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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 27 May 1976

Vol. 291 No. 3

Family Home Protection Bill, 1976: Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

The family as a unit is the basis of our society, and any legislation to protect the family must be welcomed and supported. Therefore, I welcome this Bill as introduced by the Minister and compliment him on introducing yet another measure which is designed not only to afford greater protection, security and shelter, to one or other of the spouses but also, perhaps, to conserve happiness and ensure that the family home will always be looked upon even as a refuge, especially for the children.

Sometimes we in this country adopt the attitude that some of these problems do not exist. I think the Minister is right in extending the number of reforms he has brought in to protect the family and to protect the status of the individual, and he is to be congratulated on the tremendous efforts he has made in his field.

One of the great difficulties about Irish life is that everybody is very much concerned about what the neighbours think. If there is a row in an Irish family home it is more likely to have a regime of silence rather than the continental form where the participants screech and shout and toss things at each other, and they do not particularly mind whether the neighbours or the people on the street enjoy the spectacle. Consequently, it is sometimes very difficult in this country for anyone who is empowered by law to intervene to see that there is difficulty. I was interested in the remark by Deputy de Valera this morning that there was a danger that some sections of this Bill might encourage people to cohabit. I am inclined to agree with the views expressed by Deputy Kelly that people who get married do not think of the gloomier days that may very well crop up. Therefore, I think the amount of protection the Minister is affording in this Bill is adequate.

It is unfortunate that so many unions seem to fall on rough times, but it is still more unfortunate if, as happens, human nature being what it is, people get very much entrenched in their attitudes and in their hatred, perhaps; it is not a nice term, but it applies in many cases. I see this measure as ensuring that a spouse who may be careless about his or her responsibilities towards the other spouse and towards the family will be constrained by the provisions of this Bill. This Bill also affords a considerable amount of protection for the wife and, in some cases, for the husband, where a husband marries into property or a homestead, and also protection for the children.

This Bill is necessary in a changing society. We cannot bury our heads in the sand and think that the 'seventies will not touch the mode of life in our country. It is sad to hear of family rows and cases even where wedding presents are disposed of and not given to the partner to whom they were originally presented. The Bill should ensure that people will take a more thoughtful and more positive view of the situation and will not be able to treat family squabbles as lightly as some people have treated them in the past.

I particularly welcome section 11 of the Bill which gives a spouse the right to register with the Land Registry the fact that he or she is a spouse of the registered owner. That provision will give added protection. I would like also to refer to section 10 (6) which provides:

Proceedings under this Act shall be conducted in a summary manner and shall be heard otherwise than in public.

Then subsection 7 reads:

(7) Proceedings in the High Court and the Circuit Court under this Act shall be heard in chambers.

I am not a legal luminary, and I suppose that is just legal terminology, and that the two subsections mean the same thing on different levels.

Although this Bill is quite small, it has aroused considerable interest throughout the country. It gives tremendous security to a lot of people whose spouses when perhaps a little inebriated lay down the law on who owns what. It gives the other spouse that modicum of security. We would all like to think that Christian ethics and standards will always prevail but sometimes they are overlooked and this Bill will ensure that in such cases justice will be done by the family, and that as far as the State is concerned the minimum amount of hardship will be imposed on the husband, the wife or the children.

I thank Deputies from all sides for their welcome for the principle of the Bill, and for their analysis of it and criticisms of part of it. All these things are necessary so that we can have a fully rounded debate and to ensure that when we come to Committee Stage a lot of the preliminary teasing-out processes will have been started.

This Bill is intended to end the abuse of vindictive sales by husbands over the heads of their wives and dependent children. The principle of the Bill was welcomed generally. Some Deputies felt that the method adopted by the Bill for ending this abuse was somehow inferior to procedure whereby joint ownership would become compulsory. I am in favour of voluntary joint ownership. There is a section in the Bill whereby the State waives its rights to take stamp duty on transfers into joint ownership between spouses, and also waives land registry fees in the case of the land registry dealing with such transfers. That is a clear indication of my attitude towards the concept of joint ownership. I think it is ideal, but only when it is voluntary. I am not in favour of compulsory joint ownership.

