I was saying that the Minister's actions and statements in the United Nations Assembly were criticised on certain counts. Two have been selected for criticism in speeches supporting this motion. Before I come to deal with them, I might refer, in passing, to others which had favourable and unfavourable comments also, just as in the case of the two which are the subject of the motion here.
He spoke of the question of Algeria, suggesting—as was his duty as a member of an organisation which was established to try to maintain peace and prevent fighting wherever it occurred, substituting peaceful methods for fighting—that the conflict might be brought to an end by getting a responsible body of Algerians to negotiate with the French Government; and he outlined certain proposals.
It is suggested that that was an act inimical to France. I suppose that, wherever there is fighting, one side or the other in the fight will consider that it is inimical to suggest methods of peace. There are people who believe in unconditional surrender as the only basis upon which peace can be brought about. I do not think we would take up that attitude. I think, if we are serious at all in being members of the United Nations, that it is our duty, if we see a conflict, to try to suggest methods of bringing it to an end. In suggesting methods we are in no position to impose them. You can only suggest them.
When people are angry and fighting, and when lives are being lost, it is true that any suggestions for peace are disliked by one or other of the contending parties; but we could not be accused of any further partisanship than is implied in the fact that we have ourselves, in the past, fought the powers that were imposing their will, as we believed, upon us. We tried to get a settlement which was in accordance with the principle of self-determination. The principle of self-determination is in very specific terms in the Charter of the United Nations as one of the bases upon which peace can be secured. The Minister's suggestion was based on that principle. He acted, therefore, as the representative of a nation that wishes to be a good member of U.N.O. and not a false one.
That has not been the subject of any special criticism, except in so far as it might be implied that we were offending a friendly nation. We believe that it is in the interests of peace that a suggestion such as the Minister's should have been made. We cannot impose it, of course. Unfortunately, U.N.O. is not yet in the position in which it can impose settlements and secure peace by imposing the common will upon those who are engaged in conflict, and so end conflict in the areas concerned. But, clearly, a good member of the United Nations would make a suggestion that he thought useful. Mind you, when suggestions are made by us on matters of that sort, they are made by people who have some experience and know where these conflicts will ultimately end. They are made by people who think it is very much better that the final stages towards peace should be reached sooner than that there should be a great deal more suffering and hardship and more loss to both sets of combatants. I do not think that, as a member of the United Nations, we have any excuse to offer to anyone for making that suggestion.
The next is the suggestion with regard to action in the Middle East. Anybody who has any realisation of the position of the world to-day knows that is one of the danger spots. Ordinary threat and counter-threat will give rise to somebody saying: "I am going to call the bluff", and then we are in it. Is it not better that some representative of a nation which is acting honestly as a good member of the United Nations should make a suggestion that the tension there might be lessened? The suggestion in that case was with regard to the direction in which diplomatic action should be taken. I do not see why anybody can think that Irish national policy was departed from, or that the policy that is in the interests of this country was departed from, by a suggestion of that sort.
The next suggestion which has been referred to immediately in connection with this motion was that the possibility of a step-for-step withdrawal on latitudinal lines should be investigated —investigated because, again, we were not in a position to impose anything. The Russian suggestion that they would withdraw behind their lines if the United States and other forces went out of Europe was clearly a suggestion that could not be considered, and it was not considered. It was obviously a partisan suggestion made for propaganda purposes. The question was: is there a modification of that suggestion that might possibly be adopted with a view to relieving the tension and making less dangerous the situation that exists?
It is said that withdrawal latitudinally to such distances as might be mutually agreed had no meaning. Again, all that could come from the suggestion was that the proposition would be examined and that, if both sides realised and wished to avoid the danger that existed in close contact between armed forces, they might be prepared even to get back, say, 300 kilometres or 200 kilometres or 100 kilometres. Every kilometre they went away from each other meant lessening the danger of a sudden explosion.
We all know that the greatest danger that exists in Europe, the dilemma that is before those who stand for liberty and who, at the same time, do not want to face a world war with its awful consequences, is that you have certain nations in Europe that are dominated. They have a local minority which is supported by an outside power and is in a position to impose its will and keep them in subjection. A great deal of sympathy was given to Hungary because that was the situation there. Was it possible that some agreement might be arrived at which would give the Hungarian people an opportunity of determining for themselves the form of Government they would have?
If such an opportunity were given to the German people I am perfectly certain they would, if they were free to vote, east and west, vote for union, if outside forces were removed.
It may be suggested that the superior equipment of a minority in Eastern Germany might be sufficient to dominate the lot. There would be ways of curing such a situation. It would be far easier to handle that situation than the situation that exists at the moment if it happened. But the suggestion that there was something inimical to the general idea of keeping freedom here in the West is unfounded.
The Minister's suggestion was that the danger of war might be lessened by a withdrawal of troops or at least by an examination of the position. We were not in a position to examine in detail exactly the points the various groups occupied, the strong bases they may have had. However, we did know that there was a certain line, the Iron Curtain, and that there was a certain amount of continuity in that line. We knew that, if the two Parties sat down to consider the situation like people negotiating an armistice, there was a line from which both sides could see what progress in withdrawal was being made.
If Russia at the present time were behind her own boundaries and if it was clear that she was going to stay behind her own boundaries and within her own territory, I do not think the dangers in the world situation would exist at all. The great dangers that exist are due to the fact that Russia dominates a number of other countries that used formerly be independent countries in Europe and is enabling minorities in these countries to impose their will by force upon the majority of their fellow-countrymen. That is the cruel situation. I know nothing more cruel than the situation in Hungary a year or so ago. The United Nations was not able to do anything because it was feared that the action it might take—any forceful action— would lead to a world war, a type of war which, as I tried to get advertence to at the start, would be of a character completely different from the wars we have known in the past and would threaten the very existence of humanity.
It was because that was the situation that the unfortunate people of Hungary were permitted to be ground down by attacks from outside. If, by any chance, it was possible to get some sort of understanding so that there would be a withdrawal to allow these people to govern themselves, would that not be an advantage, apart altogether from the fact that you were removing the immediate combatants to some distance from each other and that you were lessening the danger of a sudden explosion.
It will be said: "But you know the Russians will not accept that." It is true of every proposal that it will not be accepted if one side is stubbornly against it. You might also have a stubborn attitude by Western countries that might have established certain strong points, certain bases. You would, no doubt, have a good deal of stubborn opposition to any change in that, but at least you would be bringing both sides to realise the alternative. The alternative in this case might be the war which I think we are beginning to forget about and taking much too easily altogether, so that, if it comes, it will be too late for us to do anything about it.
We ought to be very thankful to any people who try, by any method what-so ever, to get two sets of opponents to realise where they are heading. I see no reason why we should be ashamed of that proposal. I see no reason why anybody in Ireland should feel any anxiety about it. If it is not possible, it is not possible. If the two sides are determined that the situation they occupy is essential to them and that they are not giving up, well it is only a suggestion made that has not been acted upon. But it has the effect, and had the effect, of getting the people to realise that, unless some effort is made, we are heading towards war.
