Committee on Finance. - Vote 54—International Co-operation. – Dáil Éireann (16th Dáil) – Thursday, 23 Feb 1961

Committee on Finance. - Vote 54—International Co-operation.

Aire Gnothaí Eachtracha (Proinnsias Mac Aogáin)

Tairgim:

Go ndeonófar suim fhorlíontach nach mó ná £80,765 chun íoctha an mhuirir a thiocfaidh chun bheith iníoctha i rith na bliana dar críoch an 31ú lá de Mhárta, 1961, le haghaidh ranníocaí do Chomhairle na hEorpa agus don Eagras um Chomhar Eaenamaíochta san Eoraip agus do na Náisiúin Aontaithe; agus le haghaidh costais eile i ndáil leis an gcéanna.

The principal reason why I bring this Supplementary Estimate before the House is that, as Deputies will be aware, the United Nations has for some months past been facing a very serious financial crisis. The Organisation began the financial year 1961 with a virtually empty treasury and with arrears of contributions to the Regular Budget amounting to $8.5 million and to the United Nations Emergency Force (Gaza) account of $22.5 millions. The crisis was brought to a head by the added heavy financial burden of the United Nations operation in the Congo since last July which is of the order of $10 million monthly.

The alternatives now facing the Organisation are either to revise its policies drastically and face withdrawals from Gaza and the Congo, with all the consequences such steps would have, or to make appropriate and speedy arrangements to cover the very high costs imposed by the policies adopted to meet these situations.

Various measures have been suggested to meet the situation such as augmenting the Secretary-General's borrowing powers, increasing advances to the Working Capital Fund or establishing a Peace and Security Fund. It may well prove necessary to resort at some stage to one or more of these measures. In the meantime, however, there is one course which Member Governments can adopt to at least alleviate the situation, namely, to pay their contributions to the 1961 budgetary accounts at an early stage in the year. It is the Government's view that, as a concrete manifestation of our loyalty to the United Nations Charter and our determination to stand by it, we should take that course; and this is the purpose of the Supplementary Estimate now before the House. If, as I confidently hope, the Dáil approves the Estimate, the Government will then be in a position to effect payment of our 1961 contributions to United Nations expenses some six months or so earlier than in previous years.

Of the amounts falling due for payment, details of which are set out in the Estimate, our shares of the United Nations Regular Budget and of the United Nations Emergency Force (Gaza) Budget are calculated in accordance with a percentage scale of assessments. This is determined by reference to national income, population and other related economic factors. In our case the percentage is small and stands at present at just under 0.16. The net cost of ONUC— the United Nations Organisation in the Congo—for the period 14th July to 31st December, 1960, has been apportioned among member States on the same basis subject to the application of certain voluntary contributions to reduce the burden on member States with the least capacity to pay.

The United Nations Fund for the Congo is a voluntary fund to be used under United Nations control and in consultation with the Central Government of the Congo for the purpose of assisting that Government to maintain certain essential public services with the ultimate objectives of preserving its unity, territorial integrity and political independence, protecting and advancing the welfare of its people, and safeguarding international peace. The Secretary-General estimated that the immediate financial support needed under this head from all Member States is $100 million if United Nations operations in the Congo are not to be jeopardised or even nullified. The Government consider it important that Ireland should make a contribution to this fund and subject to the approval of the House, they propose to contribute $25,000 or £8,950.

I am sure that the House will agree that we should do what we reasonably can to help the United Nations in the extraordinarily difficult financial position in which it finds itself this year. It is vital for the future of the Organisation that nothing should be left undone which would contribute to the success of its task in the Congo. It would be particularly unfortunate if the United Nations efforts were to fail because of financial difficulties which, with the goodwill of Member States, could be overcome. This country has met its responsibilities to the United Nations in relation to the Congo. We have every right to be proud of the gallant service of our soldiers and medical teams who responded to the request of the Secretary-General. In the Government's view, we should be prepared to bear the very much smaller burden involved in making the payments covered by this Estimate. I therefore propose that the Dáil should approve these payments.

Mr. Dillon

I just want to say that our view is that the gesture suggested by the Government is a reasonable one in all the circumstances, but it causes me some surprise that the Minister did not think it appropriate to tell us what corresponding gesture is contemplated by the other members of the United Nations. I understand that some members are in default of their contribution and it would be helpful if the House were told what the position is in regard to the various member nations and how many have indicated their willingness to emulate the example set in the procedure adopted by our own Government with regard to advance payment of the 1961 contribution.

I do not want to go into the extremely complex and difficult situation which obtains in the Congo at present; yet there are certain aspects which we are bound to consider on the occasion of the submission of an Estimate such as this. We are faced, in that difficult and dangerous situation that has arisen in the Congo, with all the consequences of the horrors that ensue when murder is adopted as an instrument of policy. Murder begets murder. One side murders a politician and the other side murders a priest. One side murders simple people in their homes. The other side wreaks vengeance on those whom they conceive to be responsible for that outrage until ultimately a country such as the Congo, peopled by so many different races, approaches the full horror of civil war.

To apportion blame in all that dialectical horror is very easy if one is utterly irresponsible, extremely difficult if one recognises the limitations of one's own information and if one realises how rarely it is possible to simplify the complex affairs of a distant State, more especially those of an emergent State where normal political institutions have never existed before.

We have, in common with many other nations, decided that such help as we can offer to the Congo people in their trials and tribulations should be channelled to them through the medium of the United Nations and that policy has so far enjoyed the unanimous support of this House. We still believe that to be the right policy but we have noticed that, within the recent past, the United Nations have decided by a resolution of the Security Council, by the unanimous vote of those who voted albeit with two abstentions, that the responsibility of the United Nations Force should now be extended beyond its original charge to preserve the peace to the further responsibility of using force if necessary to avert civil war.

The armies of several States who have made contributions to the United Nations Force are at present serving in the Congo. Amongst them is the contribution made by our Army. It is difficult for us to keep constantly present to our mind, as we have a clear duty to do, the realisation that General McKeown is now not serving the Irish Government but is in the service of the United Nations and is the United Nations Commander there. Bearing that fact in mind, whether the United Nations Commander is one of our own or a national of Sweden or anywhere else, it behoves us to ask ourselves the question: if the United Nations have decided to accept the very substantial additional responsibility of undertaking to avert civil war, if necessary by force, what decision have they taken to provide the United Nations Commander in the Congo with forces and equipment adequate to bear this additional grave responsibility?

The Congo is a vast country. I think it is true to say that it is as big as France, Germany and the Low Countries combined. Its communications are extremely primitive. It is inhabited by a variety of tribal peoples There is a struggle for power proceeding. Even though a Government has been recognised by the United Nations, various rivals claim a variety of rights in regard to the autonomy of the various districts they inhabit and the danger of conflict amounting to civil war is pretty imminent.

I think our Government and every other responsible Government attending the United Nations have a clear duty to measure the liabilities they undertake as members of the United Nations with the resources they are in a position to deploy. I put it to the Minister for External Affairs that, with the resources which the United Nations Commander-in-Chief at present disposes of in the Congo, to charge him with the responsibility of averting civil war, if necessary by force, is to charge him with a responsibility far beyond the resources he disposes of, both in men and material. That is not a reasonable thing to do.

I believe the policy of the United Nations as expressed in various resolutions to date in regard to the Congo represents the best policy, in all the circumstances. It would be a very good thing if the United Nations could succeed in putting an end to the internecine warfare that has threatened the very existence of the new State, but it would be the greatest of all disasters if the United Nations undertook a responsibility expressly without carefully counting the necessary cost and providing that cost in full time to meet any emergency that may arise.

We certainly cannot feel easy in our minds that the United Nations have made any corresponding decision in regard to men and materials with the new decision to charge the Commander-in-Chief in the Congo to stop civil war, if necessary, by force. We feel that very substantial additions of men, materials and equipment should be made available to the United Nations Commander forthwith, if he has this added responsibility. We would be gravely concerned if we were told that the United Nations Commander in the Congo were called upon to meet these responsibilities without the additional force.

I know that in circumstances such as at present confront us in the world, it would be very easy to use the language of panic and alarm and I am concerned to refrain from that course. However, I do not want the Minister to underestimate the anxiety we feel in this regard. It would be idle to deny that the pride we have all legitimately taken in the contribution our Army has made to the valuable work that has been done to date adds to our anxiety lest in the present circumstances when the United Nations Commander is an officer of our Army, he should be placed in an impossible position which no personal sacrifice on his part could redress.

I am not fully informed, and I do not suppose the Minister himself is fully informed, of all the details of the situation obtaining in the Congo, but I think both of us know enough to realise that the task of preventing a civil war, if necessary, by force, in a country of that kind, in a territory of that size, is a formidable assignment. We all know from our past experience in this country and elsewhere there can be no greater disaster than to ask the forces of order to meet an emergency with inadequate resources. There is no more fundamental rule in situations of that kind than the obligation, if you have to meet disorder, to deploy forces so amply as to make the success of the effort certain. Such forces to meet the situation in the Congo must be very considerable and they are subject to the further limitation that the sources from which they can be drawn are strictly limited because it appears that practically every major power which could quickly deploy overwhelming forces and material is virtually excluded from participation in this operation by political considerations.

In that delicate situation, we ask reassurance from the Minister for External Affairs that, if we are correct in believing that the recent resolution of the United Nations has considerably expanded the responsibility of the United Nations Commander-in-Chief in the Congo, the Minister is satisfied that the United Nations are in a position to and intend to place at his disposal adequate resources of men and material to carry out his charge. If that is done, then our anxieties will be largely allayed. If a situation is allowed to develop in which the United Nations Commander-in-Chief in the Congo is called upon to undertake these very substantial additional responsibilities, without corresponding reinforcement of his resources, we would consider the situation to be extremely difficult and one which the Government, in our judgment, should very carefully consider.

It is one thing to help out as in the Gaza affair where fully adequate forces were available to deal with any possible situation which could arise under the limited responsibility the United Nations had accepted in that area. It was very limited, almost restricted to the function of an observer force. There is a very great difference between that and the almost unlimited responsibility which the recent resolution of the United Nations would envisage. We want assurances that the recent resolution is not going to wind up on the part of the United Nations as a pious hope and that the United Nations are in a position to provide the additional forces requisite and that they have a firm intention of doing so without delay. I do not doubt that the Minister and the Government share the anxieties which I now mention but I hope that before this Supplementary Estimate is disposed of they will be able to reassure the House.

As regards the finances of the United Nations, one finds it hard to imagine that the States which are members of the organisation will allow it to go bankrupt. I do not think they will and I suppose the present financial stringency is simply part of the general campaign on the part of the Soviet bloc to bring pressure to bear on the administration. I imagine that is a crisis that will be relatively easily overcome. In any case the attitude of our Government as outlined here is the correct one. I should be glad if the Minister would tell us when concluding what the judgment of the Government is as to the ultimate prospects. I rather imagine that whatever else may affect the future of the United Nations it will not be finance but I should like the Minister's view on that aspect of the Estimate we have before us.

