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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 7 Dec 1960

Vol. 185 No. 6

Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, 1960—Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

There has already been a request that the Government should send a personal representative to the Congo to keep the Government here informed of political developments. I should like to make that request again. The Taoiseach has made very considerable adaptations in his original attitude as to the sacrosanctity of the decisions of the United Nations. He is now prepared to question them. I wonder would he now reconsider this question of the personal representative and if he is sending out a further contingent, see that they are protected by such a representative?

The Taoiseach suggested that the danger of the personal representative is that his appearance might be resented in the Congo. That, of course, is what happened in regard to the Ghana delegate but we are most anxious that no interference should take place at all if such a personal representative were sent out and that his sole function should be to keep the Taoiseach and the Government in contact with the day-to-day and week-to-week political developments in the Congo so that he will have first hand information upon which to make his decisions. The general principle of the personal representative is established as long as States exist. Every major city in Europe has a representative of the Government and it is just rubbish for the Taoiseach to suggest that a personal representative might get us into trouble. We have our ambassadors and our personal representatives in every major city and their main function is to refer back the details of political activities in the countries to which they are attached. That is the sort of function that I had in mind in suggesting that a personal representative should be sent to the Congo.

The Taoiseach went on to make the statement that certain conditions could arise in which the Government might decide not to send out a further contingent. I welcome that in so far as it is almost a clear decision by the Taoiseach to take positive action, if he decides that the situation requires action in any particular way in relation to our contingent, and will refuse to send them out if he considers it undesirable to do so. I should like the conditions under which he would refuse to send out troops to be that the Parliament of the Congo be reconvened; that Mr. Lumumba be freed from jail; that Colonel Mobuto be tried as a rebellious general——

This is not a question that can be relevantly discussed on this Bill. I have already informed the Deputy——

——and that Mr. Tshombe be tried as a traitor to the Central Congolese Government——

If the Deputy pays no attention to the Chair I shall have to ask him to resume his seat.

——that the Afro-Asian——

Will the Deputy please sit down?

——that a representative be sent out forthwith——

I have already pointed out to the Deputy that these matters do not relevantly arise on the Bill. The Deputy has already alluded to them and he is now repeating the argument. If the Deputy continues on this line I shall have to ask him to resume his seat.

(Interruptions.)

Is it not rather extraordinary that this was in order when the Ceann Comhairle was here but the minute the Leas-Cheann Comhairle arrives it is irrelevant?

The Deputy had not started on that line when the Ceann Comhairle was here.

You do not want to state the facts at all. You want to keep the people from knowing what happened.

(Interruptions.)

It has been made quite clear by an independent Indian delegate, Mr. Dayal, that we have been made party to all the things to which I have referred, the effective partitioning of the Congo, the deposition of the Premier, the removal of Parliamentary immunity——

None of these matters arises on the Bill.

——the rejection of the Council's——

Since the Deputy will not obey the Chair I shall ask him to resume his seat.

It led to the——

I am asking the Deputy to resume his seat.

——the return of the——

The Deputy may not continue after I have asked him to resume his seat.

Surely that is an outrageous decision to make in view of the importance of the matter under discussion.

The decision is made according to Standing Orders.

It is quite clear that the Leas-Cheann Comhairle is protecting the Taoiseach. He is protecting the Government.

The Deputy will resume his seat.

This is a disgraceful action carried out consistently with the consent of the Government. I shall retire from the Chamber in protest against your partisan decisions throughout the whole of my speech, the suppression of discussion and debate. It is a farce.

The Deputy will leave the House now.

I am not quite as heated about this as Deputy Dr. Browne. I am not a Party man and so I am not concerned about any request. I am just concerned about facts but, to some extent like Deputy Dr. Browne, I want information. I know it is difficult to discuss this Bill without in some way touching on the Congo but I shall do no more than that if the Leas-Cheann Comhairle permits.

