I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. I do not think I need say overmuch as to the provisions of the Bill which proposes to remove from the Statute Book once and for all the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893. That Act has over the years been the subject of much criticism and in this day and age it is hardly necessary to argue very strongly to convince people as to the injustice it occasions to members of the community with causes of action against public authorities.
The Act was put rather hurriedly through the British Parliament and was alleged to be a consolidation of existing statutory provisions, and nobody at the time seems to have been too well aware of what it involved. Under its provisions a person suing the State or a local authority has to bring proceedings within six months of the act, neglect or default complained of and not within six months of the date the cause of action arose. In this respect the Act differs fundamentally from other statutes of limitation under which the rule is that time begins to run from the time the cause of action arises, or, as it had been termed, the date of accrual of the cause of action. The provisions of the 1893 Act can thus lead to what one judge called "the starting result that you may lose a cause of action before you have got it", because the period of six months runs not from the date the plaintiff suffers injury but from the date of the act of the public authority or the ceasing thereof, which may be long before any actionable injury is caused.
The period of six months is, of course, far too short and cases have arisen where a person could not bring his action because the damage caused to him did not manifest itself in time. A typical case is where damage is done to the foundations of a house by vehicles belonging to a county council passing along the roadway near the house.
Where a person with a cause of action against a public authority is insane or an infant and cannot, accordingly, sue, the 1893 Act makes no provision postponing the beginning of the six months' period until his disability has ceased and in this respect again, it differs from other limitation statutes.
The remaining objectionable feature of the 1893 Act is that the public authority gets specially favourable treatment as to costs. An unsuccessful plaintiff is liable to solicitor and client costs instead of party and party costs. Even a successful plaintiff is liable for solicitor and client costs if he proceeds with an action after an offer has been made or after payment of any money into court and if he does not recover more than the amount offered or lodged in court. Finally, solicitor and client costs may be awarded to a public authority, if the court is of opinion that the plaintiff did not give the authority sufficient opportunity to make an offer for settlement.
The construction of the 1893 Act has led to endless difficulty in the courts and as a judge of the Supreme Court said once in a famous case: "It is scarcely possible to lay down, with any approach to completeness, any affirmative principle of interpretation of the words of the Act". It may be that originally the Act was designed to prevent people challenging important administrative acts of public officials after a long lapse of time but it has turned out that the vast majority of the cases in which the Act has been relied on are cases of ordinary negligence by servants of public authorities as, for example, the negligent driving of a local authority vehicle or the negligence of a local authority medical officer and the like. There seems no reason why these wrongdoers should be given special protection simply because they are paid from public funds. Injustice has resulted and does result from the Act and a British committee observed rather pointedly that it was only those who benefited from the Act who considered it should continue.
At all events, my view and the view of the Government was that the Act should be completely repealed and the present Bill is the result. The text of the Bill is based on that introduced in 1952 by the present Minister for Agriculture as a Private Member's Bill. My predecessor in office agreed to examine that Bill and I think I may say that, after he had considered various amendments which would alleviate the injustices of the 1893 Act, he had more or less come round to the view that the best thing to do was to abolish the Act altogether.
Section 2 (1) of the Bill now before the House repeals the 1893 Act and Section 2 (2) repeals the enactments specified in the Schedule to that Act in so far as they are not repealed by that Act. These enactments, about 100 in number, gave protection to persons acting in pursuance of particular Acts of Parliament. The repeal in the 1893 Act is limited to so much of the Acts as relate to any proceedings to which the 1893 Act applies and there is, consequently, a doubt as to how far these old Acts might be considered still to apply. The repeal in the Bill will clear up any such doubt.
Section 2 (3) of the Bill provides for the repeal of Section 44 of the Great Northern Railway Act, 1953, which applies the 1893 Act to the Great Northern Railway Board subjects to the extension of the six months' time limit to 12 months and subject to the non-application of the special provisions as to costs in the 1893 Act. Section 44 was inserted in the 1953 Act to bring the law in this part of the State into line with that applicable in the Six Counties. The 1893 Act does not, by reason of Section 10 of the Transport Act, 1950, apply to C.I.E.
The new Act is, under Section 1, expressed to come into operation on the 1st January next. Under sub-section (4) of Section 2 the repeal of the 1893 Act and the repeals of the other enactments will not apply to any proceedings if the cause of action accrued before the 1st July of this year. The effect of this is that, where a person suffers actionable injury after the 1st July by the act of a public authority, the authority will not be able to plead the 1893 Act. Where, however, actions have arisen before the 1st July the authority will be able to plead the 1893 Act. These provisions are designed to prevent stale claims being brought and I think they are reasonable.
I recommend the Bill to the House. It provides a highly desirable and long needed reform of the law and even if it comes a bit late it is better late than never.
