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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 24 Jul 1975

Vol. 284 No. 3

Wealth Tax Bill, 1975: Report Stage (Resumed).

Debate resumed on amendment No. 6:
In page 5, line 21, to delete "ordinarily resident" and to substitute "domiciled".
—(Minister for Finance.)

This is a difficult area because some of the terms are not precisely defined, even if they are clearly understood by lawyers. "Domicile" has not been defined for the purpose of death duties, although it was a very basic ingredient in the determination of liability to death duties. It is a concept of general law. We all take at birth the domicile of our fathers which, incidentally, might not be the country in which one was born. "Domicile" is something which is distinct from either residence or nationality. It involves intent as to where one proposes to dwell, not merely as a runner-in, if I may use the words generally understood in the Irish context, but rather to dwell with the intention of living permanently there.

The amendment helps to clarify the issues very clearly for wealth tax purposes and does it in such a way as, in all probability, will relate to and properly reflect the intention of persons.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 7:

In page 5, line 23, to delete "and ordinarily resident".

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 8:

In page 5, lines 39 and 40, to delete "and limited interest shall be construed accordingly" and to insert "and, for the purposes of subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, property to which a person is beneficially entitled in possession but to which he is not absolutely entitled shall be deemed to produce income and the income shall be deemed to be payable to him or applicable for his benefit and ‘limited interest' shall be construed accordingly".

In the course of the Committee Stage debate on paragraph (b) the question arose whether the paragraph as drafted covered the case where property yielded no income. In other words, could an individual be said to have a limited interest in property that yielded no income? The intention of the paragraph as drafted was that a limited interest could exist, whether or not there was an income. That was the reason that the words "if any" were inserted in line 25. It appears, however, that the insertion of the words "if any" could be said to have precisely the opposite effect, namely, that the paragraph does not apply unless there is income. In order to rectify the position, I propose this amendment which I trust will be acceptable.

I must confess that at present I do not recollect the discussion on Committee Stage on this paragraph to which the Minister referred. I take it from the wording of the amendment, and from what the Minister has said, that the intention is that property shall be artificially deemed to produce an income, even though it is not producing an income and that in addition, that artificial income shall be deemed to be payable to the person who is beneficially entitled, in possession, but not absolutely entitled.

What is produced in this amendment seems, on the face of it, to be an artificial creation in its entirety. It is not quite clear why it is necessary to go so far in deeming a situation to exist which does not exist. Perhaps, when replying, the Minister would briefly recapitulate why he considers it necessary to have a situation in which a person who has property —to which he is beneficially entitled, in possession, not absolutely entitled but is getting no income from it—has to be deemed to be deriving an income therefrom so as to construe him as having a limited interest.

May I just make two short points? First, this "i" in italics has occurred again, instead of the Roman (I), in the amendment. This is another printing error. The printed sheet of amendments shows subparagraph (i) instead of subparagraph (I).

Supplementing Deputy Colley's question, is the Minister simply capitalising a certain income, in a certain case, because he feels the capitalisation involved in the definition of "limited interest" is not sufficient? Is that what the Minister is doing?

He cannot capitalise an income that does not exist.

That is what I am getting at: "shall be deemed to produce income". Is the Minister capitalising notional income? If that is what is involved, is there any limit to the abstractions and notions we are going to import? Like Deputy Colley, I should like to hear what the Minister has to say because I do not understand the matter either.

First of all, I should like to say to Deputy de Valera that there is no printing error.

In subparagraph (i)?

No. It is not a printing error. It is a confusing printing practice. The italic form of the small Roman (i) looks like an "i".

Could we have the same symbol, whatever it is called, in the right place?

It arises out of the practice, in draft legislation, to quote subparagraph references in italics, which is done, no doubt, to arrest our attention. The final print of the Act will be in the Roman script and not in italics.

I am merely making a small point but, if the Minister wishes to make an issue of it, we will bring the matter before a commission of printers and let them decide the matter.

I thought the Deputy thought there was an error and I was making it clear there was not. Talk about dotting the "i's" and crossing the "t's"——

That is our job.

