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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 14 Feb 1963

Vol. 199 No. 11

Committee on Finance. - Copyright Bill, 1962—Committee Stage.

Section 1 agreed to.
SECTION 2.

I move amendment No. 1:

In page 4, line 24, after "means" to insert "the negative and".

I must apologise to the Minister for handing in the amendment very late last night. There was such a flood of amendments that I thought I had included it. I am informed that people interested in this Bill have been given legal advice that there is grave doubt that the definition of a photograph contained in Section 2 includes the negative of that photograph. The Minister will agree that he intended to include the negative as well as the positive print. In the Industrial and Commercial Property Act of 1927, the making of the negative was the crucial matter from the copyright point of view. It would be wrong if we did not make the definition beyond all question. None of us would like to have interested parties having to go to court to make certain that the definition set out in the Bill does include the negative. I think the Minister will agree that the House should add the words "the negative and".

Might I say that in the printed amendment, the quotation marks should be before the word "the" instead of before the word "negative".

In the short time available to me I took what advice I could about this matter. As the Deputy has said, the term of the copyright previously extended from the time of the making of the negative. Under this Bill, it extends from the time of the making of the print which is in favour of the owner of the photograph. I have been advised that the definition is wide enough to include the word "negative". I have not been able in the time available to get advice as to what the implications might be of the inclusion of the word "negative" but I would suggest that the matter could be considered between now and the Report Stage.

I will willingly withdraw the amendment but the people interested have been advised by counsel that there is the gravest doubt in the matter. The Minister will agree that we should put the matter right.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 2 agreed to.
Amendment No. 2 not moved.
Section 3 agreed to.
Sections 4 to 8, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 9.

I move amendment No. 3:

In subsection (7), page 11, line 45, to substitute "fifty years" for "twenty-five years".

This is an amendment simply extending the period of protection from 25 to 50 years. Representations in this regard were made by photographers and I readily accepted them. We will have a repetition of this amendment in subsequent sections and I do not know if it would be in order to take them together.

I was about to suggest that.

Fifty years will be the period of protection in every case?

Yes, except in the case of special editions. If somebody prints a special edition of previously printed matter, the 25 years will run.

But it will be 50 years for the original one?

If a person printed a special edition to celebrate a 40th anniversary and included in that photographs taken 40 years before, the original copyright would have 10 years to run and the special edition would have 25 years more.

The 25 years will have regard only to the typographical arrangements of the special edition and the 50 years will run in the ordinary way.

Amendments Nos. 3, 18, 29, 32, 33, 34, 38 63, 64 and 70 would appear to have the same principle running through them.

In effect, does it mean that we are making no change in the existing law except with regard to special editions?

That is right.

It has been 50 years and we are going to continue the 50 years ?

That is so.

In the case of special editions, was it previously 50 years or 25 years?

There was no copyright in special editions previously.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 9, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 10.

I move amendment No. 4:

In subsection (3), page 12, line 18, after "pays" to insert "or agrees to pay".

This is simply a drafting amendment.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 10, as amended, agreed to.
Section 11 agreed to.
SECTION 12.

I move amendment No. 5:

In subsection (4), page 13, line 40, to delete "or in a broadcast".

This Bill re-enacts provisions which are in existing legislation for exceptions from protection of literary, dramatic or musical work and, generally speaking, the legislation which has existed up to the present time has been based on sound principles of common sense and, as provided in this section, fair dealing in, say, a literary or dramatic work for the purpose of research or private study or for criticism or review will not amount to a breach of copyright. There is, however, in this section as drafted a provision that the reading or recitation in public of a reasonable extract of a published literary or dramatic work shall not constitute an infringement of a copyright, if it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgment. That seems to be a reasonable provision but the subsection also provides that the protection is also given where the reading or recitation is given on a broadcast. The purpose of this amendment is to draw attention to that fact and to suggest that if the work of an author is broadcast, either by means of television or by sound radio, the ordinary copyright law should apply to it.

I appreciate that an argument can be made that the broadcasting of a work and its acknowledgement is in fact an advertisement of the work for the author concerned, but, whilst that argument is there, I feel that it is overborne by the stronger argument, namely, that this is a matter of property right with which we are concerned and if a broadcasting corporation, either by sound radio or television, wishes to utilise the work of an author, the ordinary copyright law should apply. It is not unreasonable to suggest that this should be done. That is the object of this amendment.

The 1927 Act did not specifically provide for the using of a reasonable extract in a broadcast but in this Bill public performance and broadcasting of a work are separately designated as matters within the control of the copyright owner. The intention was at all times that reasonable extracts, with due acknowledgment, should be permitted, notwithstanding copyright, and I think it is not unreasonable to ensure that reasonable user is extended to broadcasts as well as to ordinary performances. I think, Sir, it would be a reversal rather than anything else to exclude reasonable user from broadcasts. It is, in fact, very likely that under the existing law reasonable user would extend to broadcasts even though not specifically provided for in the 1927 Act. Therefore, I regret I cannot accept the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 6:

In subsection (7), page 14, line 28, after "of it" to insert "in the form of a record or cinematograph film".

This amendment refers to what are known as ephemeral broadcasts. These apply in the case of broadcasting companies who, for the purpose of later presentation, take a recording and maintain that recording, pending the publication through the ordinary means of broadcast or telecast. In the meantime, the recording as taken for the purpose of subsequent broadcast is an ephemeral broadcast. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the ephemeral broadcast in the form of a record or cinematograph film will be covered by the section. The three amendments, Nos. 6, 7 and 8, are really drafting amendments and I submit them to the House as reasonable.

On this matter of ephemeral broadcasts, ephemeral records, it is true, as I understand it, that the theory that the ephemeral recordings should be permitted has in fact been accepted in the Brussels revision of the International Copyright Convention and it has been left to individual countries to determine the manner in which these ephemeral recordings will be permitted.

The point I wish to make on this subsection, however, and arising out of the Minister's amendments, is that in fact the time limit of six months is rather long and, secondly, I would suggest that the Minister should consider some method of informing the person concerned of the existence of the recording and also of the fact that it has been destroyed. I am not for a moment suggesting that the existing authority, Telefís Éireann or Radio Éireann, will deliberately infringe copyright but I do suggest that the danger does exist of, perhaps, a change in administration or, alternatively, a danger may exist arising from error or accident. In such circumstances, it would be better to safeguard the author of the work concerned. If there were written into this section a provision by which the author would be informed of the time the recording was made and was informed of the time that it was destroyed, the whole concept of the ephemeral recording would be met. The word "ephemeral" is being stretched rather far by this subsection. I feel that if the Minister would implement this suggestion by an appropriate amendment at a later stage the dangers involved in the subsection would be overcome.

I think the practice in fact removes the danger, not only the practice but the economics of the thing. In the first place, the maintenance of the vehicle for retaining these ephemeral recordings is a very expensive thing. Apparently, the type of tape or electronic device that retains the recording is very expensive and one that in the ordinary way the broadcasting authority would not want to have tied up. In any event, the Performing Rights Society apparently give licences for the making of these recorded broadcasts, and in the case of Radio Éireann and, I presume, in the case of other authorities who take such recordings, they make comprehensive weekly returns to the organisations looking after the interest of the copyright owner. Therefore, in the event of the ephemeral recording being retained up to a period of six months, in respect of which there would be no charge, the organisation looking after the interests of the copyright owner will be fully informed week by week of the condition of the recording. When the six months are up, of course, it will either have to be destroyed or put into the archives. All along the line, there will be a full disclosure of the condition of the recording. I think the practice which is applied will overcome the point raised by Deputy Costello.

The Minister's remarks may apply in respect of a musical work, where an organisation such as the Performing Rights Society is concerned, but it would not apply to a literary or dramatic work, where an individual author is concerned. No such organisation exists. I presume there would not be any system of giving such an individual regular information. Therefore, it would seem to me that, if in fact the present practice is to give this regular information to the Performing Rights Society or any large organisation looking after the interests of composers and authors, it would be no harm to extend that practice to individuals also, so that they would get the benefit of what is now the practice.

I shall consider that for the next Stage.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 7:

In subsection (7), page 14, line 30, to delete "a reproduction, in any form, of the work" and substitute "such reproduction".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 8:

In subsection (7), page 14, line 31, to delete "including a reproduction in".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 9:

In subsection (8), page 14, line 35, to delete "of the work" and substitute "or any copy thereof".

Again, this is a drafting amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 10:

In subsection (9), page 14, line 50, to delete "public performance or reproduced" and substitute "other purpose".

Amendment agreed to.
Section 12, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 13.

I move amendment No. 11:

In subsection (1), page 15, line 27, after "royalty" to add "which shall be deemed to be at the rate of five per centum of the retail selling price of each record unless and until otherwise determined under the provisions of subsection (2) of this section".

I move this amendment on the following grounds. The existing law prescribes a royalty of five per cent., but this Bill proposes to introduce a degree of flexibility, which I think is welcome, in regard to assessing the amount of the royalty. If there should be any dispute between the copyright owner and the recording manufacturer as to what is fair royalty, the matter has to be, in effect, referred to arbitration under subsection (2) of this section.

I am concerned with the situation which would arise in the interval between the making of the record and the assessment of the rate under subsection (2). I am informed by experts that this investigation could very easily take six months or perhaps even longer, that in some circumstances it can take a very elaborate investigation and that very elaborate evidence has to be produced. I understand that even the record manufacturers are not happy about the prospect of a long period elapsing during which the copyright owner might get nothing. For that reason, I am suggesting that the rate of five per cent. be laid down as a guide pending the determination otherwise under subsection (2).

