Private Members' Business. - Offences Against the State Bill, 1966: First Stage (Resumed).

I have moved the First Stage of this Bill, the Long Title of which is:

Bill entitled an Act to repeal the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939 and 1940.

It is generally accepted that a Government elected by the people should be prepared to undertake the obligation of protecting the rights of the citizens. The laws which they enact must, therefore, be founded on the principle of individual liberty. This is the bedrock of democracy, or government by the consent of the governed.

The Offences Against the State Acts of 1939 and 1940, which we seek to repeal by this Bill, are a clear example of how the bedrock of freedom may be shattered and the edifice of law, built at a cost of great effort and the tremendous exertions of civilised man over the centuries, may be levelled, dismantled and taken away for so long as it suits the Government of the day. These Acts, for so long as they are on the Statute Book, remain as a lurking background threat of imprisonment without charge at the Government's pleasure and a denial of the accepted right of trial by jury. They are, therefore, undemocratic, false and bad and are inherently offensive to our concept of a free society. These are the Acts— the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, and the amending Act of 1940— which the Labour Party Bill would repeal. We seek, in this Bill, to restore to the citizens that of which they stand deprived — liberty guaranteed by statute. I commend to our narcissistic rulers in the consideration of this Bill the words of the Book of Leviticus:

And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto the inhabitants thereof; it shall be a Jubilee unto you; and ye shall return every man unto his possession.

In general, the Acts created a new series of offences which are made crimes. These crimes are by law required to be tried in secrecy before special criminal courts. The right of trial by jury is abolished, the accused is presumed guilty in most instances. The accused is required to testify whether he desires to do so or not. Upon conviction, the accused is not allowed to appeal to a higher court unless the special criminal court gives its consent. In actual practice, there is no appeal. Part II of the Act, as passed in 1940, is even more drastic because it allows the Government to imprison a person without ever holding a trial or making a charge.

It should initially be pointed out that the Act is not effective except when it is declared so by a Proclamation of the Government. Civil liberties are suspended by the Government's proclamation. No limitations are placed on the Government's right to issue the proclamation suspending civil liberty. Any time they wish to do so, they may publish the proclamation, suspend all personal rights and deprive our criminal courts of all jurisdiction. Part II of the Act contains some of the most radical provisions in the law, as it contravenes and nullifies every recognised principle of our criminal law as established by our courts. This Part of the Act out-lines numerous things which are made crimes but fails utterly to describe with clarity the acts or things forbidden.

It is an elementary rule of criminal law in any country where Anglo-Saxon law prevails—and this includes Ireland—that a law which labels an act criminal must satisfactorily describe in some detail the exact acts outlawed. The rule is such because the law recognises that fairness requires that a person be appraised in clear and concise language of the acts forbidden so that he can avoid them or, if accused of committing an act, answer the charge against him. The courts in this country, as well as England and America where Anglo-Saxon law prevails, have consistently set aside and avoided convictions based on vague and indefinite criminal laws. In effect, the courts have ruled that a criminal law must be clear and definite so as to enable the general public to be in a position to avoid breaking it.

Part II of the Offences against the State Act, 1939, fails to specify the acts forbidden as criminal, and as a result almost anyone is liable to be picked up off the street and charged with a violation of some part of the Act though, on reading the section allegedly violated, he is unable to learn what exactly is forbidden by the law. For instance, under section 7 of Part II of the 1939 Act, anyone who "prevents or obstructs" the "carrying on of the Government" is guilty of a felony and subject to seven years' imprisonment. One may well ask what is an act of prevention and obstruction as referred to in the law. Would, for instance, the refusal to pay part of one's income tax be deemed such an act? Who is to say, except apparently the Government or a Minister of the Government?

Section 9 of the 1939 Act makes it a crime to "encourage any person" in Government service "to be negligent". We are not told what the section means by "negligent". Obviously the word means many things to many people and as long as the act prohibited is not defined, we must only guess at its meaning. Those sections, like so many others in the Offences against the State Act, expose a person to any type of charge any Government official or police officer cares to make. In fact, the Act allows the Government official to say what the alleged crime is. This vitiates the entire Irish system of justice. The Government is allowed to act as a press censor under section 10 of Part II of the Act which violates our basic right to a free and uncontrolled press. Even Cromwell in Puritan England did not get away with that without protest and exposure by Milton.

