Joint Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies: Motion.

Minister for the Public Service (Mr. R. Ryan)

I move:

(1) That it is expedient that a Joint Committee consisting of 7 members of the Dáil and 4 members of the Seanad (none of whom shall be a member of the Government or a Parliamentary Secretary) be appointed to examine the Reports and Accounts and overall operational results of State-sponsored bodies engaged in trading or commercial activities (being the State-sponsored bodies referred to in the Schedule hereto), and to report thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas and make recommendations where appropriate.

(2) That, after consultation with the Joint Committee, the Minister for the Public Service with the agreement of the Minister for Finance may include from time to time the names of further State-sponsored bodies engaged in trading or commercial activities in the Schedule, or delete from the Schedule the names of any bodies which he considers no longer to be State-sponsored bodies engaged in trading or commercial activities.

(3) That, if so requested by a trading or commercial State-sponsored body, the Joint Committee shall refrain from publishing confidential information regarding the body's activities and plans.

(4) That the Joint Committee shall have power to send for persons, papers and records and, subject to the consent of the Minister for the Public Service, to engage the services of persons with specialist or technical knowledge to assist it for the purpose of particular enquiries.

(5) That every report which the Joint Committee proposes to make under this Order shall on adoption by the Joint Committee be laid before both Houses forthwith whereupon the Joint Committee shall be empowered to print and publish such report together with, as it thinks fit, any evidence and other such related documents given to it.

(6) That 4 members of the Committee shall form a Quorum of whom at least I shall be a member of Dáil Éireann and at least I shall be a member of Seanad Éireann.

Schedule

Aer Lingus, Teoranta

Aerlínte Éireann, Teoranta

Aer Rianta, Teoranta

The Agricultural Credit Corporation, Limited

Arramara Teoranta

Bord na Móna

British & Irish Steam Packet Company Limited

Ceimicí, Teoranta

Cómhlucht Siúicre Éireann, Teoranta

Córas Iompair Éireann

Dairy Disposal Company, Limited

Electricity Supply Board

Fóir Teoranta

Industrial Credit Company, Limited

Irish Life Assurance Company Limited

The Irish National Stud Company, Limited

Irish Shipping Limited

Irish Steel Holdings Limited

Min Fhéir (1959) Teoranta

National Building Agency Limited

Nítrigin Éireann Teoranta

Óstlanna Iompair Éireann Teoranta

Pigs and Bacon Commission

Radio Telefis Éireann

Voluntary Health Insurance Board

In moving this motion, I am taking a significant step in public service reform. I am proposing to open to review by the Oireachtas an area of the public service where the public and Deputies have frequently expressed misgivings about the degree of information available particularly for parliamentary consideration. The magnitude of the area of the public service covered by the 25 bodies in the Schedule to the motion, and their importance in the national economy, can be gauged from the fact that their total net assets now exceed a figure of £1,000 million and their annual turnover is well over £500 million and they employ some 57,000 people.

In response to specific needs in some cases and because of a doctrinal approach in others, public enterprises, nationalised industries and similar State bodies are a feature of most developed countries. The Irish State-sponsored body has from early days been a major force in the development of the economy. Our State-sponsored bodies grew out of ad hoc responses to different requirements. Once established each body has tended to operate independent of its parliamentary creator while Members of the Oireachtas and the public were alternatively infuriated by or apathetic about its activities. This unhealthy situation has brought about a realisation that the effectiveness and acceptance of these bodies as efficient national agencies required a more formal relationship to the Oireachtas.

Beginning with the establishment of the Electricity Supply Board and the Agricultural Credit Corporation in 1927, they have grown in number and size until today there are now about 100 State-sponsored bodies employing some 65,000 people. Originally designed to enable the Government to operate with flexibility in commercial ventures, the form has over the years been adapted to provide similar flexibility in the discharge of functions which might, perhaps, be discharged by civil service structures. While there may be some borderline cases, it is normally possible to distinguish between "commercial" or trading bodies and those which are purely service type agencies. While the latter or, as they may be termed, the "non-commercial bodies" are the most numerous, they are also generally much smaller. The commercial bodies, which are included in the Schedule, employ over 57,000 out of the total figure of 65,000 and these are dominated, in size at least, by the four largest: CIE, ESB, Aer Lingus and Bord na Móna.

Public opinion has long been concerned with the lack of accountability of the State-sponsored bodies. I believe that the passing of this motion will help to allay public anxiety. It should also satisfy the long-felt desire of many Members that the Houses of the Oireachtas should take a greater interest in the affairs of State-sponsored bodies. As far back as 1950, I recall that a motion was introduced and debated in the Seanad to provide.

That a Joint Committee, consisting of members of both Dáil and Seanad, should be set up to consider and report on what steps, if any, should be taken to provide for a periodic review of the operations of companies in which the State holds a majority of the issued shares.

After a lengthy debate the Seanad agreed not to pass the motion. In the late 1960s, the Committee of Public Accounts suggested that the activities of State-sponsored bodies should be subject to parliamentary review. In November, 1972, the Informal Committee on Reform of Dáil Procedures recommended an early examination of the relationship between the Houses of the Oireachtas and State-sponsored bodies. Finally, during the course of the debates on the Ministers and Secretaries (Amendment) Bill, 1973, many Deputies and Senators expressed misgivings about the accountability of State-sponsored bodies to Parliament and called for increased participation in the review of these bodies. As I indicated at the time I was sympathetic to this view.

In their considerations leading to the introduction of this motion, the Government have had to consider whether the Oireachtas should be asked to review the whole State-sponsored body area or should have a more limited mandate. As I have said, there is a significant difference between the commercial and non-commercial State-sponsored bodies. The latter are in many ways similar to the executive branches of Government Departments, except that they have a larger degree of operating freedom. There is a problem in relation to their responsibility to the Oireachtas but, at this stage, it seems that a solution may well lie in a redefinition of their relationships to Ministers. For the commercial State-sponsored bodies, however, we feel that the existing relationships to Ministers, which provide for considerable operating freedoms, are broadly correct but that there is, in the overall structural pattern, a gap in the area of responsibility to the Oireachtas which will be filled by the proposals now before the House. We are, therefore, proposing that review should cover those bodies engaged in trading or commercial operations.

It is not possible to give a precise definition of the term "State-sponsored body". Generally, the term may be taken to include bodies established by or under statute and financed wholly or partly by means of grants or loans made by a Minister of State or the issue of shares taken up by a Minister of State. In addition there may in some cases be doubts as to whether a body is commercial or non-commercial. For this reason, the general principle is being adopted that commercial bodies are those which derive the greater part of their current revenues from the sale of goods or services. To put the matter beyond doubt, the bodies to be covered by the Joint Committee are listed in the Schedule to the motion.

The motion provides for the establishment of the Joint Committee consisting of seven Members of the Dáil and four Members of the Seanad to examine and make recommendations where appropriate in relation to the 25 bodies set out in the Schedule. There is provision for the addition of new bodies or the deletion of existing bodies if required and the powers of the Joint Committee and certain procedural matters are specified. There are a few points on which I might make particular observations.

The motion provides that the committee will have power to send for such persons, papers and records as it considers necessary for the task of examining the reports and accounts and overall operational results of the State-sponsored bodies listed in the Schedule. The emphasis is on examining the general efficiency and effectiveness of the bodies rather than on attention to operational minutiae. The examination required may also involve oral presentations and senior officers of a State-sponsored body being reviewed and, possibly, senior civil servants from Departments should attend before the Joint Committee. These people should be in a position to supplement the examination of reports and accounts which very often may require elaboration or clarification.

Another factor which I would regard as being vital to the success of the Joint Committee's job is that it should have adequate specialist and technical support. I shall endeavour to provide the committee, on request, with any technical or specialist expertise available within the public service. In addition, the committee may wish to employ outside specialists for particular inquiries from time to time and provision is made accordingly in the motion.

The third point is that it is provided that, if a commercial State-sponsored body so requests, the Joint Committee will not publish confidential information about that body's activities and plans. The reasons for the provision are obvious and I will not labour them. Certain confidential information might, if published, give an unfair advantage to competitors who were under no similar obligation to make disclosures. While the interests of the bodies in the matter of publication will be safeguarded, the committee will not be inhibited in seeking information relevant to their task.

While the Joint Committee will determine their own operating programme, there are certain general questions which they may wish to resolve at an early stage in their proceedings. Because of constraints of time and resources, they will hardly be able to examine all the scheduled bodies together and they will probably have to be selective in the order in which bodies are chosen for examination. It might be wise if, before getting down to the task of selection, they considered the general principles which should govern the operations of the bodies and the form in which accounts and reports are presented. Should the committee so decide, I can assure them of all the assistance that can be given by both my Departments.

The establishment of the Joint Committee should be seen as a significant development of our parliamentary institutions; it should not be construed as a criticism of the way in which State-sponsored bodies have been handling their affairs up to now. Indeed, I would like to take this opportunity to express a word of appreciation to the boards and the staff of all the State-sponsored bodies for the way in which they have tackled the often difficult tasks assigned to them and for the enormous contribution they have made to national progress. I am confident that the work of the Joint Committee will not only result in making the bodies more accountable to the Oireachtas and, through it, to the people, but will help the bodies themselves to make an increased contribution to the economic and social development of the country in the years to come.

I look forward to a constructive and positive debate on this motion because it responds to a need very frequently expressed by the public in general and by Members of the Oireachtas. I would hope therefore that the acceptability of the principles behind the motion, as well as the motion itself, will not be unnecessarily blunted by any issues of detail which may arise in the course of the debate.

I should like to anticipate some comments which may come from the Opposition because of the amendments they have tabled. With regard to the size and composition of the committee, under Standing Orders the appointment of Members to Select Committees is a matter for the Selection Committee. It is provided by Standing Order 69:

Every Select or Special Committee, previous to the commencement of business, shall elect one of its members to be Chairman....

I believe this is the appropriate way in which to handle matters like this rather than to spell something positively into the motion in the way suggested by the Opposition amendment. It is relevant to observe that there are at the moment two not dissimilar committees, the Committee of Public Accounts and the Joint Committee on Secondary Legislation. There are other committees. One relates to matters over which you, Sir, preside, namely, the Committee on Procedure and Privileges and then there is the Committee of Selection which is presided over by the Government Chief Whip. In our sister Parliament in Britain the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries is chaired by a member of the Government party. I understand the thinking behind this is that, where you have a number of committees, the chairmanship should be shared. Our Parliament is very much behind the practice in other countries.

