I move:—
In page 3, line 28, to delete "or an appointment to,".
There are seven amendments in my name to this piece of legislation. The Bill is incapable of real amendment but I have put down these amendments in an effort to get rid of some of the worst features of the Bill. I want, first of all, to draw your attention to the phrase that is used in the description of "official information". In the definition section, Section 2, it says: "‘Official information' means . . . "; then there is a series of words which are something of substance, something that might possibly be regarded as proper to be protected by an official secrets code: "Secret official code word or password". However, then the definition widens out and there is included: "Any sketch, plan, model". Again this might be regarded as a type of document which should be protected but after that the definition becomes very general: "article, code, document or information . . . "
First of all, the information has to be secret and confidential and, if that were left for the adjudication of the court, nobody could object to it because there would have to be a case made by those who were prosecuting that the information communicated was secret and confidential. However, there is added to that that this information may be expressed to be either secret or confidential. In a later part of the section it says:
A certificate given by a Minister under his seal that any official code word or password or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information specified or indicated in the certificate is secret or confidential shall be conclusive evidence of the fact so certified.
The safeguard that at one time seemed to be provided by the adjudication of the court is taken away. All that is to happen is that a Minister, a member of the Government, certifies that something is secret or confidential and the first obstacle in the way of getting a successful prosecution is gone. The second point is this: the material declared to be secret or confidential has to be in the possession, custody or control of a holder of a public office. So far as that refers to civil servants or the people who are servants of the State in different capacities, one again might not object to it but it goes on to say: "or to which he has or had access by virtue of his office . . . " The rest of it does not matter for the purpose of my amendment.
That directs attention immediately to the public office. All civil servants are bound by a declaration which they sign with regard to keeping secret any information which comes to them by virtue of their office and if public office merely meant the servants of the State that would not be so bad but the public office goes on further and is widened in its interpretation to mean "an office or employment which is remunerated out of the Central Fund or out of moneys provided by the Oireachtas." Stopping at that point, there immediately comes to one's mind the fact that civil servants are clearly people remunerated by moneys from the Oireachtas. So are the Guards and so are the teachers. When one thinks of the Central Fund that brings in the judges, so that "public office" here refers to the whole body of servants of the State whether they are in the Civil Service, the Guards, the Army or the judges.
The matter goes further still. Again, I feel that there might not be much trouble as long as there is a protective clause that the information was prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the State. There is no necessity, for the commission of an offence in connection with this matter, that there should be anything prejudicial. As long as what is official information is communicated to somebody else, then an offence has been committed. Again when one sees the end of this definition while hesitation would be greater with regard to, say, the ordinary servants of the State, one would not object to bringing in as the holders of public office anybody employed "under any commission committee or tribunal set up by the Government or a Minister for the purposes of any inquiry." Generally speaking, when an inquiry is established under the auspices of the Government one calls upon civil servants and local authority servants as being practised people in the taking of minutes and recording information.
Again, I think there should be some protective clause if the net was only cast wide enough to catch those employed under any commission, committee or tribunal set up by the Government or a Minister for the purpose of an inquiry, but the public office is made applicable too and groups anybody appointed to a commission, committee or tribunal set up by the Government or a Minister for the purpose of any inquiry. These people then, having become by definition the holders of public offices, are forbidden to communicate to anybody other than amongst themselves anything called official information. That means not things upon which the safety of the State depends and not things prejudicial to the safety of the State but anything that comes to that person to which he has access by virtue of his office having being appointed a member of a commission, committee or tribunal.
Further, it has to be noted that the reference to communicating includes not merely "communicating or receiving, whether in whole or in part" a particular document, but the information or the substance of it, or the effect of it or the description of it. If anybody communicates either the substance, or the effect, or the description of something to which he has had access because of having being appointed to a commission, committee or tribunal under the auspices of the Government, then by merely communicating that to somebody else he is guilty of an offence. The communication includes the transfer or transmission thereof. Not merely that, not merely the transfer of the document, but the communication of any information or the substance, the effect or the description of any information to which a person has had access because he has been made a member of a commission set up by the Government.
A number of examples occur to me. One commission established at the moment deals with higher education. The chairman is the Chief Justice and a very eminent member of the hierarchy is a member of that body. These two members become holders of a public office. If they desire to communicate, say by letter to the newspapers, something that has come into their possession, or the substance of something to which they have had access because of their position on such a commission, then the Chief Justice will have committed an offence and the Bishop to whom I referred will have committed an offence. The commission of the offence is clear.
The prosecution is a different matter. My memory picks up two occasions. It may be asked why would the Chief Justice or the Bishop who is a member of the commission want to communicate to the public or to anybody else the substance of some information to which they have had access because of their membership of the commission? The present Bishop of Galway was made chairman years ago of a commission which dealt with vocational organisation. I suppose it was one of the best manned commissions this State has ever had. They deliberated over many years and produced a tremendous volume which indicated a great deal of interested and devoted work and, many people thought, a number of very sound suggestions.
