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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 16 Feb 1977

Vol. 296 No. 11

Bula Limited (Acquisition of Shares) Bill, 1977: Committee Stage (Resumed).

SECTION 2.

I move amendment No. 5:

In page 2, after line 28, to add a subsection as follows:

"(4) The sum referred to in subsection (1) of this section shall not be paid until a motion to that effect shall have been passed by Dáil Éireann, which said motion shall not be moved until after the Agreement shall have been laid on the table of each House of the Oireachtas."

The agreement, of course, is defined in section 1 as being the agreement of 12th December, 1975, which is the written version of an agreement which was apparently verbally come to earlier by the Minister with the shareholders in Bula Ltd. who are to be paid in respect of this deal.

The House last night declined to change the consideration figure of £9,540,000 which is to be paid to the vendors, not, I want to emphasise again, to be invested in the company but to be paid personally to the vendors without any reference to the company. The Bill contains six references, in a very short space, a little over a page, to this agreement. This section, in fact, contains two. In subsection (1) it says:

The Minister may acquire shares of the Company in accordance with the Agreement...

This is not simply the buying of shares and that is the end of it. The Minister may only buy the shares in accordance with the terms of the agreement. We in this House do not know—and I cannot repeat this often enough—what the terms of the agreement are. We do not know what way he is buying them in accordance with the agreement. We have established a couple of points. We have established, for example, the very important point—the Minister did not tell us; I told the House and the Minister afterwards confirmed it was right—that the shares do not rank pari passú. It is highly damaging to the position of the State and of the taxpayers that this is what is meant by the phrase “in accordance with the Agreement”. We are entitled to ask how many more such provisions are in the agreement that render unattractive from the point of view of the tax-payers, the purchase of shares from private shareholders. The Minister, by reason of his incredible and unsustainable secrecy, is responsible for the public speculating in this way. This secrecy is not for the purpose of any commercial consideration but in order to avoid the disclosure of matters that would be damaging from the Minister's point of view and to avoid the revelation that this deal which, on the face of it, is a bad one, is even worse than it appears.

This amendment seeks to have the money held up, or not paid, notwithstanding the passage of the Bill, until a motion to release it is passed by the House. What we are seeking is not an uncommon provision. It is merely requesting the passing of a motion by Dáil Éireann for the purpose of allowing moneys to be paid.

Apart from seeking to provide for a motion of this kind, another purpose of the amendment is to give the Minister an opportunity to mend his hand in this regard in that, if, as it appears, he is not prepared to produce the agreement now—I suggest that this is the right time to produce it—at least when the Bill is passed, if it ever becomes law, and there is some doubt in this regard, taking into account the provision of Article 13 of the Constitution, the agreement would be made available to the House. Consequently, at that stage and for the first time, the House will have an opportunity of assessing whether the payment should be made. The Minister suggested that in some way this company would be damaged commercially should the terms of the agreement be disclosed. In view of his stance on this issue, I should like to make a fair analogy and to ask the House to assume that Bula Ltd were a public body, rather than a private body, offering 192,000 shares to the public for subscription. In general terms, I wish to enumerate the sort of prospectus which, under the rules of the Stock Exchange, and the rules of our Stock Exchange are less strict in this regard than are those of many other Stock exchanges, the company would have to publish and make available to any member of the public who was interested or who, potentially, would take up shares in the company.

There are a number of headings which normally would appear in a prospectus of that kind. I shall not go through what would be the equivalent of a full prospectus but shall concentrate on a few basic provisions. Normally, the first heading in a prospectus offering shares would be one which would read: offer for sale of shares. In this regard we would have to reword that in respect of the case we are talking of to make it read something on the lines of "we demand that you buy 192,000 shares, being part of 1,000,000 shares issued to the vendors and issued for a consideration other than cash."

The second heading in a prospectus of this kind—I contend that the analogy is valid since the public are being asked to take up these shares—would be a statement by the directors of the company of their past trading profits and the dividends paid. Normally, this would cover the last five years of the company's trading history and would have to be certified not only by their own auditors but also by independent accountants appointed by the bankers who were underwriting or supervising the offer. Unless that could be done the rules of the Stock Exchange, in this or in any other civilised country, would not allow shares to be offered because the view would be taken that this was one of the issues on which prospective purchasers of shares would need to have information.

