Did I understand the Parliamentary Secretary to say before the debate adjourned that he would look into the matters raised?
Rent Restrictions (No. 2) Bill, 1960 [ Seanad ]— Committee Stage (Resumed).
Debate resumed on the following amendment:
Before subsection (4), page 9, to insert the following new subsection:
"(4) Where—
(a) a building consists of two or more controlled dwellings and the landlord of the dwellings expends an amount in excess of two-thirds of the aggregate of the basic rents of the dwellings on putting the building into a reasonable state of repair, and
(b) all the controlled dwellings benefit directly or indirectly from the repairs,
the following provisions shall have effect for the purposes of subsection (2) of this section:
(i) a calculation shall be made in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (e) of that subsection of the sum which would be the lawful addition if the building were a dwelling having a basic rent equal to the aggregate of the basic rents of the buildings,
(ii) that sum shall be apportioned among the dwellings in proportion to their respective rateable valuations,
(iii) the said paragraph (e) shall be taken as having provided, as respects each dwelling, for the sum apportioned to it on the apportionment (and no other sum) being a lawful addition to its basic rent."—(Minister for Justice.)
Yes.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 34:
In subsection (4), page 9, line 41, to delete "1946," and substitute "1946 (being an excess of expenditure by reference to which there has been a lawful addition within the meaning of that Act)".
This amendment seeks to make provision for a landlord who may have incurred expenditure prior to the passing of the Bill but who may not have got the lawful addition by that time. As the Bill stands, it is possible that such a landlord would be denied the 12½ per cent. increase in rent to which he would be entitled, even though he had not got the special lawful addition. This amendment is designed to ensure that if he has not got the lawful additions, he will still get the 12½ per cent.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 35:
In subsection (4), page 9, to delete lines 52 to 57 and substitute the following:
"(b) In the case of a dwelling with respect to which there has been, during a relevant period, an excess of expenditure such as is referred to in paragraph (e) of subsection (2) of this section (being an excess of expenditure by reference to which there has been a lawful addition), paragraph (b) of that subsection shall cease to apply in relation to the dwelling except in a case in which a relevant grant was made in respect of repairs by reference to which the excess of expenditure occurred.
(c) In this subsection—
‘relevant period' means—
(i) in paragraph (a)—any period of two years ending on a 31st day of December, being the 31st day of December, 1945, or any subsequent 31st day of December not later than the 31st day of December, 1960, and
(ii) in paragraph (b)—any period of two years ending on a 31st day of December, being the 31st day of December, 1960, or any subsequent 31st day of December;".
This amendment is designed to ensure that where a landlord, after the passing of the Bill, incurs exceptional expenditure and seeks a special lawful addition in respect of that, the 12½ per cent. increase on basic rent which this Bill is giving him will cease to apply if he does not take a grant.
Why all this anxiety to get people to take grants?
It is not anxiety to get people to take grants but to protect tenants from very heavy increases. As the Deputy is aware, the special lawful addition is related to the expenditure. If the grant is deducted, the amount of special expenditure on which the lawful addition is calculated will be all the less. Therefore, the special lawful addition itself will be all the less so that once the grants are given— and it is desirable the landlords should avail themselves of them—increases in rent will not be very great.
As the Parliamentary Secretary is aware, there was a feeling abroad that the grants available were there for the individual type of landlord and that it was not considered by the Department of Local Government or the local authorities as being good form for a substantial company to apply for these grants. That view was very widely held. I want to get it clear from the Parliamentary Secretary that the purpose of the policy he is now implementing is that he disagrees that that urge was there.
There were undoubtedly cases where some landlords did not apply for the grant for the purpose of getting a higher rent. In my own view, that was utterly stupid and short-sighted because what they would have got under the grant would have been far more than they would have got under the excess provision in the rent. It did not work out that way at all. There was undoubtedly some criticism of companies who did apply for grants of this nature. Undoubtedly, there was some belief that there was a certain type of means test in relation to these grants. It seems a little unfortunate that what I describe as the decent landlord in that respect should be penalised as against the landlord who was merely availing of a loophole to charge an excessive rent.
I admit there is some substance in what the Deputy says. What we are concerned with primarily is the rent increase on the tenant.
