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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 14 Nov 1956

Vol. 160 No. 7

Committee on Finance. - Statute of Limitations Bill, 1954—Committee Stage.

Before I move the various amendments, I should like to obtain the permission of the House for the procedure we propose to follow. As Deputies will be aware, the Statute of Limitations Bill is a difficult Bill. As I said on the Second Stage, it covers a large number of matters, and it is, in many respects, highly technical. I also indicated that the law of limitation requires a specialised study in order to become fully conversant with its many ramifications and effects. We are fortunate that the Attorney-General is a member of the House, and in discussing the details of the present Bill—and this applies to all our law reform proposals—we will be able to have his valuable assistance.

We are submitting 82 amendments for the approval of the House and have followed the policy which we adopted for the Bill of adding explanatory sidenotes to each amendment. The idea of these sidenotes was welcomed by the House when we were discussing the Second Stage. The sidenotes are often technical and to comprehend fully what is involved in the proposals needs very often a study of the leading cases we have cited. Where Deputies raise particular points, the Attorney-General will do his best to explain the law as existing and the changes in the law which the Bill, as amended, will seek to effect.

I propose simply to move each amendment formally and the Attorney-General will then explain what exactly is involved from the legal point of view. Any points raised which are not covered in the Bill will be considered between this and Report Stage. I trust this will be approved.

Before, however, I move any amendment I should like to state generally what the principal objects of the amendments taken as a whole are.

First of all, we want to ensure that an executor or administrator may plead the statute except where he is guilty of fraud. This will help people on farms, who have taken out administration, to establish title where the other members of the family or the next of kin do not make any claims or are abroad for a period of 12 years. It will, we hope, also encourage people to take out administration. Secondly, we desire to cover all types of action which may be taken by a mortgagee so that the reforms contemplated in the Bill will be in conformity with the practice in this country as to mortgages. Thirdly, we are suggesting that the position in regard to certain charges and burdens on land not at present specifically provided for should be covered. Fourthly, we wish to enact that certain actions, such as actions to recover annuities charged on personal property, should have periods of limitation applied to them. Finally, we are suggesting that the law as to the appropriation of part-payments made generally should be cleared up and put in statutory form.

All the points made by Deputies on the Second Stage have been carefully considered, and, in so far as we could, we have tried to meet them.

SECTION 1.

I move amendment No. 1:—

In sub-section (2), page 5, line 13, to delete "January" and substitute "September".

This amendment proposes to postpone the date of the coming into operation of the Bill from January 1st next to September, 1957. It is hoped to have the Bill enacted in the next month or so. People will then have about nine months in which to assert their rights, and any person whose limitation period might be shortened by the new legislation will have time within which to bring an action and protect his rights. If Deputies think that a longer period is necessary, we have no objection to postponing the commencement of the Act still further but we think that nine months ought to be sufficient. The Minister will arrange to draw to the attention of the public, when the Bill becomes law, the fact that persons who might be affected ought to consider taking such action as is necessary to protect their rights. It will be noticed that Section 8 of the Bill prevents any action barred on the operative date being revived except in so far as the action may be revived by acknowledgment or part-payment. Acknowledgment or part-payment always revives a debt even though the period of limitation has expired. In actions to recover land (which includes rentcharges) the title is under Section 24 of the Bill extinguished and acknowledgment after the period of limitation has expired will serve no useful purpose as far as the person receiving the acknowledgment is concerned, because, his title having been extinguished, there is nothing to acknowledge. In this type of case, therefore, it is immaterial when the new legislation commences for the reason I have given and also because the period of 12 years is not being altered. In the case of State land there is an alteration being made in that the period of 60 years for former Crown land is being reduced to 40 years and, in the case of land belonging to a State authority which is not former Crown land, a period of limitation is being introduced for the first time.

Major de Valera

Does the Attorney-General think there will be sufficient time? This is the 14th November. We shall not have very much time in this session. It means a calculation as to when we anticipate the Dáil will meet next session and also when the Minister anticipates this Bill will pass through all stages in this House.

A couple of months, at the outside, I should imagine. This is the Committee Stage.

Major de Valera

Does the Attorney-General say there will be no unforeseen interruptions after Christmas?

I do not see what there could be.

Major de Valera

Could we, in the present situation, calculate on having this Bill law by, say, 1st March.

Major de Valera

It has to go through the Seanad, too. This is a very detailed Bill and, if one is so minded, there is quite a lot to discuss.

I do not think there is, really. A lot of changes have been made but I think they are all accepted.

Major de Valera

In principle, there is a lot to discuss. It could take time in this House and then it must go to the Seanad. I do not know how long it would take after that before it would actually become law. Can we do it before Christmas in this session? It is doubtful.

If we do not, then the date will have to be altered.

Major de Valera

If it does not, then it will have to be postponed until after Christmas. What will happen after Christmas is problematical. It will be seen, within the terms of the Bill, that if a person brings an action to establish his rights then that, of itself, will protect the status quo irrespective of the Bill coming into operation. That is the net point I want to put to the Attorney-General on this.

Look at Section 8—"...except so far as the cause of action or right of action may be revived...."

Major de Valera

Sub-section (b) of Section 8 states:—

"Nothing in this Act shall—

(b) affect any action commenced before the operative date or the title to any property which is the subject of any such action."

Therefore, it seems to me that there is ample time in the Minister's proposal.

Sub-section (a) of Section 8 states:—

"Nothing in this Act shall enable any action to be brought which was barred before the operative date by any enactment repealed by this Act,——"

that is the action we are discussing

"——except so far as the cause of action or right of action may be revived by an acknowledgment or part-payment made in accordance with Part III of this Act, or...."

It provides the opportunity for people who fear their rights may be barred.

Major de Valera

If they bring an action in regard to their claim before the Bill becomes law—if they actually initiate an action before this Bill is law—is it the status quo ante that rules?

Major de Valera

Therefore, I think September is eminently reasonable.

Instead of the 1st day of January, 1957, we could make it the 1st day of January, 1958, if you have any view on that.

Major de Valera

On the other hand, is there not a certain urgency for cleaning up the law?

It seems to me, from an ordinary practical point of view, that it would be easier to have this come into operation on the first day of the year. A very considerable number of statutes altering the law come in on odd days. One has to consider the situation with regard to a right to commence an action. One very often finds dates such as 13th September, 12th October, or 8th December. If it is not going to operate before September, it would be of assistance to the ordinary practitioner to take it on the 1st day of some year.

Major de Valera

That is a point. We would have no objection here.

Instead of making it September, we can make it January, 1958.

Major de Valera

We agree if you would prefer it so.

Amendment amended, by leave, to read:—

In sub-section (2), page 5, line 13, to delete "January, 1957” and substitute “January, 1958”.

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.
Section 1, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 2.

I move amendment No. 2:—

In sub-section (1), page 5, between lines 15 and 16, to insert:—"‘the Act of 1891' means the Registration of Title Act, 1891".

This is only a drafting amendment.

