I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
This is a Bill to deal with a problem to which the community has been increasingly exposed in recent times and which finds expression in the forcible occupation of other people's property, mainly at the instigation of quasi-political groups, and forcible interference with the legitimate rights of the owners and sometimes of the general public as well.
Since the House is well aware of the activities with which the Bill is concerned I need not refer to them in detail but I would like to make it clear that the Bill applies not only to the forcible occupation of buildings but also to the type of intimidatory exercises that have come to be known as fish-ins.
In a democracy such as ours, where there are no permanent political minorities, there are adequate democratic processes not only for ventilating dissatisfaction with the existing order of things but also for resolving grievances and differences of opinion. Changes in law and policy can be, and are, secured by these processes. Unfortunately, some of those who seek change are not prepared to abide by. the rules which our society has laid down for the conduct of its affairs. Instead, they resort to force and violence—or, as they would call it, "direct action"—to achieve their aims. In recent years we have seen a growing tendency on the part of individuals and groups within the community not only to behave as if they were outside or above the law but to claim that they are entitled to act in this way. It is clear that this development strikes at the very roots of our society and could not be allowed indefinitely to go unchecked.
The Bill provides for the creation of three new offences in relation to land and vehicles, namely, forcible entry, dealt with in section 2, forcible occupation, dealt with in section 3 and encouraging and advocating the commission of these offences, section 4. "Vehicle" as defined in section 1 means an aircraft not in flight, a train, an omnibus or a boat, ship or other vessel. The terms "forcibly" and "forcible" are defined in section 1— they include unspoken threats of force caused by the weight of numbers but, on the other hand, do not cover peaceful picketing or the like. In section 3 the action of locking or barring doors, windows, et cetera, and the action of erecting physical obstructions to entry will constitute forcible occupation, where, but only where, such actions are calculated to prevent or obstruct the entry of any person lawfully entitled to enter. Since the Bill is not designed to deal with such forms of occupation as, for example, where a “wandering minstrel” sleeps in a disused outhouse, or an itinerant or other homeless family seeks temporary shelter in an abandoned farmhouse, an exception is made in section 2 for a person who, having forcibly entered land or a vehicle, does not interfere with the use and enjoyment of the land or vehicle by the owner and, if requested to leave by the owner or by a uniformed garda, does so with all reasonable speed and in a peaceful manner.
Section 4, subsection (2), of the Bill provides that, where a statement encouraging or advocating the commission of an offence of forcible entry or occupation is made by or on behalf of a group of persons, each member of the group will be guilty of an offence. Contrary to what I understand has been suggested by some critics, there is in this no element of guilt by association. A member of a group is not being held responsible for what other members say unless what is said was said by or on behalf of the group. Here I would point out that whether a statement has been made on behalf of a group is a question of fact which the prosecution would have to prove and, accordingly, the provision could not apply to a statement purporting to be made on behalf of the group which was actually made by some outsider. Even though the provision is limited in this way, it might be unfair to individual members of a group to allow them no line of retreat where a spokesman has perhaps said more than some members would wish and subsection (3) of section 4 provides, therefore, that it will be a good defence for a person charged with such an offence to prove that he immediately took all reasonable steps open to him to dissociate himself from the statement or that the statement was made without his knowledge or that it was made without his consent.
The Bill has been framed on the basis that the sanction of the criminal law should not be invoked as a substitute for civil action against trespass or to protect property rights or remedy civil wrongs where the circumstances are such that there is no threat to the community and no general public interest is involved. The Bill will not, therefore, apply to incidents that arise in the course of private disputes between persons having different estates or interests in the same land, for example, between landlord and tenant or between mortgagor and mortagee. These are matters to be regulated only by existing civil property law.
Where a person commits an offence of forcible entry or forcible occupation, it will, in the overwhelming majority of cases, be in circumstances where he has no colour of right to the property entered or occupied. Consequently, it would in the ordinary way be unreasonable to the point of absurdity to require the prosecution to go through the tedious and possibly costly process of proving ownership that is not being challenged. Members of the House who have had personal experience of the purchase or sale of a house will appreciate that proof of title can be a tedious process. Accordingly section 5 of the Bill provides that, unless the defendant shows to the satisfaction of the court that he has a bona fide claim to ownership of the property, it will not be necessary for the prosecution to prove ownership.
It may happen that, when squatters or protest groups occupy buildings and refuse to leave, it will become necessary for the owner to use some force to eject them and, in the process, he may cause damage to his property. A practical example of this is where an owner had to break down a door of his house that was barred against him. Since damage reasonably caused in such circumstances is directly attributable to the refusal of the illegal occupiers to get out when asked to do so, the Bill proposes, in section 6, that the court, in coming to a decision as to a penalty appropriate to the offence, should be able to take account of the damage as if it were damage caused by the defendant and also to take into consideration whether the defendant had compensated the owner for the damage. Section 6 also provides that the owner may recover the amount of the damage as a simple contract debt in civil proceedings.
