Before the House adjourned last week I was dealing with the implication of Section 2 (2) (c). This is the most important part of the measure. I should like Deputies to hear my interpretation of what powers the Government are likely to have if this provision is allowed to remain in the Bill. The paragraph in question reads:
The contingent is intended to replace, in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force and consisting of more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force.
This Bill is designed to embody permanent legislation. If it is enacted in its present form, the Government may at any time—if there is a demand for our troops to take part in any United Nations affair—come to this House and have a Resolution passed empowering them to despatch 12 members of the Defence Forces. They must first come to the House for the Resolution to get 12 members of the Defence Forces but if, the following week, the Government want to reinforce that number by 1,000 men they will be entitled to do so without coming to this House. They are further entitled, without coming near this House, to leave that Force abroad for any period they wish or feel that Force is necessary.
Deputies may have been misled by the subsection when they read it or heard the Taoiseach's opening statement as reported at Column 775 of the Official Report of Wednesday, 7th December, 1960. He said:
I indicated that it was proposed to ask the Oireachtas to pass a permanent Bill with a clause requiring approval of the Dáil by resolution before it could be given effect in any specific instance. The Bill before us is of this character.
The Bill is not of this character. It will entitle the Government, once the Resolution is passed, to send any number of troops they like to the Congo. If the Bill is enacted in its present form the Government will be entitled to send any number they like to reinforce the existing numbers in the Congo. Next January, they may send 600 men, if they wish. In March, they may send another 600 men, if they wish. In May, they may send the rest of the Army, if they wish, but they need not come back at any stage to this House to seek authority on any of those occasions. That is a most serious situation to allow. Paragraph (c) which I mentioned makes nonsense of the statement by the Taoiseach that a resolution of this House would be necessary whenever a decision was being taken to send forces abroad.
This House, is entitled to have a discussion on the merits or otherwise of sending troops abroad. If this measure passes into law, it will mean that next June if the Government decide to replace a battalion in the Congo with another battalion, this House will not be asked to comment on or approve of their action. The country will not know anything about it, except that the Government have made a decision. We shall have allowed the matter to have passed from our hands by this legislation. I shall make it quite clear that Deputy Dr. Browne and I are opposing paragraph (c) of subsection (2). We believe it is not the wish of this House or of the country that the Government should have the power on any occasion they wish to send any number of our troops abroad without consulting this House.
The Taoiseach in his opening remarks also referred to the position with regard to length of service and as reported at column 780, said:—
It will be understood, however, that, as in the case of the first contingent, the period during which the new battalion will be available in the Congo will not exceed six months.
I do not know where in this Bill there is anything in writing to say that the service of any contingent abroad will be not more than six months, or three months, or 12 months. It is not in the Bill. Prior to its becoming legislation a period should be fixed and prior to that period elapsing, the House would then have an opportunity of discussing the situation and of saying whether, in our opinion, further contingents should be sent to a particular locality.
I should like to refer briefly to our manpower in the Congo. Two battalions have been sent and I think the combined strength of the units is over 1,200 men. Our normal peace-time Army is supposed to be in the region of 12,000 men and at no time in the past 15 years, have we had what we had hoped to have—a normal peace-time Army of 12,000. The Army has always been around 8,000 to 9,000 in number and we have over 1,200 men out of that small Army in the Congo. It is estimated in military terms that to keep one soldier in the field at least seven other men are required. Out of our entire Army, we have not at any time more than what I would call one full strength battalion, with all the necessary attachments in the line of cavalry and artillery units and so forth. That is all we could afford to put into the field and the rest of the troops would be in the back lines engaged in various other duties.
We should consider very seriously whether we are straining our resources here at home and whether we are being fair to the units which are being left at home, if we decide to send a certain number abroad. I think we should not set out to compete with nations who have Armies 10, 15 and 20 times the size of our Army. Let me say that on a percentage basis, we have contributed more troops than any other nation to the Congo. On a percentage basis, not perhaps in actual numbers, of our total Defence Forces, we have made a bigger contribution than any other nation. That is a point that should be considered not alone in regard to that aspect but in regard to the welfare and the conditions of our troops at home. That should be taken into consideration as well.
There is another point I wish to make. I do not know if it has been thought about or discussed very much here, but I may tell the Minister for Defence that I discussed it with a number of Army officers. Perhaps I am lucky enough to be in closer touch with men who would be on the active end of the picture than the Minister. It is on that basis that I propose to make these remarks. What I have to say is in no way intended as criticism of our troops, but it is a well-known fact that our troops have no training whatever in bush or jungle warfare and even as far as police work is concerned. While it could be argued, and fairly argued, that there was no time to give the first contingent a reasonable period of training in relation to conditions existing in the Congo, there was no excuse whatever over the past six months for not giving proper advice or training to what may be replacements in the Congo.
It was suggested to me that the advice of some specialists who have experienced such conditions in other Armies should have been sought and, if necessary, they should have been brought here to give the full benefit of their advice to our young men who might be going abroad. It is a well-known fact that the type of training given in our Army is related to completely different conditions from those which the men were likely to encounter. There is no question about that. Any Deputy who has been a member of the Defence Forces knows that that is true. That is not a criticism of the Army, but it is meant to be criticism of responsible authorities who have not taken the necessary steps to give the proper advice and training in preparation for any decision to send troops abroad. It is even alleged abroad that the Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces is completely unfamiliar with the conditions likely to be met in the Congo.