In this debate it is up to us, as legislators, to ignore the pressures on us from diverse sources. There are liberal pressures, sometimes based on principles with which many of us—most of us perhaps—do not agree. There are conservative pressures, highly organised, dishonest in some respects—that is in the organisation of the campaign—and often, in fact mainly, ignoring completely the realities of the situation. All the organised letters I have received have been ones which, even since the Supreme Court decision, have totally ignored its existence. They have virtually all used the same form of words. I have replied to every one; only in one instance out of scores has anybody written back. What this signifies I do not know; whether I convinced them all by the logic of my argument; whether they did not feel they wanted to take the matter further; whether they had written a letter to me in the first instance and somebody else put their names to it— there are a variety of possible explanations.
Our job here is to make up our own minds. Although one would not have known it from what was said earlier today by Deputy O.J. Flanagan, that is something which has been put firmly and squarely to us—those of us who are Roman Catholics—by the Hierarchy of our Church who said, having made some preliminary remarks in their statement:
It does not follow, of course, that the State is bound to prohibit the importation and sale of contraceptives. There are many things which the Catholic Church holds to be morally wrong and no one has ever suggested, least of all the Church herself, that they should be prohibited by the State. Those who insist on seeing the issue purely in terms of the State enforcing, or not enforcing, Catholic moral teaching are, therefore, missing the point.
Deputy O.J. Flanagan managed to miss the point for two hours this morning because he would not listen to what his Bishops said to him despite that he seemed to be talking as if he were a Bishop himself.
The real question——
The Bishops said——
facing the legislators is: What effect would the increased availability of contraceptives have on the quality of life in the Republic of Ireland? That is a question of public, not private, morality. What the legislators have to decide is whether a change in the law would, on balance, do more harm than good, by damaging the character of the society for which they are responsible.
They went on to suggest then—having put the responsibility for the decision fairly and squarely where it belongs in this House, and indeed in the other House—to make a case that there was evidence that the quality of life would be affected, a case which they are fully entitled to put, a case which some of us would feel was selective in the presentation of the figures, but which certainly needs to be considered seriously by anybody dealing with this matter.
However I feel it was perhaps a mistake to confine the issue put to us to the question of public morality. I will come in a moment to deal with the question of public morality, and I reject completely the idea of some liberals that there is no such thing as public morality or that we should not concern ourselves with it. But I think there are other matters as well as public morality to be considered. There is the question of human rights, which was not adverted to in the Bishop's statement. There is the question of the wishes of the people, which also must have some consideration. There are other related political issues with which we are entitled to concern ourselves and have regard to unless there are compelling arguments under the headings of public morality or human rights, such as, for example, the impact of what we do or do not do upon opinion in Northern Ireland; upon the tensions that exist between the communities there and, therefore, upon the lives and prospects of life of the people there. Therefore I should like to deal with this general question, because I will deal first with the general question of the rights and wrongs of controlling, not controlling, or having limited control of contraception. I should like to deal with it from the point of view of these different principles— the question of human rights, public morality, the wishes of the people and impact on opinion in Northern Ireland.
I am starting with this general issue. I am doing so because, although in fact what is before us today is not the principle of whether or not to control the availability of contraceptives, or whether or not to prevent them being available—because that issue has been determined by the Supreme Court; they must be available on some terms—nevertheless, so much of the debate outside and, to some extent, here has been on the general principles involved rather than on the practical problem of dealing with the Supreme Court decision, I feel it is right that somebody addressing himself to this subject should speak briefly on these general principles.