In other countries, where there are several committees, the practice is to distribute the chairmanship between both sides and I would hope there would be general agreement on that principle here. Which particular committees should be occupied by members of the Government or by members of the Opposition as far as the chairmanship is concerned is a matter for debate and for, I hope, gentlemanly agreement. I would hope the principle of sharing the chairmanship would be accepted because the likelihood is that the number of parliamentary committees will tend to increase and it is desirable that the principle of distributing the chairmanship around the House should be accepted at this stage when we are embarking on this new committee.

As far as State bodies are concerned, I do not think it matters a hoot who occupies the chair in any committee because Members serving on such committees in the past have tended to leave aside any partisan loyalties they might have and have dedicated themselves totally to the national good in an unprejudiced way. I believe that will continue in the future.

There is an amendment also suggesting the work of the committee may extend into the area of policy. The purpose of the motion, as the House is aware, is to examine the reports and accounts and overall operational results of the scheduled bodies. The amendment goes further. I notice that in the equivalent committee in Westminster the power of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries extends only to examining the reports and accounts. We propose to go further and examine the overall operational results.

The Minister responsible for any particular company is responsible for the overall policy of the company and answerable therefore to the Dáil and the Seanad for that policy. I believe that is as it should be and it would be wholly undesirable that that area of responsibility should be transferred away from the responsible Minister to a committee. There would be the danger that, if the Minister were not to be held responsible for overall policy, fundamental decisions might get delayed or real policy issues might become concealed in the volume of work the committee would have to undertake. It would be a wrong interpretation of the functions of the committee, I believe, to insert the word "policy". We cannot, of course, be certain as to what is the correct mandate for this committee at this stage but I would urge that we should allow the committee to operate for some time so that in the light of experience we could form a view as a result of the study of the reports the committee might provide for us. With that experience it should be possible to take a fresh look at the committee's mandate in a few year's time to see if any further extension of its powers would be desirable.

I notice the Opposition have some misgivings about the proposal to delete bodies from the Schedule or from scrutiny by the committee. I want to assure the Opposition that the need for such an amendment was identified since we tabled the original motion. When we tabled it we had the Potato Marketing Board as one of the bodies because this board had been a State-sponsored body. It has now lost that status and is a private enterprise body. As such, it does not come within the ambit of the committee. Another example of a change of character occurred in 1972 when Bord Bainne was reconstituted in order to comply with EEC law. Its status was changed to that of a co-operative society under the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts, 1893 to 1936. As Deputies are aware I have provided that deletions could occur after consultations between the Minister for the Public Service, the committee and the Minister for Finance. I suggest that that is an adequate safeguard: it is the right way to do it, rather than requiring that each amendment should require the full sanction of the Dáil and Seanad. Sometimes it might be necessary to effect a quick change and I could not anticipate that a Minister, after consultation with the committee, would come to a decision which was in conflict with the wishes of the committee. It is desirable that we should provide for the deletion and that is why I made the amendment to the motion as originally tabled.

I should now like to deal with another suggestion made by the Opposition. They suggested that the committee should be left with a discretion as to whether or not they might publish confidential reports received from a State body. In my view it would be dangerous to leave the discretion with the committee. Many of these bodies are operating in competition with enterprises in the private sector and it would not be fair that information relating to their affairs which could be used against them by their competitors should be revealed by the committee in their formal reports or by members of the committee arising out of information which came to them in the course of their work on the committee. There is a real danger that if we leave the discretion to the committee in matters of this kind that information which could be helpful to the committee in their workings would be withheld from the committee. I feel certain that State-sponsored bodies, aware of their responsibilities to the nation and to the committee, would not, unnecessarily, withhold information even of a confidential nature.

If the committee find, in the light of experience, that their work is frustrated by the withholding of information it would be open to the committee to comment on that fact and ask the Oireachtas to take remedial action. I urge Deputy Colley, and his colleagues, not to in any way soften the obligation which would lie on the committee not to disclose confidential information because it might not always be possible for the committee, even objectively, correctly to assess the need to withhold information which if released could be damaging to the best interest of a State-sponsored body and the State.

There were suggestions for the addition of a number of bodies. It was suggested that Bord na gCon, Gaeltarra Éireann, Bord na gCapall and An Bord Gáis be included. I should like to state frankly that I have no strong view as to whether they should be included or not but I would like the House to know my thinking on the matter because that might help Members to assess whether on balance the boards in question should be included. I would remind the House of the distinction I drew earlier between a commercial State-sponsored body and a non-commercial State body. In the selection of bodies for inclusion in the Schedule only those bodies which derive the greater part of their revenues from trading or commercial activities were included. That was the test I applied. Some other bodies which are primarily executive agencies of government derive some revenue from trading or commercial activities but they have not been included in order to keep the activities of the committee in the purely commercial State-sponsored bodies area.

With regard to the bodies mentioned in the amendment, taken in the order of the degree of their commerciality, I should like to state that Bord na gCapall are a promotional body financed entirely by grant-in-aid from the Vote for Agriculture and Fisheries. In 1976, £647,000 was provided. There is no element of commerciality as such in the workings of the board and, therefore, I respectfully suggest, no case for their inclusion in the Schedule. Gaeltarra Éireann were originally a commercial type body but in recent years they have moved very dramatically from commercial to promotional activities. In the year ended 31st December, 1974, the last year for which accounts were published, Gaeltarra Éireann received £4,500,000 by way of grants-in-aid and repayable advances while their total sales for the same period amounted only to £1,500,000. While Gaeltarra Éireann are now primarily engaged in industrial promotion the commercial activities are now a relatively minor part of their activities their inclusion would divert the attention of the Joint Committee to examining non-commercial operations which now make up the principal part of their operations.

Mr. Colley

Is it not true in regard to Gaeltarra Éireann that they have fairly substantial equity holdings in a number of operations apart from the trading operations the Minister mentioned?

Mr. R. Ryan

That is true but I am not satisfied that even taking those into account Gaeltarra Éireann could be treated as being primarily a commercial organisation. Most of their work nowadays is analogous to that of the IDA in that they are acting as a promotional institution. The IDA also have shareholdings in some enterprises but we have not on that account considered that they were primarily a commercial organisation.

Bord na gCon derive their revenue from the operation of the totalisator which was £751,000 gross in 1975 and from the levy on bookmakers which was £591,000 gross in the same year. Out of this they contribute to prize money in greyhound racing and coursing and make various promotional grants. They also have a number of subsidiaries to run certain greyhound tracks. Since their revenue comes from what might be called quasi taxation, the deduction from totalisator receipts and bookmakers' levies, they are not, I suggest, a commercial body. They could be regarded as administering a tax on greyhound racing for the benefit of the industry. I should like to state that I would find it hard to distinguish between Bord na gCon, on the one hand, and the Racing Board on the other. I notice no suggestion was made for the inclusion of the Racing Board and I imagine it was for the reason that they are similar to the character of Bord na gCon; they are primarily promotional and administering revenue collected in the nature of a tax.

Bord Gáis only recently came into being and are not yet engaged in commercial activities. At the moment their funds come mainly from the European Investment Bank. They will be a trading company whenever they sell gas when it comes ashore but this is unlikely to happen until 1978 onwards. I suggest that this is a company which in due time would be added to the mandate of the committee. However, between now and 1978 the committee have more than enough to do to look at the workings of the 25 bodies which are in the Schedule, particularly as they include the four major organisations, the ESB, CIE, Aer Lingus and Bord na Móna. There is ample work to keep everybody busy between now and 1978 without at this stage endeavouring to look at the workings of An Bord Gáis. Because that board have just come into being they will not have any reports or accounts until late 1977 or 1978.

I hope the House finds my observations on the suggested amendments helpful. They are offered with a desire to help the House produce the best mandate for this new committee which I hope will be well received on both sides of the House, in the other House and by the public. It means that we will have available to us an instrument which will explain to the public the workings of State bodies. In turn it may help State bodies better to understand some of the public anxieties and criticisms which from time to time may be expressed in tendentious and sometimes unhelpful language but which through the working of the committee may lead to a more mature understanding on everybody's part of the true functions and possibilities of the semi-State bodies who have served this country so well and who, I believe, will be able to serve the country better as a result of the greater understanding which will arise by the operations of this body. I commend the motion to the House.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The amendments will be discussed with the motion.

Mr. Colley

In practice I take it that means that speakers may deal with the motion and/or the amendments but can speak only once.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

That is correct.

Mr. Colley

I appreciate the fact that the Minister has outlined some of his thinking in relation to the amendments. It is helpful, but perhaps not as helpful as I should like it to be, to know some of the Minister's thinking. Before dealing with the amendments in detail there are a few matters I should like to refer to.

The first is that the Minister stated towards the end of his script that the establishment of this committee should not be construed as a criticism of the way State-sponsored bodies have been handling their affairs. I should like to endorse that and to say that in so far as we agree with the principle involved in this motion—we have certain reservations in regard to its terms—I want to make it clear that that agreement is not in any way intended as a criticism of the way in which State-sponsored bodies have been handling their affairs.

On the contrary, I have personal experience of a number of CEOs of these bodies expressing the view that they would prefer, in regard to the bodies for which they were responsible, that there would be a review of their activities by the Oireachtas, and they felt that as a result they would succeed in bringing to Members of the Oireachtas a much clearer understanding of the role of the activities of the bodies concerned and they would hope thereby to avoid uninformed criticism of their activities. That is a view I have heard expressed by a number of CEOs. I do not claim it is a unanimous view because I do not think it is, and I mention it in order to underline that the setting up of a committee of this kind is not a criticism of the way State-sponsored bodies have conducted their affairs.

There may not be a Member of the House who has not got certain activities of some of these bodies in mind which he believes are matters that should be subjected to criticism—that is inevitable—but I believe the general principle in this motion is one that should not only make for a greater understanding of the work of semi-State bodies with a possible spin-off of better informed criticism, but also that it should be of assistance in the long term in the more effective working of State-sponsored bodies in the carrying out of the purposes for which they were set up or additional purposes.

I believe a committee of the kind proposed will be extremely important. The possible effects and ramifications of an effective committee of this kind working are almost impossible to visualise at this time, but one can say they could have very important consequences, and they could have very damaging consequences, too, if the matter is not handled correctly. Therefore it is important to pay attention to the small print of the motion as well as to its general principle.

As we all know, various semi-State bodies have been set up during the years until we have reached a stage when I think it is true that bodies of this kind in our economy form a considerably higher proportion than in the economies of most if not all other western democracies. This has happened for historical reasons but largely due to the fact that the capital, enterprise and expertise that could have been expected to emanate from the private sector were not available. I am glad to see that situation has been considerably improved but, for whichever reason, we have an unbelievably wide spectrum of public bodies. The range of their activities is incredible to anybody who gets down to examining them, and the problem of their accountability to Parliament and the people is one that has exercised the minds of many for a long time.