The questions that I have been asked by members of the community are on those lines. We do not recognise any existing authority in the Congo. We are there only to keep the peace until some decision is taken as to who is the authority. That being the case it happens that it was reported in the Press that the Katanga forces did, in fact, attack tribes and massacre them, namely, the Balubas. I think, therefore, that it would be our duty in recognising any particular body to prevent any such body as the alleged Katanga Government or any other body from taking any action pending the settlement of the whole question. But it has happened that tribes were massacred for some time before the attack was made on the Irish troops. The question has been put: if this body, the Katanga force which is not a Government but some junta or other, have the right to attack other tribes, are not the Balubas who were attacked entitled in turn to throw up some barrier to prevent further attacks? Were we going a little too far then in removing these barriers? Were we, on the one hand, preventing the Balubas from attacking the Katanga group and, on the other hand, were we preventing the Katanga group from attacking the Balubas? That is a fair question. It was posed in an editorial in one of our own newspapers.

I do not intend to delve into Congolese politics, but the point is where does our police action begin and end? Should we, or should we not, have removed these barricades? Should we have prevented the alleged Government of Katanga from taking action against the Balubas? We should, I think, do all these things pending some settlement recognised by the United Nations.

As I am on this attack on the Balubas, I should like to state that I am not satisfied that the Irish Forces under the authority of the United Nations are properly armed. Judging by the reply given by the Minister to a question I tabled that would appear to be the position. The Minister said that the patrol that was attacked had two Bren guns, four sub-machine guns and four rifles. There was no mention at all of side arms. Not even the officer carried side arms. All the evidence goes to show that while these men were removing the obstacles none of them was armed. They were completely defenceless. That is common knowledge. That information was conveyed in a letter from one of the soldiers serving in the Congo. The men were not properly armed. I assert that any new Force sent to the Congo should be supplied with side arms so that, if it is any part of their duty to remove obstacles, or carry out the work of a construction corps, they will not suffer a surprise attack and be completely helpless in the face of it as they were on the last tragic occasion.

I have no objection to sending a Force to the Congo. I recognise that were it not for the action of the United Nations there would have been largescale massacres in the Congo. They are a primitive people "rarin' to go" and to some extent we put a brake on them. I know that we shall be misrepresented. We may take sides but I believe that in the long run we shall do good, much as our efforts may be misrepresented at this stage.

I am not concerned with Congolese politics. I am concerned with our soldiers in the Congo. Suppose civil war breaks out and it becomes a case of every man for himself, and suppose the United Nations cannot help in the withdrawal of our troops, are there plans to withdraw our Forces independently of any United Nations help? Could this Force become a sort of lost battalion?

This Bill gives the Government power to send our Forces outside the State. Is it not possible that a situation similar to that which exists in the Congo might arise in Northern Ireland? Would this Bill cover that? The area would not be outside the State. I just mention the possibility.

Service in the Congo will be recognised as active service under this measure. I approve of that. If a man gets a "belt" of a feather, that will be accepted as active service. What a shame, remembering that the I.R.A. were not regarded as being on active service although they were subject to arrest, imprisonment, and everything else. Our Forces in the Congo are a police force. They may not even be hit with a feather, but their service is recognised as active service. It was disputed that the service given by the I.R.A. was active service. I mention the point for what it is worth.

With regard to compulsion, I do not agree that a man should be compelled to serve overseas. I know that compulsion will refer only to those who join after this Bill becomes law. Is there not a possibility that that provision may have an adverse effect upon recruiting? Will men refuse to join because they realise they may be sent to the Congo, or elsewhere? Is there not a possibility that future crises may be of an ideological nature and men may hold opinions "for" or "against"? Is it not possible some men may be sent overseas in an ideological clash between Russia and the West and, holding certain opinions, might desert? I do not think that men should be compelled. One can rely on volunteers. One cannot rely on those who are compelled. Apart from that, many young men join the Army for economic reasons. I do not suppose they carefully study the terms of enlistment any more than tenants study the leases of the houses in which they live. They may resent being sent to the Congo, or their parents may resent it. I think all service overseas should be voluntary.

I could discuss this question in the same way as Deputy Dr. Browne discussed it because I know a little about international politics. I have made a study of them. I believe we are doing the right thing now, though time may show that we are doing the wrong thing. It is stipulated in the Bill that the matter will be reconsidered from time to time. I just want to mention one case in which grave mistakes were made. During the struggle for Italian independence it was a very laudable thing for people to enlist to help the Pope. Events have proved that that was wrong because it is in the Pope's own interest not to have temporal power. At the time it seemed to be right. History has proved that it was wrong.