First, the question of human rights. The various judgments of the Supreme Court on this are interesting and I do not think they have been sufficiently appreciated. I think that something of the quality of the thought in those statements needs more publicity than it has had. It seems to me that some of those statements derive from a strong sentiment—one might almost say a passion—for human rights which some of the judges felt were being ignored. I want to quote from some of the judgments to illustrate what I mean by that. Judge Walsh said that:
the rights of a married couple to decide how many children, if any they will have, are matters outside the reach of positive law where the means employed to implement such decisions do not impinge upon the common good or destroy or endanger human life. It is undoubtedly true that among those persons who are subject to a particular moral code no one has a right to be in breach of that moral code. But when this is a code governing private morality and where the breach of it is not one which injures the common good——
which comes into public morality——
then it is not the State's business to intervene. It is outside the authority of the State to intrude into the privacy of the husband and wife relationship for the sake of imposing a code of private morality upon that husband and wife which they do not desire. In my view Article 41 of the Constitution guarantees the husband and wife against any such invasion of their privacy by the State. It follows that the use of contraceptives by them within that marital privacy is equally guaranteed against such invasion and as such assumes the status of a right so guaranteed by the Constitution. If this right cannot be directly invaded by the State, it follows that it cannot be frustrated by the State taking measures to ensure that the exercise of this right is rendered impossible.
Towards the end of his judgment, Judge Walsh concluded:
I am of opinion that not only has the State the right to do so but by virtue of the provisions of the proviso to section 1 and the provisions of section 3 of Article 40, the State has the positive obligation to ensure by its laws as far as is possible (and in the use of the word "possible" I am relying on the Irish text of the Constitution) that there would be made available to married women in the condition of health of Mrs. McGee the means whereby a conception which was likely to put her life in jeopardy might be avoided when it is a risk over and above the ordinary risks inherent in pregnancy.
Mr. Justice Walsh not only asserted that the State had not the right to interfere to prevent the availability of contraceptives but in cases like that of Mrs. McGee, have a positive duty to ensure that they were available.
Mr. Justice Griffin said:
The present case concerns a relationship lying within the zone of the privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.
He went on to ask some rhetorical questions:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights, older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming-together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
Judge Griffin concluded:
In my judgment, this subsection violates the personal rights of the plaintiff, in this case her right of privacy in her marital relations with her husband under Article 40, section 3, subsection (1).
Mr. Justice Budd came to a similar conclusion, concluding that the Act with which he was dealing:
is in particular in conflict with the personal rights of the citizen as to the guarantee of Article 40.3.1 to respect, defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen as far as practicable.
Mr. Justice Henchy said that the section, section 17 had the effect:
of condemning Mrs. McGee and her husband to a way of life which at best will be fraught with worry, tension and uncertainty that cannot but adversely affect their lives and, at worst, will result in an unwanted pregnancy causing death or serious illness, with the obvious tragic consequences to the lives of her husband and young children. And this in a Constitution which in its preamble proclaims as one of its aims the dignity and freedom of the individual; which in Article 40, section 3, subsection (2) casts on the State a duty to protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, to vindicate the life and person of every citizen; which in Article 41 after recognising the family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law, guarantees to protect it in its Constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the nation and the State; and which, also in Article 41, pledges the State to guard with special care the institution of marriage, on which the family is founded, and to protect it from attack.
Section 17 in my judgment so far from respecting Mrs. McGee's personal rights, violates them. If she observes this prohibition (which in practice she can scarcely avoid doing and which in law she is bound under penalty of fine or imprisonment to do) she will endanger the the security and the happiness of her marriage, she will imperil her health to the point of hazarding her life, and she will subject her family to the risk of distress and disruption. These are the intrusions which she is entitled to say are incompatible with the safety of her life, the preservation of her health her responsibility to her conscience, and the security and wellbeing of her marriage and family.
He therefore concluded that:
Section 17 violates the guarantee by the State to Article 40 section 3 subsection (1) by its laws to protect her personal rights not only by violating her personal rights to privacy in regard to her marital relations but in a wider way by frustrating and making criminal any efforts by her to effectuate the decision of her husband and herself, made responsibly, conscientiously and on medical advice, to avail themselves of a particular contraceptive method so as to ensure her life and health as well as the integrity, security and wellbeing of her marriage and her family.
