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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 27 Oct 1953

Vol. 142 No. 5

Committee on Finance. - Courts of Justice Bill, 1953—Committee Stage.

Sections 1, 2 and 3 agreed to.
SECTION 4.

I move amendment No. 1:—

Before Section 4, but in Part I, to insert a new section as follows:—

From and after the passing of this Act:—

(a) The Supreme Court shall be styled and known as "An Chúirt Uachtarach";

(b) The High Court shall be styled and known as "An Ard-Chúirt";

(c) The Circuit Court shall be styled and known as "An Chúirt Chuarda";

(d) The District Court shall be styled and known as "An Chúirt Dúiche";

(e) The Chief Justice shall be styled and known as "An Príomh-Bhreitheamh" and shall be addressed as "A Phríomh-Bhreithimh";

(f) The President of the High Court shall be styled and known as "Uachtarán na hArd-Chúirte" and shall be addressed as "A Bhreithimh";

(g) Every judge of the Supreme Court, of the High Court and of the Circuit Court shall be styled and known as "Breitheamh" and shall be addressed as "A Bhreithimh";

(h) Every justice of the District Court shall be styled and known as "Breitheamh" and shall be addressed as "A Bhreithimh".

This is a comprehensive amendment, but it is a simple one. Its purpose is to bring the courts into line with the general national tendency towards the use of the Irish language where practicableand possible. In our State institutions generally there has been a development over the past 30 years whereby the holders of important offices would be known by the Irish title and would be addressed in the Irish form.

Since the establishment of the State, even in this House the office of Chairman of the Dáil has been styled Ceann Comhairle, and has been known and accepted as such over the years. Similarly, the Vice-Chairman is known as Leas-Cheann Comhairle. Those two titles have become so popular that no one would think of addressing the occupants of those offices by any other than their official Irish style and title. The President of the State is known as An tUachtarán; he is referred to as such in official correspondence, and he is properly so addressed. The head of the Government or Prime Minister is known as the Taoiseach. Everybody refers to him as the Taoiseach, and there is no difficulty whatsoever in regard to the pronunciation or the meaning of the term. Similarly, the second principal Minister in the Government is known as the Tánaiste.

Many other terms have been popularised over the years. Our road transport service is known as Córas Iompair Eireann and no one finds any difficulty either in regard to pronunciation or the meaning of the term. Similarly, our airlines are known as Aer Lingus. We have very many boards established in the State which are known generally by the Irish titles.

The proposition in this amendment is that this national development should be continued and brought into our courts of justice, that our different courts should be known by the Irish form. It is quite a simple form and there is no difficulty whatsoever as to the meaning or the pronunciation. It would require only a short period to familiarise the Press, the public and litigants generally with the Irish style and title.

The second part of the amendment relates to the form of address by which judges would be addressed in court. That has been a slight problem for quite a long time. It is proposed inthe amendment to address the judges in court as "A Bhreithimh", the Irish title of judge. It is proposed for simplification that that term should be used for judges of the Supreme Court, the High Court and the Circuit Court, and for justices of the District Court. I think a uniform style of address would be welcomed by everybody. The House will agree that it would be preferable to address a judge in that way in the Irish form than to follow the system which has been brought in and developed from a foreign system.

When the first Courts of Justice Act was passed in 1924, the problem was before the Dáil. There were two sections which dealt specifically with it— Sections 10 and 18—which gave to the rule-making authorities for the High Court and the Circuit Court power to determine the title by which judges would be addressed in court. Under the rules they made for the High Court, a judge would be addressed, according to the phrase they adopted in the rules, "in the form hitherto adopted". In other words, even the rule-making authority at the time was a bit dubious about putting into the rules, which would come before the Dáil, the expressions "My Lord" and "Your Lordship".

They got over it simply by saying that judges would be addressed "in the form that was hitherto in use, or in the Irish form, ‘A Thiarna Bhreithimh'". Now, if one examines that term, "A Thiarna Bhreithimh"—Lord Judge—it is not a term that one would consider appropriate. I do not think anyone would consider that the dignity of the Bench would be in any way lowered if that particular form of words was not used. Similarly in regard to the Circuit Court. Recent rules of court provided that a judge could be addressed as "My Lord", "Your Lordship", or in the Irish form, "A Thiarna Bhreithimh". Certainly this Parliament in 1924 would not have passed that form of address as what I might term the Republican outlook and feeling and the Republican conception of forms of address could not possibly justify that archaic system of address which on its face is absolutely nonsensical.

It is proposed in this amendment to bring the Courts of Justice in line with other State institutions by the encouragement of the use of Irish terms so far as they can be encouraged, and the use as forms of address of a simple Irish term which, as far as I can gather from my reading, was the form by which the old Irish Brehon judges were addressed. I think every member of this House would be anxious that the respectful form of address which was used in old Ireland to our judges should be the respectful form of address that would be used now by our counsel and advocates generally and by the public generally to our judges. I think that the term which I advocate in this particular amendment is more dignified and more proper than that in use, and I recommend the amendment on those grounds to the House.

I would like to say that this is something that quite a number of Deputies have shown interest in from time to time, and I would like to congratulate Captain Cowan on going to the trouble of preparing such an amendment as this. I would simply like to say I am in complete agreement with him that it was a wrong thing to have the titles used in our courts taken over as they were from an alien Government. The least we might have done in this House was to ensure that a clean sweep would be made on the titles in our law courts. I have on numerous occasions expressed dissatisfaction at the titles used in the various courts, District Court, Circuit Court and High Court, and perhaps I would go further than Deputy Cowan in connection with this amendment.

He is anxious, and rightly so, that our courts be brought into line with other State bodies where Irish titles are now in use, and nobody for a moment would dream of addressing the Ceann Comhairle, for instance, as "Chairman". We all prefer the title of Ceann Comhairle, and I see no reason in the world why Irish titles could not be used in our courts.

Perhaps there are individuals who say that the choice or the libertyshould be left to the individual to say either "A Bhreithimh" or in plain language "Sir" or "Judge". I believe that as far as judges and justices are concerned what everybody must show is respect. It is for the office that the individual holds that we have respect, and I have always been taught that "Sir" is a form in an address of respect. The highest officer in the Army, whether Chief of Staff or ordinary second lieutenant, is addressed as "Sir", and there is no grading up along the line. Even if he is wearing a line of stars he is not given any other title when addressed by a junior officer or soldier other than "Sir".

As far as the amendment is concerned I think Deputy Cowan is on the right lines. There might be a lot of difficulty if we had to introduce the use of "Sir" in courts, and it is a nicer thing to utilise the Irish expression if everybody would use it.

On this question of titles of respect in courts we could learn something from other countries and from their outlook on the matter. The only country where there is real pomp and ceremony in connection with the law courts is our next-door neighbour and if we go back on history we will see that they had very good reasons to have these forms and titles and also to have the impressive peacock dress so that the unfortunate aborigines and the so-alleged uncultured savage people would have respect for their lords and masters. That is really very briefly how all the trappings arose in the British system and how the address that is used in our courts to-day came into operation in the beginning. I think it would be no harm to get rid of some of the trappings here and in view of the fact that Deputy Cowan has taken this line I think he should and will get the support of the House in pressing on the Minister at this stage to accept this amendment which is well overdue.

Mr. Boland

My attitude to the amendment is that I have a great deal of sympathy with it. Naturally I would like the Irish terms to be used in the courts and the judges to be addressed by their Irish titles and the courts tobe called by their Irish names. The way I feel about it is that this particular Bill was brought in for two purposes, to increase the salaries of the judges thereby compensating for the reduced purchasing power of money and restoring the status quo so far as jurisdiction is concerned. I think an amendment of this kind would be more appropriate on another Bill, which will be introduced shortly, to formally establish our courts under the Constitution. A Bill of that nature is due in a couple of months and I think it would be better if Deputy Cowan would withdraw this amendment and put it down again when that Bill is being considered by the House. The Bill is almost ready.

There are certain amendments tabled here which would so widen the scope of this measure as to completely change its character. If we open the door even a little we shall have to open it altogether. I shall do my best to get the House to agree not to widen the scope of this Bill more than is absolutely necessary because I think it should be confined to the two principles underlying it. The other questions can be considered at some other time. This particular amendment of Deputy Cowan's can be dealt with at a later stage.

It is the Government's intention to set up a committee or a commission to consider the whole question of the courts. I am not asking Deputy Cowan to wait until the report of that body is available. I am merely asking him to wait until the Bill dealing with the formal establishment of our courts under the Constitution is introduced here. I do not want to be taken for one moment as opposing this amendment, because I am altogether in favour of having Irish terms used in our courts but, as I say, I do not think that can be done under this Bill.

I would have liked to have had some more views from the House in regard to this matter. I appreciate what the Minister has said. He has stated that he is in sympathy with the idea of the extension of Irish terms and Irish forms of address toour courts. I am glad to know that when the proposed measure comes before the House that matter will be dealt with; it certainly would have been much better if we did not have to do it by legislation at all. It would be better if the people concerned, who have the power under the rules which they are empowered by statute to make, would advance with the times. In the course of my professional business I have to go into court day after day and address a judge, for whom I and my colleagues have the greatest respect, as "My Lord". I have never considered that an appropriate form of address. I think it is ridiculous. I cannot for the life of me understand why judges in 1953 would wish to be addressed in such a nonsensical and archaic fashion. They, however, have decided that they must be so addressed under the powers given them by statute. I had one experience where, inadvertently, I addressed a judge as "Sir" and I was taken to task for doing so. I do not think it adds to the dignity of our courts that we should have these archaic forms of address. I know that the public would welcome the elimination of what is a ridiculous form of snobbery. I am so anxious to get this eliminated on the first opportunity I put down this amendment and I am, in fact, somewhat disappointed that we cannot have a decision of the House on it now, but I am prepared to accept the Minister's statement that he will bring in this Bill in the very near future.

Mr. Boland

I will.

It has been my experience of the Minister that, when he says he will bring in a Bill, he does introduce it. In those circumstances, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment on the specific undertaking from the Minister that a Bill will be introduced in the near future in relation to which this matter can be dealt with more appropriately than on the present measure. Meanwhile, I hope that what has been said here will have the effect of awakening the rule-making authorities to the fact that this form of address is neither welcomed nor approved by the general public, bylegal practitioners or by Parliament. They should themselves take early steps to eliminate it. I am anxious that this Bill should become law as quickly as possible and, on the Minister's undertaking to the House, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. O'Higgins

Perhaps the Minister meanwhile might also consider eliminating the English term "solicitor".

I am quite agreeable, but it does not arise on this Bill.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 2 not moved.

I move amendment No. 3:—

Before Section 4, but in Part I, to insert a new section as follows:—

All courts shall normally sit at 10 a.m. and shall, where the business so warrants, continue until 5 p.m. with a break for refreshment from 1 p.m. to 2 p.m., but by agreement of the parties and, in the case of a criminal proceeding, with the consent of the accused, the court may sit after 5 p.m.

This covers somewhat more difficult ground. The purpose of the amendment is to provide that the courts will sit for longer hours and, therefore, so more work. Everyone knows that our High Court is at present cluttered up with work. Jury cases are in a scandalous state of arrear. Plaintiffs and litigants have been deprived of rights because their cases are not disposed of within a reasonable period. Possibly the present practice has carried over from feudal times. I did not have time to study far back enough to discover the beginning of all this, but the practice certainly goes back a long way to the days when judges sat at 11 o'clock in the morning, had a break of three-quarters of an hour or an hour for lunch and rose at 4 o'clock. Judges agreed to work four and a quarter or four hours a day for five days in the week. In modern times it is impossible for the business of the court to beexpeditiously dealt with when our courts sit for so few hours in the year.

The courts sit for only a few hours on four or five days a week and there are very long vacations. For two solid months, August and September, the courts are almost entirely closed down. There are other periods of vacation. That practice arose in times when the position of the judge was, to some extent, incidental. It was a break in the pleasures of the year, a break with hunting, fishing and shooting. These games, amusements and sports could not be interfered with too much and the sittings of the court were arranged accordingly.

Every practitioner knows that the business of the courts cannot be dealt with expeditiously while so few hours are worked by the judges. It would be interesting for the House to have figures from the Minister as to the annual number of hours our principal judges sit. It would come as a shock and a revelation to the general public.

I see no reason why our courts cannot start at 10 a.m. In that I am supported by many practitioners who function in the courts. There should be no reason why District Courts, in Dublin and the other cities and towns, should not start work at 10 a.m. and, with a reasonable break for lunch, continue until 5 p.m. Anyone who has any experience as a practitioner or as a yaryman in the High Court will find that a court scheduled to start at 11 a.m., will barely get down to business much before 12 o'clock. The court rises at 1 o'clock, having heard the opening addresses of counsel, and resumes at 2 or 2.15 p.m.; a few witnesses are examined and crossexamined and the court adjourns at 4 p.m.

If law was paid for by the State and practitioners were paid for by the State, perhaps it would not matter, but most of the litigation has to be paid for by the citizens. Under this system a case which might reasonably be expected to conclude in a day continues for a second day, doubling the costs on the unfortunate litigant who happens to be a party to the action

On that statement of the case every person, certainly every Deputy, would be expected to support longer hours for the courts but there are objections raised. It is significant, not only in regard to this particular measure or this particular reform that is advocated, but in regard to any reform wherever it may be that, once a reform is suggested, an amazing number of objections can be invented, objections that were not thought of when the original idea was adopted. In the old days there was a difficulty about getting to courts. Transport was slow. One had to depend on the old horse and car. In those days it was not unreasonable that the courts would sit at 11 a.m. Now we have the most rapid forms of transport. Motor cars can bring witnesses and other parties from many parts of the country in a very short time. Yet the idea is still advocated that some person who has to cycle ten miles to a district court could not reasonably be expected to be there before 11 a.m. He can be reasonably expected to be at his work, which involves cycling the same distance, at 8 a.m. I want to demolish in advance a few of the objections that will be raised to this reform. That is the first objection, which is a ridiculous objection, an invented objection.

The next objection is that, in regard to the High Court, solicitors would have tremendous difficulty in getting their witnesses to Dublin before 11 a.m. Everybody knows that the good solicitor and the bad solicitor has his witnesses in Dublin the night before the hearing of the action and that they are enjoying themselves in a hotel or some other place, as they are entitled to do, on the expenses that will be provided for them for attending court.

There is no question, except in the most unusual circumstances, of a witness having to travel to the High Court from the country on the morning of the trial. Generally speaking, as a matter of practice, there is a consultation the night before either in the consultation rooms at the court or at the senior counsel's residence, at which senior and junior counsel and solicitor and all the witnesses are present. The whole case is gone through perhapsuntil after midnight. They are all ready to start out on the case in the morning. If it is a State case, the consultation is in the State Solicitor's Office on the afternoon before the trial. There is no question, therefore, of witnesses travelling from the country to the court on the morning of the hearing. It may happen in an exceptional case but not very often. That is the second objection disposed of.