As I said on an earlier occasion, we may have the best intentions, but that will not save us from being beaten up by both sides. That has already happened. Members of the Irish Brigade fighting with the French forces were butchered when the revolution broke out because it was held that they had no business being in France and no business interfering. I think one of Deputy Dillon's forebears was in charge of the force that was guillotined.

I endorse fully the proposal to send these forces but I want to ensure that in future they will be adequately armed and able to protect themselves. I also want to ensure that if it comes to withdrawal, the method of withdrawing is carefully planned in case at some stage it is "every man for himself".

I do not want to open the wide question as to what is the solution to the problems in the Congo because it seems to me that that is a very deep and muddy stream in which to fish at the moment. It is quite clear our troops in the Congo are very largely in the role of endeavouring to keep the peace—of endeavouring, in fact, to hold the reins in the hope that the good sense of the Congolese will ultimately assert itself and triumph over the disunity and chaos which exist there at present.

The only hope of solving the Congo problem is on the basis that it will give satisfaction to the Congolese. Settling the Congo problem on whatever basis Belgium or Russia desires will provide no enduring solution. The Congo problem must be settled by the Congolese people themselves. The task of our troops, and of the United Nations forces as a whole there, must be to create such conditions as will enable the wisdom of the Congolese people to exert itself, and to endeavour to set up a homogeneous Congolese State, taking cognisance of the tribal pecularities of that part of the world but ultimately giving that vast region which is about 34 or 35 times the size of Ireland some kind of stable Government.

The danger in relation to the Congo is that, like Berlin and like East Germany, it will provide another bone of contention for the continuance of the cold, and sometimes nearly hot, war between the East and the West. It would be a tragedy and a disaster not only for Africa but for the world if the cold war were extended to that overheated cauldron of the Continent of Africa. If the East-West dispute is carried into Africa there is no knowing where it will end and there is no knowing what harm it will do the world. The biggest sufferers will be those emergent nations in Africa who will find, no matter in what guise their liberators arrive, the ultimate result will be a bad one from their point of view.

Nobody will question the fact that the presence of the United Nations troops in the Congo has averted a large-scale civil war and in the Congo the tinder of civil war lights easier than it does in Europe and many other places throughout the world. The presence of the United Nations troops has not averted the creation of chaos in many parts of the Congo but it has at least kept the trouble so far within manageable proportions. I hope that ultimately the Congolese people themselves will recognise the futility of fratricidal strife which is only weakening their own country and perhaps creating conditions which will continue to worsen and make an ultimate peaceful settlement impossible.

The line of our people in the Congo has been a noble line which thoughtful people throughout the world will applaud. Whether it was wise or unwise to have sent troops to the Congo, we need not stop now to assess that. The whole nation has shown its gratitude to those who have gone there and, no doubt, the whole nation will applaud them on their return home.

Nobody who has not seen the bush and the desert of Africa has the slightest notion of the terrain in which troops from Western Europe are compelled to live and to fight; millions of acres practically unoccupied where the foot of civilisation has not yet made its impression on the ground, places where there are no roads, streets or paths, no water, no electric light, no sanitation, no medical supplies or hospitals, and no protection from the burning, blistering heat. That is the kind of atmosphere and the kind of climate under which our troops must operate. One person there of some rank has described it to me as a living hell out of which, he says, he cannot get quickly enough. I can well imagine how troops, used to Irish climatic conditions, not having had the slightest notion of what Africa looks like, feel in a country so friendless and inhospitable as the African bush and the African desert.

There is in Africa, stemming from colonialism under which the African people were frequently exploited, a deep prejudice against the white man and it is open to discussion as to whether white troops should be sent to Africa in these circumstances. There are now so many Afro-Asian nations in affiliation with the United Nations that it might be well to try to find a police force for the Congo from the Afro-Asian nations. It is said that climatically it is no place for white troops, for a long period certainly and, even when it was staffed by Colonial Powers with white troops, they were never left there very long. It is a matter for careful consideration whether, in view of the climatic conditions, the inhospitable country and the prejudice against the white man on the part of even countries which are in affiliation with the United Nations, it is desirable to send further troops there.

We must, when requested by the United Nations, discharge our responsibility under the Charter. We have done that and we have shown our willingness to do it and I think that it redounds to our credit as an independent affiliate of the United Nations. However, on the grounds of sheer practicability, some consideration ought to be given to the question of using Afro-Asian troops instead of white troops.