It may be said that a contract between the copyright owner and the manufacturer can cover this point. In the first place, it probably will not do so for some years, because heretofore these contracts have not had any such provision at all since the rate was laid down by statute. Apart from that, the Minister might consider, if he thought there was something substantial in the amendment, the feasibility of accepting the principle but to insert in it a proviso that the rate payable would be five per cent. or whatever was fixed by contract, subject to determination. under subsection (2).

There is one further point which may arise on the amendment and which the Minister might consider, that is, whether it is possible to have a contract between the copyright owner and the manufacturer which would lay down a rate of royalty and which would, in effect, exclude the provision in this Bill about a fair royalty.

The purpose of this Section is to enable record companies to have copies made of musical works which have once been recorded. The usual practice is that the second, third and so on recording companies are expected to pay a royalty related to the value of the recording for this facility. In general, the amount of royalty is settled by agreement between the parties. In the British Act of 1956, the royalty has been fixed at six and a quarter per cent., subject to certain regulations. It was not inserted in this Bill because it was not intended to intrude officially in these matters, but only where the parties did not agree. If, however, the House feels there is some merit in having a rate inserted below which the royalty will not go, then I shall consider the feasibility of bringing in a suitable amendment on Report Stage. Would that suit Deputy Colley?

Certainly.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 12:

In subsection (2), page 15, line 35, to delete "by the Controller" and substitute "under the said section 30".

This is a drafting amendment. It deals with the undertaking referred to in subsection (2); the amount of remuneration determined by the Controller will also cover the case where the remuneration will be determined by an arbitrator, in the event of the Controller submitting the case to an arbitrator.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 13:

In subsection (8), page 16, line 36, after "importation" to insert "for sale by retail".

Our recording companies are not very powerful organisations. The making of the basic article from which reproductions are made is expensive. The article is called a matrix. I understand it is the practice for Irish recording companies to have the matrix made abroad, in Britain, most likely, and the purpose of the amendment is to cover the importation of the matrix for the "sale by retail" of the recordings.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 14:

In subsection (8), page 16, line 39, to delete, "whether the making of a record made outside the State" and substitute "in relation to a record made outside the State and so imported whether the making of the record".

This is consequential on amendment No. 13.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 15:

In page 16, to add to the section the following subsection:

"( ) The Minister may make regulations for the purposes of this section and in this section `prescribed' means prescribed by regulations made by the Minister."

This is a drafting amendment to define the word "prescribed" where it occurs in the section. Regulations will be made for the implementation of the section.

Amendment agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 13, as amended, stand part of the Bill".

I want to raise a point on this section, but it is a point which probably arises also on other sections. I want to find out whether there is power to control the charges fixed by a body such as the Performing Rights Society. I have received representations that, in the case of parochial halls, or other halls running functions for charitable or other lawful purposes, in recent years the Performing Rights Society have raised their fees very substantially. In one specific case, the fee paid for a recording or performance was fixed for a number of years at £11 13s. 9d. That continued through the years 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953 and 1954; for the years 1955 to 1961, the annual fee stood at the same figure of £11 13s. 9d. Then for the same performance, for the year ending 1962, it was raised to £35 17s. 9d. It is the same figure for this year. As I understand it, the general arrangement whereby fees are charged in these cases is based on the seating capacity of the hall, or some notional arrangement of that sort. In the case of the seating capacity, it can be ascertained. In the case of a hall of a certain size a fee is fixed.

Representations have, as I said, been made to me that where parochial halls, or other halls, avail of these recordings, in the case of a dispute as to the amount charged, those concerned—either the parish priest or a committee—have no redress. Apparently the Performing Rights Society have the power freely to alter the basis of charge. No one wants to deny an equitable or reasonable charge being made, but in this case the charge has been trebled in a comparatively short space of time. Has the Minister any power under this, or any other section, to prescribe regulations regulating the charge, or is it a fact that a body such as the Performing Rights Society has an absolute right to impose whatever charge they decide upon?

It is objectionable that a society such as the Performing Rights Society should have an arbitrary power to fix a fee, not only in regard to recordings but also in respect of musical works played by bands, and so on. There is grave dissatisfaction throughout the country in relation to this matter and I would press the Minister to accept Deputy Cosgrave's suggestion.

Under Part V of the Bill all schemes of charges by organised copyright owners will come under review. I think the fears expressed by the Deputies will be met under Part V.

That will include the Performing Rights Society? Even though the body is outside the country, the Minister will still have power?

I will still have power, because to enforce their rights, they will have to come here.

We can discuss it on Part V.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 14.

I suggest amendments Nos. 16 and 17 might be discussed together.

I move amendment No. 16:

In page 18, to delete subsections (11) and (12) and substitute the following subsections:

"( ) Where by virtue of an assignment or licence or otherwise, Radio Éireann is authorised to include an artistic work in a television broadcast but (apart from this subsection) would not be entitled to make a reproduction of it, the copyright in the work is not infringed if Radio Éireann by means of its own facilities makes a reproduction, in any form, for the purpose of the authorised broadcast.

( ) The general exception mentioned in the immediately preceding subsection of this section shall not apply if without the consent of the owner of the relevant rights in the work——

(a) the reproduction so made or any copy thereof is used for any purpose except that of making the broadcast in accordance with the authorisation, if any, or

(b) the reproduction or any copy thereof is not destroyed before the end of the period of six months next following the making of the reproduction, or such longer period as may be agreed between Radio Éireann and the person who, in relation to the making of reproductions of the description in question, is the owner of the copyright subsisting in the work."

Even though this amendment looks fairly formidable, it is in fact a drafting amendment. The provisions relate to the right of Radio Éireann to make recordings of artistic works in various broadcasts or re-broadcasts and the intention is to bring them into line with those in Section 12 relating to literary, dramatic and musical works. The only substantial change being made is the use of the word "reproduction" so as to cover any kind of copy made by the Broadcasting Authority.

I wonder if the Minister, considering the suggestion I made on an earlier section, would not decide to introduce a system by which the owner of the copyright is informed of the date of destroyal and the date of user? Would the Minister consider bringing the amendment into this section also so that it will apply also to this section?

I will, certainly.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 17:

In subsection (13), page 18, line 23, to delete "recording or".

This is consequential.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 14, as amended, agreed to.
Sections 15 and 16 agreed to.
SECTION 17.

I move amendment No. 18:

In subsection (2), page 20, line 18, to substitute "fifty years" for "twenty-five years".

This is one of the numerous amendments which deal with the substitution of the words "fifty years" for "twenty-five years".

The same applies to several amendments, including numbers 29, 33, 63, 64 and 70. I take it we can deal with all of these amendments together.

That is agreeable.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 19:

In subsection (4), page 20, line 34, after "broadcast" to insert "or to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service".

With this amendment, I think we could discuss amendments 21 and 52. The purpose of the amendment is to cover a case where a diffusion service would be established and which in turn would establish a copyright in its transmissions to customers paying for these transmissions. It would involve the playing of gramophone records during any period of the day when a radio broadcast might not be available for transmission. It is thought the record companies should have the same right to payments for the use of their records in such cases as if they were used in ordinary forms of transmission. In effect, the amendment covers piped radio. It is not common in this country at the moment but it could be.

Such transmissions would be to municipal housing schemes?

It would also cover background music?

Not so much background music. It could cover municipal housing schemes.

In the United States, it is piped to factories.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 20:

In subsection (4) (b) page 20, line 34, before "payment" to insert "consent of and the".

The purpose of this amendment is to enable a broadcast to be made only with the consent of the person who has the copyright in the work and for the payment of equitable remuneration to that person. One of the difficulties in this matter is that records may be made and performed in the cases we have just referred to almost to an unlimited extent and artists and others who make these recordings can, to a very considerable extent, suffer from the continued rebroadcasting or reuse of these records, without either their consent or equitable remuneration or payment being made to them.

I would suggest that if the words in this amendment are included, the consent of the person who made the recording would be necessary and also the diffusion company would be required to make payment of adequate remuneration to the artists concerned. As I understand it, many persons who make recordings do not object to a reproduction, because naturally one of the objects in making the records is to ensure they will be reproduced and rebroadcast. However, if with the large-scale development these days of broadcasting and rediffusion, the consent of a person is not secured or some arrangements made to provide that he will be adequately remunerated, then the whole livelihood and the consequent possibility of a person remaining in business as an artist or a musician may be jeopardised. This, therefore, is a serious question from the point of view of persons engaged in this sort of work and some such provision should be made to safeguard their remuneration and their livelihood. I would accordingly urge on the Minister the desirability, in the interests of fair and equitable treatment for artists and musicians and others of that sort, to accept this amendment.

When a person makes a record, say, a musician, and makes it available to the public, then I think the public ought to have access to it, subject to the obligation to pay equitable remuneration for its user. If a person makes a record and does not want to make it available to the public, he has a perfect right not to make it available, to keep it for himself, but once having made it available in circumstances in which he will be paid for it, it is only reasonable that the public should have access to it, subject, of course, to the continued right of the owner of copyright to remuneration.

Record companies naturally make available records to a radio service or to any other public performance proprietors on the basis of receiving reasonable remuneration, but I do not think it should be left to those record companies to say when and where such a record will be played. I do not think it is fair the public should be denied the right of hearing these records on television or an any other medium by a decree of the record company or by a withdrawal of the right by the company, so long as the company is getting fair remuneration for the playing of that record. Subsection (4) provides for the payment of equitable remuneration to the owner of the copyright. I therefore regret I cannot accept the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 21:

In subsection (4), page 20, line 39, after "broadcast" to insert ", or to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service".

This has been discussed with amendment No. 19.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 22 not moved.

I move amendment No. 23:

In subsection (5), page 20, line 48, to delete "by the Controller" and substitute "under the said section 30".

This was discussed with amendment No. 12.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendments Nos. 24 and 25 not moved.

Amendments Nos. 26, 27 and 28 could be discussed together.