I agree we must try to avoid confusion. There are a number of practices which might be worthwhile looking at, including the practice of not numbering lines in Schedules which I found quite confusing since we had to consider Schedules in such detail. Perhaps we can take it up elsewhere.

A limited interest can exist in a property irrespective of whether it is producing an income. One can have a life interest in painting, jewellery, works of art, precious objects and so on and one does not have to have an income nor is the section deeming that an income has to exist in order to give rise to wealth tax liability. Wealth tax liability arises out of possession of the limited interest irrespective of whether the property may or may not give income to a person holding that interest. That is what the section is saying. It is saying it with greater clarity as a result of the amendment.

It is deemed to produce an income. Perhaps the Minister would refer to lines 47 and 48.

The size of an income is irrelevant to the question of the tax liability arising out of the limited interest.

Is it merely to ensure that in a case of this kind it will come within the definition of a limited interest?

The Minister for Lands was handling this section on Committee Stage and I understand the Opposition made the point that the original draft would not include non-income yielding assets although, in fact, clearly a limited interest could lie in such property. The amendment puts beyond doubt that an interest in such property would create a liability to wealth tax in respect of an interest held.

Presumably the Minister's advisers saw a point in that.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 9:

In page 5, to delete lines 50 to 57 and in page 6, to delete lines 1 to 5 and substitute the following:

"(1) For the purposes of this Act, the property to which an individual is beneficially entitled in possession on a valuation date shall be deemed to include all the property to which the minor children, if any, of the individual is or are beneficially entitled in possession on the valuation date:

Provided that, where both parents of such minor children are living, all the property to which such minor children is or are beneficially entitled in possession shall be deemed to be included in the property to which the male parent is beneficially entitled in possession unless, prior to the valuation date, the Commissioners are notified to the contrary, in writing signed by both parents of such minor children.".

This is the second of three amendments I have put down in order to try to provide in the Bill a framework in which wealth tax can be applied to each individual, that whether that individual be a married woman, a single woman, a separated married woman or a man in any of those categories it would apply equally to them.

Basically, in regard to individuals who are subject to wealth tax the Bill deals with them in three different categories. First, there is the husband living with his wife and her property is deemed to be his property and he is accountable for the tax. Secondly, a widow or widower and, thirdly, a minor child. I am endeavouring with this amendment, taken in conjunction with the other two, one of which we have dealt with, to have the categories concerned consist of a widow or widower, a minor child and any other individual.

This amendment seeks to provide that where it is necessary to aggregate property as in the case of the minor children it will be done in the way set out in the amendment. The Bill provides that the wife's property is aggregated with that of her husband. In my view, it is extremely downgrading to the role of a married woman. There is a problem, admittedly, in the case of minor children because one has to aggregate their property with one or other of the parents. If you are taking them separately you have to decide with which one should it be aggregated. For that reason I suggested in the proviso to the amendment that:

where both parents of such minor children are living, all the property to which such minor children is or are beneficially entitled in possession shall be deemed to be included in the property to which the male parent is beneficially entitled in possession unless, prior to the valuation date, the Commissioners are notified to the contrary, in writing signed by both parents of such minor children.

An agreement such as that, I suggest, gets over the only real administrative difficulty that arises. If one accepts that, then one can go ahead and deal with the individuals, whether it is a husband or wife living together or husband and wife who are separated or single people, each as an individual having the same rights and benefits under the Bill.

The amendment which appears later in regard to the thresholds is tied up with this whole proposal. Basically what I am trying to do is to take out of the Bill this approach which is very much outdated—I would suggest in 1975 it could almost be described as pernicious—under which the married woman is effectively being treated as a chattel of her husband. You get the situation in which if the married woman living with her husband has a good deal of property and the husband has little or none, nevertheless he is the one who is accountable and, therefore, he has to know all about it. He has to know all the ins and outs of it in order to make a return to the Revenue Commissioners. He is the one who is legally held to be liable for the tax. She does not figure in the arrangement at all. She does not exist in the eyes of the Revenue Commissioners except for the purpose of aggregating her property with that of her husband.

