I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. I think the first point I should make in moving the Second Reading is that this is the first occasion on which a Bill dealing with extradition has been introduced in the Oireachtas. Why this should be so, after over 40 years of independence, is mainly attributable, in my opinion, to two factors. The first of these is that very few criminals from continental countries have taken refuge here. Secondly, the arrangements for the surrender of offenders to Britain, and from Britain to the State, have operated satisfactorily enough in practice, notwithstanding that they are based on pre-1922 statutes which have had to be adapted in recognition of the altered political circumstances.
Whatever the reasons may be for not having legislated on extradition before now, it is a fact that there are several advantages attached to our late entry to this field. It enables us to profit from the experience gained from the drafting of the multilateral European Convention on Extradition which was in preparation for several years under the auspices of the Council of Europe before it was opened for signature in 1957. What is perhaps more important, it enables us to provide for the enforcement, on a reciprocal basis, of warrants for ordinary criminal offences emanating from Northern Ireland, a step which might not have been possible before now. This particular provision is, in my opinion, the most significant one in the entire Bill.
I do not think it is necessary for me to justify the need for a Bill of this kind. It is universally recognised among civilised countries that an offender should not be permitted to escape justice by fleeing from the State where he has committed the offence to another jurisdiction. The remarkable improvements in communications and transport in the past century have made the provision of efficient extradition arrangements more necessary than ever. These improvements have, on the one hand, facilitated the escape of offenders and, on the other, have made the return of these offenders to the countries where the crimes have been committed far less oppressive than was the case formerly. The real significance of this latter point is that where the return of an offender would involve a prolonged period of travel, extradition might constitute a supplementary punishment in excess of what the particular offence would deserve. Nowadays, when no country is more than a day or two distant from another by jet travel this particular aspect of extradition has ceased to have the same validity.
Turning to the actual provisions of the Bill, I think that the only provision in Part I to which I need refer at this stage is section 7, which contains certain transitory provisions about extradition arrangements made with the former United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland before 1922, and which may be still in force. Over 40 of these treaties were in force before 1922, but it is not possible to say definitively which of them are still in force as this is dependent to a large extent on recognition by the States concerned of the applicability of these treaties in our present circumstances. It has not been necessary in practice to invoke more than a few of these treaties, but it can be said that some of them are regarded as binding and could be invoked by us to procure the return of an offender.
Clearly the present position is unsatisfactory, and it is proposed to negotiate formal extradition agreements in due course under the authority of this piece of legislation. These negotiations will necessarily take some time but in the meantime it is essential that such of the existing treaties as may be in force should be continued in force. Section 7 provides accordingly, but it places a limit on the operation of the existing treaties beyond 1st January, 1968. From that date onwards the only extradition arrangements which will be valid will be those negotiated after the commencement of this Bill.
Part II deals with extradition generally to countries other than Northern Ireland and Britain. It sets out the principles which should govern extradition to these countries, principles which must be observed by the Government in concluding extradition agreements or conventions or in applying the provisions of this Part to countries without such a formal extradition agreement. These principles are almost entirely based on those enunciated in the European Convention on Extradition to which I have already referred and which it is proposed to ratify as soon as the Bill becomes law. The Convention came into force in 1960 and, so far, has been ratified by six members of the Council of Europe, namely, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Turkey.
Acceptance of the principles governing the European Convention involves a departure from the present practice of requiring proof of a prima facie case against the person claimed before his extradition is permitted. This requirement is a feature of the Anglo-American tradition. In the continental civil law countries generally, extradition may be allowed on evidence that a person is wanted for prosecution or punishment under an order of a competent authority of the requesting country. I believe it is consistent with our desire to participate fully and effectively as a member of the European community that we should be prepared to subscribe to the principles generally acceptable to the rest of that community. It is to be presumed that any country with which we may make an extradition agreement will not forward through its diplomatic representatives a warrant for the arrest of a person on a criminal charge unless that warrant has been properly issued on receipt of a complaint by the party aggrieved or on reasonable suspicion that the person claimed has committed an offence against the law.
All this involves making, so to speak, an act of faith in the administration of justice in the countries with which we are likely to make extradition arrangements, whether these countries be within the Council of Europe or outside it. My view is that we should not enter into an extradition arrangement at all with any country unless we are satisfied as to the integrity of its judicial institutions; but once we are so satisfied then we should accept a properly authenticated warrant of arrest or of conviction emanating from that country as having been made on reasonable suspicion that the person claimed has committed the offence in question and as an order which should be enforced here without further inquiry into the merits of the accusation.