The report did not please the Government of the day. The present Taoiseach when questioned about delays in bringing in some of the recommendations characterised the document as a slovenly document. The Bishop was naturally moved to make some comment on that. The discussions were not really made public and a considerable amount of information was contained in minutes. There was a considerable inquiry into the way in which certain people took advantage of the tariff movement; the way in which they had worked particularly for their own benefit had been brought out in a number of pieces of evidence which were brought before the commission and published in minutes. All the documents that came before the commission were not published in the recorded minutes. Certain matters were regarded as being of a confidential nature in the sense that they were rather revealing with regard to say a business in such a way that it might be important to a competitor to get the information.
That was kept secret as far as the published minutes were concerned but they were recorded and there is no doubt that the proper defence against this attack of slovenliness, if the particular member of the hierarchy bothered his head about the remark, would have included a number of references to the type of documentary evidence he had before him.
In the case of a person who is of sufficient repute to be made a member of a commission to inquire into certain things, and more particularly if he is of such repute to be made chairman of such a commission, is it not the height of madness to declare that person has been guilty of an offence because he communicates to the public by means of letter the substance of something contained in a memorandum to which that person had access as a member of the commission? This definition brings him in because he has been appointed to a commission.
I want to refer to another matter which is historically well known. It was better known some years ago, but matters like this are dimmed by the passage of time. There was another commission set up to inquire into the work of the old national health insurance project. The then Bishop of Clonfert was made chairman of that commission. That commission reported in terms that were very adverse to the particular type of national health insurance being run at present. As might be expected, the present Minister for Health was a member of the Government whose administration was brought under critical scrutiny in this particular commission's report. As might be expected, he, of course, jumped into the fray right away. Quite a controversy developed over that, which led to the late Dr. Dignan publishing a pamphlet in which he set out his views on the national health insurance programme and his attitude toward an amendment of that. He undoubtedly made use of and communicated to the public the substance, if not the actual record, of certain information to which he had access because he was a member of that commission.
Again is it reasonable to seek, as is done in this proposed legislation, that the communication of such information, without any hint of its being prejudicial to the interests of the State— merely the fact that a person lets another person know, not by communicating the official document or information itself but by giving him the substance of it without question of what he has done being prejudicial to the interests of the State—is it reasonable to seek that that man can be found guilty of an offence? These are some of the reasons why I want at least to clear out that part of the Act. As far as one part of the proposed Act is concerned, where it deals with the safety and preservation of the State, nobody can make much objection to it.
There are a few points I want to attend to because I think they are pressed too far and too much power is being taken as against whatever emergency might be thought likely to occur. I am not thinking of information prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State, but simply the communication of official information without its being information which would affect the interests of the State let alone the safety or preservation of it.
I think the Act goes too far. It could be called an administrator's dream. It certainly is a citizen's nightmare. The matter is pressed far too far in the circumstances which can be contemplated. I want to get rid of one excrescence. If you must, have it kept to civil servants, guards and teachers. They are definitely confined. They are public servants and they are all tied by certain declarations with regard to the non-communication of official information. Be it for good or ill, they are all tied. But this is extended to bring in employment under commissions or tribunals of inquiry. I have said already that so far as the people who generally officiate as secretaries, notetakers and so on at these commissions, members of the Civil Service are concerned, it is not such a big extension, although I hate to see its being done. But I think it is madness and I do not see any argument for putting the burden of this on people who are appointed to a commission of inquiry.
I take my example again and come back to the Chief Justice, who is chairman of the Commission on Higher Education. One of the members of the Hierarchy of the Catholic Church is a prominent member of that Commission. If they tell anybody anything to which they have had access because they were members of the Commission, these people are guilty of an offence. I said at an earlier stage of this legislation that it seems to be following the lines of matters that have been very seriously discussed in England with regard to those situations in which the State claims privilege as regards the production of evidence. In England, the judicial system has worked to this point: that where the claim is made that the bulk of the information would be prejudicial to the safety of the State or the preservation of the State, the courts accepted without demur— or at least they used to until the matter was pressed in an extravagant way—the statement of a responsible member of the Government that whatever was in issue was or might be harmful to the safety of the State.
That, of course, has gone to extremes. It started off with the case where a submarine was sunk and a lot of people lost their lives. An action was taken by the dependants of some of the officers that they should be remunerated, the claim being made that there had been negligence in the construction and operation of the submarine. Notice was served asking for the production of certain documents in regard to the building of the submarine. Particularly as the 1939 War was pending, the claim was made that the production of the documents would give away secrets of submarine construction, and that was something in which the safety of the State was concerned.