Dr. Browne

I move:

"That the Supplementary Estimate be referred back for reconsideration."

I do this as a measure of our criticism of the Government's, and I suppose the Minister's failure since July last—when we accepted responsibility in the United Nations by sending troops to the Congo—to exercise proper initiative or to make positive suggestions for active protests against certain decisions taken by the United Nations in the Congo during the last eight or nine months. At the outset I should like to make it clear that I appreciate that the Army authorities and personnel—every one of them, as far as we can gather—have behaved in the most exemplary way and that anything I say is not meant to be a criticism of anything they have done because, of course, they are merely the instruments of Government policy and must do what they are told, whether it be right or wrong.

I should also like to make it clear that any intervention I make or have made here in the past is merely because of my great concern for the fate of the United Nations. Everybody must know now that the world could be faced with the final cataclysm and that the only shield between us and final annihilation is probably an effective United Nations in which all the peoples of the world should be encouraged to meet, debate and even abuse one another so long as they continue to maintain peace. We, Deputy McQuillan and myself, are as anxious as anyone to help to see the United Nations continue as an effective instrument in attempting to maintain peace in the world. We have had the example of the failure of the League of Nations to prevent war in the past and we should learn something from our experiences.

I hope it will be possible for us to get information from the Minister on his actions from time to time in the United Nations. Due to the continued inexplicable reticence of the Taoiseach on occasions when I have asked questions we have been—I have been, at any rate—denied information which I should have liked to have. There may be reasons for that information being denied but I hope that we shall get it now because we have not had an opportunity of discussing in any great detail this terribly serious and tangled problem since last July.

As the Leader of the Fine Gael Party points out, the whole pattern of events has taken a particularly dangerous and frightening turn through the decision of the Security Council to accept responsibility for imposing peace by means of force. It was a shocking decision to have to make and one which I am sure was reached with the greatest possible reluctance. I am sure it was a decision that the unfortunate Mr. Hammarskjoeld must have been more than reluctant to advise the Security Council to take.

At this stage I should say that I believe that the total responsibility for any failure in the Congo lies with the United Nations, with the General Assembly and the Security Council and that I think it is unfair to criticise the actions of the Secretary-General. Like every human being, he has erred from time to time, but effectively, he is merely, as is our Army in the Congo, the instrument of the United Nations policy. It would be as unfair to blame him for United Nations failures as it would be for a Government Minister to blame a civil servant for his own failure in the operation and control of his Department.

We are a component part of the United Nations and so we must accept the imposition of collective responsibility. For this reason I should like to criticise the Government decisions that are taken from time to time. Taking up the point mentioned by Deputy Dillon, I suppose the most important matter now to be considered is the position of our troops in the Congo following the decision to take forceful action to suppress civil war, should it break out.

I do not share Deputy Dillon's view. Deputy Dillon appears to believe that the present United Nations Force could be used for this purpose. Taking the vast size of the Congo and the appalling problems of communication, climatic conditions, and lack of administration into consideration, I cannot see how the present United Nations Force, as at present constituted, could be expected to carry out the latest recommendation of the Security Council. For that reason, I believe a very much more radical approach must be considered. The radical approach I would suggest is that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. must somehow come to an agreement to send the necessary reinforcements, personnel and equipment, staff and technicians, into the Congo as a United Nations Force under some neutral high command, if possible—and it must be "if possible"—such as India or some other acceptable country.

Quite clearly—I shall give the reasons later—the present forces in the Congo cannot be expected to intervene to prevent civil war. If they do, they do so at the peril of their very lives and I do not believe our men should be subjected to the intolerable risks involved. Let them play their part to the extent they can, but the reinforcements necessary will have to come from the Great Powers. I know the intricacy of the considerations involved in such a proposition, but it now appears that we are dealing with two Heads of State, one of whom is quite clearly completely different from his predecessor. I refer to the present President of the U.S.A., Mr. Kennedy. As far as one can see, he is anxious to bring the cold war to an end. Mr. Khrushchev has made many protestations of his anxiety to bring it to an end. This would seem to me to be an ideal opportunity to call the bluff of both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. They may be completely sincere. I hope they are.

It seems to me this can be a vital test case. If the United Nations Organisation fails, it is completely discredited almost before its task has properly begun. The Suez affair was successful, but it was relatively small. The tasks that lie ahead are limitless because of the continued emergence of the many new former colonial African societies. It is quite clear, looking at the chaos in the Congo, that there is no one responsible colonial African leader at present fighting for freedom in Africa, who will in the future turn to the United Nations for help, should he have to meet problems such as those which the emergence of the Congolese people has thrown up for them in the past eight or nine months.

The United Nations has lost the confidence of most of the nations of the world. That is no consolation and could be no consolation to any responsible person in any country. I believe that, because of the various actions taken from time to time in the Congo episode, the United Nations has forfeited the regard, the respect and the confidence which that Organisation should have built up in the minds of the people of those nations, in leaders like Nyeri, Aboya, and all these other African leaders who will need help but will not be able to seek it from the United Nations, if the present situation continues.

It seems to me inexplicable that this situation should have been allowed to develop because it was clearly predictable in practically every single detail. It was predicted by both Deputy McQuillan and myself with our grossly inadequate sources of information. We predicted the inevitable conflict between the colonial powers refusing to give up willingly, attempting to maintain a foothold in the wealthiest part of the Congo, the Katanga Province, and, while nominally relinquishing power, in fact retaining it. It was suggested by us last July that the Security Council would eventually come to be dominated by the colonial powers and decisions taken would be taken not in favour of the Congolese but, rather, in favour of the financial interests concerned in the Katanga Province in particular.

That is precisely what has happened. The three great interests—the Rockefeller mining interests, Captain Waterhouse, Conservative M.P., actively and acutely interested in copper mining in Katanga, and the Belgian interests—are all anxious to retain real power in the Congo, financial power and the power to continue to exploit the wealth of the Congolese people for the Belgians, the British and the Americans at the expense of the unfortunate Congolese people.

It is a criticism of our Government's action in going along with these interests since July last that they should have gone along with them so happily. That is something which seriously perturbs me. In the beginning, we had a suggestion from the Taoiseach that it was not our business to interfere. Our job, he said, was to send these troops to the Congo to act under the command appointed by the Security Council and it was not for us to question their decisions. That seemed to me to be absurd. I said so at the time. Some weeks later, the Taoiseach mended his hand; he said there were certain conditions in which we might protest and express disagreement with decisions taken in the Congo. Our attitude at the United Nations appears to me to have changed fundamentally and radically since the election of the present President of the United Nations. I do not know if there is any relation between the two events and the change from the policy of non-commitment, the policy of neutrality vis-à-vis the two powers, Russia, and America, involved in the cold war. The policy of non-commitment created a great measure of goodwill for our country, a measure of respect and high regard in the United Nations and, in particular, amongst the emergent Afro-Asian societies—a position which I believe we have since sacrificed by our attitude of support for the policy of colonialism in the Congo in the past nine months.

It was clear in July last that the Belgians intended to partition the Congo. They had appointed their puppet Tshombe, who expressed his fealty on many occasions to the Belgian ruling classes, and presented a wedding present to the King. He demanded that Belgian troops be allowed to remain in the Congo, and demanded that Belgian troops should reinforce the existing troops in the Congo, and in Katanga in particular. Since the United Nations went into the Congo, he declared the secession of Katanga, and we made no effective protest at this effective partitioning of the Congo. In allowing the secession of Katanga, we permitted the removal from the Congo of its whole basic, real mineral wealth. The sole wealth of the Congo is in Katanga—the main wealth is certainly there. We, above all people, it seemed to me, should have protested and protested again until it was made quite clear to Tshombe that he would not be allowed to carry out the partitioning of the Congo on the same lines as we have suffered here for the past 40 years.

It seemed to me that that was the first occasion on which the United Nations failed. They asked for the removal of Belgian troops from Katanga, and Belgian troops not only remained there from that time to this day, but reinforcements have been continually built up. Equipment, ammunition, personnel, aircraft and advisers of all kinds have been allowed to percolate into Katanga. Every bandit, brigand and highway-robber, every no-good from South Africa, from our own country, from Great Britain, from Belgium, gangsters of one kind or another, every freelance soldier who thinks there is something laudable in killing, all have been allowed to swell the forces of Tshombe and Mobutu.

Those reinforcements have gone on continuously and no effective effort has been made to stop them. Now, in the heel of the hunt, when these armies are properly and fully armed, highly trained and well equipped, led by vicious Belgian paratrooper officer cadres, having been handed a machine gun, as a result of vacillation, equivocation and failure to take positive action, our unfortunate boys and officers are told to go and take that machine gun from them. That is the predicament in which we have now placed our troops.

It is no good saying that the Belgians were requested to leave Katanga, or that protests were made against the building up of a force in Katanga. If it was possible to take forcible action the day before yesterday, or to decide to take action, it was possible to take that action seven or eight months ago. When Tshombe cocked a snook at the United Nations, that was the time the United Nations should have acted and prevented the present appalling drift into civil war and anarchy.

I know of no single decision by our Government to protest at that, in spite of the fact that our job was to attempt to establish and maintain law and order, to establish an effective administration and civil service and to organise some form of Parliamentary Government or democracy. I cannot see that any effective action was taken by the Security Council of the United Nations or our Government to protest against the deposing of the very man who asked the United Nations into the Congo, Mr. Lumumba. I do not know anything about the personal merits of the man, but if words have any meaning, this man was the Premier of the Congo. He was elected by an adult universal suffrage, with the largest single Party in the Congo. He was elected Premier by the House of Representatives and the Senate and ratified in that position after his illegal deposition by Kasavubu.

Our purpose was apparently to establish and maintain law and order, and while we were doing that, the Premier of the Congo was taken, locked up and kept in prison, and the United Nations sat by and twiddled their thumbs. No; they did not twiddle their thumbs. While he was free, they refused permission to the Premier of the Congo to broadcast to the people. They closed the radio station and put a young English soldier in charge of it with orders to shoot him—to shoot the Premier of the Congo. Think of it—to shoot President de Valera or Deputy Costello or the Taoiseach, if he went down to Radio Éireann to use the station. The order was to shoot Mr. Lumumba if he tried to use his own radio station—and what did we do? Our people, and particularly our Minister with his own fine record in this whole struggle of anti-colonialism —what did we do to help this man in his hour of need? We stood by and made no protest of which I am aware. They locked him up: they locked up the Premier of the Congo. They dissolved Parliament and suspended parliamentary immunity.

Mr. Booth

Who did?

All this was carried out by Mr. Kasavubu, who has been described by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, as the puppet of the American Intelligence Service. That is who he is—a puppet of the American Intelligence Service. We stood by and the United Nations stood by, and we twiddled our thumbs and went to the Waldorf-Astoria and ran up bills to the tune of £1,900 for entertainment and drank our champagne—and Lumumba languished in jail.