I move amendment No. 26:

In page 21, to delete subsection (11) and substitute the following subsections:

"( ) Where, by virtue of an assignment or licence or otherwise, Radio Éireann is authorised to broadcast a sound recording, but (apart from this subsection) would not be entitled to make a record of it, the copyright in the recording is not infringed if Radio Éireann by means of its own facilities makes a record of the recording for the purpose of the authorised broadcast.

( ) The general exception mentioned in the immediately preceding subsection of this section shall not apply if, without the consent of the owner of the relevant rights in the sound recording—

(a) the record or any copy thereof is used for any purpose except that of making the broadcast in accordance with the authorisation, if any, or,

(b) the record or any copy thereof is not destroyed before the end of the period of six months next following the making of the record, or such longer period as may be agreed between Radio Éireann and the person who, in relation to the making of records of the description in question, is the owner of the copyright subsisting in the recording.

( ) Any record of a recording made under subsection (11) of this section which is of an exceptional documentary character may be preserved in the archives of Radio Éireann, which are hereby designated official archives for the purpose, but, subject to the provisions of this Act, shall not be used for broadcasting or for any other purpose without the consent of the owner of the relevant rights in the recording."

The amendments submitted by Deputies Cosgrave and Coughlan are met by this amendment which is to insert three new subsections. The first of these subsections is merely a redrafting of subsection (11), which authorises Radio Éireann to make its own records. The other two subsections deal with the destruction methods of ephemeral recordings or their preservation in official archives on the same lines as provision has already been made in Sections 12 and 14 relating to ephemeral recordings of literary, musical and artistic work.

The Minister's amendment meets the points I had in mind.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendments Nos. 27 and 28 not moved.
Question proposed: "That Section 17, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

Representations, I know, have been made arising out of the provisions of subsections (8) and (9), and the effect of these subsections will be that copyright will not be infringed where a sound recording is made, for example, in any hotel or any holiday camp. The Bill, when enacted, will permit these records to be played on any premises where persons reside or sleep as part of the amenities provided exclusively or mainly for residents or inmates therein. Of course at holiday camps, it is not at all unusual to have records played as part of the amenities for which people pay an inclusive charge when they go to the camp. The same can apply indeed in hotels and it does not seem to me that there is a case to be made in favour of not giving this protection in such a wide way. In fact, a great deal of the remuneration which would be obtained from the owners of the copyright might be obtained from such performances, which are tantamount to performances in public. I would ask the Minister to reconsider the advisability of giving this protection in such places as holiday camps and hotels.

The performances referred to by Deputy Costello are not performances for payments specifically. They form part of the general amenities of the hotel, or the holiday camp involved. I would suggest that there is no point in excluding hotels from this section. I think there might be even less point if we were considering excluding holiday camps. They vary in size and vary in the kind of amenities they offer. The bigger ones usually employ live performers to a considerable extent and I think actors, dance bands and other types of performers benefit greatly from the availability of engagements in these large holiday camps. I would suggest that a holiday camp that relied on recordings as a means of entertainment for its patrons would not last very long and I would suggest that the live performers regard very highly the outlet for their talents that holiday camps provide.

I would not agree in any circumstances to deny the right of hotels to play records like these. Holiday camps, as I said, vary in size and while small hotels where 30 or 40 people are accommodated might rely on recordings of music and other works to entertain their patrons, it would be difficult to exclude the larger holiday camps if we wanted to include the small ones and hotels as well. By and large, the fears expressed by Deputy Costello are not serious enough to warrant the exclusion of hotels and holiday camps from the benefits of the section.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 18.

I move amendment No. 29:

In subsection (2), page 22, line 17, to substitute "fifty years" for "twenty-five years".

This has already been discussed.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 30:

In subsection (2), page 22, line 18, after "published" to insert "or the first year in which in relation to the film an act referred to in paragraph (b), (c), or (d) of subsection (4) of this section occurs, whichever year is the earlier."

This is an amendment regarding the term for which copyright in a cinematograph film is to be measured. If there were registration of films here, that would probably be the most suitable date, that is, the date of registration for commencing the term. In the absence of registration, it is thought that the term of copyright should run from the year in which the film is first published, as defined in subsection (10), or the year in which it is first shown to the public, whether by cinema or by broadcasting or by means of a diffusion service. I think the amendment is reasonable.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 31:

In page 22, to delete subsection (6)

The objection to this subsection has been somewhat met by the amendments which the Minister has provided for and which have been accepted. The position actually, as envisaged in the Bill as it was drafted, was that where a film was made and where the copyright only existed for 25 years, then the other Copyright Acts that might be associated with the film, for example, the rights in the musical works involved in the film, would also cease. It seems to me that part of the objection to this subsection is now gone as a result of the fact that the copyright period has been extended to 50 years. The position would have been that the right to a musical work in the sound track of a film would have gone after a period of 25 years and there was, I think, some injustice involved to authors generally in the subsection. I think that has been met to some considerable extent by the amendments which have been made.

The British Joint Copyright Council made representations to this effect and I think they have agreed also that the representations they have made have been met by the extension to 50 years from 25 years.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 32:

In subsection (7), page 22, line 48, to substitute "fifty years" for "twenty-five years".

This amendment is similar to amendment No. 33 and we can discuss the two together.

Amendment agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 18, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

I take it, in the definition subsection (10), that "cinematograph film" in fact includes also a television film.

That is so.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 19.

I move amendment No. 33:

In subsection (2), page 23, line 32, to substitute "fifty years" for "twenty-five years".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 34:

In subsection (4), page 23, line 45, to substitute "fifty years" for "twenty-five years".

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments Nos. 35 and 36 may be discussed together as No. 36 appears to be an alternative to No. 35.

I move amendment No. 35:

In subsection (9), page 24, to add to the subsection the following paragraph:

"In any case where either a television or sound broadcast is communicated in places accessible to the public against payment a single equitable remuneration shall be paid by Radio Éireann to the performer or to such body as may be authorised to receive such payments on behalf of performers collectively."

The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that where television or sound broadcasts are made by Radio Éireann, Radio Éireann shall pay either to the performer or such body as may be authorised to receive such payments on behalf of a group of performers collectively, fair and equitable remuneration. Because of the way the section is drafted, I am not certain whether there is provision for equitable remuneration. Quite a number of broadcasts, such as broadcasts of sporting events, may have a very limited life or interest and reproduction would be of interest only while the event was fresh in the memory or for a short period afterwards, but in the case of an artistic or musical performance, or something of that nature, the question is obviously different. In that case, I suggest a single equitable payment should be made by Radio Éireann either to the performer or in the case of a group of performers, to the body authorised to act on behalf of the group.

Does Deputy Coughlan wish to speak on his amendment?

No; Deputy Cosgrave has covered it.

This is usually something which the performer himself provides for in making his contract. If he makes a contract with Radio Éireann for a single performance which is likely to be repeated on future occasions, normally speaking, it is a matter for him to provide for subsequent telecasts or broadcasts of his performance to be paid for. In fact, the purpose of the amendment is not appropriate to this Bill. There is a separate performers Bill in course of preparation and I suggest we should take care of the problem in that way. It is not proper to this Bill and therefore I suggest the amendments might be withdrawn and consideration given to them when the performers Bill is introduced.

Will that be introduced shortly?

It is in course of preparation.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 36 not moved.
Section 19, as amended, agreed to.
Sections 20 to 22, inclusive, agreed to.
NEW SECTION.

I move amendment No. 37:

In page 27, before section 23, to insert the following new section:

(1) In any action for infringement of copyright commenced and heard in the High Court—

(a) where any relief (other than damages) claimed is within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and, if damages are claimed, the amount of the damages recovered by the plaintiff is not more than six hundred pounds, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover more costs than he would have been entitled to recover if the action had been brought in the Circuit Court, unless the judge hearing the action grants a special certificate under this section, and

(b) where the only relief claimed is damages and the amount of the damages recovered by the plaintiff is not more than fifty pounds, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover more costs than he would have been entitled to recover if the action had been brought in the District Court unless the judge hearing the action grants a special certificate under this section.

(2) In any action referred to in subsection (1) of this section the judge hearing the action may, on the application of the plaintiff, grant a special certificate in writing that, in the opinion of the judge, it was reasonable, owing to the substantial or important nature of the action or the importance of any question of law involved therein that the action should have been commenced in the High Court.

(3) The reference in subsection (3) of section 12 (which limits the amount of plaintiffs' costs in certain actions in the High Court) of the Courts of Justice Act, 1936, to a restriction imposed by that section shall be construed as including a reference to the restrictions imposed by this section on the amount of costs recoverable by plaintiffs in the actions referred to in subsection (1) of this section.

This amendment introduces a new section, the purpose of which is to make provision regarding the level of costs recoverable in copyright actions which are not governed by the Courts of Justice Act of 1936. Under existing law, that is, the Act of 1927, the court in which copyright actions had to be commenced is defined as the High Court and this arose from the fact that the word "court" was defined in the 1927 Act as meaning the High Court for the purposes of the Act as a whole and accordingly governed the copyright provisions which are Parts VI and VII of that Act. The word "court" is not defined in this Bill and therefore an infringement of copyright may be prosecuted in any court which would have jurisdiction. As is well known, the Circuit Court has jurisdiction in civil cases for claims up to £600. The High Court has unlimited jurisdiction and the District Court, I think, has jurisdiction up to £50.