What I am saying does not apply to offences of a political, revenue or purely military character for which warrants of arrest may be received. These warrants will not, of course, be enforced. But in the case of ordinary criminal warrants it must be assumed that any countries with which we have extradition treaties will not forward them unless there are reasonable grounds for thinking that an offence against that country's laws has been committed by the person whose surrender is requested.
Deputies will also notice that extraditable offences are not being specifically listed as they were in the 1870 Act. Instead, an extraditable offence is being defined by reference to the maximum penalty which may be imposed for it under the law of the two countries concerned or, where the person has already been sentenced, by the actual penalty imposed. The advantage of having a list of extradition crimes is that extradition can be confined to specified serious crimes, such as murder, manslaughter, robbery with violence, et cetera, but in practice, as in the Extradition Act, 1870, some crimes are specified in general terms which would permit extradition for what possibly might be trivial offences, for example, obtaining money or goods by false pretences. The disadvantage is that fresh legislation must be enacted whenever it becomes necessary to add to the list of extraditable crimes. Difficulties may arise, too, owing to the lack of uniformity in the definition of crimes under different systems of criminal law.
On the whole, the balance of advantage seems to lie in the solution adopted in the European Convention. Accordingly, section 10 of the Bill provides that an offence to be extraditable must be punishable under the law of both countries to the extradition arrangement by a maximum of at least one year's imprisonment or, if there has been a conviction and sentence, where imprisonment for a period of at least four months or a more severe penalty, such as the death penalty, has been imposed. It may be noted that these limits are minimum limits. A particular extradition arrangement could provide, for example, that extradition would be allowed only for offences carrying a maximum penalty of two years or, say, even five years.
Another change of significance— though it is a change of emphasis rather than of substance—is that prohibiting the extradition of citizens in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the relevant extradition arrangement. There is no provision in the present law restricting extradition of nationals but the reciprocity clause inserted in extradition arrangements has a severely limiting effect as in many countries extradition of nationals is prohibited by law.
The advantages of extraditing nationals are such that I should expect it would be the policy of any Government to allow it provided reciprocity was being afforded. The main advantage is, of course, that it is easier to deal with a case before a court in the country where the offence has been committed and where witnesses are readily available. Moreover, non-extradition of nationals implies an obligation on the requested State to prosecute the offender in its own courts. This procedure is likely to prove unsatisfactory under a system such as ours which attaches the greatest importance to oral evidence, having regard to the difficulty of transporting witnesses over long distances and having them available at particular stages of the proceedings.
However, it is the case that many countries are not willing to extradite their nationals. The Government have recognised this position in Section 14 by providing that normally our citizens may not be extradited but that the extradition agreement may provide otherwise. It is the intention that extradition of citizens will be allowed only on a basis of reciprocity. As a consequence of making provision for non-extradition of citizens, section 37 provides that an Irish citizen who has been accused of committing an offence in a country with which we have an extradition arrangement may be prosecuted for the offence in our courts where that country has requested that such proceedings be taken and where the Attorney General so directs.
Part II contains also a number of provisions which are customary in international extradition practice, such as the restriction on extradition for political, revenue or purely military offences. These provisions are, I believe, generally acceptable and I do not think it necessary to list them here. They are all contained in the European Convention on extradition. The Bill proposes, however, to reduce the period for which a person committed to await extradition must remain in this country before surrender from fifteen days to eight days and it provides also that a person may be surrendered before that period expires with his consent, to be evidence before a district justice. These provisions recognise the improvement in communications since the 1870 Act. In addition there is provision in section 33 that a person in custody awaiting surrender may be released, if, owing to his state of health, he cannot be surrendered within a reasonable time. There is no specific provision to this effect in the Convention.
May I say before leaving Part II that an endeavour has been made to follow the text of the European Convention as far as practicable? This procedure has considerable advantages from the point of view of establishing uniformity of interpretation. Our courts will be able to have regard to decisions of foreign courts on the provisions of this Convention when interpreting the provisions of Part II and of extradition agreements to which we become party.
I shall now turn to Part III of the Bill. In contrast with Part II which, having regard to previous experience, is likely to be availed of rather infrequently, the provisions of this Part will be invoked regularly as between ourselves and Northern Ireland and Britain. Its most important aspect is that it enables Northern warrants to be enforced here. Any instance of co-operation between ourselves and the North is welcome but I think it is fair to say that the reciprocal enforcement of warrants in criminal cases which is now to take place is particularly welcome and will be of considerable mutual benefit.
