I have no desire to prevent the Committee of Public Accounts discussing this, but I have, I think, a duty to direct the attention of the House to certain limitations which apply to Select Committees and also to the operations of the Committee of Public Accounts. Deputies who have been members of the Committee of Public Accounts are probably aware of these limitations.
As I say, this is a serious matter. It is somewhat unusual to proceed to have a special or a particular investigation by the Committee of Public Accounts in advance of the normal Appropriation Accounts being referred to it for investigation. The particular limitation to which I want to direct the attention of the House applies by long-established convention to Grants-in-Aid, as they are called, and that convention goes back as far as 1896. It is important that the House should be aware of this limitation. I shall quote for the House Appendix No. 16 to the Third Report of the Committee of Public Accounts in the year 1896 which is entitled "Grants in Aid". Briefly, the procedure is that the Public Accounts Committee does not go behind or beyond the Accounting Officer's certificate in respect of a Grant-in-Aid. That is a particular limitation.
The strictly conditional manner in which provision for public services is made by Parliament constitutes one of the cardinal principles of our financial system.
1. Not only may no grants be exceeded without fresh Parliamentary authority, accorded by a supplementary or excess grant; but the only sums which are chargeable against grants must actually come in course of payment within the financial year to which the grants relate; and consequently any portion of the grant unexpended and remaining in the hands of the Accounting Officer on the 31st March, is returnable to the Exchequer, the surrender being, for the purposes of convenience, usually effected by a write-off of the unexpended sum against the grant of a subsequent year.
Now, this is the important part:
2. The expenditure within the Parliamentary Grants has to be accounted for in detail by the Accounting Officer, and his account of the appropriation of the money, which is called the "Appropriation Account", is directed by Statute to be examined on behalf of the House of Commons by the Comptroller and Auditor General—
This, of course, has been changed by the Standing Orders which apply in our case.
—who has to ascertain and report whether the conditions attaching to the grant have been complied with, and vouchers for payments are forthcoming.
In the case, however, of one form of grant, that is, of grants which are technically called "Grants-in-Aid", the conditions are less strict. For, while such grants, which are in the nature of subscriptions or contributions, must like ordinary grants, be paid away within the year by the Accounting Officer, the receipt for the money in the lump, which he obtains from the grantee or grantees, is held to be a sufficient discharge; and the expenditure in detail is not necessarily followed up by the Comptroller and Auditor General. I say "not necessarily", because in these cases, though the Comptroller and Auditor General is often required, under Section 33 of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, to examine and audit the account of the grantee, yet his statutory duty, in the absence of such requirement, is confined to seeing that the Accounting Officer is entitled to claim credit for his payment to the grantees.
I direct the attention of the House to that Appendix to the Third Report because it has been since then the practice in respect of the Committee of Public Accounts and there is, therefore, an obvious limitation on the extent of the investigation, or investigations, which the Public Accounts Committee can make.
There are, in addition, other restrictions on the powers of the Committee of Public Accounts. As the House is aware, under Standing Orders the Committee of Public Accounts is selected from the different parties in the House. It has been the established practice for the chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts to be a Deputy of the Opposition rather than a Government Deputy. The report of the committee can be approved only if it is assented to by the committee, or a majority of the committee, and, under Standing Orders, in the event of there being—I quote Standing Order No. 71—"an equality of votes the question shall be decided in the negative". This, I think, has rarely happened but, because of the special nature of this investigation, it is right the House should be aware of these limitations.
The normal procedure is for the chairman to submit to the members a draft report. Frequently that report is considered at more than one meeting and very often it is amended. Finally, the report, as approved, is signed by the chairman and becomes the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts. Because of the terminology of the Standing Order, as applicable to either the Committee of Public Accounts or to any other Select Committee, in the event of a majority of the members not accepting the chairman's draft report or in the event of an equality of votes on any matter, then the question is decided in the negative.
Although the committee may investigate the subject matter of the reference included in the motion, the Grant-in-Aid for Northern Ireland issued from Subhead J, Vote 16 (Miscellaneous Expenses) for 1969-70, the precise terms of reference of the investigation have not been laid down other than anticipating that the Committee of Public Accounts will in the normal way investigate the matter; but, because of the limitation to which I have referred in the Appendix to the Third Report, which has governed the practice and procedure of the Committee of Public Accounts up to now, there is an obvious danger. As the procedure is at the moment—this is an important matter for the House to consider—the Committee of Public Accounts will not normally go beyond the certificate of the Accounting Officer that the Grant-in-Aid has been paid and that he has got a receipt from the grantee.