That was accepted without demur. That was pushed and pushed and pushed until in England the courts have occasionally said: "We feel bound by what has happened before but must have regard to the old canon with regard to the law that justice not merely be done but should be seen to be done." That certainly was not the case in these privilege questions when they were pressed to the extremes to which they have been in England.
There is quite a volume of opinion growing in England—there have been questions and debates in Parliament— and this division of thought has been shown: people will accept the preservation of the State and say "Do more or less what you like, but we think you have extended that on those grounds to many matters that should not come under it at all because what is involved is not the safety of the State but the secrecy of departmental records." While they have felt bound by precedent, they have kicked more frequently and more violently against this type of thing. This is the line of thought that will not accept a global statement by a Minister of the British Government that a whole mass of documents is privileged. They demand that he examines each one and is able to say with regard to each one: "I have had my attention directed to it and I think it is prejudicial."
In any event they at least—and this is from letters in English newspapers and debates in the House of Commons —keep the question clear that it is the Civil Service proper and the Army as well that are protected in this way by the plea of privilege. A member of the Civil Service in England sending up minutes, or minutes going up with various Civil Service signatures on them are also to be brought in because otherwise the civil servant would not write as freely or advise in such a valuable way if he thought at some time or other what he was advising might come into the public light. The distinction has been made, and it is a peculiar thing in England, that the nationalised boards have not that protection. A Minister in England dealing with anything like fuel or his civil servants are covered and the information sent him is confidential but the Chairman of the National Coal Board or his servants are not protected. If he comes into court, he cannot claim that sort of protection.
As well as extending over this matter, under this Bill not merely do people employed in various types of enterprises who might be described as people remunerated by moneys provided by the Oireachtas come in, but others who are appointed on the Boards are brought in. In the later stages we have dragged in contracts made, and the contracts are made either by an outsider and the Minister or between a State authority and the Minister. A "State authority" brings in the Attorney General, the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Revenue Commissioners, the Commissioners of Public Works and, of course, the Irish Land Commission.
I shall be dealing with that at a later stage but it is appropriate now to show the widening of the whole matter. People who enter into contracts, and there are many contracts that have to be entered into by the Board of Works, the employees of people who are in contractual relation with the Board of Works, all fall inside this scope of this piece of legislation and if they communicate any information they have got in such a way as is expressed to be confidential, whether the employee knows about that or not, they are guilty of an offence.
I should have thought one could recognise the necessity for carrying on the old official Secrets Act and dressing it up in modern form but to make this wide extension goes far beyond anything required either by the safety or the interests of the State.
I need not be reminded—because I know—of the old dilemma that faces everybody dealing with this type of legislation probably best expressed by Lincoln, President of the United States years ago, when he said that it was a grave question as to whether a Government not too strong for the liberties of the subject could be strong enough to preserve its existence in a great emergency. I do not mind, with few exceptions, what is done in a great emergency where the safety and preservation of the State are at stake but it is a different matter where it is a question of passing out some document or the substance or gist of a document and that is to be made into an offence because the Minister stamps it and says: "No matter what you say, that is secret and confidential and my certificate goes. The courts cannot inquire into it."
The people who serve on these commissions tell somebody something or publish a note about something and the Minister says: "That is secret and confidential. You should not have done it." That makes it an offence. Is there any justification for that? We have lived under the Official Secrets Acts since they were established and there was only one prosecution and that failed disgracefully, with the comment from the judge that the case should never have been brought. That is the background of all this. Yet, into something dealing with the security of the State, we dig in a whole lot of other things in regard to people who go on commissions so that they are theoretically guilty of an offence.
I suppose the answer will be made that no offence can be prosecuted without the consent of the Attorney General but in these latter days does anybody think that is a good safeguard? We have heard the Minister himself speak of the way prosecutions are brought. In certain cases, the police make the prosecution themselves. In other cases, they must go to the Attorney General but do not forget the position in which the Attorney General is in regard to dealing with State matters. It is a very weak position. The Attorney General is not a judge. He has not the fortifications the judges have. There is no question of his getting a term of office, even though it may be only for a number of years, which cannot be terminated except on grounds of incapacity or misbehaviour. The Attorney General is a creature of the Taoiseach who appoints him and the Taoiseach is entitled at any time to demand his resignation and take his office from him.
This proposed Act takes away all the protection of the courts which are ousted in many ways. The Minister certifies certain things and in the background then is the Attorney General who has to consent. The prosecution must be brought either by the Attorney General—which is quite a good safeguard—or with his consent. We give our judges a position and fortify them in many ways because we want them to be independent. We take the fortifications away from the Attorney General who is in an entirely different position. Yet that is the bulwark of safety for a person who goes on a commission and wants to tell the public of some information he got because he was chairman or a member of a commission of inquiry.