent the problem is. It does not look to be so urgent at the moment but I have a feeling that until 1954 is out there is always a certain amount of urgency about it. I would not advocate at this moment spending excessive sums on defence. Nevertheless, the provision which is being made in that regard seems to be reasonable. After all, what we are doing this year is to provide the moneys necessary for maintaining the Regular Defence Forces at approximately their peace-time establishment and then we are providing some moneys to buy equipment for them. That is where all the money is going and that is all we are spending on defence. When we look at the problemin its wider sense, we see there is a lot more to think about and a lot more to deal with. We do not seem to have got to that stage and to get to that stage we will need a good deal more expenditure which we are not prepared to carry at the moment. Let us carry the expenditure we are carrying, shall I say, cheerfully.

In conclusion, I would like to ask Deputies who succumb to the temptation—let me put it that way—of saying: "Save on defence", because that is really what it is, to pause and think on what is involved. Would those same Deputies say: "Save on a number of other things"? The last day I asked Deputy O'Donnell, when he spoke about cutting, whether he would advocate cutting in regard to the Department of Industry and Commerce, the Department of Local Government or any of these Departments! It is very easy—it might be even popular—to say things like that, but it seems to me to point to the sterility of ideas in Deputies. It all seems to come back to this one point which is, after all, not the biggest element in capital expenditure by any means in this country.

I am referring to a table. The routine expenditure on the Army and the Department of Defence is certainly not excessive. Capital expenditure— if you call war equipment purchased capital expenditure—is not excessive either. Deputies talk about saving but the amount of saving that would be possible, even if their views were to be carried out to the point of liquidation of this expenditure completely, would be relatively insignificant in regard to the total Budget that the State has to carry. We are carrying on the current side alone, for supplies and services, roughly in the region of £100,000,000 in the year. The Defence Estimate is only a relatively small percentage of that. Even if you were to wipe out the whole of the Defence Estimate, it would still have relatively little effect on the total bill of the State for the year but if you wipe out only a proportion of that defence expenditure it would have a still smaller influence having regard to the total Budget but it would also havea completely destructive influence on the problems for which the small sum is being expended.

It is purely a question of balance. I think that the sums we are spending on other items are very much in excess of what we are spending on defence. Altogether, on the capital side we are spending £39.29 million and the bulk of that goes in the directions mentioned by Deputy Hickey. There can be no question but that the bulk of it is going into those things which have priority. The provision for defence is made very, very secondary, indeed, in all Government spending and Government calculations. It is less proportionately even than its importance warrants. When you look at the matter realistically you are still taking a great risk with things as they are.

Deputies talk about saving in defence but they do not talk about saving elsewhere. I wonder why? Is it a question of popularity? I do not know, but if they look at the sum they will find that the return from the saving they advocate is likely to be very small and that the bulk of the spending that you make is going in other directions altogether. The amount of equipment which the Minister is going to get in next year will not bring us by any means to the saturation point in regard to the equipment that will be needed by the Defence Forces and even though we have already spent a considerable amount on equipment, we have not yet arrived at the position where we could say we were in any way over-equipped or even adequately equipped for the forces we have got.

I think that those are the only remarks I would make about this Estimate. One could join issue on the whole question of defence but we have done that so thoroughly on previous occasions that I feel it is mere repetition to go into it again. I would like to know and the Minister would like to know precisely what the attitude of certain Deputies is. If they wanted to cut it out altogether we could understand that but people who want it both ways are difficult to understand. I would like to ask the Minister whether the question of the First Line Reservewill be given attention. It is a situation that will not improve of itself but it may improve to some extent slowly if the strength of the Reguar Army is kept up, but that will depend on service and other factors.

Now, leaving defence, there is only the question of Army pensions. I understand that an Army Pensions Bill is being brought in and that provision is going to be made for the dependants of officers and men in the Defence Forces who die while on service and that something is going to be done to improve that position. I hope it is going to be adequate. We did press certain cases very hard on the Minister. What was unique about that was that members of every single Party and every single interest in the House urged the same views on him. I understand that something is going to be done now to improve the position. I hope so but still I am not satisfied, because I think there is one question that requires attention in that regard. As far as I can gather, anything that is to be done will be done merely on the basis of a pension. That is all right as far as it goes—that is, where a person is serving in the Army and becomes disabled or dies there will be certain automatic provision for the widow and dependants, But there is something more. There is the case of a man who is killed, say, or very seriously injured in circumstances arising directly from his duty somewhere, of a case where there is a particular risk associated with his employment and where that risk has resulted in serious or fatal injury to him.

In the case of civilian employment, many firms have insurance schemes. If an employee dies during the period of his employment, the insurance scheme makes provision for his dependants. If a man has to retire prematurely from his employment there is, very often provision for the payment of either a lump sum or a pension. I presume that is the type of provision that should be made in the Army also. There should also be provision to meet a specific risk. Take the case of an Air Force officer who is injured in the course of his duty, or of an engineerofficer who is blown up by a mine that he is working in the course of his duty. One can also think of the case of an artillery man who is killed because a shell accidentally explodes beside him when it should not have exploded. These are all additional risks which are associated with the work that these men are doing and which are not statistically serious in the sense of being of frequent occurrence. In that way they are not likely to be the cause of large claims against the State.

In all these circumstances, I think we should make specific provision for insurance for such personnel, particularly in the case of people who are employed in the handling of explosives or in the flying of aircraft because civilian insurance is beyond their reach, due to the risks involved. I know that the Minister challenged us on this before. I checked on it, and it is a positive fact that a civilian company will only insure a pilot of a military aircraft at an exorbitant, at an impossibly uneconomic, premium. In the ordinary insurance policy there will be exceptions put in for such things as the flying of a military plane, for those dealing with explosives and matters of that nature. That being so, I think that an opportunity for insurance should be given, and that the most direct way of doing it is to provide insurance for members of the Defence Forces who are seriously injured or killed as a result of some occurrence or accident arising directly out of their duty.