There is a further strange anomaly. If the married woman is living with her husband, between them they are allowed an exemption in respect of their principal residence and contents and a threshold of £100,000. If they are separated they are allowed two dwellinghouses and thresholds each of £70,000, making a total of £140,000. All these anomalies I suggest are rising because of this very peculiar and outdated approach embodied in the Bill which effectively disregards the existence of the married woman except, for the purpose of aggregating her property.

I suggest that this amendment, in conjunction with the other two to which I have referred, show that it is possible to deal with the whole problem in this Bill without doing that, that administration does not make that necessary, that the framework of the Bill in this regard can be altered so that individuals can be dealt with in their own rights, whether they are married women living with their husbands or not. If this can be done— and I suggest that these amendments taken together show it can be done— the question that arises is, should it be done? I have no doubt but that it should be done. I do not think the Minister should have any doubt that it should be. I suggest it is intolerable in 1975 for a married woman to be treated as she is in this Bill, merely as a chattel of her husband. It is not necessary from a legal or administrative point of view, so the only question is whether it is desirable or not. On that score I have no doubt at all it is quite undesirable to treat the matter in the way the Bill does. I hope, even at this late stage, that the Minister will acknowledge that this is the wrong way to approach this problem. It is degrading for married women living with their husbands. The matter should be approached in a manner more consonant with what is the more generally accepted view today, not only of the role but of the rights of a married woman, as an individual. That is the important thing to understand. The married woman is entitled, as an individual in her own right, to be treated the same as other individuals. She is not being so treated in the Bill. This amendment is suggesting a way in which she can be treated as an individual in her own right.

There is a well known cartoon which begins with the word "Love". I venture to suggest that an appropriate cartoon would be "Love is sharing". Married life in Ireland is all about sharing.

Love is sharing less.

The Minister is being very sentimental tonight. Now let us talk about the practical effects.

I am very realistic and I do not go, either individually or in my corporate position, for the notion that married life is all about divisions and selfishness. It is sharing, and property is held in all normal, healthy, marriages. It is not split down the middle, or evenly divided between spouses and their children. It is sharing it within the family. This is not peculiar to Ireland.

That is not what the law says.

Europe, within and without the Community acknowledges that property in marriage should be shared and property within marriage is aggregated for tax purposes because that reflects the reality. The thresholds of exemptions for married couples in Ireland, compared with the rest of Europe, will open people's eyes. In Ireland the threshold for a husband and wife is £100,000; in Denmark, £31,500; in Sweden, £19,000; in Germany, £23,000; in the Netherlands, £9,300; in Norway, £7,700; in Finland, £3,600, and in Luxembourg, £1,100. The family home and contents are not exempt. For whom are we displaying love, affection and care? For the husband, the wife and the children——

By taking £40,000 from them.

——and we, therefore, must clearly repudiate the allegations of ill-treatment of or disregard for, the woman in marriage. There is no sex disadvantage in this Bill. It simply says that where property exists within the marriage it should be aggregated. There is many a man who went into a rich woman's house and hung up his hat. You would think that it was always the other way around. But of course that is not the truth either and Deputies know it. I think it is time we got off the "women's lib" bandwagon. Some of you do not look very attractive passengers. That is no disrespect to you, but out of my regard for the women folk for whom I am not supposed to have any affection or interest.

You never know.

Perhaps some of them would welcome the Deputy aboard, but there are those who would not.

First, let me compliment the Minister on his good humour. It is refreshing when we can approach even a serious matter like this in a good humoured way. I was guilty of making some cynical and facetious remarks as the Minister went along on his thesis about the healthy marriage. In effect the Minister is penalising the healthy marriage and providing benefit for the pathological marriage, as I hope to show in a moment.

In all seriousness, what Deputy Colley is saying here, and what we as an Opposition are trying to draw attention to, is that there is an anomaly here which can be avoided. Admittedly it may have a threshold effect in one section. I want to dispose of two things the Minister said in his good humoured concluding remarks. We recognise the generosity of the thresholds. Let there be no mistake about this. He recognises the comparison with other countries, but this is not the point. We are disagreeing with the whole code of taxation and this Bill in particular on a certain principle I need not go over. On this specific question, we feel that even though it possibly involves some increase in the joint thresholds for a married couple, if you care to look at it from the Minister's point of view, the advantages otherwise are outweighed. Remember, the revenue to the Minister is not all that much. All that is involved is 1 per cent of £40,000—£400 in the year, if I have done my sums wrong when I am very apt to do my sums wrong when I am on my feet here. The point is that, as on the first amendment, and I will not delay the House with repetition, if the proprietary rights in the property are separate, why should the taxation not be separate?

