Earlier the Minister conceded the giving of a warrant to an authorised officer. In a criminal proceeding the principle would have been that, before my house could be searched or my property could be confiscated by the police, a warrant would have to be secured. That warrant would have to show cause as to why this was necessary. Here we will have the Revenue Commissioners' authorised officers going in on a general warrant and nobody is to know whether there is cause for this or not.
I want to mention something which might be a sobering thought. It is a well-known fact that legislation dealing with driving tests has induced widespread suspicion among the public as to the bona fides of procedures and the integrity of the system. We are now going to legislate and put something into our revenue law that will have a similar effect. For obvious reasons I will not spell out the details, but the way the Minister is going, sooner or later it will be necessary to spell them out. I am approaching this case from the point of view of the good name and the undoubted untarnished reputation of our tax gathering and revenue administering system and organisation.
If we put legislation like this on the record we are going a step further. This is something the Minister has been consistently doing, that is, passing his own responsibility for making decisions, and the odium for these responsibilities, back to an agency that has served this State well, an agency which over the years has been conspicuous, as anybody who has examined the accounts of this country or had anything to do with the Committee of Public Accounts will recognise, and outstanding as a model of the public service both in integrity and efficiency.
The return per pound from tax collected by the Revenue Commissioners over the years has been, until recent burdens were accumulated and thrown upon them, extraordinarily good. To put it another way: the net return to the Exchequer, after you take the money collected and the expense in collecting it, has been very high. I have taken that in conjunction with integrity.
A Leas-Cheann Comhairle, it may appear that I am wandering from the point and perhaps I am, but those two facts have a bearing on this section in this way. Firstly, its mechanisms and provisions of power, on the surface may seem to be arbitrary and without the protection which the custodians and guardians of the law have in normal procedures. They are not here. We are bringing about a situation where more and more, following on the Minister's attitude, the Revenue Commissioners eventually will be in a position in the eyes of the public comparable with the legendary position of the publican in the New Testament. That is a very serious matter. In the long run it can only bring disastrous consequences for all concerned. That is the relevance of my first point dealing with integrity.
The relevance of the second point is that the more one multiplies these procedures the more staff will be required, the more administrative expense will occur and will have to be paid out of revenue collected, and the net return of the Revenue Commissioners per pound will fall. I am aware, as chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts, of many of the difficulties facing the Revenue Commissioners and their officers in collecting revenue in certain Departments through the fact that mechanisms and demands for taxation have been imposed on them and they have been left with the responsibility of collecting them. I know that that is a serious enough problem for them to consider. Indeed, I can very well see and sympathise that some of the present pressure about tax evasion may stem from just that situation. My point is that this section is not going to help, that we are getting lost and the Minister is getting lost in an obsession that perhaps one or two errors might occur and that they must be caught.
The Minister has been preaching about equality of taxation. That is all very fine but that is not what he will achieve. What he is achieving is expense to the community, a diminishing net return to the Exchequer, the creation of a monstrous organisation where before there was model efficiency, the destruction of the confidence of the public and consequently, the loss of any degree of co-operation there was in the system, particularly for the Revenue Commissioners. All these things I regard as extremely serious.
On another section the Minister talked about social and political consequences and tried to suggest that political and social disturbances in other countries are largely attributable to taxation inequality. May I quarrel with the word "inequality" and say "taxation imposition"? The more taxes are imposed in this way and the more people are bound with unproductive taxation, the more the revenue authorities are put in the position of being agents for an unproductive system which in the end is basically unfair to all taxpayers, a system that is introducing friction and destroying mechanisms that should work. This is what we have to contend with. This section has all the elements and is characteristic of this as it stands. I would ask the Minister to seriously reflect on the consequences.
I have talked about general public consequences. Let me talk about the economic consequences of this section if passed. The Minister, in company with certain other elements in the community seems to have completely forgotten that economic activity, prosperity, the maintenance of standards of living, even the provision of the wherewithal to live, depends on productive and useful economic activity and is not a product of academic or literary efforts, or of administrative provisions, or of accountancy, law or anything else. We have got our priorities wrong. Accountancy, law, revenue and the State service itself are auxiliary and ancillary to, and depend utterly upon a basic economic activity that support it.
The Minister is in a jam today. He may get the plaudits of administrative staffs in public as well as in private for his wonderful efforts, but basically the country is in the state it is in today—and it is well known what state it is in—because the Minister and the Government have failed to realise that all this is supported by economic activity. I am not wandering when I say this because I want to show the impact of the section.
This section is bad enough at present. I can assure the Minister from personal experience—and anybody who is engaged in any kind of productive activity other than one of these service auxiliary jobs, whether as employee or employer, manager or worker, will realise it—that the effect of this administrative burden that is coming upon the community from all angles is that everybody's time is being absorbed in this kind of work and in preventing problems arising. As a result of this, productive work is suffering. When this is done, what will be the effect? Everybody in business, whether retail or productive, is going to be very concerned that anybody can walk in—and the Minister conceded me a general warrant earlier— and demand not only the production of what you might call regular books but can demand documents, correspondence, and carry out a general search. They could even search a manager's pockets under the terms of this section.