I am referring now to cases where there is an enormous amount of risk. It may be urged that there are administrative difficulties in the way of doing that. That is no reason or excuse, however, why this should not be done. I think that in cases of this kind, provision should be made for insurance. We are all glad to learn that the Bill that is to be introduced will, we hope, give some measure of improvement to people already affected. At any rate, I think that the principle which I am urging needs to be established and, in fact, I would go so far as to suggest that there should be retrospection in certain cases.

That immediately brings up the interestingpoint of this award. It is now over two years since this matter was raised, and as yet we have not had any result. That is one thing. The second thing is that I understand, there was an anomaly there in regard to N.C.O.s and men who had between 12 to 18 years' service, if they went ill, in regard to treatment. The Minister is aware of this because representations have been made to him on it. I was told, although I cannot say that I can rely on the authority on which it was mentioned to me, that this matter was probably being adjusted. There is one urgent case at the moment of a man who had 19 years' service. This is the case of a man who became seriously ill and who was hit very badly by the operation of this provision whereas if he had, before becoming ill, less than 18 years' service and more than 12 he would be in a more fortunate position. I would ask the Minister to try to adjust the position there, because I understand there is only one week or so to go before the situation can be solved. I can give the Minister the particulars. This is a type of anomaly which I think needs correction. I think Deputy Cowan mentioned a somewhat similar case last week. It may probably have been the same case.

I think that is all that I can add to this debate. In conclusion, I want to refer in particular to this question of insurance for Army personnel who are injured in the course of duty through something happening, and arising directly out of the performance of their duty. In regard to that, I think there is an awful lot to be done both in justice and from the point of view of the morale of the Defence Forces.

Dr. O'Higgins

I will pay Deputy de Valera the compliment of saying that he definitely does take himself seriously, and that he takes this question of defence equally seriously. But, in the case of people who take themselves seriously, or too seriously, he occasionally falls into the mistake that is common to such people that, having conceived a plan or drawn up a theory, he falls into the mistake of thinking that nobody else could have a point ofview even nearly approaching the truth except himself. In some frenzied way he has built up this figure of 12,500 into a kind of sacred emblem.

Major de Valera

That is what I was trying to avoid. The Deputy was not here when I was speaking on that.

Dr. O'Higgins

The figure of 12,300 or 12,600 or 13,000 will not do. It must be 12,500. It must, of necessity, be the aim of any and every Government to attain to that particular figure, and to be satisfied with nothing less. I would expect accuracy from a Deputy who goes into such laboured detail, but when he was giving us this lecture on the importance of that particular figure, and when he was referring to the question of strength in past periods, he was dealing with a Book of Estimates that outlines the strength of the Army for this present financial year as being 10,000 N.C.O.s and men—very nearly approximately the strength of the Army two years ago but certainly nearer the strength of the Army two years ago than the figure we have all this talk about.

At the same time, the Deputy refers to the cut in the Army strength in the year 1948-49. There again, he pays no attention to a situation presented by anybody else. He will recollect, if he looks it up, the strength of the Army when I took it over. The only cut in the strength of the Army was to allow the Construction Corps to go home. Not a man was demobilised. The Construction Corps—those little boys—were allowed to go home: nothing else. But there was work and there was hope of work throughout the country at that time. Business was throbbing and it was difficult if not impossible to get recruits, but recruiting was never stopped. The strength that the country gave us, short of conscription, was the strength of the Army.

The Minister, having spent three years on the Opposition Benches talking in terms of 15,000, took over. He spent a lot of money on recruiting. He had to alter the age. He had to reduce the age and reduce theattestation period. He had to take boys of 17 years and take them for two years' service in order to keep an Army even up to this strength. Remember, the whole trend of modern life is antagonistic to the well-being in strength of a modern army. Unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, the State intervening in order to try to make employment and find employment—all that is deadly opposed to the maintenance of a voluntary army. What was my problem a few years ago is the Minister's problem to-day. I doubt if the Government would have an Army within 2,000 or 3,000 of its present strength if it were not for a reduction in the age to 17. Yet we have this change featured as if one person deliberately cut or reduced an army to what is called "danger point" and another came along, conscious of his responsibilities, and was able to build it up to safety point.

We had the same tricky dishonest presentation of a case by the Minister for Finance when broadcasting about his Budget. He dragged in, for political purposes, the amount he proposed to spend on armaments, saying how little was spent on armaments during the period of the inter-Party Government. If there was ever abuse of the pure ether waves it was that tricky dishonesty in misrepresenting to the public a difficult situation. Both as a Deputy of this House and as a Minister of Government, he knew that from September 1939 up to 18 months or two years ago there were no arms to be got by an island such as this, by a neutral country, except what was given to us—and it is well to express appreciation of it—by Great Britain alone in small quantities.

During the emergency, Great Britain supplied small quantities of warlike stores: I admit she had her own interests at heart as well as ours. They were supplied in small quantities. However, throughout the whole world, no other country would sell us a popgun. When the war terminated, and the Atlantic Pact formation, and so forth, began to take place, you had the same position except that it was intensified. Countries in WesternEurope outside the Atlantic Pact would not be sold a bullet. I was candid with the House all through those years. I came here year after year and pointed out the situation. I invited Deputies of all Parties to make suggestions as to where arms might be procured in case any one of them knew of any such place. I did get suggestions from Opposition Deputies. I followed up every single one of them —from here to Israel, out to America and to Canada. I tried any place where we heard of an army changing over in its type of equipment or anything else and where there might be surplus stores. We got a certain quantity each year from Great Britain —and nothing else.