Specifically, section 10 forbids the printing and publication of any document which is incriminating, whatever that means, any document which is treasonable, whatever that means and any document which is seditious, whatever that means. None of those terms is defined in the Act and so we are all at the mercy of the personal interpretation of this section entertained by the Garda who happens to jail us. The great danger in all of those provisions lies in the fact that we are not appraised of what is unlawful and so we have nothing to guide our conduct.

The Offences Against the State Act rejects any principles of criminal law and procedure. Perhaps the most glaring violation is found in the provisions of the Act which state, in the very first instance, that the accused shall be presumed guilty and shall be required to prove his innocence. Our own courts, as the courts in England and America, have always followed the principle that an accused is, in the eyes of the law, presumed innocent and the State must carry the burden of proving the accused to be guilty. Unfortunately, the Offences Against the State Act reverses this process and the accused is in many instances presumed guilty and the State is not required to prove his guilt. As an example of this section 15 of Part II of the Act provides:

In any prosecution under this section the burden of the proof that any act was authorised under this section shall lie on the person prosecuted.

Section 19 contains a similar provision and states that:

The charge itself carries with it a presumption of guilt on the part of the accused.

The presumption of innocence in a criminal case, how I cannot say, has been universally accepted in all jurisdictions following Anglo-Saxon law. This includes Ireland, Great Britain, Canada, the United States and many other Western nations.

As if motivated by fear of the people, the organisation of groups of people is forbidden by Part III of the Offences Against the State Act. The Act provides that the Government can ban any organisation which in its opinion is unlawful. The ban is effected by a suppression order. All this is done, of course, by the personal edict of a State official without a trial or hearing. Moreover, section 19 provides:

A suppression order shall be conclusive evidence for all purposes that the organisation to which it relates is an unlawful organisation within the meaning of the Act.

As you can see, this section is very sweeping. In effect, a Government official can ban and suppress any organisation he personally declares to be unlawful. Not only is the organisation found unlawful without a hearing or trial, but any member of such an organisation is automatically guilty of a crime and subject to two years' imprisonment and heavy fines under section 2.

All property of the unlawful organisation, both real and personal, is forfeited to the State under section 22. In addition, a chief superintendent of the Garda can if satisfied that a building is being used or has been used in any way for the purposes, direct or indirect, of an unlawful organisation, close any such building. The closing is automatic and no hearing or trial is held beforehand. Although opinion and hearsay evidence is not allowed in our criminal courts an exception is made to this rule by the Offences Against the State Act. An example of this is found in section 26 of Part IV of the Act which allows the chief superintendent of the Garda to testify that an outlawed publication was published by an accused despite the fact that the police officer has no personal knowledge of the subject. Although our criminal courts and Constitution forbid the use of testimony based on rumour and suspicion in criminal prosecutions, an exception is made in the Offences Against the State Act and an accused can be convicted solely on the basis of hearsay and rumour testified to by one who, admittedly, has no personal knowledge of the commission of the alleged crime.

Public meetings of citizens can also be banned by a chief superintendent of the Garda merely because he is of the opinion that the meeting will aid or encourage an unlawful organisation. Anyone attending such a meeting can be imprisoned and fined. The Act also permits any member of the Garda to arrest without warrant. In this respect the Offences Against the State Act militates against our criminal laws which ordinarily require that an arrest must be based upon a warrant. Penalties under the Offences Against the State Act are extremely severe and go beyond the normal criminal penalties of imprisonment and fine. Section 34 provides that accused persons convicted by a special criminal court who are in the employment of the State shall forfeit their office, employment, place or emolument and the same shall forthwith become and be vacant. This means that a person, in addition to fine and imprisonment, will also suffer loss of his job and pension rights. The section also deprives the accused of the right to public employment for a period of seven years in the future.

One of the most significant departures from our system of criminal law is found in Part V of the Offences Against the State Act. This part creates what are called special criminal courts. Those special criminal courts deprive our regular criminal courts of all jurisdiction in criminal matters. The special criminal courts are, in fact, military boards which try non-military persons. All proceedings are held in secret. No appeals are allowed except where the court gives its consent. All special criminal court judges are subject to removal at will, unlike judges in our regular criminal courts. In practice, all special criminal judges are high ranking military officers. The Government, in effect, is the accuser, prosecutor and judge of the accused, like Hempenstall. Under such a system justice is neither sought nor applied. The courts merely provide the Government with a device to arrest, jail and impoverish persons who may disagree with the Government's policy.