This is a large Bill. I raised a certain matter, when the Bill was introduced, in relation to certain charges on lands which have no effect on the sale or transference of lands as between private individuals, but which do affect the sale and transfer of land as between the State and individual owners. Deputy Finlay pointed out to me that we might, in rectifying what I regard as an evil at the moment, run into some constitutional difficulties. I was not concerned with the denial of property rights. Where, to use a famous phrase, the insistence upon right had been left in abeyance and where a charge on lands had not been paid for a particular period, that charge should no longer exist. There should be a limitation.

At the moment, I think these charges are abolished after about 80 years. They do not affect the sale or transfer of land as between private individuals, but they gravely affect the sale of land as between the farmer, the landowners, the Land Commission and the Board of Works. I think a good deal of injustice is being done to landowners. I know of cases where payment of any sort is being held up by the State simply because the original owner has disappeared from the face of the earth. I think it is wrong to retain the right beyond some certain limited period. I should like to be assured on that.

I did not want to interrupt the Deputy. I was not present during the Second Reading, but I understand the Deputy raised a point which I am told is covered by amendment No. 6. Perhaps the Deputy might leave that matter over to be discussed on amendments Nos. 6 and 13, which have to be taken together? I am instructed that amendment No. 6 covers the point the Deputy raised. We can discuss it on amendments Nos. 6 and 13, or we can go back to the matter on Report Stage.

I will leave it to the lawyers.

Major de Valera

Right through the Bill, the expression "the Act of 1891" occurs and I presume that, on perusing the Bill a second time, it was found it was not specifically stated. Incidentally, in regard to the last amendment and in connection with sub-section (2)——

We are covering that also. It has to be consequential.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No 3:—

In sub-section (1), page 5, between lines 17 and 18, to insert:—"action to recover land" includes—

(a) an action claiming a declaration of title to land,

(b) proceedings by a mortgagee for the delivery of possession of land by a mortgagor,

(c) proceedings under Section 13 of the Registration of Title Act, 1942 (No. 26 of 1942), by a person who is registered under the Act of 1891 as the owner of a charge on registered land for possession of the land.

This is a drafting amendment.

This is a drafting amendment in a sense. The aim is to cover all actions which are actions to recover land so that they will be brought within the provisions of Section 24 of the Bill and the other sections providing for the law in regard to such actions. We are going to bring all recovery actions within that section. There are other sections, but Section 24 is the real root section.

Besides the ordinary action to recover land, as where, for instance, B is in occupation of A's land and A desires to eject him, there are the three types of action mentioned in the amendment. First of all, there is an action claiming title to land or, say, claiming title to a rentcharge. The Irish case of Vandaleur v. Sloane (1919) 1 I.R. mentioned in the sidenote, and in which the Court of Appeal followed an old English decision of Walters v. Webb, decides that such an action is an action for the recovery of land to which the Real Property Limitation Act of 1833, as amended by the Act of 1874, applies. The existing period, and also the period prescribed in the Bill, is 12 years. An action claiming a declaration of title to land might be brought where it would be impracticable to recover possession of the land in view of the rights of tenants. It might also be brought in order to get a declaration from the court that a rentcharge was properly attaching to the land.

The second type of action dealt with in the amendment is an action by a mortgagee against a mortgagor for the delivery of possession of the land. The normal practice is that, when a person mortgages land, though the legal title under the instrument of mortgage vests in the mortgagee, the mortgagor remains on in possession of the land, his right being purely an equitable right to redeem the mortgage. If the mortgagee wants to recover his money, he may proceed to sell the land. But in order that he may do this easily, he will often want vacant possession and hence he proceeds to obtain this possession from the mortgagor. This type of action was at one time quite rare because a mortgagee obtaining possession must account to the mortgagor for any profits arising out of the land before he sells it. The action is provided for in Order LV, rule 7, of the 1905 Supreme Court Rules.

In the two cases (Bank of Ireland v. Slattery (1911) 1 I.R.; and Ryan's Case (1950) I.R.) cited in the footnote, the mortgagee wanted possession in order that he might easily realise the mortgage debt. On the sale of the property, there would be no difficulty in allowing the purchaser to go into possession. Actions to recover land by a mortgagee would at present arise where a person with a mortgage on his house defaulted in his payments to an insurance company or building society (Ryan's Case) and the company wanted possession of the house to hand over to a purchaser or person willing to take over the mortgage loan. I shall have more to say about mortgages under later amendments.

The third kind of action which we want to cover is a proceeding under Section 13 of the 1942 Registration of Title Act. Under this section, where a person is registered as the owner of a charge on land and the principal money has become due, the registered chargeant may apply to the court in a summary manner to be put into possession of the land. On being so put into possession, he becomes a mortgagee in possession by virtue of the section and can sell the land. No period of limitation is specially prescribed for this type of summary proceedings. The period will in future be 12 years. It will, of course, be the same period as the existing period in the other two actions mentioned in the amendment.

Major de Valera

I want to make what really is a lawyer's point which I had not an opportunity of going into. This definition is for the moment immediately related to this particular enactment. However, lawyers have a habit sometimes, when they are casting round, of making the seemingly irrelevant relevant and finding it relevant. Is there any danger in so extending the definition of an action to recover land that you may have unforeseen repercussions in regard to any other type of common action? I do not see it myself. I merely raise the point whether the matter has been looked at from the point of view of other common actions or procedures which are not specifically envisaged in this Bill from the point of view of limitation? In other words, can this definition, if universally adopted, cause confusion in relation to any other type of action relating to land?

It will be easier to move back on this amendment when we come to Section 24.

Major de Valera

This is only a definition.

I do not see there is any danger of the type apprehended.

Major de Valera

There is no harm in mentioning the matter.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 4:—

In sub-section (1), page 5, between lines 17 and 18, to insert:—"‘arbitration', ‘arbitration agreement' and ‘award' have the same meanings as in the Arbitration Act, 1954 (No. 26 of 1954)."

Major de Valera

That is emphasising the point I made in the first case —making sure you are adopting the same type of definition.

The Deputy will realise that we are taking certain things out of Section 60 and putting them into the forefront of the Act.

Major de Valera

I know that. That is quite true; I was looking at what was actually intended.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 5:—

In sub-section (1), page 5, between lines 17 and 18, to insert:—"‘charge' includes a lien and a right in the nature of a lien for money's worth in or over land for a limited period not exceeding life, such as a right of support or a right of residence, not being an exclusive right of residence, in or on a specified part of the land."

Charges on land or personal property are liens and not mortgages. They confer no estate legal or personal. Section 32 covers liens of various kinds under the term "charge". For instance, there is a vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money, which is an equitable charge on the property. Liens may be charges on land or charges on personal property. At present there is no bar to the recovery of money charged on personal property, but we are providing a period in Section 32 of the Bill. The real object of the present amendment is to cover rights of support and residence and I want to say something about these.