Before I left office as Minister for Defence I heard from the ex-Chief of Staff that there was a possibility of getting arms in Sweden, that the Swedish factories had satisfied the demands elsewhere and that, provided sanction could be got for the export of those arms from the big people of the Atlantic Pact formation, they would sell to us. I told him to follow up that vigorously and energetically. He did. My successor in office was fortunate enough to get those arms. Yet, the Minister for Finance goes on the air and tries to pretend that, for purposes of false economy, we would not buy. I think that that kind of play-acting in regard to the question of national security is disgraceful, discreditable and unworthy of any Minister in any country.

We have heard a lot of talk about the minimum strength of the Army, compatible with safety. What is our experience? Any one of us can be dogmatic about these things. What is our experience? Nil. But what is held up as our experience? The bungling and difficulties of mobilisation in September 1939—and that situation was not due to numbers. It was due to lack of experience, to lack of training, to lack of facing up to the fact that some day there might be mobilisation. Every man who was within reach of the Army was called up practically simultaneously — and there was neither food, stores equipmentnor shelter for the unfortunates when they were called up.

I am raising that matter not in any critical way at all. We learn from mistakes. There should be far more practice at mobilisation—partial here partial there—than there is. All through the emergency, when we were talking of evacuation, I urged that there should be tests of partial evacuation. If the day came when we had to evacuate Dublin City I do not know what would have happened. The children of not even one school had been evacuated for one hour.

I should like to see a lot more training by the Army and by the reservists of different classes in something like a lightning district mobilisation. That is not a very ambitious thing. The child learns to walk by toddling and stumbling and falling. If we had a fairly big mobilisation to-morrow, I think it would be a bit of a bumble. A lot more should be done to overcome these problems.

We have adopted an attitude of neutrality. In the modern world, by far and away the smallest military problem, facing the General Staff or the Government, is the problem of manpower. The real problem is not to get the Army together; that can be done simply enough. The initial equipment, provided steps are taken in time, can be got quickly enough. The real problem is how to maintain that Army as a fighting force. The Army of to-day is mechanised, it moves on wheels. On one occasion during the last war, I saw a modern composite battalion pass by; when it had passed, I had seen no man —every man was inside armour of one kind or another, the infantry were carried in vehicles, and so on. The maintenance of an army in the field to-day presents two big problems— ammunition and fuel oil or petrol.

Both ammunition and petrol come from outside this country. We do not supply a bullet, we cannot supply a gallon of petrol; our sources of supply are at the far corners of the earth, our lines of supply are halfway across the world. Yet our policy is one of neutrality. The war we visualise as a possibility, if not a probability, is awar between the western nations and the eastern and presumably the countries we think might jump in here to safeguard their own supply lines would be some of the western countries. What is our outlook with regard to ammunition, petrol and fuel oil in that situation? If it is the Americans or the British that jump in here, are we going to say: "All right, but will you keep on supplying us with ammunition, petrol and oil?"

If that is not a practical proposition, if that is absurd, then should not our line of training in the main be to make it impossible, or as difficult as possible, for any such force to continue in this country? If that is a sensible outlook we should look more towards the F.C.A., towards 100,000 or 150,000 men scattered around the whole country carrying light equipment—an underground army rather than look towards a regular army uniformed and moving in bigger units. The two types of training — the guerilla type, the underground type, as against the regular army type — are completely incompatible and contradictory. The man trained in a regular army is trained more or less to become an automaton, a robot, a man who without thinking will do the thing he is trained to do, who will subconsciously obey a word of command but wait for the word of command and until he gets the word of command will stay put. If he is ordered to stay there, no matter what happens on the right or on the left, the well-trained soldier will stay there. In its own way that destroys initiative. It is the very opposite type of training from that given to a guerilla band or a subterranean army.

All my time as Minister for Defence and since I came over here I have not been advocating the abolition of the Regular Army, but I have been advocating more and more attention to the F.C.A. I think it is getting less and less attention. One of the things any Minister for Defence has got to stand up against and resist in his office is the tendency for the Regular Army and its staff to pull him and his attentionaway from any volunteer force outside the walls of barracks. That is the test. I found that I had nearly to quarrel with the officers and General Staff in order to force them to give adequate or even slightly adequate attention to the F.C.A. The Minister probably found the same difficulty but I think he has succumbed to these influences.

I heard from behind the Minister's back his own Deputies ask him and the Army to give more attention to the training of the F.C.A. There is an immense potential there. The F.C.A. could be a force of between 160,000 and 200,000 men. They would not get anything like Army training, but they would get a taste of it. They would not be completely raw if you wanted to mobilise a big Army and you would have them there within your grip in the legal sense.

A force like the F.C.A. will not keep on its toes by itself. It is very frequently and continuously encouraged by Regular Army personnel. The F.C.A. group in any area feel that it is a tremendous compliment and encouragement for a regular officer to visit them, to go through them, even though he spends only half an hour. I insisted on practically every member of the headquarters staff being out one week-end a month, each of them moving through the F.C.A. —surprise visits, check inspections, short lectures, supervising or viewing the men doing their ordinary normal week-end work. I found that that was appreciated, that it had the effect of encouraging them, that they were taking more interest, and that other fellows outside looking on at that were inclined to join.

Deputy Vivion de Valera spoke of balancing. I think that is exactly what we must do. We may never get opposite views to coalesce but we should try to get a balance by having a reasonable Regular Army and also the biggest, the strongest, the keenest and the most enthusiastic Volunteer Reserve outside of barracks. The cost of that is relatively small, but the degree of insurance or safety which it gives is relatively very high, and Ibelieve that, no matter what the attitude may be with regard to Regular Army strength, any Minister is failing in his duty if he does not insist that the officers under him do their utmost to keep that force up to its greatest possible strength.