Objection has been taken from time to time that all these infringement actions were taken only in the High Court and usually I think High Court costs were given. This section is to ensure that costs of an infringement case would be given in relation only to the value of the case, so that if a case is taken in the High Court and the jurisdiction value of the case is proper to the Circuit Court, then costs on the appropriate Circuit Court scale would be given rather than the High Court scale. Similarly, if an infringement value is within the jurisdiction of the District Court, the costs on that scale will apply. While it is still open to bring such cases to the High Court, the tendency would probably be in future to bring such cases in courts of appropriate jurisdiction. I think this is in ease of persons charged with infringements by such organisations as the Performing Rights Society and I think there has been pressure for that in a number of cases for some years.

There are difficulties involved in these copyright actions to which special consideration should be given in regard to the Minister's proposals. As the Minister said, this new section is in ease of the infringers but the question is whether we should legislate in ease of infringers. Persons who infringe a copyright may do so either with full knowledge of what they are doing or innocently. In the former case, which is not at all uncommon where musical works are concerned, the person who deliberately infringes a copyright might decide it would be worth his while to do so and take the consequences of an action being taken against him. If an action is taken against him for such infringement, he might find himself in the position of having to pay only quite a small sum in damages and quite a small sum in costs. In certain circumstances, it might pay the infringer not to take out, for example, the licence of the Performing Rights Society and allow himself to be sued and pay up on the costs and damages.

The Minister should consider very carefully the proposals in this section before they are adopted. A case in which I was personally involved not so long ago concerned infringement of copyright in a musical publication. The High Court had to consider the damages sustained by the owner of the copyright. The owner proved quite clearly that there was a flagrant breach of copyright, that the defendant must have deliberately taken his work and, although a defence was put in to the claim, denying that the plaintiff had the copyright in the work, that defence was subsequently withdrawn and it was left to the court to decide on the measure of damages. In fact, the measure of damages allowed by the court was comparatively small, but, because the action was brought in the High Court, High Court costs were obtained against the infringer. It is in the light of such serious consequences to the infringer that many people submit to the legal obligations with regard to copyright. In this case, we are legislating in ease of infringers if the benefit contained in this amendments is proceeded with. We should carefully consider whether this should be done.

A further aspect of the difficulties involved in this matter of copyright law involves the difficulty of proof in such an action. Not infrequently, the defendant puts the plaintiff's entitlement to a copyright in issue. It may be an extremely difficult thing to prove, according to the law of evidence, that the plaintiff is entitled to the copyright in the work. It may involve bringing witnesses from abroad and it seems to me reasonable in such cases that an action in the High Court should be brought.

I would ask the Minister to carefully consider the advisability of pursuing this section. In principle, all actions should follow the general provisions of our Courts of Justice Acts and the recent legislation passed here, following the setting up of our new courts. In cases brought in the District Courts and the Circuit Courts, special costs should not be awarded except in special circumstances. We are dealing with a special type of law and I strongly apprehend that if this amendment is insisted upon, many people will prefer deliberately to infringe copyright.

Reference has been made to the Performing Rights Society. I can see cases of people throughout the country deciding to take a chance and not take out the licence, deciding to wait until they are caught out and then, when small damages and small costs are given against them, finding that the amount they have to pay might be less than the licence they should have taken out in the first place. I feel that more consideration should be given to the amendment. If the Minister wishes to press it, I would ask him to reconsider the circumstances in which the special certification for High Court costs would be granted. As the amendment is drafted at present, the judge may grant a special certificate for High Court costs, if in his opinion it was reasonable, owing to the important nature of the case or because of the points of law involved, that the action should have been commenced in the High Court. I would ask the Minister to consider giving the court a wider discretion in this regard if he decides to press for this section.

What I have in mind is that it might be reasonable for the court to grant High Court costs, if the court is satisfied that a deliberate infringement had occurred. If the infringement were an accidental one, it might not be reasonable to grant High Court costs. I would also suggest that the High Court should have power to grant High Court costs, if it decided that the defendant had put in issue unreasonably the plaintiff's entitlement to the copyright. What I means is that if, prior to the proceedings, the copyright owner were to write to the defendant asking him to admit that he was the owner of the copyright without formal proof and if this admission were not forthcoming, it might be extraordinarily difficult for the owner to prove his case and it would not be unreasonable for him to institute proceedings in the High Court.

If an infringement takes place in a remote part of the country, it might be necessary to bring witnesses great distances to prove what is a formal matter. In such circumstances, I think the court should be given a much wider jurisdiction with regard to giving the special certificate envisaged in the amendment. I would suggest that if the Minister is to press the amendment, this new section should be so widened that the court would have a general discretion to give costs according to the circumstances of any given case.

We should not legislate lightly to benefit an infringer and that is what we are doing here. I can see where an innocent infringement can occur and a person can innocently perform a play without realising that copyright exists or may do a musical work without realising that copyright exists. In such a case, it would be unfair for that person to find himself involved in an action in the High Courts. It would be easy to cover such circumstances but we are legislating here for the other type of circumstances. We are legislating to protect the infringer and I do not think we should do that.

This proposed new section gives the court all the powers that will safeguard the copyright holder and the innocent infringer. Another section ensures that the flagrant infringer will be dealt with as well.

Where is that?

If the Deputy will look up Section 22, subsection (4), he will see that it gives power to deal with deliberate infringement.

That gives power to the court to give exemplary damages?

That does not meet the case. I can refer the Minister to a typical case which occurred in the courts only a few months ago, where exemplary damages were given. The actual pecuniary loss to the owner of the copyright was in the region of £5 and the exemplary damages given were £50, which was not bad when dealing with exemplary damages. That was then just barely outside the District Court jurisdiction. It was in at the lowest scale in the Circuit Court jurisdiction. If this subsection is passed, the wilful infringer, against whom exemplary damages are given, will only have to pay £55 and quite a small sum for costs.

These are matters that I am sure Deputy Costello would always argue should be left in the discretion of the court. I think the attitude of members of the main Opposition Party is that the courts should have freedom of action within their jurisdiction, that they should have power to deal with cases as they see them, impose damages or penalties as they see fit, according to the facts of the case.

This section and the previous one, Section 22, which provides for flagrant breaches, give the court very ample powers to deal with all kinds of cases. I, personally, have no practical experience of copyright cases. I understand Deputy Costello has. He knows much more about the law in practice than I do. I am given to understand that many of the cases are comparatively innocent infringements, involving, perhaps, dancehall proprietors in remote parts of the country.

While this legislation right through runs in favour of the copyright owner, here is a case in which we should have some regard for the infringer, particularly for the small man like a dancehall owner in the west of Ireland who commits an infringement, innocently perhaps, or maybe not so innocently. If it is not so innocently, the courts have ample powers to deal with him under Section 22. If it is innocently, then it is unfair that any organised body of copyright protectors should bring that man from the west of Ireland to the High Court and have damages assessed against him in a comparatively small amount, notwithstanding that all the other attendant costs would be involved of bringing whatever witnesses he had, his solicitor and everybody else involved, to the High Court.

The new section as drafted provides adequately for such cases. It provides for the certificate that is to be given by the presiding judge if the matter is so serious as to merit High Court costs, even though the amount of the damages would not so merit High Court costs, and Section 22 deals with flagrant breaches. Therefore, I submit, Sir that the interests of both parties are adequately met and the person who flagrantly disregards copyright law is very well taken care of under Section 22.

I must press my objection to this draft. We should bear in mind what we are trying to do. We should punish the deliberate infringer. If a person innocently infringes copyright, he should be given leniency. It would be quite a simple matter to legislate for the innocent infringer. It could be provided that if the court were satisfied that the infringement was innocent, the court would have jurisdiction to grant a limited sum for costs. I am in complete agreement with the Minister that the innocent infringer in the west of Ireland should not be put to great expense if, in fact, he proves that. I can say from my own personal knowledge with regard to matters affecting performing rights societies that that has not occurred.

We are not merely concerned with performing rights societies. We are concerned principally with plays and we are concerned with infringement of copyright in publication of musical works in printed form. It is quite obvious at the present time that many people will decide that it will be worth their while deliberately to infringe copyright, decide that they will deny the right of the claimant to the copyright and decide to let him prove his case.

Take the author of, for example, an English work or the Irish author who has gone abroad or the widow of an Irish author who is entitled to copyright and who may find it extremely expensive and inconvenient to travel to Galway, Donegal or Kerry, wherever the infringement may have taken place. How is that person to be assisted by providing that he must go in the District Court?

It is all very well for the Minister to say that the court has power to grant damages for flagrant breach. As I understand the position, there have been very few cases where exemplary damages have been awarded. The one to which I have referred, which came before the courts quite recently, was a very exceptional case and I do not think there have been any others in this country. There has been one fairly recently in England in the English Reports where very high exemplary damages were given in a very flagrant case, but, by and large, the number of times when exemplary damages will be given for flagrant breach will be, perhaps, one in 30 years. That has been the record to date. If that is so and if the damages which are awarded as exemplary are in the region of £50 or so, then it is quite clear that the deliberate infringer will find himself better off taking a chance and deciding deliberately to infringe if this section stands.

The Minister says that the court has jurisdiction and discretion in the matter. I agree the court has, under Section 22, when dealing with damages in the case of a flagrant breach but the court's jurisdiction is very limited in this new subsection with regard to giving a certificate for costs.

If the Minister is going to press this, I would ask him to reconsider the power of the court to grant costs in these cases. The jurisdiction of the court and the discretion of the court to grant costs are severely circumscribed. What it says is that it was "reasonable owing to the substantial or important nature of the action." An action where £5 damages and £50 exemplary damages were awarded might not be regarded as a substantial or important action, where there was no important question of law involved, where the defendant admits that he has flagrantly broken the plaintiff's copyright. In those circumstances, the court would have no alternative but to grant District Court or Circuit Court costs. It would have no discretion to do otherwise.

I would suggest, therefore, that if the Minister is going to press this section, a much wider discretion should be given and that one of the grounds on which High Court costs would be awarded would be where the defendant unjustifiably puts into issue the plaintiff's entitlement to the copyright or, alternatively, where there has been a deliberate infringement.