It is well that we should in this debate understand something of what lies behind the decision of the Supreme Court. These are the views of four judges, asserting the people's marital rights vis-à-vis the State, and if at any time the State sought, as it did in 1935, or by constitutional change to interfere with these rights, this would be a very serious matter indeed. Once the principle is established and is allowed to endure and is upheld that the State has the right to interfere in the private married lives of people in that way, then it would be difficult to sustain the proposition at some future time that the State would not have the right to interfere to enforce contraception on the people and force sterilisation on people. The family has rights antecedent to the State and no State has the right to interfere with the inherent rights of the family or with the institution of marriage, and it is on those grounds which seem to me to be fundamental to the whole thoughtbasis of our community, fundamental to our Christian heritage, might I say, that these judgments of the Supreme Court are of vital importance. They have upheld a principle which had been ignored for far too long, the principle of the basic rights of people in marriage and of the fact that the State has no right or power to interfere with them in their private married lives. That is a principle which it is very dangerous to seek to undermine.
There are people at the moment who have put forward the proposal that we should go to the country in a referendum to take away this right of the family, to go to the country and put to the people the proposition that this right, proclaimed in words of some nobility by the Supreme Court should be taken from them, that a campaign should be waged to give the State powers it has not now got to interfere with the family. I do not think that if such a foolish proposition were contemplated by any political party the people would entertain it. The dangers are much too great. There are rights antecedent to law and above all those rights concern marriage and the family.
I turn now to the question of public morality, the second consideration which we have to bear in mind. At the outset I should like to reject the liberal view that there is no such thing as public morality. The fact is that all States, I think, without exception—certainly I know of no exception—have such legislation. They have legislation on marriage, legislation laying down conditions and limitations on divorce and abortion, legislation controlling pornography and blasphemy. Even the most liberal States today have some legislation along these lines. Public morality is the concern of the community and of the State and we have the right and the duty to protect public morality by legislating against public acts that may interfere with it, so long as in so doing we do not interfere with basic human rights.
I also reject the liberal view that public morality is concerned only with public acts. It is so concerned but not only with them, such as for example acts of public indecency. Private acts, if tolerated or encouraged by State action, can have cumulative effects on the public mind and the social consequences of an aggregation of private acts must be considered. Thus the mere fact that a brothel is discreet, not advertised or clearly indicated on the exterior, does not mean that the law may not regulate or forbid brothels. The suggestion to the contrary is the individual heresy of the liberal west in the 20th century expressed in the phrase so often used "So long as I do not directly harm another person, I do what I like" and indeed the adverb "directly" is often omitted from this proposition. The fact is that indirect damage must be considered too.
For example, if we are considering the question of divorce, we cannot simply consider, as liberal thinkers do, the desire of the two parents to free themselves from entanglement and to enter into some other relationship. We must consider the indirect effects on the children and also the indirect effects if the availability of divorce should change the quality of marriage. I do not wish to enter into a debate on this, nor do I want to express a view one way or the other on whether there should or should not be divorce. I only want to reject the concept that in considering matters like divorce one can only consider the immediate effects on the people immediately affected and one has to rule out the impact on what has been called—though the phrase is so constantly used nowadays as to have become virtually derisory—the quality of life.
Having said that, and having rebutted as far as I am concerned those liberal individualistic heresies so characteristic of much of western culture at the present time, the fact remains that when we come to regulate public morality we may not do so by infringing on basic human rights and certainly not by infringing on them in ways that cannot be shown conclusively to be required by the needs of public morality. In any event, in this particular instance we are dealing with how strong is the public morality argument? It has been put in this House by Deputies. We are told that in other countries where there is contraception the quality of life has deteriorated and that immorality is prevalent. But how many of those countries are ones that we can compare with our country and its particular culture? How many of them are characterised by the strong Christian faith of the vast majority in this country? How many of those countries have 85 per cent of their population practising Catholics? It is not clear to me that what has applied in other countries with their cultural traditions has relevance here.