Rights in the nature of a lien such as rights of support and rights of residence arise very often in Irish rural districts. I think I can best illustrate this matter by referring to the Keegan's Case (1931) I.R. which is mentioned in the sidenote. By a memorandum agreement between C.K. and his aunt, M. K., made in 1915, C.K. agreed to give to M.K. “during her life the exclusive use of the drawing-room and bedroom over same, with fuel and suitable support and maintenance”, in a certain dwelling house, “free of charge, the consideration for same being natural love and affection and services rendered” by M.K. to C.K.; and C.K. thereby agreed with M.K. “to execute a deed whenever called upon to carry out and give effect to the foregoing contract.” In 1921 C.K. deposited the title deeds of the house with a bank to secure the payment of present and future advances. Subsequently in 1927, a large sum being owing to the bank, they brought proceedings to enforce the mortgage and the question arose as to M. K's. rights. It was held by the Supreme Court that she was entitled to an equitable life estate in the two rooms, which interest was not subject to the bank's equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds, but that she was not entitled to a charge upon the premises for fuel and support and maintenance. I should now like to read portion of the late Chief Justice Kennedy's judgment which will explain what is exactly involved in those types of cases—cases which will be familiar to Deputies.

"The instrument (i.e., the memorandum of agreement of 1915) presents two problems, viz.: first, as to the residential right, and, second, as to the right of support. The residential rights which are so commonly given in farm holdings in this country, especially by way of testamentary provision for testators' widows, also frequently by the reservation to parents of rights in settlements made on the marriage of sons, are of two types, namely, the type which is a general right of residence charged on the holding usually coupled with a charge of maintenance; and the type which is a particular right of residence created by reserving or giving the right to the exclusive use during life of a specified room or rooms in the dwelling house on the holding. The general right of residence charged on a holding is a right capable of being valued in moneys numbered at an annual sum, and of being represented by an annuity or money charge. It is clear that such is not the type of benefit given by the instrument before us. Here we have the second type of case, in which the exclusive use during her life of a specified part of the holding comprising two rooms is given to the beneficiary. If this benefit were given to her by a deed or a will, I think that it is clear that she would hold an estate for life in the property, legal or equitable, according to the terms of the instrument. The document of the 27th September, 1915, is an executory agreement to grant such a life estate or interest, and to perfect it by a deed, if called for, and Mary Keegan went into immediate occupation and enjoyment of the premises, and took, and has held, exclusive possession thereof ever since. ... In my opinion, Johnston J. rightly held that Mary Keegan is entitled to an equitable estate for life in the two rooms mentioned in the agreement.

The second problem under the agreement is the question as to her right to "fuel and suitable support and maintenance in the dwelling-house free of charge". Johnston J., by his order, declared that this right amounted to an equitable charge on the lands and premises. He does not, however, refer to this question in his written considered opinion, which is so full in every other branch of the case. I regret this, because I have not been able to find in the agreement anything to support a charge of the fuel, support and maintenance agreed to be given to Mary Keegan. In my opinion, if she had called for a deed, she would not have been entitled under the terms of the agreement to ask for anything more than a covenant on the part of the defendant in respect of the fuel, support and maintenance which he agreed to give her, and she could not have required to have the benefits under the covenant charged on the house and premises. I do not agree, therefore, with so much of the order under appeal as declares Mary Keegan entitled to a charge for fuel, support and maintenance."

And the Chief Justice concluded his judgment by saying:—

"In my opinion, she is entitled to an equitable life estate in the two rooms, which interest is not subject to the plaintiff's equitable mortgage. In so far as the order of Johnston J. so declares it should be affirmed; but, in so far as it declares that there is a charge on the premises for fuel, support and maintenance, it should in my opinion be reversed."

Exclusive rights of residence are accordingly equitable estates and the Bill will by reason of Section 25 (1) apply to them. Non-exclusive rights of residence and rights of support do not of themselves create equitable estates but they may be registered as burdens on registered land under the provisions of rule 99 of the 1937 Land Registration Rules. It is this type of burden that the amendment is concerned with. Such burdens whether registered or non-registered will, by reason of the amendment, be charges to which the limitation provisions as to ordinary charges will apply.

We may have to reconsider the wording of this amendment and of Section 32 (1) but we can do this on the Report Stage.

Could the Attorney-General say whether it is intended that Section 32 is to apply to liens? The section provides that:—

"No action shall be brought to recover any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or charge on land or personal property...."

Now, charge will be defined as a lien and "a right in the nature of a lien for money's worth in or over land." Is it proposed that the word "charge" is also to include a lien over personal property—for example, goods?

I do not think so.

Major de Valera

Is it not explicit here that it is only over land?

Over land, yes.

The doubt I have arises out of the proposed definition amendment which states that a charge includes a lien; and then there is "a right in the nature of a lien for money's worth in or over land."

The whole of that charge definition must relate to land.

That is what I wanted to know.

Major de Valera

Section 32 states:—

"No action shall be brought to recover any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or charge on land or personal property...."

That is how the section reads. But is it not sufficiently explicit in the amendment now proposed that the word "charge" is in the nature of a lien in or over land?

That is so.

Major de Valera

And there is nothing from which to infer that it relates to personal property. If one had "charge"simpliciter and another section enabling one to charge personal property, which is an innovation in this Bill, Deputy Costello would have a point. On the actual wording, however, it is sufficiently clear as it stands.

I said that the wording of this amendment might have to be revised before the Report Stage. That also applies to Section 32. We may have to look at both again.

Have we got any limitation in this Bill for the bringing of an action with regard to a lien over personal property?

No. There is no limitation in any event

Major de Valera

What would be the difference between a charge and a lien on personal property?

We are defining "charge" in a certain way.

Major de Valera

On land, yes.

We are defining it as being a lien in or over land. We are not including personal goods.

Major de Valera

But what is the difference between a charge and a lien over personal goods?

I would not like to answer the Deputy offhand.

Major de Valera

I do not think the same definition holds there with regard to personal goods.

There is no bar at the moment to recovery of money charged on personal property.

Would it be necessary to insert that? Are we not amending all the legislation with regard to limitations?

So far as we are including certain liens, which may be charges on land or personal property, they will be covered by a later section. I have remarked that Section 32, which is the limitation of actions to recover principal money secured by a charge on land or personal property, may have to be looked at again in the light of the present definition; and the definition will have to be looked at, too.

Major de Valera

If the principle is agreed, it can be amended on the Report Stage.

We shall have to look at it. It may not require amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 6:—

In sub-section (1), page 5, line 22, to delete "(No. 4 of 1946);" and substitute "(No. 4 of 1946), but does not include a fee-farm rent payable under a grant which creates the relationship of landlord and tenant."

The object of this amendment is to clarify the meaning of conventional rent.

Amendment No. 6 and amendment No. 13 do a certain thing and really go together. Possibly, therefore, we can look at them together. As far as amendment No. 6 is concerned, we are deleting line 22 "(No. 4 of 1946)" and reinstating it, but with an addition. We are substituting "(No. 4 of 1946), but does not include a fee-farm rent payable under a grant which creates the relationship of landlord and tenant." All fee-farm rents are being made rentcharges under amendment No. 13. It is not quite clear in the Bill that all fee-farm rents are rentcharges and, in order that I might explain this, perhaps I could say something on fee-farm rents. This question was raised by Deputy Moylan on the Second Stage and he was later kind enough to give to the Department of Justice a specific case of what he had in mind. When the Bill was originally drafted we took it that all fee-farm rents were rentcharges by reason of the way they originate and because of their nature. Still, in the case cited by Deputy Moylan, there was the suggestion that the law was not specific enough as to the period of limitation applicable.