Mr. Kyne

I very much regret that I did not hear the whole of Dr. O'Higgins' speech because I certainly concur in the views he expressed in the latter part of that speech. I am one of the people who do not believe in the building up of a large Army, and my reason is that, if we are to be attacked, the attack will come from one or other of the large powers who are now facing one another in no uncertain way. Any of these powers would possess the most modern and terrible of weapons possible in this atomic age. They would attack us with remote-controlled aircraft, with guided missiles and with the new atomic gun —some details of which were published in the newspapers within the past few days—which can throw a shell, even at this early stage, a distance of over seven miles, a shell packed with as much atomic destruction as destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima during the last war.

In view of the size of this country and the manpower we can build up, even when fully extended, there is very little use in endeavouring to provide against attack from nations of so much greater size. If that is a true assessment of the position, there is very little use in going in for large-scale defence which will be limited by our size. We would be in the position, I suggest, of the other small European countries which came in the path of these nations during the last war and our resistance would be rather more a measure of the loss of life and destruction of the country than anything else. I do not see any point in sacrificing human lives and having our country destroyed just to give one of the other powers—we must be on some side, and if we are attacked by one power and we defend ourselves, we automatically line up with another—a short respite to regroup their forces to carry on the war somewhere else. That does notappeal to me personally and I see very little sense in building an Army if it is to carry out a policy of that kind.

Even if such a policy is advocated, I wonder can this country afford it. Have we got, first, the manpower necessary to build an adequate force and, secondly, are we in an economic position to do so? Deputy O'Higgins put forward the points that were running through my mind. Can we make the ammunition for the guns, if we get them, and are we guaranteed a source of supply? Petrol and oil are essential in a modern war, whether for tanks, aeroplanes or any other weapons we may have, and surely these essentials would be cut off from us in the event of invasion. Unless we are linked up in some pact with another country, I see very little hope of getting either financial help to build up our Army or the essentials for an Army in the shape of ammunition and the petrol and oils necessary for mobile units. Our decision on neutrality, I suggest, forbids us dreaming of entering into any pact. This country has made it clear that it is standing alone, that it is on neither side and that we are prepared to fight only if we are directly attacked. We cannot enter N.A.T.O., U.N.O. or any other organisation under any contract to take a particular line in particular circumstances. The only circumstances I know of in which we have said we will fight is if we are attacked.

That being so, I hold that our Defence Forces should be of a size only sufficient to maintain law and order internally. It could be of that size and be of some use in regard to ceremonial occasions and it should be of such a type as to be able to play some useful part in the economic life of the country. I can see a certain use for our patrol boats in protecting our fisheries and our coasts and in giving succour, in case of the need for rescue at sea, and, a lesser extent, I can see the air force, if they used scouting planes, being of somewhat similar value in protecting our fisheries, in directing our corvettes where to seek pirate trawlers and in directing the corvettes or other craft to places where rescuesat sea could be carried out. I agree with money being spent on this aspect to a limited extent because it helps the economic life of a nation.

I am well aware that the views I have expressed are open to such criticisms as the criticism that it is a defeatist attitude and the advocating, as the Minister for Finance said when I expressed these views in my Budget speech, of a policy of "come and take us." Whether that is so or not, it is very easy to accuse a person, but surely other nations are no more foolish than we are. We can see these weaknesses, any sane and thinking person here can see them, and I am quite sure that other countries can see them. Small countries like Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and various other small countries during the Second World War did not invite them to come and take them, but they came nevertheless and they took them in very short time, short in terms of hours but at a very heavy cost in the loss of life, civilian and Army and almost total destruction of these countries.

However heroic our defence may be, it must only be a question of hours, or days, at the outside, as to how long we could repel an invading army, armed with the atomic weapons of this age. I believe we should train an Army which would be capable in time of invasion of expanding itself and taking under its individual sections recruits from the F.C.A. or other voluntary organisations. That, I believe, will come in time of invasion in this country, as it came in other countries. When France was overrun and defeated, she put up a more heroic fight than before with her underground movement, and I believe that a policy of guerilla warfare, a policy of non-co-operation by the people here, will be a bigger danger to any invader than any formal attempt at defence on the beaches or anywhere else. An underground force, whether a uniformed force or a guerilla force, Britain found to its cost, could be a source of irritation and annoyance and trouble during the Tan War. That could be increased 100-fold. By disruptivetactics, ambushes, the destruction of bridges and means of communication by men specially trained, such as the men in the engineering section, we could make it so costly on an invading force that any big power would not find it easy to hold or even to invade the country. In that way we could tie down the troops and would automatically secure the support of the side opposing the invader, if that were of any use to us. It would certainly come, whether we liked it or not.

The training of a guerilla force or a force capable of being turned into a guerilla force, such as the F.C.A. is of the utmost importance. The weapons that we purchase should be suitable for that purpose. Training by the engineering section should tend towards carrying out that policy as a long term policy in case of invasion.

The expense of adopting a defence policy on those lines would be minimal as compared with the present extraordinary amount of money that it is suggested we should spend on what are, at best, second-hand weapons even now. We know that in this modern age weapons which are first-class to-day almost daily become obsolete and of very little use.

It is significant that the Lee Enfield rifle survived from the Boer War time until practically the other day. It is a safe assumption that the modern rifle will remain in use for a similarly long period. Certainly it is the most suitable type of weapon for us to adopt. We should follow the line adopted by Switzerland, where every adult male is given a certain amount of training and is issued with a rifle and 40 rounds of ammunition per year. Switzerland can better afford to spend money on expensive weapons than we can, but Switzerland has succeeded in maintaining neutrality during two major world wars and I venture to suggest that we could follow the line adopted by Switzerland of depending for our defence in time of need on the civilian population.