Deputy Callanan and Deputy Mrs. Desmond both advocated joint ownership as being a preferential mechanism for securing what the Bill wants to secure. In another jurisdiction where they had the means for investigating these law reform measures in some detail, it took many years to investigate this question of compulsory joint ownership and the question still is to some extent an open one and the problems that were found in that jurisdiction are equally present here. There could also be a constitutional difficulty in relation to compulsory joint ownership.

Deputy Andrews raised the constitutional issue in regard to what is proposed in the Bill by asking if it would represent an invasion of the right to private property given by the Constitution. I have no doubt that it does not. The right to private property is very much qualified by references to the common good. It is not an absolute right, it is a qualified right. I was supported in this view by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, Deputy John Kelly, whose expertise in that area is well known. If we must look further than Article 43, which deals with private property, we will find, in the Articles dealing with the family, even more arguments to support my contention that the Bill is constitutional. That is not to say that a constitutional question might not arise if compulsory joint ownership were proposed, because this would be a very serious interference with the right to private property. It would be an interference under the guise of the common good and benefit of the family. It would be a blanket interference, whereas, under the Bill, if there is an interference with a husband's right to alienate his property, that right can only be exercised where there is a family situation that merits this interference, and in each individual case the common good or the greater good of others can be specifically pointed to. Compulsory joint ownership would give rise to a number of technical difficulties. One of its consequences in the event of a dispute is that it involves the tedious, expensive and quite difficult necessity of a partition suit. This would involve the parties in a very difficult legal area. That is obviated in the present situation. No case has been made at this stage that would convince me that compulsory joint ownership is preferable to what is proposed in the Bill.

I understand that the number of dealings in the land registry in respect of new houses shows a very high proportion as being in joint ownership. This is a desirable and a good thing. At the moment we should only go so far as to encourage voluntary joint ownership. It has been suggested that joint ownership would solve the problem of the wife who is left with the responsibility for mortgage payments and would preserve her security of tenure. This is a misunderstanding of the position because even if she were a joint owner she would not be likely to be in a stronger position to remain in possession than she is under this Bill because the strength of her position depends on her ability to procure funds to meet the liability under the mortgage. It is not an answer to say that that problem would not arise if there were compulsory joint ownership. It could just as easily arise.

Deputy Andrews raised the question of whether the provisions of the Bill would in some way inhibit lenders of mortgage money. I do not think so, because one thing that a mortgagee does not want to do is to have to realise his security and to have what is commonly known as a sheriff's sale. He wants to get back his money with the appropriate interest and he would much rather get it back over a longer period by instalments than be forced into a situation of having to sell the security. The Bill enables a married woman whose husband has defaulted on mortgage payments or rent to stand in his place and to take over responsibility for the mortgage repayments or the rent. If she is not in a position to do that a system of compulsory joint ownership will not help her. At this stage it would not be proper to introduce into any legislation any measure which would prevent a mortgagee or a landlord from realising his property. If there were such a measure in our law there would be no incentive, but there would instead be a positive disincentive against lending money to married couples. That of course, would be socially disastrous. To suggest that joint ownership would resolve that sort of problem is fallacious, as even a superficial examination must reveal.