In regard to the sending of a further contingent to the Congo I take it nobody will be asked to go unless he is a volunteer. I believe, however, that those who are being asked to go in the future should be permitted the opportunity of hearing from those who have been there what life out there is like. If they are told the real facts of the situation and if they have to encounter all the difficulties which our first two contingents have experienced there in that extremely difficult country, there may not be so many willing to go. It is very easy in a case like this to appear to be wise after the event and I do not want to adopt that role.

However, bearing in mind all the difficulties which must be encountered in that vast, almost tractless country, I want to ask the Government is it desirable that we should send more troops there. It may very well be found that an equally fruitful job may be done by the utilisation of Afro-Asian troops. If they continue to play the part, as the present contingents are playing, of trying to keep the reins and hoping for the emergence of a uniform Congo administration, in the long run we shall all be glad to acclaim the splendid part the U.N. is playing and its ultimate triumph.

Our concern must not be with Kasavubu and all these transitory characters moving across the stage. It is unwise for any of us to believe that any of them has a Heaven-sent solution for the Congo problem. What the United Nations must do, and what our troops must do, is everything they can to maintain what we believe in, namely. Parliamentary Government. It does not matter who drops by the wayside so long as, in the long run, Parliamentary Government is maintained so that the people of the Congo may be able, so far as their standard of democracy permits, to select a Government and form their institutions in accordance with the democratic code.

It is quite clear that the House and the country welcome the part that our nation is playing in the United Nations generally and the part played by our troops in the Congo for the purpose of preserving peace and establishing democratic Government. I should like to point out that when the first Bill came before the House prior to the Recess, a Bill which when enacted enabled the Government to send two battalions for service in the Congo, some of us here, while welcoming the part about to be played, pointed out that we had the responsibility to ensure that our troops would be used for the purposes for which they were meant to be used. I do not intend to deal at any length with the internal fluid political situation in the Congo, but I want to repeat this. The United Nations Organisation was asked by the Government, Premier and President of the Congo to send troops into the Congo. The Irish Government were asked by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to allow Irish troops to be part of the United Nations contingent in the Congo. The duty of the U.N. troops in the Congo was to establish order and to ensure that the Belgian troops in Katanga were sent about their business.

That was the purpose of the invitation issued by the Government of the Congo to the United Nations. Nobody can deny that. Some months ago we pointed out here the danger of trouble in Katanga, due to the fact that the Belgian mining interests controlled the political situation there. Regretfully, I have to say that our analysis of the situation at that time and our forecast has proved to be completely and absolutely accurate. Therefore, because of that, we may find ourselves criticising the Government for their apparent lack of interest in establishing to their own satisfaction that our troops were being used for the original purposes for which they were invited to the Congo.

The situation since last June is that the duly elected Premier of the Congo, the man with the largest single Party in the Government and with the assent of both Houses of Parliament at that time, has now been removed from office and is in jail. His place has been taken—for the time being, I hope —by a military dictator. I shall not go into the situation concerning that dictator, but I want to put this on the records of the House. Democracy was one of the things we were anxious to establish, not a military dictatorship. We must ensure while we have troops in the Congo, and if we are sending a further contingent in the future, through our contacts with the United Nations or otherwise, that our troops do not become the instruments of imperialism and colonialism and are not used for the partition of the Congo. I think no Deputy should deny the right of any other Deputy to put that point of view when we are making a decision in regard to the lives and welfare of the fine young men we have in the Defence Forces.

It was in order to ensure that every possible action would be taken by our Government to ensure that our troops would not be misused in the Congo that we suggested the idea of the appointment of at least one political observer, or perhaps one in each of the areas concerned. Without in any way being critical of the Army officers and those in the higher command of the Army, I say emphatically that military men are not the best judges of the delicate points in a political crisis.

The Bill deals with the despatch of troops. There is no other party concerned.

I am putting the case that we must have some liaison with our troops outside the actual military in order to ensure they are used for the purpose for which they were sent to the Congo. I shall pass from that.

I want to emphasise again to the Taoiseach the absolute necessity of establishing a political contact apart altogether from the military contacts. I welcome the action of the Chief of Staff and other members of the Defence Forces in touring the various localities in the Congo where our troops are stationed in order to see the conditions there.

