Skip to main content
Normal View

Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 14 Dec 1960

Vol. 185 No. 8

Committee on Finance. - Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, 1960—Report and Final Stages.

I move:

Section 2.— To delete the words "or reinforce" in line 46.

On an amendment moved on the Committee Stage to Section 2 subsection (2) (c) it was sought to delete the section. The purpose of the subsection was to empower the Minister to send on service outside the country a contingent of troops if that contingent was intended to replace, in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Forces serving outside the State as part of that international United Nations Force and consisting of more than 12 members of the Permanent Defence Force.

I want to avoid as far as possible going over all the ground that has been covered in the Committee Stage discussion on the section. I said then that, so far as I was concerned, I was prepared to agree that, having entered into the commitment to send troops to the Congo, we should continue to honour that if circumstances remained in any way comparable to those in which we first entered into the commitment. I would not, for example, see any special reason why if every other country pulled its troops out of the Congo we should leave Irish troops to provide a blood bath. However, on the assumption that the circumstances would be comparable to those in which the contingent was sent in the first instance, and provided the Government were satisfied that nationally and internationally our continued participation in the policing of the Congo was justified, I was again willing to allow the replacement of those who were sent out so that they could be relieved for home duties and so that we could fulfil our obligations to those who went out, as well as to the United Nations.

In this section, however, there is power taken to reinforce the troops which are out there and, in that connection, while the Dáil was sitting there might be two battalions of Irish troops in the Congo and, by the time we came back after the Christmas Recess, there might be four or five battalions of Irish troops in the Congo without Parliament having had an opportunity of considering the matter. So long as Parliament is allowed to consider the matter, Parliament by a majority can take any decision it likes. I do not question that. Nevertheless, I take the view, and I think my parliamentary responsibilities compel me to take the view, that if having in the first instance agreed to a Bill which provides for the sending of two battalions of troops to the Congo, my support of its passage is used, or misused, as the case may be, to send three more battalions, then I am morally bound to take some steps to prevent an undesirable situation such as that arising.

The Minister said to-day that this section was necessary because, when you got out to the Congo, you might discover that you were missing a signalman or a driver and, therefore, you needed some reinforcements. However, I do not think we should give the Government — this Government or any Government — a Bill which empowers them to send out one contingent, in the first instance, followed perhaps by two contingents, not to reinforce the first but to increase its strength by 100 per cent., 200 per cent. or 300 per cent.

If circumstances arise in which there is a call for reinforcements in the Congo the question ought to be discussed in the Dáil and the Minister ought to say: "There is a change in the whole situation. We originally intended to send two battalions but we now discover, for reasons with which we will acquaint the House, that more than two are necessary. We think five are necessary. As this is a wide departure from the decision taken in the first instance we think the Dáil should be told about it and we want authority to send"— four, five, or six battalions, as the case may be. Parliament want to get a chance of looking at that situation. It is not just a question of counting heads, but of an entirely new political situation in the Congo. The Dáil ought to get a chance of evaluating circumstances of that kind and of saying what it wishes the Government to do.

My amendment would not prevent the Government from replacing, in whole or part, the troops sent there. Having relieved them and brought them home, we could say to the Government: "You cannot reinforce the troops you originally sent there unless you come to the Dáil and ask for the necessary authority to do that." After all, as I have said, these troops are not taking a position of Custer's Last Stand. According to the Bill, they are there as police officers. We are entitled to say to the people who want our police officers: "We are willing to give you a certain number but beyond that we cannot go without coming to our own Parliament." In the long run this Parliament is the custodian of the interests of the nation.

I think the Government could quite easily accept, in detail or in principle, that it will not send troops to the Congo or elsewhere in excess of the number sent in the first instance without coming back to the Dáil and getting the necessary authority. If the Dáil, in its wisdom, thinks the situation is such as would necessitate giving the Government authority to send additional troops its good sense would prevail on an occasion like that as it always has prevailed. In the meantime the Government should be held to consulting Parliament so that the Parliament would have an opportunity of evaluating the whole situation afresh and in the light of what we should do in relation to others and in relation to the general circumstances.

On this occasion I should like to support the Minister, although I usually oppose the Government. This is purely a military question. In the first instance, when the Government asks that a contingent be sent, it is a political issue. But when that has been disposed of, it becomes a military matter. The question as to whether there should be reinforcements or replacements is a military one and should be left to the Government. It would be very dangerous to allow a matter of that kind to depend on a vote of the House. Our forces could be annihilated while the House was discussing the situation. I have no great faith in the House in matters purely military. It is a fact that the Tan War was not declared by the then Dáil, but by individuals. If it had been left to the House, the Tan War would never have been declared, and they would have been talking until they were defeated.