It was suggested also that the Bill was defective in that it did not deal with the position of parties where the family home might be the subject of a compulsory purchase order or proceedings by the Land Commission, that there was no protection for the wife in that case. To raise that objection shows a misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of the Bill. As I said at the outset, this Bill is to prevent a husband selling the family home. The positive action of selling comes from the husband whereas, in the case of compulsory purchase proceedings, or Land Commission proceedings, it is not the husband who is the initiator of proceedings; it is society via the local authority, the Government agency or the Land Commission. Certainly, as far as the Land Commission is concerned—if the family are in residence—I cannot ever see it happening. In the case of compulsory purchase orders it can arise if the property is needed for whatever scheme the local authority have in mind. It has arisen and will arise in the future. This Bill is not designed to inhibit local authorities in the discharge of their duties nor does it in any way leave parties more vulnerable to that sort of procedure than they are already. One may put it this way: the question of compulsory purchase orders is irrelevant to this measure. If the House felt that a compulsory purchase order should never be made against family homes, then, in that situation, it could be considered but that would be a very drastic thing indeed to suggest.

Deputy Andrews felt that sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Bill would circumvent the rights of a mortgagee and a lessor. I do not think that anything of the like will happen. The Deputy felt specifically that under section 8 (2) mortgagees would not be entitled to call in the entire mortgage debt and that their rights would be clogged. As I have pointed out, the essence of a mortgage arrangement is to provide for repayment. That section gives the wife a legal entitlement vis-à-vis the mortgagee to take over those payments. It does not in any other way inhibit or diminish the rights of the mortgagee. We were very careful not to do that because, if we did so, we would then make lending to married couples an extremely risky business, so risky that lending agencies would be forced to give it up. We are putting the wife into the legal position of being able to say to the lending agency: “I want to pay you the arrears; these are my proposals, and these are my proposals to continue paying the current sums due”. If those proposals are reasonable, they have to be accepted by the mortgagee. The wife is then on the same footing vis-à-vis the mortas the defaulting husband. The mortgagee then is not prejudiced by this. He is getting his loan back, albeit some of it in arrear, but he is getting it back. That is always preferable to a mortgagee than having to go and realise his security.

Deputy Andrews referred to the rights of a woman in the marital home, and appeared, I think, to suggest, in the context of section 12 of the Married Women's Status Act, that that provision was to the effect that marriage, as such, confers on the wife a right of property in the home. Whilst the section does not provide this, the entitlement of a wife to a beneficial interest in the home under that section has been extended by judicial decision. This is a matter in which there is some doubt as to the exact borders of this extension. It is something that may require legislation to tidy it up or possibly we may await further clarification judicially.

Many Deputies mentioned the necessity for legal aid and some Deputies stated that the rights given under the Bills are not really valuable in the absence of legal aid. I agree that the presence or availability of legal aid would be in ease of many persons, not just under this legislation but throughout our whole legal code. At the same time it is not a good argument to say that a good principle, as this Bill proposes, is somehow lessened because the mechanics for enforcing it are not as perfect as we would like them to be. We have to provide the legislative reform. That is the first thing. Then, hopefully, we will be able to provide these additional benefits subsequently. In any event, the burden or the onus for taking legal proceedings under this Bill will not rest on the wife. They will rest on the husband because all that the wife has to do in the case of a proposed, vindictive, sale is to refuse her consent. Her husband then accepts her refusal or, if he does not, he goes to court—he is the person who has to go to court— and asks the court to hold that the refusal is unreasonable. Therefore, the onus is on him; he is the moving party in the court.

Of course, the wife will have to appear to make her case in the court and she will have to have legal assistance to do that. It is not provided for in the Bill but I would anticipate that the costs would be awarded against the party who was the stronger financially and probably that, in practice, will turn out to be the husband. It will not be a question of costs following the event because what is the event? Possibly if a wife unreasonably and vindictively withheld her consent, she might find herself punished by costs. I would say: "fair enough" in that situation. But, if her opposition to the sale was reasonable and so appeared to the court, then the court in finding equity between the parties, would not punish her in costs. Therefore, I do not think the lack of legal aid will be an inhibiting factor in the operation of this Bill. The onus is being placed on husbands, not on wives, to move.