The proposals in the Bill have been the subject of discussion between officers of my Department and representatives of the Belfast Ministry of Home Affairs and the Home Office in London. As a result of these discussions, our warrants will be enforced in the North as from the commencement of the Bill under existing legislation and will continue to be enforced in Britain.
The present authority for the enforcement here of British warrants is section 29 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851. The arrangements have operated satisfactorily in practice since the establishment of the State. However, after a review of the arrangements in connection with the promotion of the present Bill the Government decided that they should be modified in a number of respects, notably by the introduction of certain safeguards common to international extradition practice.
Accordingly, provision has been made for prohibiting the surrender of persons who are accused of political offences, offences connected with such offences, purely military offences or revenue offences and in cases where there are substantial reasons for believing that the persons concerned will in fact be prosecuted for political offences or offences connected with them or for purely military offences.
Moreover, warrants relating to offences punishable by less than three months imprisonment and warrants for imprisonment in default of payment of a sum of money will not be enforced. Restrictions have also been introduced on the enforcement of warrants for summary offences committed in Northern Ireland or Britain. These restrictions are designed to ensure that a person will not be arrested on a warrant for a summary offence unless he has had adequate notice of the court hearing. The object is to afford him an opportunity of voluntarily attending the court himself. A further safeguard for the individual's rights is the provision that any person arrested on a Northern or British warrant must on arrest be given a reasonable opportunity of consulting a solicitor if he wishes to do so.
The introduction of safeguards in relation to political, revenue and purely military offences has made it necessary to provide that, as far as practicable, a person shall not be arrested where the offence falls within one of these excluded categories. Accordingly, it is proposed that the Minister for Justice will have power to direct that a warrant be not endorsed for execution where he is of opinion that it comes within any one of these categories. Alternatively, in such a case the Minister may refer the question whether the warrant should be endorsed or not to the High Court for determination. Apart from these provisions, any person who has been arrested under Part III may, in addition to the ordinary right of habeas corpus, apply to the Minister for Justice or the High Court for a direction for his release on any of these grounds.
The only remaining provision to which I should like to draw attention is subsection (2) of section 3 of the Bill. Under this subsection the Act will apply, except where otherwise provided, in relation to an offence whether committed or alleged to have been committed before or after the passing of this Act. The 1870 Act provided that a "fugitive criminal" was liable to be extradited whether the crime in respect of which his surrender was requested was committed before or after the passing of that Act.
In relation to British warrants, the provision is necessary because some of the warrants which will be coming along after the commencement of this Bill will relate to offences committed before then and which can under the present law be sent here for endorsement. As regards Northern Ireland warrants, which will be coming here for the first time, the section will permit the endorsement and enforcement of warrants for crimes alleged to have been committed at any time in the past. It will be open to us also to forward warrants to Northern Ireland or Britain for offences committed before the commencement of the Bill.
I should like to take this opportunity of expressing appreciation of the assistance given by the Northern and British authorities in connection with the examination of this legislation and their helpful approach throughout the discussions. As a result, I think it can be fairly claimed that the enforcement of the criminal law in these islands has been brought to a commendable degree of efficiency while preserving fully the rights of the individual.
May I express the hope that the Bill marks the beginning of further beneficial co-operation in the administration of justice? I have already communicated tentative proposals for the reciprocal enforcement of various orders and judgments made by Northern and British courts in civil cases and I have little doubt that it will be possible to work out in due course a satisfactory system of mutual enforcement. The most important of these orders, from the point of view of the general public, is the maintenance order. I am satisfied that the absence of arrangements for reciprocal enforcement of these orders in particular is causing hardship to many wives in this country and I shall endeavour to press ahead with these proposals as quickly as possible. Examination is also proceeding of proposals for the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments and orders of the courts of other jurisdictions. The Hague Conference on Private International Law is, in fact, engaged in the preparation of a draft convention on the subject.
There is also scope for other measures of mutual assistance between our courts here and courts outside the State in both civil and criminal matters —such as the service of witness summonses, the attendance of witnesses and the taking of evidence on commission. These aspects are also being actively considered and proposals for legislation to deal with them are in course of preparation.
In conclusion, may I say that the Government consider this to be a desirable and non-controversial measure which will improve substantially the administration of justice and fill a gap in our criminal law which has existed far too long. If there are any points arising on the Bill which I have not dealt with in the course of this opening statement or any particular provisions which Deputies would like to have clarified, I shall endeavour to deal with them when replying.
I trust that the House will agree to give the Bill a Second Reading.