The third objection is that solicitors would object to it because they have not the post opened and studied at 10 o'clock in the morning. Perhaps that applies to some solicitors, but the busy solicitor, the active solicitor, has his post read and his letters dictated by a quarter past nine in the morning and is ready to be in court at 10 o'clock if he wants to be in court at 10 o'clock. The amazing thing is that the objection to starting at 10 o'clock does not come from solicitors who function in the court but come from solicitors who, perhaps, never put their foot inside the court door but operate entirely by counsel and send down one of their clerks to attend the counsel when the case comes off. The general objection comes, as I say, from solicitors who do not practise themselves physically in the court, so that there is not very much in that objection. Certainly, any solicitor who practises in the Dublin Courts would have no objection to starting at 10 o'clock in the morning. In fact, he wants a start to be made at 10 o'clock, particularly in the District Courts, because it gives him an opportunity of getting to all the different courts he has to get to in the day.

Another objection is that from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., with an hour's break, would be six hours, and that six hours would be too long for a judge to stand the heavy strain of the court. Most people have to work longer than six hours in the day. The strain on some industrial workers who have to work much longer than six hours is, undoubtedly, a heavy strain. I have yet to learn that the strain of listening to a case is such a strain as will tire a judge in more than five and a half hours, so that that objection of the strain on the judge, particularly on ajudge who gets over two months' holiday in the summer, and extensive periods of holidays during the rest of the year, cannot be sustained. I often wonder what our judges would do if they were surgeons, in which case they would have a very heavy strain, or if they were Ministers, or if they occupied many other of the positions in our Civil Service or business or professional life. I do not think that a judge is any less seasoned timber than the occupants of other professional or business appointments, and I cannot see why he is not able to last a longer day than four and a half hours.

They will say that the strain of going beyond four and a half hours may result in injustice—injustice to the party or some of the parties before the judge. Injustice could hardly arise in that event, and anyway the lawyers or counsel or solicitors or advocates who are looking after the accused person in the case of a criminal trial are well able to look after that particular aspect for the accused person; so that there is nothing very much in that argument unless we are to take the line that our judges are to be specially pampered. I can see no reason for it.

Another argument advanced against it is that the judges, when the day's work is over, have got to consult authorities; they may have to go to libraries; they may have to look up their notes. We all have to do that. After a much longer day we have to consult authorities, we have to read cases, we have to search for the cases we want; whereas a judge has them all marked down for him by one side or the other, authorities are given, the books are available for him if he wants to read them. I see nothing wrong. Every person who does his work well in any sphere of life has got to burn the midnight oil, and if a judge has to burn the midnight oil now and again I do not think he can complain very much about it. This State will provide in abundance the midnight oil for him.

There may be other objections to the course advocated by the amendment. I will be glad to hear them, and I will be glad to make my commentsupon them, but I think that we ought to agree that in the interests of the people the court day should be somewhat longer than it is. I am not tied entirely to the hours I have in this amendment. I am not unreasonable, and I do not want to be unreasonable in regard to it, but I do think that it is most important that our courts should sit to the minute of the time they are expected to sit.

I think that there is tremendous inconvenience to practitioners and to litigants to find a court starting at 11 o'clock which should start at half past ten, to see a court start at half past 11 that should start at 11, and particularly here in the City of Dublin where practitioners have to do cases in a number of courts, all cases fixed for the same time. It is impossible to arrange one's work when you go into court and do not know in the name of God when the justice is going to come out. They are all due at, say, half past ten. They may come out at half past ten or they may not. One may arrange his business on the basis that a particular justice is punctual and will be out at half past ten, and that another may not be out until 11 o'clock, and find, having taken that chance, that the man who does not come out generally until 11 o'clock will be out at half past ten and that the man who generally comes out at half past ten is out only at 11 o'clock. It is absolutely unreasonable that we should have that state of affairs. There is no reason why the courts should not sit at the hour they are expected to sit; and in that respect I want to say from my experience that I find no grounds for objection to the High Court, the Supreme Court or the Circuit Court in regard to punctuality in sitting.

I think I have said enough to make a reasonable case for this particular amendment. If, by any chance, on any day a judge were to feel a particular strain because of a very technical case or something else before him, nobody would object if the case were adjourned sooner than the usual time. There would never be any trouble whatsoever in regard to it. Even if an advocate became ill or unfit to carryon with the strain of a particular court, it is quite possible that, on application, an adjournment to suit his convenience and to suit his health would be arranged.

We have advanced a good distance beyond the long hours of some of our famous criminal cases in Green Street. I am moving this amendment on principle. I shall be quite satisfied if the Minister says that he will have this particular amendment examined before the Report Stage and will bring in an amendment to which the House will agree.

The general public are anxious that our courts should do more work and, in the interest of the general public, I have brought forward this amendment.

Mr. O'Higgins

This amendment certainly does refer to a problem of some importance, perhaps unlike the earlier amendment which the Deputy moved. The question of the hours during which courts should sit is of public importance. It is correct to say that people have been inclined to attribute arrears of legal business to the shortness of court sittings. Whether or not that reasoning is sound is, I think, difficult to be certain about. At any rate, I agree that there is some matter to be inquired into and that the amendment seeks to deal with a problem that does exist.

It is a pity that Deputy Cowan should have availed of this House and of this amendment to raise this particular problem because I think that the matter of court sittings is primarily one for the courts and that, in the first instance, the hours of sittings must be ordered by the courts. I retain sufficient respect for our judicial system and for our legal practitioners in both branches of the profession to believe that it is not a difficult matter to order court sittings for as long as people require them to sit. One of the judges in the High Court—in fact, the President of the High Court—has, for the past three years, been endeavouring to get litigants and solicitors to commence their cases well before 11 a.m. He has had lists informinglitigants and solicitors that cases would be taken at 10 a.m.; 10.15 a.m., and 10.30 a.m.—and time after time no one turned up. I do not think it is quite fair to suggest—as I think is inherent in Deputy Cowan's remarks—that all this must be laid on the shoulders of our judges. I do not believe that that is so. I think that every judge—each judge of the Circuit Court, the High Court, and the Supreme Court—within his physical abilities, will be only too anxious to sit for as long as he possibly can.

I feel that the suggestion of longer court sittings should come in an organised way from the professions engaged in the courts and should be discussed in an orderly and proper manner before the rule-making authority for each court. I feel that it should not be for a Deputy of this House, in his privileged position in this House, to move an amendment of this nature, with the innuendoes behind the speech which he made when moving the amendment. It is quite wrong and it is unfortunate that it was done.

I ask for the protection of the Chair. I am a Deputy of this House and a representative of the public. I am entitled to put down an amendment to this Bill and I put it down in that spirit. I object to any Deputy making the reference to me which Deputy O'Higgins has just made and I ask for the protection of the Chair and also that the reference be ruled out of order.

Mr. O'Higgins

Deputy Cowan can object away; I will continue.

Deputy Cowan is entitled to put down an amendment to the Bill. On the other hand, Deputy O'Higgins is equally entitled to criticise the amendment and the reason for putting it down.

I have no objection to that. I object to Deputy O'Higgins's statement that I availed of a privileged position in order to do something that I would have the right to advocate somewhere else. I ask the Chair to rule that that is not in order.

Mr. O'Higgins

It is correct thatevery Deputy in this House is in a privileged position. It is correct that everything said in this House has parliamentary privilege. It is notable that Deputy Cowan moves this amendment instead of doing what I suggest he should do—namely, get the proper professional machinery in motion and have the matter dealt with by the proper authorities.

Deputy Cowan is within his rights in putting down an amendment to the Bill.

The suggestion is now being made that, because I happen to belong to a particular profession, I should have adopted the machinery of the profession to do something which I am entitled to do as a member of this House. It does not matter what profession I belong to; I am entitled to do what I am doing and I object to Deputy O'Higgins's remarks. I ask for the protection of the Chair.

Deputy Cowan, as I have said, is quite entitled to put down such an amendment, but Deputy O'Higgins is fully entitled to criticise it.

Deputy O'Higgins has no right to say that I should adopt the machinery of my profession to do something which I am entitled to do as a Deputy of this House. I ask the Chair to rule that that reference should not be made.

I am afraid the Chair cannot rule on that submission.

Mr. O'Higgins

As I was saying, in my opinion, this matter could have been better dealt with outside this House. However, it has been raised here. While agreeing that there is some foundation for advocating longer court sittings, I cannot agree with some of the reasons offered by Deputy Cowan. The assimilating and sifting of evidence—whether Deputy Cowan agrees with me or not—is a highly technical matter. Listening to evidence, and acting in accordance with an oath to do justice to all, is a matter of considerable anxiety, I believe,to all our judges. It is very easy for a Deputy to say that an industrial worker works eight hours a day and to ask why a judge cannot work more than four hours a day. Most judges can and I believe do work considerably longer than four hours a day. How many Deputies sit in this House for longer than an hour at a time? I should like an honest answer to that question. For how long at a time can they sit here and listen to speeches— even sensible speeches—without ducking out to the back to have a smoke? We all know that that happens. One of the most difficult things to do is to sit consistently and patiently and to follow anxiously and carefully—as a judge is bound under rule to follow— every syllable, every inflection of a voice, every flicker on a witness's face, to make quite sure that he is doing justice. I do not think it is wrong to expect our judges, for however short they may sit each day, for as long as they do justice, to be tired and anxious men when eventually the court rises. I know that that, in fact, is so. It may be that it is possible to prolong the sittings in some way, but that is a matter for the judges. It is not a matter for a Deputy in this House.

Is it not a matter for the House?

Mr. O'Higgins

It is not a matter for a Deputy of this House.

Is it a matter for the House?

Mr. O'Higgins

I am making my speech; I did not interrupt the Deputy. If we want proper justice administered here, we will leave the settlement of these matters to our judges and to our professions. There is nothing more harmful than the meddler and there are many things that are better left alone. I believe this is one of them.

The Deputy advanced a variety of other reasons why it would be more convenient to have our courts and judges sitting longer. He mentioned the District Courts. I do not believe that anywhere in this country would you find a District Court still insession after two o'clock in the day. Their business is finished at that hour and in fact such is the situation that in this very Bill the Minister is seeking powers drastically to reduce the number of justices, and still it is suggested that in the case of district justices, whose business ordinarily finishes within an hour or one and a half hours, it is a matter of prime national importance that they must get up an hour earlier and sit at 10 o'clock. I cannot see the sense behind that. It is suggested that in the High Court—the Deputy particularly mentioned High Court juries—longer hours are necessary. I am not a judge, and possibly will never be one, but what about juries? Are 12 decent citizens who serve as jurors every day in the High Court to be forced to sit for two hours longer each day? Are their feelings not to be considered? Again I suggest that this is a matter to be left completely to the judges and to the rule-making authority which represents both solicitors and Bar to decide. We would be very wrong to interfere.

I want to say that I am against this amendment also. I am not against the idea which inspired it. I think we are all anxious that our courts should be as efficient as possible and I presume that the Deputy in putting down this amendment thought that, by getting this passed into legislation, our courts would be more efficient. I do not think that the delay in our courts is primarily due to the shortness of the hours which the courts work. I think the delay in our courts—certainly in the High Court—has in the past been due to the shortage of High Court judges. Our remedy in the desire we all have that litigation should be speeded up should be to endeavour to have an adequate number of judges, particularly in the High Court, so that the work will be got through with greater speed.

I do not know of any country in the world whose judges are asked to sit from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. and I think the reason for that, as Deputy O'Higgins pointed out, is a very good one indeed —that judges' work is in many waysmore difficult and more demanding, when done conscientiously, than even a surgeon's work, and I think the very system of the courts, which requires consultations before and after cases and constant discussion with witnesses and with counsel and solicitors on the other side, necessitates a greater margin at the beginning and end of the case than the ordinary day's work which the ordinary person does.

I am in agreement with the idea that our courts should work longer. I think the courts, all courts, could sit at 10.30 in the morning without putting any undue strain on judges or on the system of hearing cases. I do not think the way to bring about that state of affairs is, as Deputy Cowan suggests, putting down an amendment to a Bill which, I presume, he wishes would become the law of the land. One of the main objections to this amendment is its futility. We pass an amendment requiring judges to sit between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. and one of the first principles of law is sanction. Where is the sanction if the judges do not sit? Do we fine them £10 for not being in time? I think that such an amendment is in its nature a futile one.

We have to appreciate and realise fully what this country, by adopting its Constitution, has done. It has deliberately put our judicial system into a privileged position and I for one regard it as one of the fundamental safeguards of the freedoms we all recognise here as being desirable to be maintained that that privileged position should remain. I know that privilege of one sort or another is a matter which it is the task of the Parliament of a country to examine, to see if the body of persons or individuals in the privileged position are using their position in the interests of the country as a whole. That is a right which this Parliament should exercise, no matter what the walk of life in which the individuals exercise the privilege, except in regard to our judicial system. It is of vital importance that this country under its Constitution recognised the principle of the division of powers and set up a separate independent judiciary and for that reason, when dealing with such matters ofdetail as the sittings of the courts, we should be very careful that we here in the Oireachtas do not encroach upon the privilege of the judiciary which this country, in its wisdom, has adopted as a principle of its Constitution.

I agree with Deputy O'Higgins that these are matters which are best left to the rule-making body of the profession and to the judiciary themselves. I do not think this House should interfere in the manner proposed in this amendment. I think we are exceeding our functions as one of the branches set up under our Constitution, if we do so. I certainly do not think that the hours proposed in this amendment would be suitable or would, indeed, help to bring about the efficient legal machinery which we all desire.

I must say that I have slightly different views from those expressed by my colleagues on this matter. I think we all know that there are entirely separate problems involved for the High Court, the Circuit Court and the District Court. One of my objections to this amendment is that it tries to meet all three courts on the same basis. I, of course, regard the Supreme Court as one with the High Court. The delay that exists at present in the High Court in obtaining a decision in a trial by jury, and indeed in obtaining a decision in a case where there is no jury, is of undoubted hardship to litigants. I think every member of the House, no matter whether he be legal, lay or even a Minister, will agree that the delay causes great hardship to litigants. But when it comes to ascertaining the cause of that delay, that is where many of us would part company. I do not think that, primarily, the hours of sitting are the cause of that delay. Without being personal or without taking individual cases, we all know that one person will dispose of a great deal more in an hour than another will dispose of in two hours. After all it is a question of approach. Some of us in this House will say in five minutes what others will take 55 minutes to say. It is, perhaps, a problem of human nature if you like but I do not think the question of whether one sits at ten orlater is at the base of the trouble at all. There is another cause, in my belief, for the delay in the High Court at the present time but I think that is a cause which is not a suitable one for discussion here.