A number of Deputies raised the question of bona fide purchasers for value who have taken reasonable steps to investigate the title and made all reasonable inquiries. Does the Bill place an undue burden on purchasers? Just recall what is in the Bill. It provides that for a sale of a family home to be valid the conveyance must be endorsed with the wife's consent. Where the vendor is a single man, or appears to be a single man, the question then arises: what is the position of a purchaser in that case? There are two courses open. One could say that the concealment of a wife and her subsequent arrival on the scene could vitiate the sale, but I think that would be an intolerable position. No conveyance or transaction in regard to property would ever be final if that possibility were lurking in the background all the time. The procedure adopted in the Bill is to put an onus on the purchaser, who must be a bona fide purchaser for value. In other words, there must be no element of collusion on the part of the purchaser. He must be bona fide and have given full value. He must have made all reasonable inquiries. The phraseology in the Bill refers to the obligation to make reasonable inquiries as does the Conveyancing Act, 1882. Deputy O'Kennedy asked precisely what it meant. It has a clear meaning in the realm of conveyancing. It means that reasonable steps, in the circumstances of a particular title, have to be taken by a purchaser. That normally means that he puts the usual requisitions or questions to the vendor and may seek a statutory declaration to support the replies to the requisitions. He has to make reasonable inquiries to satisfy himself that there was no need for a consent. If one did not have that, a vendor would be placed in the impossible position of having to prove that he was not married. Therefore, I do not think this obligation will be a burden on the title. It is only another incident of title that will have to be investigated on the conveyance and it will not be a harsh or onerous burden.

The alternative was to allow a defeated wife to appear at any stage and defeat the contract or conveyance. At first sight, that might seem a desirable thing to do but it would have the effect of ensuring that no conveyance was ever final, or free from attack in the future. It is in that context that the protection for the bona fide purchaser has been introduced.

However, the debate did raise in my mind as something I shall have to consider between now and Committee Stage the position regarding subsequent purchasers. I will not go into that at this stage. It does raise technical, conveyancing problems that, in the event of, say, the original purchaser taking a conveyance from an apparently single man who turns out to be a married man and where it is subsequently shown that his investigation was not of the standard required by the Act but, in the meantime, he has sold to a second purchaser, what is the position then of the second purchaser vis-à-vis the wife who may appear at a later stage? It is something we shall have to consider before Committee Stage. It is a technical point of conveyancing.

So our contributions were of some assistance to the Minister.

If the Deputy had been here when I commenced, he would have heard me say that the analyses and criticisms put forward by Deputies are useful in enabling the teasing-out process, which is typical on Committee Stage, to get under way at this stage, although the point I have just made was not adverted to. It was a point that occurred to me listening to the debate. It might not have anything in it at all.

The Minister is far more reasonable than his colleague, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach.

The Parliamentary Secretary was talking a few political home truths. I am slightly confined for time and I will stay off that aspect of it.

The Minister is very wise.

The Parliamentary Secretary was very pertinent and very much to the point in a few hard, political home truths. The irritable and very speedy reaction from the far side showed that his barbs were getting home. If there had been silence on the far side it might have been less satisfying for the Parliamentary Secretary and those on this side who were listening to him. I suggest to Deputy Andrews that in the future the best way to react to a political speech is by a stoney face of silence but that takes self-discipline and that is something Deputy Andrews has yet to achieve.

This side of the House are searching for the truth.

We are all searching for the truth. Deputy Andrews made numerous references, which I consider to be inappropriate, to the parliamentary draftsman, that this was his Bill and he was responsible for this wording or that wording.

That is not true.

If Deputy Andrews looks at the record he will see constant references to referring back to the parliamentary draftsman to look at this and why did the parliamentary draftman do the other.

I did not impugn the integrity of the parliamentary draftsman.

I am not saying that the Deputy criticised the integrity of the parliamentary draftsman. It was inappropriate for the Deputy to refer in the context he did to that person. The parliamentary draftsman merely follows the instructions which I as Minister give to him by way of the heads of the Bill.

The Minister is trying to make too much out of this. My conscience is clear and I make no apology for what I said.