Obviously, in the case in point there is no history of profit and there are no underwriters except, in effect, the taxpayers because the deal amounts to an issue of shares to each of 3.1 million people. There are no independent accountants reporting to the public on the accounts and there is no dividend history. Therefore, because these provisions, among others, have not been complied with, there could be no question, under the terms of the Stock Exchange, of an issue of shares to the public.

The third heading that one would see normally in the prospectus of a company issuing shares to the public would be one on such lines as application of the proceeds of the issue or of the sale of shares. Normally, this would indicate the use which a company whose shares were being offered, proposed for the moneys subscribed. In the case we are talking of the company receive no money because all the moneys are going to the shareholders. Consequently, even if they were in a position to do so, and I doubt that they are, they could not inform the public as to the use to which the money would be put. They would be private shareholders who would be getting the money but even if this were not so the paucity of information we have in regard to the company's capitalisation plans or their production plans, all caused by the doubtful situation in relation to planning permission, would render it impossible for the company to comply with that provision.

The fourth heading would be a director's statement as to the essential capital requirements of the company, both in the short term and in the long term. This is the statement generally which certifies that the company have adequate resources for their foreseeable needs. It is a requirement of the Stock Exchange that the directors would certify that statement. In this case the directors say they will need about £25 million, perhaps more, but they do not say how, or on what terms they will raise the money. Neither do they tell us what are to be the duration periods of the loans or on what security the capital is to be raised.

The ordinary company trying to raise money from the public would immediately be knocked if they could not fulfil that condition or if the directors were not in a position to fulfil the condition as they are not in this case.

The Minister has been asked time and time again for this information and has refused to give it. The Minister has refused because he cannot say and does not want to speculate in that regard.

The fifth heading would be the details of the directors and their beneficial shareholders in a normal prospectus. This would normally indicate the experience of the directors in the relevant business, in this case the mining business. It would indicate the duration of that experience and their shareholding in the company. In this case the position would be that the prospectus would have to say that the directors have no previous experience in the mining business. So far as I know, that is the case and it has not been suggested by the Minister that they have previous experience. I must emphasise that I am not trying to criticise Bula or its directors but in considering the company I must relate the facts. If these are painful or hurtful to the company, I am sorry. We have no information as to the beneficial interest in the company of the directors. On the face of it, this may appear to be surprising, but it is not, because apart from the Wright shareholding which we know of, all the other shares, apart from the Minister's proposed shares, are held by a private unlimited company called Bula Holdings. The shareholders of Bula Holdings are not disclosed in the company's office file in relation to Bula Holdings. I am not being critical of that fact. There is no obligation under the Companies Act, 1963 to disclose the membership of a private unlimited company. We are left in the position that 80 per cent of the holdings of Bula Ltd. as things stand now are in the name of a private unlimited company and we do not have the beneficial ownership of the shares in that. Because of that, if this were a normal public issue subject to the normal rules, it would fall down.

The next heading that one would expect to see in a prospectus for a normal public company would be on the lines of a profit and dividend forecast of the directors. Normally, this is regarded as a test of the ability and credibility of the directors and the management of the company. We have asked time and again for this in respect of this company and in respect of what the Minister proposes to do. We have got no profit forecast, and no dividend forecast, either the amount or the likely time when it might be paid. On the evidence it would appear that at least eight years will have to elapse from the date of the start-up of the company before any dividend on earnings that would be attributable to, or available for distribution to the ordinary shareholders would arise. Even on the most optimistic basis, start-up production could not be earlier than about two years from now. One must bear in mind that the planning application is in every sense back at square one. It will take a very long time from after it has been relodged to process this difficult planning application. Up to about two weeks ago the planning application had not been relodged. Inevitably there will be an appeal and almost certainly there will be an oral hearing on this appeal. If the ordinary public company offering shares to the public were not able to give a profit and dividend forecast that would be the end of it. Again, the Minister's proposed purchase falls down on that aspect.