I disagree entirely with Deputy Cowan when he says, as I understood him to say, that this is going to make legal action cheaper for litigants. I think, by and large, it is going to make it dearer. I agree, of course, that where witnesses have to come up from, say, Mayo—I am dealing at the moment with the High Court—they come the night before, but in the vast majority of cases in Leinster, the litigants and the witnesses come up on the morning of the trial. If they have to arrive before 10 a.m. it is going to mean that more of them will have to stay over-night, and that, obviously, will increase the cost. We all agree that the cost of litigation should be decreased and not increased.

What about jurymen? It is sometimes impossible to assess the damage that a person engaged in business might suffer by not being able to attend for a short period at his business premises in the morning, when he is called to serve on a jury on a particular day. Under the present system a juryman has some chance, at least, before he attends court of going to his business premises and of giving perhaps what I might call some directions as to what might transpire while he is away. He will have further opportunity of dealing with the matter again when he comes off jury work in the evening. I think that the jury system is one that we must retain. I equally think that we must try to make it as reasonable for people who serve on juries as we can.

So far as convenience of the legal fraternity, be they judges, barristers or solicitors, is concerned, I do not think that really enters into it. It is the convenience of litigants, witnesses and jurymen that should be considered and, so far as the legal fraternity is concerned, into whichever of the three branches they fall, their convenience should be considered only in so far as it is necessary to assist them to carry out their respective functions properly. So much for the High Court.

When it comes to the Circuit Court, however, other considerations arise. Mayo has been mentioned, and in Mayo people from Achill have to travel to Ballina to the Circuit Court. A 10 o'clock sitting would mean that they would have to come the night before, because what invariably happens in the country—and I think Deputy Cowan will agree—is that the consultation is held at 10 o'clock before the Circuit Court sits. There is never a consultation the night before, and putting back the hours of sitting for the Circuit Court in the country would merely mean that litigants and witnesses would inevitably have to travel the night before and that would very substantially indeed increase the cost.

So far as the District Court is concerned, the position at the moment in Dublin is that the District Court starts at 10.30. I do not think it is worth arguing about starting the courts half an hour earlier in Dublin. The Minister has included a provision in the Bill by which he hopes to have fewer district justices in country districts. It seems to me to be difficult to argue that you should say, on the one hand, that there is so little work for justices in the country that you are going to cut down the number, while on the other hand you propose to increase the hours of sitting. Either of these statements is true; you cannot have both.

In regard to the question as to whether this is a proper matter for the House to discuss, I have very strong views. I consider it is entirely a proper matter for the House but an unwise matter for the House to discuss until the House has got the point of view of those who are dealing with the problem every day. I think the decision would be a proper matter for the House but that it would be unwise for the House to come to a decision until it had got, presumably through the Minister, the viewpoint of those who are immediately concerned—the judges in the various courts and district justices, the Bar through the Bar Council, presumably, and the solicitors either through the Law Society or the local Bar associations who deal withthese matters down the country. They seem to me to be the bodies to whose views on this matter the House should give grave consideration.

I think that until we have these before us we should not take a decision. I think that is what Deputy O'Higgins meant to say, though, perhaps, if I may say so without offence to him, he did not quite express it: that it would be very wrong to come to a decision without having these views before us. I do not think, however, that anybody would suggest that the question of legislation is not one with which we in the House must ultimately deal. But we should be reasonable men and take all proper steps to get opinions from the skilled men before coming to a decision.

Mr. Boland

I believe that all the Deputies who have spoken on this are legal men. I have, however, gone out of my way to try to find out what the opinions of the Incorporated Law Society and the Bar Council are on this matter. While we had our committee dealing with judicial salaries there was a question raised as to the hours of sitting of the courts and I took advantage of that to draw the attention of the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court to the opinion of the committee, which, of course, made no recommendations. They thought, however, that the courts ought to sit longer. I mentioned that to the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court. They were pressing, of course, for an additional High Court Judge and we are making provision for that, but they said they would do what they could. The arguments that have been put up by Deputies were precisely the arguments they put up. I wish Deputy O'Higgins had not dealt with Deputy Cowan's speech in the personal way in which he did.

Mr. O'Higgins

On a point of order. Is that fair? What is the personal way in which I dealt with it? I am not in the habit of dealing with people in a personal way.

Mr. Boland

The Deputy suggested that he was using his position——

Mr. O'Higgins

I made no suchsuggestion. The Minister said that I dealt with some remarks of Deputy Cowan's in a personal way. I pointed out and Deputy Cowan objected—he is entitled to his point of view and I am entitled to mine—that the proper way of doing this was to go to the rule-making authority and not by raising it here.

Mr. Boland

That is how it struck me, anyway. Deputy Sweetman has made his case far better. It was made in a far more reasonable and less objectionable way.

You will be getting into trouble with the Minister for Agriculture for saying that.

Mr. Boland

Deputy Cowan expressed the hope, when dealing with the last amendment, that as a result of what was said here the rule-making committee might change their attitude and make a move in the matter of how the judges in the different courts ought to be addressed. I think it would be wrong to take it out of the hands of the rule-making committee.

Mr. O'Higgins

The Minister agrees with me?

Mr. Boland

I certainly do.

Mr. O'Higgins

Then that is a personal attack on Deputy Cowan?

Mr. Boland

I agree with the substance of what Deputy O'Higgins and Deputy Sweetman said. My attitude, as I said in the beginning, is that we ought to try to keep this Bill confined to the main purpose for which it was brought in, the question of salaries and the raising of the jurisdiction to what it was intended to be before money lost its value. Then this question was raised in the House, that there ought to be a change of hours. If that is felt generally by the House, I think the proper way of settling that is by some commission or committee who could go into the whole question. That committee could decide whether the hours should be fixed by law or by the rule-makingcommittee. I think Deputy Costello was not right in suggesting, as I understood him, that this was not a matter for the House. It definitely is. We are entitled to discuss these matters and decide them. But I think this matter, like some other matters raised in amendments, would be more properly dealt with by a committee which would go into the whole question of our courts. I intend to ask the Government to set up such a committee to make recommendations, and for that reason I think we ought not to take a decision in this matter until that committee reports.

When this Bill passes, the solicitors' profession can be represented by two solicitors. At present you have one ex officiomember, who is President of the Incorporated Law Society. I understand that this rule-making committee generally meets on Friday, and that it is not always easy for the solicitors' member to attend. If there are two members permanently on it for a term, they would be able to put the point of view of the solicitors' profession.

I am definitely of opinion that the hour of ten o'clock would not suit witnesses. What Deputy Sweetman has said is what I was told by the representatives of the Bar Council and the Incorporated Law Society, that witnesses who came by car from a distance were generally interviewed in the morning; that the majority of them generally have these conferences in the morning and that it would mean great hardship and more expense if they were brought up the night before and had to be kept in a hotel. That is what they tell me.

Mr. O'Higgins

All cases within 30 or 40 miles of Dublin.

Mr. Boland

The Incorporated Law Society also said that they would find it very awkward if they had to be in court at ten o'clock, as they would not have an opportunity of dealing with their post. Deputy Cowan said they can, but they tell me they cannot. I do not know who is right. Maybe Deputy Cowan is a quicker worker or gets up earlier. Some of them say they get their post about a quarterpast nine, and that they could not very well deal with it before ten o'clock.

Then there is the question of the jury. There is no doubt that it would be difficult to expect a jury who have to sit for long hours to attend at that hour. I agree that any judge who would be required to sit for more than three or four hours listening to a case, and to come to a decision, would find it difficult to do it with such long hours. I could not do it anyhow. Even a Minister, when engaged in this House, can go out for ten or 15 minutes, and he requires a break. I am only giving a personal opinion, but I think it would not be right for a judge to be asked to give a decision after a very gruelling day.

That whole question would be settled better by a committee which would inquire into the whole question of the operation of the courts. My suggestion is that the Deputy should not press this now that it has been ventilated. The same thing applies with regard to extending the scope of the Bill. I do not think the Deputy ought to go further with it.

The Minister is not a legal gentleman, but will he agree that when we sit here at half-past ten in the morning and continue sitting until four or five in the afternoon it is a most tiring thing for the Minister in charge of a Bill? Is not that a fair analogy with a judge's work?

Mr. Boland

I do not know how a judge manages, but it is very onerous work here.

If I still belonged to my original profession of a soldier, I suppose no one could object to my raising this matter. But, being a Deputy who is interested in matters pertaining to the public and having heard a number of complaints about short hours in the courts, I felt that it was my duty to raise this matter. I think I am entitled to put down an amendment and this House would be perfectly entitled to pass the amendment if it so wished. I want to make that perfectly clear.

I am intrigued by one fact. Imentioned in advance the number of objections there was to the extension of the court hours and I knocked all those down one by one. The judges never said that the hours would be too long. They were interested in the strain that would be put on the jurymen. The Incorporated Law Society and the Bar Council were not interested in themselves, but in the enormous expense that would be imposed on litigants if they had to bring the witnesses up.

I would much prefer if the judges said: "Well, it would not be possible for us to deal with these cases if we had to work an hour later, or if we had to work a five hour day instead of a four hour day"—"That it would be too severe a strain"—I could understand that. Let the litigants and jurymen speak for themselves through the only people who can speak for them— their own representatives in this House. There is no representative of the witnesses on the rule-making authority. There is no representative of litigants on the rule-making authority. There is no representative of our county councils or local authorities or even of this Dáil on the rule-making authority. The rule-making authority should have the views of the witnesses, the litigants and the jurymen.

I have had cases where jurymen objected in court when the judge said he was adjourning the case until morning. They were country jurymen— farmers. It was a good harvest time and there was good weather and they wanted to do the work. They asked why should they have to come back the following morning for an hour when they could do the business that evening. The judge told them they had got to go home and come back the following morning. Nobody gave two hoots about their convenience, about their farms or anything else about them.

I have no objection to the judges making the case that the strain would be too long but do not let them make the case that it would be too severe on the jurymen and do not let the Incorporated Law Society or the Bar Council make the case for the witnesses.Let them make it for themselves. In that way, I think we could all understand one another much better.

It is a strange thing that Deputies O'Higgins and Sweetman agree that there is some problem but they do not agree that my amendment is the right way to meet it. I do not suggest it is. I did say, when introducing it, that I was putting it forward so that the matter might be considered by the Minister and something introduced on Report Stage that would meet the general view. It is a significant fact that the rule-making authority has been in existence for the last 29 years and have not dealt with the matter and would not deal with it for the next 29 years were it not raised by some Deputy in this House.

Let anybody say what he may but the fact that the courts do not sit longer imposes heavier financial burdens on the people of the country. If a case can be concluded in one day there are fees for one day only—not refresher fees or fees for two days. I would make a little bet with anyone that the refresher fee in a day would be much more than the cost of bringing a few witnesses up and putting them in a hotel in Ballina or elsewhere. If we are going to talk about expense, let us talk about expense and let us see how it works.

This nonsense that it would be more expensive to have the courts working longer days should not be accepted by any intelligent person. There is no foundation for it and it is only what I term an invented objection. The rule-making authority is an authority set up by statute. As this Oireachtas set up that rule-making authority, it can prescribe its powers and we can ourselves make rules in relation to the hours at which the court sits.

I think Deputy Costello was trying to be humorous when he asked where were the sanctions for a judge if he did not sit at ten o'clock. There is a very good sanction—£2,000 odd or £3,000 a year if he does not carry out his duties and that can be dealt with by the Oireachtas. That is the sanction that can be imposed.

Under the Rules of Court which are statutory rules made under the authority of legislation, judges are required to do this, that and the other thing. There is no question of imposing sanctions on them or imposing a penalty of £10 for not doing this or that. It certainly would be a poor day if we had to impose penalties on our judges. However, I think that was a humorous intervention and was not intended to be serious.

Under the Constitution of this country—and I have always supported it—the judges are independent. I have always supported that. I believe they should be independent and should not be subject to the Executive in matters particularly within their own domain, as to how to deal with cases. As to the hours at which a court opens and as to when it should close, those are peculiarly matters for statute and, in fact, are controlled and governed by statute at the moment. The Minister said that he proposed to introduce a Bill which will deal with a number of matters in the near future.

Mr. Boland

There will be a Bill under which this other matter in relation to style will be dealt with. These other matters that are the subject of amendments could be dealt with by the committee which the Government proposes to set up.

I do not want to be unreasonable in regard to this. We have had 29 years of it and the work of the High Court has fallen into shocking arrears notwithstanding the very excellent efforts of the President to try to make the day a little longer by bringing the jurymen in earlier. The court is in a scandalous state of arrears. The only remedy they suggest for it is one additional judge. If they do not wipe out the arrears they will come to the Minister and ask for another judge. Are they going to ask for a third judge?

Mr. O'Higgins

I do not think there is anything unreasonable in that. I would have six more to get the work done. I think the Deputy would agree with that. There is nothing to that.

If it is necessary to have six judges to do the work that is to be done, then we should have six judges. But the judges that are there should, in my opinion, work reasonable hours. No one will tell me that from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m., with a break in the middle of the day for lunch or a light repast, are reasonable hours.

Mr. O'Higgins

Can we not agree to leave it to the judges?

The judges have had it for 29 years and they have done nothing about it.

Mr. O'Higgins

They have.

Not for 29 years have they done anything about it. When we raised the matter on the committee that considered their salaries, they came along and reduced the long vacation by a certain number of days. At least, they took that much notice of the representations that were made to them.

Mr. O'Higgins

If you dealt with the long vacation you would have my complete support.

I am saying that they dealt with that.

If we wiped out one of the vacations around the Easter period it would be far more satisfactory than this.

Deputy Sweetman and Deputy O'Higgins may agree that the shortening of the long vacation is something that is desirable. I agree with them and I am sorry that they did not put down an amendment to that effect. I did consider that this question of a longer working day for the judges was important. I think it is particularly important in the District Courts where I have seen little cases that might be dealt with in a quarter of an hour left over. The court rose at 4 o'clock to the second with the result that 15 or 20 litigants, with their witnesses, all of them concerned with informal matters that could be disposed of in a quarter of an hour, were told to come back onthat day fortnight. That is wrong, I do not care who says to the contrary. It is scandalously wrong and is happening very frequently.

I remember going down to the country one time to do a case. I travelled a long way from Dublin. When I arrived in the court I had to wait until some cases that were at hearing were disposed of. Suddenly, the court adjourned at an hour that I have never seen courts adjourn at. There was an absence of the justice for a couple of hours. I was anxious to get my case finished and get back to Dublin. When I made inquiries, I was told that the justice was out disposing of his cattle. That may be perfectly all right, but I do not think the general public would think it is right during a day on which the court is sitting. I do not think it should be done. However, that is a long time ago, and I am probably the only person alive who was there on the day in question, so that the court cannot be identified.

