On this amendment, before the adjournment, I was pointing out that perhaps there was a trap here for the Minister. I concede fully, as Deputy Esmonde pointed out, that the deferment of the incidence of interest acts as a relief but it does not get away from the fact that in the Bill, under section 2, the tax is levied with effect from 5th April, 1975. If 5th April, 1975 is to be the determining date, the tax on that date is completely indeterminate; it will remain indeterminate and the assessment will remain indeterminate until such time as this Bill becomes law or at least until such time as it has passed both Houses of the Oireachtas. It is only then that one will achieve certainty.
We do not have to prove that proposition any further than to go back on the history of the Bill which preceded this where very substantial modifications were made. Therefore, if the Minister says people made valuations as on that date they have no real basis for making these valuations. One does not know exactly what the incidences will be.
What I am suggesting to the Minister is—I have suggested it in the earlier Bill—that sooner or later in regard to taxation and the intrusion of the Executive on citizens and the abdication of this House of its proper functions as a legislature—as I fear it does abdicate—the courts may be promoted to intervene in a most unexpected way. Thou shall not tempt the Lord thy God, and neither shalt thou tempt the Supreme Court in this case, because the Supreme Court is sovereign in a certain area under our Constitution. One must beware of interpreting the cases and the accepted canons of English law in our set-up beyond a certain point.
I remarked earlier that, up to today anyway, the British Parliament was supreme; it was the single supreme authority; the British courts were therefore subordinate to it and could not question legislation, not even the retrospection of legislation. The judges and the judiciary generally went as far as they possibly could to enforce two principles, (1) to lean against retrospection and (2), to construe taxing statutes in the strictest manner possible.
Here we have another set-up. Here we have a case where our courts are independent and co-sovereign with this Legislature. They are charged specifically with the administration of justice and a situation could develop, if it was provoked, where our courts could legitimately adopt an attitude that would curb this House in its legislation beyond what is currently accepted as being constitutional or unconstitutional.
We must not forget that up to now it has not been necessary for our courts to proceed any further than the English precedents. In deciding the constitutionality or otherwise of a provision, the courts have stayed strictly to the wording of statutes. That was all that was necessary. But if this Parliament abdicates its powers—this is why I questioned to some extent in the earlier Bill the extent of delegation by regulation—or if it acts irresponsibly and, in effect, tyrannically, for whatever motives or anything else the Minister wishes and when I say "the Minister" I do not mean the present incumbent personally, to advance, we must have regard to the fact that it is possible that the courts might intervene. It was in that sense that I said there was a temptation for the courts to intervene.
I should like the Minister to consider the specific case where somebody resorted to the courts on the ground that he was asked to make a return or to make an assessment at a time when there was no necessity for him to be assessed and when, to say the least of it, there was uncertainty of the law and where the whole tenure of legal interpretation and the weight of the courts would lean towards judging the person in the status quo at the date in question.
This may seem a very academic point but at the rate we are going it may develop further and that aspect should be considered. The Minister took the attitude that a person who had assessed his valuation at 5th April might not thank us for extending the date if he found at, say, August 5th, another assessment showed an increased valuation.
Lawyers deal with the case at the moment and tend to forget the one that went before but I should like to remind the Minister of his smiling if not explicit agreement with me when I pointed out to him that on this matter of dates what was lost on one Bill was gained on the other. I do not think the Minister would deny the suggestion that the date would have disadvantages from one point of view but might have advantages from another. In other words, taking any date, provided it is the same date, the requirements of the Wealth Tax Bill, of the Capital Acquisitions Bill and of the Capital Gains Bill would nicely balance themselves so as to ensure that the only safe course was to take the objective one in the middle.
I do not know that there is any great force in the Minister's argument in this. I cannot see why he is adamant on it. Foreseeably, the Minister did hope that his legislation would be through much earlier—that is very patent—because he had hoped that the period from which interest would run would be an earlier date and he has quite properly extended that date. Why does he wish to stick on this date for this year? As Deputy Colley pointed out, it is this year only. I have suggested to him that there is even a risk to him that he might lose the tax in respect of 1975 altogether, whereas if he put the date forward to the date of the passing of the Act even as the first assessment and 5th April ever after, he loses nothing but may gain in security and certainly will conform to more acceptable principles. Why therefore does he object to this? What can he gain by sticking on that date for this year? I am not going so far as to say that the amendment could be adjusted to meet the point of view I am suggesting, but I think it would be a much more proper and safer thing to do. It would ensure that he would get the same tax as early and would not in any way prejudice future years. If that is not a reasonable appeal to the Minister, I would like him to indicate what is unreasonable in the request put in that form.
As I say, this Bill is one of a series, but it has this particular incidence in it. We will have the Capital Acquisitions Bill afterwards, where another problem in regard to date may arise, and I wonder would the Minister rethink and reconsider this, taking this amendment as being something honestly presented to him as an adjustment that the circumstances of the case require. It has taken long to put these Bills through and will take a considerable amount of time, but I do not think the Minister can complain that the attitude of the Opposition has been anything but what that attitude should be. I am not suggesting that the job of the Opposition is to rubber stamp the Minister at every stage. Our job is the process of argument, exactly as two sides in court bring out the truth and the judge decides. In theory, the two sides here, the Minister and the Opposition, bring out the merits and demerits of a particular legislative proposal and the House decides, although the Minister will decide it by the weight of his support. I do not think we have in any way exceeded what an Opposition should do and I confidently hope that the Minister will give due attention to what has been said in favour of the amendment.