Fee-farms are of three kinds. First of all, there are the ordinary fee-farm rents at common law, which do not set up the relationship of landlord and tenant at all. At common law a fee-farm rent arose where there was a grant in fee with a regrant of a rentcharge. In other words, the land was held subject to the rentcharge. There is no reversion in the grantor and there is no doubt that these rents are rentcharges.

Secondly, there are the fee-farm rents arising under the Renewable Leasehold Conversion Act, 1850. At the time of the Act many lands in Ireland were held under leaseholds with covenants for perpetual renewal, and it appears from the recital in the 1850 Act that great expense was constantly incurred in procuring renewals, and that it was expedient that such tenures should be converted into tenures in fee. The Act provided that the owner of the lease could require the owner of the reversion to execute a grant of an estate of inheritance in fee simple in such lands subject to a perpetual fee-farm rent to be charged upon the lands. Under the Act, two estates were created, one being an estate of inheritance in the lands and the other an estate of inheritance in the fee-farm rent. The difficulty arose because Section 20 of the Act provided that the fee-farm rent was to be recoverable in the same way as a rent service (an ordinary conventional rent) reserved in a common lease was recoverable, but this did not make it a rent service for the purposes of the statutes of limitation, and so the land judge, Judge Ross, decided in the Maunsell Estate Case (1911) 1 I.R., which we have cited opposite amendment No. 13. The term rent service is now obsolete in this country since Deasy's Act of 1860, which provided that a reversion was no longer to be necessary in a lease. Under Section 3 of that Act the relation of landlord and tenant is founded on the contract of the parties and not upon tenure or service. A conventional rent is an incident of the ownership by the landlord. A rentcharge is an encumbrance on the ownership of the person in possession.

Thirdly, there are fee-farm rents under Deasy's Act. These create the relationship of landlord and tenant and Section 2 of Deasy's Act applies to all fee-farm grants made since the 1st January, 1861, which set up the relation of landlord and tenant. It is important to note that, though the relationship of landlord and tenant is established and though the grantor is given all the rights and remedies of recovery such as a landlord has, the nature of the rent is not changed. The grantor has no estate in fee in the lands for there cannot be two estates in fee co-existing in the lands. The grantor merely retains a statutory right to recover an estate in fee in certain events. His estate is in the rent which remains a rentcharge.

The position was further complicated by the Land Code. The benefits conferred on ordinary tenants by the Land Law Act of 1881 were gradually extended to other classes, to lessees by the Land Law Act of 1887 and finally to grantees under fee-farm rents. The relationship of landlord and tenant, for the purposes of the particular Act, but only for such purposes, is assumed to exist between parties who were not landlords or tenants at all, because the landlords had no estates in fee in the lands.

The definitions of conventional rent and rentcharge as amended by this amendment and amendment No. 13, respectively, will remove any doubt that may exist as to what category the different types of fee-farm rent belong. In all cases they will be rentcharges and for the very logical reason that the grantor has no estate of inheritance in fee in the lands but has an estate of inheritance in fee in the fee-farm rent.

By reason of the clear-cut distinction we are making between conventional rent and rentcharge in this and some later amendments, we will get rid of the difficulty which arises under the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833, as amended by the 1874 Act. The word "rent" occurs many times in the 1833 Act meaning at one time rent service or conventional rent and at another, rentcharge. In Section 9 of the 1833 Act it occurs seven times—in four cases meaning conventional rent and in three cases meaning rentcharge, and it takes a specialist knowledge of the Act and the cases thereunder to find out when it means what. In our Bill as amended, where we mean rentcharge, we propose to say rentcharge, and, where we mean conventional rent, we will say conventional rent. As originally drafted we did not think that any difficulty could arise. Investigation of Deputy Moylan's point has, however, led us to the conclusion that it would be much better to make assurance doubly sure and to save the expense which might be involved in having the matter finally settled by the courts in a particular case. Amendment No. 13 links up a bit with this and I will deal with that in a moment.

Major de Valera

Do I take it that the net position is something like this: that the attempt is being made to define "rent" in what would be loosely described as the "conventional rent" meaning, and going back to what was more or less called the "rentcharge," and you are separating as rentcharges, everything that would have been a rentcharge in the original sense of the fee-farm rents, for instance? In other words, where you have what is a fee-farm estate, namely, a perpetual estate in the land subject to a rent, you are going to treat that rent as a rentcharge—is that roughly the position?

We are clearly distinguishing conventional rent and rentcharge. There was a section which said that a rent includes a rentcharge and that is going.

Major de Valera

Yes.

And what we are doing——

Major de Valera

You are dividing conventional rent and rentcharges.

Major de Valera

In arriving at those definitions you are, in effect, trying to partition the idea of rent into its traditional meaning of rent in the ordinary sense and rent as a charge?

Major de Valera

If all that legislation was not there and there was a rentcharge on the land and a rent service on the land——

Rent service is gone.

Major de Valera

I know, but the idea that was between them——

The old rent service is since Deasy's Act a conventional rent.

Major de Valera

I see no serious objection to the amendment.

Our definitions, I think, clarify the matter.

Major de Valera

I think so, too.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 7:—

In sub-section (1), page 5, between lines 26 and 27, to insert:—"‘judgment mortgage' means an affidavit of ownership registered under the Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) Act, 1850;".

This is purely a drafting amendment necessary in order to define "judgment mortgage", an expression which occurs in amendment No. 8. Judgment mortgages in Ireland are dealt with in the Irish Judgment Mortgage Act of 1850. The Act allows a court judgment to be registered by affidavit by the creditor under the judgment against the lands of the debtor. The registration has the effect of an ordinary legal mortgage in that it vests all the estate of the debtor in the lands in the creditor, subject, of course, to a right of redemption on payment of the money owing under the judgment. The legal estate being vested in the creditor, he may obtain possession of the property by the action to recover the land mentioned in amendment No. 3.

Major de Valera

"Judgment mortgage" was more or less a term evolved from the 1850 Act and it was not statutorily defined until 1891—is that right?

At any rate, amendments Nos. 7 and 8 go together and in No. 8 the phrase is put in that mortgage includes a "judgment mortgage" and an "equitable mortgage". That being put in there, one must anticipate and define what a "judgment mortgage" is here.

Major de Valera

Just a point of nicety: in Section 8 you insert that a mortgage includes an "equitable mortgage" and a "judgment mortgage" and you do not find it necessary to define "equitable mortgage"?

Major de Valera

Why, when you have an existing statutory definition of "judgment mortgage", do you want to bring it in explicitly, and thereby throw doubt on what you mean by "judgment morgage"?

"Judgment mortgage" is rather precisely defined as meaning a mortgage within the meaning of the 1850 Act.