This brings me to a mystifying feature. When consideration was given to this problem in the past, frequently one of the major difficulties adduced was the danger of the disclosure of confidential information in relation to the activities of commercial or trading State-sponsored bodies to their detriment and to the benefit of their competitors. The reason I find this situation somewhat mystifying is that looking at the motion one finds it proposes the setting up of a Joint Committee to keep an eye on the activities of the State-sponsored bodies which are engaged in trading and commercial activities, the very bodies which were supposed to present the major problem.

The Minister has glancingly adverted to this in his speech. He said the reason for excluding the non-trading bodies is that such bodies are extensions of the Departments concerned, and the policy for which they are responsible is one in respect of which the Minister is answerable in the House.

That may be so in theory but it is not the practice, and I should like to give the Minister an example. I will take RTE. They have not only a policy imposed on them by the Minister but a statutory obligation to achieve balance in their programmes for, let us say, politics, the one with which all of us or most of us are familiar. If a Deputy came in here with a question to the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs which was aimed at eliciting information as to the balance achieved by RTE in relation to political matters, it is almost certain such a question would be ruled out of order and the Deputy told "This is not a matter for which the Minister is responsible—it is the responsibility of the RTE Authority". It is therefore a fallacy to suggest that in the case of non-commercial, non-trading bodies, the matter can be dealt with by virtue of the Minister's responsibility for policy in this House and the Seanad.

I strongly urge the Minister to have another look at this problem. When one thinks about it, one is entitled to ask the question: "Why should a body like Córas Tráchtála or the IDA or other similar bodies not be answerable to the Houses of the Oireachtas in respect of certain major aspects of policy?" If we take the IDA, it is true that the general policy followed is the subject of discussion and debate in this House but, on the other hand, the methods used by the IDA to achieve its aims are not open to question in this House. There are good reasons in some cases why it should not be open to full scale public discussion at least until the facts are established. I am referring to the IDA just because it is of major importance. What I am saying is true of many other bodies also. I would question the wisdom of excluding from the terms of reference of this committee all State-sponsored bodies which are not engaged in commercial or trading activities. It may well be that the range of work involved is such that it would require another committee or even two other committees to do it. I am not dealing with the practicalities of that at the moment but rather with the principle involved.

When you come to the trading and commercial State-sponsored bodies you immediately come up against a problem which does not arise in the case of non-trading and non-commercial companies, that is, the danger of damage being done to the activities of such bodies by the disclosure of information concerning their activities or plans to other private commercial firms who are in competition with them. I will refer later to the paragraph in the motion which is designed to deal with this problem but the fact is that that is not an easy problem and it arises directly out of the scrutinising of the activities of commercial and trading companies but it does not arise at all in the case of non-commercial and non-trading companies. Therefore, there is a stronger case in my view for subjecting the activities of such bodies to the scrutiny of the House. I strongly urge the Minister to think again about the activities of the non-commercial or non-trading State-sponsored bodies and the subjection of those activities to a committee of the Houses of the Oireachtas.

Alternatively, if the Minister for various reasons, feels that is not something which can be contemplated at this stage, I would urge that the whole question of the responsibility of the Ministers concerned in regard to accountability in this House for the policies of such bodies should be reviewed, perhaps, jointly between Government and Opposition representatives, with a view to establishing clearly and unambiguously that responsibility for policy and all aspects of policies of such bodies is here in this House and ensuring that we do not have a "no man's land" in which there is, on the one hand, no responsibility in this House and, on the other hand, no committee or scrutiny by elected representatives of the policies of such bodies. There is an area here where attention is required and the requirement could be met by setting up a similar committee or, alternatively, and perhaps, less satisfactorily, by a review of the Standing Orders and the practice and procedure of this House with a view to establishing clearly beyond doubt the full accountability of Ministers to the House in respect of the policy of State-sponsored bodies which are engaged in non-commercial or non-trading activities.

The Minister disclosed in his speech the criteria which had been used in distinguishing between State-sponsored bodies which are engaged in commercial and trading activities and those which are on the borderline. The Minister used this criteria to show why some of the bodies we have suggested as being suitable for adding to the Schedule should not be added. The Minister will appreciate that the first we heard of this criteria was in the House today. There is nothing on the face of the motion to give any indication that one should have regard to whether the major portion of the income of a State-sponsored body should be derived from commercial or trading activity in order to include it in the terms of this motion.

The Minister will appreciate that since we did not have the criteria to apply we could not apply them to the companies we proposed to add. Furthermore, it may be that the criteria put forward may not be universally accepted. I would question, except on the grounds of practicality, whether such criteria should be applied at all. If the Minister had said that the range of bodies was so large that a committee of the House could not deal with this work and, therefore, he wanted to confine it to the major bodies concerned in terms of commercial and other activities, that would be a practical approach whether one would accept it or not. That was not the argument made. The Minister has been putting forward somewhat arbitrary criteria and applying them to the various bodies concerned.

There are some matters in relation to the operation of the committee on which a little more light could be shed. Is it envisaged that the Press would normally be admitted to meetings of this committee? Presumably if it is so envisaged the possible exclusion of the Press would also be envisaged where matters of a confidential nature such as are referred to in paragraph 3 of the motion would be concerned. On the other hand, if it is envisaged that the Press would not be present at all, we would like to know that. Speaking for myself, my first reaction would be that this would be unacceptable. We ought to have spelled out what exactly is envisaged.

Mr. Kelly

I am sorry—it would be unacceptable if the Press were excluded?

Mr. Colley

Yes, in all circumstances. I noted also that the motion before the House is not the motion originally put down by the Government. There are certain changes. The Minister referred to one change which is the exclusion of one particular body because it has ceased to be a commercial or trading body. I do not think he referred to an addition which was put into the changed version of the motion, that is, the addition of Irish Life. That is an addition of some significance. The Irish Life Assurance Company Limited is a very large and important body. As we all know, it figured in certain controversial matters not so long ago.

An argument is put forward by some people that it should not be subject to scrutiny by this committee because of the interest of the State in it, while the great bulk of its shareholding is extremely small in relation to the interests of the various policy-holders. I may say that is not an argument with which I agree, but I know the argument is made very strongly. I would have expected that the Minister would throw a little light on why it was originally decided to exclude the Irish Life Assurance Company from this and subsequently decided to include it. Perhaps before the debate concludes, we might get from the Government side a little more light on the reason for this decision.

There is one thing that is crystal clear, as far as I am concerned. If this committee is set up, and if it does its work even moderately well, the demands on the time of the members concerned will be enormous and, for that reason, paragraph (4), which includes a provision to enable the committee to engage the services of persons with specialist or technical knowledge, is of vital importance. I should appreciate it if the Minister would spell out in more detail, in so far as he can, what he has in mind as regards the range of assistance which would be made available, and the numbers of persons involved, and whether there is any thought about limitations on this kind of assistance. Clearly, we do not want a situation in which outside experts of various kinds, be they auditors, engineers or whatever, are engaged to such an extent that the matter becomes one of dialogue between the representatives of the State-sponsored bodies on the one hand, and these outside experts on the other. Clearly that is not what is desired or envisaged.

On the other hand I cannot lay too much stress on the fact that the demands on the time of Deputies are very great. They are increasing, and particularly Deputies of the calibre we would like to see serving on this committee, if it is to be effective, are Deputies whose time is already very heavily committed both inside and outside the House. Consequently, I regard it as being of very great importance that every possible step should be taken to try to ensure that the Deputies and Senators who will be members of this committee will have affairs so arranged for them that they will be able to concentrate on the important matters on which they should concentrate, particularly aspects of policy and I will come to that in more detail later.

I do not want to see a situation in which members of this committee have to dig and delve through a great deal of largely irrelevant information in order to get at the real information with which they should be concerned. We should try to ensure that the assistance which will be made available to them will be such as to enable them to avoid having to spend unnecessary time on that kind of activity. If we get the right people on this committee, their time will be much too valuable to be spent on that. Indeed, it is not unknown for people in the public service, and outside it, to develop a technique whereby they can drown people in paper, paperwork and details in order to keep them from getting at the major issues with which they should be concerned. Now is the time we should try to ensure that the machinery being set up will, so far as is humanly possible, avoid that pitfall.

I come now to the amendments and I should like formally to move amendment No. 1 standing in my name:

He might say amendment No. 1 is not a constructive suggestion. I think it is, and it represents the view we would take in the Opposition having regard to the fact that we are making a concession in regard to numbers. As regards the chairmanship, I am not sure what the position is. From what the Minister said earlier and from what the Parliamentary Secretary has said, it may be that the Government have an open mind on that question. But I want to make it clear that if this is to be a watchdog committee it is important that it should be seen to be, and one way in which that can be done is by having a member of the Opposition as chairman.

I am not in a position to discuss these aspects of the matter nor, indeed, do I think I should, since I was not directly concerned with the correspondence nor am I familiar with dates and so on. I do not think it is relevant to the point I am putting forward in relation to amendment No. 1. I think I have made as clear as I can the reason for putting down this amendment. It may be that some further discussions or some further contributions from the Government side on this will clarify matters in regard to amendment No. 1.

I am trying to make out thinking as clear as possible in relation to the composition and chairmanship of this committee and why we think it is important. In case there is any doubt on this matter. I want to draw attention to the fact that the motion provides for the exclusion of a member of the Government or a Parliamentary Secretary. That, Sir, is also in accordance with the Standing Order relating to the Public Accounts Committee and reinforces the case I am making that this committee is analogous to the Public Accounts Committee and should be structured in the same way.

Mr. Kelly

The same rule applies to Special Committees set up to discuss Bills.

Mr. Colley

Since the Parliamentary Secretary has chosen to say that, we will have to spend some time pursuing it. Standing Order No. 126, which deals with the Public Accounts Committee, reads:

Mr. Kelly

I did not deny that. The rule for the composition of Special Committees, such as the Wild-life Committee and the Drugs Committee, has a similar provision.

Mr. Colley

I have not finished. Standing Order No. 126 further reads: "The committee shall be otherwise constituted according to the provisions of Standing Orders No. 66 and 69..." Standing Order No. 66 reads:

The Dáil may, on motion made after notice, appoint a Select Committee to consider and, if so permitted, to take evidence upon any Bill or matter, and to report its opinion for the information and assistance of the Dáil. Such motion shall specifically state the terms of reference of the Committee, define the powers devolved upon it, fix the number of members to serve on it, state the quorum, and may appoint a date upon which the committee shall report back to the Dáil.

Standing Order No. 69 reads

Every Select or Special Committee, previous to the comencement of business shall elect one of its members to be Chairman, who shall have only one vote.