The order was countersigned by Mr. Ileo. He had never been given the power to countersign this order and consequently the order was illegal. Mr. Lumumba was illegally imprisoned and we stood by. We stood by while we knew quite well that the forces of the new dictator, Mobutu, Kasavubu's nominee— Mobutu, the army general—were being paid for by the Eisenhower Administration. We continued to wash our hands of the problem when eventually they delivered Mr. Lumumba to Tshombe, and, when they did that, they signed Mr. Lumumba's death warrant.

In November last, I believed Mr. Lumumba would not survive that imprisonment and said so in this House. It was quite clear that they had to get rid of Mr. Lumumba, if they were to discharge their responsibilities as puppets to the puppet masters in Belgium, America and Great Britain. In time, they did kill Mr. Lumumba—and all the time we stood by and let this go on.

I believe our behaviour in this whole thing is out of character with the Minister's personal behaviour in the past. I believe he was frightened (1) by the campaign carried on against him for his decision in relation to Peking, China, by the Fine Gael Opposition and (2) by the fact that, owing to the vicious and unscrupulous activities of our national newspapers, the Premier of the Congo was smeared as a Communist, because, when the West failed to help him, he turned to Russia. So, in the eyes of the West, no matter what his merits, no matter who elected him, no matter how democratic a Prime Minister he might be, he became an untouchable—and Deputy Aiken continued to side with the Americans, the British and the Belgians.

It was interesting to read of the unfortunate man the other day that when he was getting the bullet in the back of his head from the Belgian officer, he was on his knees saying his last prayers —this "Communist". At least, they accorded him that right—and, of course, our Press did smear him. Pro-Lumumba men raped nuns; pro-Lumumba men killed the priests; pro-Lumumba men did all the deeds of arson, pillage and village burning, according to our national newspapers— I suppose the basic idea being that Catholic Belgium could do no wrong. Casement told us what Catholic Belgium was doing 40 years ago and nobody has refuted it since.

It was only after the death of Mr. Lumumba that the Irish Independent came out with their editorial in which they talked about Mr. Lumumba, the legal head of the Congo. Up to that, he was a terrorist, an anarchist, a Communist and a trouble-maker. What surprises me and disappoints me is that there is not a single worthwhile Minister on the Fianna Fáil Front Bench or among the older generation on their back benches who, in his own time, was not called a trouble-maker, anarchist and communist. “Shaking hands with murder”. All these and other epithets were thrown at them by the same murky Press 40 years ago. It surprises me that they should have forgotten so quickly, that they should not have stood by this man going through his Gethsemane as they did 40 years ago.

Now we are seeing who is the friend of U.N.O. Mr. Lumumba asked U.N.O. into the Congo. Tshombe refused to have them. Ileo is now refusing to have them. They are threatening to go to war with them, if they send in their troops. These are the people we spent nine months bolstering up, equipping and staffing their armies.

It is interesting to note we are not going to recognise the Government of Mr. Gizenga, the deputy leader of the Lumumba Party. The only positive act I know we have done in the United Nations is to refuse to condone the decision of the Belgian, American and British Governments in insisting on seating the Kasavubu delegation at the United Nations. On that, again, we looked for another basin of water and the Minister calmly washed his hands. He abstained from the vote—knowing that Kasavubu had no legal right, while Lumumba was alive and legal Premier of the Congo, to nominate a member to the United Nations. We stood aside on that occasion, as we had stood aside on so many occasions.

We have now the position where Mr. Lumumba and a number of his Ministers have been executed, while prisoners, some of them without trial, and some of them alleged to have had trials. Probably the most bitter irony of all is—and I was interested to read an editorial in one of our papers the other day criticising them for killing their prisoners, criticising them as "savages" or some word of that kind for so doing—that they tell us that, in doing this, they are merely doing what we did, what the British and the Americans did after the last war when they killed the German and Japanese prisoners whom they took. Of course, we are the last people to pass any judgment when it comes to killing prisoners without trial.

The Taoiseach attempted to give the impression here that the decisions of the United Nations High Command were in some way sacrosanct and could not be protested against or queried by us, that we were inviolably committed to any action or decision they might take. That was rubbish, and I said so at the time. The Taoiseach changed his view to some extent after it was proved to be rubbish by the fact that the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Malaya, Burma and, to a certain extent, India, all protested in varying degrees against these decisions and in particular against the decision to continue to imprison Mr. Lumumba, the properly elected Premier of the Congo. When they saw their protests were ineffectual and clearly had no influence in changing the decisions of the United Nations in the Security Council, they took the only decision which, it seems to me, was open to them—to refuse to condone these flagrant violations of the rule of law in the Congo by retaining their troops there. They withdrew their troops in an attempt to bring the Security Council to its senses. They did not succeed in doing that until a couple of days ago.

What did we do? We scabbed, we blacklegged on the Afro-Asian countries. We refused to support them in that effective protest—effective because it worked the other day. The white nations realised that they could not control the Congo, that they had not a hope of controlling the Congo without the support of the majority of their Afro-Asian colleagues. Therefore, they were brought to their senses by this decision. But we were not a party to that decision. As far as I know, we disapproved of it. Once again, we, the great, ancient nation, fighting against colonialism for 700 years, sided with the colonialists—America, Britain and Belgium, the Rockefellers, the Waterhouses and the mining interests in Brussels.

The net result of our intervention and decisions in the Congo has been that we have betrayed the unfortunate man who invited us in to help, Mr. Lumumba. We have betrayed the Congolese people to the various financial interests now dominating the Congo. We have permitted partition of the Congo. We have permitted the murderous and traitorous Tshombe to go on re-arming his forces and establishing a position which is going to be nearly impossible to question, both from the military point of view and the political point of view, in the partitioned province of Katanga. Most important of all, we have betrayed—we have effectively played our part in it, at any rate—the hopes of the world in the United Nations, that it might become a force which would ultimately lead to some kind of world government and prevent this apparent, inescapable and inevitable drift to war. For these reasons, I move to refer the Vote back.

Mr. Cosgrave

We have made it abundantly clear that we support the efforts which have been made by the United Nations force in the Congo to restore order. When this country first sent a contingent to the Congo it was expressely done for the purpose of restoring order, preventing civil war and establishing peace. During the last eight months this country has played its part in that operation. We have, so far as our resources permit, played a useful and constructive role in the efforts to maintain peace and to prevent civil war.

The responsibilities which we undertook were taken in accordance with the directive of the United Nations. The task which was assigned to the United Nations Force there was not an easy one. Initially, when the decision was arrived at, it was well known that the duties and responsibilities which would fall to be discharged by that Force might tax to the very limit the resources, the patience and the ingenuity of those responsible for its direction. Since then considerable changes in the position have taken place, many of them anticipated, some of them unexpected, but all indicating that the original conception which recognised that the problem was a complex one was a correct assessment.

The recent decision of the United Nations Security Council that force may be used to maintain order is, in my view, a hopeful sign and a definite indication that the United Nations are prepared to take action. But, having taken that decision, the equally important assignment which the United Nations must accept is to provide adequate forces properly and effectively equipped. It does not require much knowledge of history or experience of conditions elsewhere to realise that there is nothing more futile than accepting the responsibility for establishing order and not providing those responsible for maintaining order with the forces necessary to do so.

We are most anxious that the assignment accepted by the Irish troops and also the assignment accepted by the present Commander of the United Nations forces in the Congo should be capable of fulfilment. If the United Nations forces are to be effective there, they must have adequate numbers of troops and they must be properly and effectively equipped to discharge the task they have undertaken.

The information available about the very complex situation there is inadequate to enable one to express opinions on the various problems which arise. Similarly, the scope of the territory, the extent of the area which has to be covered, of itself involves difficulties and creates problems which a force similar in size would not be faced with elsewhere. But it is important that, having accepted these responsibilities, the United Nations should provide adequate forces and equip them with the necessary military and other equipment, such as transport, etc., to undertake the task assigned to them.

The recent decision of the United Nations appears to be a practical decision—a decision that should have been taken earlier but, recognising the very nature of the United Nations, when we look at the various interests represented there, it might have been too much to expect that a decision such as the recent decision would have been taken in advance, more especially when so many interests are seeking to defeat the objective of the United Nations and in particular the use on many occasions of the Russian veto to block action when action was necessary.

I believe that the policy we have adopted in this matter and generally the independent line that we have taken in the United Nations, have reflected credit on this country and have been in accordance with our history and our attitude in international affairs generally. It is not true to suggest that this country was ever neutral vis-á-vis the situation as between the United States and Soviet Russia. Our future, the future of everything we value, is indissolubly bound up with the free countries of the world, with the United States, Canada and Western Europe. We have taken an independent line on many issues and we have endeavoured to play a constructive, useful and helpful rôle in the various problems that have presented themselves in the United Nations and before other international bodies of which this country is a member. As to the suggestion that this country was neutral in the great issues which divide the world ideologically or otherwise, this country has repeatedly made it clear that we value the part which the United States, Canada and Western Europe have played in defending the free world and the beliefs which we hold dear and which we believe are essential if mankind is to live in the way in which not alone many in this country but many people throughout the world aspire to live by playing the part we have played in the effort to establish and maintain peace in the Congo.

We have undoubtedly assumed responsibility and assumed a rôle that is different from any we have adopted or had to accept previously but we have undertaken our duties there on the basis of the directive taken by the United Nations initially when the Force was sent in there. It was one of the weaknesses of that directive that in many respects it was vague. As I say, the very nature of the organisation probably prevented a more definite directive at that time. The recent decision is, in my view, an obvious sign and an indication that the United Nations recognise that if the Congo effort is not to end in failure and if an extension of the existing chaotic conditions in many parts is not to increase, the method to prevent it is to employ force in order to do so. We believe that if that is to be done, the United Nations Commander there should have adequate forces at his disposal and that those forces should be properly and effectively equipped to discharge the responsibilities which they have undertaken.

The part which this country is playing is an indication of our desire to make our contribution to the United Nations effort in that direction. I hope that, if opportunity offers, this country will endeavour to secure the necessary financial response from other members of the United Nations who are in arrears with their contributions. Some time ago, a table was published which showed the arrears in respect of contributions to the United Nations. I hope that, should an opportunity offer, we will make it clear that if the United Nations is to continue as an effective organisation, it is an inescapable obligation of member countries to pay their contributions.

As evidence of our desire to render what assistance we can as expeditiously as possible, the Minister said it is proposed on this occasion to pay the contribution at an earlier date. That in itself is an indication of the desire and anxiety of this country to contribute as reasonably as possible from its resources to the work of the United Nations and, in particular, the force at present operating under United Nations auspices in the Congo. In so far as that is concerned, we are in favour of this proposal and believe that the measures which have been taken should have our full support and co-operation.