Major de Valera

I know. My point is this: in relation to amendment No. 8, you are defining only one of the terms appearing there in the next definition. Why is it necessary to single out that term as against the remaining terms in that definition particularly as this particular term is one that is already statutorily defined in a prior enactment?

I am not sure about that, but I think we must bring the judgment mortgage within this Bill.

Major de Valera

I do not see the necessity for it.

I do not think it does any harm or that it makes any difference.

Major de Valera

I do not think it makes any serious difference but it does seem odd that you should define the one thing that is already defined and do not define the others. I know that the cognate words can be the subject of discussion in individual cases. I should not like the Minister or his Department to attempt definitions of these statutorily, but they remain undefined.

It would be very dangerous to attempt such definitions.

Major de Valera

I agree, but why define "judgment mortgage"?

It is easier to do it and it makes the matter quite clear.

Major de Valera

Going on that, you could logically——

I am advised that "judgment mortgage" has already been defined but that was for the purposes of the 1850 Act and we are now defining it for the purposes of this Bill. I think that is necessary.

Major de Valera

You say defined for the purposes of this Bill, but this Bill has such wide scope that you cannot limit its scope and accordingly all definitions appearing in this Bill would be definitions of a very general character.

No, they are definitely for the purposes of this Bill only.

Major de Valera

But the purposes of this Bill will be so wide——

The Deputy sees we are still at Section 2, which is the definition section.

Major de Valera

I have no objection that I wish to press on this.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 8:—

In sub-section (1), page 5, between lines 30 and 31, to insert:—"‘mortgage' includes an equitable mortgage and a judgment mortgage and ‘mortgagor', ‘mortgage' and cognate words shall be construed accordingly;".

This amendment defines a mortgage to include the judgment mortgage dealt with in the previous amendment and an equitable mortgage. An equitable mortgage arises in three ways. First of all, the equity of redemption of a mortgage may be mortgaged. That is to say, the mortgagor's right in equity to redeem a mortgage of his property on payment of the mortgage debt may itself be mortgaged. Secondly, an agreement in writing to execute a legal mortgage creates in the creditor an equitable mortgage; and this means that he has a right to demand the execution of a proper legal mortage. Thirdly—and this is the usual type of case—an equitable mortgage may be created by deposit of title deeds with, say, a bank to secure an advance of money. This type of mortgage arose in Keegan's Case which I mentioned in dealing with amendment No. 3.

An equitable mortgagee, where the mortgage instrument is under seal, can exercise all the powers given to a mortgagee by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and, if he has a right to possession, he can exercise the power of sale. An equitable mortgagee is not the same as a chargeant. A charge gives the chargeant a lien on the property but, as I explained in dealing with amendment No. 5, it does not give him either a legal or an equitable estate in the property. A chargeant can apply to the court to have the property sold in order to realise the charge, and, as I mentioned when discussing amendment No. 3, if the property is registered land, a registered chargeant may have himself put in possession by going to the court in a summary manner under Section 13 of the Registration of Title Act, 1942.

The Bill deals with mortgages and charges. This amendment defines "mortgage" and amendment No. 5 defines "charge".

Major de Valera

In spite of what the Attorney-General says, this term remains as undefined as ever. I do not think the Minister would risk committing that quite valid description to a Bill in the terms that are described. That gets back to the point about judgment mortgage. However, I take it it is the opinion of the Attorney-General that it is necessary to define mortgage for the purpose of the Bill. We have no objection to that.

It tidies the thing up.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 9:—

In sub-section (1), page 5, line 31, to delete "January" and substitute "September".

As this amendment is consequential on amendment No. 1, I suggest we alter it in the same way so as to provide that "January, 1958" be substituted for "January, 1957", in Section 2 (1).

Amendment altered, by leave, to read:—

In sub-section (1), page 5, line 31, to delete "January, 1957” and substitute “January, 1958”.

Amendment, as altered, agreed to.

I move amendment No. 10:—

In sub-section (1), page 6, before line 1, to insert:—"‘personal representative' means the executor, original or by representation, or the administrator of a deceased person and includes, in relation to land to which the Land Purchase Acts apply, a person who, under those Acts, is for the purposes of proceedings under those Acts appointed to be the administrator of the personal estate of a deceased person or nominated to represent a person dead, absent or under a disability."

This amendment relates to amendment No. 14 where we can go into the question of trustees and various related matters. However, I shall anticipate amendment No. 14 and say that this is a drafting amendment defining "personal representative". We propose to exclude personal representatives from the operation of the provisions as to trustees. I shall have more to say on this question when we come to amendment No. 14 and later amendments. Personal representatives under the Land Acts arise where land is vested by the Land Commission in a particular person appointed to be the administrator of a deceased tenant or nominated to represent a person who is dead, absent or under a disability. The idea is that persons so nominated or appointed should be deemed to be personal representatives so as to be able to plead the statute and obtain title after 12 years. Section 18 (4) of the Land Act, 1953, gives these limited administrators and nominated representatives full power to transfer or otherwise deal with land. References to these persons will also be found in Section 67 of the Land Act, 1923, and in Section 54 of the Land Act, 1939. This hangs on amendment No. 14 and I think the House will have a better view of it when we come to deal with amendment No. 14.

Major de Valera

I take it there are no complications elsewhere?

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 11:—

In sub-section (1), page 6, line 1, to delete the definition of "rent".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 12:—

In sub-section (1), page 6, between lines 1 and 2, to insert:—"‘registered land' means land the title to which is registered under the Act of 1891."

This is a drafting amendment defining registered land as land registered under the Registration of Title Act, 1891. I might mention that most land in Ireland is registered land, which for devolution purposes on intestacy comes within Part IV of that Act. It vests in the personal representative and is distributed as personal property. In respect of such land, there is no such person as the heir-at-law so that the provisions of Sections 21 and 22 of the Bill which provide for possession by a younger brother or by a co-parcener have no application to such land. Co-parceners are female heirs and they all take together jointly where there is no male heir.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 13:—

In sub-section (1), page 6, line 14, to delete "(iv) any other rentcharge" and substitute:—"(iv) any other rentcharge, and

(c) a fee-farm rent, whether the grant under which it arises does or does not create the relationship of landlord and tenant' ".

This amendment is a corollary to amendment No. 6. It requires a bit of trouble to put it into the text of the Bill. We want to make it quite clear that fee-farm rents are rentcharges for the purposes of the statute, and this whether or not they create the relationship of landlord and tenant. I have referred to Maunsell's Estate Case (1911) 1 I.R. already in dealing with amendment No. 6. We relied on this case in the draft of the Bill, but as I have said we think it better to remove any doubt. Further, the decision of Judge Ross that fee-farm rents are rentcharges might possibly be overruled and, apart from this, the decision only covers the type of fee-farm rent which was in question in the case. The amendment comes in the order of (d), (e) and (f) following (a), (b) and the new (c). As I say, it is a corollary to amendment No. 6.

Major de Valera

In other words, you want to include a fee-farm rent, even though it is a Deasy's Act case and you want to exclude the conventional rent?

And whatever follows in (c), (d) and (e).