What is the practical effect of that going to be? First of all, it will stifle all activity because there will be an immediate reaction to deal with a section like that. Even a company's auditors, statutorily appointed under the Companies Acts by the shareholders of a company, cannot walk in and do that. They can see the authorised books of account. Their function is to see that accounts are adequate and sufficient. They can see the minute book of the company, ledgers, various contract documents, wage records and things like that. But under this section the Revenue Commissioners can come in and inspect even correspondence dealing with a tentative contract or negotiation. Are we going to create a dictatorship which can do practically anything it likes economically in this way and force that dictatorship on a people who do not want it? If the Minister goes on like that, let us appoint a revenue minister, a minister who will take public responsibility. Let us pass simple legislation to put the public responsibility in the hands of the Revenue Commissioners and cut out the farce of putting the responsibility on this House. That is the logic of it and, of course, it is a reductio ad absurdum.
The effect of this section is going to be not only stifling but positively conducive to two most undesirable things: first of all, the adjustment of all accounting, all management, to the requirements of this section. Talk about tax evasion; you will be creating the temptation and atmosphere for a massive concentration on methods of tax evasion that will require an army of administrators to cope with. You are already starting your fraud squads. It will not be squads, it will not be platoons, it will not be battalions, it will be divisions you will want of them before you are finished with this kind of legislation.
A day of reckoning will come. Again it was not I but the Minister who talked about political and social consequences in other places and other countries. The complete abdication of the Minister to points dealing with tax evasion, his obsession with this, will have the most disastrous effects along lines like this. While the Revenue Commissioners are being gradually put in an intolerable position— because this is what will result from it —the whole economic fabric will be further disrupted and destroyed.
The second consequence of this is that you will have to legislate—and you will not get reciprocal tax agreement on this—for where documents are kept and where they are not kept. The stage will be reached when an authorised officer will have to be sent along with every negotiator from the country, because he is going to go out of the country, carry out the business, keep the books elsewhere and only keep certain things at home. You cannot beat that unless you send an officer out with him and have him present at his negotiations and what he is doing outside the country.
The Minister may smile, but the Minister smiled when we talked about his deficits. The Minister smiled when we talked about his borrowing. The Minister smiled when we talked about what was going to happen inflation and employment. The Minister stopped his smile when he went out appealing to the unions for restraint, appealing to the public, and then finally the Minister abdicates and surrenders his whole function to an organ of State set up by the House, the Labour Court. Incidentally, who is going to examine the accounts of the State. For instance, in this, can an authorised officer, authorised by somebody else to carry out Government policy, go in and examine the Revenue Commissioners themselves? Will some other Minister or maybe the Taoiseach bring in that?
This is where we are going, and if my language seems extravagant and if I seem vehement today, it is to warn against the dangers that this is gradually sliding us into. If I use graphic and perhaps over-graphic descriptions, it is in a very earnest desire to impress upon the Minister that proportions are being lost sight of. Coping with tax evasion is something with which we fully agree, and we have always wanted to give the Revenue Commissioners discretion in this regard. The only occasion on which I demurred against this principle was when I felt they were being asked to be judges in their own case, which is not fair to anybody.
Again, that has a very big bearing on the approach here. It was being urged on the Minister to give a discretion in a certain case and it was remarked that I did not support it. I think I said silence might be more eloquent. In face of this section maybe I should give my reason for that remark. The remark was precisely this, that it would be grossly unfair to impose that discretion on them in that case. The imposition of this responsibility—because in the last analysis it is a responsibility, not a privilege—may seem to the man in the field a help, but let the thinking top staff look at it—and I think they will—and it might be a chalice that they might prefer to have pass.
This is what is in this section and in the whole Bill, and with the greatest sympathy for much here, I earnestly ask the Minister to reconsider what is being done here. It would be much better to have a special squad in the Garda Síochána to whom these things could be referred than to turn the Revenue Commissioners into a police agency and a secret police agency at that.
I know what the Minister is trying to get at here in this section. I know that books can be "cooked". I know that partial information can be given. I can well understand the frustration of an inspector or anybody dealing with these matters who has circumstantial evidence for believing that somebody is getting away with something substantial. Incidentally, in fairness to the Revenue Commissioners it must be remarked in passing that they have always been most reasonable and sensible in dealing with matters that were not serious, if you know what I mean. They could take a very sensible view of things. In other words, they would not spend £100 to get a halfpenny or they would not upset the whole apple cart because one apple was a little bit off; nor would they cut off a nose to spite a face.
I am quite ready, therefore, to accept that the intention of this is governing substantial cases. The intention is to deal with cases where there is turpitude and malice—I use the word "malice" in its legal sense—and, using the words of another Act, something that is material. There is, in other words, gravamen. Now, although I may have been a bit hard on the Minister, I want him to accept from me that what I have said I have said objectively. I do not want him for a moment to think that what I have said is meant in any petty sense.
Consider those cases then. If you have a situation of that nature it will be clear and you will want more circumscription. You must approach this very much in the spirit in which one has to approach criminal law because, in effect, Revenue law is becoming criminal law. There are two well-known facets of a well-known principle in criminal law: everyone is innocent until proved guilty and the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.