Mr. Booth

We must be very careful in speaking on this Congo situation that we do not follow the lead of Deputy Dr. Browne and indulge in gross over-simplification, to put it very mildly. Deputy Dr. Browne has used a number of clichés which are quite unjustifiable in this connection. In addition, in his tirade this morning, he made the most vicious attacks on "them". I intervened at one stage to try to find out who "they" were, but it appears that those whom he described as "they" are rather hard to identify. In his mind, however, "they" are always wrong; "they" do the most impossibly wicked things; and "they" are being supported by us.

As a commentary on a chaotic situation, I find that less than helpful. It does appear to be established that the difficulty of the United Nations has been to find out what the actual facts were or are now. Yet Deputy Dr. Browne refers to the break-down of the rule of law in the Congo as if in fact the rule of law had ever been properly established, which is at least far from definite. My personal opinion is that the new independent government of the Congo never established the rule of law at all because it was faced with a situation which was far too difficult for it to cope with. The fact that it was not able to deal properly with the situation is not really a reflection on those who formed that Government; it is simply due to the fact that the country was not properly prepared for independence and that in fact the country was not a unit at all, in the political sense.

Deputy Dr. Browne refers to the Congo as if it were an ancient and historic nation, quite overlooking the fact that the territory which used to be known as the Belgian Congo was simply a large tract of Africa which fell into the hands of the King of the Belgians in his personal capacity. That certainly was colonialism in the very worst sense. But, at no time has there been a united Congolese nation. There has been general resistance and opposition to Belgian colonialism over that whole area. The situation was that the new Government which was set up rather shakily lost control and began to disintegrate.

We got a tremendous denunciation of the sin of partition from Deputy Dr. Browne this morning. I honestly do not know whether Deputy Dr. Browne really believes that the Congo was an historic nation which has now been partitioned by industrialists. He may and, if so, his simple mind is even more simple than I thought it was.

I admit, of course, that there are very large business interests in the Congo, particularly in the Katanga Province, but that is a matter which will have to be dealt with quite separately from the general political situation and I hope the United Nations will deal with it in due course. To say that it is a crime against the united Congolese people for the people of Katanga to cut themselves off from other areas is again a gross over-simplification.

The Government have been castigated for their support of colonialists and colonial powers. Here, again, Deputy Dr. Browne used this phrase purely as a term of abuse. He should be more careful and should try to define his terms. He refers to Belgium, Great Britain and America jointly as the colonial powers. What an odd trinity of nations to be grouped together in this way! He blames these three nations entirely for the lack of decision in the United Nations and claims that our Government have supported these three nations all the time.

It is so easy to make such accusations but it was noteworthy that the Deputy was able to produce no evidence whatever to support his allegation. Not only that, but he completely overlooked the fact that the main difficulty faced by the United Nations has been that the Soviet bloc has consistently acted to block and discredit the whole Congo operation. Not only has it used its voting strength, but it has used financial pressure by failing to pay its dues to the United Nations, thereby trying to force the United Nations to abandon the operation.

It is interesting that when the Soviet bloc uses financial pressure, it is acting justifiably, but if Belgium uses financial pressure, it is acting as a brutal colonial power. It all comes down to what is a fact in Deputy Dr. Browne's mind, that the Left is always right. There, again, we have this gross over-simplification.

Time and again when the United Nations, both in the Assembly and the Security Council, were on the point of making a strong decision which would have a real chance of successfully dealing with the chaos in the Congo, it has been the Soviet bloc which has prevented it. That cannot be questioned. In his childish simplicity, Deputy Dr. Browne now suggests that the Soviet and the United States of America should join in sending troops into the Congo. If the Deputy can believe that that would be successful, he would believe anything. I honestly believe that he would believe that, because he even believes that the Minister has been terrorised by Fine Gael on the question of the debate on China at the United Nations. I think he is capable of believing both those things. I can assure him that his belief in each case is without foundation.

The greatest risk which has existed so far in the Congo is that one or other of the Great Powers should become actively involved there. It has been the great hope of Russia that they would be able to take the initiative and get a grip on the whole situation for their own needs. Here, again, this effort by Russia which is still being made is not seen by Deputy Dr. Browne as colonialism, although of course that is what it is and the Soviet is, of course, the greatest colonial power in the world at present.

Even if that were its only success, the United Nations deserve the greatest credit for having avoided the intervention of the Great Powers in this situation and I hope the United Nations will continue to do that, because the dispatch of troops by any of the major powers into the Congo could only in further deterioration of the situation.

Personally, I am very proud of the attitude which our Government have taken in this matter. They have acted courageously and with foresight. Above all, I am proud that we have not attempted to bring pressure to bear on the Security Council in the way that some of the Middle Eastern countries have done.

Deputy Dr. Browne insists that we should protest and bring pressure to bear whenever we object to something being done. To my mind, that is not the way in which a loyal member of the United Nations should behave. We have tried in every conceivable way to influence the voting in the United Nations, but where the voting has gone against us, we have loyally accepted the decision. It is only when nations are prepared to accept a majority vote against them that there will be any chance of establishing an international rule of law. It is very much to our credit that even though that vote went against our wishes, there was never any suggestion that our troops should be withdrawn. We have taken our stand as a loyal member and I hope we shall maintain it.

The criticism that has been expressed that we have sided with colonialist powers has not been substantiated and should not have been made. I hope that even at this stage Deputy Dr. Browne will have more consideration for our lads who are in the Congo at the moment and will not try to inflame the situation even more than it has been inflamed already. We can easily inflame the situation by taking sides and making irresponsible decisions as to who is right and who is wrong. There is so much in the Congo which is unknown that no decision has commended itself to anyone except Deputy Dr. Browne. A decision in such a case is never a decision quite clearly between absolute right and absolute wrong, between absolute good and absolute evil. Very often one has to take the lesser of two evils.

In that complex situation, we have acted with courage and determination. I only hope that our action now in making our payment in advance, as it were, in discharge of our financial obligations to the United Nations will in itself be an example to others so that they may see that, even though they may be greater in power than we are, they are failing in loyalty where we have not failed.

In every instance, our Government have set an example which is supported by the great majority of our people and I hope that the resolution of the Government to continue along those lines will not be shaken by subsequent events even in the Congo. We are probably facing a very difficult situation there in which our men will almost certainly be involved. Let us not only pray for them but let us give our support to them and to the Organisation which they are serving. If we do that, we shall be doing something of value to many people, apart from ourselves. Unless Deputy Dr. Browne can speak in a more responsible way, more coolly and with greater regard for the facts, it would be better if he kept silent.

Mr. McQuillan

You will say a prayer for him, too, I suppose?

Mr. Booth

That might be arranged.

Dr. Browne

It is easy to rest on another man's wounds.

Mr. Booth

I am sure the Deputy has tried it.

Sir Anthony Esmonde

It was obvious when we joined the United Nations that we would have to accept full responsibility in any situation that presented itself. Therefore, it does not surprise me that the Minister has to come to the House with a Supplementary Estimate to meet the extra cost his Department will incur in the Congo.

The Congo situation is probably one of the most difficult that have faced the world since the advent of the United Nations as a controlling force in world affairs. In the first instance, we have to consider the Congo is composed of several nations and any political unity that was achieved within that country was achieved very much as a makeshift at the last moment in a united effort to obtain independence. We in Ireland can appreciate and understand that. The difficulty in the Congo was that so soon as they had achieved that for which they had set themselves out to fight, politically and in every other way at their command, there was a division among the nationalist ranks in the Congo. That is very easily explained by the fact that there is the rich Katanga province and also that within the geographical confines of the Congo there is one of the richest mineral belts in the world containing uranium for which many people are looking nowadays. What then transpired was that the makeshift unity or the unity that they hoped to achieve and maintain became disunity. The sudden departure of the Belgians who appeared to me to have panicked somewhat, to have left sooner than they might have done without setting up all the normal machinery of government, created a situation in which there was virtually no central Government functioning.

As I know the position, in those circumstances the United Nations were invited to go to the Congo by the then leader of the Congolese Parliament who, I regret to say, is since dead. Ireland as a member of the United Nations was bound to answer that call and I understand that the Secretary-General of the United Nations specifically and deliberately asked for Irish troops as we were a European power entirely devoid of colonialism; we ourselves had sought the right to govern ourselves and never sought to impose our mandate on anyone else. For that reason the Swedes were also asked to go into the Congo as a neutral power, a power that was not in N.A.T.O., and with them many of the other African and Asian countries.

The situation was a confused and difficult one; in fact it was almost an impossible situation. The question was: were the United Nations to go in and endeavour to establish law and order or were they to fail to answer the call and let the Congo sink into chaos? Make no mistake about this, that with all these rich deposits so vital to the chemical advances of today, if the United Nations had not acted as they did, the Soviet Union would have gone in there. From some people's point of view that might be desirable but I do not think that is a point of view that would be accepted in this country.

Deputy Dr. Browne suggested—and I accept that he is sincere in his beliefs although I do not agree with him at all—that there should be a rapprochement between the President of the United States and Mr. Khrushchev, that they should combine and send a united force to the Congo to restore law and order. He also indicated that there was a new look in Russia. I do not think he categorically said that— I want to be fair to him—but he believed there was a new look there on account of the recent remarks of Khrushchev. Of course, one must always judge international Powers by deeds rather than by words. One of Mr. Khrushchev's deeds recently has been to take off his shoe, hammer on the table at the United Nations and try to turn it into a rough-house. He did not succeed in doing what he thought he would succeed in doing, in uniting the Afro-Asian Nations behind him.

Another of his deeds was that when there was to be a Summit Conference he behaved in what I consider, from the point of view of political politeness, to be an outrageous fashion. His argument was that he would have nothing to do with ex-President Eisenhower. Now everything is sunshine again. There is a new President and a new look. Is Deputy Dr. Browne gullible enough to believe that the two Great Powers should go into the Congo with forces to settle the question? Anybody who knows anything about the Afro-Asian groups, anybody who knows anything about the emergent nations who were once colonised knows that they do not wish to embroil themselves in any way in the rivalry that exists between the two big Powers. That has been categorically stated by leaders of the different countries and for that reason the suggestion that those two Great Powers should enter the Congo seems to me to be nothing short of ludicrous.

Our position is that we have gone to the Congo. Our forces in the Congo have lived up to the traditions of Irishmen who have fought and served all over the world. Our troops are trying there to carry out the mandate of the United Nations. The world has sufficient confidence in Ireland, small though we are, to ask one of our soldiers to be the leader of the United Nations force in the Congo. At the moment an Irishman presides over the United Nations. We have a lot to contribute to the world. We have proved so far by acting as any responsible Government would act, that we shall answer the call when necessary, that we shall play our part in securing that the world will be spared the holocaust of another war.