No. The whole point of this Bill is the preservation of the national asset.
That is so. We are concerned to give the landlord a 12½ per cent. increase to compensate for the increased cost of repairs. In those cases where exceptional expenditure has been incurred, landlords have already got very satisfactory increases. The average return on an expenditure of £300 has been approximately 10 per cent. on the money invested.
That is correct.
That is an adequate and satisfactory return and we feel that we should not put the additional burden of a 12½ per cent. increase on to the tenant in that case. It is not for me to debate housing policy, but, as I understand the position, these grants are made available to anybody who wants to take them. The principle underlying the grants is to enable old houses to be renovated and put into proper habitable condition. It does not matter who owns them.
There was, of course, a means test at one stage under the Housing Act of 1952.
Local authorities make their own stipulations.
There was a statutory overriding means test in the Housing Act of 1952, piloted through this House by Deputy Smith, who was then Minister for Local Government, and that overriding means test prevented local authorities exceeding a certain ceiling.
We are concerned here with repair grants only.
I am not quite sure whether it applied to supplementary building grants or to repair grants.
It was building grants.
Whatever the principle, these grants are there. We are not compelling landlords to avail themselves of them, but, if they do not and thereby get a very handsome return on their expenditure, they will not get the 12½ per cent.
I can understand that that will be the position in the future, but the other feeling was abroad in the past.
I admit bad feeling arose between a very big landlord and his tenants. Fortunately, the trouble there has been resolved and good relations have been restored. I do not think there will be any more difficulty in that regard.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 36:—
In subsection (5) page 10, line 1, to delete "reference" and substitute "references" and to insert "and the 31st day of December, 1961," before "were".
This amendment is consequential and it has already been debated with amendment No. 28.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 10, as amended, agreed to.
Sections 11 to 20, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 21.
I move amendment No. 37:—
In subsection (1), page 15, line 58, to insert ",if ‘(being dwellings to which Chapter 1 of Part II of the Act of 1946 applied)' were contained in subsection (2) of the said section 9 after ‘controlled dwellings'," after "would".
This is really a drafting amendment. The object of it is to bring the provisions of Part III of the Bill dealing with the adjustment of basic rents into line with the provisions of Section 8. It is desirable that the same principles should be followed by a district justice when he is provisionally determining rents under Section 21 as he follows when adjudicating on an application by a tenant to have his rent reduced under Section 8. If the tenant of a small controlled dwelling were to apply to the court under Section 8 to have his basic rent reduced, the criterion which the court would apply in determining whether the basic rent was unduly high would be the levels of comparable Chapter I basic rents, that is, the 1914 basic rents of premises which have remained under control since 1915 and which are related to 1914 levels. This amendment will ensure that the same criterion will be adopted by the district justice when he is deciding on an application for a provisional reduction of rent under Part III.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 38:—
In subsection (1), page 16, lines 7 to 10, to delete "(substituting in that section a reference to Chapter 1 of Part II of the Act of 1946 for the reference to Chapter 2 of that Part)".
This amendment is consequential on amendment No. 25 and was debated with amendments Nos. 21, 23 and 25.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 21, as amended, agreed to.
Sections 22 to 28, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 29.
I move amendment No. 39:
In subsection (1) (e), page 20, to delete "suitable" in line 17 and substitute "equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects".
There has been a departure from the terminology used in the 1946 Act. The words "equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects" have been omitted. The words used in the section which it is desired to amend are, "reasonably suitable to the residential and other needs of the tenant and his family". The effect of the subsection could be that where alternative accommodation is being made available the words "reasonably suitable" could be interpreted to mean suitable as regards the physical needs of the family in regard to the number and size of the rooms. The rent of the alternative accommodation might be beyond the means of the family. The words used in the amendment are "equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects" which would cover not only suitability for the family from the physical and health points of view but also from the point of view of their social needs.
One can visualise that a tenant might be living in a four-room dwelling and that the landlord might seek possession of that dwelling. The dwelling might consist of four rooms but might be in a street of fairly good standard in an attractive area and in a desirable position. It could be argued that the term "reasonably suitable" could mean that, in order to gain possession, the landlord merely had to provide another four-room dwelling even though the tenant might consider the area to be unsuitable or even though the rent might be in excess of the rent of his existing premises. The words "equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects" provide greater protection for the tenant than the words in the subsection.