I have a little experience of copyright. I am not so thoroughly acquainted with the Bill. I have followed the line of argument here. I have been in the dance business most of my life. Dancehall proprietors are hounded by representatives of copyright owners. The vast majority of people engaged in the dance business are innocent in this matter. They do not know whether what is being played by the band is copyright or not. The musicians play the music. The fellow who runs the dance does not know what they are playing and does not care. He does not know whether he is infringing the law or not, and I doubt if a lot of the musicians know either.

Copyright should be levied at the source—the producer, the publisher, the seller of the music or record. It is ridiculous that the performer should be asked to pay, when 99 times out of 100, he is innocent of any infringement of the law. It was impossible in practice to collect the dance tax from the small people. That is why it was given up. It will also be found impossible to get the small people to pay copyright fees. Very often it may be only a one-night-a-year dance or one night a week. What they would make in the year, the copyright people would want. I was asked on a number of occasions for £40 a year for my band to play certain music. It was a period when things were bad with me.

I am afraid the Deputy is getting away from the section. It deals with the limitation on the amount of plaintiff's costs.

Ninety-nine per cent. of the people concerned are entirely innocent.

What Deputy Costello fears most in this case is the deliberate infringer of copyright, who will regard it as worth his while to deliberately infringe copyright, take a chance on an action in any court and have damages with costs awarded against him. There is, however, a well-known procedure in law, which I presume applies to copyright actions as well as to others. In the case of the deliberate infringer, who puts the plaintiff to the highest possible degree of proof as regards ownership of copyright and perhaps other matters, the procedure is that a motion is served to admit facts. Usually the facts referred to are facts that may be expensive to prove, but facts that could not be as a general rule disproved by the defendant. If a defendant realises that the plaintiff has a right to prove certain facts and is well able to prove them, he admits these facts formally in a document which appears before the court at hearing. If he refuses to do so, then according to the plaintiff's motion, application would be made to the court to have appropriate costs and expenses fixed against the defendant. If the people who have to put forward the proof have to be brought to court at considerable expense, a motion to admit facts in such cases will ensure that in the case of a flagrant infringer the question of ownership of copyright will not entirely be in issue and will be no help when he is fixed with the costs.

I should have perhaps mentioned earlier on that there is another section, Section 26, which I think is a deterrent. Under this, he may be brought before a court and fined or put in prison. I suggest, with the wide powers given to the court here to cover the flagrant infringer as it might affect the innocent infringer, it is better that the section should be left like that. We should not tie the court down by trying to define what is a flagrant or what is an innocent breach. The courts are well able to decide for themselves having regard to their experience, the measure of culpability in these matters. I submit that the amended section as it stands covers very adequately in relation to the other sections the matters likely to cause concern to Deputy Costello.

I do not know if I have made very clear the point I am making. The Minister seems to think the court has wide jurisdiction. My complaint is that the court's jurisdiction is severely circumscribed. I would ask the Minister to read again the power given under subsection (2) of this new section to the courts to grant a certificate for High Court costs. It will in fact only be in very exceptional circumstances that that would be done. My suggestion is that, if this section is being maintained, then this subsection (2) should be considerably broadened.

With regard to the point I have raised about the cost and difficulty of proof in copyright actions, I do not think the Minister's arguments answers the point I made. For a start, there is no procedure for serving notices to admit facts in the District Court. If in fact the matter is one of the District Court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff will have to prove his case. Secondly, in the District Court, there is no pleading as such and the plaintiff will have, in any case brought to the District Court, automatically to prove his entitlement to the copyright. The third point is that if a notice to admit facts is brought in a case that may have been started in the Circuit Court or High Court, it is by far the more usual thing for the defendant to admit the facts. In such circumstances, the plaintiff is put to the expense of bringing witnesses from abroad or from remote parts of the country to prove the facts not admitted.

I do not think the fact that the defendant may realise he may have to pay the costs of producing such witnesses will deter him from not accepting the notice to admit facts. My experience, for what it is worth, has been that the defendant will not admit the facts and may put the plaintiff in the position of having to pay the cost of witnesses. There is a further difficulty. It may be extremely difficult to prove the particular facts, although undoubtedly the copyright is vested in the plaintiff. When I say "prove," I mean prove according to the rules of evidence. Persons may in fact be abroad or witnesses of the assignments may not be available. All these matters will be made extremely difficult of proof in the operation of this section.

It seems to me we are agreed in principle that the deliberate infringer should be punished and that the innocent infringer should get leniency from this legislation. If we agree on that principle, it is merely a question of working it out in practice. I feel the way it has been worked out in this section has been to make it extremely easy for the deliberate infringer to get away with his deliberate infringement and to make it very difficult to operate copyright protection.

The troubles raised by Deputy Sherwin are well known. The fact is that copyright is a property right and the methods used to obtain remuneration for this property right are, of course, not very popular with those who have to pay it. The people concerned are Irish, as well as foreigners; they are Irish people who have composed musical, literary or dramatic works, and I do not think we should lightly legislate away any rights they might have.

Could they not get it on the sale of records and music? Why start chasing people all round the country? In 99 cases out of 100, they will not succeed anyway. The people they catch will not have tuppence.

Deputy Costello says we are close enough now to come to some agreement on this. While he wants the section deleted altogether he would not, I take it, object if subsection (2) were not so restrictive as to matters in which High Court costs would be given. These matters are restricted to cases where the action is of a substantial nature or the question of law involved is one of importance. Deputy Costello is concerned still apparently, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 22, that a flagrant breach case might not be covered here. I shall consider a provision to cover that on the Report Stage, if that will satisfy the Deputy.

Not completely, but half a loaf is better than none. I ask the Minister to consider two possibilities. I ask him to consider either leaving wide jurisdiction to the court with regard to a certificate or indicating the circumstances in a wider way than at present in which the certificate would be granted. I have in mind an indication to the court that, if the defendant has unreasonably put the copyright owner's title in issue, then costs might be awarded. I also have in mind the possibility of providing that if there is a flagrant breach, or a deliberate breach—I think the word "flagrant" is, perhaps, the wrong word here—the matter would be at the discretion similarly of the court. I fully appreciate the force of the situation where a person has innocently committed a breach and is damnified in high costs, but I think the situation might be met by the suggestions I have made.

May I intervene for a moment in regard to one matter? I have been listening very attentively and, while we are in this Bill attempting to give leniency, a leniency with which I agree, there is also the fact that the plaintiff may be in the position, usually is in the position, to bring very expensive evidence or witnesses, and could litigate very strongly against even an innocent defendant.

The innocent man usually pays up anyway.

But he may not have the wherewithal.

Deputy Carroll has a point there—it is covered in a later amendment—because what he says is quite true; to prove a case very expensive costs may be involved. That would not arise, of course, where the innocent infringer does not put the plaintiff's title in issue. If he does put it in issue, then very substantial proofs may be involved. Deputy Carroll has a point. It is one of the matters which are referred to in a later section; there may be some much simpler way by which the plaintiff's apparent copyright title is accepted without going to the necessity of very expensive proofs.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 23 and 24, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 25.

Amendment No. 38 is consequential on amendment No. 3.

I move amendment No. 38:

In subsection (4), page 31, lines 2 to 5, to delete "or the period of twenty-five years (according to the term of the subsistence of copyright under this Act in a work of the kind in question)".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 39:

In subsection (6), page 31, to delete lines 16, 17 and 18 and substitute "In an action brought by virtue of this part of this Act with respect to a literary dramatic musical or artistic work—".

The object of this amendment is to give effect to the point raised by Deputy Carroll. This section provides for proof of facts in copyright actions. Under subsection (6) it is provided that certain presumptions will be made where the author is dead. I suggest these presumptions will also be made in respect of any action brought for infringement in regard to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work. Such a presumption would not, I think, be contrary to the general practice of the courts. It would not involve any great injustice and if, in fact, a person wrongfully claimed to be entitled to the copyright and wrongfully claimed he was the owner, that matter could be litigated fairly in court by the defendant raising the issue. Until he does, I think the presumptions I suggest would be a way out of the expensive matters of proof which very frequently work injustice, very frequently mean that copyright owners cannot prove their claim and, therefore, do not bring actions, and very frequently suffer loss as a result.

I must, I am afraid, resist this amendment. It is obvious that if a man is alive and can prove his title, he should do so if it is put in dispute. As a rule, he does so only when the defendant to an action puts it in issue. Again, I suggest that a defendant will not lightly put that matter in issue because he must realise he will have to pay the costs of whatever proofs are necessary, even if they involve bringing people long distances overseas. I think he will be careful not to put the authorship of a work in issue in a case of infringement brought against him, knowing he cannot dispute the author's title, and knowing that, if he does, it will cost him extra money by way of costs and expenses of his action. It is only fair, I think, that the presumption should be there in favour of an author or in favour of an action of infringement in respect of works of an author who is dead. I might point out, too, that the provision proposed by Deputy Costello does not appear in the British 1956 Act. I do not see any good reason why we should make such provision in our legislation.

I do not accept the Minister's view that the defendant will admit the plaintiff's claim. There have not been many copyright actions in the courts, but the general experience has been that the copyright is put in dispute as an automatic matter of pleading. In the action to which I have referred, an action heard quite recently in the High Court, this was in fact done and only on the morning of the hearing was the plaintiff's entitlement to the copyright admitted. It did not, in fact, arise in this case, but the circumstances might have been such that it might have been impossible to prove the plaintiff's entitlement according to the laws of evidence. These facts exist to such an extent that many actions for breach of copyright are not taken because of the difficulty of proof. I submit my suggestion would bring about economies of time, economies of cost, and I do not think it is an unreasonable one.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 25, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 26.