I do not think the Parliamentary Secretary is correct in what he is saying.

Mr. Kelly

I mentioned Special Committees of this House.

Mr. Colley

The point I am making, and with which I trust the Parliamentary Secretary does not disagree, is that the proposed committee should be regarded as being analogous to the Public Accounts Committee and structured on the same lines.

Amendment No. 2 proposes to insert the word "policy" so that paragraph (1) would read: "... be appointed to examine the Reports and Accounts, policy and overall operational results of State-sponsored bodies ..." I regard this as a matter of considerable importance. I have already dealt with the policy aspect in relation to non-commercial companies but we are now dealing with the activities of commercial and trading State-sponsored bodies. I suggest that, if one were to exclude the examination of policy, one could well be ensuring the non-effectiveness of this committee. This committee is not necessary to perform the kind of function the Public Accounts Committee performs, that is, in relation to accounts, except to a limited extent. I think—and it is generally acknowledged—that, in so far as there is a need for this committee, the need is in relation to the policies pursued by the State-sponsored bodies, in trying to relate that policy to the aims laid down for the particular body and in trying to measure the degree to which the policy pursued is helping to achieve the aims involved.

One matter to which attention should be drawn is that the terms of reference laid down in paragraph (1) include the examination of reports and accounts and the reporting thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas and the making of recommendations where appropriate. If this were confined to accounts and the making of recommendations on them, one could understand the position, but the paragraph refers to the overall operational results and recommendations in regard to the overall operational results. It is difficult to distinguish between making recommendations on the overall operational results and making recommendations on policies.

For that reason the Minister should accept amendment No. 2, which will make it clear that there will be no room for argument that policy is excluded. If, for instance, amendment No. 2 is not accepted, it may be taken that there will be arguments that these terms of reference, which include making recommendations in regard to overall operational results, include the examination of policy. If it is not intended that those words will include the examination of policy, it should be spelled out. If that is what it means then we will have to examine the position again. If this committee is to be effective and is to do the kind of job the public will expect it to do, the policy must be a matter of concern to the committee.

I am well aware of the difficulties that can arise in this regard, some of which are adverted to further on. What is involved is that we should not purport to set up a Committee of the Houses of the Oireachtas to examine the activities of commercial and trading State-sponsored bodies and then refuse that committee the powers to do the job the public expects it to do. To examine the reports and accounts alone would not be doing the job. To examine the overall operational results is going further and is welcome. But how can a committee examine the overall operational results of such a body and make recommendations, if necessary, without examining the policy of the body?

I urge the Minister to accept amendment No. 2. Failure to accept it will lead to argument and disagreement in the committee, which will be arguing about matters of this kind instead of getting on with the job it was set up to do.

Amendment No. 3 proposes to delete certain words from paragraph No. 2. Paragraph 2 provides:

That, after consultation with the Joint Committee, the Minister for the Public Service with the agreement of the Minister for Finance may include from time to time the names of further State-sponsored bodies engaged in trading or commercial activities in the Schedule,...

We are not objecting to that at all. We accept that in the long-term additions to this are probably largely a matter that must be decided in some similar way. Our objection is to the rest of the paragraph which says that the Minister may delete from the Schedule the names of any bodies which he considers no longer to be State-sponsored bodies engaged in trading or commercial activities. I accept—and I think the Minister put forward these arguments when commenting on the amendments—that it may be possible to read that paragraph as meaning that the Minister can only delete bodies from the Schedule after consultation with the Joint Committee. Certainly that is a possible interpretation. We feel that the question of deletion is a matter which, in the normal way, may raise no problems. But we must envisage a situation in which, let us say, there is a very intense inquiry going on in the committee into a spectacular State-sponsored body. The situation is becoming difficult and the Minister concerned is under a lot of pressure perhaps from representatives of the State-sponsored body. Indeed I can envisage a situation, arising out of that kind of inquiry, where one might have a chief executive or others in the State-sponsored body telling the Minister: "If this goes on we are going to resign". The Minister, under pressure, might say: "Right, I will consult with the committee to delete them". He is not obliged to go by what the committee say. He merely consults them and then he deletes them.

Mr. Staunton

With respect to the Deputy the section says that he might consider this in relation to semi-State bodies engaged in trading and commercial activities. He could not arbitrarily do it. He would have to justify such a decision.

Mr. Colley

We had a little example of this today. When the Minister introduced it he told us for the first time of the criteria he was applying to put in or delete companies. The criteria he applied related to the proportion of their income derived from trading or commercial activities. It is not inconceivable that the same criteria could be applied to say: "This body should come out". The point I want to make to the House is this. If a State-sponsored body has ceased to be a commercial or trading body is it conceivable that there could be any difficulty about the committee agreeing wholeheartedly to take it out out of the Schedule? I do not think there could be any difficulty there. On the other hand, if a situation arose in which, as a result of a very detailed inquiry which was resented, an effort were made to take a particular State-sponsored body out of the ken of the committee, it is quite clear that such a situation would lead to grave suspicion which might be unjustified.

I do not think we should put ourselves in that position. I suggest that where a body has ceased to be a commercial or trading body there can be no difficulty. In such a case all that is needed is a motion in the House to take it out of the Schedule and there would be no opposition from any part of the House to such a motion in such circumstances. I do not think we should leave it open to have a situation of the kind I have described arise. It might be a temptation to some people to pressurise whatever Minister was concerned and the Minister might just give way to such pressure. In my view that would be the worst possible thing that could happen. When the going gets too tough it should be possible to take a State-sponsored body from under the scrutiny of this committee. I urge that amendment No. 3 be accepted.

With regard to amendment No. 4, this proposes to change the emphasis somewhat in regard to what the procedure would be in the event of confidential information relating to a State-sponsored body's activities being furnished and whether or not it should be published. The motion as it stands, in paragraph (3), envisages that, if the State-sponsored body requests it, then the committee must— there is no choice—agree not to publish confidential information regarding the body's activities and plans. My amendment proposes to change that to: if the body requests it, and the committee so decide, then the information will not be published. If this committee when set up is to be trusted to examine the confidential information that should be made available by the various bodies, then it should be possible to exercise proper discretion as to whether or not such matters should be published. I do not accept that any State-sponsored body should have the right to dictate to a committee of this House as to whether it should or should not publish particular information. Of course, I understand the concern—I share that concern—that there should be no damage done to the activities of any commercial State-sponsored body by reason of the publication of confidential information. I would think that every Member of this House would share that concern.

I think also that there is a principle involved here, that however important the information may be, however important the State-sponsored body may be, we cannot accept the proposition that a State-sponsored body whose affairs are being examined should be in a position to say—because that is the effective result of that paragraph —to a committee of this House: "You may not publish any of the following information". I do not think that is a position that we should or could tolerate.

Therefore I urge this amendment to ensure that the decision as to whether or not something should be published would be made by the committee— at the request of the State-sponsored body, of course, because they are the people who are in the best position to indicate to the committee what is confidential, what is not, what could be used to their disadvantage and what could not. But I submit that the decision should be made by the committee who are entrusted by both Houses of the Oireachtas with this task of examining the affairs of these bodies, of having submitted to them confidential information, who are being trusted with that information. They must be trusted to exercise a discretion which any responsible Member of the House would exercise in such circumstances.

I come now to the last amendment, No. 5, which proposes to add certain bodies to the Schedule. These bodies are Bord na gCon, Gaeltarra Éireann, Bord na gCapall and An Bord Gáis. They are inserted merely as examples. There are quite a number of other bodies which might be added even under the criterion of being solely commercial or trading State-sponsored bodies. Bord Iascaigh Mhara is one that springs to mind. I know it is largely a promotional body but it does engage certainly in some commercial activities. I think it operates boat-yards. Perhaps they engage in other commercial activities.

The Minister spoke about some of these bodies and seemed to suggest that they were not engaged in commercial activities. If I may take the last one first, he spoke of An Bord Gáis as not being really operational yet, that it would be operating only when natural gas came ashore and was being sold. My information is that they are already engaged in the purchase of wayleaves, in negotiations with farmers, providing a pipeline for a supply to Nitrigin Éireann Teo, and the ESB in Cork. I am not terribly concerned about An Bord Gáis and its inclusion. These bodies were put in merely as examples. There are others that can be added. But I am concerned about Gaeltarra Éireann and its exclusion. The Minister suggested that the reason for its exclusion was that it is now very largely a promotional body.

I accept that a great deal of their work is promotional. He mentioned a figure for the amount of their activities that are related to trading and said they have got rid of most of their trading activities. The Minister for the Gaeltacht was not here at the time and that is the reason I am repeating this. I pointed out to him, and he accepted, that Gaeltarra Éireann hold substantial equity holdings in quite a number of companies which are trading. In many cases Gaeltarra Éireann are the majority shareholder but in some cases they are the minority shareholder but is it widespread.

Mr. O'Donnell

All of those are private companies.

Mr. Colley

The fact that they may be private companies does not mean that the activities of Gaeltarra Éireann, who derive their income in the main from the taxpayer, are to be completely free of all scrutiny. It is clear, in relation to the activities I am describing of shareholding in different companies, that they are not subject to scrutiny in this House. If they are all to be excluded from scrutiny in this committee we could not accept that position, certainly not on the grounds that these are private companies.

We are talking not alone about the taxpayers' money but about much more than that. We are talking about the general policy that Gaeltarra Éireann are following in relation to their investment in these various companies, their activities, where they are located, and what they are achieving in the areas concerned. This is something which goes to the basic roots of Gaeltarra Éireann's existence and why they are there. I do not think it could be accepted that activities of that kind on the part of Gaeltarra Éireann should be excluded. I do not know the proportion of Gaeltarra Éireann's income or expenditure which is involved. It is unreal to suggest, from my knowledge of Gaeltarra Éireann's activities, that they should be excluded from the scrutiny of this committee because they are not really, or to any degree, substantially engaged in commercial or trading activities. Whatever may be the structure in the future, to anybody who has any real knowledge of the Gaeltacht situation Gaeltarra Éireann are perhaps the major body concerned with commercial activities, with development in the Gaeltacht in one way or another.

I am not denying that they are not concerned with various other activities, which are not commercial, but the degree of their involvement in commercial and trading activities is such that it would be quite wrong, unreal and might begin to raise questions and suspicions in people's minds if they were excluded, when bodies of the kind listed in the Schedule are included. I strongly urge the Government, particularly the Minister for the Gaeltacht, who I imagine will have a large say in this matter, to include Gaeltarra Éireann in the Schedule to this motion.