In any event, it is not clear from anything that has been said, or any statistics or any assertions from whichever source and with whatever authority, that the availability of contraceptives has itself been the cause of immorality. That proposition has been put but certainly has not been proven. There is, however, one relevant example we can look to for an indication of the consequences of the free availability of contraceptives in an environment and cultural situation similar to our own. That is, of course, Northern Ireland and particularly the parts of Northern Ireland which have an overwhelming Catholic population and are similar in their religious composition to much of the Republic.
If we look to Northern Ireland and particularly to the Catholic areas there do we see a long history of pastoral letters directed against contraception as dangerous? I have never seen one or heard of one. The first reference I have seen to anything of the kind has only come in this debate during the last couple of months when suddenly some people have woken up to the fact that their case is weak on this account and have started to worry now, rather belatedly, about the quality of life in Northern Ireland. The fact is that in Northern Ireland in general, and above all in those parts of Northern Ireland whose population have a similar religious composition to our own, there does not exist a situation comparable with that in Britain or America or the other countries we have been told to compare ourselves with.
There is a situation in Northern Ireland in which people who want contraceptives can get them but they are not flaunted, there is no effort to affront public morality, there has been no visible significant large scale change in the pattern of human relationships or in the way people behave. There have, of course, been changes similar to those that have occurred here, just as in this part of the country there is a much wider acceptance today of contraception than a couple of years ago. That is also true of those parts in Northern Ireland, but there is no evidence that if in areas similar to our own in cultural composition and similar to our own in the attitudes of the people, if you abolish controls you will get any significant perceptible change caused by that.
We are fortunate, indeed we are unique virtually, in being the only country which in legislating is able to look to somewhere and be confident that the example is one that is relevant because there is nothing inherently different between us and our fellow people in Northern Ireland in this respect. It has been alleged that there are certain differences. I do not accept their relevance.
Two arguments were put forward. The first is that the repression which Catholics have suffered in Northern Ireland for so long has made them staunch in their faith and that we, not having had the benefit of such repression, having been completely free and having been strengthened in our faith, therefore are liable to fall into evil ways which the fortunate Northerners are free from, after 50 years of one-party Protestant Government until a couple of years ago. I find that curious argument—an argument no doubt in favour of having one-party Protestant Government in Catholic areas—one I do not take to and I am not convinced by it. Neither am I convinced by the reverse argument. I simply do not believe that this has fundamentally altered the attitude of Catholics in Northern Ireland or that we are such weak brethren here that we would necessarily react totally differently from the way they do.
It has also been suggested from authoritative sources that the Northerners are more puritanical than we are. I am half Northern and half Southern; I have been accused at times of being puritanical; I am never quite sure whether it is the Southern Catholic or the Northern Presbyterian in me, but I am not sure there is such an enormous difference in attitudes as has been suggested here. I simply do not accept that the people of the Republic are such weaker brethren that they cannot be trusted with the liberties which can easily be given to people in Northern Ireland without dangerous effects.
This argument is one which I reject for a number of reasons. It would seem to argue in favour of Protestant repression, that we are a different kind of people, that Partition runs very deep, indeed, that there are two nations in this country so different that they require totally different legislation to keep them in their place. I reject that. I reject the divisive attitude involved here. We might even say that Partition is the attitude involved. I believe there is one people in this country, though with different subcultures, but I do not see that we ought to legislate in two totally different ways as if we were dealing with two peoples, one African and one Asian or something like that. Whatever differentiation there is between North and South, it does not seem to me to mean that what is tolerable in the North and does no harm will destroy the quality of life down here. The contrast is simply not credible and I do not accept it.