It is only right to put it on the record that I consider that those references were inappropriate. The Deputy might be interested to to know in that context that this Bill, which will probably be further amended, is in fact the sixth draft of the Bill, which is an indication of the care that has gone into the drafting of this difficult and novel piece of legislation.

It shows how difficult it must have been to draft if it is the sixth drafting.

It was difficult. I made the point that the Bill may be further amended before it is finished its progress through this House. That is why we have this legislative process in the House, why we have all the different Stages.

Perhaps the Minister should have had the seventh, eighth or ninth drafting before he brought the Bill into the House.

I could not quite follow the point raised by Deputy Andrews that the Bill was conferring jurisdiction on the Circuit Court and that this is somehow inappropriate. The Circuit Court is a court of full jurisdiction in this area. It is fully geared to handle any business given to it by the Bill. It is only right that the Circuit Court would have that jurisdiction.

Deputy Burke referred to the question of the costs of voluntary transfers into joint ownership in the context of the section that encourages such transfers by abolishing stamp duty and waiving land registry and court fees. He then said that the solicitor's costs would still be an inhibiting factor. I take the point that they will not make it any more attractive but the level of costs for such transactions is considerably less than the level of costs obtaining in sales for full value. In the case of a transfer from one spouse to another there is no investigation of title. It is a simple procedure. I do not anticipate that legal fees will be an inhibiting factor there. The biggest factor was the stamp duty, which was chargeable at one per cent on the full market value of the property being transferred. This, having regard to the present day value of houses, could be a substantial sum. I know in many instances it inhibited people from transferring the family home into joint ownership. Let me repeat that this is something I am in favour of on a voluntary basis but not on a compulsory basis.

Deputy Burke raised the question of a man whose marriage is annulled by a particular religious tribunal and asked if he would require his wife's consent in the event of subsequent sale of the family home. The answer is that he would because in the eyes of the civil law that man is still married and his wife's consent would be required.

The Parliamentary Secretary referred to how long an interval we had to wait for at least a beginning to be made to deal with some of the anomalies in this whole area. I do not want to start that debate over again because of Deputy Andrews' sensitivity. Deputy Burke and other Deputies raised the question of the definition of family home and asked what the position would be in regard to residential business premises. One cannot define a family home so as specifically to take account of the premises which is used "half and half". If it is so structurally laid out that the residence can be sold separately, then there is no problem identifying the family home. On the other hand, if it is an integral part of the business premises, in my opinion, it would not be possible to sell the business premises without the wife's consent because the business premises would automatically bring with it the family home. It will depend on the layout of the premises in the particular case. If the consent were to be refused it would have to be threshed out before a court. The court would then have to decide whether or not the sale would be reasonable. One could have the situation of a 100-bedroom hotel in which there was a family flat. If there were very strong reasons why that hotel should be sold would it be right that the wife, in order to preserve her right of residence in the flat in this very valuable property, should be able to prevent the sale? This is something that the court will have to rule on. In the case of premises that would be mixed in their use the court would have to decide in the circumstances of the particular case whether or not the consent should be waived.

Would it be the same position in the case of accommodation over a licensed premises?

I think it might be in some cases. There is no way out of that if the premises are structurally intermixed.

Could the wife prevent the sale in the case of a licensed premises?

Where the family home was proposed to be sold, she could refuse to give her consent, but it would be for the court to prevent the sale. The court would make a decision, having regard to the rights of the parties vis-á-vis each other.

Would the Minister be prepared to give a private decision as to what the outcome of it would be?

I could not because, as the Deputy is aware, every case that comes into court is different from the one before it and it is only the judge hearing the case, hearing the facts of that particular family, hearing the claims of the two parties, the financial position of the parties and the demands of the children in relation to their particular state of development, who can make the decision. It is only after hearing all these facts that a court can decide. It would be impossible for me to anticipate what a court would decide without a complete statement of the relevant facts, such as I have indicated.