Our policy must be to stand or fall by the United Nations. At present nobody knows what the outcome will be in international politics. We can only hope and pray that the United Nations will stay in the Congo and that they will establish law and order there. We can only hope that they will not be called upon to use physical force to defend life and liberty, but if they have to, it is their duty to do so. It is their duty to protect those they are sent to protect. I might add in conclusion that the attempt on behalf of the Soviet bloc to discredit the United Nations has failed among the very people with whom they thought they would be successful, the Afro-Asian nations. Furthermore, it has failed among nations who are French speaking in the main and who were well able, through that language, to discuss the facts fully among themselves. Their vote the other day upheld the attitude of the United Nations and I am glad to stand up in Dáil Éireann and support it.

Mr. Corish

My remarks will be brief and will not be detailed in respect of this Supplementary Estimate. In the ordinary course, I would not expect the Minister for External Affairs to make a long statement with regard to the United Nations and in particular with regard to the Congo affair but in view of the fact that the situation seems to be so serious, in view of the fact that events in the Congo are moving very swiftly, the time is long overdue for the Minister for External Affairs to make a comprehensive statement on certain matters.

It is about eight or nine months since the Taoiseach introduced a measure to this House to provide for military assistance from this country for the preservation of peace in the Congo. We have had two contributions, I think, from the Taoiseach; we have had contributions from the Minister for Defence; and we have had discussions on the military implications of our intervention in the Congo on the various stages of the Bills which the Minister for Defence introduced. Our obligations and responsibilities, so far as military assistance is concerned, seem pretty clear. We are members of U.N.O. and I hope we are fulfilling and shall always fulfil our obigations and live up to our responsibilities as members.

We assist when required; there is no question of our being directed by the United Nations to provide a force of a certain size, but I think we should be acting contrary to the spirit of U.N.O. if we refused a request to provide assistance in the form of military personnel to go to a particular place to assist in the preservation of world peace. But it is time we heard something about the political implications in the Congo—and there are such.

I do not pretend to have as much detailed information as Deputy Dr. Browne or Deputy Booth but I am sure the Minister has information that the members of the House and the public have not got. If we were to consider the political implications in the Congo on the information we get in the Press or in any of the magazines—usually either British or American—we should be, as we are, very confused about the whole situation. I think the Government have been failing in their duty in not having the Minister for External Affairs make a statement in the House. I may be doing him an injustice but my memory is that this is the first time since last July that the Government presented the Minister with an opportunity to make such a statement.

We have, and we accept, certain responsibilities and obligations as members of the United Nations in the matter of contributing military forces to the Congo but I do not believe it is sufficient merely to leave it at that. We must know where we are going and what we are doing. The Minister should tell us whether or not, in his opinion, the use of all soldiers in the Congo is directed—so to speak—in the right way. It seems now from reports we get that the onus of preventing civil war is on the Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces in the Congo.

The Supreme Commander, after all, is not a politician, nor is he expected to be one. Are his orders merely to prevent civil war? How do outside nations prevent civil war? It seems to me and to many people that there is an effort to support the secession of the Katanga province from the rest of the Congo. Deputy Booth seems to justify that when he says that the Congo cannot be be regarded as a country in the sense that Ireland, Britain, Germany, France or Spain are countries, that it is just a vast area of land.

I do not like to be party to supporting a division of what we now know as the Congo. It seems to smell of the situation we have in Ireland now, the situation created in 1922 when the division of the country into the six Counties and the Republic took place. If the mission of the forces in the Congo is merely to maintain peace at any price, a temporary peace, I do not think we should subscribe to that. Again, if it means the division of the Congo into a Katanga province and the rest, I believe such a decision should not be left to the rulers or the junta of the Katanga province: it should be a decision by all the Congolese people. Are we supporting that view in the United Nations? If it is the wish of all the Congolese people to have this type or that type of government or a federal government, if it is their wish that the Katanga province should establish its own government and secede from the rest of the Congo, that is all right with me, but it is not good enough that all we should be told is that our forces are there in the Congo merely for the preservation of peace or the prevention of civil war.

It must be a difficult situation for the Supreme Commander—in this case he happens to be an Irishman—to go in there merely with those directions. He is not a diplomat and does not pretend to be one. He was not appointed as such. He is not a politician. Is he expected to deal with all the political implications existing in the Congo? I ask these questions because we do not know the answers. The Minister has not taken the opportunity over the past seven or eight months to make any statement on the Congo situation. As a matter of fact, the Minister has been absent from the country on United Nations business for 95 days and therefore, having spent so much time in the United Nations, he must be fully aware of everything that has happened. Certainly he must have made up his mind as to what course he would pursue in regard to the political implications, considerations and questions that are bound up with the Congo situation.

I should like to pursue this; I asked the Minister about representation in the United Nations. Up to now, Mr. Boland, who is president of the Assembly, was our chief delegate. Has the Minister for External Affairs substituted for him? I should like to ask if it is necessary for the Minister —who has always been regarded as a senior Minister, not so much because of the Ministry he occupies but because of the person he is—to stay away from this country, of whose Government he is a member, for 95 days? I am not criticising the expenditure involved because whether it was the Minister or some high-ranking civil servant, the cost would be approximately the same, but I wonder if other member-countries of the United Nations find it necessary to send the political head of a Department, their Foreign Secretary, Minister for External Affairs or whatever he may be called, to the United Nations as a delegate? I think the Minister should clear that up and let us know whether he is now the chief Irish delegate to the United Nations.

Any criticism made here is, in my opinion, understandable. Deputy Dr. Browne has posed a number of questions. People want the answers to those questions and I wonder if, from that point of view, the Government should not consider the establishment of a foreign affairs committee representative of all the political Parties in this House. Everybody will agree that it is desirable that we should have an agreed foreign policy. We cannot have that so long as we get little or no information from the principal Government spokesman. Such a committee may not have been necessary in the past but, with the establishment of the United Nations Organisation and our membership of it, and the problems that are cropping up from time to time in connection with that Organisation, it is highly desirable that such a committee should be established now. It may be protested that the pursuance of foreign policy is the business of the Government, but we have quite a number of examples of such committees being established in other countries with, as far as I know, complete success.

The Minister and his Government may argue that the framing and pursuit of foreign policy are matters for the Government. As far as the Congo is concerned, we are all involved. We are all concerned that the good name of our country should be maintained. We are concerned to ensure that we shall pursue a policy which will not smack, or appear to smack, of support for colonialism. We are concerned that the policy our Government pursues in the United Nations is a policy which will not antagonise the African Continent and people who have always shown themselves sympathetic towards the aspirations of the Irish nation. Some damage in that direction may already have been done so far as the Congo is concerned and, if we do not mend our hand, we, and indeed the world, may be faced with a very precarious situation. Such a situation may arise if United Nations intervention is called for in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The situation will be just as complicated and intricate as the Congo situation now is.

There are differences between Northern and Southern Rhodesia; there are differences of opinion between the two main parties in Britain. The Minister should, therefore, take this opportunity—it is the first offered to him—to give us a comprehensive statement on the attitude of the Government towards the Congo, towards the general question of military intervention by the United Nations and, above all, render an account of his own stewardship in the United Nations where he appeared to be the chief delegate for this country from September of last year until January of this year.

Mr. O'Sullivan

After the passage of some eight or nine months, since Irish troops took on the assignment in which they have gained such credit in the Congo, there is now one thing clear; the decision of the United Nations was to confine army personnel in the Congo to non-committed nations such as ours. If they have not succeeded in their ambition there as well as we would desire, that lack of success may be attributed to the fact that the U.S.S.R. has maintained a constant political, if not military, intervention directed towards discouraging neutral nations playing their part to the utmost of their ability.

Each of the non-committed nations should have been as closely, if not more closely, concerned in the outcome to the Congo as Ireland. It is most discouraging, therefore, to note the casualness with which some of these nations withdrew their contingents in response to political pressure from outside. I view with consternation the proposal of Deputy Dr. Browne to substitute joint U.S.-Russian forces in place of the forces of the non-committed nations. That proposal shows the despairing attitude there is now in regard to any possibility of obtaining from the non-committed nations a properly responsible reaction. Surely they should be just as much alive to the situation as we are. If they are, surely they should provide the forces and materials necessary, as outlined by Deputy Dillon, so absolutely essential to augment our forces. If our Irish troops are to continue in their worthy effort the Minister must make every effort to ensure that they are augmented as quickly as possible to the strength which will permit them to deal effectively with the colossal problem that exists.

I do not entirely agree with Deputy Corish's comments relating to the political entity known as the Congo. The situation in Africa is peculiarly different; Africa is a combination of tribes existing in a country carved up by colonialism with very little regard to the ethnic character of the people. For generations they have been dealt with exclusively on the basis of tribal affiliations rather than as an individual constituted nation. There is very grave danger that a political problem will arise there which will take a great deal of effort and thought to solve. Federation should be given due consideration.

Recent reports give some hope inasmuch as the people in the area are now directing their attention towards some measure of mutual understanding. The immediate problem that exists at the moment is one which concerns us deeply. I hope that the Minister will give us some information regarding the intention of the Government to ensure that the Irish contingent will be augmented as quickly as possible with sufficient men and material to ensure that the mighty task they have undertaken will be dealt with adequately and without creating undue danger for the Irish forces in the area.

Mr. Russell

We all appreciate the fact that the Government have a difficult situation on hands. I should not like to contribute in any way towards increasing that difficulty or making the position more awkward. None of us here is an expert on the Congo situation. I am sure most of us will admit that our knowledge is gained mainly from newspaper accounts, accounts which cannot be regarded by the widest stretch of imagination as either completely accurate or non-partisan. For that reason, we should be slow to pronounce judgment or suggest solutions for what is a very difficult and delicate problem. Our main concern—it is implicit in the contributions here today—is for our own troops in the Congo, troops who have been drawn from practically every constituency in the country. If we appear to the Minister to be frustrating or difficult in our attitude, I think he will understand that we have a very human approach to this problem.

At the outset, the Taoiseach introduced a measure to send our first troops abroad last July, and he received the wholehearted support of the House. Deputies of all political Parties supported it and wished this first effort of ours, in sending our own troops abroad in their own uniforms, every possible success. Since then, a radical change has taken place in the duties of the United Nations Forces in the Congo. That change has caused the sense of uneasiness which was evident in the House this morning.

Originally, the Taoiseach described the duties of the United Nations Force as police duties for the preservation of peace in the Congo. Within the past few days, the Security Council decided that the United Nations Force may now use force in order to prevent civil war. In other words, what was originally to be a police operation could now become a military operation. To a layman's eye, that appears to raise problems of a far different nature from those originally anticipated.

As other Deputies have said, the main question that concerns us, in the light of this new development, is: will the forces at the disposal of the United Nations now have the requisite personnel and material to carry out that task? The Minister has not told us the Government's view in that connection, and I hope, with other Deputies, that when he comes to reply, he will tell us the Government's considered opinion. As I said a few moments ago, we have not got information at our disposal to enable us to form an accurate balanced judgement of the situation. We must rely on the Government, through the Minister, telling us their assessment of the situation in the light of the information at their disposal.