Everything that was said on Deputy Colley's amendment No. 3 is germane to this amendment. Following on that premise that those arguments apply there are two parts to this amendment. The first part of the amendment implies—it is a very important implication—that paragraph (a) of subsection (1) is deleted. In fact, it is deleted. That means then that the wife is to be treated as sui juris and separate from her husband for the purposes of property ownership and property taxation. She is already in many ways so treated from the point of view of property ownership. If there is not sharing there is the benefit.

The peculiar consequence of the Minister's position is that, if you have a healthy marriage the threshold is cut by £40,000, plus the house, but if you have a pathological marriage, that is a marriage that has broken down and husband and wife are separated under an order of the Court of competent jurisdiction, or by deed of separation, or separated in circumstances where the separation is likely to be permanent, they have the benefit. The pathological marriage gets the benefit and the healthy one the Minister was extolling a moment ago is, in effect, at a disadvantage. Purposely, in recognition of what the Minister has done with his threshold, I have not used the word “penalty”. I said “disadvantage”.

Let us take the pathological marriage first. Thanks be to God, so far in this country, notwithstanding all our economic ills, one may safely say that the bulk of the community are healthy. That does not mean that we have not got a big problem with the health services for those who are unhealthy. In the same way, where marriage is concerned, we have got to recognise the fact that marriages do break down. I am now going to confine myself to (a) where they are separated under an order of the court of competent jurisdiction or by deed of separation because, on the earlier amendment, I referred to (b) and the possible difficulties inherent in the concept of permanent separation.

Referring specifically to (a) and, incidentially, to (b) where there is a separation and a breakdown, there will again be a benefit under this Bill and there is a direct instigation, therefore, in so far as economic factors are an instigation, towards the resolution of matrimonial problems by such a breakdown. It has not been unknown in history where large amounts of money are involved, and the Minister has been saying that it is only large amounts that are involved here, for artificial situations to have been contrived, where even the healthy sentiments the Minister extolled earlier on are sacrificed for more mundane reasons founded on economic causes. That is the first point. There is an incitement here if there is a disadvantage—I have avoided the word "penalty"—to the healthy marriage. There certainly seems to be a premium put in this Bill in principle on the unhealthy marriage.

Let us now come to a few practical points. No doubt the Revenue Commissioners are like a very experienced medical practitioner; they have heard it all and come across it all before and they know all the diseases to which tax administration is prone. Perhaps the Minister can give me an answer on this as I have not had the opportunity of looking it up from a legal point of view. As regards section 1, paragraph (a)—I have already spoken about paragraph (b)—and amendment No. 3, if two people are separated by order of the court or by a deed of separation the primary purpose of either the order or the deed is to legitimise or, rather, neutralise the conjugal rights of both partners and at the same time, if necessary, restrain one from molesting the other if the situation calls for that. So far as I know—let me be corrected if I am wrong—if the two separated partners have no particular objection the court does not say they must not meet one another and neither does the deed of separation.

This could raise an interesting situation in this modern, liberal world where people are less concerned with the conventions of the past. In fact, apart from being a disincentive to matrimony at all, legislation of this nature, plus the current trends, appears to have the one and only purpose of legitimising children and even that is, unfortunately, apparently becoming of less importance than it used to be. With that almost as the sole counterpart, for anybody with property who is affected in this way, a division of the property through either the avoidance of a formal marriage or connivance by getting relevant deeds or orders of the court and thereafter exercising the free human consent could give rise to an interesting situation. I do not know how this would appear in a constitutional case with regard to human rights.