Major de Valera

You want to include the one and exclude the other——

All fee-farm rents are to be rentcharges for the purposes of this Bill.

Major de Valera

In every case where you have a perpetual fee-farm rent, no matter what its regular origin, it is a fee-farm rent, and is a rentcharge for the purposes of this Bill.

I hope that is right.

Major de Valera

Is that what you want?

Major de Valera

That is what you intend to do?

Yes. The rentcharge here clearly excludes the conventional rent and includes the fee-farm rent.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 14:—

In page 6, to delete the definition of "trustee", lines 28 to 30 inclusive, and substitute the following new sub-section:—

( ) (a) In this Act, "trustee" does not include—

(i) a person whose fiduciary relationship arises merely by construction or implication of law and whose fiduciary relationship is not deemed by any rule of law to be that of an express trustee, or

(ii) a personal representative in the capacity of personal representative.

(b) Where—

(i) an interest (in this paragraph referred to as the new interest) in land, which is conveyed to or vested in a purchaser under the Land Purchase Acts, is, under any provision of those Acts or otherwise, a graft or deemed to be a graft on any previous interest in that land or any other land, and

(ii) the new interest is subject to any rights or equities arising from its being such a graft,

then, neither the purchaser nor any person claiming through him shall, by reason only of the matters mentioned in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this paragraph, be, in respect of the new interest, a trustee for the purposes of this Act.

(c) Where—

(i) a person is registered under the Act of 1891 as owner of land, and

(ii) the registration is, in pursuance of sub-section (3) of Section 29 of the Act of 1891, made subject to the rights or equities referred to in that sub-section,

then, neither that person nor any person claiming through him shall, by reason only of the registration, be, in respect of that land a trustee for the purposes of this Act.

(d) A personal representative in the capacity of personal representative shall not, by reason only of Section 1 of the Executors Act, 1830, or Section 86 of the Act of 1891, be a trustee for the purposes of this Act.

This is a very important amendment. It covers a matter that was raised here and was the subject of controversy in the House on the Second Reading. As at present drafted, the specific provisions in regard to trustees apply to all trustees whether they are express trustees or trustees whose trusts arise by operation or implication of law. These latter are known as constructive trustees. As the Minister explained on the Second Stage, one of the objects of the Bill was to consolidate the relevant provisions of the Trustee Act, 1888, and apply them to all trustees. It has been argued that the intention of the 1888 Act was that all trustees should be in the same position; but it was held that an executor or administrator could plead the Statute although he retained the property. An express trustee cannot plead the Statute where he retains the property or is guilty of fraud. Express trustees are, of course, trustees specially so created in the trust instrument.

There are two views on this matter and we have carefully considered them. First of all, there are those who say that a constructive trustee is in a peculiar relationship with the beneficiaries and that he should not be allowed to abuse his position by retaining property belonging to the beneficiaries. This is the view which was adopted in England by the Law Revision Committee in its Fifth Interim Report presented in 1936, and that view is now enshrined in the English Limitation Act of 1939. On the Second Stage of our Bill, Deputy Finlay and the present Minister for the Gaeltacht were inclined to favour that view. On the other side is the view that constructive trustees, like everybody else except express trustees, should be able to plead the Statute and establish title by long possession. This is the view as expressed by Deputy Boland and Deputy Glynn in regard to personal representatives.

We have considered this matter very carefully and we have been particularly impressed by the examples cited by both Deputy Boland and Deputy Glynn. We examined the law which was adopted for personal representatives in the Six Counties in their Administration of Estates Act of 1955. Deputies will find the subject very thoroughly discussed in an excellent handbook which has just been published in Belfast on that Act and which was written by Mr. Leitch, who was the draftsman responsible for the Act. I mention this book because it should prove very helpful when the House comes to discuss the provisions of a comprehensive Administration of Estates Bill which we have at present under examination. We have, also, consulted the Registrar and Assistant Registrar of Titles in the Land Registry, officers who have had a wide and specialised experience in matters concerning registered land.

The Bill as amended will propose to allow constructive trustees, be they personal representatives or others, to plead the Statute. The problem in so far as this country is concerned arises mainly in rural areas. If a registered owner dies intestate leaving, say, three children and two of the children leave the farm to get married or to take up employment elsewhere, the son who remains on in the farm is in a peculiar position at the moment. If he takes out administration he may find himself in the position of an express trustee, if In re Loughlin (1942) I.R. is correct. As an express trustee he can never establish title and an application to the court under Section 52 of the 1891 Act will fail. This section says that “where any person but for the provisions of this Act would have obtained a title by mere possession to any registered land, he may apply to the court in the prescribed manner for an order declaring his title to such land, and the court, if satisfied that such title would have been acquired but for the provision of this Act, may make an order declaring such title, and ordering the register to be rectified in such manner as it thinks just.”

Despite the words "but for the provisions of this Act" in Section 52, Loughlin's Case has decided that an administrator in the case of registered land is an express trustee because he is made such by the provisions of Part IV of the Act, and that, consequently, he can never establish title by lapse of time. The same is the position if he is an executor of a will of registered land. If he is a personalty representative where leasehold property is concerned, he can establish title. In preparing the Bill, we were conscious of this and decided to put all administrators and executors in the same position. The question now is as to what is to be that position.

On reconsideration, we have decided to propose, for the agreement of the House, that, along with other constructive trustees, personal representatives be allowed to plead the Statute except where they are guilty of fraud. This we are doing in amendment No. 45. Our opinion is that this is the best policy to follow, because it is a policy more in line with Irish social conditions. The decision in Loughlin's Case has, admittedly, been questioned and the late Mr. Justice O'Byrne reserved his attitude on the point in a later case of Owen v. McGarry (1948) I.R. I notice from Mr. Leitch's book that it is understood that a somewhat different view from that in Loughlin's Case was taken in an unreported case up North and I gather that there is at present a prospect of having Loughlin's Case questioned in our Supreme Court.

It is necessary to settle the matter one way or the other in our Bill. The provisions now proposed will be in line with the Government policy (recently declared by the Taoiseach) to facilitate the establishment of title. In addition, the new provisions will, we hope, encourage people to take out administration to estates in all cases.

The amendment under consideration will also cover cases where an interest in land, vested in a purchaser under the Land Purchase Acts, is deemed to be a graft on any previous interest in the land. This will make it quite clear that, where land purchased through the Land Commission is subject to previous rights or equities, the vested owner will be able to establish title as against the owners of any such rights or equities.

The new provisions will not, of course, help an executor who is specifically made a trustee for the beneficiaries under the will. In such a case he is more than an executor, being, in fact, intentionally constituted an express trustee. In such a case it would be improper deliberately to allow the executor to circumvent the express terms of the will. This amendment has to be read with amendment No. 45 and then related to the trustee sections.

Major de Valera

There is only one point I would like to raise on that. There is a matter of policy in this. I think we will probably agree that the line now taken is the better line. It will go a certain distance towards meeting the points that have been raised on previous occasions. The question is whether the draft here is the best way of effecting that. I would like to put this to the Minister and to the Attorney-General: in the form in which this amendment is submitted, the effect is that "trustee" does not include a constructive trustee. Perhaps that is going rather further than they might wish to go and I am bringing them right back to the point in regard to the rentcharge.