I understand that the wording in this Bill is different from the wording in the 1946 Act. What is the reason for the change? Does the Parliamentary Secretary not agree that the words "reasonably suitable" do not afford to the tenant the protection the amendment seeks to give him?
There is a change in the wording but I do not think Deputy Larkin need have any fears about it. First of all, may I point out that we are dealing in this amendment with the case of a man who is seeking premises for his own occupation? Secondly, there is the overriding consideration of reasonableness. The court will all the time have regard to whether the thing is reasonable or not. If Deputy Larkin reads subsection (5) of the section, he will see that it is as follows:
In making a decision, pursuant to paragraph (e), (f) or (g) of subsection (1) or paragraph (c) of subsection (4) of this section, as to the suitability of alternative accommodation, the Court or the appellate court (as the case may be) shall, in particular, take into account the proximity of the accommodation to the place of work of the tenant and of the members of his family residing with him, the means of the tenant and of the members of his family residing with him and the extent and character of the accommodation.
So that, broadly speaking, we are providing much the same thing.
The reason for the change is purely that it was recommended by the Conroy Commission. The Conroy Commission, having examined carefully the existing requirement of alternative accommodation felt that alternative accommodation would be adequate if it were reasonably suited to the residential and other needs, say, proximity to work and so on, of the tenant, and was available in controlled premises. I want to make it clear to Deputy Larkin that the alternative accommodation found for the tenant must be in controlled premises so that the rent will still be a controlled rent. If all these things in mind, are kept in mind, there is nothing really to worry about. We are giving very adequate protection.
I am afraid I am not entirely satisfied with the explanation. Controlled rents might vary from district to district. The question of proximity to work is mentioned all right but there is the question of the rent and there is the other factor which is considered rather important, that is, the area, the type of neighbours and so on. I would suggest that the words in the amendment would give the tenant better protection than those in the subsection.
I am aware, of course, that the subsection applies only to a case where a landlord is seeking to acquire a residence for his own living accommodation but in doing that, he is, in effect, seeking to put the tenant out.
Into alternative accommodation.
Yes, but he is seeking to put the tenant out. The tenant and his family may have lived in the dwelling for a considerable period. They are the subject of very serious disturbance from the point of view of children, social position and so on. Consequently, they are entitled to the maximum protection we can give them in this matter. I would submit to the Parliamentary Secretary that the words in the subsection do not provide the maximum protection and are not as satisfactory as the words used in the 1946 Act.
I know that the Parliamentary Secretary is concerned in this matter to be fair in dealing with this aspect of the problem. I would ask him to bear in mind that there may be a very wide difference from the point of view of desirability between two houses having the same type of accommodation with regard to the number of rooms, toilet facilities, water supply and so on. There may be no difference between the houses from the point of view of accommodation but there may be a very wide difference between them from the point of view of desirability as a residence. There may also be some difference in the rent payable.
Having regard to the fact that this matter arises only when a landlord is seeking to obtain possession of a dwelling for his own occupation and, in doing so, is seeking to put a family out of it, I would ask the Parliamentary Secretary to consider that the family it is being sought to put out should get the maximum protection.
Deputy Larkin has not persuaded me that I am wrong in what I am doing. This is one of these thorny questions of trying to keep the balance fairly between two groups of people. On the one hand, there is a man who has a house and wants to live in it himself—not an unreasonable request—and on the other hand, there is a tenant who has lived in that house probably for a long time and who has built up his position in the community and so on and we are going to disturb him. Where does the balance of equity lie?
We feel that the old provision was much too onerous on landlords. The Conroy Commission felt that very strongly. The old wording was to the effect that the alternative accommodation must be equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects. We are changing that to make it somewhat easier for the landlord to get possession of his own house for his own occupation, but, if we are doing that, we are hedging it around with all sorts of safeguards for the sitting tenant and I think they are being adequately protected. There is the overriding consideration of reasonableness; there is the question of suitability and proximity to employment; and the rent is still being controlled. Then the court must have regard to the capacity of the tenant to pay. If you take the thing as a whole it is a fair compromise between the two conflicting interests.