I want to impress on the Taoiseach that he seems to my mind over a long period to have had no interest in the idea of keeping close contact with our troops in the Congo. On the 23rd November he was asked in this House about that problem and his reply to the Dáil was:

I pointed out that the Irish contingent in the Congo would be subject to the orders of the United Nations Supreme Commander and not to the orders of the Irish Government and that, while it could be said that we were not sufficiently informed about the situation in the Congo to make a proper appreciation of it, we should not, in my opinion, regard ourselves as being under any obligation to make that appreciation.

I regard that as a most damning statement for the Taoiseach to have made. It infers that it is not our business as a Parliament and as a nation to establish to our satisfaction that our troops in the Congo are not being used for purposes which we never envisaged. I maintain that it is our duty to do so and I am glad to-day that the Taoiseach has altered his opinion and has decided, according to his own statement, that the question of a further contingent or replacement depends on two points.

One of these points is whether, in January next, it will then be considered more advisable that only non-white troops should be there solely for the purpose of establishing peace and order. The second point he made was that there may be a change in the objectives of the United Nations forces in the Congo between now and next January. We know that the Taoiseach has now decided that it is our business and in our own interests to make sure of the situation under which our troops are likely to be used.

He has now decided that we have an obligation to make an appreciation of the situation in the Congo and he has stated that if we are not satisfied on the two points he mentioned we may not send replacements to the Congo. Therefore, I think it was a disgraceful attitude on the part of the Taoiseach to launch an attack on Deputy Dr. Browne when he said that he had no shame in his bones. I think the Taoiseach should make an apology to Deputy Dr. Browne for his disgraceful and unreasonable attack on a Deputy of this House for saying what he did say with regard to a situation on which the Taoiseach himself has now altered his view.

The point made by the Taoiseach up to this is that we have handed over our troops to the United Nations and that, once we have done that, that is the end of it. Is this country going to be out on a limb in the United Nations in this respect? Are we going to take up a different line from that of other countries? The day after Deputy Dr. Browne suggested that a political observer should be sent to the Congo the Premier of India, a man for whom we all have a great regard, protested to the United Nations at the way in which Indian troops and officials were treated by the Congolese. He pointed out also the alleged military dictatorship that had been set up under Mobuto. There could be nothing wrong in our following the example of a statesman of that calibre. The Premiers of Ghana and Egypt also protested at the way their troops were being used and surely we are not going to take up a different stand on that so far as Irish troops are concerned, and say that we are handing them over to the United Nations and that we have no further responsibility?

While I am proud of the fact that we are members of the United Nations, I know that the United Nations are not infallible and therefore there is nothing wrong in our pointing out where we may feel that they are wrong. Even a former Taoiseach mentioned in this House, when I suggested that we should bring up the question of Partition in the United Nations, that we might not get the answer that we would wish for. Even the former Taoiseach of the country realised that fair play might not be given at all times. Even members of the Fianna Fáil Party have no great confidence that every action taken by the United Nations is a proper one. If they feel in that way, they should do something to protect the good name of this country and make sure that it will not be associated with imperialism or colonialism, or, worse still, associated with the idea of securing the partition of any country. We should take every possible step to protect our good name in that regard.

The great majority of our troops in the Congo have been stationed in the Province of Katanga. I want to know if it is the intention under this Bill that this replacement of our troops will be going to Katanga, or perhaps to Niemba and other places where tragedies took place in November? Let us remember clearly that our idea was that the Congolese should be allowed to settle their own affairs, and that the Belgian or Russian solution was not to be the solution for the Congolese. We find that our troops, who were sent to the Congo for the purpose of giving police protection to the people there, are actually being used in Katanga to strengthen the position there. If that is so it is not going to be much help to the Congolese as a nation. It is in Katanga that our troops are and it is there that the new contingent is likely to go.

Last July in the Security Council of the United Nations there was a motion on the question of the Congo by Ceylon and Tunisia which called on the Belgians to withdraw their troops immediately. That resolution was passed unanimously by the Security Council of the United Nations. What did we find? At that time, and afterwards, the Belgians, instead of withdrawing their troops, strengthened their armed forces there. They sent in over 4,000 troops, mostly paratroops, from last July up to the present. In addition they have 2,000 seasoned troops stationed in four garrisons in Katanga at four permanent bases.

