I think that the main point in this debate is to develop the idea that the Irish people will have no opportunity in the future to judge the economic issues of the day if the Parties come before them and make utterly irresponsible statements in regard to the responsibility of the Government of the day for the increases in the cost of living and, by means of panic statements and wild promises, succeed in deluding a portion of the people who have neither the time nor the inclination to study economic documents, to read about what is going on in the world outside or to make any comparisons as to how they have been treated in relation to other people in the matter of prices.
Since the end of the war, we have been through this period of wild talk about prices on two occasions. This is not the first effort of the inter-Party Government to secure office by telling wild untruths and making exaggerated statements about the cost of living. Apparently they decided that, as it succeeded fairly well in the 1948 General Election, they would try it again. I should like to make a certain comparison between the two periods.
In 1948, the position was that the cost of living had previously risen rather sharply—in 1946-47, I think—by about 10 per cent. It rose because money became more quickly available than goods. That happened not only in this country but in every country in Europe. In the period 1943 to 1946, as a result of measures taken by the then Government and of war-time controls everywhere, the cost of living remained stable. But, beginning in August, 1946, the cost of living here rose sharply. The Coalition groups thought they would take the opportunity of spreading panic among the people by giving them the impression that the cost of living had gone out of control, that the Government had ceased to be active and had ceased to consider the interests of the people.
For a period of three or four months, there was the wildest lying and filthy propaganda designed only to deceive the innocent. During the course of that propaganda campaign, promises were made not to make the cost of living stable, not to prevent it from going up further, not even to put a brake on it or to reduce it by whatever small modicum could be found possible: the promises were to the effect that the cost of living would be slashed. The impression was given that it was like a balloon that could be pricked with the pin of Coalition policy and burst almost overnight. The people were given to understand that all that was required was a Government sufficiently vigilant to prosecute a few key profiteers in every industry, sufficiently vigilant to bring them to a court of law and there prove that they had profited excessively and that they had been protected by the Fianna Fáil Government because they had paid lavish sums to the Fianna Fáil Party funds. The impression was given that the moment price control machinery was put into operation by the new Government, prices would be slashed, the cost of foodstuffs would go down and it would be proved that, by 1947, the Fianna Fáil Government were tired out after a lengthy period of office—that they were old men unfit for their job who had been guilty of the gravest corruption through the use of funds obtained in a corrupt way from leading industrialists and trading groups in the country with the object of maintaining high prices and high post-war profits.
We had the present Minister for Industry and Commerce telling everybody in Dublin that there were rich men going around in big cars who deserved to be prosecuted and who would be prosecuted if he had a chance of doing so. Deputy MacBride, who was Minister for External Affairs in the Coalition Government, made a solemn promise, many times repeated, that he would reduce the cost of living by 30 per cent. if he secured office. Although he was informed that the subsidies to effect that would amount to £30,000,000 a year, it did not deter him from making these extravagant statements.
Let us examine the record of those Parties who formed the first Coalition Government. What happened? There was not a single reduction in the price of any important commodity either immediately or thereafter for the ensuing three years. At one time, they produced a list of commodities whose prices had been reduced by 3 per cent.: these commodities included knife sharpeners and similar articles of no importance.
Not a single person was prosecuted by a court for profiteering, as a result of the first Coalition Government's taking office. They searched the files in the Department of Industry and Commerce for profiteers but could not find any. They could not find any group of profiteers and no industrial group or trading group was prosecuted either individually or collectively. Nobody was brought before the bar of public opinion and told that they had illgotten gains, that they would have to pay for it and that the cost of their commodity would have to come down with a bang. None of those promises whatsoever was fulfilled. You had the extraordinary spectacle of the Minister for Industry and Commerce, in the course of his speeches, continuing to decry the community of merchants as profiteers, and of the then Taoiseach, Deputy Costello, going to banquets and saying to these same merchants that only a negligible percentage of them ever engaged in profiteering. We heard Deputy McGilligan, the then Minister for Finance, saying in the 1948 Budget that, as far as he could see, the increases in wages had gone far enough for the present to satisfy social justice, and recommending that there would be no further effort to inflate the rate of wages at that period.