The Parliamentary Secretary appears to be leaning towards the side of the landlord. We seem to be talking in terms of the landlord who has owned a dwelling for quite a long time and then requires this dwelling for his own use and, if he does not get it, there will be hardship inflicted upon him. However, for the purposes of this subsection a landlord can well be somebody who has come into the dwelling only a relatively short period before seeking to occupy it. A landlord may seek to purchase a dwelling which is subject to the control of this Act. He may decide to purchase it because it is a dwelling which would be suitable to him but he may have purchased it only 12 months previously.
On the other hand, the tenants may be a man, his wife and a growing family. I am sure the Parliamentary Secretary will agree with me that in these circumstances it is only reasonable to provide the maximum protection. There are many examples, especially in the city of Dublin, of tenants of controlled dwellings being in residence for 30, 40 or 50 years. They are married, have reared children; perhaps the children have gone away and there is only the man himself and his wife. Then the landlord comes along and desires to occupy the house. These people have lived in these circumstances for 30 or 40 years and have always kept the house as best they could. They are then told the Court will give possession but they are not being given the same type of protection they would have had under the 1946 Act. These groups of people are those in which I am particularly interested. Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary will look into this between now and the Report Stage to see whether it is possible to deal with it in some other way.
I certainly shall but without holding out any hope.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 40:—
In subsection (1) (i), page 20, line 47, to delete "three" and substitute "six".
This is a relatively simple proposal. The subsection provides that where the tenant must surrender possession of the dwelling the court will be empowered to grant them compensation. The basis on which compensation will be granted is set out in a number of subsections, but in subsection (1), the subsection with which we are concerned, there is a limitation of three years allowable to the court. Even though the court might well feel that an amount of compensation in excess of that allowable would be fully justified, the subsection prevents the court's awarding any more than the equivalent of three years. I propose that the court should be given a little more latitude so that where this application for compensation is made and where it appears to the court there are justifiable grounds for awarding the compensation the court will not be limited to three years as set down in the section.
The point about this is that whatever is put into the section is likely to become a minimum, standard figure. This figure of three years was arrived at by the Conroy Commission after careful consideration and consulting with its professional advisers, valuers, solicitors, auctioneers and the other people who are intimately connected with this problem.
What will happen is not that any landlord who is suffering from financial stringency will get possession of his house at all. All that will normally happen is that he will sell the house to the tenant. If he sells the house to the tenant at the moment he will get nothing near the market value. The ultimate effect of this provision will be that he will sell the house to the tenant and get the market value of the house less three years gross rent. I imagine that is the way it will work out.
That is no hardship on the tenant. He is still getting the house at considerably less than the market value. Any building society will advance him up to the net figure he will be paying the landlord because the difference between the market value and what he will actually pay the landlord would normally be the deposit which he would put down if he were buying the house from a stranger. If you look at it in that way the provision in the section is a reasonable one.
I take it that if a landlord and tenant are able to arrive at an agreement by themselves without going to the court they are entitled to do so under this subsection?
Certainly.
That being so, there is far more likelihood of an agreement without recourse to court proceedings as the Bill is than as the Bill would be with the amendment. With the amendment the landlord would be inclined to stand back and insist on a court decision. With the provision as it is in the Bill there is a better chance of agreement being made outside the court and these three years being utilised, as one might describe it, as the deposit the building society would require.
That is a good point.
Do these two subsections apply only in the case where the landlord is proposing to sell the premises?
It appears to me that the compensation is given to the tenant for a particular purpose in a case where the landlord has recovered possession of the premises. It is given to compensate the tenant, to some extent, for his particular problem arising from the loss of the premises. In this case, the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation. He may require it because of economic circumstances, but the necessity for disposing of the dwelling has nothing to do with the tenant.
Deputy Larkin realises the difference between paragraphs (i) and (j). In paragraph (i), it is a maximum of three years and in paragraph (j) it is a minimum of three years.