The question of the financial contribution is a very secondary issue. If that were the only consideration, this Supplementary Estimate would have been passed through the House in a matter of a few moments this morning. The situation in the Congo appears to be even more bedevilled, now that several of the Congo political leaders have themselves repudiated the United Nations Force there and have called on the United Nations to withdraw all foreign troops from the Congo. Again that adds to the difficulties of the situation and, to my mind, makes it all the more urgent that sufficient personnel, resources, materials, arms, etc., are available, if we agree with the United Nations policy of preventing civil war in the Congo.

Furthermore, of course, Russia and her allies are using every opportunity to make the situation more difficult than it is. One of the great powers which, with its apparent interest in human suffering and misery outside its own territory all over the world, one would naturally think would be the first to step in and assist in preserving peace and freedom in the Congo, is actively using the situation to make the position even more difficult than it is. I think criticism of Russia for seeking to break up the United Nations through their activities in the Congo is receiving more and more support every day.

It has been said that the Congo is not a nation but a collection of tribes, a territory which fell into the hands of a former Belgian monarch. There is some substance in that statement, but I suppose if we went back far enough, we would find that every nation emerged from that condition at one time or another. The fact remains that the Congo is an existing entity and has been for 60 or 70 years. Irrespective of any criticism we may make about the Belgian financial interests which waxed so rich out of the rich resources of the Congo, the fact remains that the situation is as it is and it is our duty, and the duty of other nations contributing to the United Nations, to accept the situation as it is, and to do what we think is the best thing in all the circumstances.

I should like, therefore, to suggest to the Minister that he should give this House the reassessment the Government must have made of the situation, arising out of recent developments. Will he honestly tell us that the policy which the United Nations now intend to pursue is the right policy, and if it is the right policy, do the Government think sufficient men and materials are available in the Congo to carry out that policy? The prevention of civil war is a very serious task indeed. We have had some experience of what civil war means and if we relate the situation in the Congo to the situation here 40 years ago— the conditions are far more difficult in the Congo—we shall be able to make some assessment of the difficulties that may arise.

Therefore, my personal view is that sufficient troops, materials and money should be provided to enable the United Nations to take adequate steps to preserve law and order in the Congo, if necessary for many years to come, and to allow, in the course of events, a democratically elected central Government to emerge, with all the institutions of such a Government: a civil service, a judiciary and the military appurtenances which go with a modern State. I do not intend even to guess how long that may take. It may take five, 10 or 20 years, but if the United Nations want that situation to develop democratically under their mandate or tutelage, they must provide adequate forces and material.

If they are not prepared to do that, if they are prepared to allow things to drift on in the hope that something may turn up, I would prefer that we would withdraw our troops completely. There is no use in trying in a half-hearted sort of way to carry out what is a very difficult and onerous task. Unless the United Nations are prepared to tackle that task, the Government should very carefully reassess the whole situation.

At the moment reading the reports one sees daily in the papers, there appears to be absolutely no solution to this apparently hopeless position. I hope that is not so, and I think everyone in the House will join me in expressing that hope, but there is no use in shutting our eyes to the facts. The situation is that there are a number of leaders who command a certain amount of respect and support and, apparently, at the slightest provocation, they are prepared to slaughter one another in the manner of primitive tribal peoples. Undoubtedly, they have all the infra-structure of a modern society: hospitals, buildings, schools, houses. The only thing lacking is people to take the country and run it as a modern democracy. How that will be provided without someone taking charge from outside, I do not know.

It would be grand to believe that if all foreign troops withdrew, peace would suddenly descend and that those disagreeing political leaders would come together and decide to set up a centrally-directed Government. I cannot see that happening in the future. That is why I believe the United Nations will have to exercise sufficient control over the country until it is, itself, in a position to exercise control. I may be accused of suggesting a modern form of colonialism. I do not wish to suggest that in any measure. I am trying to review the situation. I suggest what I think is the only possible solution and the only possible way of tackling this problem urgently because it is urgent. If it is allowed to drift or if it is tackled with inadequate troops or materials, there may be very serious results.

Like other Deputies, I hope the Minister, when he comes to reply, will give us a fair and honest assessment of the situation. I trust he will take us into his confidence and tell us what he and the Government think of the situation and whether or not the United Nations are adequately equipped to deal with it.

Mr. McQuillan

I am amazed that the Minister for External Affairs has not so far made any statement with regard to the new situation that has arisen in the Congo as a result of the Security Council's decision within the past few days. For the past eight or nine months, the task of the United Nations in the Congo could be described as one of keeping the peace. The Taoiseach made it quite clear in this House that our soldiers were going there for police action. When questioned very carefully, he said that if the situation altered in any respect in regard to the reasons for taking part in the Congo operation, this House would be consulted and the country would be given the full facts because a different decision might be taken with regard to our troops there.

At column 776 of Volume 185 of the Official Report, the Taoiseach made it quite clear that the second contingent which recently went to the Congo was going there only on the basis that the objective of the United Nations Force in the Congo will still be as it was when the first contingent was dispatched, namely, to keep the peace in the Congo. That situation has changed completely as a result of the decision of the Security Council in the past few days. It is no longer just a matter of police action. If we accept what we read in the papers, then, according to statements by the various political factions in the Congo, they are not prepared to accept this decision of the United Nations Security Council and are prepared to fight to the bitter end to prevent that decision being implemented.

What is the implication of that situation for our troops? We must have regard to the safety of our troops in the Congo. It is beyond doubt that if the decision to disarm were to be carried out, not 20,000 troops would be required in the Congo but a minimum of 100,000 men. There are experts who say that 500,000 men with material and equipment would be necessary to carry out that Security Council decision. I gather that at the moment there are fewer than 20,000 troops in the Congo under the command of the Irish general.

Is it suggested that that decision is to be implemented with the present force? Is it suggested that the Irish troops who have played a wonderful part up to the present will be put in the position that perhaps not eleven lives will be lost but the entire contingent wiped out? The position all along the line for the past eight months has been that equipment, ammunition and modern guns of all sorts have been poured into Katanga and other parts of the Congo. United Nations troops had to stand by, because their instructions forbade them to interfere, while foreign legions were formed, armed and trained. They are the foreign legions which must now be disarmed. Are our troops to be used to disarm these people?

For months we pointed out that the Belgians were using backdoor methods to send in foreigners, equipment, ammunition and modern means of destruction into Katanga. No action was taken to prevent that. I have seen letters from some of the soldiers who were in Niemba. They said that, in that area, there was no shortage of European volunteers to train the local Congolese, the Katanga people, and that these foreign volunteers had nothing but contempt for the United Nations soldiers and brushed them off the streets when they met them. The Irish troops, well-disciplined, had to put up with this. Now, these foreign troops and the gendarmerie of Katanga are armed to the teeth, in addition to other factions. Is it now suggested that without any consideration by this House——

Mr. Dillon

What are the other factions?

Mr. McQuillan

I think Deputy Dillon is as well aware as I am of some of the other factions involved.

Mr. Dillon

I am.

Mr. McQuillan

Will he agree that this House should have an opportunity of discussing the significance of the change that has taken place? Deputy Dillon has stated, and I accept it, that, as a result of the decision of the Security Council in the past few days, this House should have a special opportunity of considering the position of our troops and that special time should be made available for such a discussion.

The objects of the United Nations Force have changed. Let us recall that on a number of occasions we put questions to the Taoiseach about the Congo. His reply was that so far as internal political affairs in the Congo were concerned, there would be no interference. He said point blank in this House that he was not interested. We were doing a job in the Congo because we were asked to do it by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We would carry out the commands given to us. There would be no interference with the internal political affairs of the Congo. Has that situation not altered radically? What is there now but absolute interference in the internal political affairs of the Congo, since a decision has been taken to disarm all the Congolese? Before the Government make up their minds, time should be given in this House for a debate as to whether we agree or disagree with the new decision by the United Nations Security Council.

We must put the safety of our troops first. The older members of this House have recollections of what a civil war can mean. I have not, because I was not born then. It would be a tragedy if Irish troops were used in the Congo for the purpose of bolstering partition there. I was hurt by the speech of Deputy Booth, who said that it was for the various groups in the Congo to decide whether or not partition was desirable. He went so far as to suggest that if the Province of Katanga wished to secede from a united country, they were entitled to do so. Within the past 12 months, I recollect Deputy Booth publicly declaring his views on the Six Counties. He stated quite bluntly that a minority in the north of Ireland were entitled, if they wished, to break off from the rest of the country. He condoned Partition here, and it is quite evident from the views he expressed today that he is prepared to condone it in the Congo.

Is Deputy Booth speaking for the Government when he makes statements of that importance? The Minister for External Affairs should rebut Deputy Booth's statement. It is too serious at this stage to have a prominent spokesman of Fianna Fáil saying here that if the Province of Katanga wishes to secede from the rest of the Congo, it is entitled to do so. That is the same gentleman who said that if the Six Counties wish to stay out, they are entitled to do so. We want to find out is there a change in the Fianna Fáil policy on Partition. If Deputy Booth is speaking for his Party, then it becomes clear that the Government are not seriously interested in ensuring that the Congo remains a united country, that they are prepared to allow Mr. Tshombe and his group, who are guided by the Belgians, to hold the rest of the Congo to ransom by threatening to cut off its lifeline.

Mr. Dillon

Has the Deputy any observations to make about Mr. Gizenga?

Mr. McQuillan

Deputy Dr. Browne made a suggestion which was sneered at by Deputy Esmonde and other speakers. He referred to the fact that there was a new President in America who has, so far, appeared to have disowned the Eisenhower policies of the past and is prepared to use commonsense in international affairs. He made a suggestion—perhaps it is a naïve one —that the two major powers in the world, the United States and Russia, could help to solve the Congo problem at this stage. I see nothing wrong with the Americans and the Russians each offering troops, equipment and money as part of a joint effort under the U.N. command to try to improve the situation in the Congo. I do not know what the purpose of the United Nations is if we are to spend all our time dealing only with one section. The United Nations Organisation consists of all the nations in it. If there is to be a true Assembly, a true meeting of minds and a breaking down of the barriers of suspicion, the only way that can be achieved is by a discussion and understanding of the problems involved so that they can be overcome, if possible, by co-operation.

Perhaps we are a little less cynical than some of the other Deputies who spoke when we suggest that at this stage, in view of the magnitude of the task in the Congo, it is desirable that the major powers should offer contingents to the United Nations under the control of some group acceptable to both. It may not be feasible, but at least it could be tried out. We would then find out which group was bluffing and was not prepared to play its part. I cannot understand why that proposition should be sneered at by some of the Deputies who have spoken.