We saw Deputy Larkin, in September, 1948, saying at the Trade Union Congress that he was not satisfied with the Prices Section of the Department of Industry and Commerce and that he did not believe prices could not be broken. We heard him utter the first faint murmur of protest on the part of the Labour Party that these downward prices had not been effected—promises that had so formally and so floridly been made to the electorate. Three or four months later, the then Minister for Industry and Commerce, Deputy Morrissey, suddenly admitted the grim truth. After freeing a whole group of commodities from price control, he said at a banquet of merchants that, after all, the remedy for price control lay in the hands of the public. In other words, his final solution of fulfilling all these wonderful promises was that the public should stop buying the goods because that was the only way in which the prices could be made to come down.
In the meantime, in other countries, the tide of post-war inflation was momentarily arrested until the outbreak of the Korean war. Labour Deputies who wish to learn the truth about all these matters would do well to study the International Labour Review Statistical Supplement, Vol. 48, Nos. 4 and 5, in which are recorded, mainly in the interest of the working people, all the facts about the increases in the cost of living that took place from the time the war ended. They will find a brief period between the immediate post-war inflation and the devaluation of the dollar—indeed, a period lasting, I think, from the end of 1948 to somewhere about June 1950 —when the price rise was arrested not in all countries, because conditions vary in the different countries, but in countries where there had been some reasonable price control in operation, where the value of money was preserved by wise fiscal and economic policy and where they had been able to control their finances so as to avoid, what every country dreads, a rise in prices due to the flow of money being far greater than the volume of goods becoming available. These figures can be examined. There can be no gainsaying the fact that the price changes that took place were of a marginal character up to the beginning of the Korean war and were also marginal in other countries.
The inter-Party Government could take no more credit for the stabilisation of prices which took place during those first two years than any other Government in Europe could except to the extent that the same sort of fiscal and financial policy was adopted. In 1949 the £ was devalued and the inter-Party Government over-anxious to show how concerned they were with prices, and not having fulfilled their wild promises that they would smash the price of commodities, fell over themselves to point out that there was not any likelihood of an increase in price as a result of the £ being worth only two dollars, 80 cents instead of four dollars, 25 cents.
Deputy Dillon proclaimed to the whole world that although the £ had been devalued he could see no foreseeable increase whatever in the price of maize. The Irish £ would be able to buy maize at the same price although the £ itself had been devalued. And so for a period everything continued fairly well for the inter-Party Government because the effect of devaluation was slow. It caused subsequent and ancillary changes in the financial position of countries throughout the world. People adjusted their price levels for the time being and the effect of buying goods and raw materials did not result in an increase in price for them.
The Korean war began. I think it is a shameful thing that in this country the inter-Party groups are not sufficiently adult-minded to argue economic issues by admitting the general effect of the Korean inflation as being valid in this country as in every other country throughout the world. It is a most interesting thing that if you examine the political disputes and controversies which have taken place in most European democratic States such as Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Great Britain, you will find that, however they may disagree, you will not discover one entire group of Parties virtually denying there ever was such a thing as the Korean inflation. This was felt throughout the length and breadth of the living world and was evident from China to Peru and backwards east and west.
During this period we had to listen to the economic arguments of petulant schoolchildren unable to start on a reasoned basis of controversy whereby you admit the Korean inflation, start from that point, and argue whether one Government was likely to do better than another Government in combating it. It would have been an intelligent approach to discuss how the situation could be best met and whether it could be met better by one Government or by the policy suggested by the Opposition.
There may have been a small handful of people who approached the matter in this fashion. I would like to give credit where credit is due. During some period of the actual examination of the position, Deputy Costello, the Taoiseach, did refer to the Korean inflation as though it actually had taken place to some extent in this country, but he was alone and completely isolated among the rest of his Deputies in the Fine Gael Party. Certainly, we never heard of the Korean inflation from the Labour Party. Across the water and in the Six Counties, the Labour Party could discuss whether they were doing their best to deal with the Korean inflation or whether the Conservative Party was more capable. Just across the Border, where the same currency was being actually utilised, where there was roughly the same level of prices paid for agricultural goods, and where the value of money was the same as in England and the Twenty-Six Counties, the matter was discussed; but so far as the Labour Party here were concerned, they never believed that such a thing as the Korean inflation existed.
The price rise analysis, in actual fact, is based generally on the year 1948, which is the standard year used by every international organisation in Europe as the basis upon which to study the post-war Korean inflation. The price level in our index rose, from August, 1950, to August, 1951, by about 11 points. Naturally, the inter-Party Government were worried about it, but they did not have to bear the full brunt of the price rise as by that time they had left office. They were so disturbed about it, however, that in December, 1950, we had the astonishing spectacle of two Ministers of State advocating different policies in their water-tight compartments which must inevitably conflict with each other and which had absolutely no effect whatsoever in substantially reducing or preventing the price rise.