We had a very interesting one that led to a rather surprising perambulation of the Taoiseach in this Chamber on one occasion arising from somewhat similar causes. I am wondering whether, just for the sake of recognising what the facts are, we are not wandering down the leafy lane of legal uncertainty. This may seem farfetched. Nevertheless, I say it in all seriousness even though I follow the Minister in the cheerful tone, which I am glad he adopted, when he was dealing with this.

I am old-fashioned enough to feel the dangers of these things. I am social enough to be worried about the consequences of provisions in a Bill like that in particular circumstances affecting the very class that might be prone to this kind of thing. I do not know if "moral" is the word to use, but "social" certainly is the word to use. Apart from the property aspect which we dealt with on the earlier amendment, there is a trend which will follow from the fact that the wife and husband are being integrated at a disadvantage. If they are separated, or if you avoid the legitimate relationship, by device or otherwise, this Bill will favour such a situation. For that reason I support the first part of Deputy Colley's amendment, namely the deletion.

As regards Deputy Colley's amendment, the Minister might accuse him of being liberal and I might accuse him of being "a chauvinistic what" because he is giving the custody prima facie and in the first instance to the male. Even Deputy Colley prefers the male in this amendment.

We have to take one or the other and I do not mind which.

If the Minister said that was an argument for treating them as one I would not blame him. If female was written in instead of male it would have precisely the same effect. Perhaps my little joke misfired. In all seriousness I say to the Minister that we are dealing with a taxation Bill and the property of the married parties is separate and should be taxed separately. If the Bill remains as it is—we will come back to this on the other appropriate amendment and on the threshold— there is a disadvantage for the healthy marriage and an incentive towards the pathological. Frankly we should try to avoid that at all costs. If the cost is to be, in this particular case, to increase the threshold by the amount I have said, socially it would be worth it. In saying this, let me be generous to the Minister if not only just. The thresholds, particularly in the Capital Acquisition Bill, and the thresholds in this Bill are, to my mind, generous enough.

I have two qualifications to that statement and they are made in the spirit of friendliness. One is the whole question of our approach to this Bill on the question of productive assets and the other is the doubt about inflation and the feeling that an automatic compensator should be in the Bill. We discussed that earlier and I would be going outside the terms of this amendment if I were to discuss it again now. I hope these are reasonable arguments, and reasonable alternative points of view, even if they are contrary to the Ministers point of view. Making them does not debar me from recognising the merits of what the Minister has done. I would like to assure him that we are only too willing to acknowledge and recognise these merits.

If we try to keep to our muttons here, these merits are not to be pleaded where they are not directly relevant to the arguments we are making. The relative measures and the generosity of the thresholds are not really at issue in this argument except in so far as the cost of the increase to the Exchequer might be relevant. Weighing the social and the other arguments, I would strongly submit to the Minister the view that the cost would be worth the result.

The Minister was extolling his own approach, as outlined in the Bill, to a healthy marriage as that of loving care.

I said love is sharing.

Later on he said his attitude was one of loving care to the healthy marriage. You can measure the extent of that loving care. It is £40,000 plus a house plus its contents taken away from the healthy marriage. That is the measure of the loving care being displayed by the Minister in this Bill. That is the built-in advantage in this Bill to a separated couple.

Is the Deputy suggesting that both husband and wife should have separate houses?

I am suggesting that the Minister is providing that if they are separated, that is what they can have— two houses, and contents, and £40,000 more, and be taxed in the same way as the couple who are living together. That is what the Bill says.

They would not have love in that situation.

True, but the Minister seems to be taxing love very hard in this Bill.

That is the price of love.

It is priceless.

Deputy de Valera has opened up a very interesting avenue in his reference to paragraph (b) of the definition section in regard to separation. For people who have considerable wealth it might well be worth their while to have a deed of separation executed if it meant exemption of another £40,000 and another house and its contents. It could be well worth their while to do it although they might not, in fact, be separated.