Every Deputy is in agreement on the magnitude of the task in the Congo. I have already said that the number of troops at the disposal of General McKeown is absolutely inadequate to carry out the decision of the Security Council. We cannot be asked to give another contingent for the simple reason that we have not got the troops. What other nations will provide the troops necessary to enable the Commander to carry out the decision of the Security Council? I do not think it is possible to get sufficient trained troops and equipment in what have been termed the uncommitted nations. Those nations which have the troops and equipment at present should co-operate in such a venture under neutral leadership. I should like to hear the Government's view on that.

I have spoken mainly because I am worried about the position of our troops. The Government should be severely censured for failing to make time available to debate the situation of our troops, in the light of the decision of the Security Council to change from a police action in the Congo to a military one. If these groups in the Congo refuse to be disarmed, it means that the United Nations troops will have to use force. We did not send our troops to the Congo for such a warlike job. Further, the number of troops available are insufficient to carry out such a task. Therefore, where do we stand as far as the safety of our troops in the Congo is concerned at the moment? Is it intended now, within the next week or next month, to state a date on which this action of disarming is to commence? We want information on all this.

I suggest to the Government that they should make time available for a discussion of the new situation that has arisen as a result of the decision of the Security Council to take the necessary steps to disarm all the Congolese.

Mr. Coogan

I did not intend to intervene in this debate, but I am constrained to do so by the remarks of certain speakers. On this Supplementary Estimate, it is only natural that our thoughts should turn to our soldiers across the sea. We are not accustomed to having our soldiers stationed overseas, but out thoughts are with them to-day. I must certainly take exception to some of the remarks made by Deputy Dr. Browne when he sought to defend certain elements in the Congo—the pro-Lumumba group. There is certainly one thing that is known about the pro-Lumumba group from one end of the country to the other. They were the gentlemen, if I can call them such, who cast the shadow of death on many a home throughout this land. I do not know what prompted certain Deputies to defend these groups. I could not see myself taking the same line. I do not wish to refer disrespectfully to the dead when I advert to the reference by Deputy Dr. Browne to Lumumba being a very good Catholic.

Dr. Browne

I did not say that.

Mr. Coogan

May I draw the attention of this House to another gentleman who was supposed to be a very good Catholic until——

Dr. Browne

I did not say that. He may have been a good Catholic. I just did not say it.

Mr. Coogan

The Deputy was on that line. May I refer to another gentleman who was supposed to be a very good Catholic until he got control in Cuba?

Mr. Davern

I did not intend to intervene in this debate, but I think many Deputies are unduly pessimistic. Our troops in the Congo are well trained young men. They are disciplined and they are led by officers that nobody need fear for a moment are not as good as the world's best. Being so led and disciplined, I do not think that we can have any undue fear at all as to what our troops will do out there.

This is not the first time that Ireland, small though it is, has sent people abroad in the cause of peace and Christianity. We all feel, and must, of necessity, feel, very proud of the men who were there and came back, and of those who did not come back alive. We offer our very sincere sympathy not alone on this but on every occasion to the relatives of those gallant men who gave their lives in such a worthy cause.

I am afraid that many people are not taking the position of the Congo seriously enough. It is, to my mind, and to the mind of many others, nothing short of a barrel of dynamite. That is why I say that our troops will not be responsible for anything that may be ignited, but they will be there, as they have been, in the cause of world peace and that at a time when we have nations gasping, so to speak, to go to war, regardless of its dreadful consequences. We can feel happy that our troops are not going to take part in any war. They are going to take part in the mission for which they were sent out there, that is, peace in the Congo—world peace, for that matter.

We know that our task is a very difficult one. There are language difficulties and the difficulty, perhaps, that those people who are now free may not be fully prepared for that freedom. Unfortunately, there are the demons who would try to stir up trouble or try to make out of the Congo what they have made out of other nations. If for no other reason than that and to try to combat the satanic policy of Russia especially, we feel very happy that this little country of ours has taken such a prominent part.

I hasten to congratulate the Minister on the attitude he has taken in his many sound, sensible and sincere contributions towards world peace—fearless contributions from a man of his calibre who has been through the fight and the struggle for independence here. It is obvious to us that his statements were in keeping with our sentiments.

I also hasten to congratulate that great Irishman who has been selected as President of the United Nations—Mr. Boland. He sat in this House on many an occasion. We can feel certain, knowing him as we do, that he is and will continue to be an ornament to any organisation that demands and has a genuine love for peace.

It is indeed very strange that this country should play such a very prominent part in the affairs of the Congo. Many people very foolishly say that we are only a small nation but on this occasion we are playing a very big part and a part that we can be very proud of. There is, unfortunately, as I said the black mark there that thirteen of our gallant soldiers lost their lives. However, I suppose that is a soldier's privilege, to die. They knew there were hidden dangers there and they volunteered. I was very pleased to hear the Minister for Defence say that three volunteers offered for every one man that was needed. That in itself shows the true mentality of the Irish soldier. It was not a love of war— because we hope and pray that war will not develop—but a love of peace, of a genuine lasting peace, among a people who have been fortunate enough to secure their independence.

We hope nothing will be said here that will in any way misrepresent the attitude of the Government towards the Congo or the attitude of the soldiers towards the Congolese and other armies which are there. I am very proud to be a supporter of the Government which sent out these men. We pray that their mission will be fulfilled in the spirit that every true Christian desires and that they will return to this country having fulfilled their contract, so to speak, that contract which the United Nations so desire them to fulfil.

We want a lasting peace there but if bigger nations send in any new contingents, then other nations will probably follow suit. I feel that in the interests of the Congolese our Army must be the most welcome of all. We ourselves re-emerged as a nation a few years ago, having regained our independence through a method which we considered the only one that would ever give us independence, and that was force. I congratulate the Minister on his many strong and fearless contributions towards the maintenance of peace and I congratulate the Chairman of the United Nations Assembly. This country naturally must feel proud of our Minister, of our representative at the United Nations and of our Army.

Mr. O.J. Flanagan

In the course of the Minister's address he referred to the fact that one of the reasons for this Estimate was to enable the Department and the Government to pay our contribution to the United Nations earlier than usual. No Deputy has any objection to that course; rather every Deputy thinks that if the United Nations feel that contributions should be paid at a particular time the Government should comply with any reasonable request that is made in that regard. No member of this House can voice any protest against that. If the contribution is to be paid, it might as well be paid six months earlier as on a later date when the full contributions might be required by the United Nations.

I trust that when the Minister is replying he will refer very fully to the query put to him by the Leader of the Opposition with regard to member nations and whether they have paid their contributions and if, having regard to the financial position of the United Nations, all member countries have paid their contribution on the prescribed dates. If the contributions have not been paid by other nations it is the duty of the member countries to direct the attention of their Parliaments and Governments to that fact, as the Minister for External Affairs has done here today arising out of our membership of the United Nations.

Reference was made by the previous speaker to the troops who are serving and who have served with the United Nations force in the Congo. I want to add an expression of my praise and admiration of the excellent work undertaken by the members of the Irish Defence Forces in the Congo. When the last battalion returned the tributes paid to them by the chaplains who had been serving with the forces were very striking. They paid tribute to the fine devotion of the troops, their good example and spoke of the high respect and esteem shown the Irish soldiers in the Congo.

By their good example, their bravery, skill and manliness, by the manner in which they carried out their duties with great devotion and with their exercise of charity, I feel they must have been a shining example to others who were serving in the Congo and particularly to the people of the Congo. It is indeed encouraging and I feel our soldiers will play a big part in preserving the peace by the religious example which they show to those in the Congo who are probably in need of it. The tributes paid to them by the serving chaplains are admired by members of all Parties. There is no doubt that the men serving in the Congo are carrying on the fine traditions which are expected from a Christian country such as ours.

I trust that the Department of External Affairs will keep a very close eye on all the activities of all our soldiers and that their health, protection and safety will be their primary concern. Ireland should be very proud of the Commander of the United Nations Forces, who is an Irishman, a fact which focusses world attention on the ability of the Irish soldier to command and the great respect, confidence and trust which a great world organisation such as the United Nations places on an Irishman in that regard.

However great the tribute paid to the Minister by Deputy Davern, there have been times when the ordinary person reading the speeches of the Minister found difficulty in understanding what our policy was in the United Nations. One often wondered if we had an external affairs policy in the United Nations. There were many occasions when the Minister could have been more tactful in his observations. I and most Deputies feel that our aim in the United Nations should be to increase the number of Ireland's friends. As a very small nation, we may have no enemies but our effort should be to retain the friendship of those countries that have been friendly disposed towards Ireland and not by ill-advised remarks or speeches to estrange our friends or insult them.

Whatever line of policy may be pursued in the United Nations by the Minister, I hope it will be based on the desire of the Irish people to increase the number of our friends abroad, realising that the Irish people have no desire to have the countries that have been friendly disposed towards Ireland discredited, insulted or reflected upon.

I have often wondered whether the Minister realises that the greatest and freest country in the world today is the United States of America. Great ties of friendship have existed between this country and the United States of America for generations. For generations up to the present time, families from every part of Ireland have been settling in the United States of America. There has been a tradition of Irish people emigrating to the United States of America. Attention has been focussed on that tradition by the recent election of President Kennedy whose forefathers emigrated from Ireland many years ago. There is no reason to doubt that the election of President Kennedy will be an asset to Ireland. We hope and trust that the friendship between Ireland and the United States of America will continue and that the election of President Kennedy will make stronger these ties of friendship. I think President Kennedy during his term of office will endeavour to increase co-operation and friendship between Ireland and the United States of America. There are many ways in which the Minister and the Department can help to secure that greater friendship and co-operation between the two countries.

If the Minister sees no reason to regret any of his statements in the past, I hope he will bear in mind that whatever his own personal feelings or intentions may be in regard to the United States of America, the vast majority of the Irish people regard the United States as having been always our friend and that it is their desire that the United States should always be a great friend of Ireland. I make that statement in the hope that the Minister will realise the great bond of friendship that has existed for generations between this country and the United States of America.

The election of Mr. Boland as President of the United Nations has also focussed attention on our country, to our credit. I notice that the Government have not made any appointment to the United Nations to replace Mr. Boland. I imagine that as a result of Mr. Boland's elevation to the Presidency of the United Nations, there is a vacancy for a permanent representative in the United Nations.

Having regard to the many speeches made by the Minister for External Affairs in New York, Boston, Washington and elsewhere, I cannot agree with Deputy Davern that his speeches were always in the vein of a demand for world peace. A number of his speeches tended to antagonise Ireland's friends. World peace is one thing. Offensive speeches are another thing. If it is the intention of the Minister to return to the United States in March for the next session of the Assembly, he ought to guard his tongue carefully and say nothing which would offend Ireland's friends.

I addressed a Question to the Minister yesterday:

To ask the Minister for External Affairs the length of time spent by him in the United States of America during 1960 and the total cost of such stay, including entertainments.

That was a simple question. The Minister stated in reply that he had been 95 days in America. If it would not be too embarrassing for the Minister—I doubt if anything would embarrass the Minister for External Affairs—I would ask him to indicate whether a Minister or Foreign Secretary of any other member country of the United Nations was present in the United States of America for 95 days. I do not think that Britain had their Foreign Secretary there for 95 days.