The seventh heading one would normally see in a prospectus of a company asking the public to subscribe would be roughly on the lines of details of assets and liabilities of the company. These are normally based on accounts prepared by the company's auditors and examined and confirmed by independent accountants appointed for that purpose by the bankers who are handling the issue and who normally underwrite it as well. It is normally presented in the form of a certified balance sheet which is usually endorsed by the directors and endorsed independently. The balance sheet would list the issued capital, the reserves, the fixed assets and the liabilities. Where these assets are in property, details are normally given of the tenure of the property and of the extent of the holdings, with a directors' certification for which the directors are personally liable. As well as that, an auditor's certification would be given and an independent valuation of the property made by some well-known firm of valuers. The bank balances, the value of work in progress, and the value of stocks would be given. In this case we know some of these details but I suggest to the House that what little we know about them are known as a result of myself and my colleagues giving the details to the House so far as we could ascertain them. It was not from anything the Minister told us. For example, we gave details of the charges on the company's assets, we introduced the fact that the company had received no money in cash or cash subscriptions for the million shares they had issued. We have been told that there were valuations for the company's assets ranging from just marginally under £1 million to £106 million. The actual price being demanded for the shares that the Minister is buying was fixed by a panel of arbitrators acting in a manner described by the Minister as horse trading.

That is not so.

This is rather difficult since the Minister in two of his Second Stage speeches referred to horse trading as being the method used here, on I would safely guess, six occasions.

Not by the arbitrators, which is the point the Deputy is making.

I am only correcting the Deputy for the record.

I am glad that the Minister corrects me for the record sometimes because that underlines the number of times he makes no attempt to deny what I say. We are entitled to ask ourselves whether we, the Minister and this House, are engaged in a serious commercial assessment or whether we are having some sort of day out at a horse fair when we engage in this operation?

I have given seven headings of absolute importance under which disclosure is mandatory if an offer so serious is to be made to the public. It is not the law of the land directly which makes disclosure of these matters mandatory. It is the rules of the Stock Exchange. Those rules are there for the protection of the public. Here we have a situation where the public are being committed, in effect, to subscribing for shares at a substantial price and where all the rules that the Stock Exchange feel are necessary safeguards are not complied with. Not one of those seven headings—and they would be seven of the basic, fundamental headings in a prospectus on the offer of shares for sale to the public— has been complied with here. It would be bad enough if one was not complied with but all seven are not complied with, and they are only the basic ones. Anybody who has seen a prospectus knows that it is a big document which goes on and on for pages in very small writing and covers an enormous amount of ground in order that the public might be safeguarded. I could go on and give probably another seven or 17 specific deficiencies which exist in this case.

We do not even know in this case when the business is going to start and what the company is going to do about, for example, working capital. The example I have cited should be sufficient for the Minister and the House as a whole to realise the shortcomings in investment terms of his approach. I doubt if the betting procedures engaged in by even the most unsophisticated newspaper in this or any other country would permit that newspaper to take an advertisement soliciting investment from the public when the deficiencies I have listed here in relation to this matter exist. It is undisputed and is common case that this information is not available, and we are entitled to ask how can the Minister persist in this approach. How can he be supported continuously by a majority of the Members of this House when all these patent deficiencies exist? Do the Members of the House care? Is the only function of this House now to rubber-stamp whatever the Minister of the day happens to bring in?

I have shown in detail that the minimum measure of disclosure required in any appeal for or solicitation of investment funds by companies who are in competition with other companies has not been complied with here. For those companies—companies who offer shares to the public from time to time—this information is publicly quoted on the stock exchange.

Commercial privacy is just as necessary as it is in the case of Bula. Nonetheless they give all this information. This is the private information we are asking from the Minister and we are not getting it. Some of this information at least—not by any means all of it—is contained in this agreement we are asking for and the Minister will not give it on grounds of commercial secrecy. How is it therefore that any and every public company in this country give it in a prospectus every time they invite the public to subscribe for shares? How is it that they are able to give that information without damaging themselves commercially? Even if they are not inviting the public at a particular time to subscribe they have to file in the Companies Office in Dublin Castle a very detailed annual return, much more detailed than in the case, for example, of a private company like Bula Ltd. They are able to do this without damaging their commercial viability.

