I move: That the Bill be now read a Second Time.
The introduction of this measure represents a further significant step forward in the development of our social insurance system. It is designed to make adequate provision against loss of income by insured workers and their families during periods of sickness or unemployment. As Deputies are aware, the loss of income suffered by a person during periods of sickness and unemployment has up to now been catered for by payment of flat rate benefits. Down the years these benefits have been regularly improved not only in the matter of provision for dependants and in duration of payment but also in the levels of payment which have been increased at a rate very considerably greater than the rate of increases in the cost of living. The main defect in these flat rate benefits is that they are not flexible enough and cannot be adjusted or shaped to provide adequately for the different needs of persons who, when working, had not the same levels of earnings and, as a result, had widely differing financial commitments related to their levels of earnings.
In many cases, particularly at higher pay levels, the rates of benefit are not sufficiently high to enable insured persons to maintain anything approaching their accustomed standard of living during longer periods of sickness or unemployment. To increase the flat rate benefits to a level which might be regarded as adequate for the higher paid workers would, however, require such an increase in the contribution rates that these would be a heavy burden on the lower paid worker. Further, very high flat rate benefits could have the undesirable effect of giving lower paid workers, when unemployed, such a high proportion of their wages as to deter them from seeking work. The purpose of this Bill is, therefore, to improve the position in this respect by relating both benefit and contributions to earnings to some degree and to provide rates of benefit which will better enable persons to maintain, during sickness and unemployment, a standard of living reasonably close to that to which they have been accustomed.
Although, as I have said, this Bill is a significant step forward in the development of our social insurance system, I am fully aware that there is nothing very novel in the idea of pay-related benefit. It is a feature of the social insurance schemes in one form or another of many countries including Britain and it has been my intention for some time to introduce such a scheme here. In the Third Programme for Economic and Social Development it was included among the social insurance schemes scheduled for introduction but, for reasons which I shall explain, it has only now become a practical proposition.
The main problems in setting up a scheme of pay-related benefit are the collection of contributions based on pay and the obtaining of accurate, reliable, and readily accessible information as to annual income on which to calculate the benefit. It is essential for the purposes of such a scheme that the earnings of persons covered should be fully and clearly recorded and readily accessible for the purposes of both collection of contributions and payment of benefit. In the PAYE and associated methods of collecting income tax from employees the Revenue Commissioners have machinery under which accurate records are available of the earnings of the majority of persons employed in this country. Some classes of employees are not included, however, and I will refer to these later.
If the machinery of the income tax collection system were not to be made available for the purposes of this pay-related social insurance scheme, then a separate system of collection and of record-keeping would have to be set up by my Department for these purposes. Such a procedure would be an unnecessary duplication of work in the public service and would place an intolerable burden on employers by requiring them to furnish the same information twice. It would have been feasible but it would have been costly and involved further delay as it would have entailed the setting up of a separate computer installation in my Department for which not only special accommodation would have to be provided but also additional specially trained staff.
Some work was, in fact, done in this connection but this only brought out more clearly the magnitude of the problems a separate installation would involve and the extent of the extra burden which would have been placed on employers. The setting up of a separate Departmental computer installation for the purposes of this particular scheme was not therefore considered a reasonable alternative to using the income tax collection system for the purposes of a pay-related benefit scheme. However, as the Revenue Commissioners themselves have only recently reached the position where they could undertake the collecting of pay-related contributions and, at the same time, furnish the information needed to pay benefit, it has only now become possible to introduce the pay-related benefit scheme provided for in this Bill.
The scheme of pay-related benefit in this Bill is designed to provide a new benefit, under the social insurance system, which will supplement unemployment benefit in the case of unemployment and disability benefit and maternity allowance in the case of incapacity for work. A person who is entitled to disability benefit may, because his incapacity is due to an accident at work or a specified occupational disease, be in receipt of injury benefit under the occupational injuries scheme in lieu of disability benefit and it is intended that pay-related benefit will be payable in such a case also so long as the person involved has an underlying entitlement to disability benefit.