The penalties for offences are provided in section 7. Increased penalties are prescribed for second and subsequent offences tried summarily but all the offences are to be triable either summarily or on indictment. Because the district court has no basic jurisdiction in regard to title to land, it is necessary to provide that jurisdiction in summary proceedings will not be ousted by reason solely of a question of title to land being brought into issue. Likewise, decisions of the district court in prosecutions under this Bill would not affect questions of title. Both these matters are dealt with in section 8.
Because the offences created by the Bill are indictable it will be possible for the Garda Síochána to apply for warrants of arrest where necessary. However, there may be cases where an offence under section 3 has taken place and the circumstances are such that serious damage to, say, a building, or serious interference with the lawful rights of the owner in relation thereto, or serious inconvenience to the public wishing to transact business in the building, is being or will be caused as a result of the continuance of the offence and the only way of preventing the damage or inconvenience or of minimising it would be for the gardaí to arrest those concerned immediately. Accordingly, section 9 of the Bill provides for the vesting in the Garda Síochána of a power of arrest without warrant in what is an emergency situation. This arises only in relation to an offence under section 3. Deputies will notice that all the four conditions set out in section 9 for the exercise of the power of arrest must be satisfied—they are not alternatives.
So far as the problem of squatting is concerned, the provisions of this Bill are of general application and will extend to squatting in local authority dwellings as well as privately owned houses. I want to make it clear, however, that the provisions of the Bill are without prejudice to section 13 of the Housing Act, 1970, which makes it an offence for an unauthorised person to enter a local authority dwelling in certain circumstances. That section was enacted last summer to deal with an urgent and serious situation that had arisen in relation to squatting in houses owned by Dublin Corporation. The section is part of the Housing Code and its enforcement is a matter for local authorities. It will remain on the Statute Book alongside the provisions contained in this Bill, which, as I have said are of general application. It may well be that section 13 of the Housing Act will prove adequate to deal with the problems confronting local authorities in this regard. On the other hand, it is easy to envisage circumstances in which certain provisions of this Bill would be needed to supplement what is in the Housing Act. I am thinking primarily of section 4 of the Bill, under which it will be possible to deal with organisations which encourage and advocate squatting for quasi-political motives, and section 6, which will enable an owner to recover in civil proceedings the amount of any damage involved in recovering possession of property taken over by squatters.
While I do not propose to involve myself in any discussion on housing matters, I think that, in so far as the Bill does seek to deal with the problem of squatting in local authority houses, it is necessary to say this much by way of justification of it. Dublin and to a lesser extent other cities and towns, like cities and towns in every other country that we know of, have a shortage of houses, though it is of nothing like the dimensions that some of the critics would have us think. Those who have studied the problem most extensively say that the only city without a housing problem is a city that is dead or at least dying. If they are right in this—and I believe they are — we must accept as a fact that urban housing shortages cannot be solved overnight, particularly in a country like ours that has limited resources. Given that situation, it is essential that priorities should be determined in a rational and objective way and that needs should be met in accordance with these priorities. The people who are most vociferous in their protests are rarely those in most urgent need. If there is to be elementary justice, houses must continue to be allocated in an orderly manner and in accordance with the priorities established by the local authority. I suggest that all of us here can and must agree that this is so and that the allocation cannot be allowed to be decided by small unrepresentative groups using force.
The Government—and, I would submit, not only the Government but the Oireachtas — has the duty to protect the rights and the freedoms of all citizens — not just the most noisy elements. To say that is not to condemn people for voicing their grievances and for keeping on doing so. Protest and pressure for change are not in themselves bad. On the contrary, human progress can be measured by the extent of man's questioning of himself and his environment and his willingness to adopt new concepts when the old ones have proved inadequate or unsuitable. Consequently, although many of us disagree profoundly with the ideas of some of those who are at present seeking to change the existing order of things and although we may, with justification, suspect their motives, we can and must respect, and if necessary defend, their right to propound their ideas and to voice their dissatisfactions, provided that they for their part understand that the majority, too, have rights. But when people resort to force and violence to achieve their ends, the situation takes on a different complexion. As I said earlier, ours is a democratic régime in which there are democratic processes for dealing with grievances and, where necessary, altering laws and policies. In these circumstances there can be no justification for the use of force and violence. If the foundations of democracy are liberty and order, let us not forget that without order there can be no liberty.
It so happens that just at the moment we are in a period of relative quiet so far as the particular problem with which the Bill is designed to deal is concerned. I think it is fortunate that this is so because it enables us to examine the proposals in the Bill in a more detached way than might perhaps be the case if our deliberations were to take place against a background of heat engendered by particular incidents.
Before I conclude, I want to stress that I do not put forward this Bill as the last word in perfection. I put it forward as a reasonable and moderate attempt to meet a serious and recurring problem. Some may think it is not strong enough: others that it may go further than is necessary. I shall be glad to hear the views of the House and to consider any suggestions that may be made for its improvement.
With that, I commend the Bill to the House.