I move amendment No. 40:

Before subsection (4) in page 32, to insert the following subsections:

"( ) The District Court, upon the application of the owner of the copyright in any work, may act as follows: If satisfied by evidence that there is reasonable ground for believing that infringing copies of the work are being hawked, carried about, sold, or offered for sale, may by order authorise a member of the Garda Síochána to seize the copies without warrant and to bring them before the court, and the court, on proof that the copies are infringing copies, may order them to be destroyed, or to be delivered up to the owner of the copyright or otherwise dealt with as the court may think fit.

( ) If the District Court is satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence under subsection (1), (2) or (3) of this section is being committed on any premises, the court may grant a search warrant authorising a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of Inspector, accompanied by such other members of the Garda Síochána as that member thinks proper, to enter the premises between the hours of 6 a.m. and 9 p.m., if need be by force, and to seize any copies of any work or any plates in respect of which he has reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under any of the said subsections is being committed.

( ) All copies of any work and plates seized under subsection (5) of this section shall be brought before the District Court, and if proved to be infringing copies or plates intended to be used for the printing or reproduction of infringing copies shall be destroyed or delivered up to the owner of the copyright in question or otherwise dealt with as the court thinks fit."

Amendment No. 41 is consequential on this amendment and we could therefore take the two together. In the 1927 Act, powers could be given to the Garda Síochána for the seizure of pirated copies of musical works. That provision applied only to sheet music, not to records, and as a result of representations made to us, we are now extending that power of seizure to pirated records. I think the amendment is reasonable.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 41:

To delete subsection (9), in page 33, and substitute the following subsection:

"( ) An appeal shall lie to the Circuit Court from any order under subsection (4), (5), (6) or (11) of this section."

Amendment agreed to.
Section 26, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 27.

I move amendment No. 42:

In subsection (1), page 33, line 9, after "work" to insert "or sound recording".

Amendments Nos. 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 and 49 are consequential and can be discussed together. The subsection as it stands makes provision for the owner of the copyright in any published literary, dramatic or musical work to give notice in writing to the Revenue Commissioners. I now propose that we include sound recordings in this provision as well.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 43:

In subsection (1), page 33, line 12, after "work" to insert "or the recording".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 44:

In subsection (1), page 33, line 15, after "work" to insert "or the recording".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 45:

To delete subsection (2), in page 33, and substitute the following subsection:

"( ) This section applies—

(a) in the case of a work, to any printed copy and

(b) in the case of a sound recording, to any copy,

made outside the State which, if it had been made in the State, would be an infringing copy of the work or the recording."

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 46:

In subsection (3), page 33, line 23, after "work" to insert "or a recording".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 47:

In subsection (3), page 33, line 25, after "work" to insert "or the recording".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 48:

In subsection (6), page 33, line 45, after "to pay" to insert "to the Commissioners".

This is merely a drafting amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 49:

In subsection (6), page 33, line 51, after "work" to insert "or the recording".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 50:

To delete subsection (7), page 34, and substitute the following subsections:

"( ) Any fees paid in pursuance of regulations under this section shall be accounted for in such manner as shall be prescribed by the Minister for Finance.

( ) The Public Offices Fees Act, 1879, shall not apply in respect of any fees payable in pursuance of regulations under this section."

Amendment agreed to.
Section 27, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 28.

I move amendment No. 51:

In subsection (1), page 34, line 21, before "the work" to insert ",or to record for the purpose of broadcasting,".

Under this section, copyright owners can introduce schemes for the user of the works in which they hold copyright and to cover the appropriate fees to be paid therefor. The purpose of this amendment is to bring within the scope of this Part of the Act, which deals with the jurisdiction of the Controller, any schemes that may embrace organisations of copyright owners in works for the purpose of broadcasting.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 52:

In subsection (1), page 34, line 26, after "it" to insert ", or to transmit it to subscribers to a diffusion service".

This amendment was discussed with amendments Nos. 19 and 21.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 28, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 29.
Question proposed: "That Section 29 stand part of the Bill."

I just want to say, and it is with some diffidence I raise it on Section 29 because I do not wish that anything I say should be regarded as reflecting on the Controller or his predecessors, that we are here setting up a system of arbitration of disputes which is tantamount to compulsory arbitration, automatic arbitration, and I question the wisdom of providing that an individual should be appointed as arbitrator. The English legislation in this respect makes provision for a board of three and I think it would be preferable to establish here a board such as that provided in the English legislation rather than leave the matter to the discretion of an individual.

I do not wish these remarks to be taken in any way as reflecting on the person who is immediately concerned, but I do think that a question of principle is involved here. These are very important matters which will be referred to the arbitrator. He will be a single person and he will have to act on many occasions and I feel that, generally speaking, a board of three is a preferable method of determining those matters than an individual person.

We are, in fact, legislating in respect of property rights. We are going to provide a system of automatic arbitration by which one indvidual will have to determine the prices to be paid in respect of property rights. I feel the English precedent is a better one, namely, a board of three persons. I do not know why this was not followed, unless it was for reasons of economy. If for reasons of economy it was decided to utilise the Controller of Patents rather than establish an outside board—which of course would not be in permanent session and would only meet regularly and when required—I do not think that would be a sound reason for doing so and I would suggest that the Minister should give consideration to this suggestion.

I am advised in this connection that the British system operating in England is considered unnecessary in our circumstances. It is perhaps more expensive and as well as that, the Controller has somewhat similar powers in respect of other commercial property such as trade marks, and I do not think we need have any fears—and I know Deputy Costello has no fears except that he prefers the British system—that any injustice would be done by the single Controller we have in making decisions on subjects of this nature. The British system is rather too expensive for our circumstances.

Mr. Costello

I did perhaps think that it was expense that was the reason for this and if it is a question of expense, I should like the Minister to re-consider it because there will not be a great deal of expense involved in convening a board from time to time, nor do I think it would be cumbersome. I think it would be easier to operate a board in a country like Ireland which is much smaller and where distances are so much less than in England. The objective is one of principle and not in any way applicable to individual circumstances. We have all had experience of persons who are in a position of arbitrator over a great number of years and very frequently patterns evolve from a single arbitrator which may not be desirable and, generally speaking, it is better for an arbitrator who will be concerned regularly with the matter that such arbitration should take place with three persons who are appointed to deal with the matter to which reference to him has been made.

I think this is a matter of very considerable importance. These disputes are matters that will fairly regularly be brought before the arbitrator whom we will appoint and I think the general experience has been rather in favour of an ad hoc arbitration board of three persons than maintaining an individual person who would over a number of years perhaps set a pattern which might not generally be regarded as desirable. I would ask the Minister to give consideration to the suggestions I have made.

I should like to make one comment before I pass on from this. The points raised by the Deputy have not been raised before. We have not received representations on these —not meaning that the Deputy is not entitled to make representations on this section. I think the main argument he makes is that the single arbitrator, even with the best will in the world, with the greatest degree of objectivity that he can bring to bear on his hearings, might evolve a pattern of decision on schemes that would be undesirable. If that happens, I think again we have means whereby it can be controlled and changed where necessary, because in Section 39—"an appeal shall lie to the High Court from any order or decision of the Controller..", so that if his pattern of decisions evolves in an undesirable way, then there is power of having them checked in a proper manner.

What I want to say is this, while I am not convinced that we should have a tribunal on the British lines, since I had no opportunity of giving it advance consideration, I shall do so on the Report Stage.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 30.
Question proposed: "That Section 30 stand part of the Bill."

I need not reiterate what I said earlier on Section 13. Is it a fact that the Controller has power under Section 30 to fix charges imposed, say, by a body similar to, or the Performing Rights Society? Can the Minister say if, in fact, in the past any such control has been exercised by the Controller?

The existing position is that the rate of royalties is fixed at five per cent. It was intended that in this legislation we should leave that rate unmentioned so that it could be a matter of negotiation between the parties concerned, but it is only when they are in dispute that the Controller comes in. They can then take the dispute to the Controller for his decision. The Controller, if he sees fit, may not decide to make a decision himself but refer it to an arbitrator, so that the Controller has not initially the power to fix these rates.

I do not know whether the case I have in mind and which was brought to my notice was limited to five per cent. or not, but I assume, because of the fact that it is the same hall and the same body who are running these shows, that the fees increased very substantially over a period of years. As I mentioned, it was a rise from £11 13s. 9d. to £35 17s. 9d. If of course the particular matter which was reproduced, or whatever form of record was made, referred to a different or substantially different thing then, naturally, the increase might be passed as five per cent. of the cost of the thing. As I understand it, the persons involved in running this hall feel that the charges were raised without due regard to the size of the hall and indeed were considered in all the circumstances quite excessive.

It would be open to a group of hall proprietors to bring this case before the Controller for his examination.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 31.

Amendments Nos. 53 and 54 may be discussed together, I think.

Yes, they can. I move amendment No. 53:

In page 36, to delete subsection (5) and substitute:

"(5) Subject to the immediately preceding subsection of this section the Controller, on any reference under this section, shall consider the matter in dispute, and after giving to the parties to the reference an opportunity to present their cases respectively, shall decide whether or not the licensing body concerned has monopoly powers and, if so, if it has abused its monopoly powers by establishing the scheme referred to him and if he so decides he shall make such order varying the scheme in so far as it relates to cases of the class to which the reference relates as the Controller may determine to be reasonable in the circumstances".

I think it may be taken as characteristic of human nature that people do not like paying money and they do not like paying it in the form of tax if they run dances. They do not like paying money to the Performing Rights Society if they run dances and if they put on a play they do not like paying money for the right to perform the play or if they reproduce works of authors, similarly, they do not like the obligation to pay for the copyright. For these reasons there are objections from time to time to the charges that have been made by organisations protecting the authors or composers of musical works.