Another argument is put forward and with respect, because I am quoting from it. I must quote my source. I recall several years ago his Eminence, Cardinal Conway, in a radio programme putting forward—I am not quoting verbatim and I hope his Eminence will forgive me if I do not give the full statement—in a few sentences two statements which could broadly be summarised as that there is no need to change the law here because in any event it imposes no hardship because if you want contraceptives you can get them easily; and that a change in our law would be disastrous. I find it hard to accept the logic of those two statements in such juxtaposition. I do not think that the situation is such that a change would be disastrous in that way. I do not think one can argue on both these bases at once.
Let us summarise the facts of our situation. The pill is freely available. It has been said that 40,000 couples need it—Deputy Andrews mentioned that. I made a quick calculation after he said it. I checked the figure out and it seems to me to be roughly correct from information available from other sources, in this instance the evidence of surveys carried out which is in accord with evidence from medical or pharmaceutical sources. Another form of contraception has been freely available to all since time began, that is, coitus interruptus. Nothing we could do or say would change that. Contraceptives can be freely imported as set down in the Supreme Court decision and are being widely pushed.
These are the facts that we have to consider. Yet we are told that a change we make in the law will radically change the whole way of life in this country. If that is to be argued it would have to be shown that at the moment there are restrictions and that the change would involve such a degree of liberalisation that it could have such a big effect. Given the facts I have mentioned and given the controls to be imposed by this legislation, it does not seem to me credible that it would have any really significant effect on our way of life.
We must also consider the fact that the vast majority of our people are practising Roman Catholics—about 85 per cent of them—that we are a people who have traditionally a high standard of sexual morality and that, therefore, we are unlikely suddenly to change our way of life simply because one particular form of contraception became available at points of sale inside the country rather than freely importable. A change involving the legal availability of contraceptives within the State to married people will not change the quality of our life. The quality of life here will change anyway.
I, therefore, am simply unconvinced with the arguments on public morality. They seem to me to have been expressed unconvincingly and at times even hysterically. I do not see enough in the arguments here to justify even contemplating intruding on the basic human rights which have been put forward so effectively in the Supreme Court judgment.
There is another consideration which a democratic Legislature must consider. It is not the only consideration. Human rights and public morality are important considerations —most important—but we must also consider the wishes of the people. It is relevant in legislation to consider them. We are not bound by them; I do not feel as a legislator that I must always look at the latest public opinion poll to see what percentage voted what way. On the other hand, it would be wrong not to have some regard to the wishes of the people, not to try to establish what they want and take it into account unless there are strong contrary indications in such areas as human rights and public morality. It happens that we know a lot about the wishes of our people in this matter. Three surveys of public opinion have been carried out in the course of the present year. These surveys provide cross-checks on each other and all the cross-checks that one can make show a high degree of internal consistency between them. What they indicate is that there is a majority in favour of the availability of contraceptives—the questions put are slightly different in different cases —and that feeling is very strong among married women of the age at which they could have children and is overwhelming among younger married women.
I should like to illustrate that with some actual figures. As regards the population as a whole we have two surveys, the Market Research Bureau survey carried out earlier this year, in the spring, with a random sample of 571. We have the Irish Marketing Survey carried out around the same time with a quota sample of 1,600. The MRB sample excludes people aged under 18 or over 60—it does not cover the whole range of age in the population. For the range it covered it showed 58 per cent in favour of the availability of contraceptives. The question as to whom they should be available is one I shall return to because they went on to ask that question and a very clear picture emerged. The range of variation was from 73 per cent in the 20-24 age group down to 38 per cent in the 55-60 age group. The IMS survey, covering the whole population, showed a figure of 70 per cent for the age group 15-24—very close to the 73 per cent figure for the 20-24 age group in the MRB survey—declining to 30 per cent for the 55-upwards age group, the whole group above that, that is, 30 per cent of everybody over 55 as compared with 38 per cent for the 55-60 age group. The older you get the less the support, but the two sets of figures are very closely comparable.