None of these problems would arise at all if the Minister would approach it in the way we are seeking to get him to approach it in this amendment. It is true that the thresholds to which Deputy de Valera referred in this Bill are generous, subject to the reservations he expressed about no provision for inflation and the taxation of productive assets. In our circumstances they are high. I do not accept the Minister's comparison with thresholds in other countries, because, as I said earlier, it is not possible to make a comparison unless one can compare the overall effect such as other taxation rates, and, in the case of wealth taxes where they exist in other countries, the rate of tax. Deputy Brugha spoke about this earlier and seemed to demonstrate that in most European countries the rate is lower than here. We should also compare the structure of the tax in so far as the items to which it is applied are different. There is in one case, maybe in others, a method of valuation of property which produces quite a different result from what one gets here. Comparisons of this kind do not appear to be very useful.

As Deputy de Valera said, that is not really the point at issue here, nor is the point at issue merely one of the position of those who will be affected by wealth tax. There is much more involved in it than this. What is really involved is the basic approach of this Legislature to the role of the married woman in 1975. In my view, the provisions of this Bill are degrading to married women, whether they are affected by wealth tax or not, or whether their husbands are affected by wealth tax or not. An approach which sets out in legislation passed by this House in 1975 that the woman is to be ignored except for the purpose of taking her wealth and aggregating it with that of her husband and making him liable fully for all tax on it, plus accounting for all the details of it seems is something that should not be done. This House I would hope in this year would have advanced sufficiently not to approach the role of the married woman in that way. Unfortunately, that is what the Bill is doing.

This amendment and the other two which are tied in with it although not formally under our rules of order but taken together, provide the framework in which an alternative approach to the one in the Bill could be implemented. It is possible to approach this matter differently. There is no insurmountable problem from a legal or an administrative point of view. I stated, in regard to this matter on an earlier Stage, and the Minister did not contradict me, that I believe that the possible loss of revenue involved, as far as the Exchequer is concerned, cannot be very great, especially having regard to the fact that the total amount of revenue involved is not likely to be very great anyway. The amount of revenue that would be involved in approaching the matter on the basis of treating a married woman as an individual in her own right cannot be great.

This is a new Bill for a new tax. The Minister is not bound in any way by previous legislation or by considerations of loss of revenue. He has a free hand here in a way that is not often available to a Minister for Finance in a matter of this kind. He has a free hand to do the job right, but instead of that he is adopting an approach which one can find in legislation that was passed in the last century in a number of countries and in the earlier part of this century in other countries. Whatever may have been the view of that legislation and its approach to the role of the married woman at that time, surely, it cannot be contended today here that this Bill represents the approach of Dáil Éireann to the role of the married woman. I do not believe it does or that it is necessary because of legal or administrative problems. It is possible to do this in a way that will treat a married woman as an individual in her own right. This is basically what I am concerned with as distinct from the anomalies that are arising—I am concerned about them also—but basically I am concerned that the married woman with or without property, coming under the wealth tax or not, should as far as this House can do it in legislation it passes from now on, be recognised as an individual in her own right, having the same rights as her husband, as single women, as separated married women or separated married men.

That is not an unreasonable propostion. I would have thought that the justice of it was self-evident, but, unfortunately, so far the Minister has not indicated that he is even conscious of the enormity of what he is perpetrating in this Bill in regard to married women. I do not wish to delay this debate unduly. It is clear from what the Minister said that he is not prepared to accept this amendment but there will be one further bite at this cherry in a later amendment. I can only express the hope that between now and the time we reach that amendment the Minister will think a little further about the matter and recognise that his approach should be different. I hope he will recognise that it can be different, with no great difficulty, that if it is not different when this Bill is finally enacted, he and his colleagues will stand convicted of, at the very least, a totally Victorian approach to the role of the married woman in our society in 1975.

Amendment put and declared lost.

Amendments Nos. 10 and 11 are cognate and I suggest we take them together.

I move amendment No. 10:

In page 7, between lines 33 and 34, to insert the following:—

(4) Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioners that property comprised in a discretionary trust on the 5th day of April, 1975, was transferred to an individual on or before the 4th day of April, 1976, that property shall be deemed to be the property to which the individual was entitled in possession on the 5th day of April, 1975, and section 3 shall, in lieu of subsection (1), apply to such property.