Whatever the pros and cons may be on the question of the best defence policy, I feel that there is a great deal in Deputy Hickey's suggestion. Instead of arming and implying by the merefact of arming that we are prepared to fight, this country should adopt the line that this is a Christian country, a country that believes in the inherent good in all people and in all nations. As I said on the Budget, we should make a virtue of our poverty and let it be known that we, as a country, are not going to fight, that we are a peace-loving people, that we are prepared to join with any country in the world who will join with us in disarmament. We should say that we are sent to this world to live a life of Christian charity and peace with all people. By our example we should endeavour to win over even the big nations to rake that view. That policy may not be very practicable; it shows very little signs of reward, but there is always somebody who has to do it. We have very little to lose by it and we have a whole lot to gain if we could succeed in giving an example to the world. If Ireland adopted that role, she could make a much more important place for herself in the world than by building up an Army at enormous cost and which would show an awful cost if we were invaded and if we were to make our defence on the lines on which we are preparing to make it.

On the economic side of the matter I feel that this country cannot afford to have a proper defence and, if we cannot have a proper defence, we should take the other line. That is a personal view.

I wish to put before the Minister some complaints I received as a Deputy in my constituency, in the hope that the Minister will take note of them as individual cases or as typical cases.

There is a case, in my town, of a young soldier who joined in 1924. He served until he was released on to the First Line Reserve. He worked from the time he left the Army until 1939, when he was called up. During the 1940-1941 manoeuvres, which included crossing the Blackwater, he received severe wettings. He was discharged in 1942, having been attended by the military doctor, at least twice, in hospital. A year or two later he was found to have T.B. It is pretty evident that he contracted T.B. during Armyservice because he had been medically examined on going into the Army in 1939 and in the years he was on the Reserve he had attended for a month's or fortnight's training and was examined each time and was passed as O.K. on all those occasions. When he was discharged from the Army he was discharged unfit but not with T.B. Within a year of his discharge he showed signs of T.B. and is now a definite T.B. case. He has not received a disability pension. The matter is under discussion and no definite ruling has been made against him but a long period has elapsed since the time he was discharged. He is a married man with a wife and children and has to survive as best he can on home assistance or something. That is not encouraging to other people to join the Defence Forces. I feel that a little more should be done in such cases to expedite decisions.

I received a complaint from certain soldiers some time ago that at various times in the year soldiers in the battalion found that there were outstanding debts against them and that their pay for the week was withheld because of that. When they wrote away, as they were entitled to do, for a statement of account of the arrears that were supposed to be against them and which were being held, they received a reply within a week or two that the matter had been rectified.

It was suggested to me that that matter was straightened up within that time and that some other battalion somewhere else in the country was shown to be in arrear. That suggestion was that there is a floating amount of money that is not completely accounted for and that it was dealt with in this way to keep the matter from attracting full attention. Whether that is the reason or not, I am quite positive of the fact that on a number of occasions, whole battalions' money has been shown against a number of soldiers for which it was later proved they were not liable. That matter requires investigation.

I have personal experience of the matter about which I am now going to complain. As a trade union officialI have had on occasions to go to Griffith Barracks, where the Labour Court is situated. While awaiting decisions I happened to look out on to the barrack square. It is no credit to us. Of all the dirty looking things, with hundreds of men standing all around, that barrack square needs to be seen to be believed. If some of the English papers published these things we would cry out in horror and say that it is not possible. Only three or four months ago, when we were preparing for the Tóstal, I saw soldiers drilling there while all around, under the very window, was overgrown with grass, there were rusty cans, pieces of motor tyres, anything and everything, newspapers. I certainly think that some attention should be paid to that matter. I do not know of any others that are in that condition but if all our barracks are like that we certainly have a good deal to learn in the matter of tidying up. There is plenty of room for improvement.

There is the case of a civilian employed in the barracks in Clonmel, a carpenter. When his time came to retire he applied for an extension. This man was a 1916 veteran and he understood that British war veterans under the old Board of Works were entitled to an extension. He applied on these grounds and got an extension, but the extension meant that he was to continue in employment, not in his normal trade as a carpenter, but as a labourer. Certainly that does not seem a fair and just reward for long and faithful service to the Board of Works and for his 1916 record. Surely if he is physically fit and capable of doing labouring work, he is equally physically fit to carry out the work of his normal trade. I have made representations to the Minister's Department that the concession should be given to him to carry out his normal work.

I am in agreement with other Deputies that the answers to questions by Deputy MacBride last March indicate that there is a serious falling off in the First Line Reserve and in the Second Line Reserve. I was not impressed by Deputy V. de Valera's explanation as to why the numbers in theFirst Line Reserve are so short. His suggestion is that that is due to the policy of the inter-Party Government. There is not so much of a difference between the numbers during the time of the inter-Party Government and the present time. I suggest that the reason for the falling off in the First Line Reserve and the F.C.A. is not that people have not gone into the Army, but that there is not work for the ordinary person in the country and that emigration is taking its toll. If, instead of spending £1,800,000 on the most modern defence weapons, we spent that money in developing the economic life of the country, we would give work and employment to the people and there would be plenty of people to fill up the First Line Reserve and the Second Line Reserve and we would have the nucleus of a guerilla force if we ever had the misfortune to be in danger.