As I understand the position, organisations such as the Performing Rights Society do not object to the principle of arbitration and it is reasonable that where a dispute arises the matter could be put to arbitration and the parties' cases would be fairly ventilated and an independent tribunal can adjudicate on the disputes. But I think there is a matter of principle involved and the object of the amendment which I have put down is to give effect to that principle. I feel that arbitration should arise where there has in fact, been an abuse of a monopoly. Undoubtedly, some such organisations as the Performing Rights Society are in a position of quasi-monopoly. The organisations protecting certain authors' rights may be in a similar position but I feel what is important to safeguard is the right to negotiate these contracts to which reference has been made and the right to arbitrate where there has been any abuse such as has been suggested here today by Deputy Cosgrave. But, apart from the existence of an abuse, I feel it is rather dangerous to legislate for a system of what I imagine would be automatic arbitration.

The existence of copyright tribunals to arbitrate in disputes is, of course, internationally recognised but the general principle is that these tribunals are there where there has been an allegation of abuse of their position by a monopoly or a quasi-monopoly. In regard to the Performing Rights Society I understand that they and similar organisations have willingly accepted this principle and it is one which should be incorporated in our legislation. I very much doubt if dancehall proprietors are as innocent as Deputy Sherwin indicates. I think it is generally known to all of them that the performing rights of dance music have, as a matter of convenience, become vested in an incorporated body such as the Performing Rights Society and it is generally known throughout the country that it is an infringement of copyright to perform these works in public without the licence system that has been operated.

It should be borne in mind that this licence system is, in fact, for the benefit of the composers of the music. It is regrettable that much of the dance-music performed in our halls should not be composed by Irish nationals and has, perhaps, a rather foreign and alien atmosphere about it, but that is a matter of public taste and it is very hard to go against the tide. In fact, many of the works that have been performed in public have been composed by Irish authors and we are actually helping to remunerate them when these works are performed in public. This is a property right which we should not lightly throw away. For these reasons, I suggest we should devise a system of arbitration which would come into operation where it is established that any monopoly or quasi-monopoly has abused its position. It is not at all unusual to provide for monopolies in different forms of property rights and legislation concerning the registration of patents and trade marks, and rights of redress are given where there has been any breach of monopoly powers. I think the principle ought to be applied also, in different circumstances but by an analogy, when dealing with matters of copyright.

To clarify one point, 90 per cent of the dances run in the country are run by promoters, not by ballroom proprietors. The word "proprietor" means the owner of a ballroom but the owner rarely runs a dance. He simply lets the hall and so 90 per cent. of the dances or at least a great many of them are run by people who know nothing about copyright. They book the hall and book the band and they do not know anything about the performing rights licence. The owner would probably know but very few owners run dances.

But is it not the owner who takes out the licence?

I do not know. As far as I know, the owners would shift responsibility to the person who books the hall.

I appreciate the point made by Deputy Sherwin but at all events the letting the dancehall owner makes is the subject matter of a contract of some nature and I do not see that it would be impossible to have written into that contract some right of action, or rather some form of indemnity, for the proprietor of the dancehall in the event of an infringement of copyright.

The Minister should appreciate that most people who run dances have no money and are running the dances to make some. They are not concerned with whether they give a fee or not.

That is why we have to go after the other people. In regard to Deputy Costello's amendment, this is a matter that was taken up by the British Government during the Brussels revision of the Berne Convention. They wanted to secure from the Convention some means whereby they could insert some such provision in their own law. Nevertheless, they did not proceed with it in their own law in 1956. There are obvious reasons why. In the first place, an abuse of monopoly powers would have to be defined and this, I think, would be rather difficult.

The purpose of the amendment, as I understand it, would be that disputes between the organisation of the copyright owners and a representative body of users would be brought before the Controller only when there would be an abuse of monopoly rights. Licence schemes operated by an organisation of copyright-owners may concern the terms of user as well as monopoly powers. For example, Deputy Cosgrave asked me a while ago if the users would have some rights in respect of the financial terms of user and I said they would and that this would be the section. It is only right that users should have the right to come before the Controller in the event of a dispute about financial involvements, whether the copyright owners or the organisations are charging too much to the owners. With Deputy Costello's amendment, a case could be brought only where there was an abuse of monopoly powers and abuse of monopoly powers is not defined anywhere. I understand that the performance of practically all modern music is within the control of one group representing the copyright owners. Where there is a reasonable dispute between the group representing the copyright owners and the users about the terms of a scheme, common sense requires that the dispute be determined by the Controller on the basis of what he considers reasonable. There should be no limit on the right to bring such matters before the Controller and in drafting the section, we are following, in effect, the British law.

On that point, I am given to understand that at the time of the British enactment, it was clearly understood that the object of the Act was to deal with abuse of monopoly rights. As I understand the Minister, he states that what I suggest might in some way be in breach of the Brussels Convention. I do not think that is so. As I understand the provisions of the Brussels Convention, it does not in any way bind this country to set up a tribunal to deal with all disputes. To set up a tribunal to deal with disputes arising from abuse of monopoly rights would be well within the terms of the Convention. I understand that such a tribunal has operated in Switzerland for a number of years past.

The overriding argument in favour of the section is that matters in dispute should not be confined only to monopoly rights. I think that is reasonable.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 31 agreed to.
Amendment No. 54 not moved.
Section 32 agreed to.
Sections 33 and 34 agreed to.
SECTION 35.

I move amendment No. 55:

In subsection (1), page 39, line 26, after "prescribed" to insert "by rules made".

These two are drafting amendments to define the word "prescribed".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 56:

In subsection (2), page 39, line 30, after "prescribed" to insert "by rules made".

Amendment agreed to.
Section 35, as amended, agreed to.
Sections 36 to 38, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 39.

I move amendment No. 57:

In subsection (2), page 41, line 26, before "A decision" to insert "Subject to subsection (3) of this section,".

This is a consequential amendment on one which I propose to submit later providing for appeals to the Supreme Court on specified questions of law. This is in accordance with what the Opposition usually require.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendment 58 not moved.

I move amendment No. 59:

In page 41, after subsection (2) to add to the section the following subsection:

"( ) By leave of the High Court, an appeal from a decision of the High Court under this section shall lie to the Supreme Court on a specified question of law".

The Minister's amendment is put down to meet my amendment and there are only two points I wish to raise on it. As the Minister's amendment is drafted, it says that by leave of the High Court leave to appeal may lie to the Supreme Court. Is that restrictive? The other point is on the specified question of law. Is that question of law to be specified by the High Court? I am satisfied if the amendment makes available to a person with an action before the High Court the right of appeal to the Supreme Court. I think it is desirable in all cases that legislation should provide for that right of appeal and it is for that purpose I put down the amendment. The only questions arising are (1) whether the amendment restricts the right of appeal to the Supreme Court and (2) whether the High Court judge decides what is the specified question of law.

The amendment I propose is according to what the draftsman gave us to meet Deputy Cosgrave's position. I cannot defend the draftsman's amendment, if it does not meet the point. The best thing to do would be to leave it over to Report Stage and see if it covers it.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 39, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 40.

I move amendment No. 60:

In subsection (4), page 41, line 47, before "A decision" to insert "Subject to subsection (5) of this section."

This is consequential.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 61 not moved.

I move amendment No. 62:

In page 41, after subsection (4) to add to the section the following subsection:

"( ) By leave of the High Court, an appeal from a decision of the High Court under this section shall lie to the Supreme Court on a specified question of law."

Amendment agreed to.
Section 40, as amended, agreed to.
Sections 41 and 42 agreed to
SECTION 43.

I move amendment No. 63:

In subsection (3), page 43, lines 36 to 42, to delete paragraphs (i) and (ii) and in line 35, after "until" to insert "the end of the period of fifty years from the end of the year in which they were first published,"

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 64:

In subsection (3), page 43, line 38, to delete "twenty-five" and substitute "fifty".

Amendment agreed to.
Section 43, as amended, agreed to.
Sections 44 to 46, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 47.

I move amendment No. 65:

In subsection (1), page 45, line 41, to delete "musical".

I would ask the Minister to consider whether or not it may be very difficult to operate this section in respect of musical works in cases where licences are granted from time to time to cinema owners to provide for works performed by them both in relation to the sound track of the film and records that may be played both before and after the beginning of the programme.

It seems to me it may be apprehended that there might be difficulties in working out equitable remuneration which will cover the different types of films, the different types of programmes, the different circumstances of the individual cinema proprietors. This difficulty arises particularly, and perhaps solely, in the case where music is incorporated in the programme, either by means of the sound track or by records. The Minister should perhaps have another look at this section with a view to seeing if it might be difficult and complicated to operate it.

With regard to the question of what cinematograph films are covered in the section, which is raised by Deputy Costello's amendment to subsection (1), I am advised that by reason of paragraph 25, subparagraphs (1) and (2) of the First Schedule, any licence in respect of a copyright work given before this Bill comes into operation will be interpretable in accordance with the law as it stood when the licence was granted. Apart from this question that there should not be retrospection in the provisions of the section, I understand the main concern arises from the inclusion of musical works in it and the danger that subsection (1) (d) of Section 47 as worded might encroach too far on the rights of copyright owners. I think Deputy Costello is right, that this matter might be reconsidered. If the House thinks fit, I shall have it further considered and, after examination, will bring in an amendment on Report Stage.

I am grateful to the Minister. Will that apply to all the suggestions I have made on this section and the amendments to it?

I shall reconsider them all.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments Nos. 66 to 68, inclusive, not moved.
Section 47 agreed to.
Sections 48 and 49 agreed to.
SECTION 50.

Amendments Nos. 69 and 71, I take it, go together.