The object of these two amendments is to provide a reasonable time for taxpayers to adjust their affairs in the light of the legislation being enacted in regard to capital taxation. This is particularly relevant in the case of this Bill where, as we demonstrated earlier today, the Government in their White Paper clearly indicated that the wealth tax was not to be implemented until 5th April next.

In other words, that the first valuation date under the Wealth Tax Bill was to be in the tax year 1975-76, whereas the first valuation date under the Bill is in the year 1974-75. Therefore, this Bill, and this wealth tax, are being brought in a year earlier than was indicated in the White Paper. Consequently, no reasonable opportunity is being given to people to rearrange their affairs in accordance with law. Nor indeed is any opportunity being given to their professional advisers to study the law and advise them. Nobody, not even the Minister, can say, at this stage what the ultimate version of the capital taxation measures the Government propose will be. Certainly nobody apart from the Minister can say with any certainty what will be the provisions of this or any of the other Bills until they are enacted.

There is no reason why people should not be given the opportunity to study the law, as enacted, and arrange their affairs in accordance with that law, subject to the exceptions that the Minister was obliged to announce in the White Paper in regard to certain aspects of capital gains tax and gifts where, in effect, the legislation is leading back to the date of publication of the White Paper, 28th February, 1974. But, subject to that exception, I would suggest that there is no good reason why the taxpayers concerned and their professional advisers should not be given an opportunity to consider the law and its implications.

It should be remembered that in so far as people have their affairs arranged in a particular way at present, unscrambling that—it may be necessary for some people in the light of the new provisions which will be enacted—may mean legal costs; in some cases stamp duty, capital gains tax and, in other cases, perhaps gift tax as a liability arising out of that unscrambling. The fact that some, say, discretionary trusts, or, indeed, private non-trading companies, may have been used as a vehicle to avoid death duties does not, in my view, mean that the people concerned have no rights because anything that was done by them was done within the law. Secondly, we have established in the course of the passage of this Bill that, in the case of discretionary trusts, quite a number were set up for perfectly legitimate reasons having nothing to do with any form of tax avoidance whether death duties or income tax. Indeed, provision is made in the Bill now to cover such cases. That being so, it seems to me that such persons are at least entitled to take what was said in the White Paper, to rely on it. That White Paper indicated quite clearly, on pages 45 and 60 that wealth tax would operate, most likely on the 5th April, 1976 as the first valuation date. I do not think it is reasonable to bring in the wealth tax a year earlier and to make no provision at all for such persons to have an opportunity of re-arranging their affairs, in the light of the new legislation. To provide, as is the position at present that such persons, if they do re-arrange their affairs, will automatically become liable to various expenses, and in some cases various taxes such as are provided for in this Bill and other Bills, is unreasonable.

Therefore, I urge the Minister to accept the proposition involved in these two amendments, to the effect that where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Revenue Commissioners that property comprised in discretionary trust on 5th April, 1975, or, indeed, in a private non-trading company on that date—where that was transferred to an individual on or before the 4th April next—it should be deemed to be the property of that individual and taxed accordingly. In fact, I believe there ought to be provisions which would exempt such persons from the kinds of liability I have indicated in the event of their unscrambling their affairs in that way. But that is not provided for in this amendment. I am just mentioning it in passing. Primarily, what is provided for in this amendment, and the subsequent one we are discussing with it, is the opportunity for persons to re-arrange their affairs so that the property that might be comprised in a discretionary trust or a private non-trading company, could be transferred to the individual concerned. If that is done, it does not mean that such persons will be exempt from wealth tax. It does mean that they would get the benefit of the thresholds provided in the Bill for other individuals.

Whatever case that might be made by the Minister in resisting these amendments could be made only with reason and logic, if an earlier amendment of ours to operate the wealth tax, as indicated in the White Paper with the first valuation date occurring on the 5th April next, had been accepted. Had that been accepted, then I could see the Minister could have a good, reasonable case for resisting these amendments and I would not be pressing them. But that amendment was not accepted and in my view makes the acceptance of these all the more necessary and desirable. I urge the Minister to give serious consideration to the implications of what is involved in non-acceptance.