It might seem that I have spoken at undue length on this motion but, as I said at the beginning, I regard the small print of this motion to be extremely important as well as the principle. I have tried to deal with a number of aspects arising from the small print and the amendments which I have put down. There is a very interesting paragraph in the Minister's script regarding the adding in of other State-sponsored bodies in which he seems to be saying that the general approach is that all State bodies, which are commercial or trading, are really included. Then he states:

To put the matter beyond doubt, the bodies to be covered by the Joint Committee are listed in the Schedule to the motion.

If that is the real approach, that it is just to put the matter beyond doubt, I hope there will be no objection from the Government side, unless there is a very good reason for their exclusion, to having all State-sponsored commercial and trading companies in and if some of them are overlooked that they can be added in immediately. That seems to be the sense of that statement in the Minister's speech. I am not sure if, on reflection, that is exactly what he would want to convey. I do not think I am being unfair to what he says in that paragraph in interpreting it the way I did.

I want to make it clear that this committee, if they operate even reasonably effectively; could be extremely important. It is very important that we try to get it right at this stage and not have to come back mending our hands time and again when perhaps certain vested interests will have grown up. We should, as far as we can, try to envisage them now and get the matter right at this stage when there should not be any great vested interest on one side of the House or other in regard to the activities of this committee.

I hope the Government will reconsider the position in the light of the amendments we are putting forward and the case I have made and my colleagues will be making. It is important. It could be vitally important but I do not want to see that we end up appearing to have a committee which will review the activities of State-sponsored bodies but which in reality are so hamstrung one way or the other that they cannot effectively do the job. I reiterate something which I suspect most people outside the House do not realise and few people in the House realise, that is, that the amount of work that is involved or can be involved in this committee for Members of either House if they are to do the job envisaged here is enormous. One of the big problems we will come up against is to get Deputies and Senators of high calibre to give the time that is required for the working of this committee. Anything that can be done to smooth the work, in particular anything that can be done by the Minister for the Public Service to assist the Members in not having to spend too much time on donkey work but concentrate on the real work, will be very valuable. I hope the Government will have an open mind on the case we put forward. If they have we can ensure that we get this committee off to a good start. I believe if we do the committee can do a job which could be very important for all of us and indeed for democracy in the country. It largely depends on the attitude the Government adopt arising out of the debate we are having today, whether or not we get it off on the right foot.

Mr. Staunton

It is gratifying in the House occasionally to see a measure of consensus between Government and Opposition regarding the necessity for this motion, the introduction of parliamentary review of semi-State bodies. This issue has in recent years become much more important than it was earlier after the foundation of the State. In the 1920s the development of semi-State bodies such as the ESB represented an infinitesmal proportion of our national budget. They have grown out of all proportion to the original intention of the Government of that day and today they hold an enormous proportion of the national cake. For example, as the Minister stated in his speech, the semi-State bodies he intends including in this parliamentary review have a turnover of £500 million a year, their assets are valued at about £1,000 million, and they employ about 65,000 people. Originally, I presume, they were established on an ad hoc basis, which was sensible at that time. But as time has passed and taking into account the huge proportion of the national budget, national turnover, national assets of this sector, a certain amount of disquiet has developed vis-á-vis the issue of control. The Government may ultimately have control, but at present they are so busy with other briefs in other areas that in practical terms their control of such bodies is minimal. Through the present parliamentary process, there are inadequate means of discussing the activities of such bodies. For that reason I welcome the introduction of the Bill by the Minister for the Public Service. It is most necessary to establish the formal relationship with the Dáil which he described.

I accept his point of differentiation between semi-State bodies in the commercial sector and those in the service sector or the promotional area. I accept it in the sense that I accept this as being the Bill which is being introduced by the Government. However, in terms of concept, of philosophy and of control, I believe that all such semi-State bodies, whether commercial, promotional or service, should ultimately be incorporated in this system. In the service sector there is the same need for this formal relationship with the Dáil, for parliamentary control, for dialogue and for questioning of attitudes. There were practical limitations, the main one being the incapacity of Members of this House to take on a vast new area of additional work at a time when we are finding it extremely difficult to get quorums sometimes for existing committee of the House such as the EEC Committee or the Committee of Public Accounts. I accept that we are going to cover those companies which are in the commercial sector, but I hope that in terms of philosophy the Government accept the view that ultimately other semi-State bodies should be incorporated in this system in possibly two, three or four years hence.

Deputy Colley mentioned Gaeltarra Éireann. A progressively smaller portion of Gaeltarra activities is in the commercial sector. There has been a severe cut-back of their own activities in the commercial field and the vast proportion of their activity at present is in the promotional and developmental fields. Hence they are in the same boat as the Industrial Development Authority, which is not included. It seems to me that if one of these bodies is included, then both should be. If for the time being the attitude of the Government is that the commercial bodies are to go in, on that yardstick Gaeltarra should not be included. In so far as they hold equity—and of course they do—the equity they hold is in private companies, and one might question the broad policy of Gaeltarra Éireann of involvement in taking equity. However, one could not possibly entertain a situation where such committees should examine in any detail the workings of such private companies. This would obviously be a breach of confidentiality and of the whole business of free enterprise in our society. For that reason it would not be acceptable.

Regarding the issue of disclosure of information, it seems that if there is goodwill and if common sense prevails in the semi-State body in question and the committee, this question of disclosure will be minimised. It is very unlikely that we will have a stalemate situation in which the semi-State company refuses to yield information on the basis that it is confidential whereas the committee would demand that such information be granted. I disagree with Deputy Colley's point that the ultimate arbitrator in this situation should be the committee itself. If the committee in question had a political complexion—we are not talking in terms of the present Government or Opposition but for posterity—there is a danger of political motivation of such decision by the committee. Such a committee should not be the arbitrary decider of whether information be divulged as confidential or whether it should be released. If there are reservations on this score it might be useful for the Minister to consider the naming of the Minister himself as the final arbiter in such circumstances. If there is the deadlock to which the Deputy referred, it might be a useful practice for the committee to appeal to the Minister for his decision in such cases, and thus the Minister of the day would be the ultimate decider in cases of such contention. I do not accept that the committee themselves should have his type of arbitrary power in this area of confidential information.

One aspect of the motion needs to be spelt out further. I quote from section 1:

... a Joint Committee ... be appointed to examine the Reports and Accounts and overall operational results of State-sponsored bodies engaged in trading or commercial activities (being the State-sponsored bodies referred to in the Schedule hereto), and to report thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas and make recommendations where appropriate.

There is a weakness in this wording which should be examined more closely. On analysis, if this committee is going to examine reports and accounts and overall operational results, we are talking about an historical analysis. In the world of accounting today it has been recognised in accounting, management and financial circles that there is a weakness in placing too much regard on historical accounting and that in terms of control budgets one needs to look at policies and to discuss the future in addition to examining the past and historical records. I see the practical weakness in the wording in that if for a semi-State commercial body the financial year ends on 31st December and the accounts for that year are not published until the following June, July or August due to difficulties with the auditors of the semi-State body, with the publishing firm, or other such complications, we are getting the results of the year ending 31st December in June or July of the following year. We are into the summer recess of this House at such time, so that the earliest time at which the committee could begin to consider the review of such semi-State body would be October.

Therefore in practical terms, if the examination of reports and accounts and overall operational results of semi-State bodies are to be the work of this committee, we are going at best to examine results of a year which started a year and nine months previously. At worst we may be examining the results of some companies in an historical two-, three- or four-year situation.

I can understand the reluctance at times of the Government and the Minister to allow a review of policy because policy is in the area of Government and policy is reviewed in this House. Having regard to that, there should be some arrangement for a look at the operations of such bodies. I hope there will be a loose interpretation of this examination or the inclusion by the Minister of some note in that regard. If we can examine the reports, accounts and operation, for example, it will allow us to talk about their operations. It will allow us to articulate the views of the people about the semi-State body in question and to pose questions about certain of their activities. It will allow the chief executive and the personnel of the body to reply to the reservations of members of the committee and to articulate the policy of the company. Of course, there may be a clash on whether it should be the policy but presumably it will reflect Government policy ultimately and, at least, the articulation of such a policy in the committee will be a useful public exercise. In addition to examining reports and accounts and overall operational results. I hope the committee will have the authority to talk about the broad day-to-day policy and the immediate future policy of such companies. That is important.

The committee will have useful work to do in terms of the philosophy of the semi-State companies. When such companies start operations there is a great deal of enthusiasm in Government circles and in the sector concerned and articles of association are drawn up confining the activities of the company to a certain area. These are the objectives set by the Government of the day. However, there is a danger as time goes on— and there is a certain amount of evidence of it—that certain bodies begin to act and to take a loose interpretation of the articles of association under which they were set up, perhaps 20 years previously. There is a danger that some companies may go beyond the original intentions of the Government and of the Oireachtas at the time of their establishment. The committee could perform a useful function in discussing such broad matters with the semi-State bodies being reviewed. I hope that cognisance will be taken by the chief executives of the importance of the committee. I hope it will become the practice of the committee in its review of a company to engage in dialogue with the chief executive concerned if he is available. It should have this type of significance and it should become a major committee.

For instance, Aer Lingus have been enormously successful in their operations in the air and subsequently that company broadened their base to include activities in overseas operations in hotels and in leisure activities. Aer Lingus have done a very good job in their overseas activities and it appears from their investments that they have been one of the more successful semi-State companies. The revenue accruing from their investments in overseas operations in hotels has helped the viability of that company but in terms of philosophy one could see the committee questioning the validity of the company in getting into such activity at a certain time. That seems to me the type of work the committee could do with many other companies.

The growth of power of the semi-State companies has built up anomalies and people with a concern for democracy have had some misgivings. The Oireachtas is the premier institution in the country but although we may have the trappings of power here in some cases the reality is different and much of the real power lies elsewhere. There has been an enormous growth in the sectors I mentioned and there has been an erosion of the position of the Oireachtas. I hope that this vital Bill will tend to restore balance in this area.

The primacy of this House must be fundamental to democracy in this country and if the primacy of this House is fundamental to the running of the country it raises certain other anomalies. In practical terms the workload of Deputies who will be appointed to the committee will grow enormously. An anomaly already exists so far as Members of the Oireachtas are concerned with regard to office accommodation, the capacity to delegate constituency work and such matters. As this is the premier institution, nominally other institutions are responsible to this House but even at the fourth, fifth or sixth level in semi-State companies one could find individuals much better equipped than are the Members of this institution. We are not having proper regard to the primacy of the Oireachtas if we allow that situation to continue.