I move amendment No. 69:

In subsection (4), page 47, line 20, before "a photograph" to insert "an engraving or".

The inclusion of the word "engraving" here repairs an omission in the Bill as originally circulated. It continues existing law that engravings will have copyright for 50 years after first publication.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment No. 70 was discussed with amendment No. 3.

I move amendment No. 70:

In subsection (4), page 47, line 21, to substitute "fifty years" for "twenty-five years".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 71:

In subsection (4), page 47, line 22, to delete "photograph" and substitute "work".

This amendment substitutes the word "work" for the word "photograph". It is merely a drafting change.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 50, as amended, agreed to.
Sections 51 to 53, inclusive, agreed to.
NEW SECTION.

I move amendment No. 72:

Before section 54, page 51, to insert the following new section :

(1) It shall be the duty of the proprietor of every theatre, hall, room or other place, in which dramatic works are performed to keep or cause to be kept in such theatre, hall, room, or place a register, in the form prescribed by the Minister by rules, of all dramatic works performed in such theatre, hall, room, or place, and within twelve hours after each performance to enter or cause to be entered in such register such particulars of the work and of the person presenting it as shall be prescribed by rules made by the Minister.

(2) Every register kept in pursuance of this section may be inspected at all reasonable times by any person who is the author of or owner of the copyright in any published work and copies of the register or of any part thereof may be made by the person.

(3) The Minister may make regulations prescribing all or any of the following matters, that is to say:—

(a) the form of the register to be kept in pursuance of this section,

(b) the particulars to be entered in the register in respect of dramatic works, and of the person presenting them,

(c) defining the person who is to be deemed, in respect of any particular dramatic work, to be presenting it.

(4) If any person who is required by this section to keep, or cause to be kept, a register—

(a) fails to keep the register or to cause it to be kept, or

(b) fails to make or cause to be made in the register within the time prescribed by this section any entry required by or under this section to be made therein, or

(c) fails to produce the register for the inspection of any person entitled under this section to inspect it or obstructs or impedes any such person in making such inspection, or

(d) wilfully or negligently makes or causes or permits to be made in the register any entry which is false or misleading in any material particular,

he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds."

This amendment is being introduced as a result of representations made by dramatists, mainly. A register was required to be kept of dramatic works performed in halls and was inspected as long as the entertainment duty was charged in respect of performances in these halls. There was an inspection system by the Revenue Commissioners for the purpose, mainly, of entertainment duty, but when the entertainment duty was taken off, there then remained no inspection system which could also be used for the inspection of records of performances in these halls of dramatic works. Playwrights and others felt we should, nevertheless, continue to have a register maintained. It was pointed out to them that since there were not inspectors available for inspecting these registers, there would be no purpose in it, but they have undertaken that inspection of the registers will be carried out in any event. Therefore, in response to the representations made, I am continuing what was, in fact, previous law.

Am I right in saying that this was Section 181 in the previous Act? I think there was an obligation to maintain a register under Section 181?

There was an obligation. I am not sure if it is Section 181, though.

I am not certain. The point I wish to raise on this is: Would the Minister consider giving this protection in respect of musical entertainments also? The section as drafted is in protection of dramatic works and protection of authors, so that they will know, where registers are bound to be kept by law, whether or not their works are being performed. It might be difficult to provide that every musical work performed in a hall would be kept in a register but would you not keep a register of musical entertainments? What I have in mind is that it would merely be stated that a musical entertainment was held either in the form of a concert or a dance, and then it would be a matter subsequently to ascertain whether or not an infringement might or might not have occurred. This would be of help also with regard to the licences that would be granted by an authors' organisation and it might be a help to the Controller in determining the amount of fees to be charged in respect of such licences because it would be a comparatively simple matter if a register were kept, to ascertain the number of functions, musical entertainments, that were held.

I would ask the Minister to consider the possibility of inserting "musical entertainments" in this section.

It is only after considerable thought that I acceded to the representations made by authors in respect of dramatic works. A dramatic work is something very special, which can easily be recorded, but musical entertainments are different matters. It would be difficult. It would be rather an imposition to require a register to be kept. I am afraid I should not like to go any further.

I agree with the Minister that it would be very difficult for a proprietor of a hall to write down every musical work that was performed on every occasion and I am not suggesting that. All I am suggesting is that if we are providing for a register, which, I understand, was provided for in existing legislation, there would also be a register merely stating a musical entertainment was held on 31st January, 2nd February, or whatever date it was. That would be a great help in seeing that the law was enforced.

Amendment agreed to.
SECTION 54.
Amendments Nos. 73 and 74 not moved.
Question proposed: "That Section 54 stand part of the Bill."

Has the Minister considered whether this section is not, as at present drafted, an unduly onerous one on small printing and publishing companies? This matter was adverted to on Second Stage. It was decided that in principle it was desirable to retain this obligation on publishers to supply copies to certain specified libraries: the National Library, the Library of Trinity College, the National University, Saint Patrick's College, Maynooth, and the British Museum.

As I understand this section, it imposes an obligation on publishers to supply a certain number of copies to each of these specified libraries. It has been suggested that on small publishing and printing companies the obligation to furnish so many copies is an onerous one. It is different in the case of a wealthy company, where a company is engaged in very large publishing business, has not merely considerable resources but publishes annually a large number of books. The obligation placed on a company of that sort is not, relative to their business, any serious burden. But because of the number of small publishing companies in this country, a number of them feel that the provisions of the section are unduly onerous.

I would be glad if the Minister would consider whether some alteration might not be made in the section which, while preserving the obligation on publishers to supply copies of books—and I think it probably would be deemed desirable to do so— the number of copies might be reduced in the case of certain publishing firms and certainly in the case of firms where the number of copies published of a particular book is of a restricted nature.

I should like to know from the Minister if British publishing firms are under an obligation to supply to Saint Patrick's College, Maynooth, and other libraries in this country books published in their country in the same way as Irish firms have to make books available to them? I think it is now past the time, if they do not have to do so, that we relieve Irish firms of this obligation. This dates back to a time when the British Government had control over us. It is time we got rid of that obligation, no matter what it costs. We have now reached the stage when it is time to get rid of these silly obligations, imposed on us by an alien Government at a time when we were not able to defend ourselves.

In reply to Deputy Cosgrave and Deputy Leneghan, this arrangement works so much in our favour that it is worth while retaining. The number of copies publishing companies would be required to make available free under this section is eleven. There is a corresponding obligation on British publishing firms to make available a copy to Trinity College, Dublin. While I agree that that obligation does not extend to the libraries mentioned by Deputy Leneghan, nevertheless the arrangement is so much in our favour that it is worth while continuing it. I should not like to interfere with it in any case.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 55.

I move amendment No. 75:

In subsection (1), page 52, line 21, before "The copyright" to insert "Notwithstanding anything contained in Part II of this Act,".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 76:

In subsection (2), page 52, line 26, before "The copyright" to insert "Notwithstanding anything contained in Part II of this Act,".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 77:

In page 52, to delete subsections (3), (4) and (5), lines 29 to 40, and to insert the following subsections:

"( ) Notwithstanding anything contained in Part II of this Act, the copyright in all coins to which this section applies and the copyright in the artistic work defining the design of any such coin shall be perpetual and shall belong to the Minister for Finance.

( ) (a) In the application of subsection (1) of section 3 of this Act to any such legal tender note or consolidated bank note or any coin to which this section applies references in the subsection to a substantial part of a work or other subject-matter shall be construed as references to any part of a work or other subject-matter.

(b) Sections 12 and 14 of this Act shall not apply in relation to the copyrights referred to in this section.

( ) Coins to which this section applies and the artistic work defining the design of any such coin shall, for the purposes of section 172 of the Act of 1927, be deemed not to be designs."

Amendment agreed to.
Section 55, as amended, agreed to.
Section 56 agreed to.
NEW SECTION.

I move amendment No. 78:

Before section 57, page 52, to insert the following new section:

Section 70 of the Act of 1927 is hereby amended by—

"(a) the substitution in subsection (2) of `before the expiration of a period of five years and six months from the date of such registration' for `within the prescribed time before the expiration of the said five years', and

(b) the substitution in subsection (3) of `before the expiration of a period of ten years and six months from the date of such registration' for `within the prescribed time before the expiration of such second period of five years'."

This amendment inserts a new section to extend the time allowed for the payment of renewal fees for copyright in designs under Section 70 of the 1927 Act. The provision is part of the law on the protection of industrial designs by registration, which is contained in Part III of the 1927 Act. We are a party to the Lisbon Convention. It is necessary to enact this section now in order to enable us to ratify the Lisbon Convention. Otherwise, we would be obliged at some later stage to introduce a law providing for this. This, however, is a convenient time.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 57 agreed to.
FIRST SCHEDULE.

I move amendment No. 79:

In paragraph 9, page 54, line 50, after "of that Act" to insert "as respects contrivances referred to in that section made before the commencement of section 17 of this Act.”

The purpose of this amendment is to clarify the intention of this paragraph —paragraph 9 of the First Schedule— which relates back to the copyright in gramophone records established by Section 169 of the 1927 Act. It provides that whatever copyright was secured under that Act by records made before the present Bill comes into force will be retained by such records. Sound recordings made after the Act comes into force will derive their copyright from this Bill.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 80:

In paragraph 25 (4), page 57, lines 18 and 19, to substitute "the Act of 1911 or the Act of 1927, as the case may be," for "this Act."

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 81:

In paragraph 25 (4), page 57, lines 23 and 24, to substitute "the Act of 1911 or the Act of 1927, as the case may be," for "that Act" in both places where it occurs.

Amendment agreed to.
First Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Second Schedule agreed to.
Title agreed to.
Bill reported with amendments.
Report Stage ordered for Thursday, 28th February, 1963.
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