Let me just add to what Deputy Colley has said. Some people—to use Deputy Colley's phrase —who will have unscrambled earlier will I think get the benefit of the thresholds. Notice was given in the White Paper. Either for bona fide reasons or, perhaps, through inadvertence, some people will be caught and miss out on the threshold here. Common fairness suggests that something on the lines of this amendment should be accepted.

I do not wish to accuse the Minister or the Revenue Commissioners of unworthy motives, but we have to be on our guard here in the House against anything that would savour of a punitive measure. Admittedly, the devise —whether of discretionary trusts or a non-trading company—was used for tax evasion purposes. Nevertheless, when they were used they were used quite legitimately and lawfully for these purposes or they would not have got away with it. I feel there is a certain danger that we might approach this on the basis: "Ah, ha, now we will give them a rap." I am not imputing such a motive either to the Minister or his advisers, but it is now before us in the House. It is quite possible that that motive would be imputed to us in the House. Very little is going to be gained. Vindictiveness or getting one's own back plays no part whatsoever in approach to our legislation. We are big enough to rise above that. I would commend the amendment to the Minister with such thoughts, again reiterating that there is no imputation of motive. I am simply speaking as a Member of the House who is asked to judge on the merits of this amendment. The quality of mercy should not be strained when it is unnecessary to strain it. Perhaps it would be very appropriate to accede to Deputy Colley's request in this case.

Whatever about being tempted to do so, I would think the temptation is dissipated when I am told yet again that the White Paper said what it did not say. The White Paper said in the clearest possible language that the wealth tax would operate from April, 1975.

April 6th.

No other notion struck the greatest genius, tax avoidance genius or anybody else, until the debate began in this House. Then it suddenly struck somebody——

The Minister was not here for the earlier analysis of the White Paper.

I know all about it. I think it is the greatest nonsense. If it had struck people they would not have been coming to me during 1974 asking to have legislation brought in earlier because the tax was going to operate from 1975 and they wanted to know where they stood before April, 1975.

Did the Minister not read the submissions?

It was only after that that some bright geniuses came along and thought they could twist this language and transfer 1975 into 1976. They thought if they could put this off until the Christmas session of the Dáil they would be in an even stronger position to argue that it should be 1976. The Opposition have said on many an occasion throughout this debate that some point was worthy only——

I do not think the Minister was here when we discussed this rather fully today. Does he want it all again?

No, I do not, but I know well what the Minister for Lands said in my absence because we discussed beforehand the line we would take. The record and the White Paper will speak and so will all the representations that I have received over the last year. There was only one understanding, that was April, 1975. We made it perfectly clear that estate duty would go only when we were ready to bring in the wealth tax. That was always the argument and that is what we have stuck to. Let us leave that nonsense aside. The argument of the Opposition is not worthy even of their low estimate of the intelligence of the L and H society which I regard highly.

On the issue of this particular proposal I would say the following. The point is academic for any persons whose assets exceed £100,000. It does not matter whether they are held in a discretionary trust or by a private non-trading company. They will be caught anyway. If their wealth exceeds £100,000 they will be caught whether they hold it personally, or whether it is in a discretionary trust or in a private non-trading company. Secondly, the amendments affect only those cases where the individuals interested in these entities would not themselves be liable to tax. In such cases not all persons would be in a position to unscramble the discretionary trusts or companies, and if the concession were to be given to those who could do it they would be treated more favourably than those who could not and that would not be fair.

The worst that could be said is that some people might have to pay the tax once, that is in respect of 5th April, 1975, but such people had fair warning. The White Paper was published on 28th February, 1974. They had plenty of time to contemplate their position. It is a strange business indeed when the House is asked to compensate for imprudence. If people think that the prudent thing now to do is to unscramble their discretionary trusts or companies they ought to have exercised that prudence long ago. They received plenty of warning because the White Paper gave the date on which it would come into operation and that was 1975. Do not let anybody waste time arguing otherwise. As Deputy Fitzpatrick, the Minister for Lands, pointed out, international commentators and experts on wealth tax in their book "Annual Wealth Tax" have observed, and this includes the deputy chairman of the Revenue Commissioners in Britain, that the Irish wealth tax would be operative from April, 1975.

Debate adjourned.
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