In regard to married women we have three surveys giving different figures. Taking the MRB and the IMS surveys they show, overall, 54 per cent of married women in the MRB case, in favour of availability of contraceptives and 51 per cent in the IMS survey in favour of availability of contraceptives through chemists—the question was put in more precise terms. Taking individual age ranges for married women of an age likely to have children, up to 44, the MRB service shows 72 per cent in favour and the IMS 68 per cent—again closely comparable. If you take the sub-groups of age you get similar figures. Incidentally I should correct this: when I said MRB I should have referred to the other survey of married women carried out by Mr. Wilson-Davis. The two I am comparing are the Wilson-Davis survey with a random sample of 754 and the IMS survey. If you go through the different age groups you get the same compatibility of figures. It is therefore clear, given the size of samples, the three different surveys and the gross compatibility between the figures that whatever some people may think, or like to think, the facts are that our population as a whole have come to the view that on some basis or another contraceptives should be available: that view is held by the great majority of married women, women of marriageable age, the people most directly affected.
The surveys also tell us something about those to whom contraceptives should be available and on that, from the Wilson-Davis survey there is a very strong view that they should be available only to married people. I do not suggest that view should be compelling with legislators but it is a very strongly held view and legislators should have regard to it in legislating. I want to put the point that the Dáil, subject to other considerations, should have some regard to the wishes of the people and the wishes of the people, so far as they can be established, have been established with more clarity and certainty and consistency than usual and we have information which can guide us in our decision— not the determining factor, but one to take into account, when one has had regard to human rights and public morality.
What about the Churches? All the Protestant Churches have specifically asked the Government to have legislation to make contraception available. The Catholic Church, through their authoritative spokesmen, have opposed this or, to put it more accurately, indicated in their statement last November that their inclination would be towards not making contraception freely available and that they feel the balance of argument on public morality grounds lies in that direction. Our Catholics themselves are divided on the issue. The Wilson-Davis survey of married women showed, in relation to the attitude of Catholic married women to Humanae Vitae that 23 per cent either did not understand it or had no opinion, about 33 per cent agreed with it and 45 per cent disagreed. So, although the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church have a clear preference in the matter of legislation as they have indicated, while leaving the decision entirely to the legislators, the views of the Church in terms of the members of the Church on this issue, at least as far as married women are concerned, are not even on the moral issue—never mind the legal issue— consistent with the views expressed by the leaders of the Church. I do not think that should compel us one way or the other, but it is a point worth noting.
The final consideration which we should take into account in deciding our attitude on this general question before I come to the legislation itself, is the impact of what we do or say, or do not do or say, on the situation in Northern Ireland. It would be wrong to say that this is a major issue in the minds of people there; wrong to say that if we take a particular decision on this Bill or on the broad issue of contraception, that even if we remove all constraint on contraception it would have a significant effect on people's attitude in Northern Ireland or would bring peace there perceptibly nearer. To assert that would be to assert an extravagance. What is, however, clear is that the rejection of access to contraception would tend to confirm hostile views and would have an adverse affect on opinion there. In so far, therefore, as this issue is one that is significant the balance clearly lies with taking action to make contraception available in the Republic in view of opinion in Northern Ireland, although this is a very minor element by comparison with the three other considerations I have put.
To sum up—the Supreme Court has asserted very clearly that the availability of contraceptives for married people, at any rate, is a human right : the public morality argument is a valid one in principle but on the practical facts it does not seem to me to stand up and carry the weight and the burden that is being put on it by those who are pressing it. The people seek a change in the law regarding availability of contraceptives for married people because, as I said, the figures are very compelling. In the Wilson-Davis survey something like 63½ per cent favoured them for married people only, rather more than half wanted them on prescription only while 21½ per cent would be in favour of them only in cases of medical need and only 8 per cent of all the married women concerned thought they should be available to everybody. Admittedly these were the views of married women. The views of single women might be different but it is the one indication we have of the views on the particular point of legislation regarding confining contraceptives to married people. It seems a strong view and had we an indication of opinion over a wider range of women in the child-bearing age groups, it is unlikely that we would have a reversal of that view. It seems fairly clear that there is a strong opinion in favour of the limitation of contraceptives to married people. Whether that is practicable is another question. I am dealing with the question of what people want.