The Attorney-General does not want to separate constructive trusts from express trusts for all purposes? If I understand the Attorney-General properly, he wants to put constructive trusts in this regard on the same footing as other constructive trusts? Would it not, therefore, be better to use the two words "express trustee" and "constructive trustee"? You may also have to provide for an implied trustee. In effect, what you are saying in this is that "trustee" does not include constructive trustee. Should you not say "trustee" means express trustee? You would have to define that and leave constructive trusts in their ordinary interpretation. In other words, could you not use the terms in the forms more or less normally used and frame your definitions accordingly without bringing in complications? I do not know if I have made my point clear.

You want to say that; "trustee" is only to mean an express trustee?

Major de Valera

That this Act applies to express trustees.

Major de Valera

A further section to say that such a person is not an express trustee. That would be one way of doing it. I do not expect that that can be answered immediately on the spot and I would simply ask if the Minister will consider that as a possible improvement in the drafting of that section. I do not expect an immediate answer here. We are agreed on the principle of the Bill but I would suggest that for consideration.

If the Deputy turns to the section in the Bill dealing with trustes, I think he will see that the matter is made as plain as it need be.

Major de Valera

Which section?

Major de Valera

Yes, but your trouble is that what you are saying in effect is "in this Act ‘trustee' does not include" certain things which the word "trustee", in the ordinary general connotation of law and as used in the courts, generally speaking, does include. There is an attempt to distinguish these.

It does seem to me that anybody interpreting this Bill will have no difficulty in seeing that Section 35, which applies to an action against a trustee, will not apply to the persons who are set out in the amendment that we are now dealing with and it seems to me to be the best way of dealing with it.

Major de Valera

That may be perfectly well so but I do not like, generally speaking, an artificial definition which means, in effect, even though it is only in this Bill, a new connotation for a word, which is unnecessary. "Trustee" in all its ordinary meaning does include a constructive trustee and an implied trustee as well as an express trustee.

I do not think there is any false definition or artificial definition being given here.

Major de Valera

There is, because you are excluding something that is normally associated with the word.

What you are saying in this Bill is that Section 35 will not apply to certain people.

Major de Valera

You do not say that in the amendment with which we are dealing. We are dealing with amendment No. 14: "In this Act, ‘trustee' does not include——" etc.

The Deputy will understand that, as the Bill originally was drafted, the definition of "trustee" did include a trustee whose trust arises by construction or implication of land as well as an express trustee. We are reversing on that and saying that "trustee" is not applying to these people and the only point the Deputy is making is, would it not be more precise and comprehensive and satisfactory to say "trustee only means an express trustee". I doubt it very much.

Major de Valera

May I put it this way to the Attorney-General, as it is really his Department rather than the Minister's? I do not want to quarrel with this or to go into hair-splitting. From the very remark that the Attorney-General passed there, it seems to me that the mere fact that you are reversing your definition may have unduly influenced your draftsmanship. Therefore, would the Attorney-General have his draftsman just have a look again to see can it be made neater?

Major de Valera

I do not press it further than that.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 15:—

To delete sub-section (2).

This is to delete sub-section (2), which has reference to foreclosure. The sub-section is as follows:—

"(2) In this Act references to a foreclosure action shall, in relation to land, be construed as including references to an action claiming the sale of the land instead of foreclosure."

It is proposed now to delete that sub-section. As the Minister mentioned on the Second Stage there is no such thing as foreclosure in Ireland. When the Bill was being prepared, we relied on an earlier case and did not advert to a later leading case of Waters v. Lloyd (1911) 1 I.R. in which Lord Justice Holmes in the old Court of Appeal dealt comprehensively with the differences between the law in Ireland and in England. Some of his judgment will, I hope, clarify what the position is with us:

"The remedies given by the well-settled law and practice of this country to mortgagees differ in one essential feature from those usually adopted in England. In both countries, the mortgagee is entitled to gain possession of the land by an action of ejectment or otherwise; but as the mortgagor may years afterwards bring a suit to redeem the mortgage, in which the mortgagee must account for the rents and profits he has received, this is a course rarely resorted to. In England, the usual remedy of the mortgagee is an action to foreclose, the judgment in which makes him the absolute owner of the mortgaged lands if the mortgagor does not redeem within a limited period.

I understand that this is the course taken, not only by the first mortgagee, but also by mortgagees of the equity of redemption who undertake to redeem the earlier mortgages, and even by a person whose right as mortgagee arises from a deposit of the title-deeds of the lands. In these cases the lands themselves become the property of the foreclosing mortgagee; and they seem to me to be actions or suits to recover land within the meaning of the first section (Section 1 of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874). In Ireland foreclosure is unknown. The mortgagee who desires to put an end to the mortgage takes proceedings to obtain, not the mortgaged land, but the money secured by it. The judgment he seeks is that the lands be sold by the court, and that all persons interested therein be paid out of the proceeds in due priority. This court recently considered the effect of this mode of procedure in connection with the arrears of interest which a mortgagee was entitled to be paid out of the purchase money of the mortgaged property; and, as far as we could ascertain, sale of the lands, by the Court of Chancery, and in later times by the Landed Estates Court, has in Ireland always taken the place of foreclosure in England. Mr. Ronan has called our attention to a remarkable legislative recognition of the difference of practice in the two countries which is to be found in Section 25 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881. This section, which authorises the court to direct a sale of the property in foreclosure and redemption suits, ends with the provision that it does not extend to Ireland, which can only be accounted for by the fact that the settled practice in this country made it unnecessary. Now, while an English foreclosure action may be properly described as an action to recover land, a proceeding taken by an Irish mortgagee to realise his charge by selling the lands subject thereto is not so. It is, in the words of Section 8, that is, Section 8 of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, an action, suit, or other proceeding to recover money secured by a mortgage, similar to a proceeding to realise a lien for unpaid purchase money or any other sum charged upon or payable out of land."

The question which arose in Waters v. Lloyd was as to whether an acknowledgment of a mortgage debt having been made by an agent was sufficient to keep alive the right to have the lands sold and the debt realised. If an action for sale was an action to recover land, the acknowledgment made would not satisfy the law as it was made by an agent. If, however, it was an action to recover money secured by a mortgage the acknowledgment was sufficient. The court of appeal held that it was an action to recover money. The point as to the type of acknowledgment required will, in future, be academic in view of Section 47 of the Bill which proposes to allow an acknowledgment made by an agent to be effective in every case. But the point at issue in the case could still be vital where an acknowledgment is made after the period of limitation has expired, and for the reason that, if actions for sale were to remain, for the purposes of the Statute, actions to recover a mortgaged debt, these actions could still be brought irrespective of the date of the acknowledgment.