However, I have raised this matter because I think it is important. I do not think it is the sort of matter that should be dealt with by a hasty amendment of the law. I have put down this amendment for the purpose of having it discussed. Frankly, I am disappointed that Deputies who are interested in the general public, and have no connection with the law, did not give us their views on this matter. If they had done so, it might be helpful to the Minister and to the rule-making authority, and certainly might have been in the public interest, because, after all, the courts are more concerned with the general public than with the legal fraternity.

For the purposes of the record, I should like to say that, so far as my experience goes, I have never known an occasion when the court, knowing that a case could be disposed of in another quarter of an hour or 20 minutes, did not continue to sit on for the purpose of finishing the case.

The Deputy would not suggest that I have said something that is untrue?

No. I am speaking from my own experience.

What I have said is happening every fortnight.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed: "That Section 4 stand part of the Bill."

On the section, this is the section which provides for an increase in pay of judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court, for judges of the Circuit Court and for district justices. The section was discussed on the Second Reading of the Bill here. This has been a unanimous recommendation by the committee that considered the matter. Under the Constitution, as has been mentioned, judges are independent in the exercise of their functions. Unfortunately, since this matter was under discussion by the committee, certain things have occurred in regard to district justices which might have altered my views if they had occurred prior to that.

I want to speak within the limitations that will be imposed on me by this House in regard to the exercise of their functions by the judiciary. In the exercise of their functions, the judiciary are absolutely independent. No one can interfere with them in the exercise of their functions, but one can take grave exception to some statements that they make from the Bench. In recent months and weeks there has been a spate of contradictory declarations by district justices in regard to the hours of dancing.

On a point of order.

I am not raising that matter.

The Chair was about to point out to the Deputy that what he has referred to is not relevant on Section 4, which deals with remuneration, expenses and pensions.

On a point of order. Regardless altogether of its relevancy, it surely always has been a Standing Order of the House, or at least aruling of the Chair, that, in so far as any statement is made by any judge or justice from the Bench, we are not entitled to discuss it here, but that, in so far as any statement may be made by a judge or a justice off the Bench, we are perfectly entitled to discuss it.

I agree. As a matter of fact, I am trying to put it to the Chair that I am very restricted by the Constitution and by the rules of this House, and that I am not at all going to trespass either on the restrictions imposed on me by the Constitution or by the rules of the House. But I do want to say that if I had read certain declarations before I had agreed to what is in this section, I might have taken a different view, and within the purview of that particular matter I could have expressed my views.

I endeavoured to raise this matter last week on the Adjournment, but the Ceann Comhairle ruled it out of order, and, consequently, I was not permitted to raise it in the House. I realise that I cannot raise it within the limits of this section. There is a place in which I possibly could raise it, but I can see the difficulties in regard to it. I do want to make the position clear—as a person who has been a very good friend of district justices—that I think it would be much better if we did not have some of the nonsensical declarations that they have been making from the Bench.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 agreed to.
SECTION 10.
Question proposed: "That Section 10 stand part of the Bill."

I am not quite clear what exactly the meaning of Section 10 is. Am I to understand that it means that, after the passing of this Bill, the pensions provisions of earlier Acts are not operative for anyone appointed in the future? If it does mean that it seems to be a rather cumbersome way of saying so.

Mr. Boland

The position is that ajudge can get a pension now after 15 years' service. If he has not reached 65 years of age he cannot get that pension even though he has 15 years' service. This is only for future appointments. Existing judges have their rights under the old Acts.

It is the difference between "Acts" and "This Act".

I think that is the technical point.

It seems to be an extraordinary way of drafting it.

Suppose we leave it that the Minister will look into it.

Mr. Boland

Yes. It is not the intention to interfere with existing rights.

That is what I understood.

It is strictly right but it does not look right.

That is about the way of putting it.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 4 not moved.
SECTION 11.
Question proposed: "That Section 11 stand part of the Bill."

Might I say that perhaps the Minister would consider the intention that Deputy O'Higgins had in regard to this section.

This is hardly relevant.

Mr. O'Higgins

We are not at the section yet.

We must be because your amendment has been ruled out of order.

The Deputy is certainly out of order at the moment.

Are we on the section, Sir?

The amendment came before Section 11.

It is ruled out of order.

But the section deals with High Court judges not county registrars. The title of the Bill, that is where it might be relevant.

The Deputy cannot discuss the amendment.

I am not discussing the amendment, but there are people who have been county registrars and State solicitors and who have been made district justices. There may be some question of a break in service. All I want to refer to is the principle of Deputy O'Higgins's amendment, and I would like the Minister to look into it before the next stage.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 12.
Question proposed: "That Section 12 stand part of the Bill."

I think the Minister indicated he was dropping Section 12.

If he drops it we will all be happy.

Mr. Boland

If the section is opposed I am prepared to cut it out.

We are all agreed.

It will be one of those that will go to the committee.

Mr. Boland

I will consider that. I will drop it out of the Bill at the Report Stage.

We can delete it at this stage.

Mr. Boland

There has to be a consequential amendment.

That can be brought in on the Report Stage and the section deleted now.

Agreed to delete Section 12.

SECTION 13.

Mr. Boland

I move amendment No. 5:—

Before Section 13, in page 6, to insert the following new section:—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 34 of the Act of 1936, if, at any time before a judge begins to travel a High Court Circuit for the purpose of holding therein any half-yearly sittings of the High Court on Circuit, the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court ascertain that there is no business to be transacted at such sittings in any particular appeal town for a county or county borough in that High Court Circuit, the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court may direct in writing that it shall not be obligatory to hold such sittings in that appeal town.

(2) (a) Where—

(i) two or more judges are travelling a High Court Circuit for the purpose of holding therein any half-yearly sittings of the High Court on Circuit, and

(ii) the senior of the judges ascertains that there is no business to be transacted at such sittings in any particular appeal town for a county or county borough in that High Court Circuit,

the senior of the judges may direct in writing that it shall not be obligatory to hold such sittings in that appeal town.

(3) (a) Where—

(i) one judge only is travelling a High Court Circuit for the purpose of holding therein any half-yearly sittings of the High Court on Circuit, and

(ii) the judge ascertains that there is no business to be transacted at such sittings in any particular appeal town for a county or county borough in that High Court Circuit,

the judge may direct in writing that it shall not be obligatory to hold such sittings in that appeal town.

(4) A direction under this section may be filed in the Circuit CourtOffice serving the appeal town to which the direction relates.

I think this amendment explains itself. It provides that it will no longer be necessary for the High Court to sit in the appeal town where there is no business to be transacted.

Is that not going to be bad for the textile trade? There will be no gloves needed.

I think we can accept the amendment without explanation.

Yes. It is obvious.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Boland

I move amendment No. 6:—

Before Section 13, in page 6, to insert the following new section:—

The power to remit or transfer an action conferred by Section 25 of the Act of 1924 may, with the consent of the parties to the action, be exercised by the Master of the High Court, and any action remitted or transferred by him shall be regarded as having been remitted or transferred under that section by the High Court.

This amendment proposes to give statutory authority to a practice which was being followed up to a few years ago and under which the Master of the High Court, with the consent of the parties, transferred to the Circuit Court or the District Court any High Court actions which might have been commenced in the lower courts. In fact the power of remitting or transferring such High Court actions, with or without the consent of both parties, is reserved to the court itself under the provisions of Section 25 of the 1924 Act. Where the parties to the action consent to the transfer of the action to a lower court, the exercise of the power of transfer becomes a more formality and it will be a saving of time both for the High Court and the parties themselves to have the transfer orders made in such cases by the Master.

I am all in favour of it, but is the Minister sure it is constitutional?

Mr. Boland

We are told it is.

I am in favour of it, if it is.

On amendment No. 6, would the Minister say if there are any other like functions that the Master could undertake and if certain jurisdiction could be given to him? In several matters which I will not go into now his jurisdiction is still rather vague. There are many purely technical matters which are transferred automatically, even when they are subject to the consent of both parties, from the Master of the High Court. I think power should be given to the Master to deal with these matters. As I say, I cannot go into them now in detail but I would suggest that the Minister should get in touch with the rule-making body and find out from them what power they suggest should be given to the Master in many of these small matters of detail which, in practice, could be dealt with by him but which he has no jurisdiction to deal with and which are helping to clutter up the courts.

Mr. Boland

This is a matter which this committee could go into. I discussed it with the parliamentary draftsman and he suggested that this is one of the ways it could be dealt with.

Is that to get you over certain difficulties? I do not want to start a discussion but there are a number of functions exercised by the Master at the moment in a court, as it were, that in my view could be readily dealt with in the office. However, I do not want to start an argument on that. Perhaps Deputy Costello has something there in suggesting that certain powers should be given to the Master. We will run into a difficulty in the fact that the Master is not a judge and cannot exercise judicial functions. However, I suppose the committee will be the place to deal with this. Some of the things the Master does could very well be doneby him in the office without having counsel, solicitors or anybody else appearing before him in the court.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. O'Higgins

I move amendment No. 7:—

Before Section 13 to insert a new section as follows:—

(1) Every appeal from a judgement of the Circuit Court in an action tried by judge and jury shall be made by way of a motion before a judge of the High Court for a new trial and the allegations on which such motion may be grounded shall include the allegation that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence or was otherwise perverse. In any such appeal the judge of the High Court before whom the same is prosecuted may, in lieu of an order for a new trial, set aside the verdict findings and judgement appealed against and enter such judgment as the court thinks proper.

(2) The provisions in the Act of 1936 relating to appeals from the Circuit Court shall be modified in relation to appeals from judgments in actions tried by a judge and jury in accordance with this section.

This again is an amendment which I think is a simple one. It was intended to be considered with amendment No. 22 and arises out of the increased jurisdiction proposed to be given to the Circuit Court. In effect it is to provide that a civil jury's decision in the Circuit Court on a question of fact should be final, and that an appeal should lie only from a jury's decision in the same way as it now lies from a High Court jury to the Supreme Court.

This particular provision is sound common sense, where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is proposed to be doubled. I had hoped that it might be discussed with the later amendment No. 22, as I think that—whatever may be said about the High Court—in the Circuit Court and in rural areas where a litigant exercises his right to bring jurors in to hear his case heshould be bound to provide some expenses for the jury; and he would get as a corollary to that an assurance that the decision of the jury could not be upset by one judge coming along later on, on appeal. That is unfortunately the position at the moment— the jury that hears a case in the Circuit Court is wasting its time, the whole thing is unreal because after they come to their judgment on the facts they hear, an appeal is brought and is heard by a judge of the High Court, on a rehearing completely without a jury, and he may come to quite a different view. The purpose of this is to ensure that where a civil jury is heard, their decision on fact will be final.

Deputy O'Higgins's amendment is an attempt to deal with what will develop into a very real problem very shortly after this Bill comes into operation. By raising the jurisdiction to £600, we are automatically going to bring into practice a rule of court which has been availed of very little up to the present time, namely, the right of a plaintiff in an action tort to have a jury. At the present time, it is vary rarely that you have a jury empanelled in an action where the claim is for £300. Now the claim may be up to £600 and there will be many such claims heard in the Circuit Court. That practice is going to creep in, in all the circuits, including Dublin, and we will have juries being empanelled, if some provision such as in Deputy O'Higgins's suggestion is not made. We will have the paradoxical and wrong situation that the right of everybody to have a substantial case tried by a judge and jury will be whittled down, by reason of the appeal which, for example, a defendant would have against a decision by a jury, and that appeal coming on before a judge without a jury. You will have a ridiculous situation where facts are threshed out in the Circuit Court before a judge and jury and the same facts are again threshed out in the Hight Court before a judge alone.

On the Second Reading of this Bill, I suggested that there should be an appeal direct from the Circuit Courtto the Supreme Court on the judge's notes, on the motion for a new trial, in the same way as there is an appeal from the High Court to the Supreme Court. If that is not acceptable to the Minister, I suggest the form proposed by Deputy O'Higgins, in order to get over the very cumbersome and ridiculous system that will develop in appeals from the Circuit Court to the High Court as the Bill now stands.

I have been thinking over this problem of cases of tort, actions for damages, tried before a circuit judge and jury. Undoubtedly every sensible plaintiff in one particular type of action will endeavour to have a jury in the Circuit Court and it is certainly wrong that there should be, from the verdict of 12 men who have seen the witnesses, observed their demeanour and have been able to make up their minds on the facts in front of them, an appeal to a single judge. I think there is a certain amount of merit in Deputy O'Higgins's amendment, but personally I prefer the appeal direct from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court.

Mr. O'Higgins

That is a very sound suggestion.

I am much more in favour of that. From a practical point of view, where you have a case dealt with by a Circuit Court judge and jury, there is not a lot of difference between that and the High Court, where you have an appeal to the Supreme Court.

If you are going to have appeals to the High Court, you may help to clutter up the High Court more than it is. For that reason, I would strongly urge that the appeals should be direct to the Supreme Court. I would ask the Minister not to say he will leave it to the new Bill. I would ask him to have it dealt with on the Report Stage.

Mr. Boland

I will do that. I will deal with it on the Report Stage.

Amendment withdrawn?

What will the Minister do?

Mr. Boland

I am not saying I will accept it, but I will have the point considered and it can be raised again. I will let the Deputies know whether I am accepting it or not, in sufficient time to enable them to put it down again if it is not agreed to.

I have the gravest difficulty in accepting Section 18 as it is, until I know the Minister's view.

You could put down an amendment on Report Stage on Section 18.

I was going to discuss this more on Section 18 than on Deputy O'Higgins's amendment. Perhaps we might get this agreement, that if the Minister is not able to meet the point that has been suggested he would agree on Report to recommit the Bill to enable us to argue out this point again?

Mr. Boland

I will agree to that.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I suppose someone could move amendment No. 8 for Deputy Moran?

I doubt whether anyone would be in order in so doing.

Has the Deputy received Deputy Moran's authority to move the amendment?

I have not. It would be just for the purpose of knowing the Minister's attitude.

Mr. Boland

I could not accept it. I think some of the powers are going far enough. This committee may wish to report on that.

I only raised it in order to get the Minister's view.

Amendment No. 8 not moved.
Section 13, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 14.

What does the Minister say about amendment No. 9?

Mr. Boland

I would be against it.

Amendment No. 9 not moved.

Mr. Boland

I move amendment No. 10:—

Before sub-section (4), in page 6, to insert the following new sub-section:—

(4) Every nominated member of the committee shall, unless he sooner dies, resigns, or ceases to be (as the case may be) an ordinary judge of the Supreme Court, an ordinary judge of the High Court, a practising barrister, or (in the case of the member of the Junior Bar) a member of the Junior Bar, or a practising solicitor, hold office as such member for five years from the date of his nomination.