I refer to the fatuous and idiotic price freeze Order established by the inter-Party Government in December, 1950. No sooner was it established than category after category of goods were taken out of the list of those subject to the price freeze Order and why? Because Deputy Norton in his water-tight compartment could not conceive that prices could rise in Ireland. They might rise everywhere else. The price of every commodity on earth might rise but Deputy Norton in his water-tight compartment could not conceive of prices rising in Ireland. He was like King Canute who sat on the edge of the sea and said the waters must recede.
He instituted this price freeze Order and came to the Dáil. Forgetting all that had passed since 1948, he started to talk about the profiteers and labelled them as far as he could Fianna Fáil profiteers who in some mysterious way had escaped prosecution for three long years but, by heavens, he was going to get them now and have their throats cut as a result of the price freeze Order. At the same time, Deputy Morrissey in his Department was encouraging a spree of stockpiling which went on continuously. We all remember what happened. We were told by every living international economic authority that the price rise would be steep and continuous so long as the Korean war lasted and so long as the rearmament policy continued in every country. Many importers asked Deputies whether they were really supposed to obey this Order knowing that every single raw material they wanted to buy would be at least 60 per cent. higher in six months' time. They asked whether they should buy or wait until Deputy Norton gave permission for the price freeze Order to be modified or eliminated their particular commodity from the list.
Other importers said they would simply go ahead and buy, that they would not wait for the price freeze Order to be repealed. They knew it was crazy and they went and bought. Those traders who were supremely honest enough to wait for the price freeze Order to be repealed so far as their category of goods was concerned had to pay a great deal more three months afterwards than they would have had to pay in December, 1950. That was all because there was a lack of collective responsibility in that Government and because it was unpopular to admit that prices would rise.
The Government was unable to restrain one group and make them realise that there was a time and place for a price freeze Order and that such an Order could have been established a little bit later. At that particular moment when there was a war scare all over the world it was obviously not the thing to do to establish a price freeze Order. That was what was supposed to be intelligent control of prices. As I have said, following on that, the same Government decided to throw £45,000,000 of American money into circulation, and in all their speeches trying to show how much more advanced they were in economic thought than the Fianna Fáil Government they talked as though there was a classic period of recession with a fall in prices, in the cost of materials and the cost of goods, and they yelled and yelled to us from every platform about how much money they were pumping into circulation at every possible moment while the price level was rising and how they were spending £45,000,000 of American money, throwing more money into the pool and having the effect of raising prices still more. In other words, they were applying the theory of Lord Keynes in reverse, at exactly the time when he said it should not be applied.
We went through all that. Then we had to face the same kind of propaganda in the recent general election, propaganda suggesting that all the price rises were due to the acts of Fianna Fáil, that they bore no relation whatever to the world outside. We had, for example, an advertisement issued in one constituency which said: "The Fianna Fáil Government increased the price of every loaf of bread by 3d., every lb. of sugar by 3d., every stone of flour by 2/-, and every lb. of butter by 1/4." That was typical of thousands of pounds' worth of advertisements, money for which was expended by the inter-Party groups and published throughout the land.
I asked some of the Deputies in my constituency on the Opposition side to give a factual explanation of how it was that in a neighbouring country using the same kind of money, having the same kind of agricultural prices, the same kind of prices for goods bought abroad, the price of sugar could rise during the same period as during our period of Government from 5d. to 7d. a lb., that the 2 lb. of bread could rise from 6d. to 9d., that butter could rise from 1/10 to 4/2, and so on and so forth—to answer in simple terms to the people how they could rise there and why they would not rise here. I challenged Deputies on the Opposition side during the election to explain how it could be that five other countries, including two neutral or undamaged countries, could reduce subsidies and announce publicly that they were reducing subsidies for exactly the same reason that they were reduced here—that they could not afford to pay them, that they had become to a considerable extent unreal—how it was that those five other countries, two of which were either undamaged or neutral and one of which had made a fortune out of the war and I think three of which were run by socialist-liberal type Governments, could reduce subsidies, could do exactly the same thing as we did, reduce subsidies either the year before us, the same year as ourselves or the year after, and give higher social service benefits in part compensation for the reduction of subsidies. I never got an answer. No answer was ever given. An answer was made by one Labour speaker, I think, in the election that we could not compare ourselves with any other country because other countries were at war and we were not. Then I repeated the next week, asking why it happened in countries that were neutral in the war but had reduced subsidies, countries that were neutral or undamaged, where the cost of living had gone up in the same measure as it had here in the same period roughly by 23 to 28 per cent. between 1948 and 1953.