Deputy Mrs. Desmond spoke about the case of wives married to brutal husbands whose brutality forced them to leave their family homes. She said they had just cause for leaving and she referred to the need for shelter for them. She possibly is overlooking the fact that under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act there is provision in section 22 of the Act for the Court to exclude the violent husband from the home and so obviate the need for the wife to leave. That problem should not be as great in the future as it has been up to now. It is important that the rights under this Bill, when it becomes law and under the other Act, should become as widely known as possible.

Deputy Collins raised the question of having family guidance centres where advice might be given. In many parts of the country there are now community service councils which provide this service and are making known to people their rights under the social welfare code and the whole area of family law in general. It would be important in the case of the battered wife that women who have been subjected to such treatment, or who are in danger of it in the future, should be aware that they can now go to the Court in a very simple way and have those violent husbands excluded from the family home, and so avoid the scandal of such wives and their children being put out into the streets.

Deputy de Valera was apprehensive that the Bill in seeking to deal with what is commonly acknowledged in this House as a very small number of cases in the totality of marriages in the country, was unavoidably affecting all marriages and this could have some adverse effects. He gave the instance of a husband who was transferred in his job from one part of the city to another and wanted to move house for economic considerations. The wife was anxious to stay where she was for social reasons, her children were at school and she had established a circle of friends. Those reasons might not be as compelling as the economic indicators and possibly social indicators for moving to the area of the new job. The Deputy pointed out that under the Bill as it now stands the wife could refuse her consent, could force the parties into court and he considered this would not be a good thing. I concede that this is a consequence that could arise, but if it did arise, it would not be an ideal marriage because these problems arise in every marriage from time to time and have to be settled by the parties out of their mutual love, tolerance and common sense. The alternative to doing it was to allow a continuation of male dominance which is the present position in this regard and allow the husband to have his way.

It is an unavoidable consequence that from now on the consent of the wife will be required in all cases of the sale of the family home. In the vast majority of cases this will present no difficulty whatever. In a number of cases it may be a matter for debate, discussion or even argument within the family. In a smaller number of cases it may end up in court. The abuse and the scandal that this Bill is designed to end is so harmful and hurtful to the parties concerned, even in a small number of cases, that the Legislature had to step in to deal with it.

Deputy de Valera criticised my introductory speech where I indicated the sources to which we had recourse when studying the proposals at the early stage of formulating legislation. I referred there to textbooks and reports in this field. He said we should not seek a solution in the light of commission reports and reading textbooks and so on. He said we should procure the solution here entirely within the Irish context by practical common sense. The problem that this Bill sets out to solve is not exclusively Irish. It is a social problem that manifests itself in many other countries. It would be dangerously narrow if we were to approach its solution without reading the sources that are available on the subject. I make no apology for going to the experience of other countries in an endeavour to have this legislation as complete and as adequate as possible.

Deputy de Valera felt it was inappropriate that the State should now interfere in a matter between a married couple. Again, he took the example of the husband who got a transfer in his job and wanted to sell the house to move closer to the job. He said in such an area it was wrong that the State, via the court, should come in and act as a referee. But, this is not a new proposition in our legal code. At the moment, under the Guardianship of Infants Act, a court may have to settle conflicting claims with regard to the welfare of children. The old male dominance, the right of the father to make decisions in regard to the children, has been superseded by that Act, and by judicial decision. The proper criterion now is what is best for the children. Under this Bill the criterion that the court will apply will be what is best for the family as a whole, for the spouse who is objecting, for her children and the husband who wants to sell. The consequence of the point Deputy de Valera criticised was to allow the situation of the male prerogative to pertain no longer. We are not prepared to do what Deputy de Valera suggests because the Bill recognises that the time has come to end the scandal of vindictive sales.