I see that, but in regard to paragraph (i), I am suggesting that the maximum should be increased. It is hardly correct to say that if the maximum period in paragraph (i) is increased to six years, that must necessarily be the amount the court will award, because the paragraph says "... such sum as the Court considers proper..." The figure of three or six years is not an arbitrary one. The only arbitrary thing about the paragraph is that the court is prevented from awarding more than three years. I have no doubt whatsoever that the court will use judgment in dealing with applications under this paragraph. It is most unlikely, in a case where there are not very strong grounds for awarding compensation in excess of three years, that it would be awarded automatically. Where the tenant could only show that he had some reasonable claim in justice and equity to be awarded a sum equivalent to six months', twelve months' or 18 months' compensation, he would not be awarded compensation equivalent to six years.
The purpose of the amendment is purely to give the court greater latitude in this regard. I am sure the Parliamentary Secretary will not advance the argument that, if the period of three years is extended to six years, in any case where the applicant goes before the court for compensation under this paragraph, the court will automatically award compensation at the level of six years.
That would be the tendency.
I doubt if I could accept that suggestion—that the court would not deal with the application on the case submitted to it.
I am not saying that.
I am not suggesting the Parliamentary Secretary is saying that.
What I am saying is that I think it would work out this way: the district justice examining the case would see what he was entitled to give under the Act, and give the maximum, and it would be very difficult for the landlord to persuade him not to do that.
I do not think so.
That is only a personal opinion.
I shall not bandy words with the Parliamentary Secretary on that point. I doubt if, by and large, district justices are such great lovers of tenants that all their consideration would be given to their difficulties.
Are they not always biassed in favour of the underdog, and properly so?
I should not like to deal with that aspect because there are many occasions on which I am afraid I would be inclined to take the contrary point of view. After all, this paragraph deals with a case where a landlord complains that he is suffering from financial stringency and, arising from that situation, he feels called upon to seek the permission of the court to acquire the premises.
I would be inclined to take the view that the landlord or his representative would go to the court and make the case that he requires permission to acquire the premises for the purpose of selling it because of his economic situation. In those circumstances— whatever Deputy Sweetman says about the court being in favour of the underdog—they are hardly likely to agree automatically that the major sum which they can award by way of compensation should be awarded to the tenant. In those circumstances, I think they would be inclined to go near the major amount permissible, only if a substantial case were made on behalf of the tenant.
That is all the amendment seeks to do. In such a case, it seeks to give the court the necessary leeway to award more than is provided in the paragraph, having regard to the fact that the possession of the premises is sought arising from the fact that the landlord is suffering from some financial stringency. In that case, I would not anticipate that a justice sitting in court will examine the matter from the legal point of view only, but also from the point of view of equity and justice.
I am sure there will be odd cases where the tenant will give up possession to enable the landlord to sell and will seek alternative accommodation. In that case, he goes off armed with three years' gross rent, with three years in which to look around for suitable alternative accommodation. He can live rent free for three years. The most likely thing to happen, and what I am sure will happen is that the landlord will want to sell—and the section specifically indicates that he must want to sell the dwelling because "... is suffering financial stringency which arose since he acquired the dwelling and which can be relieved only by recovering possession of the dwelling with a view to its sale..."—and he will sell to the obvious man, the tenant. What we are deciding in fixing the number of years is how much below the market value of the premises are we to let the tenant buy it for. As Deputy Sweetman clearly pointed out, that is what we are deciding. We have decided that three years' gross rent under the market value is being reasonably fair to the tenant. If we moved it up to six years, I think we would really be putting our hands in the landlord's pocket, particularly in view of the fact that, in this case, he is suffering from financial stringency.
I still think there are two points. There is no provision that the dwelling must be sold only to the tenant. He can endeavour to obtain permission to sell it to anyone.
On the economics of the thing, the tenant is the obvious man to sell to.
There is no such provision. In many cases, the obvious person is not necessarily the tenant. In addition, I come back again to the point that this is a permissive provision which does not say that the landlord must pay compensation amounting to six years. It says that the court can award compensation up to a maximum of the equivalent of six years. Again, surely we in this House must accept that a justice sitting in court dealing with an application of this nature under this Bill will deal with it in a judicial capacity and not on the basis of automatically handing out an award. That appears to be the Parliamentary Secretary's main objection to my amendment.
You must give the district justice some indication of what the Oireachtas feel is the proper figure.
Amendment No. 40 withdrawn?
Not withdrawn.