Mr. Cogan

It is interesting to note that Deputy O'Higgins, who, I suppose, is one of the older and more responsible members of the Opposition, expressed his substantial agreement with the policy of the Minister in regard to Army strength and Army equipment. For some time there has been a campaign carried on throughout the country denouncing the Minister and the Government for spending public money on the purchase of defensive equipment. It has been represented by some members of the Opposition, and even some Ministers of the former Government, that this is an utterly irresponsible policy on the part of the Government and one which would not be operated by their predecessors. There has been during the past year, and there is contemplated in the coming year, a substantial provision for the purchase of defensive equipment. That policy has been denounced very fiercely by some members of the Opposition. But Deputy O'Higgins has blown the whole case sky high by asserting that he was as anxious to secure equipment for the Army as the present Minister and was only precluded from doing so by the impossibility of purchasing that equipment. He stated to-day that if he could have purchased the warlike stores which thepresent Minister has purchased he would certainly have purchased them. That seems to indicate that there is not a wide divergence of opinion between the more responsible elements in the Opposition and the present Government.

But another member of the former Government, Deputy Everett, who is a man also of military experience, went down to Arklow and stated:—

"Why were they suffering from taxation? They had an Army costing £7,000,000 a year and £2,667,000 for warlike stores that, when they were finished with, would be obsolete with the atom."

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Will the Deputy give the reference?

Mr. Cogan

It is a quotation from a speech delivered by Deputy Norton at Arklow and published in the Wicklow Peopleof Saturday, May 30th.

General MacEoin

By Deputy Norton?

Mr. Cogan

By Deputy Everett.

Mr. Everett

He is upset. One of his generals has reneged him and gone to Australia.

Mr. Cogan

That appears to show a wide divergence of opinion between the generals of the Opposition Party. Apparently, Deputy Everett wants to disarm the Army completely or, in all probability, to dissolve the Army. On the other hand, Deputy O'Higgins, who still retains the old sense of responsibility and the old national outlook, which I think is also held by Deputy MacEoin, believes in maintaining the efficiency of the Army and in equipping it properly. But there is not so much divergence of opinion between those who think seriously about defence problems on both sides of the House. That was also brought home to us by an exchange of views between Deputy Hickey and Deputy Major de Valera in which both expressed the view that what they wanted was a small efficient Army, capable of expansion. Deputy de Valera made it clear that the policy of the present Government is a small efficient Army capable of expansion and thatthe present Regular Army strength is the smallest that would be effective for the purpose of expansion on mobilisation in the case of an emergency. Thus we find that if we leave out the people opportunists and leave out the people who are merely indulging in moboratory and trying to appeal to people who are more ignorant than themselves —if it is possible to find such people— we have on both sides of the House acceptance of the fact that the present Army strength is something in or about the minimum that could be considered as efficient and that on that comparatively small efficient Regular Army, it is the hope of the Government and I think it would be the hope of the responsible members of Fine Gael also, that that Army could be expanded in time of emergency to deal with the situation that would arise.

A number of Deputies—I think some of them were speaking with sincerity —expressed the view that it is utterly futile to think of defending this island at all, that the most we could hope for is a peace-time Army. I do not know what is meant by a peace-time Army. If you want only a peace-time Army you want no Army at all. It will be accepted that those who have expressed that view are utterly defeatist in their attitude. There was a comparison with the situation that prevailed in Holland and Denmark in 1940. It must be remembered, however, that there was no natural barrier to protect those countries against invasion. In the dry summer of 1940 the land armies of Germany could roll across the frontier at the highest possible speed, overrun and cripple those countries in a very short space of time. The Deputies who referred to that situation did not advert to the position in the island of Great Britain, which was also threatened with attack and which also had a very inadequate Army; nevertheless, by mobilising whatever forces they had, by putting up the best possible show they could, they succeeded in averting an invasion. There is no doubt whatever that the display of resistance on the part of the British on land, combined with the resistance of the air force and navy, was instrumental insaving Great Britain from invasion. If we were to adopt the line of some Deputies and say that if we could disband the Army completely, divest ourselves of all equipment and all defensive protection, it would be just as well, but if we did we might very easily be inviting an invasion of this country in time of war. I do not think that is the thing which those Deputies would really hope for or desire. A completely undefended Twenty-Six Counties without any semblance of a military force would certainly offer some invitation to a continental army if it wanted to establish a base for attack on, say, Great Britain.

The argument that has been used— it was used by Deputy Dillon last year, by Deputy Kyne to-day and by other Deputies—that we could, instead of contemplating a defensive force which would strike at any invading army, whether by sea or air, organise guerilla warfare over a long period. I do not think that in modern world conditions such a proposal could be really entertained. If, for example, a force required a foothold in Ireland for military purposes, they would not desire or require to occupy the entire country. For that reason they would not be worried whether we contemplated a long guerrilla warfare against them in the future. What they would be concerned about in contemplating an invasion of this country would be how much resistance they would be likely to meet within the first few days of their invasion. That would be their primary consideration. What would happen in months or years to come would not be so important to them. They would probably only require certain strategic positions in order to continue their war against Great Britain or other powers. Therefore, when you consider this question from that angle—and I suppose we must as ordinary laymen, recognise that it has been considered by our Army experts —we are forced to believe that the present forces for defence are the only possible ones, that is to say, an Army sufficiently strong to be capable of offering some resistance to a sudden attack and at the same time providingthe basis for expansion and for the raising of a large voluntary Army.

I do not agree with Deputy MacBride or Deputy Rooney or any of those other Deputies who advocate compulsory military service. I do not think it is either necessary or desirable. There are many good arguments that could be put forward in favour of compulsory military service on the grounds that in it there is equality of sacrifice and that in the main it is fairer to all sections of the community. At the same time it carries with it evils which, I think, we would all like to avoid. Compulsory military service is, I would say, a step towards the complete subordination of the entire population to the State. We want, as long as we can, to preserve the individual independence of our people and for that reason as long as there is a reasonable prospect of securing sufficient recruits for our Defence Forces of all kinds, we should not consider this proposal for compulsory military training.