How is this related to the Bill?

It is in Katanga that our troops are likely to be used and I want to point out what a dangerous situation there is likely to be in the province of Katanga where the Belgians, instead of getting out, have re-established themselves.

On Radio Éireann on the 21st October, 1960 there was a news item about Katanga and it was reported that the Belgians refused point blank to withdraw their troops at the request of the United Nations. We were then coming very near November 2nd, the time of the tragedy of the Irish troops in Katanga. There is no doubt that in spite of repeated requests by the United Nations the Belgians failed to remove one solitary member of their forces from Katanga. Instead, in addition to the troops I have mentioned, over 500 officers have been attached under various disguises to the gendarmerie and other forces in Katanga, all Belgian officers to lead the troops and police who are under the control of the breakaway Premier, Mr. Tshombe.

Tragedy struck portion of the Irish contingent at the beginning of November and two days after that happened Mr. Dayal, the personal representative of Mr. Hammarskjoeld reported to the United Nations that the recent influx of Belgian nationals was responsible for part of the difficulty in Katanga and in the Congo. What was the position? We found that our men were sent out to lift a road block and they were attacked. I do not know the actual military situation; I have not been in contact with any soldier but I have an idea of the complete unpreparedness of these young men in regard to what they were likely to meet. They went out to remove this road block. That road block was put down by Baluba tribesmen and the Balubas are part and parcel of the Congo in the sense that they want Katanga re-united with the Congo.

The Balubas hate the sight of the Belgians because we know from history that Belgian colonialism is probably the worst type—even worse than the British. Every white man they saw was to them a Belgian and this Irish contingent was slaughtered because, in the belief of the Balubas, they were there to protect the Belgians. After the tragic event, we had the Chief of the Balubas apologising and pointing out that it was a tragic mistake that our troops were slaughtered because these tribes, uneducated as they are and far away from civilisation, were in the position that to them every white man that they saw was a Belgian and they took what they considered was the necessary action. At that time all through Katanga Belgian forces were in occupation, either as officers, paratroops or some sort of police under the control of Katanga and the Irish troops got mixed up in this. Can it be denied that under the circumstances our position was a most unfortunate one in Katanga? Was it unfair for us to suggest that political observers should have been sent to the Congo in order to know, before our troops were sent in there, whether this danger of mistake would arise, whether United Nations troops would be mistaken for Belgians by the warring forces in Katanga?

I think it was a very fair suggestion to make and at this stage I think we cannot tolerate the idea of troops being sent from Ireland to the province of Katanga to act for the purpose of protecting Belgian property. The richest area in the entire Congo is the province of Katanga and we know that the key to the successful formation of a national Government in the Congo, a truly democratic Government, lies in the Province of Katanga. Whatever group possess political or economic control of Katanga will control the lifeblood of the entire Congo.

We know what the Belgians did. From the time of Casement, right up to the present, their history was anything but good. Admittedly, they saw their mistake in recent years; admittedly, they decided to give freedom to the Congo but we must remember that freedom was given overnight. It came when there were no more than 16 University graduates of Congolese extraction from that entire vast territory, which had no trained administrators, no army, no native civil servants, no navy and no police drawn from the ranks of the Congolese.

Overnight, the Belgians withdrew, but they left their Trojan horse in the Province of Katanga because their idea in going was that things would collapse and that they would then return. That is the position. That is precisely what has happened, and behind all the trouble taking place in the Congo to day are the Belgians. It is not because the Congolese as such are not able to negotiate with one another if they were let alone.

The Deputy might relate his remarks to the Bill.

I am relating them to the Bill so far as I can. That is the position in which our troops may find themselves if they are sent to Katanga.

On the Bill itself, I should like the Minister to clarify paragraph (c), subsection (2) of Section 2 where it states that "the contingent is intended to replace in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force and consisting of more than 12 members of the Permanent Defence Force." I may be wrong, but my reading of it is that whereas up to this if 1,000 troops went to the Congo a resolution of this House had to be passed to enable the Government to send them, but from now on if we pass paragraph (c), Section 2 the Government can replace that 1,000 with another 1,000 without coming to this House for authority.

Debate adjourned.
The Dáil adjourned at 5 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 13th December, 1960.
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