I am sure most member countries depend upon their permanent staff at the United Nations. The Irish staff must have been the best in the world, seeing that Mr. Boland was elected President. Whether there was a necessity for it or not, the Minister was in America for 95 days and he was the only member of a Government, the only Minister for External Affairs or Foreign Secretary of all the member countries who remained so long in the United States during 1960. I would ask the Minister what he was doing for 95 days in the United States of America. The debate on this Estimate is the only opportunity Deputies have to get information in that regard.

I cannot see why Ireland could not be represented by some of the senior officers of the Department of External Affairs. On practically all the Estimates a tribute has been paid from time to time in regard to the high quality and the high standard of efficiency of our Civil Service. It is only right to express the same views on this occasion, that in the Department of External Affairs the Civil Service staff are regarded internationally as the best in the world.

There is no reason why the Minister for External Affairs should go to the United States for 95 days as he did, at a cost of £1,862 15s. 4d. When there is a general pruning of expenditure, when we see that emigration has taken so many of our people to the four corners of the world, when we see the numbers that are unemployed, this wild extravagance on the part of the Minister for External Affairs is a disgrace.

I should like to ask the Minister who was being entertained or whom he was entertaining? I thought I read in one of the papers that the Minister was the guest of the Consul-General in New York. If he was a guest, surely the Minister was not expected to pay; I doubt if the Consul-General in New York, if the Minister was his guest, stretched out his hand to the Minister when he was leaving for the payment of his board and lodging. I may be quite wrong, but I thought I remember reading that he was the guest of the Consul-General. In the case of his trips to Chicago and Boston, if he was the guest of any of the Consuls there, surely he would not be expected to pay or the Irish taxpayers would not be expected to pay on his behalf?

I would like to know who was being entertained. Are we to understand, if some reports are correct, that some of the leaders of the Communist countries and some well-known Communist leaders in the United States were invited to some of the functions sponsored by the Minister for External Affairs and paid for by Irish taxpayers? I fail to see why we should set aside £1,800 towards an entertainment for Communists, for the enemies of freedom, the enemies of free speech and the enemies of freedom of religious worship.

I recall the days of the Inter-Party Government when ex-Deputy MacBride was Minister for External Affairs and when there was a barrage of questions from this side of the House by several Fianna Fáil speakers asking when the Minister for External Affairs was coming home. They asked was he living in the United States? Deputy MacBride, when Minister for External Affairs, was never 95 days in the United States. Nevertheless he was criticised from every platform at every chapel gate in every town and village: "Mr. MacBride is living in the United States." There was never a word from any of them when the present Minister for External Affairs went to the United States.

The job of the Minister for External Affairs is to be at home at the head of his Department. There is enough confusion and difficulty in the United Nations without their having to put up with the Minister for External Affairs and without the Minister for External Affairs adding to the confusion. I hope that when the new season opens arrangements will be made to have Ireland represented by the proper type of person—by that I mean the new permanent representative. Let that be sufficient and let us not be duplicating entertainment and other expenses, permitting the Minister for External Affairs to go skating around Boston, Chicago, Washington and New York having the life of Reilly and entertaining lavishly at the expense of the wealthy, generous Irish Government.

Now that we have succeeded in finding out the cost of this entertainment, I hope we have seen the end of it. I can say without the slightest fear of contradiction that no criticism from this side of the House can compare with the criticism offered when the inter-Party Government were in office and when the former Minister had gone on very urgent business to the United States and stayed no longer than was really necessary. I trust that in future the Minister will be cautious about those he entertains in the United States at our expense. If he wants to entertain the leaders of Communist countries let him do so out of his own pocket. I object to Communists being entertained by our Government at the expense of Irish Catholic taxpayers; I protest against it in the strongest possible terms. I appeal to the Minister for External Affairs that he should stay at home during the new session. If he has to go off for a week or ten days let him guard his tongue and, if he makes speeches, let him do so in order to get on the right side of free nations like Britain, the United State and others of our friends. Whatever contribution he has to make, let it be made in an effort to multiply our friends and, if possible, to ignore those who are antagonistic towards the Irish nation.

Mr. Aiken

First of all, I want to thank the Leader of the Opposition for his support for the payments which the Government propose to make to the United Nations and also the Leader of the Labour Party and other Deputies who supported the Vote.

I want to emphasise that the payment of our subscription by means of a Supplementary Estimate means that we shall not have to make provision for that subscription in the ordinary Estimates which will be reduced next year by the amount of the Supplementary Estimate. We feel we should make this gesture. It is not that the United Nations will "go broke" if they do not get our contribution six months ahead of time but we think that, in these critical days, when the United Nations Organisation is under very fierce attack and when its Secretary-General who has guidedits affairs so wisely and bravely over the past few years is also under attack, it is right that Ireland should make this gesture of confidence in the United Nations and its Charter and of support for its gallant Secretary-General.

The second matter dealt with in this Supplementary Estimate is a sum of £25,000 for the special Congo fund. Already a number of nations have subscribed to that fund. Towards the end of last year—in October, I think —the United States contributed 5,000,000 dollars to meet a shortage in the United Nations Exchequer. A number of nations, of course, pay their subscriptions in January or early in the year—I am referring again now to the ordinary annual contribution for the general purposes of the United Nations budget—but we are not accustomed to pay it until after the commencement of the financial year. We usually forward it in April or May. There are other countries that have not paid their subscriptions for a number of years or they are at least in arrears, and there are also those who are in arrear and have refused to pay for the support of the United Nations effort in the Gaza strip to keep the peace between the Israelis and the Arabs. They have refused also to pay anything towards United Nations operations in the Congo.

I think we should give a good example when we can do so and I believe the Irish people will be very glad to support the United Nations by paying their annual contribution a little ahead of time and also by making this contribution to help in putting the Congolese back on their feet. However poor our people may be I think they are rich enough in spirit to share what they have with people who are worse off. Undoubtedly, the Congolese are highly intelligent but, through the vicissitudes of their history, they have been denied the chance to find their feet, become educated and gain experience in government.

The Leader of Fine Gael spoke about the terms of reference—if I may put it that way—of the United Nations Forces in the Congo. Perhaps it is as well to make clear exactly what the situation is. The basic resolution regarding the Congo was passed by the Security Council on the 13th July and, after certain introductory paragraphs and after calling on the Belgian Government to withdraw its troops, it declared that the Security Council "decides to authorise the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks."

From my quotation of that resolution it is clear that at that period of time the preoccupation of the Security Council was to get the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops and secondly to support the central Government of the Congo and to provide such military assistance as would enable it to find its feet. At that time, there was a Parliament in being in Leopoldville; Mr. Kasavubu was President and Mr. Lumumba was Prime Minister.

We go on to the 22nd of July when a somewhat similar resolution was passed—a little stronger—calling for the immediate action in regard to the Belgian withdrawal. That resolution commended the Secretary-General for his prompt action in trying to carry out the resolution of the Security Council and for his first report. His prompt action, of course, was to call upon a number of countries, including ourselves, to send military forces to support the Congolese Government in trying to keep the peace in the Congo.

On the 9th August the Security Council adopted another resolution and in the first operative paragraph it says that the Council confirms the authority given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council resolutions of the 14th and 22nd of July and requests him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby.

The reason for the resolution was not to urge a willing Secretary-General but to call upon the Belgian Government to withdraw its troops immediately, etc., etc. There was then a special meeting of the General Assembly. It was called towards the beginning of September. The resolution it passed stated, first, that the General Assembly fully supports the resolutions of the Security Council. I have given extracts from those resolutions. Secondly, it requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolution to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, integrity and political independence in the interests of international peace and security.

The resolution adopted by the Security Council quite recently had one very important operative clause, the first one. Under this clause, which I shall read, the Security Council urges that the United Nations should take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease fire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.

Mr. Dillon

We participate in an advisory council to the Secretary-General. We can have our say there, and we have it. It may happen that the advisory committee advises the Secretary-General on certain matters in relation to the Congo in a direction that we would prefer to have otherwise, but we feel that, if the United Nations are to make progress we must be prepared to accept the various decisions of the various organs or subcommittees of the United Nations of which we are members. We do have the influence of our votes and voice in that committee over the methods to be used by the United Nations forces, civil and military, in the Congo. We have no direct influence, and we believe it would be wrong for us in any way to attempt to influence our troops directly. We must trust the Secretary-General and the officers, civil and military, appointed by the United Nations to do a good job of work. If they cannot do it, if one single well-defined line of authority cannot make a success of the Congo, several lines will not be a success.

One reason for the present difficult situation is that many Governments acted otherwise. I think I have covered that aspect of the debate fairly fully. If any Deputy thinks I have missed out on something I should be very glad if he would say so. I thought it better to take it in a rather broader way than to answer each sentence by every Deputy.

I do not propose to follow all the points by the various speakers. The Congo situation is developing. We hope that before very long the result of the work of the Conciliation Committee will bear fruit. From time to time, we see reports from the Congo which indicate that their work had an influence for good.

Recently—it was in some of the papers—President Kasavubu had an idea that a round-table conference should get together, fully representative of all the parties in the Congo, to try to get agreement on a new Constitution which would provide not for the six States with very little power as at present but for at least 12 States which would take more account of ethnic and tribal differences and have more local control over their affairs.

Even in to-day's paper, there have been some indications that Mr. Tshombe from Katanga is having a new look at a conciliation committee and, according to reports—I want to emphasise, according to the newspaper reports—he proposes to invite Mr. Gizenga who was Mr. Lumumba's Vice-Premier, President Kasavubu and other leaders from Kasai and elsewhere to meet at a round table conference, first in Geneva and afterwards at Elizabethville. We hope these ideas will make progress. Only through conciliation of that kind, only by having a new look at the Constitution drafted in Brussels, by amending it so that it will be more suited to the situation as it has developed in the Congo, can we hope to make peaceful progress.

I am not an optimist by nature. I never thought this matter could be settled in a very short time. I feel that a steady, patient, conciliatory attitude on the part of the United Nations will finally bring the Congolese people together to form a federation or some sort of government for the centre, with governments in many districts which will take account of the ethnic differences among the people. Under such a Government, we hope the Congolese people will settle down to develop their resources and improve themselves.

There is no reason why the Congolese should not go in that direction. A couple of thousand years ago, Europe was as divided as the Congo is now. Europe is still divided but it is rather more orderly and peaceful than it was a couple of thousand years ago.

Mr. Dillon

I beg leave to doubt that Pax Romana was operating 2,000 years ago.

Mr. Aiken

Motion to refer back put and declared lost.

Vote put and agreed to.

Votes 53 and 54 reported and agreed to.

Dáil Éireann debate - Thursday, 23 Feb 1961

Committee on Finance. - Vote 54—International Co-operation.

Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 23 Feb 1961