What we should consider instead is the encouragement of our young people to join the F.C.A. if it is not feasible for them to join the Regular Army. There is no need for an investigation as to the reasons why there is a certain reluctance on the part of a great many young men to enter the F.C.A. That matter requires to be carefully examined to find out what are those causes—are they social, psychological or what are they? —that keep a large number of our young men from joining these forces. I would be inclined to feel that one step in the direction of making the F.C.A. more popular would be to provide its members with a more attractive uniform. Young men as a rule like to present an impressive appearance. The uniform of the F.C.A. is purely utilitarian and, while it may be suitable for military service, it is not attractive to young men for dress parades. After all, young men who give their time to training in the nation's interests are entitled to expect that they will be turned out in a uniform that looks well and is pleasing to the eye. I think that is only natural and it would be no harm to cater for the ordinary pride and respect of these young men. A purely utilitarian uniformis all right from the point of view of service but it does enter to a certain extent into the thoughts and feelings of young men to make an impressive display when they turn out on parade. For that reason, a more pleasing uniform should be provided.

I hope that the Minister will give careful attention to the many complaints which have been made in regard to the grievances of disabled men and those who are entitled to some assistance because of past military service. The case on behalf of these men has been ably stated by a number of Deputies. I do not want to repeat it but, at any rate, I think it is desirable that it should be known, no matter what some people may say about the financial stringency of the present time, that we should not under any circumstances be ungenerous or unjust to men who have served the country faithfully in the past in our Defence Forces.

Mr. Blowick

On the question of military service pensions, I want to ask the Minister who is responsible for sending out the recent notices to many former rejected applicants for military service pensions stating that the 1949 Act does not apply to them. I think these notices are sent out in the Minister's name to applicants who had applied for a re-hearing. They have been notified in the Minister's name, not in the name of the Referee or of the board, that the Act does not apply to them, in other words, that they had not qualified for a re-hearing before the board. These notices have caused quite a lot of annoyance and keen resentment in many areas to my own knowledge. These men felt that they were at least entitled to a re-hearing because they are of a type who took part in volunteer activities, who perhaps suffered losses and in some cases actually took part in what could be described at least as minor engagements. Quite a few of them have told me that they believed the whole system of military service pensions is wrong. They assured me that when they were doing their bit they never anticipated a pension; all that they anticipated was a yard of rope or a few leaden bullets but now that asystem of military service pensions has been established, they feel that they have been badly treated in having their applications for re-hearing dismissed in such summary fashion, as has happened. They resent that.

The people on whose behalf I speak are of a type who would not mind if their cases were re-heard and then rejected by the board but they feel that they have been rejected by the Minister. They have been notified to that effect and they feel that the Minister has not that authority under the 1949 Act. I do not know what the explanation is.

I remember taking a keen interest in the matter myself when the 1949 Act was under Government discussion, before the terms of it were released to the public or to the Dáil, and I know that the spirit of the Act was that all rejected applicants would get a re-hearing before the board. It appears that inside the last six months, since January or February last, that quite a number have been notified by the Minister that they did not qualify for a re-hearing. They feel that the Minister stood between them and the board and prevented them from having their cases re-heard. Let me say that in my own opinion quite a number of men may have failed in the matter of securing verification from a verifying officer. They may have failed in that matter but to my own personal knowledge—and I think it applies to every district and to every rural centre which had its own company of volunteers—the officers of that company were well known and are well known to-day. The part they played is well known. We find that the officers of some of these companies have themselves been turned down although we know that they had been pulled out of their houses by the Black and Tans and British military of the day. We know that they had been compelled to give up their means of livelihood, whether it was farming, business or some other avocation, and that they had suffered great losses. We know that they missed being shot or executed in many cases by a mere "fluke." I think it is not fair that these people should have been deprived of a chance of putting theircase before an impartial board as was the spirit of the 1949 Act. I should like to hear what the Minister has to say on the subject when he is replying because they feel, and I feel, that they have not been treated as they should.

There were certain people who took a very active part in the volunteer movement without whose assistance and active co-operation, without whose eyes, ears and information, without whose active help, the flying columns could never have existed or brought off so many successful engagements. These people incurred just as much danger as the actual members of flying columns all over the country. The Black and Tans, the R.I.C., and the British military knew the names of these volunteer officers very well and it was by chance, more than anything else that they escaped with their lives. In many cases their houses were broken into by the British forces and money, goods and valuables of many kinds were taken. To my own personal knowledge they suffered losses for which they never were compensated. Young men who were in the volunteers were forced by the attentions of the British forces to stay away from their business, although their parents were old and disabled in many instances. Their businesses went to loss for a period of perhaps two and a half to three years. These people feel very keenly, and I sympathise with them, the fact that their application has been turned down rather flippantly by the Minister. They resent the fact that the Minister is standing between them and a re-hearing. I want to make it perfectly clear that these people on whose behalf I am speaking are not the type who cry and whinge for a pension. They have made it abundantly clear to me that they believe the system is wrong. It is not my own opinion I am giving now. I am stating what I have been told by these men who played an active part and suffered loss. In some cases their health was impaired. What they did they did out of patriotism, they never anticipated a pension or reward. They are not now asking for something for nothing. The system has been established. Many of their former comradesare getting pensions and they feel they are equally entitled to a pension.