Therefore, I want to draw the attention of the House to the deficiencies in this procedure and to the possible need to provide certain additional powers for the Committee. As the House is aware, under Standing Orders a Select Committee empowered to send for persons, papers and records may report its opinions and observations, together with the minutes of evidence taken before it, to the Dáil and also make a special report of any matters which it may think fit to bring to the notice of the Dáil.
Under the procedure adopted in two earlier Select Committees, certain decisions were taken. So far as I am aware the first was in respect of the Moneylenders Bill, 1929. The Select Committee appointed decided in April, 1930, that witnesses would be allowed to bring advisers, including solicitors, but that it should not hear counsel. At a later date the Select Committee on Mining Leases decided in July, 1935, that the Committee, if it wished, could hear counsel.
Under the Oireachtas Witnesses Oaths Act, 1924, provision was made for each of the Houses of the Oireachtas and any Committee of either House and any Joint Committee of both Houses to administer oaths to witnesses. There are penalties in the event of the witness giving false evidence. However, there is one notable deficiency in that provision in that there is no power to compel a witness to attend before the Committee.
Therefore, the motion before the House possibly suffers from a number of technical deficiencies. Under the established procedure of the Committee of Public Accounts governed by the Minutes of the Appendix to the Third Report of 1896, it has not been the practice of the Public Accounts Committee to go behind the Grant-in-Aid. In other words, the practice has been that the Comptroller and Auditor General accepts the certificate of the accounting officer that the money has been paid to the grantee. Under the provision of the Standing Orders I have quoted, in the event of an equality of votes on the Committee the report will be in the negative. Lastly, under the Act I have quoted there is no power to compel the attendance of any witness to give evidence, although there is power if a witness attends to require him to give evidence on oath.
Without going into the matters with which this motion deals, according to the Taoiseach and the Minister for Finance in answer to questions here there are other investigations being undertaken by the Garda. The House is entitled to know whether it is proposed to furnish to the Committee the results of these investigations and whether all the documents and records will be put before it. It is important to clarify this point because all that is provided in the motion before the House is:
That the Committee of Public Accounts shall examine specially the expenditure of the Grant-in-Aid for Northern Ireland Relief issued from Subhead J, Vote 16 (Miscellaneous Expenses) for 1969-70 and shall furnish a separate report on this expenditure as soon as possible.
There is not included in the terms of this motion any power or directive to send for persons, papers and records. The established procedure of the Public Accounts Committee, long sanctioned by usage, is that the accounting officer, usually the Secretary of the Department concerned, is entitled to bring along and frequently asks permission of the Committee to allow a subordinate official of his Department to answer specific queries on particular aspects of the matters under discussion.
The established recognised procedure so far as this country is concerned and the established procedure in Britain since 1896 is that once a Grant-in-Aid payment is vouched for, and the receipts accounted for by the accounting officer as having been paid to the grantee, that is the end of the matter. The House and the country should be aware of the very serious limitations in the established practices and procedure. They have not been extended by the terms of this motion; in fact, it is quite terse in its phraseology. Although there is the implication that the Committee of Public Accounts is investigating the circumstances in which this money was expended, and the manner in which it was spent, now is the time for the House to realise that on the established procedure that has operated the Committee of Public Accounts would not normally go beyond the actual terms of the receipt issued by the accounting officer. It is essential at this stage that this aspect of the matter should be mentioned.
Attention should also be drawn to the fact that a committee of the House, or for that matter the Dáil itself, may deliberate in public or in private. It is the practice of select committees, including the Committee of Public Accounts, to deliberate in private. The report is subsequently made public, including the minutes of evidence and any observations the Committee may make. In this instance I believe there is a strong case for hearing the evidence in public but the Committee might appropriately, and possibly more effectively, deliberate in private.
However, having regard to the practice now in operation and in the absence of a definite decision to the contrary, the position is that committees of this character operate in private but make the report public. I believe that it is right that these aspects of the present situation should be brought before the House for consideration. The House is entitled to an assurance on behalf of the Government, whether by the Taoiseach or some authorised Minister, that all the facts relating to this matter, and including the Garda investigation which has already taken place, will be made available to the Committee, and that, if necessary, powers will be taken to compel the attendance of witnesses. Lastly, and not of least importance, there should be no attempt to frustrate the report of the Committee by a negative finding. This is a matter which involves the whole credit of Parliament and the accountability of public expenditure. General experience has shown that the Committee of Public Accounts has functioned in the past in a non-political way. However, this is the first investigation of a character such as this, where special reference was made as distinct from the normal reference of the Appropriation Accounts, which are normally considered approximately one year or even 18 months in arrears. In this particular case the special reference is unusual. For that reason it is important that all aspects of the situation should be fully considered by the Dáil before deciding that the procedure adopted is the most likely to achieve the result which, I believe, is in the public interest.