This amendment is consequential.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 14, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 15

In Section 15, amendment No. 11 is not moved. It is out of order.

Surely the Minister is not out of order?

Yes, I tried to slip one over on you, but even the best of us get caught out. It should be for the Court Officers' Bill.

I am delighted to hear that the Minister gets a knock occasionally.

I take it that an early opportunity will be taken to put that in order?

It has to be.

Amendment No. 11 not moved.

Mr. O'Higgins

I move amendment No. 12:—

In sub-section (1), paragraph (a), line 44, to delete "eight" and substitute "nine."

This, I suppose, cuts across the policy of the Bill because it is designed to prevent the proposed reduction in the Circuit Courts. I know that I will have Deputy Cowan's full support for this because it certainly seems strange to me that we should substantially increase the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and at the same time reduce the number of judges.

Longer hours will settle it.

Mr. O'Higgins

That is just the point. If, in fact, there are too many Circuit Court judges at the moment, it does not matter about the hours because there are too many of them sitting and they will sit too many hours. For that reason, I am quite certain Deputy Cowan will support the amendment. I do not know whether it is a matter of firm and definite policy with the Minister to reduce the number of Circuit Court judges. I always think it is far better from the courts' point of view to have redundant judges. I think the important thing is not the saving of the £2,000 or £3,000 a year that might be saved by pruning down the number of judges to the bare minimum needed to have the work done.

That does not count compared with the great public convenience and general satisfaction that will be given by having as many judges as are reasonably necessary to do the work. I think the proposed reduction in Circuit Court judges—while a case might legitimately be made for it—is unwise with the increase in jurisdiction which we will give to the Circuit Courts now. I do believe that very, very quickly we will have some Minister coming back to the House proposing to increase the number of Circuit Court judges once again. I think it would be far wiser to leave them as they are to see how the increased jurisdiction works out. It is my opinion that you require all the Circuit Court judges you have and more.

I just wish to urge the Minister to accept this amendment. I think it is just possible that a case might be made at the present time thatsome of the country circuits need to be rationalised, and it is just possible that it could be fairly argued that there should be a reduction in Circuit Courts at the present moment. I do not think there is any substance in that argument when we are, under this Bill, deliberately going to give the Circuit Courts extra work, and I am convinced a good amount of extra work, in the future. We have got to regard ourselves as trying to legislate for an effective judicial system and an efficient system, and I do not see efficiency or effectiveness arising from a new judicial Circuit Court system by which we give them, admittedly, a large amount of extra work and reduce the number of circuit judges at the same time.

I said on the Second Reading—and I believe it is true—that this is a compromise between the Department of Justice and the Department of Finance, and I think in order to give the judges the extra salary which it was admitted was necessary, the Department of Finance wanted its pound of flesh and decided to cut down on the number of Circuit Court judges. I think it is wrong. As Deputy O'Higgins said, it is better to have too many Circuit Court judges than too few, and that is exactly what I think is going to happen if this amendment is not accepted.

I do not agree with the particular amendment moved by Deputy O'Higgins, because the section says that the Government will divide the State into eight convenient groups. I agree we should have eight convenient groups as circuits but I think we should have nine judges.

Mr. O'Higgins

You mean ten?

Yes, an additional judge. I think that the President of the Circuit Court should be a person who would be available to go here, there and elsewhere where there is a lot of work to be done. As it is, he is one of the judges in the Dublin circuit, and under the Act as it will be when passed, there will definitely be a reduction of one judge. I think that the Minister could consider that—whether we could still retain the same number of judges, leaving the President tohelp out, whether in Dublin or elsewhere. In that way we will get into the machinery of the new system. We will get it operating efficiently and easily, and if and when it is found in operation to be a success, the Minister can easily come to the House on the occurrence of a particular Circuit Court vacancy and ask the House to agree to reduce the number of Circuit Court judges by one. I think, however, in the process of change-over, no harm would be done and a great lot of good might be done if the number of judges that are in the Circuit Court was retained.

In view of the fact that we are going to have this committee, what I propose to do is not to give effect to these provisions until we get a report from the committee.

Mr. O'Higgins

To what provisions is the Minister not going to give effect?

Both the Circuit Court and the District Court provisions.

The Minister will not make an Order?

No. This is permissive, and if it works as Deputy Costello seems to anticipate—and which I doubt—then, of course, we will perhaps have to amend the Bill. Meantime these provisions to which I have referred will not be given effect to. Possibly on the report of the committee we may have a new Bill. They may report in favour of this or against it. Meantime, I will not give effect to these provisions but I will take the power in case it might be necessary.

It would be a pity if the Minister did not get the chance of rearranging circuits.

You can have it on paper and have it ready to go into effect.

Do not press that or I will be taking a different line.

I think we should keep these sections and take these powers but not exercise them.

The Minister is going to leave the Circuit Courts as they are until after the report of the committee?

Yes, that is right.

Major de Valera

If the Minister is giving attention to that, I suggest that some care should be taken in the drafting of Section 15, "as soon as conveniently may be after the passing of this Act..." That may be permissive, but sometimes—perhaps Deputy Costello could help here—I have an idea there has been some difficulty in construing such a thing and that there is a possibility that somebody could move to compel the Minister in that matter if it is in this form. In other words, there is no guarantee of indefinite delay. I am thinking of Section 19.

It would be better if we disposed of the amendment first and dealt with that point on the section.

Major de Valera

I accept your ruling. On the amendment, I can speak now from a completely detached point of view and with a certain amount of knowledge. I know that up to two years ago the situation in the Eastern circuit and in the Dublin circuit was such as to demand even more judicial attention to work than was actually possible under the system. I presume the situation is more or less the same to-day. One judge is appointed for the counties, Louth, Meath, Wicklow, Wexford and Kildare. Whatever may be said for Deputy Cowan's argument in relation to High Court sittings, one must remember the amount of time involved in travelling on circuit and the physical fatigue occasioned by that travel to both judge and practitioner. I have no hesitation in saying, after a number of years' experience of that circuit, that it is too much for one judge. I merely want to stress that point relative to the proposal to reduce the number of Circuit Court judges. Possibly the Minister may find his solution by a rearrangement of circuits. Any such rearrangement must be one that will compensate in cases of the kind I have mentioned.

The Dublin Circuit Court is also notorious. Very often a judge has to be brought in from some other circuit to help clear up arrears of work. Bearing all that in mind I do not think the amendment should be accepted in its present form. It might be desirable to frame this Bill in such a way as to make it permissive. It is not permissive at the moment and anybody who says it is is not accurate.

Mr. Boland

I am advised that it is.

With all respect, I do not think the Deputy is correct because what he is saying is out of order until such time as we come to the section.

Major de Valera

I agree with the Minister's intention, and I support him in it in so far as he suggests that a redrafting of the wording of that section on the Report Stage will more clearly achieve what he has in mind. Certainly it does not appear to be in the section as it stands at present.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 13:—

In sub-section (4), line 33, to delete "nine" and substitute "ten".

We have really been discussing amendment No. 13 on amendment No. 12 to some extent, and I think it is amendment No. 13 which would appeal more to the members of this House. I think it is vitally essential that there should not be a reduction in the number of Circuit Court judges. If I may put it this way, there should be a "fluid" judge who could be sent around as a sort of shock troop to clear up wherever there is an accumulation of work. I think it is utterly illogical for the Minister to propose an extension of jurisdiction in Section 18 and at the same time a reduction in the number of Circuit Court judges.

I do not want to say anything now that might be directed towards any particular individual, but there are some judges who get through their work with great celerity. There are some who get through by sittinglonger hours on certain days. I am afraid that the rule of the Civil Service is being made to apply and that the Minister's own Department, or the Department of Finance, is rather inclined to view this matter on a rule of thumb basis. Now one cannot measure this particular type of work on that basis. A judge may have one case in his list that proves extremely difficult and that may deserve an entire day. On the other hand, there may be a case that will only take ten minutes but is allowed to take three hours. Another judge may get through three or four quite difficult cases in an afternoon. A colleague may take the whole day. Some are more prolix than others, just as some are more prolix in this House than others.

I suppose that is human nature, but one cannot measure the work done in the courts by a rule of thumb method. Perhaps it is the way of the Civil Service to take a rule of thumb basis how many cases are disposed of; how many days do judges sit—without considering whether the cases were contested bitterly or uncontested and without considering how many hardfought cases were dealt with by particular judges on a particular day.

I have in mind one judge. I have never appeared before him professionally. The nearest I have come to having any dealings with him is in the realm of sport because he occasionally indulges in the same kind of sport as I do. He is well known for the fact that he disposes of his work with tremendous celerity and gives satisfaction to litigants. He sits longer hours on a particular day, if that is necessary, in order to clear up the work. Yet, I understand that the Department of Justice, or the Department of Finance operating through the Department of Justice, merely calculates on a day-to-day basis. That particular judge, as I have said, sits longer hours on one day and keeps his work up to date.

In mentioning that I want to make it quite clear that this is work which cannot be measured on a rule of thumb basis. I think it would be better for the Minister to retain the existing number of judges and the President of the Circuit Court, through the mediumof a flexible power, should have authority to move judges around to clear up arrears wherever there may be an accumulation of business or pressure of work.

Mr. Boland

I will look into that matter. I am advised that this is permissive but I shall certainly have it examined again. The method adopted is not altogether a rule of thumb. The committee considered this matter and went into all these aspects. There are at least four Circuit Court judges who have sat less than 100 days on an average over a five-year period, and one of them very much less than 100 days. On the other hand, we have the case mentioned by Deputy de Valera of one circuit being much bigger than the others. All that will be taken into consideration. The proper step to take is to remove some of the counties from that circuit and put them into some other circuit. We will not operate this until we see how the committee report on the matter.

I take it that if the Minister did it within a year or two it would be "as soon as conveniently may be".

Mr. Boland

Yes, but if there is any doubt about that I will make it permissive.

You will not carry it out until the committee has met.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed: "That Section 15 stand part of the Bill."

I take it that the Minister will certainly have regard to the views of the committee when deciding to chop up the existing circuits?

Mr. Boland

Certainly.

I can visualise circumstances arising where the committee would advise against redistribution of the existing circuits and I would suggest then that the proper thing to do would be to make that discretionary,to put in the word "may" instead of the word "shall".

Mr. Boland

We will consider that.

If I may say so, I agree that the circuits should be rearranged and the word "shall" should be left in the Bill and in the Act. The committee that would be set up would be a committee to advise how best to rearrange, but this House having decided, on Second Reading, that there should be a rearrangement, they would have no power to advise against it. Their function in being set up is to advise the Government and the Minister how best to rearrange but they could not, and it would not be one of their functions, advise the Minister that he should not alter the circuits, this House, on Second Reading, having decided definitely that there must be a rearrangement for the reasons the Minister gave.

I do not think that is at all arguable. This House gave this Bill a Second Reading. The whole point of a Committee Stage is to enable the House to discuss it section by section, and on the discussion of this section there is a viewpoint to be put that it is not desirable to rearrange at all. Whether that viewpoint is right or not, does not matter. That is obviously a Committee decision and not a Second Reading decision. It is ridiculous to say that you will tell the committee: "Advise how to rearrange, but one of the things that you cannot advise is that there is to be no rearrangement." If you are going to ask the committee to decide how best to rearrange, the logical thing to put to the committee is to advise whether, and if so, how, there was to be rearrangement. Clearly that is a committee point.

Major de Valera

It seems to me that the basis of this section is simply that there is a case for rearranging the circuits. I think the Minister has expressed one side of that case with relation to circuits where, apparently, there was not enough work to keep them going in the past. I have mentioned a case of a circuit that was overloaded and the Minister mentionedit subsequently. Clearly, there is a case for reconsidering this circuit arrangement. On that we are all agreed.

There are two points that arise, one of them explicitly in the section but the Chair may pardon me if I mention the other one. One is, what is the correct number of circuits to have; what is the best organisation you can have for the circuits? As Deputy O'Higgins has pointed out, the increase in jurisdiction will give the Circuit Court a further reach than it has at the moment. For instance, certain negligence cases that were automatically going to the High Court because they were over £300 will go back to the Circuit Court now. That is one factor to be taken into account. There are very few of us who can really have examined the thing very thoroughly and all I can say to the Minister is that, with his advisers, it is a question for him to try to get the best solution and to find out what is the optimum number of circuits to have and what is their distribution.

There is another point that I would like to mention in connection with that, if I will be pardoned for doing so, as, strictly speaking, it is not on this section. In doing that one has to take into consideration the physical amount of work that judges and practitioners can do having regard to the fact that they must travel. That is a point that should be taken into consideration in rearranging the circuits. The second one is a question for the legal practitioners and the Bar on circuit, that you will have a very awkward problem where solicitors and barristers are established on a certain pattern at the moment. There is a point there to be watched in rearranging the circuit, to try to see that as little upset as possible is caused. In the interest of the community some upset may be necessary but after the community has been properly safeguarded the profession should get some attention.

The first question then that arises on this section is, is eight adequate? TheMinister is the only person who can really answer that on the basis of the advice that he is given but this much is clear—that is why I interjected a few minutes ago—the section is certainly mandatory. Supposing the words "as conveniently" were left out, the section would be practically directly mandatory. The words "as conveniently" do bring in a certain elasticity from the point of time but it does not get away from the fact that we are here legislating that the Government shall within a reasonable time—that is more or less the effect of it—by Order give effect to the provisions of this section. Personally, I do not like the idea that we should frame legislation in that particular form, declaring an intention to do a thing as soon as conveniently may be and at the same time have the intention of putting it off indefinitely. That is a very dangerous precedent to introduce into this House. That is why I would ask the Minister to reconsider the wording there, if that is his intention because it is quite a novel approach to legislate on the face for something to be done and at the same time to hold it in abeyance. If we are passing contingent legislation or legislation to be held in abeyance, we should express it to be so.

Apart from that point I think the Minister is perfectly right to reconsider the adjustments of the circuits. There is room for adjustment and, with the advice that he has he will probably be able to get one which will be a real improvement both from the point of view of the Bench and from the point of view of the citizen.

There is one point that I omitted to raise a minute ago, a point that does not affect my side of the legal profession. There is a system by which barristers allocate themselves to circuits. There is a situation in which a barrister may have built up a business in, say, two adjoining counties which are at present in the same circuit. The Minister, by rearrangement of the groups, will perhaps cut away overnight half that man's business.

Mr. Boland

I will keep an eye on that.