Deputy O'Kennedy was worried about the position of a couple purchasing a house from another married couple. He considered that there might be a difficulty where the wife actually gives her consent. If I was correct in understanding this to be his interpretation of the section in question, I would not agree. He was interpreting section 3 (3) regarding the bona fide purchaser for value after reasonable inquiry in the context of a married couple purchasing from a married couple where a consent had been given, but this question would only arise in the case of a purchase from a person where a consent had not been obtained. In the case of a married couple, where the consent is actually given, that is the end of it. There is no need to look behind that title.

Deputy Kelly raised the point under section 7 as to how a wife could become involved in a mortgage suit in the absence of some specific provision directing service of proceedings on her. He has an interesting point here and we will have to look at it between now and Committee Stage to ensure that there is a proper procedure and mechanism so that she will become aware of mortgage proceedings. It may be that under Rules of Court the matter can be accounted for but if it cannot, we may have to introduce an amendment on Committee Stage.

Deputy Andrews raised the question of family courts. Again, this is something that has been raised on numerous occasions but nobody has spelled out what he means by a family court. It is a desirable concept but I have asked before——

I have done so on many occasions. I can send the Minister a copy of my speeches.

I have asked before what precisely is meant by a family court. At what level in our judicial system is it to be inserted? Who is to compose the family court? Is it to be a judge? Is he to have the assistance of a permanent corps of assessors? Will the assessors be appointed on an ad hoc basis from time to time, or will it be an itinerant court that will move around the country? Will there be different chambers of it sitting in different locations in the country? What rights will it have over the disposal of property or over the custody of persons or children? These are major questions that have to be decided on.

I must send the Minister a copy of my speeches.

If the Deputy has answers to those questions I would be extremely interested in reading them. Deputy O'Kennedy wondered about the position of grandchildren and grandparents. The Bill does not extend to cover their position and I do not think it can do so. In effect what the Deputy is suggesting is that grandparents living in the family home should have the right to prevent the sale of that property. I think that would be going too far. They are in the home either as predecessors in title who handed over the home to one of the spouses, and in that case one would normally expect that their rights would be protected in the transfer, or, alternatively, they are there at the invitation of either or both spouses. If the right of a spouse to withhold consent is available it can be withheld in the general family context and the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, can decide if the consideration of the situation of the grandparents was a valid reason for refusing to give consent to the conveyance. I think it would be going too far to extend the protection to parties other than the spouse and children.

Deputy O'Kennedy also raised the question of the single parent family, the widow or the widower with children, and he wondered what right is there to stop that parent from a vindictive sale over the heads of the children. The short answer is that there is none. The single parent is left with responsibility and would have to be given the responsibility and onus of doing what is best for the family. To allow a third party to intervene would be a very far-reaching principle. We have allowed a third party to intervene in the legislation dealing with the maintenance of spouses and children to ensure that proper maintenance is provided in such cases and I think that is as far as we should go. It would be going too far to allow a third party to intervene to prevent a man or a mother selling the family home. If it is a single parent, we will have to trust that his or her discretion will be properly used. Should it be used in a way that proper maintenance will not be afforded to the children, the right of a third party to intervene arises under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act.

I think I have covered most of the points raised in the course of the debate. Many of them were Committee Stage points that may be raised in detail on that Stage and I look forward to dealing with them then. I should like to thank Deputies for the general welcome they gave the Bill. It will meet the difficulty it is designed to meet, that is, it will end the scandal of vindictive sales. The mechanism proposed in the Bill is the proper one to do this. The alternatives were the registration system—I indicated in my opening speech why that was not suitable and this has been accepted—and the other alternative was to introduce a system of compulsory joint ownership and I gave reasons why that was not desirable.

Deputy Burke said that compulsory joint ownership would obviate legal proceedings but, on the contrary, it would make such proceedings just as likely to take place and it would have the effect of making them more complex. The Bill provides for the wife's consent to be obtained by the husband and, in the event of her unreasonably withholding consent, it is a simple mechanism to have it given by the court. It puts the onus on the husband and I think it will afford every protection to the wife and children.

Question put and agreed to.
Committee Stage ordered for Tuesday, 15th June, 1976.
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