By an ingenious device the Act allows the Government to deprive the accused of a jury trial in our established criminal courts. This may be done any time the Government is satisfied that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice. Even the Dáil is helpless; it cannot invalidate any action of the Government under Part V. In other words, the people have no recourse in the case of Governmental abuse and tyranny. As a matter of fact, Part V of the Act is so sweeping that it allows the special criminal courts to try any offence under any particular enactment. This means that the Government's special criminal courts are not limited to the trial of offences and crimes listed in the Offences Against the State Act, but may try any other type of criminal offence.

This, in effect, allows the Government to try anyone in a special criminal court for any offence whatsoever, thus depriving the accused of his basic right to a trial before a jury and judge. The Act is so sweeping in this regard that the Government is allowed to divest and deprive our regular criminal courts of all criminal jurisdiction. The Government is granted complete control over the special criminal courts. This is made clear by a reading of Part V of the Act. Each court is required to have at least three members. Each member can be removed at will by the Government.

The average layman thinks of a judge as a barrister or solicitor of several years' experience but the Act provides that a judge of the Special Criminal Court may be "an officer of the Defence Forces not below the rank of Commandant." As a practical matter, all judges of the Special Criminal Courts have been high-ranking military officers, none of whom has had legal, judicial education or experience. The judges of each Special Criminal Court are unfettered as to procedure, as section 41 of the Act allows each court to adopt its own procedure without restriction. Criminal procedure is as vital to an accused in a criminal case as the substantive law and yet the special criminal courts can employ whatever procedure they see fit, without limitation of any kind.

Section 41 (4) acknowledges that the Special Criminal Courts need not employ "the practices or procedures applicable to the trial of a person on indictment in the Central Criminal Court...." The military overtones of the whole system of special criminal courts are emphasised by section 50 which provides for "military custody of any particular individual so sentenced." The right of appeal is basic to all systems of justice but despite this a person convicted by the Government's Special Criminal Courts has no right of appeal except when permission to appeal is granted by the court itself as provided in section 44. The realities of the situation make it obvious that a special criminal court will hardly consent to an appeal concerning errors allegedly made by itself.

It is elementary in our law that an accused can also question and contest the jurisdiction of the court which seeks to try him. The question of jurisdiction can be raised in a number of ways. However, an accused who questions the jurisdiction of a special criminal court is guilty of criminal contempt of court under section 51 of the Act and can be imprisoned for this crime.

A person in custody has no rights under section 52 of the Offences Against the State Act. He must answer all questions and explain his whereabouts to the police. If he fails to do so "he shall be guilty of an offence under this section and shall be liable on summary conviction thereof to imprisonment...."

An accused, in effect, is deprived of his right to remain silent, a right commonly referred to at times as the right against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent and not assist the accuser in his charges against you has been recognised in Anglo-Saxon law for centuries. The rule is codified in the American Constitution in the Fifth Amendment:

No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...

The Offences Against the State Act gives the Government broad powers of detention. These provisions are found in Part 2 of the Act which was passed in 1940. Under Part 2 the powers of detention come into operation any time the Government decides to use the powers it has. It has only to issue a proclamation under section 3. Part 2 is the most radical of all sections of the Act and permits detention without a trial of any kind. Detention as used in this section is, of course, imprisonment. The Government is given special powers of arrest and detention. A citizen may be arrested and detained any time a "Minister of State" desires the arrest and detention. The Minister need only feel that the person to be placed in detention is dangerous to the public peace or to the security of the State. It does not say, I emphasise, that the Minister for Justice should be the person to determine whether a citizen will be detained, interned or imprisoned; any Minister will do.

Even the Minister for Agriculture.

Even the Minister for Transport and Power who is now pushing the use of Irish. The detained person is hauled off to prison where he stays until released. The release of prisoners is dealt with in section 6 which reads as follows:

A Minister of State may by writing under his hand,——

it is ironical how apt some of these legal phrases are such as "writing under his hand"; we know that a lot of things that happen are underhand, God knows, in relation to the law and especially in relation to this Act——

if and whenever he so thinks proper, order the release of any person who is for the time being detained under this part of this Act, and thereupon such person shall forthwith be released from such detention.

There is no limit to the length of the imprisonment under this Part of the Act. The Government decides who is to be imprisoned—a Minister decides; one individual may decide—and where he is to be imprisoned and for how long, without trial. The accused need not be charged with any crime and need not be brought before a judge or magistrate. The Government alone decides what the punishment shall be. There is no charge, no hearing, no trial. There is just the imprisonment and the punishment. Putting the matter simply, a person can be picked up off the street or from within his home and imprisoned without charge or trial for any period the Government desires. He has no recourse to the courts or to the law. Under the Act he has no rights whatever. There are no court proceedings. The only obligation of the Government under the Act is to furnish the Dáil with a list of persons imprisoned every six months.