As I have said, this is a fair period to take, as the period recognised and acknowledged, for example, by the International Labour Organisation, which is an international organisation designed to help largely the working man to improve his status and his conditions of livelihood. The I.L.O. decided, like other organisations, that if we want to study post-war trends in living costs, we take the year 1948, that is, the year before devaluation, as the basic year, and then proceed to examine the situation and compare how various countries fared.
As I have said, the implication was given quite clearly that if the inter-Party Government was elected to office they would nullify all the evil they said had been done through the increase in the price of commodities which they had published in the form of millions of pamphlets throughout this country in which 1951 and 1954 prices were compared. They blamed us entirely for those increases, made us not, shall we say, even 10 per cent or 20 per cent. or even 50 per cent. but 100 per cent. responsible for that entire inflation in prices, as though we could remain completely isolated from the rest of the world, as though every commodity could rise daily in price during that period. As I have said, in the case of this country, we and we alone were supposed to be responsible; no other Government was responsible, no other influence was responsible, no outside influence played any part; and, of course, they very cleverly included, so far as they could, the increase in prices that took place between August 1950 and 1951, which was as great as that which took place between August 1951 and 1952.
I think one must admit that it was a very difficult situation to face, to be able to explain to the public all the difficulties. To explain to the people that prices had risen outside in the world, that they had risen for the same reason, was a task of no uncommon magnitude.
There were other promises that they made. Deputy General MacEoin, for example, speaking in Sligo Town Hall and reported in the Sligo Champion on the 20th March, 1954, made a promise that they would take steps to see that the Central Fund would undertake responsibility for all expenditure which might otherwise require an increase in the rates. We shall have to wait and see whether that promise made to the people of Sligo is implemented and the rates position will be stabilised from now on and all Government grants which are for services carried out by the local authority will be subject to any rate of increase whatever, that all Government grants whether for health or hospitalisation or anything else will be a full 100 per cent. grant and to that extent the rates will be stabilised. So far as I can gather from the recent deputation to the Minister for Health Deputy General MacEoin's promise has already been broken in regard to health matters, and the Minister for Health accepted an increase in rates as likely to take place as a result of County Westmeath's share of the burden of paying the interest and sinking fund on loans in respect of hospital improvements which are now taking place and which will be completed in the course of the next 12 months or the next three years.
I might add that on that occasion Deputy General MacEoin also said that the Fine Gael Party were never the Commonwealth Party, but that is not a matter for consideration in this debate so there is no need for me to discuss that particular subject.
Then we had a particularly scandalous form of propaganda in the Evening Echo on Tuesday, May 18th, in which the answers given to a certain newspaper by the leaders of the Parties in regard to their plans for reducing the cost of living were altered so as to make it appear that the Fianna Fáil Party was indifferent to the increase in the cost of living. That is what I describe as very near gutter politics.
The advertisement was captioned by the words "Reduce the cost of living. Fianna Fáil says ‘no'; Fine Gael says ‘if possible we shall do so'." Then followed—"Last week Mr. de Valera and Mr. Costello were asked to answer the question ‘If returned to Government do you propose to make an Order to reduce the cost of living?'. The answers were given as follows:—Mr. Costello—‘The object of our policy is to reduce the cost of living to relieve the burden of present prices."'
Of course, if Deputy Costello's canvassers and all the minor members of his Party had not been rattling down all the back streets and promising that they would reduce the cost of living and slash the price of the lb. of butter and the loaf and the lb. of sugar and everything else, his statement by itself would be the rather wise and cautious statement of any Minister, of any person who had been a Minister before and who had read the whole panoply of information available to him about the levels of world prices, about the levels of Irish agricultural prices, about the general economic position of the country; but unfortunately. Deputy Costello's supporters and the minor members of his Party did not follow his advice and see that the reductions in the cost of living were merely objects, even hopes, if you like.