The existing flat rate benefits mentioned, including amounts for adult and child dependants, will continue to be payable under the same conditions as at present. Where, however, the incapacity for work or unemployment lasts for longer than a fortnight, the flat rate benefit will be supplemented by pay-related benefit, which will be at the rate of 40 per cent of that part of the claimant's average weekly earnings, in a previous income tax year, which lies between £14 and an upper limit or ceiling, yet to be fixed.
The average weekly earnings of all industrial workers in the quarter ended 30th June, 1972, was approximately £23. A single person earning this amount will receive £3.60 by way of pay-related benefit, plus £5.55 by way of disability or unemployment benefit, making a total weekly benefit payment of £9.15. A married man earning £23 will receive total weekly benefit of £12.90 if he has no dependent children, £15.60 if he has two children and £18.60 if he has five children. The average weekly earnings of adult male industrial workers in the same period was almost £30. Under the new provisions a single man in this category will receive £11.95 total weekly benefit. A married man will get £15.70 if he has no dependent children, £18.40 if he has two children and £21.40 if he has five children.
I should explain that the 40 per cent level was chosen after an examination of the real value of various levels of pay-related benefit in terms of replacement of net pay lost during periods of sickness or unemployment. Very few workers take home the full amount of their pay. Stoppages of various kinds are almost invariably made and these include statutory deduction in respect of social insurance contributions and income tax. These statutory deductions, which arise out of payment of remuneration, are not made during weeks of unemployment or sickness so that during such weeks income replacement by way of benefit need not take the amount of the deductions into consideration but should properly relate only to the person's net or take home pay. As I have indicated the main purpose of having benefits related to pay is to enable the recipient to maintain, during periods when he is not at work, a standard of living reasonably comparable to that which he normally enjoys. Children's allowances, where payable, are part of the family income and are paid whether the beneficiary is earning or sick or unemployed, and it is reasonable to add these payments both to the level of take home pay and to the level of benefit in determining the real value of the pay-related benefit in maintaining the beneficiary's standard of living.
The 40 per cent of reckonable earnings in excess of £14, when added to the flat rate benefit payable, provides in the case of single persons, replacement of at least 50 per cent of net pay at all pay levels while, in the case of married persons, the level of replacement is higher because of the addition of increases of flat rate benefit in respect of dependants. The level of replacement of net pay, for example, at average weekly earnings of £30 would be approximately 65 per cent for a married man, 70 per cent for a married man with two children, and 75 per cent for a married man with four children. At earnings of £20 the level of replacement would be higher still, being 70 per cent for a married man 78 per cent for a married man with two children and almost 90 per cent for a married man with four children.
It will be seen, therefore, that in the case of married men with families, the highest proportion of net pay will be replaced in the cases of those with the largest families and the lowest pay, and the proportion will decline as the levels of pay rise and the size of the family decrease. It could happen in the case of persons with large families whose reckonable weekly earnings are low that, when the amount of pay-related benefit is added to the flat rate benefit, the total amount payable would exceed the average weekly earnings on which the benefit was based. As the object of the scheme is to enable a person to maintain his standard of living it would seem illogical if the scheme were to provide for his income, during periods of sickness or unemployment, to be supplemented to a higher level than when he was working. This can be prevented by putting a ceiling or wage stop related to a person's pay on the total amount of benefit that could be paid to him and there is provision to do this by regulations.
I should like to explain that the lower limit of reckonable weekly earnings of £14 was chosen for pay-related benefit purposes because the present level of £5.55 weekly for flat rate disability and unemployment benefits for a single person represents approximately 40 per cent of £14 and a still higher percentage of normal take home pay in such a case. A single person earning less than £13.88 receives by way of flat rate disability or unemployment benefit more than 40 per cent of his earnings or more than 50 per cent of his net or take home pay. A married man in this category receives as flat rate benefit for himself and his wife at least 75 per cent of his net pay. If he has children he receives a considerably higher proportion by way of replacement income. This varies from at least 95 per cent if he has a wife and two children, to well over 100 per cent if he has more than two children or has been earning significantly less than £14 weekly; and there is no wage stop in the case of flat rate benefit.