Thus does the Government operate under the Offences Against the State Act. A reading of the Act makes it clear that as citizens we can enjoy our civil liberties only when the Government wishes us to. Our freedom is ours only so long as the Government wishes us to enjoy it. Our property is ours to use only so long as the Government sees fit.

The Commission of Human Rights in its consideration of the submissions of the Irish Government relative to a case brought before it concerning internment without trial and in which the Government sought to defend its actions by citing Article 5 of the Convention of Human Rights pointed out:

...that the construction advocated by the Government would open the door wide to arrest and detention on suspicion without the requirement of bringing to trial—which is contrary to the whole spirit of the Convention.

This quotation is from page 23 of the bookHuman Rights in Europe, being an account of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4th November, 1950, of the protocol thereto and of the machinery created thereby: The European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights by A. H. Robertson, BCL (Oxon), SJD, Harvard, published by the Manchester University Press.

The Act of 1939 was found by the High Court to be repugnant to the Constitution in that a Minister of State in signing a warrant under section 55, was not only acting judicially but was purporting to administer justice, which was unconstitutional. The Act, in Part 6, did not respect the citizen's right to personal liberty as expressed by the Constitution. This was remedied to the apparent satisfaction of the Supreme Court by the amending Act of 1940 which had the effect of permitting detention and imprisonment without trial in any case in which a Minister of State was of opinion that this was necessary.

Whatever may be argued about the niceties of legal phraseology in this connection, there is no doubt that this power to inflict imprisonment, exercisable at the whim of even the most obscure and irresponsible Minister of Government, is a gross denial of the natural law of human liberty and dignity and is dangerous in the extreme.

Part II of the Act of 1940 which enables the Government to intern persons without trial of any kind was considered by the Court of Human Rights. In the Court's judgment of July 1st, 1961, it was found that the Offences Against the State Act was contrary to the provisions of Article 5 of the Convention of Human Rights. Only by a frenzied straining to the uttermost of the words "in time of war or other emergency threatening the nation" did the Government on that occasion barely escape the opprobrium of the Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg and then only by a majority opinion of eight votes to six. Finally, I should like to make this brief reference to the employment of the cumbersome legal steamroller to deal with strikers picketing outside the Dáil some time ago——

I cannot allow the Deputy to proceed on that line.

Surely it is relevant?

I have allowed the Deputy to make a statement as to what he is proposing to repeal. I cannot allow him to proceed with a discussion on the administration of the law.

I am not proposing to deal with the administration of the law.

The Deputy is introducing the application of the provisions of this. I cannot allow him to proceed on that line.

It is no wish of mine to contravene the rules of order. Much as it might delight the hearts of some people, I do not intend to act in any fashion that would bring that about, but it is obvious that the workings of the Offences Against the State Acts have resulted in creating a situation where the right which was hard won early in the last century by the English Chartists who were Irish-led——

The Deputy will not evade my ruling in that fashion. I will ask the Deputy not to impinge on the Rules. I have given him very full liberty, and if he does not obey the rules of the House, of course I shall have to enforce them.

In what way am I impinging on the rules?

The Deputy is endeavouring to discuss the administration of the Act.

I am endeavouring to point out that the Offences Against the State Acts, as well as offending against the liberty of the individual in the various ways in which I have indicated, also offend against the right of the citizen peacefully to——

The Deputy is endeavouring——

I would ask the Chair not to anticipate what I am going to say. He will find that it is perfectly in order.

I cannot allow the Deputy to proceed; that is all.

I am not proceeding with what the Chair is objecting to. I am simply saying that it is obvious that the provisions of the Act are designed to interfere with the right of the citizen peacefully to petition Parliament for the redress of grievances.

May I begin by saying that I want to put it on record that Deputy Dunne's statement as to what these Acts provide is to a very large extent without foundation? I cannot undertake here to correct all the errors which we have just heard, but I should like to make it clear, particularly in respect of the rights of Dáil Éireann in the matter, that we have in Part V a specific right to annual the proclamation bringing Part V into force. Deputy Dunne sought to say that Part V gave the Government arbitrary or unlimited power in this respect without any safeguard whatever. This was the main theme running through his remarks. I would refer Deputy Dunne to Part V, section 35, subsection (5), in which it is stated:

It shall be lawful for Dáil Éireann, at any time while this Part of this Act is in force, to pass a resolution annulling the Proclamation by virtue of which this Part of this Act is then in force, and thereupon such Proclamation shall be annulled and this Part of this Act shall cease to be in force,

So we have there the supremacy of this House in regard to whether or not a proclamation made by the Government of the day bringing Part V into force is to remain an effective proclamation or not. That very fact emphasises the basic supremacy of Dáil Éireann in this matter and is sufficient to indicate that Part V of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, cannot remain in force unless it has the democratic sanction of this House.