With regard to my fourth point, it is my belief that the rejection of the availability of contraceptives would do damage in so far as Northern Ireland is concerned. Therefore, had there not been the Supreme Court decision and if we were now deciding whether to leave the law as it is or whether to change it, I think the balance of argument would be strongly in favour of change.
I have gone on at some length on that because so many people are still arguing that issue. Although it is not an immediate issue, the counter-argument needed to be put clearly and, I hope, with some cogency. The Supreme Court has taken a decision and we must ask ourselves whether we leave the situation as it is or whether we legislate and, if we legislate, how? It would be undesirable to leave a situation where instead of the availability of contraceptives to married people who consider it necessary to have access to them there would be every incentive for people outside the country, perhaps, in conjunction with people inside the country, to promote contraceptives by way of a direct mail campaign of a kind the Minister for Justice has outlined in this House. That is an undersirable situation. I do not consider it desirable that young people, old people, or unmarried people should be subjected to literature through the post urging them to make use of contraceptives. This is a source of scandal to people and they should be protected from it but legislation is required to afford them that protection. The question is : What kind of legislation?
First, the legislation has to determine through what outlets contraceptives should be made available. It is my opinion that even if the outlets were not restricted the evidence of Northern Ireland suggests the high improbability of serious abuse or public scandal within the country. Nonetheless, there is the evidence of this campaign from outside. Perhaps there would be unscrupulous people here, too. who would seek to publicise contraceptives domestically. Therefore, there is a case for a restriction of outlets and the principle restriction seems to be to chemists' shops. These premises are to be found throughout the country, they are easily accessible and people turn easily to them for other requirements of a medical or cosmetic character.
It has been suggested from the other side of the House that contraceptives should be made available through health clinics. If I understand the suggestion correctly it advocated the setting up of health clinics for this purpose. It would seem an unnecessary complication to begin establishing special clinics for this purpose. The existing availability of clinics is not anything like the availability of chemists' shops so that from the point of view of carrying out the spirit, the intention and the letter of the Supreme Court decision, access through chemists' shops seems to be the more sensible course to adopt. A point one could consider is whether contraceptives might be available also through health clinics. However, to confine them to health clinics would be unduly restrictive and could make it more likely that even the restrictions on sale that we would have then could be overruled by the Supreme Court. However, these are Committee Stage points and I hope this Bill reaches Committee Stage.
The other point is to whom contraceptives should be available. It is argued from the other side of the House that it would be unenforceable to restrict them to married people. I accept that and on the whole I would prefer to have legislation which could be enforceable but there is evidence that our people have a strong preference for confining them to married people. Perhaps our people may not understand fully the difficulty involved in doing this but when we come to legislate in this way we are entitled to take into account what is public opinion. If contraceptives are confined to married people, even if this is not enforceable, the Bill will go some distance towards meeting what appears to be a strongly held view of our people. I do not hold a strong view on this but it is possible to defend the inclusion of this limitation on democratic grounds. May I say that in this controversy a number of people on the liberal side as well as people on the other side have at different points shown not very much regard for the question of democracy. Some of the criticisms of the Bill from the liberal side have suggested that we should have no regard for what people want but that we should give them what liberal opinion thinks they should have. On the conservative side the view seems to be that no matter what people want they should not have it. Our task here, unlike that of the liberal or conservative people, is to try in some way to respond to public opinion. I am not enthusiastic about an unenforceable ban on the sale of contraceptives to other than married people but that reflects public opinion. However, I would not be unduly upset if that particular element of the Bill were to disappear. I would appeal to the other side of the House who are not strongly represented at this moment—I mean in number rather than on the question of calibre——