Amendment put and declared lost.
I move amendment No. 41:—
In subsection (1) (j), page 20, line 55, to delete "three" and substitute "six".
With regard to this particular amendment, the Parliamentary Secretary pointed out on the earlier amendment that the compensation is a minimum amount and that the court is empowered to grant compensation in excess of the three years' rent unlike subsection (i) where the court is limited to three years. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 42:—
Before subsection (2), page 21, to insert the following subsection:
"(2) In considering whether it is reasonable to make an order for the recovery of possession of a controlled dwelling, the Court shall have regard to the extent, if any, to which the conduct of the landlord contributed to the existence of the grounds upon which he relies in support of his application for recovery of possession."
This amendment is an attempt on our part to deal with something to which Deputy Sherwin drew attention on the Second Stage. He pointed out that an unscrupulous landlord can create a very difficult situation for a tenant if he refuses to accept rent. In the lower income group, it is likely that the tenant will not save that rent but rather spend it. People in that position live from week to week. Suddenly, the landlord comes along with a demand for a large amount of arrears and can get an eviction.
There will always be unscrupulous landlords and they will always invoke the aid of tricks of one sort or another to defeat the purposes of the Acts but we have tried in this amendment to do something about this matter. I do not know how effective the amendment will be but, at least, it is an attempt to deal with the situation. Of course, I might say that in Section 33 the Bill gives power to the court at any time after the issue of a decree for possession and before its execution to grant a further stay or stays of execution as it thinks proper. It is also proper for me to say at this stage that the real protection for the tenant in such a case is to save the rent and have it available for the landlord when he demands it. Alternatively, as I pointed out on Second Stage, the tenant can get a postal order and post it to the landlord. I do not imagine it would be very likely that a landlord would refuse in those circumstances.
I, like the Parliamentary Secretary, am not so certain how far this can help but at least it gives something to the tenant to argue about when it comes to a court issue. A very large number of tenants are simple people. They have less than a primary education and do not understand the law. They are afraid of the very thought of the courts. Landlords take advantage of them especially when there is a new landlord, the fellow who has no right to act in that way because he bought the premises with all its faults. Nevertheless, in most cases that I have come across these gentlemen set about refusing to accept rent.
The practice has been that they wait four or five months and then they suddenly demand the rent or they actually go to court and pretend they were never offered the rent. The tenants I speak about live from week to week, as has been admitted, and in particular if they are people who like a jar they are not going to save money and keep it for the landlord.
We will not hold that against them.
No. Landlords have got away with it. That is the part I do not like. People who may owe £10 or £15 will gladly get out rather than face the court. Being a local councillor, I have those people coming to me looking for houses and asking what is going to happen. They have nowhere to go and they have been told they must leave. I am acquainted with this problem. At least, they now have something to argue about if they can get witnesses or evidence that, in fact, the rent was refused. Perhaps, the landlord might lose in the end and only get his money back at a bob a week. It is some help.
I raised another question at the same time that I raised this one. I do not know whether this section helps me at all. I refer to the case—I do not know whether I am entitled to make the point—of landlords making tenants caretakers. That is a stunt which I do not think the Parliamentary Secretary has covered in the Bill at all. People are engaged as caretakers without any work as such. They pay rents. They are some kind of a caretaker. They are asked to pay excessive rents. There are many cases where people were asked to pay excessive rents just because they complained about rents in the court. The landlord took action and possibly because they are only there as caretakers succeeded.
"Caretaker" ought to be defined some way in the Bill. A caretaker is a person who does not pay rent. He is a person who has certain work to do as a caretaker. Where there is evidence that such a person is actually paying rent, he is certainly not a caretaker. Could the Parliamentary Secretary help me in that?
It is not strictly in order on this amendment. There are special provisions for caretakers' agreements and possibly the provisions could be used unscrupulously to avoid the provisions of the Acts. As I said on the Second Stage, the only real defence I can offer Deputy Sherwin is that if all the facts are put before the court, no court will tolerate that sort of conduct by a landlord. If the circumstances are fully explained, the court will quickly see through the device and I am quite certain will deal with it accordingly.
Progress reported: Committee to sit again.
The Dáil adjourned at 5 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 6th December, 1960.