I should like to thank the Minister for the Public Service for arranging the additional help we received last year with regard to secretarial assistance but, with respect, it is not meeting the needs of this age. Individual Members are involved in constituency work, in party meetings, in correspondence, in attendance in this Chamber or in activities of committees such as the Public Accounts Committee, the Committee on Procedure and Privileges and on the Joint Committee for EEC legislation. There is the practical problem sometimes of getting a quorum for such committees because of the involvement of Deputies in other work. If this committee is to be successful, the Deputies participating in it must be supported to a greater extent in terms of secretarial assistance for the delegation of the simpler work that can be delegated. Otherwise the country will suffer as long as that position remains as it is.

I gather that the Minister for the Public Service has a certain amount of goodwill in this area. I am told that one of the problems about accommodation is the availability of space in this area and I realise this presents a difficulty. However, it does not take away from the fact that we must continue to consider ways of upgrading the type of support to which Deputies are entitled. I hope there will be some improvement in that regard. If there is not, this committee will not have the success it should have if it is to be of benefit to the country.

I welcome very much this parliamentary review of State-sponsored bodies and wish it well.

Ruairí Brugha

There is no question but that the Committee of Public Accounts have proved their worth in examining as they do each year the accounts of the various Departments. On a number of occasions that Committee expressed concern about the situation regarding semi-State bodies. Deputies have already mentioned the principle of accountability. That is of concern to the Opposition at present. Perhaps it is because we are in Opposition that we have time to look at that side of the economic life of the State. It will come as a bit of a shock to many members of the public to find that the companies the Minister has scheduled to be included in a review by the proposed committee already have capital assets exceeding £1,000 million and a turnover in excess of £500 million.

Perhaps it is a reflection on Administrations of the past 30 or 40 years that it is only now this motion has come before the House, although it was mentioned from time to time over the past 25 years. The Houses of the Oireachtas should fulfil their responsibility to semi-State companies as they do in relation to State Departments. The type of exercise in which we are at present engaged and the workings of this committee will provide a necessary measure of encouragement, support and public confidence for these companies. As one Deputy mentioned, we have had an increase in the growth and power of these companies over a relatively short period. There are now almost 100 semi-State bodies involving a considerable amount of taxpayers' money and covering a very wide area of commercial life.

One of the questions we are trying to deal with now relates to the publication of material. The Opposition spokesman was correct when he said it should be a matter for the committee to decide having heard from the executives of the bodies examined. We know from experience that committees tend to act as one unit and in a very responsible manner. Our spokesman was also correct when he said that the responsibility of Parliament should come before all other responsibilities and accountability should be laid on the shoulders of those appointed to responsible positions on committees of this kind. Consequently, if the question of the publication of material arose, it will be best dealt with by empowering the committee to decide. Deputy Staunton dealt with that question in a different way and I will return to it in a few minutes.

There are so many semi-State bodies that it does not seem possible that any one committee could deal sufficiently and effectively with their affairs. In the motion the Minister listed 25 companies which the Government felt should be included in the responsibility of this committee. We feel that no semi-State company should be necessarily excluded, although the first priority of this committee should be to look at the companies engaging in commercial activities.

It has been mentioned that it might be thought the many calls for a committee of this kind over the past 20 years might be taken as a criticism of the working of the executives in semi-States companies. This does not enter into it at all. Parliament should have final responsibility and be held accountable for all the companies. Executives of companies of the size of those named in the Schedule should feel the need to have to account to somebody. This should make them all the more effective. This would be a considerable aid to many of the companies mentioned here.

There is a great need for Members of this House to be as flexible as possible when setting out the workload and terms of reference of this committee. We are tackling this situation by way of motion and a number of amendments. I wonder if this is too rapid a means at arriving at the methods of operating such an important committee? Unlike a Bill this motion has to be dealt with here and now. All the amendments must be taken together. When this discussion ends there must be a vote in which the Government side would be deciding yes or no to the amendments put forward by the Opposition. It disturbs me a little bit because this kind of committee is really rather like the Committee of Public Accounts. It is not necessarily a committee which should have its terms of reference worked out other than by some sort of consensus. As the Parliamentary Secretary will agree, it is not that easy to reach a consensus across the floor of the House.

Mr. Kelly

I would not despair of reaching a consensus and I agree it would be very desirable. If we leave a few days before resuming discussion of this item—the debate will obviously not finish before seven o'clock—we might be able to get some kind of agreement as against, as the Deputy says, voting on three or four amendments.

Ruairí Brugha

I agree with the Parliamentary Secretary. There should be some time. There are at least five or six more speakers and both sides should have time to take a look at the different arguments.

Mr. Kelly

I mean we might leave this item over to next week and, perhaps, in the meantime the Opposition may be able to meet me and see if we can come to some arrangement.

Ruairí Brugha

I think that is a good suggestion. One of the reasons why I think it should not be all that difficult to arrive at some kind of working consensus, despite the difference of opinion that has shown itself as between the Minister and Deputy Colley, is that Deputy Colley himself mentioned that, whatever is put forward by the Opposition on this motion, democracy being what it is, the Opposition ultimately should be in Government and will have to wear the opposite side's point of view and whatever has been accepted by the Government. It is from this point of view we have been approaching this matter in arriving at the amendments tabled. It is a serious long-term point of view. It is not for the purpose of putting up the appearance that the Opposition is willing to co-operate and help to ensure semi-State bodies are accountable. It is rather as Deputy de Valera, as chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, and the Opposition members of that committee do; they endeavour to do as good a job as possible while in Opposition.

I believe Deputy Colley's point is a valid one. If the Opposition is to be genuinely involved in this on the basis of a committee of 11, then the number should be not less than five. I can see the Parliamentary Secretary's problem when he says the Government must have a majority. At the same time, he wants to have one independent on the committee.

Mr. Kelly

It is not so much that the Government want any particular thing but this is a committee of both Houses and groups, and even denominations like Independents, might reasonably expect to get a share in it. If Independents sit on this, it will be a good deal more central.

Ruairí Brugha

It might not be that easy to find an Independent who would give as much time as Government and Opposition Deputies would give. As has been pointed out, the amount of time involved may be far greater than any Independent could afford to give. Demands on the time of Independents are greater than they are on those who are members of political parties. If the Opposition is to carry a part of the responsibility for the accountability and operation of semi-State bodies, then it seems to me that, like the Committee of Public Accounts, the chairman should be a member of the Opposition. The Minister suggested the chairmanship should rotate. I believe the system that has worked so well in regard to the Committee of Public Accounts should be adopted and the chairman should be a member of the Opposition. That principle in the Committee of Public Accounts has proved itself over the years.

It has been argued by the Minister that non-commercial bodies should not be included. I do not agree with that. All semi-State bodies using State funds or having a State guarantee in the provision of their capital should be responsible to the Oireachtas. While they may, as the Minister suggested, be responsible in a more direct sense to the appropriate Minister, I am pretty sure no Minister can possibly get around, as this Committee will be able to get around, to looking at the accounts, the working and the general activities of these semi-State bodies.

We welcome this as a beginning, but I can see many problems arising. The demands on time will be tremendous. Deputy Colley referred to the question of engaging the services of persons with specialist or technical knowledge to assist the committee. If the members of the committee are to give the amount of time and energy that will be required to do the work entailed, then some form of secretarial assistance, specialist assistance and advice will be necessary. The accounts side of bodies like the B & I, Ceimicí Teoranta and so on would be quite mystifying to ordinary members and so, in order to do the work effectively, the committee will need assistance and advice. Will the Minister tell us if this reference to the services of persons with specialist or technical knowledge is applicable to the committee as a whole, to the members of the committee or to the chairman of the committee? The Minister seems to have included most of the bodies engaged in commercial activity but we mentioned a number of additional ones in our amendment. The reason for introducing Bord na gCon, Gaeltarra Éireann, Bord na gCapall and Bord Gáis is not specifically to bring out those companies; it is to refer to the principle that companies involved in a commercial way should be included in the Schedule for this committee.

The other point on which there is not agreement at present relates to the matter of policy. I do not think there should be any political difference of opinion on this matter. It is important that all semi-State bodies should have more clearly defined terms of reference or policy authorisation. I do not think that in that area there should be any difference in viewpoint between the Government and Opposition. For that reason we feel that any examination of the activities of semi-State companies should include policy so that there would be rapport between the executives of each company and the members of the committee. This would be useful but I am prepared to listen to the Minister since he is the person who has included those companies.

Although the Parliamentary Secretary has indicated that this is a matter which can be the subject of informal discussion, it would be a pity if we arrived at any rigid conclusion on either side in relation to the matters under discussion, particularly our amendments. The experience Deputy de Valera has had on the Committee of Public Accounts would be useful and when contributing he will be able to give the Minister the benefit of his experience.

Mr. Halligan

It is a very good aspect of the debate that the maximum amount of consensus is being sought from both sides of the House because it underlines the importance of the committee being established by the motion and the importance of the work it will be asked to undertake. To a great extent this is an innovation in our parliamentary procedures and it is correct, therefore, that all aspect of the composition and the role of the committee should be analysed in detail. It is important that before the House reaches a decision the maximum amount of consensus and agreement is reached. I take at face value the assurances of the Opposition that they are looking at the long term in putting forward their various amendments. Perhaps it is only when one goes into opposition one realises that changes should be made in our institutions that will last a long term. I can recall Deputy Lynch's conversion to an electoral commission for the constituency boundaries on the occasion when he realised he had lost a general election. That was a good thing in itself.

I had a hint of that repeating itself when I looked at the first amendment, tabled by Deputy Colley, because it was accepted in an exchange across the floor that there would be a change of Government, this being a parliamentary democracy. Yet a change which is sought on foot of Deputy Colley's amendment introduces the concept of the Leader of the Opposition. What happens if there is more than one party in Opposition and if they do not agree as to who the Leader of the Opposition is? Clearly, the wording of that amendment does not cover the possible composition of future Oppositions in this House.

The amendment is being dictated by the short term, that the Opposition at present consists of one party and it seeks to have five of its members included in the committee and one of those members to be its chairman. For that reason I do not think the amendment can be categorised as being long term in the universal sense and capable of being applied to all situations. If there was a change of Government and the Opposition consisted of two or more parties—we must always permit of the possibility of new parties arising, as they have in the past—how would this amendment stand up? How would the amendment stand up to a situation where we would have four or five parties of equal strength in opposition? Clearly, that amendment would not fit the situation. It has been drafted from a very short-sighted viewpoint of what the opposition would be.