Deputy Norton made a point that it would take several weeks to send reserves. That occurred in the first case because we were sending volunteers. But now, since permanent forces will be sent, there is no question of a delay of several weeks. A force could be sent in two days. If we have the men, the United Nations will supply the planes. This is a question of speed being necessary. I agree that we should talk our heads off in the first instance when discussing whether or not to send a force, but, having decided to do so, it should be left to the military authorities to decide whether or not to send replacements or reinforcements.

I do not think Deputy Norton should press his amendment. If it is carried and if a wireless operator or machine gunner fell ill, no reinforcements could be sent out until the man concerned had been first brought home. It would tie up the whole operation.

I take it Deputy Norton really intends this as a token amendment to give him an opportunity of expressing to the House the anxiety he feels in this matter rather than as a serious proposition, because I cannot imagine a sensible Deputy such as he is contemplating a situation in which, after a contingent had been dispatched to serve with a United Nations Police Force in any part of the world, no additional personnel of any kind could be sent to join them except after the passage of another resolution by the House?

What is wrong with the procedure?

I do not see any alternative in this matter to assuming that the Government of the day are going to act in a reasonable and responsible way. That would involve, it seems to me, when proposing the resolution initially to the House explaining the extent of the commitment they were proposing to undertake and the circumstance in which they thought it might be necessary or desirable to extend that commitment. Once the House in these circumstances knew the mind of the Government and the requirements of the situation and had given its authority for action, I think the Government must then be left to deal with the arrangements and that any other course is impracticable.

Personally, I cannot conceive any circumstances arising in which we will have an armed contingent abroad with a United Nations Force in which it will not be the aim of the Government in office, whoever they may be, to try to bring the House along with them and to bring public opinion along with them in every step they take in that direction and to limit their undertakings or commitments to the extent they feel satisfied that they will have that general support in the House and in the country.

I do not think I am allowed to make another speech on Report Stage?

The Deputy may conclude on his amendment.

I should like to support this amendment. I am not going to go into the many arguments which have been advanced during the afternoon for the case which our amendments cover. I should like to support Deputy Norton. My reason for seeking some Parliamentary control arises from the terribly difficult situation in the Congo at present, a problem which, the Government has made it clear, is a problem of great magnitude. There is no question, I am sure, in Deputy Norton's mind of trying to limit the Minister sending out the necessary additional lorry drivers, dentists, surgeons, physicians or whoever may be required to make the detachment function efficiently. The point I am concerned with is that no appreciable reinforcements should be permitted without referring back the matter to the Dáil.

The reason I am concerned about this appreciable reinforcement is this. If an appreciable reinforcement is required it must be assumed that radical changes have taken place in the initial situation which the Government faced when they brought the problem before the House in the first instance. When they came, as they did in July, and said they wanted one or two battalions, they made their case for that. They established their point of view and they got our authority. As the Taoiseach said, he brought the House along with him. Obviously, that is the most satisfactory way from his point of view, from our point of view and from the country's point of view.

The difficulty which appears to arise here is that the Taoiseach could come along, bona fide, present his case, get authority from us on the face of the facts produced by him and of the situation and thereafter he need never refer to the Dáil again for subsequent reinforcements. We have dealt with the question of Parliamentary Questions, motions and so on, and established in a reasonably satisfactory manner that they are likely to be completely ineffective. The only way in which we can have any sort of elucidation of the situation and of the reasons why these people are going out there or why reinforcements are required is in the restricted debate we have here on the particular problem. That has been most helpful, maybe only to a minority, but it is an important minority. Any minority is important It may put their minds at rest. It certainly clears up some doubts they may have; it has left some doubts in their minds but it was an advance on the position where we could send out reinforcements without any attempt to reassess the position after July.

It is quite clear that the position has changed very radically indeed. We are in a situation the outcome of which is completely unpredictable by any of us. There is this prospect, as I said, of terrible civil war and in those circumstances it would greatly help the House and greatly reassure the people if they knew that if the Government honestly believed that we should send out very considerable reinforcements they would have to come back to the House and make their case. We are just as reasonable as the Government are. If the case is reasonable, the Government can make their point and can have their reinforcements. In spite of what Deputy Sherwin says, the House can act rapidly and speedily when required. I do not think the Taoiseach will find that any Deputy or any Party was likely to make his difficult position more difficult but we would greatly appreciate his continuing to accept the right of Parliament as a whole to make our points of view known. It would be for himself to reject or accept them as he thinks fit. He, with the Government, would have to accept the final responsibility. It is he ultimately who will have to accept that responsibility.

As I said earlier, this is a situation which is changing so rapidly that it would appear to me that the Taoiseach should welcome the expression of every point of view in the House so that he might get some assistance from us. Most of our contributions have been in an attempt to find out the facts, to find out whether our conclusions are right or wrong in order that we may in that way inform the country.