It is rather difficult to see how the Minister will keep an eye on it. It is one of the things that should be considered because, if there is to be a rearrangement in that way that can affect substantially and seriously a person's livelihood, it certainly should not be done, so to speak, overnight. There should be considerable notice of it so that the person concerned may try to adjust himself accordingly and so arrange his business for the future that it will not cause him hardship. I can see cases quite obviously happening in a rearrangement where places that are in the same circuit now will be in different circuits thereafter. That is of the essence of what Deputy de Valera has said and if you are going to say that one circuit is overloaded and another is underloaded, I hope that some effort will be made to ensure that the hardship that will arise therefrom will be minimised. One of the ways to minimise it is to give longer notice than conveniently may be to the people concerned. If they got considerable notice of what was likely to happen it would ease the problem for them and enable them to make new arrangements.

Major de Valera

On the point raised by Deputy Sweetman I think that for the practitioner something more than notice should be given. I am thinking again of the Bar. This problem can arise, that a man is at the present moment practising in, say, certain towns on a particular circuit, and that he is practising in those towns in succession. If you partition that circuit he will find himself in two circuits. It may not be altogether feasible or convenient for the profession to readjust themselves completely. In other words many barristers may find themselves compelled to practise in two circuits at the one time. That brings me to the point which I can mention now and which I think is an important point, that in rearranging the circuits and the times for sittings some regard should be had to that fact and an effort be made to arrange that where a circuit is partitioned say, two important towns that once were consecutive remainconsecutive and do not have simultaneous sittings. I could go into it in more detail.

I think the Minister will grasp what I mean if I take the instance of the eastern circuit. At present you have the circuit going right around and sitting, say, in Wicklow Town in one fort-night and Wexford the next. Barristers who go to both of these towns, and solicitors—remember there are solicitors involved—the people on the borderline, have the convenience that the court hearing is consecutive, and they can attend to their business in both. Now if, for instance, Wexford were to be put in another circuit—I am merely taking that arbitrarily; I do not know if it is the intention or not—then care should be taken that Wicklow sessions and Wexford sessions would not be simultaneous, but that they should be consecutive, so that such practitioners as attend those circuit towns at the present moment could continue to do so. Furthermore, I think that although Deputy Sweetman said that his profession was not interested particularly this is a plain case where his profession might be more interested in so far as a particular solicitor had to attend both towns.

A solicitor in New Ross has to attend both Wexford and Waterford. It is as long as it is broad.

Major de Valera

Very probably it is. It is not only for the Bar. There is a problem also for the solicitors when this question is come to, and there is no harm in asking the Minister in making his rearrangement to keep that in mind.

Mr. Boland

On the Second Stage I did advert to that, and I said that the President of the Circuit Court, who will have the rearrangement of the business, will certainly have regard to that; and he would consult the Bar Council, I am quite sure, and do his best to see that there would be as little disturbance as possible; but I dare say that there will be some cases where it would not be feasible.

The Minister has ideal members available for that committee.We have heard from both sides on the subject.

Mr. Boland

I do not know whether we should make it a Dáil Committee.

No members of either House, I hope.

Mr. Boland

That is what I was hoping.

As we have arrived at that, as the Minister mentioned it, I would like to make certain remarks on it.

Could we first hear what the committee is going to do?

It is irrelevant to this section.

Mr. Boland

There were so many amendments, and the scope of the Bill being so much enlarged, I said earlier here this evening that I proposed not to accept some amendments and there were a few expressions by this House that it was necessary to look into the reorganisation of the courts and see whether any changes were necessary. This was not in any way connected with what the Bill was brought in for. The Bill was merely to restore the status quoand to give the judges and district justices increased salaries. That is really all we intended to do. On the section we are dealing with now, if this committee did not make any recommendation to increase the jurisdiction I would still go ahead. I think we should go ahead with this reorganisation of the circuits. On this question of the committee——

I do not see how we can discuss it now.

Mr. Boland

No.

Can we discuss it on the Long Title?

I do not think it would be relevant at all, but I will not prevent the Deputy from saying what the committee should contain and leaving it at that.

I think that I can get around it this way then. I would not be happy with Section 15 being sent to a committee unless I felt that the committee was going to be this type of committee; if the Minister is suggesting that he is going to leave the wording of Section 15 more or less as it is, after dealing with the "mandatory" and the "convenient" side of it, and is going to send it to a committee I am quite happy with that, provided that the committee is of a particular sort, and I think that as long as he made that proviso I would be in order in discussing the type of committee I would be satisfied with.

I do not say that it is in order.

I am only going to make a few passing remarks. I hope that the committee, when it is set up, will be a committee, that contains no member of either House of the Oireachtas. I think the committee will probably, if not certainly, have to make certain suggestions in its report which will mean legislation, and it would be entirely desirable that when that legislation does come before the Oireachtas no member of the House would have already preconceived views on it; or perhaps he might have preconceived views, as most of us have views on this, but that we would not be bound already by being parties to a report. I would advocate that very strongly indeed. I would also urge the Minister very strongly that the committee would contain representatives of the people who would have to work out recommendations of the committee, and representatives of people who would be affected. It is desirable that it should contain representatives of the judges, of the Bar and the solicitors, and in so far as one can pick them—and it is a little bit difficult to see how they are going to be picked—representatives of litigants. I do not suggest that the Minister would go down to the Four Courts and get certain gentlemen who are always there as litigants. There is one who comes to my mind straightway. But the Minister should get representatives of the non-legal people who would be affected in the ordinary way.

I think, without making any personal suggestion, that about a month ago a judge retired from the Supreme Court who had an alarming experience. A judge outside the system now might be very suitable for consideration as a person who had that type of experience.

I think that the committee should go further than having referred to it the actual matters that have been mentioned so far during this discussion here to-night. I think the committee should be asked to advise as to what other reforms it can suggest in the legal system. There are reforms in the legal system which were referred to by way of a side wind to-night in regard to things that are dealt with in the Master's Court— things which, perhaps, it may not be possible to do constitutionally. That is a matter for consideration. I hope the committee will be given reasonably wide terms of reference to consider what legal reforms it can put forward. I hope that it will be a committee (1) that will be representative of those people who will have to work it and (2) that it will also be representative of those people who have to be the sufferers—using that word to cover the general public.

I think that the Chair has allowed me to drag in my very tenuous reference. Having done so, Sir, with the help of your blind eye, I think I had better not extend that reference too far.

Question put and agreed to.
Section 16 agreed to.
SECTION 17

I take it that amendments Nos. 14 and 15 are consequential on the other two amendments?

Mr. O'Higgins

Yes.

Amendments Nos. 14 and 15 not moved.
Section 17 agreed to.

Are we to take it that Deputy Moran's amendments will go by the board?

Deputy Moran is not here to move them and no Deputy has stated that he has permission from Deputy Moran to move them on his behalf.

SECTION 18.

Amendments Nos. 16 to 20, inclusive, not moved.

Are we to take it for granted that no more will be heard of Deputy Moran's amendments?

I cannot give the Deputy any assurance on that point. Standing Orders provide that, unless a Deputy gives another Deputy permission to move amendments for him, they may not be moved.

Mr. Boland

Deputy Moran got plenty of notice to be here.

Question proposed: "That Section 18 stand part of the Bill".

The question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in civil cases is of vital consequence. I always felt, in regard to that jurisdiction, that the jurisdiction of £1,000 for probate of administration was a low jurisdiction by reference to the £300 for contract in tort. For that reason, I would not in any way quarrel with the increase in the jurisdiction from £1,000 to £2,000. Candidly, I have not enough experience to be able to offer any comment on State proceedings. I am going to deal, therefore, only with the contract in tort jurisdiction. Deputy Moran had the idea that it was desirable to extend it still further. I think it has been extended a little bit far. I do not agree with the point of view that it should not be extended at all. There is a sort of a dividing line and £500 is considered, so to speak, a round figure with which juries deal and that when you go over that round figure you are going into the realm of more important cases.

May I take it that that is not having regard to the value of money?

Curiously enough, juries do not consider the value of money.

Mr. Boland

It is only here that that is thought of.

If one adopted the some rule of thumb method for the Circuit Court jurisdiction as is adopted in Section 18—if, for example, the same rule of thumb were adopted in Section 4—I think the Minister and the Minister for Finance would explode. If, however, you adopt it as a rule of thumb method in one case, it is clearly logical to adopt it as a rule of thumb method in another. I do not propose to discuss it as a rule of thumb method. This has just been taken as a rule of thumb doubling. I think that a £500 jurisdiction would be a far more satisfactory figure. Candidly, if we had got to the stage at an earlier date of agreeing between ourselves about the committee or commission, or whatever it will be called, I think that, at that stage, the Minister would have been happy to get advice from the commission on this matter. You cannot possibly increase the jurisdiction to-day, get a report from the commission to-morrow to decrease it and then go back again. Therefore, it seems to me that this is one of the clear instances in which the advice of the committee would be desirable. They might disagree violently with my view. However, when you are going to have them deal with it, I think it would be desirable to get their point of view. If you are going to get their point of view, you must get it before you enact a change which might mean any possibility of a decrease.

I have heard some people suggest that there was no case for any increase; I would not agree with that at all. I think that undoubtedly there is a case for an increase, but I think that this goes a shade too far. Even the figure of £500 would be a better figure. Alternatively, I should be quite happy to leave it to the committee which the Minister will set up to give a recommendation, all in all, for all three. They might come to the conclusion that all three require to be dealt with at different figures. You cannot possibly change the figure to-day and then have a commission which may report to the contrary to-morrow. That would giverise to an entirely unsatisfactory position. One of the things you must get is some certainty and something definite about the matter. The Minister has agreed to his committee.

I urge on him that when he has agreed to the committee—when he has agreed that it is a desirable method of dealing with the matter—he should postpone the decision on this question of jurisdiction until the committee have reported. Suppose, for example, the committee reported in favour of Deputy Moran's amendments.

I hope they will.

It would be highly unsatisfactory to change thus far to-day and so far to-morrow. That would not make for certainty.

As regards the extent of the change there should be, we discussed that to some extent on one of the earlier sections which is to be considered between now and the Report Stage, but one of the most vital objections to any increase in Circuit Court jurisdiction is the position in which you could have the verdict of a jury completely overridden. Those people who are not acquainted with legal procedure and who are anxious to increase the Circuit Court jurisdiction completely overlook the fact that, unless at the same time you change the system, you are going to have a position in which a person may bring an action in the Circuit Court arising, say, out of a motor accident. The jury may find in his favour and award him £599. The defendant or his insurance company may then appeal and that appeal will be heard by a High Court judge alone —there will be no jury. One man is going to have the function, as it is at present, of completely overruling the verdict of the 12 good men and true. I do not think Deputy Hickey would be made very happy by that situation.

I would not.

That is one of the reasons why people oppose the extension of the Circuit Court jurisdiction.

Could that not be attended to?

The Bill, as such, does not provide for it and that is one of the reasons why some people opposed very strongly the extension of the Circuit Court jurisdiction. They wanted to retain unfettered the right of a man to get a verdict from the jury which, except when it was against the weight of evidence or had been misdirected, could not be upset. I know that certain people have entirely misconstrued—I am not certain that they have not deliberately misconstrued— the view that these people were putting forward, saying that they were putting it forward for selfish purposes. The real difficulty is the difficulty of the jury and unless that position is to be covered, it will be extremely difficult.

I do not know whether I will get into trouble now for what I am about to say, but, when the Circuit Courts were set up originally, I think it was hoped that solicitors themselves would plead in these courts and that counsel would not come into the cases. It did not work out that way. The bringing up of the county court jurisdiction to the £300 of the Circuit Court meant, in fact, that solicitors did not feel capable of dealing with cases so important. I wonder if increasing the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court from £300 to £600 is not going to have the effect that, not merely will there be a junior counsel brought into the case but a senior counsel, because it will be of such importance. It may very easily be that, by extending the upward limit more than is desirable, you may make it more expensive for the middle limit.

I take the view that some extension of the contract and tort jurisdiction is desirable, but I think the Minister has gone a little too far. I do not know whether he has any statistics—we all know that it is possible to prove anything with statistics—as to how many running-down cases in the year exceed £500 in the damages given. I should say that they would be a very small percentage and I think the Minister is in danger, by extending the jurisdiction too much, of making the system not cheaper but perhaps more expensive for litigants.

Is a solicitor entitled to plead in the Circuit Court at present?

Could that not continue in relation to the bigger figure?

Unfortunately, if the solicitor does that and loses the case, the client will think he has not done the right thing. Solicitors, like everybody else, have to carry on on the confidence reposed in them by their clients. That was originally the intention in the Circuit Court, but, as I say, it did not work out that way.

Some judges took exception to solicitors appearing without counsel.

I do not think that was so in the beginning.

I think it was at a later stage that that took place. There is, however, a danger that, by extending it too far, you may be making it dearer rather than cheaper, and the Minister may not be getting exactly where he wants to get, even if the jury question is overcome. If the jury question is not overcome, in my view, it would be an absolutely fatal flaw in extending it as suggested in Section 18.

All I am sorry for is that Deputy Moran went away from his amendments.

Maybe he is getting experience of the American system.

He prevented others from putting down amendments, anyway.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 19.

Mr. O'Higgins

I move amendment No. 21:—

Before Section 19 to insert a new section as follows:—

Where by reason of the non-appearance of the plaintiff in anaction in the Circuit Court the said action is dismissed without a hearing an appeal shall nevertheless lie to the High Court under the provisions of the Act of 1936.

This is intended to cure a difficulty which has arisen in practice in recent years. From time to time, it may happen that an action comes for trial in the Circuit Court, and, through some default or other, the plaintiff does not turn up. The action is, in effect, dismissed for the non-appearance of the plaintiff. These things can happen through a variety of circumstances, and have happened. When such a fatality does overtake a litigant in these circumstances, he has no right of appeal at the moment. He cannot put it right, because, under the Courts of Justice Act, 1936, the only appeal is by way of rehearing, and the courts have decided that, since there was no hearing in the Circuit Court, there cannot be a rehearing. The purpose of the amendment is to provide that, in these circumstances, the plaintiff or person involved shall have a right of appeal, just as if a hearing had taken place. Whatever may be said about the manner in which the amendment is drafted—it was done rather hurriedly —I do not think the principle can be objected to.

I should like to support this amendment. I remember a case I was remotely connected with in which the plaintiff had a case in the Circuit Court, and, for some reason or other, was unable to be present when the case was heard. An appeal was lodged on behalf of that person to the High Court and the High Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear any evidence at all. Undoubtedly, a very serious loss resulted for that particular plaintiff. If there is an appeal from the District Court to the Circuit Court the appeal is by way of a completely new hearing and the same thing should apply to any appeal from the Circuit Court in the type of case mentioned here to the High Court.