Cognisance has to be taken of the position of Independents. Speaking for the Opposition. Deputy Colley said they were the Government's baby, but they are not. In the other House the Independents, as in this House, sit on the opposite side to the Government. If they are anybody's baby they are the Opposition's baby. If the committee is to be representative of both Houses then it should incorporate Independents. It should also maintain a proportionality between the various parties represented in both Houses. If it is essential to maintain the principle of proportionality and, at the same time, a majority for the Government then there should be agreement between both sides here to expand the membership of the committee so that those two principles would be maintained. I would think it inappropriate to accept the first amendment of the Opposition and at the same time to leave the total number of the committee unchanged.

I cannot accept the construction which is being placed on the function of the committee by the Opposition. The last two speakers stated that they regarded it as a watchdog committee analogous to the Committee of Public Accounts. That is a false analogy which is being used to buttress the argument in favour of the first amendment.

I do not see this committee as being in any way analogous with the Committee of Public Accounts. This is a totally new innovation. The Committee of Public Accounts fulfil an auditorial role. They vet the discharge of moneys voted by this House to bodies directly responsible to this House. On the other hand, semi-State companies have moneys which are not voted by this House, which in some cases they have raised on the commercial markets by borrowing or otherwise. Therefore, the degree of accountability in a financial sense is not analogous. They also usually have a legal character totally different from that of a Department of State.

The role of this committee should be far wider than that being attributed to them by the Opposition. They should be capable of evaluating all aspects of the performances of semi-State bodies, not just financial and not just operational but developmental as well—a mixture of both financial and political, using the small "p". In other words, this committee will have to look into the policy of these companies. I agree with Deputy Colley in that respect and with the general thrust of the Fianna Fáil amendment in that regard, because although it could be argued that one could look at policy on foot of the wording of the motion—that it is there implicity—I should rather see it spelled out explicitly. Therefore I agree with the insertion of the word "policy" as has been suggested, but if one accepts the argument that policy is to be within the ambit of this committee, I do not think one can say they will be strictly analogous with the Committee of Public Accounts which, as I have said, perform an auditorial function. Policy involves political choice and therefore I believe that for the proper functioning of the committee they should have a Government majority and the chairman should be drawn from the Government side. I say that in the full knowledge that on some future occasion there will be another party in Government—I accept there will be a change of Government.

When we are talking about policy we are talking about things like, in connection with the ESB, the sort of energy that should be utilised in future. That is not the kind of area the Committee of Public Accounts investigate. Again in relation to the ESB, we are asking them to spell out their policy in relation to energy requirements during the next quarter or half century. We are asking them for their evaluation of various technologies, energy production, costs, resources and so on, a totally different area altogether. That is why I have said this committee will be a complete innovation. We cannot therefore fall back as a precedent on something that has come out of the 19th century British parliamentary tradition. We should have such a regard for precedent here that we will now and then create precedent. This is a precedent.

Therefore, the question of policy should be at the heart of this committee. In the past, too much of the policy considerations of semi-State bodies have been carried on in secret, very often between the boards of those bodies and the Minister responsible or his departmental officials, and has never seen the light of day, has never been open to parliamentary scrutiny or public debate, and yet the decisions have vitally affected the economic and social life of the country. I say this from practical experience of having been an official in a semi-State body engaged in such a process of consultation on issues of policy.

I think it will be to the benefit of the companies, and Irish parliamentary life in general, if considerations of a policy nature are available for public scrutiny. Policy lies in the area of future choice, of setting out what we see to be our objectives, the problems facing us, the alternatives open to us and the choice and the reasons for the choice. That is the sort of thing that can be properly discussed between these bodies and this House, because very often some of these bodies, notwithstanding the fact that they are responsible to a Minister or a Department, lose sight of the social role that in many cases has been spelled out for them by this House and the other House in statutes.

I do not wish to single out any particular body at the moment or to denigrate them, but 12 months ago, as most of us will recall, an example occurred in which we questioned whether a semi-State body were carrying out the social role assigned to them. For that reason, this aspect of the functioning of these bodies should be at the very heart of this committee's operations. It could be argued that the annual reports and statements of accounts are included in the first paragraph of the motion and that this will ensure policy will be discussed. A strict interpretation of that paragraph is that there would be post hoc consideration, in other words, that which was included in the annual reports.

I have "ghosted" annual reports of semi-State companies and I know the care very often taken to leave out information as much as to put it in. Therefore, if one goes on the strict interpretation of that paragraph, of course there would be many areas of policy which the committee could not examine even on a post hoc basis. Annual reports would not provide us with material for an examination of future policy, which would be very essential.

Another area touched on by Deputy Colley refers to an amendment of his seeking to change paragraph (4) to the effect that discretion in respect of confidential information submitted to the committee by these bodies would be exercised by the committee, from the point of view of publication, rather than by the bodies themselves. This is a very difficult area and I say this from experience of having been involved in a company engaged in the commercial field. I can see the need for some mechanism for a company to ensure that confidential information which could be commercially valuable to competitors would not be disclosed unnecessarily or unwittingly. I can see difficulties for any State company involved, for example, in a joint venture with a private company or another public company in having to say to their partner: "There are certain aspects of our joint operation which we must make available to this committee and which could in turn be made public. Because of the wording of the motion setting up the committee, we as a company have no discretion as to whether this information will be published."

For example, the company for which I worked, the Irish Sugar Company, are involved in a joint venture with a private company through Heinz-Erin. Are we to say, therefore, that the activities of Erin Foods are to come within our scrutiny? Are we to leave out of account, or apply different standards when we come to consider Heinz-Erin in which Erin Foods are involved and without which we could not possibly understand the operations of Erin Foods?

This is a question of balance because I could also see that as the motion is worded it will ensure that the managements of the boards would be more likely to be forthcoming with information if they were assured that on their request information would be kept confidential. If they believe that they simply have the right to make a request for confidentiality but that it would be at the discretion of the committee whether the information would be confidential, I think they would be more circumspect in offering information on the grounds that they are the best judges of their own case, particularly in the case of those companies which are engaged in commercial competition. One can think of a number of companies which are included in the Schedule and would fall into that category. The Schedule should include a number of State companies which are not already included. The suggestion that only commercial or trading companies should be incorporated in the motion is too narrow. Bord Fáilte, Córas Tráchtála and the Institute for Industrial Research and Standards are of as much value to the economic life of this country as some of the bodies included in the Schedule.

Bord Fáilte is one of our biggest industries and I cannot see why it should be left out. Coras Tráchtála fulfils a vital function in the economic life of this country as does the IIRS, and I cannot see why they should be left out either. I cannot think of anything more fundamentally important to the industrial development policy of this country than a proper research and development programme, and the IIRS is at the very heart of that. If, as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach says, the Government have an open mind on the various aspects of the motion, they should give further consideration to the extent of the Schedule of companies.

I strongly support the plea which has been made that this committee be properly serviced, that it will be given not just secretarial help which is very important, but that it will also be given specialised research facilities and assistance. Specialised assistance will be required in relation to the accounts, and will be required from economists, technologists and engineers in dealing with companies such as Aer Lingus and many others. I hope that this committee will not be hamstrung for lack of proper back-up services. As other Deputies have said, the members of this committee will be taking on a most onerous task in terms of time and commitment. Those who take it on deserve the best back-up services and this House should ensure that they get it. I subscribe to the proposition that this is one of the most important committees ever established by this House and that it should be establised on the basis of maximum consensus between all sides.

I welcome the assurance given by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach that the Government have an open mind on this issue. This debate so far has demonstrated that there is a desire on both sides to gain this consensus. I hope the real nature and character of the committee will be thrashed out further because that is where the real difference between both sides is, and we should continue to exchange views on this aspect. This Dáil has the potential to resolve these difficulties. It will go down as the Dáil who set this committee working and chartered for Irish parliamentary politics a totally new direction.

Major de Valera

In the approach to this important matter we have seen parliamentary procedure working at its best today. Too often one sees it working at its worst. There has been a determined consensus from all parties in the House in seeking an objective solution to the problem that this motion and the amendments today are designed to meet. However, everything will depend on the result of the setting up of this committee and what it can achieve.

I am sorry that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach is not here at the moment because I want to direct a few technical questions to him. Where precisely will this committee stand in relation to legal and constitutional status, in relation to both Houses and to the bodies which will be the subject of its investigations? This is stated to be a Joint Committee and a Joint Committee by definition involves both Houses of the Oireachtas. The Rules of this House provide for the setting up of such committees. Unfortunately, the three types of committee that this House has to consider do not seem to be specifically defined, namely, a select committee, a special committee, and a joint committee, although we all know pretty well what they mean. There are rules governing them and I presume the same type of rules are in the other House. Our Standing Orders refer to standing joint committees and I presume it is intended to set this up as a standing joint committee, something that will continue. If there is any point in including the word "standing" from the technical point of view, I just mention it. That is my first observation.

The second matter I should like to deal with, which has attracted some attention here today, is the comparison of this committee with other committees. I am inclined to agree with Deputy Halligan when he says this is sui generis. In agreeing with him—or, to put it another way, in his agreeing with us—that policy is a necessary ingredient here, its distinction from the Committee of Public Accounts is a valid one. The Committee of Public Accounts actually does function, as Deputy Halligan has said, largely as an auditorial committee and, perhaps, a lot of its effectiveness results from the fact that policy is excluded and that, therefore, it is constrained to its auditorial function. Thus far I will go with Deputy Halligan, and I am glad to do so. But there is something more than this.

Our argument in seeking the chairmanship for the Opposition goes rather on another basis. While accepting fully the distinction Deputy Halligan makes, while fully accepting that this is sui generis that there is the distinction he made between the two committees, nevertheless, in the nature of this body, we will advocate here that the approach of principle should be the approach that led to the constitutional convention, if you like, that the chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts should be a member of the Opposition.

In that case the reason was, of course, that the Minister has responsibility for expenditure as well as the accounting officer, under the Ministers and Secretaries legislation, and that the Committee of Public Accounts was precisely what Deputy Halligan said, an auditorial committee. That argument can be applied in a general way to this committee because the Minister is the executive ultimately responsible for the State bodies. The Minister and his Department have an intimate relation, or should have an intimate relation, with these bodies, whatever Minister is concerned. Furthermore, he has a responsibility for them, although at the present moment his answering for that responsibility to this House is extremely defective.

If that is so, one cannot separate the Minister and his Department from the State bodies which are, so to speak, generated from and associated with them. If this committee of the House is to be a body judicially to consider, advise and report on the operations of these public bodies from the point of view of parliamentary control, particularly of expenditure, then the same type of argument applies as applied in the case of the Committee of Public Accounts, notwithstanding the essential difference between the two committees.