There is, therefore, nothing discriminatory as has already been suggested in some quarters about the adoption of the floor of £14 a week proposed to be adopted in this scheme. It is a simple matter of arithmetic and commonsense, because obviously if pure pay relationship were applied to the lower ranges of weekly earnings the workers concerned would suffer a greater reduction in income when sick or unemployed than they now do under the flat rate benefit system.
The ceiling, or upper limit of pay, which will be taken into account for benefit and contribution purposes has not been provided for specifically in the Bill and it is proposed that it be prescribed by regulations. The level of this ceiling cannot yet be decided as the remuneration limit for the compulsory insurance of non-manual workers, which at present stands at £1,600 a year, affects this question. As I have already announced on more than one occasion, I am anxious to have this remuneration limit abolished and I hope to be in a position to introduce legislation for that purpose shortly.
If this limit were to stand the ceiling or upper limit on reckonable weekly earnings for pay-related benefit purposes could not exceed the weekly equivalent of £1,600 a year, since if non-manual workers over that limit are excluded from compulsory insurance there would be no case for including the earnings of manual workers above that level for pay-related benefit purposes. When the limit is abolished I will be able to prescribe a ceiling on reckonable weekly earnings for pay-related benefit purposes which will be related to the general level of wages at the time the scheme commences and which can be changed from time to time in line with changes in that level.
The average weekly earnings which will be used for the purpose of calculating the amount of pay-related benefit payable to a person will be based on his actual gross earnings from his employment which are reckonable for income tax purposes. These earnings will include all amounts paid as salary, wages, fees, arrears of pay, bonuses, Christmas boxes, overtime, commission, pay during sickness, holiday pay, "danger" money, "dirty" money, "tea" money, "tool" money, which are taken into account by the Revenue Commissioners as earnings for income tax purposes. The Revenue Commissioners will furnish to my Department all the necessary information, which will already have been recorded regarding earnings, so as to enable pay-related benefit to be calculated and paid. The information to be furnished in this regard will, of course, be restricted to the minimum necessary to enable the benefit to be paid, probably to the person's total gross earnings for the relevant income tax year in each case.
I have no doubt that objection to the use of earnings in a previous income tax year may be raised on the grounds that they relate to a past period and take no account of the rises in pay levels in the meantime. In fact, as it will be some months after the end of an income tax year before records of earnings become available, the gross earnings to be taken into account for benefit purposes may not be those in the most recently completed income tax year. However, to meet the difficulties there is power to prescribe by regulations the manner and the basis of calculation of reckonable weekly earnings for the purposes of pay-related benefit and it is intended that this power will be used to inflate reckonable weekly earnings so as to broadly compensate for the effects of the time lag.
Since the pay-related benefit will be paid as a supplement to flat rate benefit and will not be payable if there is no title to the flat rate benefit, it will not be necessary for a person to make a separate claim for pay-related benefit but he will be required to furnish whatever information is needed to ascertain the amount of his reckonable earnings in the relevant income tax year. In straightforward cases, and these should be the vast majority, all that the claimant will be required to supply will be his income tax registered serial number but in other cases he may be required to furnish further information by way of confirmation, or in cases of doubt or difficulty. It is the intention to integrate the payment of pay-related benefit into the existing system for the payment of flat rate benefits so that both the flat rate and pay-related benefits will be paid together in one weekly payment.
The pay-related benefit will be payable for not more than 147 days of unemployment during any period of interruption of employment, provided the claimant is in receipt of unemployment benefit. It will also be payable for a similar maximum of 147 days in respect of incapacity for work during any period of interruption of employment if the claimant is entitled to disability benefit. The payment in respect of incapacity for work may be made with occupational injury benefit if the claimant would otherwise be entitled to disability benefit or maternity allowance.