The answer which Mr. de Valera is alleged to have given to the question: "Do you propose to reduce the cost of living?" was "No," the implication being clearly given that Deputy de Valera was obstinate to the point of indifference, that he did not intend to do anything about the cost of living, that he was an austerity merchant, a person who seemed to take a peculiar and sadistic delight in making people face increases in living costs and in piling taxation upon them, a person who gained some personal pleasure from that and from seeing his Government lose elections and lose by-elections. Apparently he chortled with joy on every occasion when that Government lost a by-election and he apparently suffered from some peculiar form of neurosis which resulted in pleasure in other people's unhappiness.
What were the facts? The question as put to Deputy de Valera was: If returned to power, do you propose in the coming year to reduce, the cost of living by means of subsidies? Deputy de Valera simply said that he did not propose to reduce the cost of living by means of subsidies. That is flagrant and, I think, vile dishonesty on the part of an election committee to issue an advertisement in that form when the facts were that Deputy de Valera said that, with the growth of production, the stabilisation of prices abroad, the stabilisation of prices at home and the beginning of greater production all over the world, and with all the measures put into force by Fianna Fáil, most of them in 1947, to enable the farmer to increase production, he hoped that purchasing power would go up and that living costs would come down and that he thought that was the best and most profitable way of dealing with the price situation. In this advertisement, however, he is simply alleged to have said he did not propose to reduce the cost of living.
We had to face that all over the country, so we can hardly be blamed for deciding to have this debate to bring out all these facts, to try to get a sense of proportion into the whole argument concerning price increases, taxation increases and everything affecting subsidies. This Government will find it difficult, unless there is a world price decrease, to reduce living costs substantially. There may be marginal changes, but I should say that, unless there is a very drastic decrease in the price of imported wheat and in the prices of many other commodities, it will be quite impossible to implement the implied promise that prices would be brought back to the 1951 level. In that connection, we had the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Local Government, in the course of a speech made during the election, pledging himself to reduce the cost of living to as near the 1951 level, the pre-Budget of 1952 level, as he could. That is rather like somebody promising to increase the old-age pension to the nearest he could get to 40/- and then increasing it from 21/6 to 22/6 and saying he had fulfilled his promise.
Anybody can make statements and promises of that kind and, if the people get used to accepting promises at that level, we shall always have this state of confusion in the minds of the people in regard to economics, in regard to our future economic policy, because promises made as loosely and as vaguely as that will confuse the mind of the people and they will find it difficult to make decisions, if they are not inclined to study economics at the end of their day's work and if they want to get the facts, as most of them would and as most of us would, as rapidly and as easily as possible. The people will naturally spend as little time as they need on studying the economic facts and the facts will have to be presented more truthfully to them or we will never have any real meritorious economic advance in this country.
It is very important when discussing this whole subject that we should say something of a final kind on this question of the level of living costs, because there is no doubt that, if world prices should come down, if there should be a measurable decrease in the price of imported wheat and if, as a result of that, the price of home grown wheat should be reduced, if there is a continuous decrease in the price level between now and next Budget, unless it is accompanied by a recession, we may face a situation in which there is £3,000,000 or £4,000,000 with which to play, with which to provide decreases in taxation. I am going to prophesy here and now that, when that Budget comes, although the Minister for Finance may possibly, like Deputy McGilligan in 1951, make a Budget speech which is fully in accordance with the facts, so far as world conditions are concerned, the members of his Party will do their damnedest in going around the country to take full credit for the reductions in taxation which may be the result of reductions in world prices. Again we shall hear nothing of what goes on in the world outside.
The price of American wheat might collapse by many cents a bushel and the whole of the credit for that will be taken by the inter-Party Government, except that the Minister for Finance may follow the good example of his predecessor, who, although he did leave an unbalanced Budget for us, when presenting the international economic facts of the day in 1951, warned the House against inflation and warned the House that the Government was not paying its way and that there would have to be a radical change in economic policy. That part of his speech made in May, 1951, was a duly correct and accurate statement, but so far as our own finances are concerned, so far as our own immediate expenditure and receipts are concerned we claim that he did not balance the Budget.
The general economic analysis portion of his speech, however, was correct, and moreover in 1950, even before the Korean inflation and devaluation had had their full effect he made a speech which, in itself, was reasonably correct, but of course his supporters ignored the speech. Deputies around him ignored his speech; Deputies down in the country ignored it; and Deputies at the by-elections ignored it. Everybody ignored it and later, when Deputy McGilligan spoke in opposition, he ignored his two speeches—the speeches he made in regard to international facts and in regard to the general economic position of the country.