I think Deputy O'Higgins has done good work in bringing this amendment before the Dáil and that the Minister could accept it without any great difficulty.He certainly could have it examined between now and the Report Stage. I am sure the principle of it will be accepted and perhaps a more precise wording could be adopted. Everyone believed prior to the particular case I mentioned, which arose some years ago, that the law was that you had a right of appeal and to have the case fully heard in the High Court. It came as a shock when a High Court judge decided that there was no right to produce evidence before him that was not before the Circuit Court. What Deputy O'Higgins is trying to remedy here is not statute law; he is trying to cure in the interest of the public a judge's decision. I certainly support the amendment.

We shall consider this between now and the Report Stage. I suppose a plaintiff would have to give some reason as to why he did not turn up.

Oh, no. Why should he?

If he decided to appeal——

Mr. O'Higgins

You can leave all these things to the court. In fact, if a plaintiff through some fault of his own is not there, and appeals, he will do so on a penalty as to costs. That is a matter that will follow automatically if left to the good sense of the court. I think it would be unwise to attempt to provide that he should give reasons or anything like that. It was intended by the Courts of Justice Act of 1936 that every person whose action was dismissed in the Circuit Court should have the right of appeal by way of rehearing. The word "rehearing" was used. Where his action was dismissed because he was not present, there is no hearing and it was on that particular point that it was held that he was not entitled to appeal. I think that whatever provision is put in the Bill should merely say that where a person's case is dismissed because of some fatality of that kind, even though no hearing has taken place, he shall be entitled to appeal. The rest will follow as a matter of course.

He will be mulcted in costs if he fails.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. O'Higgins

I move amendment No. 22:—

Before Section 19 to insert a new section as follows:—

(1) The right of any party to an action in the Circuit Court to have questions of fact determined by a jury shall not be exercisable unless the party so requiring a jury shall first deposit with the county registrar for the county in which such action is to be tried the sum of £12.

(2) In the event of the said right being so exercised and the said questions being submitted to a jury each person serving on such jury shall on being discharged from such service be paid the sum of £1 out of the sum so deposited.

(3) After such a deposit has been made if it is found unnecessary to empanel a jury the said sum so deposited shall be paid to the person who deposited the same.

(4) The said deposit shall at the discretion of the Circuit Court judge be recoverable with any costs awarded to the person so requiring a jury.

This is part of what I consider should be a necessary new provision in the Circuit Court with regard to jury trials. We are giving the Circuit Court increased jurisdiction. I agree completely with the amount to be given and with the manner in which it is proposed to be given. It seems to follow, as suggested in an earlier amendment, that we must provide for finality in jury trials.

With regard to trial by jury, there have been time and again, in this House and elsewhere, legitimate complaints made by jurors who have had to travel long distances to serve on juries, even at considerable loss to themselves. That complaint is particularly true in wide-flung country areas where jurors have often at busy times on the land to travel distances of 30 or 40 miles to serve on a civil jury. Ithink in those circumstances it is only fair and proper that any litigant who seeks to avail of his right to get a jury of his countrymen to come in from the fields to listen to his case should deposit with the court officials concerned some reasonable sum to provide for the expenses of those who have to listen to that case. I have suggested in the amendment that the right to call for a jury cannot be exercised unless there is a deposit of a sum of £12 and that, when the right is exercised, out of the money so deposited, each member of the jury empanelled to hear the case will be paid £1, instead of the nominal sum of 5/- which, I think, they are paid now. It would follow that the person who made the deposit, if he won his case, would be entitled to recover the deposit as part of his costs.

I know it may be suggested that this is in some way undemocratic and that it is perhaps imposing a penalty on a person who has not £12 to deposit. These types of objections are there and I can see the weight that might be urged in support of them, but if we are to maintain the jury system, I feel that the time has come when litigants must realise they have got themselves to bear some portion of the expenses of the people who have to undergo jury service. Naturally, a plaintiff or a defendant seeking a civil jury in the Circuit Court if this amendment were accepted, would not lightly do so. In a case that could well be tried by a judge, he would not for no reason at all ask to have a panel called into the Circuit Court and 12 men selected to deal with his case. It would not be lightly done, because even though £12 may not be a very considerable sum, it is certainly a sum that will make those inclined to exercise this right more careful in pursuing the right if the amendment is accepted.

Secondly, if a person does decide to have a civil jury and to pay the deposit involved, I think that in practice he will have a very good case and that, in point of fact, in all probability he will not be at the loss of the deposit involved. As Deputy Cowan said earlier with regard to another amendment, I put down this amendment toenable this matter to be discussed because I feel that some such reform is necessary in our whole system of jury trials. It is not so bad in relation to the High Court in Dublin, because the distances are not so great, and for the lucky men who are not empanelled on a particular jury there is also the chance that a twopenny bus ride will bring them back to their place of business. But it is a very serious imposition in the countryside.

I have myself from time to time gone to country circuit towns in the middle of the busiest agricultural work of the year to find that some litigant, for some reason of his own, was not satisfied with the decision likely to be given by a judge and had asked to have a panel brought in to hear his case. There would be 40 or 50 farmers in the town who had to come a great distance at considerable expense, waste an entire day and be a considerable sum out of pocket. It is to ensure that this right will not be lightly exercised and at the same time provide in some way for the expenses of the jury that I suggest this amendment.

When I was drafting it, I was wondering whether there was any way in which the entire panel could be compensated. I do not think there is unless the State intervened, and that is a matter of policy we cannot be concerned with in this Bill. We can at least ensure, however, that the 12 jurors who are actually empanelled to try a case will get payment more in accord with the actual loss the service is to them. For that reason I move the amendment.

Mr. Boland

I think this is more a matter for a Jury Bill. The question of paying jurors is under consideration. I have answered a parliamentary question about that and eventually we will have to have a Bill. I do not think it would be proper to deal with the matter in this Bill. It goes with that other amendment which we are going to consider on the Report Stage—amendment No. 7. I do not think an amendment of this kind, providing for paying jurymen and for a deposit, should be dealt with in this Bill. I would not be inclinedto accept that in a Bill of this kind.

I would be strongly opposed to this. I think everybody who would consider the matter from a fundamental point of view would object to it because, after all, it is an interference with the right of a citizen to have a matter in which he is interested heard and determined by the courts. If a deposit were required to be put down, it might mean that many citizens would be deprived of their just rights.

It takes a certain amount of courage.

It does. There are too many serious objections to it. I can see the force of the arguments that Deputy O'Higgins advanced, but I think that on reconsideration Deputy O'Higgins would agree that there are too many dangers inherent in a proposal of this kind, and that anything that would affect or interfere with the right of a citizen to have his case heard or determined by the courts, whether he is a person of substance or no substance, would be detrimental and dangerous.

I do not think that the House in any circumstances should agree to the principle of the amendment. I think that it is one that should be rejected by the House and that there should be no question of the House even giving an indication that it had the least bit of merit. I hope Deputy O'Higgins will appreciate that I am putting that point of view because I can visualise the very serious dangers that are inherent in his proposal, and I think that he realises some of the difficulties in his proposal himself.

Mr. O'Higgins

I rather anticipated that the point of view expressed by Deputy Cowan would be expressed, but I think that from time to time, when we are talking about trial by jury, we are too prone to assume that a litigant has a right to have his case tried by jury. In fact, no such right is known in our Constitution, in our laws, or in our manner of approach. There is a right, so far as we talk about rights, for any man charged with a crime to have the question of hisguilt or innocence decided by a jury of his fellows. But with regard to the settlement of disputes between one man and another, when did the belief grow up that it is the right of any litigant to drag into the court to listen to his dispute 12 decent citizens? I do not believe that any such right ever did exist. It is certainly not known to the law. Under the law as it stands at the moment, if I allege that the Minister or a Deputy or any other person broke a contract with me, I cannot get a jury to decide the facts at issue and to pronounce and give judgment on them. The right does not exist.

Why should we think, merely because it is a common practice in negligence actions in the High Court to have the issues tried by a jury, that that indicates that it is some inalienable right of a litigant? In fact, it is not. Trial by jury in civil matters as a practice ceased to exist in the Circuit Court by reason of the provisions of the Courts of Justice Act of 1936. I can see it arising again now, and I think it is legitimate to say that anyone who wants to have his case tried by a jury should be a person who is prepared to foot some of the bill himself. I cannot see that the fact that a sum of money—I suggest £12—should be deposited will be in any way harmful to a litigant.

At the moment, an Irish citizen who lives in the County Fermanagh and who brings an action in our courts, as he is entitled to do under our Constitution, no matter how good his case may be, is not entitled to proceed unless he makes a deposit in the High Court of security for costs, if it is a High Court action, and the amount he might have to deposit could be £500 or £600. That is a precaution taken— it has been there for a long time—to ensure that a person outside the exercisable jurisdiction of our courts will not bring an action here, lose it and skip. I merely mention that as an example that the idea of depositing a sum of money in court, the right to pursue an action being dependent on the deposit, is nothing new.

I think it was Deputy Cowan whoearlier in this debate chided lawyers with being conservative. I think that Deputy Cowan is being ultra-conservative in this matter. It is time for a change now, and I think that that change should be made, particularly where we will possibly be resurrecting a dormant jury system in the Circuit Court.

Accordingly, if we are to make a change it is better to do it now so that those who exercise the right of the civil jury in the Circuit Court in future will know they can do so on terms. I am afraid I cannot see that there is anything very harmful to litigants in what I propose. If they do not want to deposit their money, they can do what they have been doing for many years, have their case tried by a judge. The right to have their disputes settled in any event by the court is in no way impaired.

I find it hard to agree. I have in mind a man who had a very good case to go to the High Court and the only way he could do so was by putting down a deposit. The man was unable to do it. I have two cases in mind. In one case a deposit of £120 had to be put down and in the other something under £100. I think that principle is bad. It means that a citizen has no right to avail of the courts of justice unless he is able to put down a deposit. I do not like the idea of asking a litigant to put down a deposit of £12 if he wants his case tried by a jury. I am not afraid of change.

Mr. O'Higgins

You are another conservative.

I am not. I have in mind the difficulty experienced by a person without any means who is handicapped to that extent. I have a very sad recollection of the two cases I mention. The strange thing about it is that the two cases were won. I know of another instance where the man lost his case through the usual technical points by the legal gentlemen on both sides. He also had to pay a very big deposit.

I cannot bring myself to agree that the litigant who wants to get a jurymust first put down £12. I think the principle is wrong. I am open to conviction. I do not agree with it. I feel that every citizen should have the right to avail of the courts of law and get justice in this country. Two of the three cases I have mentioned were successfully contested but the third one was lost. If the litigants had not someone to advance the money in order to bring the cases to the High Court, they would have been left in the lurch so far as justice is concerned.

Major de Valera

I must say that the idea of having a deposit for a jury in the form in which it is stated here does not appeal to me on the grounds put forward by Deputy Hickey. Is not the point here really to provide payment for the jury from a litigant? Is not that what it is in effect? We all know, of course, what is involved in the jury system at the present moment. It is very true that it involves considerable hardship, particularly in the country. In the case of Dublin High Court juries it is not quite so bad both from the nature of the jurymen concerned and the short distance they have to travel. But let us take one extreme example, the case of Wicklow town. There, jurymen are brought from the far side of the Wicklow mountains and it would seem to be a very hard thing on them to have them brought in that way.

This particular proposal does not help where criminal juries are concerned either. It merely deals with the question of a civil case. You would still have the problem of the criminal juries. After all, the present right of jury in civil actions has remained more or less unaltered for a number of years. Is not that so? It is practically the same as it was in 1936. Jury actions were very common in the Circuit Court and, I might say, very popular. Jury actions declined in number and I recollect very few civil jury actions in the Circuit Courts since the war. I think that the primary cause of that was the fact that appeal lay to a judge without a jury. What effectively diminished and almost killed the civil jury in the Circuit Court was the fact that the appeal lay to a judge without a jury, and unless things havechanged very much in the past two years, I imagine that civil jury actions are now not very common in the Circuit Court. Deputy O'Higgins can correct me if I am wrong.

Mr. O'Higgins

That is quite true.

Major de Valera

On that premises, we have two distinct things to consider one of which is the question of juries generally. In fact, in the Circuit Court a big burden of the jury duty now exists in regard to criminal cases not covered by this amendment at all. That is a separate problem outside the scope of this section and I should be out of order were I to digress. Many of us have felt there is a problem. I will leave it at that. Trial by jury has some very useful features and I, for one, would hesitate to abolish it. On the other hand, it imposes a very heavy burden on certain members only of the community.

In regard to civil actions, do you need, first of all, juries in civil actions on a question of fact? I have given the present trend. Will a judge by himself be enough? Heretofore it has been found reasonably satisfactory. The next point is whether there is more sense in providing elaborately for jury action in the Circuit Court if ultimately the matter will be decided by a judge in the High Court if one of the parties care to appeal? Let us be realistic about that. Might it not be the more reasonable approach to this matter to simply abolish jury actions in the Circuit Court in civil cases? I am not so sure that that might not be the more economic and direct approach to the whole matter.

When all is said and done, I have never served on a jury, being one of the privileged immune. As a member of a profession, I have never served on a jury but I have often wondered how facts are decided by a jury. Where the issue is a simple one of guilty or not guilty it is all right but in regard to all the complicated things that can arise in civil actions, I wonder would it not be better to leave it to the judge? He will not be perfect, infallible or even impeccable but he will do the best that human nature can do. In the way we pickour judges, we can rely upon them to do that. After that, there is an appeal.

I am not quite sure whether Deputy O'Higgins's suggestion is the wisest one. I see his point and were it not for the particular objection that Deputy Hickey raises, I would be inclined to say that, in all the circumstances, if somebody wants the luxury of a jury in the Circuit Court, he ought to pay a secure deposit for it. The only reason that I do not agree is precisely the reason advanced by Deputy Hickey. I think that justice should be equally within the immediate reach of every citizen, whether he be a beggar man or a rich man.

That is right.

Major de Valera

And to put a deposit of that nature in question does raise that. Deputy O'Higgins will realise that there are very many cases taken in the court at the present moment by solicitors on behalf of their clients where the solicitor is not at all certain of any remuneration for the work he has done. The barrister whom he briefs is in the same position unless the litigant is successful, be he defendant or plaintiff. Many solicitors in all our country towns undertake work in proper cases of that nature. They are very much in the same position, when they do that, as a doctor who treats a patient free. Frankly, I should not like to deprive the poor man of the service he is getting from solicitors at the moment in that regard. The solicitor has a certain outlay. Difficult cases such as cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act are very commonly undertaken by solicitors without there being any funds to back the case in the initial stages.