Another point made by Deputy Dunne was in regard to his statement that a man was liable to be convicted on hearsay evidence relating to a document. That is absurd. He also suggested that in some way the accused person's right of appeal was negatived under the terms of Part V of the Act. This allegation is without foundation. The Deputy said that the appeal may be brought only with the consent of the Special Criminal Court. This is false. Section 44 of the Act allows an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, if he obtains a certificate of appeal. The Appeal Court is the ultimate arbitrator whenever the Special Criminal Court refuses a certificate of appeal to an accused person. I would refer the Deputy to section 4 which rebuts his statement.

I have not had an opportunity in the short space available while Deputy Dunne was speaking, to go through his various allegations in detail but there were these three specific errors and in particular, the two very fundamental ones in which he sought to imply that the democratic right of Parliament to interfere with the Government was frustrated by Part V of the 1939 Act and I have shown that that is not so because the supremacy of Dáil Éireann is spelled out in section 35. There is also the other point in regard to the supremacy of the Court of Appeal being the final arbiter as to whether the person has a right of appeal.

I may say that the acceptance of this Bill is entirely out of the question as far as the Government are concerned. Any idea that the 1939 Act as a whole is, in any sense, emergency legislation, or was ever intended as such, is totally without foundation.

That is not what Mr. de Valera said.

I am coming to that. One Part of the Act, namely, Part V, can be said to be in a certain sense emergency legislation, and so can the 1940 Act which replaced Part VI of the 1939 Act. However, these what I may call emergency provisions of the Act can be brought into force only by special proclamation of the Government when certain specified abnormal conditions obtain and they are not in force at present. There are incorporated as well the essential safeguards as to the supremacy of Dáil Éireann and the Court of Criminal Appeal.

In saying that Part V of the 1939 Act is not in force at present, I should like to remove any possibility of a misunderstanding either inside or outside the House. When I say that Part V is not in force at present, I am only stating what the present position is and I do not want it to be thought that I am implying that there is no likelihood of its being brought into force again. Unfortunately there are grounds for fearing that some or all of these provisions may need to be enforced and I think I should make it clear to all concerned that the Government will not tolerate any renewed resort to force or violence but will take all measures necessary to preserve the peace.

The provisions now in operation, that is, the first four Parts of the 1939 Act, are and were designed to be part of the ordinary permanent legislation of the State. I refer the House to the speech of the then Taoiseach reported in Volume 74, column 1382:

If you look at the Bill you will see that it is composed, I might say, of two main parts. One part is a consolidation of what might be called ordinary legislation such as would be available in any country under normal and peaceful conditions for the protection of the State.

Here, of course, he was referring to Parts I to IV. Similarly, the Minister of the day, referring to Parts I to IV, said, at column 1290:

Those provisions are provisions that you will find in any civilised State. They are precautions that are taken by any civilised State to protect itself.

Is "civilised" in italics?

Whatever views the sponsors of the Bill may have on Part V—and I can well understand that Deputies on the Opposition benches without the responsibility of Government and without the same sources of information may feel tempted to say that we can do without Part V—whatever views, I say, they may have on this, I simply cannot understand their attitude in proposing to repeal the entire Act, except on the assumption that they have not read it. In effect, they are asking that Parliament should now declare that it is no longer an offence to commit treason, and that anybody may raise a private army, engage in military exercises and by force of arms or violence obstruct, threaten or intimidate Parliament, the Government and the courts. They are asking that Parliament should declare that people may organise to overthrow the Constitution by force and may get up on a public platform and incite their listeners to defy the law and use violence to attain their ends.

That is absolutely false. Would the Minister care to expand on the sources of information he referred to?

To suggest that we should allow this is to say that we want an end to law and order and that we want anarchy to prevail.

That is reminiscent of McCarthyist MacEnteeism at its worst.

It is what they did themselves.