We had to face these difficulties, as I have said, and it is well to remind members of the House of what has taken place recently and of the tremendous effort that will have to be made by this Government if they are to bring prices back to the 1951 level, unless there is a world collapse in prices and a substantial reduction in agricultural prices here. Although it may perhaps bore some members, I intend to place on record in the annals of this House the figures given in the statistical statement of the International Labour Review setting out the increases in the cost of living which took place since the year acknowledged to be the basic year by all international organisations, the year 1948, the year before devaluation and before the Korean war. These figures will show the position in which we left this country at the end of the Korean inflation and when stabilisation had taken place. They will indicate fully the difficulties any Government will have in bringing prices back, unless world conditions or home conditions aid that Government, as they will aid other Governments, by a normal reduction in the price level which I am willing to prophesy, if it takes place here, will take place in other countries in Europe as well.
Taking this international statement and taking the base year 1948 as 100, the figure, by the end of 1953, for Belgium was 106. The figure, I might add, even at the end of the inter-Party Government régime was 105. Belgium was a country where the cost of living had gone up about three times as much as it had here in the period from 1938 to 1948 and where, through a stronger currency and through enormous dollar credits from the purchase of uranium, they managed to restrain the cost of living from rising. During the whole period of the Korean inflation they did a better job than we could possibly do because their currency was not devalued. At the end of the period the whole world owed them money and their difficulty was getting paid for the goods they had sold.
Take a country such as Denmark where, with the index base at 100 in 1948, the figure had gone up to 123 by 1953, an increase of 23 per cent. I should, I suppose, give our figures so that people can bear them in mind in making comparisons. Our figure for 1948 had risen to 126 by August, 1953. The Danish figure had gone up nearly as much. I think one of the reasons perhaps why their cost of living went up a little bit less than here was the fact that their subsidies had less effect because the cost of their production of various kinds of food was slightly less than ours through longer experience in scientific methods of production.
In the case of France the cost of living went up by 46 per cent. and had already gone up by very much more in the period of the great war. In Germany the cost of living had gone up by 8 per cent. There is an example of the futility of the argument of the inter-Party Government that a country devastated by war must have living costs greater than ours. It shows how dangerous it is to make generalisations of that kind. The restriction of the increase in the cost of living was due largely to the deliberate effort of their people to reconstruct their country, to the voluntary restriction of wage rates increases. Although foodstuffs were by no means plentiful their cost of living increased considerably less than ours notwithstanding the fact that they were a devastated country, and that, I might add, would apply to the whole period from 1948 to 1953.
The cost of living in Italy went up by about 16 per cent. in the same period but there again they had virtually no subsidies. Therefore there was no automatic increase in the cost of living because no subsidies were effective as they were in most West European countries. Furthermore the cost of living had gone up immensely more in the previous period. They had, so to speak, taken the full measure of inflation in the previous period.
In the Netherlands, the cost of living went up by 22 per cent. The Netherlands and the whole of Scandinavia are in a group with Ireland and the United Kingdom, where the cost of living went up by approximately the same amount. In Norway the cost of living went up by 36 per cent. I would not say that the Norwegian Government were guilty of grave inefficiency and neglect of the people because the cost of their living went up more than ours did during that period. I merely mention the fact that there was some sort of parallel. In Spain, the cost of living went up by 27 per cent. Then we can take a thoroughly efficient country like Sweden where you have the kind of streamlined democracy and economic discipline that has not been found possible or desirable in this country, a country that was neutral, a country that made a fortune from selling steel to the Germans, and where the cost of living went up by 30 per cent. between 1948 and 1953 compared with our 26 per cent., compared with the Danish 23 per cent., the Norwegian 36 per cent., and the Netherlands 22 per cent.
The cost of living in Switzerland went up by 4 per cent. It hardly went up at all during the inter-Party period of Government or later. The reason we were unable to emulate the Swiss, a neutral country like ourselves, was the fact that they, like the Belgians, did not devalue their currency. They have possibly the strongest currency in the world, and for that reason they were able to buy other people's goods at far lower prices than ourselves. I would not accuse any Government in office here any more than I would accuse the Swedes for having an austerity policy because their cost of living went up by 30 per cent. as a neutral nation compared with the Swiss increase of 4 per cent. That would be a ridiculous argument. It would be just as ridiculous to accuse us of being responsible for increases in prices as it would be to accuse the Swedes of having neglected their excellently run country, as compared with the Swiss, because the cost of living went up by 30 per cent. in Sweden and only 4 per cent. in Switzerland. It was a matter in some cases of the comparative purchasing power of money.