In my experience of the Committee of Public Accounts it has been an extremely integrated committee—policy can have two meanings here—where party political considerations are submerged in the common task. Incidentally, in most committees of the House, such spirit prevails generally. Having made that general argument in reply to Deputy Halligan, I should like to mention something which occurred earlier when the Parliamentary Secretary raised a question. Paragraph 126 of Standing Orders, 1974, provides:

The committee, which shall have power to send for persons, papers and records, shall consist of twelve members, none of whom shall be a member of the Government or a Parliamentary Secretary, and four of whom shall constitute a quorum. The committee shall be otherwise constituted according to the provisions of Standing Orders 66 and 69, and so as to be impartially representative of the Dáil.

This is the essential thing which makes the Committee of Public Accounts different from the ordinary committee. Paragraph 66 which is mentioned in paragraph 126, part of which I have quoted, refers to the Dáil motion setting it up. Paragraph 69 simply says it shall elect one of its members to be chairman. The next paragraph dealing with special committees, the point raised by the Parliamentary Secretary, implies that a member of the Government or a Parliamentary Secretary can be a member of a select or a special committee. In fact, they frequently are. It may be a technical question at times as to whether or not they are members, but the Standing Order is open to the interpretation that they are.

What makes the difference is the small addendum to paragraph 126 "so as to be impartially representative of the Dáil". While admitting Deputy Halligan's distinction, there is an argument for the convention that the chairman of this committee should be a member of the Opposition. As in the case of the Committee of Public Accounts, members of the Government and Parliamentary Secretaries are excluded in the motion. Any member of the Government side, because he is supporting the Government, is involved, so to speak, and in a sense he is in the position of judging his own case. Therefore, the general argument developed on that line is in support of what we have urged from this side of the House that the chairman should be a member of the Opposition.

It is most important that this committee should be set up with all the security and power of a full statutory committee of this House. I would ask that this point should be looked at in the final draft of this motion. There is always a complication when the two Houses are involved. So much for what I might call the technicalities of the matter.

This motion is overdue and is very necessary in its own right. In order to appreciate it fully one must refer briefly to the overall problem in a modern democracy of Parliamentary control of administration as against the Parliamentary function of legislation. The Parliamentary control of administration, particularly of finance, presents more and more problems as the complexities of State organisations develop. It is very noticeable that Parliament, because possibly of antiquated procedures and not keeping up with the times, has been losing and in many cases has lost its control, first to the Government and then to the administration. I do not want to expand on that field, but I would like to refer to the situation as it was when we adjourned for the summer recess. To avoid taking up the time of the House may I say that I am speaking in the context of my contribution to the Adjournment Debate at columns 2220 to 2231, Volume 291, of the Official Report of 30th June, 1976?

A very unsatisfactory situation has developed in that this Parliament has for a considerable time now been impotent in regard to current control of the semi-State bodies. I hope to justify that in a moment by specific reference. The situation has developed because, the legislation having been passed and powers given to the Minister, the Members of the Dáil have been unable to get information on behalf of those who supply the money, the taxpayers, by the ordinary method of Parliamentary question. By a technicality a question will be ruled out of order because it will be alleged the Minister has no function. One is told, on the one hand, that the Minister has no function and one is not allowed to discuss or question the matter, while, on the other hand, the Minister and his Department are actively concerned in handing out taxpayers' money and giving directions to these bodies for which he disclaims responsibility. When I say "Minister" I am speaking in general terms. It has no relationship to any particular Government.

One might say the Committee of Public Accounts could deal with this, but precisely the same problem has arisen there. The Committee of Public Accounts has been unable to inquire into the affairs of any of these bodies. The Comptroller and Auditor General has been unable to get the full information and, as the committee itself has pointed out in at least one report, the committee is becoming stultified. Indeed, it was through the reports of that committee that continued pressure has been applied for a motion like this, supported by the feeling of frustration which Deputies and the general public have felt at not being able to find out what was happening and seeing large sums of money which was collected from the taxpayer being applied here and there without having a very clear picture as to how it was being spent. Again, as in the case of Ministers, I am not referring to any particular semi-State body. I would like to make it clear that I agree with those people who have nothing but admiration for the standard maintained and the effort made by the responsible personnel in these bodies. Here we are dealing with a matter of principle, a matter of Parliamentary control. As things have worked out, it can be said that if anybody were looking for a device to prevent inquiry from Parliament, no better instrument could be found than has evolved from the concept of the administration of the State-sponsored bodies. Presumably it was to deal with the problem that this motion was proposed.

There is one aspect of this matter to which I should like to refer and which is the cause of some concern. The Minister says in his speech and in the terms of the motion that it will be confined to dealing with State-sponsored bodies engaged in commercial or trading activity. As the Minister said, that is difficult enough to define and it is not possible to give a precise definition of "State-sponsored bodies". He goes on to give an indefinite definition, depending on the idea that any particular State body will be put into one category or the other, into the non-trading or non-commercial category or into the trading or commercial category, depending on whether the greater part of their current revenue is from sales of goods or services.

This is vague. It is very hard to see from the list what category is in question. One fundamental point is that all categories require the voting of public funds, whether as grants-in-aid or otherwise. If there is to be no taxation without representation—and this House is the representation of the taxpayer—then why should the so-called non-trading bodies be left in the present position? Why are they not to be accountable? I would be prepared to go a long way with the Minister—and I believe the Department of Finance have promised that the case of the non-trading bodies will be looked at if he is prepared to account for them in this House and I would be happy to go along with the rest of the motion. If we are to have a position where some State bodies, depending on what in the last analysis must be arbitrary classification, are to be subject to this investigation and to what I hope will be control, in the best sense of the word, of this committee and another set of bodies will be exempt and will carry on as heretofore—both sets have in common the receipt and expenditure of public money, even the disposal of public money: those who get grants-in-aid have the power to give grants which is something wider than the expenditure of public money—I would be prepared to settle for this if the Minister were to accept parliamentary responsibility.

Failing this, I see dangers. Unless there is an equal provision for parliamentary control and the informing of Parliament as the sovereign authority under the Constitution in regard to the activities, particularly the financial activities, of these other State-sponsored bodies then even this motion will be hamstrung from the beginning. For example, take the incipient debate we had earlier on Gaeltarra Éireann. Is it or is it not? I think Deputy Halligan mentioned Bord Fáilte. Again, a question arose about Bord Iascaigh Mhara. Whatever Government are in power or whatever Oireachtas is in being at the time, if there is this ill-defined borderline, with the present unsatisfactory situation on one side while on the other side there is control, then it will be too easy to transfer from one category to the other. I see a grey area which leaves it open for a Minister or a Government to effect transfers of this nature by bringing into this House a motion on the very indefinite criterion that the greater part of their current revenues are from the sale of goods or services. That seems to be a defect.

If we pass this motion—and I am more than happy to see a co-operative and understanding way of working this—without clearing this area, we are leaving the seed of the weed of future trouble in the ground we are preparing. One cannot get away from the necessity for controlling both types. One way of doing it would be to expand the powers of the Joint Committee. The obvious thing to do in the case of the administrative companies is to let the Minister take responsibility and be answerable for them in the ordinary way. Some supplementation of the existing motion will be necessary to make this new committee effective.

With regard to the working of the committee, it is important to approach it as we have approached it today. Everybody has spoken objectively about it today. There is an anxiety on the part of the three main parties in the House to make this work and to seek a consensus, which is the basis of the successful working of these committees. Something more is needed in the actual working of this committee. This committee will only be effective if there is a high degree of co-operation between the Government and the administration on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the bodies concerned and the committee.

The committee must in no sense set itself up as an inquisition. Its task must be constructive. We must recognise that, in the broader field of parliamentary control generally, time moves on and that the complexity of modern times requires adjustments. It cannot be approached on either doctrinaire or preconceived ideas as to procedures. There must be a willingness on the part of the committee to face realities and to find realistic solutions to problems that may arise. That presupposes that it must completely understand not only the executive point of view of the Government and the administrative problems of the civil service, the Government Departments, but it must also be sympathetic and understand the very real problems with which these State-sponsored bodies are faced.

Since the Committee of Public Accounts has been mentioned so often perhaps it is no harm to say that the secret of its success lies in the fact that there is such tripartite co-operation—the Comptroller and Auditor General on the one hand, the Department of Finance and the accounting officers on the other hand —particularly the Department of Finance and now the Department of the Public Service. The accounting officers of both of those Departments occupy a unique position among accounting officers in that they are supervisors as well as accounting officers in their own right. Then there are the accounting officers themselves. There has to be co-operation between those three distinct elements. Let me repeat: the committee itself, the Comptroller and Auditor General and then the accounting officers with specific reference to the secretaries of the Department of Finance and the Department of the Public Service.

If that mutual trust, co-operation and willingness to be reasonable while holding one's views, were not there in the case of the Committee of Public Accounts, it could not have done its job at all. Anyone who pursues its reports will see that essentially that co-operation is there. The Comptroller and Auditor General is necessary to the committee for it to function at all; on the other hand the Comptroller and Auditor General, needs the support of the Committee, its members being the direct representatives of this House. In the same way the Department of Finance have a supervisory responsibility as have the Department of the Public Service. They have a common interest with the Comptroller and Auditor General and the committee. While the accounting officers themselves have their own problems and are only too glad to have the assistance that can be given by the Comptroller and Auditor General, nobody likes to find something that may be commented on. In their hearts everybody is glad when the proper spirit exists.

In the same way this committee will not be anything more than a grouse shop unless it can start and can maintain this association with the Government and the Administration—and when I say Administration, I mean the Government Departments, the civil service, if you like, on the one hand, and the State-sponsored bodies on the other where there is mutual trust, co-operation, understanding and willingness to see the other side's problem and to achieve workable solutions.

Overall that is by far the best way of getting parliamentary control over both policy and expenditure. I emphasise that because, unfortunately, this problem has been allowed to drift far too long, for various reasons, over very many years. The concept of the State-sponsored body developed too fast and out of proportion to the original concept. As a result of that there has been a good deal of frustration both inside and outside this House. There might be temptations to witch-hunting. Any such temptation must be firmly put aside. Only on the basis of the type of mutual co-operation I mentioned in the case of another committee can this committee work. It augurs well for the future that we are approaching it in this way.

Obviously I shall not have time to finish before we go on to other business. I do agree with Deputy Halligan about policy but the word "policy" has two meanings. What one might call administrative or commercial policy is one thing; what one might call social policy is another. Deputy Halligan mentioned the social role. I would say "yes" but there are also economic and financial roles to be balanced with that. If one is to maintain balances—social, economic and financial—then policy has to enter in. Policy, in that sense, should exist and therefore I urge on the Government that they consider our amendment No.2.

Debate adjourned.

Dáil Éireann debate - Wednesday, 10 Nov 1976

Joint Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies: Motion.

Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 10 Nov 1976