The outlay is a serious matter for him, and if you impose further substantial outlay it will mean, in effect, that the solicitor will he unable to take that case. It will mean also that, not only will there be the difficulty of finding a deposit, but that, in fact, in the poor man's case there will be no jury. Frankly, I think that if there is to be compensation for jurymen generally, then that is another problem. I thinkthat, in the interests of justice, it is properly a matter for the State. If there is any question of payment deriving from profit sources to juries, then I can see great danger in that. If we could work out an arrangement of making some provision for juries, then I think it should be done generally, but the particular form which Deputy O'Higgins suggests in this amendment is not, I think, the best. I do not think we should adopt it, mainly on the grounds which Deputy Hickey has advanced.

Amendment, by leave withdrawn.
Sections 19 and 20 agreed to.
Amendments Nos. 23 and 24 not moved.
Sections 21, 22 and 23 agreed to.
SECTION 24.
Question proposed: "That Section 24 stand part of the Bill."

Major de Valera

On this section perhaps it would be well if we could have a clarification of the words "ten years' standing". I remember that, at the end of the war, there was a question about certain ex-Army personnel as to their eligibility for certain appointments arising out of the phrase in use at that time. This might be a suitable occasion on which to define what exactly is meant by the phrase "ten years' standing". Sub-section (1) of this section says:—

"Section 69 of the Act of 1924 (which provides for a six years' standing as a barrister or solicitor as a qualification for appointment as justice), is hereby amended by the substitution of ‘ten years' standing' for ‘six years' standing'."

Very often, in similar clauses of that nature, you also have the words "practising barrister" or "practising solicitor". What exactly is meant by practising barrister of six years' standing? Does it mean a barrister who has been six years called to the Bar but practises, say, for only one year? Does it mean a barrister who has been at the Bar practising formore than six years and at the moment is not practising? I remember that the question arose on this in connection with Army personnel. There the question was of barristers who had been more than six years called but who had had an interrupted break in their practice.

Barristers and solicitors served in the Defence Forces during the whole period of the war, and hence their professional careers, as practising barristers or solicitors were interrupted for a varying period in each case, with a maximum of six and a half years. A number of these found themselves in the category of barristers or solicitors who had been more than six years a member of the profession but who had not been in continuous practice for six years. I remember that raised a certain amount of difficulty at the time, and I suggest to the Minister that this would be the time to have the matter clarified. It is rather important in view of the fact that an amendment is being made to this section, and that the period is to be ten years now instead of six years. I should like to know what is the interpretation that is being put on it at the present time.

Mr. Boland

That a person has been practising for six years since he was called. That is the way it has always been interpreted.

Mr. O'Higgins

I think this question arose not very long ago in the case of a very important appointment.

Mr. Boland

If we were to alter it here it would mean that it would have to be altered in a number of other Acts in which it occurs.

Major de Valera

There is a question of clarification involved and I think that the thing should be clarified. Let us take an extreme case. We all know that there are very many people who get called to the Bar. They do the Bar course and get called. They may be doctors, members of the State services and members of companies who do the Bar course by way of educational qualification. Now an extremeinterpretation of the word "standing", if you had only that word, would be that, after the lapse of a certain number of years, all those people who had become barristers in that way would be eligible for appointment. That is qualified by the word "practising" but that brings up the question as to the meaning of this word. You can take again the extreme case. Take somebody who perhaps was head of a State department and who was a barrister for the requisite number of years; he would only have to relinquish that, go to the courts and practise for a month and he would be eligible for appointment to anything, so to speak. I know that is an extreme case and I am not for a moment suggesting that it would arise but the possibility of it arising suggests that some definition is required in order to clarify the position.

I realise the objection the Minister has and I think he should be cautious. I would not ask him to rush into it now. This phrase arises over a number of enactments but specific limits in regard to one might raise doubts in regard to another. There is perhaps some danger in regard to interpretation and I think it would be well to clarify it.

The period of ten years' standing raises the standard in the District Court. Personally I feel it is desirable that only experienced professional men should be appointed to these posts under our present system. I qualify that because I do not want myself to go on record as being completely committed to the thesis that only lawyers make judges, but under our present system it is desirable that only experienced people in the legal profession should be appointed to the Bench and ten years does not seem to be an abnormal qualification. It is a desirable amendment but I would like to see that it was ten years' genuine practice. There is the possibility—and perhaps there is a much greater danger of that possibility becoming an actuality in the case of the lower appointments like those of the District Court than in the case of the higher judge appointments—that a person who was professionally qualified did not practise continuously ordid not practise for some time and in fact did not have the experience that ten years seem to connote.

He might have been employed by a commercial concern for four or five years.

Major de Valera

These are all hypothetical cases but I think we should face them. Could the Minister not get out of the difficulty by definition for the purpose of the Act?

Mr. Boland

It is the first time I heard this question raised. It has never given any trouble so far.

I want to make a few observations on the section. It is not my experience that the most experienced lawyers are the best judges and it is a very strange fact that some of the best judges and justices we had in this State were men who were appointed in the early days after the establishment of the State with very little experience or practice. It may sound a kind of heresy to say that but so far as the District Court is concerned I feel that a very serious mistake is being made and has been made for some years in the appointment of district justices.

Deputy Major Vivion de Valera has just said there should be 10 years' general practice. I agree with that but what is genuine practice as it refers to the District Court? In my view it should be genuine practice in or about the District Court and if you are going to have a lawyer very actively engaged, say, in matters of title or in High Court practice, he has no conception of the work that is done in the District Court and his 10 years' experience is more a hindrance than a help.

Mr. O'Higgins

He is not likely to be appointed.

It might be better from the point of view of justice if we appointed judges in the District Court if we are appointing them from the barrister rank with no experience at all, because in that way they would give considerable study to the business of being efficient justices and in the long run I think they wouldoperate very successfully. The more practice in the court a practitioner gets the more he is inclined to get into a particular groove or rut and it is pretty difficult for experienced practitioners, particularly in the District Court, to have from time to time those persons sent as justices who know nothing whatsoever about the machinery or the practice in the courts. It takes them a long time to find their way around and particularly to find their way out of the habits they have learned practising on the barrister side of the court in the Circuit or the High Court. I do not suppose these views will be accepted as a guide to what will be put into operation but they are my views. I know the Minister in increasing the period to ten years is endeavouring to get more experienced and more balanced persons as justices in the District Court. I think there ought to be appointed to the District Court persons who have practice and experience in the District Court, who understand the litigants in the District Court and understand the summary jurisdiction of that court, because the District Court, while being a court of justice, is meant to get its work done in a speedy way. Nobody wants our district justices to deal with every matter that comes before them in the way a Supreme Court judge would deal with them. Justice in the District Court is summary justice. It is meant to be the poor man's court. It should be administered with reasonable speed and justices should be in a position to give a proper decision after hearing the evidence.

I certainly agree we want experienced people in the courts but I think the experienced practitioners of the District Court should be the persons who would be considered in the first instance for appointments. In the solicitors' side of the profession there is some objection to the preponderance, as they put it, of appointments of barristers as district justices.

Mr. Boland

I think they are half and half.

Perhaps that is considered a preponderance. Thesolicitors do feel that as practitioners in the Circuit Court and as persons who undergo courses of study somewhat higher than those of their colleagues in the barristers' profession, they, too, should be considered for appointment to the Circuit Bench. However, that does not arise on this particular section but it is a point of view that is held by many members of the Incorporated Law Society and of the solicitors' profession, and I just mention it on this section.

Mr. O'Higgins

Section agreed, subject to examination.

Section 24 agreed to.
SECTION 25.

Mr. O'Higgins

I am opposing that section because I do not think the Minister should have power to abolish a district once it is established. I think it is a wrong power for him to have.

Mr. Boland

It is very necessary.

It will be if you are going to rearrange the districts.

Mr. O'Higgins

Once you arrange them, why are they not left there?

Mr. Boland

I have the power already to abolish a district.

Mr. O'Higgins

Very well. Amendment withdrawn.

Major de Valera

The objectionable thing would be if the Minister were to determine the district justice's appointment, but that is saved.

Mr. Boland

We are only repeating a power we have already.

Major de Valera

The district justice personally is appointed. If it was a question of dismissing a justice I would agree with the Deputy.

Section 25 agreed to.
SECTION 26.

Amendment No. 25 not moved.

Mr. Boland

With regard to amendmentNo. 26, I want to increase the jurisdiction for tort from £25 to £50, the same as in contracts. Deputy Moran wants it increased to £100, but I am suggesting as an amendment that it should be £50.

Major de Valera

He wants to increase it to £100?

Mr. Boland

I am agreeing to increase it to £50 if the House allows me. I will do that now on this stage.

What is the objection to £100?

There are a lot of objections.

Mr. Boland

It is too big.

What is the effect of it?

Mr. Boland

It raises District Court jurisdiction in cases of tort to £100.

Mr. O'Higgins

I oppose that amendment.

Mr. Boland

I am asking the House to accept an amendment to the amendment that £50 be substituted for £100.

Mr. O'Higgins

I think £25 is sufficient.

Mr. Boland

I will bring it in on the Report Stage.

Amendments Nos. 26, 27 and 28 not moved.

Mr. O'Higgins

I was just going to ask the Minister when he puts in that amendment on Report Stage will there be a full discussion on it—I mean amendment No. 26?

Mr. Boland

Yes. I move amendment No. 29:—

In page 10, line 49, to delete "and", in line 51, at the end of paragraph (d), to insert "and", and to add at the end of the section the following new paragraph:—

"(e) by the substitution in clause (v) (inserted therein by Section 52of the Act of 1936) (which relates to proceedings on behalf of certain public bodies) of ‘£50' for ‘twenty-five pounds'."

Amendment agreed to.
Section 26, as amended, agreed to.
Amendment No. 30 not moved.
Sections 27 and 28 agreed to.
SECTION 29.

Amendment No. 31 not moved.

Question proposed: That Section 29 stand part of the Bill.

Major de Valera

I am unfortunately not briefed on the point I want to make here but I have a recollection of once coming across the Dublin Police Act outside the Dublin district and finding that it was possible successfully to make a case for the delivery of the goods back to the person charged with unlawful possession notwithstanding a conviction. I do not know whether the Minister is aware of that particular case. It occurred at Dundalk some years ago and there was a considerable legal argument on it. In the application of the Dublin Police Act outside the district of Dublin there was the possibility of some flaw and in fact the whole situation in regard to the provisions of that Act as it stands leaves room for improvement. That is my recollection. Unfortunately I have not got the title now of the case of which I am thinking but briefly the situation which resulted was that a person was convicted of unlawful possession but at the end of the legal argument he walked out of court with the goods and a good title thereto. There is therefore, I think some cause for investigating the present law in regard to this generally and I am wondering if the Minister can tell us what the effect is. Unfortunately as I say I have not the papers now and cannot point out exactly what the position is.

I wonder if the deletion of the words "within the limit of the police district" will be sufficient.

This section carries a number of amendments. It is in rather an unusual form, as it runs straight on.It refers to Section 68 of the Dublin Police Act and declares it to be amended by the substitution of "justices of the District Court" for "any of the said divisional justices". That is merely an adjustment in nomenclature. It is an adjustment to fit our present District Court structure as against the structure at the time the Act was passed. Then there is provision to delete "within the Limits of the Police District", which is a separate amendment. I would like to know the reason for that, from the point of view of covering the case I have more or less indicated. Thirdly, there is the substitution of "twenty-five pounds" for "fifteen pounds", and the section as so amended shall have effect throughout the State. If the Minister could give us his reasons for the draft in this particular form in regard to the latter two amendments, he would be helping us considerably.

Could the Minister say why he has doubled on other sections and has not doubled here?

Mr. Boland

Deputy Moran has an amendment down to increase the amount to £100. I know the original £15 has to be increased, and I was proposing to increase it to £25. I would like to move on Report Stage to increase it to £50.

That is three and a half times the original amount.

Mr. Boland

The Act was passed in 1842.

What is the correct value of 1842 money now?

Major de Valera

I will be satisfied if the Minister will look into the other point.

Mr. Boland

I will.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 30.
Amendments Nos. 32 to 44, inclusive, not moved.
Question proposed: "That Section 30 stand part of the Bill."

Major de Valera

I think it is generally a good idea that an appealshould lie from any order of an inferior court. I do not know if other practitioners would agree, but from such experience as I have had in court I have come to the conclusion that wherever there is a court of inferior jurisdiction it is desirable to have a right of appeal. We have all had the experience of a certain difference in approach in courts to matters where an appeal lay and to matters which were final and conclusive in that particular court. Therefore, I think it is highly desirable in principle that you should have a section in which an appeal should lie to the Circuit Court. I would go even further. In general terms, although the Constitution says an appeal lies to the Supreme Court, the mechanics get so complicated that it is not really practical. In the case of practically every order that is made by an inferior court, there should be a right of appeal to the next higher court. That would bring in a uniformity that is much to be desired especially in regard to the lower courts.

I agree with what Deputy de Valera says. There was one stage in the development of our courts of justice when there were certain matters on which there could not be an appeal from the District Court and it is within the recollection of practitioners that biassed and malicious district justices deliberately imposed the penalty or made the order that could not be appealed against. We have been trying time after time to remove from the judges the power of doing anything like that. It was a reprehensible thing for them to do but they did it. I doubt very much if any of them can do it now. Every order in the District Court or Circuit Court should be capable of being appealed if a person wants to appeal against it.

Question put and agreed to.
SCHEDULE.

Mr. Boland

I move amendment No. 45:—

In Part I, column (3), to delete "sub-sections (2), (3), and (5) ofSection 67" and to insert in lieu thereof "sub-sections (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Section 67".

This is consequential on amendment No. 10. Sub-section (6) is now being repealed and it is proposed to re-enact it with the addition of the words "or a practising solicitor".

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Boland

I move amendment No. 46:—

In Part I, immediately before "No. 20 of 1947", to insert the following: "No. 21 of 1946, Courts of Justice (District Court) Act, 1946. In Section 22, the words ‘(other than the Principal Justice of a Division)"'.

This is to make provision for appointing a substitute for the Principal Justice when he is not available, to allow someone to take his place if he is absent on holidays, for instance, or vacates his post.

Amendment agreed to.
Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
TITLE.
Question proposed: "That the Title be the Title to the Bill."

May I make a suggestion to the Minister? The commission he is going to set up will be, I hope, and I think the Minister intends, a non-political commission?

Mr. Boland

Certainly.

Might I suggest to the Minister that it would be desirable in the circumstances to have consultation with those on this side of the House?

Mr. Boland

I am quite prepared to do that.

I appreciate that. The Minister has made it easy.

Question put and agreed to.
Report Stage ordered for Tuesday, 10th November.

Might I suggest to the Minister as representative of the Government in the House that it isnot desirable to start on the next business at 12 minutes to 11?

Mr. Boland

I am in agreement.

The Dáil adjourned at 10.50 p.m. until 2.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 28th October, 1953.

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