Last let us take the cost of living in Great Britain which went up by 30 per cent. in the same period. I might add that in the case of Sweden, Norway, Great Britain and Ireland, although the period is not used for purposes of comparison by the International Labour Office because they do not regard the period 1950 to 1953 as a good basis of comparison, but in that period it so happened that the cost of living went up by roughly the same amount in Sweden, Norway, Great Britain and Ireland. I would like to hear an argument showing that the Governments of any of these four countries showed scandalous neglect of their people, particularly the people of Great Britain who during that period had at their head a Socialist Government, people who showed an astonishing power of restoration at the end of the war.
I have heard people in the Labour Party say that you cannot compare English prices with Irish, because the British suffered economically in a war. In actual fact anyone who knows anythink about economics knows that so long as the two countries use the same money, pay the same prices for raw materials or semi-manufactured goods, so long as the British pay their farmers an increase in prices in the same period, in roughly the same degree as is paid here during the same relevant period, the argument that they were in a war is no argument. If living costs went up in England by roughly 30 per cent. during that period recognised by the International Labour Organisation, it went up for reasons that were parallel to those here. Whether or not there was a war in Great Britain and whether or not they were the victims of a war I should like to find any sane economist in the country, particularly the economists advising the Fine Gael Party, who will make the statement that the cost of living, in so far as it can be controlled by the country, should have increased less here between 1948 and 1953 than it did in England, bearing in mind, as I said, the purchasing power of the money concerned and the approximate increase in agricultural prices that took place in Great Britain and here during the parallel period, a parallel in price increases which was inevitable when we were selling to Great Britain agricultural produce of the kind that they needed and most of which they themselves were also producing. If those facts are admitted then, of course, the parallelism in price increases is a genuine parallelism that cannot be denied.
If the price of butter goes up in Great Britain from 1/10 per lb. to 4/2 over the years 1950-1953, then it is no wonder no one was able to give me an answer during the general election in my constituency as to why there should not be at least some fairly big increase in the price of butter here. We are not talking about the margins affected by small subsidies and the 10 per cent. reduction that will take place now. We are talking about a measured increase of some note. As I said, I never got the answer during the whole course of the election.
It is rather difficult to explain all these facts to the people down the country during an election. We have had experience of what we thought would take place when a new Government took office. Once again there can be no slashing in prices. There can be no general break-down in taxation levels. Whereas some of the Fine Gael leaders in their speeches were careful and conservative in their statements, the promises made by their supporters and their canvassers, and the promises made by the Labour Party, are not likely to be fulfilled immediately. There was no Fianna Fáil balloon to be burst, so to speak. There was no frightful scandal to be unearthed and no desperate extravagances to be eliminated because there was nothing of that kind to be found, nothing which could result in any immediate improvement. Therefore, when Labour speakers went round Westmeath and Longford and asked: "Would you like butter to be 2/10 or 4/2 per lb.; if you want it to be 4/2 per lb., vote Fianna Fáil; if you want it to be 2/10, vote for the Labour candidate," the people who listened to that kind of propaganda will be grossly deceived.
I will make this prophecy: the world level of butter prices will remain high in the future; butter will be, to some extent, replaced by other commodities as a feature of consumption in a great many countries. If the consumption of butter in the United States is nine lb. per head per year, and if butter there costs something like 6/- or 7/- a lb. and if the consumption here is 39 lbs. per head per year and the costs of producing milk go up in every country in the world, I prophesy that the Labour Party speakers will not find their promises fulfilled, namely, that butter will be 2/10 per lb. a year, or even two years, hence. It will remain one of the scarce commodities.
So far as other commodities are concerned I think I had better deal again with some facts provided through the medium of the International Labour Organisation. I mention this organisation because it can be regarded from the point of view of the working man as one that is on his side, an organisation that is not likely to be prejudiced in favour of the employer or of the farmer. From the International Labour Organisation one can obtain figures showing how long it takes a builder's labourer in any country to earn his main rations. It is an interesting form of computation because if one, for example, takes the price of butter in French francs and translates that into English shillings, while that may be a rough guide as to comparative prices, there are distortions created by currency relationships and the International Labour Organisation which desires to protect the interests of the worker and present trade unions with information on how far their members are being protected in their struggle for existence and their ability to buy rationed foodstuffs decided to find out how long it would take a builder's labourer earning a basic wage, without overtime, to earn the main commodities essential to life. That is a very fair comparative method because builders' labourers occupy roughly the same place in the economic and social life of all the main European countries and their wages are indicative of the purchasing power of the less privileged of the comunity.