I would ask the Taoiseach to consider whether there is not some way, possibly not Deputy Norton's amendment, but some way the draftsman could devise, whereby it would be possible for him to send out the forces required to maintain in the field the number stated in the first instance without any delay of any kind but, where a radical change took place requiring serious or appreciable reinforcements, he would come back to the House, put his case to us and then take his decision on whatever conclusions he arrives at after that debate.

Parliamentary Government requires for its efficient operation the application zealously and continuously of checks and balances. In that respect an Opposition has very considerable responsibilities, not merely to Parliament but to the people it represents. It is a quite reasonable precaution to say to the Government in general principle, "We support you in broad outline on things with which we agree but we are entitled to be consulted and to have an opportunity of evaluating a changing situation from time to time so that we can express our point of view and see whether we are necessarily still with you in altered circumstances."

In certain circumstances, as is known to every Deputy here, this House generously gave the necessary sanction to send troops to the Congo as police officers, and that is their function there. So far as the House is concerned, therefore, its goodwill for sending these troops to the Congo in the circumstances then existing is well known and I do not think anybody wants to get away from that situation. I certainly do not. If we are a member of the United Nations, we ought to abide by the rules and play our part in doing that. Others, of course, have similar responsibilities and we must not be left standing in the wreckage of United Nations, saying that we are the Casabianca of the whole outfit, that everybody else can get off the boat and go anywhere they like to safety. Our loyalty does not necessarily mean that we stand on the wreck there to be consumed in its last stages.

We have got a responsibility vis-a-vis the Congo and elsewhere of seeing what changes take place from the time we give approval to the Government to do a particular thing. If the Government are satisfied that it is necessary to replace the troops in the Congo by other troops from here, well and good. I travel that far with them. I do not see in the circumstances just at the moment why we should change our line of policy in that respect but I think the Opposition is morally obliged to say to the Government, “If, however, you are going to send to the Congo in changed circumstances two or three times more troops than you got authority from us to send in the first instance, you must come back to the Dáil and tell us what the changed circumstances are.” That is not unreasonable and that is necessary if you are to carry the goodwill of the House with the Government in an effort to fulfil our obligations under the United Nations.

The Korean business and American >-participation in Korea changed an American Government and caused considerable bitterness. I should not like to see grow up in this country a group, party or section, or whatever you like to call it, demanding that you take back the people from the Congo. It would be a bad business for the Government, a bad business nationally and internationally. There is a great deal to be said for the Government carrying the House with it in what it does.

If, however, we should take the line of substantially extending the number of troops used overseas without the obligation to come to the House and to explain the circumstances which necessitate these changes, the Opposition would be entitled to feel aggrieved by that change of policy on the part of the Government but I would not accuse the Government of any "smart alecking" in doing that. If we pass this section, the law would permit them. There would be nothing immoral or illegal or unparliamentary so far as the Government is concerned. It would mean that the Opposition would have forfeited their right to a close appraisal of the change in the circumstances as compared with the circumstances when the Government got the authority in the first instance.

I do not want to emphasise any disagreement with the Government in their approach to this problem.

I am satisfied if the Government keep within the limits of the contingents they sent out in the first instance but I do not want a contingent of 2,500 to be reinforced by another 3,000. If the Government could do that —as they are legally entitled to do under this Bill — they would be departing from the circumstances which induced the House in the first place to send a contingent of 2,500. If the Taoiseach is prepared to say that we shall not increase the number of our troops over and above the original contingent, whether that is in one or in two parts. I would be quite satisfied. I would ask him to give us that assurance and to say that he would consult with the leaders of the different Parties and give them an opportunity of debating the matter if they wish to do so. I should not be advising the Government to take these safeguards which would enable them to carry the House and the country with them.

I said that in my view a Government coming here with a resolution under this Bill should be very frank with the House and try to define the limits of the commitment into which they were proposing to enter. As regards the Congo, I mentioned that we have already made it clear to the United Nations that, as from January next, our commitments in the Congo must be limited to one battalion and that we are unable to go beyond that, not because we think the situation may not require more United Nations troops but because our resources do not permit of it. The United Nations have been so aware for many months past.

May I point out, however, that the term battalion is somewhat elastic. When we decided to send the 32nd Battalion to the Congo, the Government consulted the Army Command as to what number would constitute a properly integrated, effective battalion with all the necessary components in it. It worked out at about one hundred more than we had first assumed. I have informed the Dáil that we have told the United Nations that our commitment in respect of the Congo force must be restricted to one battalion as from January.

That satisfies me.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill, as amended, received for final consideration.
Agreed to take remaining stage to-day.
Question: "That the Bill now pass" put and agreed to.
Top
Share