The pay-related benefit will, in the ordinary course, begin to be payable after the claimant has been incapacitated or unemployed for two weeks, which period will include the existing three waiting days for flat rate benefit. And here I must emphasise that the new benefit is not intended for shorter-term periods of incapacity or unemployment during which flat rate benefit will be payable, as normally these should not seriously affect the claimant's standard of living. It will continue to be paid, up to the maximum in either case of 147 days, for as long as the beneficiary continues to be entitled to flat rate benefit but, if the flat rate benefit should cease to be payable before the 147 days are completed, the pay-related benefit will also cease.
In the normal course a person claiming flat rate unemployment benefit will have three waiting days of unemployment before any benefit becomes pay-related benefit with unemployment benefit for 147 days after a 12 day waiting period which will include the three waiting days for the flat rate benefit which I have already mentioned will bring the beneficiary up to the same point where he has been paid 156 days flat rate unemployment benefit. Similarly payment of pay-related benefit with disability benefit will normally cease at the point where the person has been paid 156 days disability benefit.
I should now like to say a few words about the financing and scope of the scheme. It is provided that the cost of the pay-related scheme will be borne by contributions shared equally by employers and employed contributors. The contribution will be pay-related and thus the cost of the scheme will be spread equitably over all pay levels between £14 a week and the ceiling to be fixed for benefit purposes. I am satisfied that the Exchequer should not have to contribute towards a scheme which is designed to provide the greatest benefit for higher paid workers and from which lower paid workers are excluded and so the pay-related contribution levied on employers and employees will be set at a level adequate to cover the total cost of the scheme. For the same reason I do not consider that employers should be asked to pay a higher proportion of the pay-related contribution than an employee.
As I have already indicated, it has been arranged to have the pay-related contributions collected by way of the income tax machinery of the Revenue Commissioners and paid into the social insurance fund and the nature of the pay to be taken into account for pay-related contribution purposes will be the same as for benefit. Instead of using the earnings in the preceding tax year, however, the contributions will be based on and collected from a person's actual earnings in the income tax year then current. These earnings will, of course, be the earnings which will be the basis of the person's entitlement to pay-related benefit in a subsequent year.
It has not yet been possible to make a really firm estimate of the cost of the scheme because of lack of detailed information regarding pay levels of employees. My Department have, however, very recently been supplied with better information on pay levels and this is being processed in order to cost the scheme more accurately and to determine the level of contribution that will be required to meet that cost. Also being examined in this connection is the detailed manner in which the contribution will be collected through the income tax collection system. I may say here that largely for technical reasons this may involve collection through the PAYE system of pay-related contributions from pay below £14 a week but if so there will be a consequential adjustment of the flat rate contribution for the classes of insured persons concerned.
Apart from the question of the ceiling of reckonable earnings yet to be determined another problem still not fully resolved is that of financing the scheme in the initial stages. I will refer to this later. It is not, therefore, possible at this stage to determine the rate of contribution. Subject to what I have already said, the cost of the scheme has, however, been estimated to be of the order of £7 million to £8 million a year and the rate of contributions is expected to be about 3 per cent of reckonable earnings, of which 1½ per cent will be payable by the employer and 1½ per cent by the insured person.
The contribution rate as finally determined will be prescribed by regulations as will also the ceiling of pay up to which contributions will be levied.
The scheme will apply to all insured persons in respect of whom the ordinary full rates of flat rate employment contributions are payable under the existing social insurance system. The scheme will thus cover most persons who are in industrial, commercial and services type employments. These are estimated to number about 680,000 persons at present. When the remuneration limit of £1,600 a year for compulsory social insurance is removed this number will be increased by an estimated further 30,000 persons.