The statistics which I propose to quote are based on the month of October, 1952, after the Budget rise had taken place here and I think it will be somewhat difficult for the inter-Party Government to improve upon them very much. They may make marginal improvements as a result of price decreases throughout the world, as they have done in the case of butter though they have not told us from where they are getting the money.
Here are the figures. In October, 1952, the time taken for a builder's labourer to earn 6 lbs. of bread in Ireland, the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland averaged 45 to 50 minutes. Ireland is actually one of the two lowest of that group of five well-run, modern, democratic States, all countries with good Governments. In the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Portugal and Italy it takes from one hour to two hours and 20 minutes. Ireland is one of the best in Europe as evidenced by the International Labour Organisation and from that point of view it is one of the best in Europe in relation to the capacity of a builders' labourer to earn the bread necessary for his family out of his wages.
We will now take sugar. Here, the Danes beat everybody else. It takes a Danish builder's labourer only 21 minutes to earn 6 lbs. of sugar. It takes Ireland, Sweden and Norway 55 to 60 minutes to earn 6 lbs. of sugar. The Swiss and the British are more or less the same with 65 to 70 minutes. Other countries take from one hour and 20 minutes up to seven hours to earn 6 lbs. of sugar. There, again, the Irish and Danish builders' labourers are in a very good position so far as their earning capacity is concerned.
We will deal with butter next. At the time these figures were prepared, in October, 1952, we were actually fifth in Europe. We were more or less the same as the British, but both the British and ourselves were thoroughly beaten by the Danes, the Swedes and the Norwegians, in all of which it took 37 to 45 minutes, as compared with 65 to 80 minutes in the case of Great Britain and Ireland. That situation has been improved by the announcement made of the reduction in the price of butter by some 10 per cent., but that reduction still leaves this country fourth in Europe. There are three countries where the builder's labourer can earn 6 lbs. of butter more quickly than his colleague is likely to do it here. I will not blame the inter-Party Government if they cannot get down to the Scandinavian level, because I do not believe in isolating this country from other countries in making political comparisons.
One of the reasons why the Scandinavian level is so low is because the milking herds there are high yielding, giving 800 to 1,000 gallons per year. As a result of that butter can be produced and sold more cheaply than it is likely to be in any country which produces cattle on the hoof for sale as beef because in such circumstances, no matter what improvement is made and irrespective of the milk yield of our cows, Ireland cannot easily be brought up to the level of those three countries. It will still be fourth and not the best from the standpoint of how long it takes a builder's labourer to earn a lb. of butter. Milk is roughly in the same proportion as butter and I need not give any more figures.
In connection with potatoes and sirloin beef, the Irish builder's labourer can earn his potatoes at the third quickest rate in Europe. Denmark and Norway beat him by a slight head. These figures are there for all to see. I would be delighted if someone would take the trouble to get the figures for last year. Taking sugar, bread, butter, beef and potatoes together we are not in an unsatisfactory position. Naturally we would like the position to be better. Perhaps when agricultural production is increased and the output per acre is greater we will find ourselves level with the Scandinavian countries in relation to milk products. I doubt if we ever will in the case of beef so long as the British are willing to pay a price for our beef which is related to some scarcity value.
I want to put these facts on record to show how difficult it will be for the inter-Party Government to get back to the 1951 price level. Quite clearly, the import of all their promises made not, as I have said, by the more sober leaders when making official statements in the Press but by many of their canvassers, minor supporters and canditates throughout the country was to give the impression that we and we alone were responsible for all the increases in prices which had taken place since 1951, and that if we were defeated all that would be set aside.
As I have said, my prophecy is that, although some slight marginal changes may be made if the Budget is balanced next year or balanced as a result of this year's financial operations, unless there is a major decrease in world prices it will not be possible for the inter-Party groups to fulfil the implied promises which they made that prices would come down not by 10 per cent., 5 per cent., or 15 per cent., but by a margin sufficient to show the utter, complete and reckless disregard of the people's interest which was alleged to be shown on the part of a Fianna Fáil Government.