I know one case in particular. I have mentioned this case before on the Minister's Estimate and on the Pensions Bill. This man has letters in his possession showing that he was ordered out of his native town by the District Inspector. His motor-car was taken from him. Yet, his application has been turned down. I know myself that he took a dangerous part in a raid on British military stores at a railway junction not far from my place. His van was used on that occasion. He was subsequently ordered out of the town by the District Inspector. He continued to play an active part. The evidence in his favour has been rejected and I do not blame him now for having a suspicion that the Military Service Pensions Acts have not been as fairly and impartially administered as we were given to understand they would be. Some of the documents proving his claim are over 30 years old. Everybody in his native town knows the part he played. They know his claim is genuine. He possibly is not in a position to submit documentary evidence on all aspects of his claim. Some of his former colleagues may not be available to give evidence on his behalf but he feels he has been the victim of politics in the administration of the Pensions Code.

There is another case, too, in which the applicant has been turned down. These rejections have brought the Acts into disrepute. Many people feel they have not been justly and impartially administered. I am sure the Minister must be well aware of the criticism. I have no experience of the administration of these Acts myself but I know the individuals affected in the present instance and I cannot find it in my heart to disbelieve the information they have given me. I think these people should get a re-hearing. There are not many of the old forces with us now. The numbers are lessening each year. Every day that passes death is taking its toll and the numbers are getting fewer and fewer with the passage of time.

I make a special plea for those whosupported the flying columns. Without them these columns could not have existed or successfully achieved their objectives. The relatives and friends of all these people walked in constant danger. We should devise some means now of acknowledging the part played by them in freeing our country. Many of these would be satisfied with a re-hearing. If they were told definitely then that the Act does not apply they would be content. I ask the Minister to consider the matter and, if anything is done along the lines I have suggested, I am sure it will meet with the wholehearted approval of the House. No one would be so mean or so niggardly as to deny these people whatever this House in its wisdom might decide to give them.

Mr. Everett

I do not deny I am against the propaganda being disseminated by the Fianna Fáil Party that we are in an emergency. We always seem to be in an emergency according to Fianna Fáil and for that reason we must maintain a big Army. If we were in a real emergency I am satisfied that our Army would not be sufficient to cope with it. I wonder at Deputy Cogan advocating the expenditure of such a huge sum on warlike stores and quoting speeches. I would prefer him to quote some of the resolutions being passed at some of the meetings as regards his actions. The money we are spending at the present time on defence would be better spent on developing the land. We have 300 fewer men employed on the land this year than last year. It would be better if the money were spent in that way rather than advocate that every man with a valuation of over £25 should pay the full rate on his holding.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Surely we cannot discuss that on defence?

Mr. Everett

Deputy Cogan is now in favour of a new scheme to compel the farmers with a valuation of £25 to pay the full rate.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

That does not arise.

Mr. Everett

I would be glad to seean Army and I would be glad to see the representatives of all Parties agree as to the number, but there will be no agreement. The Deputy's general has deserted him and has gone to Australia and left his accounts. He is gone, he has flown and his creditors are trying to find out where he is.

Mr. Cogan

On a point of order. Deputy Everett made a personal reference to some general who, he said, has gone leaving debts behind him. That statement ought to be withdrawn.

Mr. Traynor

It is an election statement.

Mr. Everett

I am not making a statement against any member.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy did not refer to any person by name.

Mr. Everett

We should give the men in our Army—that is the official Army —credit and praise. I say that the F.C.A. deserves every credit we can give them.

Mr. Cogan

On a point of order. Deputy Everett referred to a general of mine saying he left this country and left his creditors unpaid. I want to know if that statement is in order and in accordance with the rules of this House?

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Deputy Everett has not identified anybody in his statement and the Chair can take no action.

General MacEoin

Is it worrying the Deputy?

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy should relate his remarks to the Estimate.

Mr. Everett

I agree that we can develop the F.C.A. I believe it deserves every encouragement that public representatives can give it. It deserves the congratulations of every member of this House. The young men of the F.C.A. voluntarily sacrifice their time at great inconvenience to themselves. I see them in my own area, officers and men, working together in a voluntary capacity for the benefit ofthe country. I would like to see the F.C.A. developed and encouraged in many ways. I would like to see the people who give their service in the Army and the F.C.A. get the first preference in regard to any position that might be vacant. Instead of making promises to them, we should make it compulsory on public boards and others to give them first preference providing everything else is equal. In that way, we could encourage a voluntary Army.

If there is going to be a fight we will have capable men in the Army and in the F.C.A. together with other voluntary forces. We have men even going to the North to recruit people and bring them to this part of the country. We have economic conscription at the present time and we are forcing people, who are unable to emigrate, into the Army. I would prefer to keep our men employed in the industries in this country and develop the F.C.A. from the men working in the factories. We ought not to have the huge army of unemployed that we have at the present time. We have a man from Wicklow getting up and talking about everybody else and now he is a fully fledged defender of the Government. I hope that during the week he will make some of the speeches made by some of his colleagues and go the whole hog.

Mr. Traynor

Like yourself with Senator McCrea. Is not that so?

Mr. Cogan

Deputy Everett said he was a Red and a Communist.

Mr. Everett

What did Deputy Cogan call the Taoiseach? What did he call the Minister for Finance?

Mr. Sweetman

The Minister had not many to listen to him on Sunday.

Mr. Everett

You will never be satisfied until we win by about 4,000 votes. Then you will be satisfied.

An Ceann Comhairle

Will Deputy Everett come to the Estimate and leave the elections in Wicklow?

Mr. Cogan

He will come back to the Battle of Baltinglass.

Mr. Everett

You got your answer. Take your medicine and take it quietly. I am against having such a large Army. Having regard to the large number of unemployed at the present time, some of the money that is being spent could be better employed.

Mr. Traynor

I move to report progress.

Progress reported: Committee to sit again.