It is not proposed, at the moment, that persons whose insurance at present covers them for disability and unemployment benefit, but for whom special lower rates of flat rate employment contributions are payable, will come within the scope of the scheme at its commencement. The main groups thus excluded will be male agricultural workers, numbering about 38,000 and female agricultural workers and domestic employees who are estimated to number about 15,000.
The principal reason for the exclusion of these workers is that it will not be possible within the income tax collection system at present to collect pay-related contributions from them or to provide the information regarding their earnings which would enable pay-related benefit to be calculated. There is provision, however, for power to bring into the scheme by regulations classes of employees other than those in respect of whom the ordinary rates of employment contributions are payable and the coverage of the scheme could be extended to those classes by regulations as soon as it proves feasible to do so. Any decision in this matter, however, would revolve largely on how pay-related contributions could be collected from the particular class of employers being considered. There is also power in the Bill to exclude any class of employees whom it may not be desired to have within the scope of the scheme.
The scheme will be brought into operation by an order or orders which will be made by me and different dates may be fixed for the commencement of payment of the benefit and the commencement of collection of contributions. I am anxious that the scheme should be brought into operation as soon as possible but the Revenue Commissioners are unable to undertake the collection of the pay-related contributions from a date earlier than 6th April, 1974 which is the start of an income tax year.
The commissioners will also be commencing from that date the collection of pay-related health contributions from various categories of persons including those insured under the Social Welfare Acts. However, while the date of commencement of collection of pay-related social insurance contributions will be 6th April, 1974, it will, I hope, be possible to commence payment of pay-related benefit some months earlier and to this end I am consulting with the Minister for Finance with a view to determining the earliest date from which this can be done having regard to the usual budgetary considerations.
There is, therefore, provision in the Bill for advances of moneys from the Central Funds to the social insurance fund to enable this to be done. Any such advances would be on a repayment basis but the amounts of any such advances which may be required, the terms of repayment and the effect of such repayment on the level of contributions have yet to be decided.
As I said at the opening of my statement, the proposals in this Bill represent a significant advance in the development of our social insurance system. Not only are they important in regard to the increased benefits they will provide and because they constitute a major advance towards bringing our social security code into line with the social codes of the EEC and other countries, but they will pave the way for further appropriate developments in our social security code in the wider field of long term benefits and pensions.
It is my intention as soon as this new scheme has got off the ground and is operating smoothly to utilise the experience gained and the basic machinery established under it to introduce at the earliest feasible date complementary schemes of pay-related contributory old age, retirement, invalidity and widows pensions. I should sound a warning, however, that even with the best will in the world these proposed developments cannot be brought about overnight and any such changes must in the ultimate be considered in relation to general financial and economic circumstances and developments in other services.
I hope that the explanations I have given here coupled with the information contained in the explanatory memorandum circulated with the Bill will give Deputies a fuller understanding of the proposals in the Bill which are, of course, highly technical and specialised. I know that some criticism has been made of the length of the Bill as if the length of any Bill per se was a matter of supreme importance, and of the time taken to produce the proposals since they were first adumbrated in the Third Programme for Economic and Social Development.
The text of the Bill of itself is merely the tip of the iceberg and gives no idea of the amount of work which has gone into the consideration and development of the proposals in it or of the major financial and administrative problems to which solutions had to be found before the introduction of such a scheme could be contemplated in full confidence that it would be a practical and viable proposition.
A great deal of what I may call the "nitty gritty" details of the scheme will appear in regulations to be drafted under the provisions of the Bill. Development of the procedures for collection of contributions and also for the payment of the supplementary benefits has already entailed a great deal of work both in the office of the Revenue Commissioners and in my own Department. At this stage much still remains to be done but Deputies can rest assured that the regulations, the provision of necessary additional accommodation and the recruitment and training of additional staff will all have been dealt with in good time to enable the scheme to be satisfactorily launched.
It is, therefore, with great pleasure that I recommend this Bill to Dáil Éireann for its early and favourable consideration.