In this respect, we think that Waters v. Lloyd should be overruled and that actions for the sale of mortgaged property should be put on the same footing as actions for the recovery of land. In other words, once the period has elapsed both the remedy and the right should be barred. At present the position is anomalous. A mortgagee may want to get possession of land to effect a sale and, as I have indicated in dealing with amendment No. 3, this type of action may now become more popular than in the days of Lord Justice Holmes. At the end of the statutory period, if there has been no acknowledgment, an action to get possession of the mortgaged land is barred but an action to have the land sold may not be, if there is a subsequent acknowledgment.

We think that, when an action to eject the mortgagor is barred and the right extinguished, an action to sell him out should also be barred and the right extinguished. The law, as we propose it should be, in regard to actions for sale, will be found in amendments Nos. 36 and 37, and the matter will arise there. Our proposals will cover all actions by a mortgagee specifically and clearly and the different categories into which they are to be placed will be clearly indicated. I have gone into this matter in detail on this amendment in order that our proposals may appear in proper perspective, but they will arise on the two amendments that I have referred to— 36 and 37.

Major de Valera

It simply deletes the sub-section.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 16 :—

In page 6, before sub-section (3), to insert the following new sub-section:—

( ) For the purposes of this Act, a cause of action to recover in respect of the liability of a tortfeasor to an injured person, an amount recoverable by the tortfeasor under Section 4 or 5 of the Tortfeasors Act, 1951 (No. 1 of 1951), shall be deemed to accrue on the date on which judgment was obtained by the injured person against the tortfeasor.

The object of this amendment is to fix the time when the cause of action for contribution under the Tortfeasors Act, 1951, accrues. We are simply saying that it shall be deemed to accrue on the date on which judgment was obtained by the injured person. There has been some doubt about this matter in England as Wimpey's Case (1955) A.C. shows but the better opinion is that it accrues on the date of the judgment and we are confirming this view in the amendment. It is desirable specifically to provide for the question. A later amendment, amendment No. 26, provides for a special period of limitation of two years.

Major de Valera

It is the date where the thing is prosecuted to action.

When the judgment is obtained.

Major de Valera

Prosecuted to the end of the action? The original right of action accrued on the date of the tort?

Major de Valera

What it simply means is that the statute is stopped from running by the bringing of an action within the time. In the first instance, if A injures B, B has an action accruing from the date of injury and time starts to run against B from that date but if, within the time allowed by the statute, B initiates an action then the statute ceases to run against him.

It is a question of contribution. It would start time running from the date that right to contribution accrues and this amendment settles that date.

Major de Valera

I want to get the sequence of things. He then goes and gets a judgment. The statute does not run again till the end of the judgment? Is that not the point? If A injures B the statute runs as from the date of injury. B arrests the run of the statute by bringing an action. He prosecutes the action to a conclusion and gets a judgment. The statute does not start to run again till the judgment is obtained and runs from the date of the judgment according to this. What happens in the case where B stops the statute running in the first instance but does not prosecute the action to judgment and the action is not determined? How long will the right stay alive?

We are only dealing here with tortfeasors and contribution. The effect of this in fact is that a joint tortfeasor could be sued 12 years after the action.

Major de Valera

Yes.

Would the Deputy look at amendment No. 26? The two are tied together.

Major de Valera

The point just occurred to me from the amendment. Is that point I have made covered?

This only deals with contribution between tortfeasors. The limitation is set out in amendment No. 26 which states that "an action to recover, in respect of the liability of a tortfeasor to an injured person, an amount recoverable by the tortfeasor under Section 4 or 5 of the Tortfeasors Act, 1951 (No. 1 of 1951), shall not be brought after the expiration of two years from the date on which the cause of action accrued."

Major de Valera

I know it is not relevant to this amendment but as I have asked the more general question, what is the answer? Is it in the Bill?

I am sorry. I was concentrating on what this amendment dealt with. Two years is to be the period, but the date of accrual of the right of action is what this amendment deals with.

I wonder could I strain the rules of relevancy to ask the Attorney-General and the Minister when they are going to bring in legislation to amend the Tortfeasors Act which requires amendment?

Major de Valera

Why does it require amendment?

It does indeed.

We have enough to occupy our minds without dealing with that question.

There is new legislation in the offing. I do not know whether it will cover Deputy Costello's point but I think it will.

Major de Valera

It does not bear on this.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 17:—

In page 6, before sub-section (3), to insert the following new sub-section:—

( ) In the application of this Act to registered land in respect of which a charge for the payment of a principal sum has been created under Section 40 of the Act of 1891—

(a) references to a mortgagor shall be construed as references to the registered owner who charged the land,

(b) references to a mortgagee shall be construed as references to the registered owner of the charge,

(c) references to a mortgage shall be construed as references to the instrument of charge,

and cognate words shall be construed accordingly.

The object of this amendment is to cover the registered owner of a charge on land. I have already discussed the registered chargeant in dealing with amendment No. 3. Under Section 40 of the Registration of Title Act, 1891, a registered owner of land may charge the land with the payment of money either with or without interest, and either by way of annuity or otherwise. The owner of the charge is registered as such and the charge is created by an instrument in the prescribed form and the chargeant receives a certificate of charge from the Land Registry. The instrument of charge has the same effect as a mortgage by deed and the chargeant has all the rights and powers of a mortgagee under a mortgage deed. As I have already pointed out, he may under Section 13 of the Registration of Title Act, 1942, apply to the court in a summary manner to be put in possession of the land when the principal money has become due. If the court orders possession, he shall be deemed a mortgagee in possession.

We want to bring the registered chargeant specifically within the orbit of the Bill. Statute has put him in a better position than a chargeant of non-registered land and we propose to recognise that position in the Bill.

Major de Valera

Under the 1891 Act, the intention was to provide for mortgages on registered land and this is simply a logical sequence to that.

Registered charges on land.

Major de Valera

They are parallel to mortgages, and this definition is consistent with that code. I do not see anything against it.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 18:—

In sub-section (4), paragraph (a), page 6, to delete lines 49 and 50, and substitute "or, in the case of a rentcharge, to distrain for arrears of the rentcharge".

If the House agrees, the three amendments (Nos. 18, 19 and 20) can be discussed together. The object of these three amendments is in line with the policy I have mentioned earlier of saying rentcharge when we mean rentcharge so as to avoid any confusion between a rentcharge and a conventional rent. These are consequential amendments.

Major de Valera

They are purely consequential. They do nothing more than specifically apply to rentcharges when that is meant.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 19:—

In sub-section (4), paragraph (b), page 7, to delete lines 3 and 4, and substitute "possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge, to making a distress for arrears of the rentcharge."

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 20:—

To delete sub-section (5) and substitute the following new sub-section:—

( ) In this Act—

(a) references to the possession of land shall, in the case of a rentcharge, be construed as references to the receipt of the rentcharge, and

(b) references to the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of land shall, in the case of a rentcharge, be construed as references to the date of the last receipt of the rentcharge.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 21:—

In page 7, to add to the section the following new sub-section:—

( ) In this Act, references to any enactment shall be construed as references to that enactment as amended or extended by any subsequent enactment.

This is purely a drafting amendment.

It simply provides that references to any enactment shall be construed as references to that enactment as amended or extended by any subsequent enactment. It is a common enough provision.

Amendment agreed to.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again.
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