I do not suggest or believe that this is the attitude of the Labour Party and I am certain that in putting forward this proposal, the sponsors cannot have understood the significance of what they were doing. Now that they do know, I ask them to withdraw the proposal. To give even a First Reading to a Bill which would have the consequences I have mentioned could only serve to sow doubt and confusion in the public mind and to increase the risk that certain groups may make a grave miscalculation as to the Government's determination to take all steps—I repeat, all steps— necessary to put down violence.

The Minister was eight years of age when these things passed.

Send a copy of that to Captain O'Neill.

Question put and declared lost.

Deputies

Votáil.

The division bells having been rung,

On the motion that leave be granted to introduce the Offences Against the State Bill, 1966, a division is being taken.

On a point of order, I want to ask a question so as to get clear what is happening now. The purpose of this division is to decide whether or not the Deputies who have their names to the Bill will have an opportunity of having it circulated and——

That is a wriggle.

If the Deputy wants a pretext to vote for the Bill, let him vote for it.

It is not a wriggle.

Vote for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations!

Is the strain of things annoying the Taoiseach?

What do you want to do—to start the Blueshirts again?

You, over there, started the Civil War.

On the motion that leave be granted to introduce the Bill——

The point of order I am making is for the sake of clarification. Am I not right in thinking that the principle of the Bill would be settled on Second Reading, if such were allowed?

Do not wriggle out of it.

I have nothing to say; it is not a matter of order.

Deputy O'Higgins is codding nobody.

Little Boy Blue, come blow your horn.

I want to get the guidance of the Chair on it. I want to have it made quite clear that the decision the House is asked to take now is as to whether or not this Bill will be circulated and further discussed.

Would you vote against it?

Mind your own business. Get out of the House, if you do not want to behave yourself.

Bring in your tractor.

I have nothing further to add to the motion and the House will now proceed to vote on the motion.

In those circumstances, I shall certainly vote for the right of Deputies——

We are not afraid to vote.

The Dáil divided: Tá, 23; Níl, 57.

  • Barrett, Stephen D.
  • Burton, Philip.
  • Collins, Seán.
  • Connor, Patrick.
  • Coogan, Fintan.
  • Corish, Brendan.
  • Crotty, Patrick J.
  • Desmond, Eileen.
  • Donegan, Patrick S.
  • Dunne, Seán.
  • Hogan, Patrick (South Tipperary).
  • Jones, Denis F.
  • Kyne, Thomas A.
  • Larkin, Denis.
  • L'Estrange, Gerald.
  • McAuliffe, Patrick.
  • Murphy, William.
  • Norton, Patrick.
  • O'Connell, John F.
  • O'Donnell, Tom.
  • O'Higgins, Michael J.
  • Ryan, Richie.
  • Tully, James.

Níl

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Andrews, David.
  • Blaney, Neil T.
  • Boland, Kevin.
  • Booth, Lionel.
  • Boylan, Terence.
  • Brady, Philip.
  • Brennan, Joseph.
  • Brennan, Paudge.
  • Breslin, Cormac.
  • Briscoe, Ben.
  • Burke, Patrick J.
  • Calleary, Phelim A.
  • Carter, Frank.
  • Carty, Michael.
  • Childers, Erskine.
  • Clohessy, Patrick.
  • Colley, George.
  • Corry, Martin J.
  • Crinion, Brendan.
  • Cronin, Jerry.
  • Crowley, Flor.
  • Crowley, Honor M.
  • Davern, Don.
  • Dowling, Joe.
  • Egan, Nicholas.
  • Fahey, John.
  • Faulkner, Pádraig.
  • Flanagan, Seán.
  • Foley, Desmond.
  • Geoghegan, John.
  • Gibbons, James M.
  • Gilbride, Eugene.
  • Gogan, Richard P.
  • Haughey, Charles.
  • Hilliard, Michael.
  • Kennedy, James J.
  • Kitt, Michael F.
  • Lalor, Patrick J.
  • Lemass, Noel T.
  • Lemass, Seán.
  • Lenihan, Brian.
  • Lenihan, Patrick.
  • Lynch, Celia.
  • McEllistrim, Thomas.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Meaney, Tom.
  • Millar, Anthony G.
  • Molloy, Robert.
  • Mooney, Patrick.
  • Moore, Seán.
  • Nolan, Thomas.
  • Ó Briain, Donnchadh.
  • Ó Ceallaigh, Seán.
  • O'Malley, Donogh.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Wyse, Pearse.
Tellers: Tá, Deputies James Tully and O'Connell; Níl, Deputies Carty and Geoghegan.
Question declared lost.