If large public companies who are in direct competition with others can do it why cannot a private company such as this who are hardly in a competitive situation, because the sale of lead and zinc is not really on the open market? A cartel situation exists in relation to it and the only alternative frequently to the prices fixed by the cartel would be for the company to try to sell their concentrates either to a new Irish smelter, if and when there is one, or alternatively to some Eastern European smelter which is not part of the cartel.

This is not an instance of commercial viability or commercial interest being protected by secrecy. This is a case of accountability to the public which is not being observed. It is only by the release to the public, and in particular to this House here and now, of the same level of information as is normal in relation to any public trading company that the Minister can fulfil his responsibility, not just to the Oireachtas but to the public and, I might add, to the courts, who may well have to make decisions about the validity or otherwise of this proposed legislation. I hope that it will come to that, whether as the result of a reference by the President or of an action by some individual citizen, because it is a matter the courts should concern themselves about and it will give the courts a great deal to think about and to chew upon.

I asked a barrister whom I know if he would go through, on my behalf, the Acts of the Oireachtas since the 1920s onwards to try to find a precedent for a Bill of this kind. He has failed to find any. We have been asking the Minister here, several of us for several weeks, for a precedent and he has never come up with one, so it is fair enough to assume that there is not one. The man whom I asked to go through as many Acts as he could to find if there was a precedent told me he could not find a precedent, but he did come up with two Acts fairly similar to this in that they both refer to and purport to ratify agreements made by the Minister of the day with companies or organisations for the takeover either partly or wholly of them. He came up with two such Acts. By saying he found two, I am not suggesting there are only two, and that exhausts the list. It does not by any means. There were two which seemed to be very apposite to this.

One is the Foyle Fisheries Act, 1952, where the State made an arrangement with the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries in Northern Ireland and the Foyle Fisheries Commission to take over the old Foyle fisheries and to administer them jointly as between the North and South with a new type of commission which would have responsibility jointly to the Six County authorities and to the Government here in Dublin. That agreement is scheduled in the Act. Another one is the Great Northern Railway Act of 1953 where the State, acting through CIE, I think. agreed to take over the old Great Northern Railway. Needless to say they made an agreement. You would have to reduce a complicated transaction like that to writing and it was reduced to writing. That agreement is referred to constantly throughout the Act and the agreement is scheduled, he tells me, in the Act. He believes there are many more.

I know that in very many cases where the agreement was lengthy—and it may well be lengthy for all I know in this case—it was often the practice not to schedule the agreement in the actual Bill for the sake of space, to save printing costs and so on. It has been the practice to lay the agreement on the Table of the House so that, well in advance, Deputies would have the opportunity to examine it fully. I was looking at the Order Paper last week and there are three motions down to ratify three agreements which the State entered into. Each of the motions ends up with the words "which agreement has been laid on the Table of each House of the Oireachtas" or "has been laid on the Table of the Dáil", as the case may be. They relate to agreements about coffee and cocoa and tin as far as I remember. They are still on the Order Paper. It was not contemplated by whatever Minister is responsible for cocoa and coffee and tin—I presume it is the Minister for Foreign Affairs—that the House would be asked to ratify those agreements and bind the State to them, or by them, without letting the House know what those agreements were and what was in them.

In this Bill we are asked to ratify something which is a great deal more important for everyone in the country than an international agreement about cocoa and we are not allowed to see the agreement concerned. The reason given is that it would be commercially damaging. I have shown that the type of things which would be in this agreement would be in a prospectus issued by a public company. That company would be in trading competition with many other companies and would be much more likely to suffer than a company engaged in the rather specialised business of mining which simply has to make an agreement with a smelter to take its concentrates. Those companies are not damaged commercially by giving the kind of information we have been seeking. How can Bula Ltd. be damaged? Are we not entitled to be suspicious when the agreement and the information are not given to us? Can the Minister complain if suspicion is widely felt throughout the country in these circumstances?

As to what?

As to what is behind all this. Why the secrecy? Why not produce the agreement? Today we have produced one very important fact——

That is not very specific.

——one matter of extreme importance in the agreement which was not published, that is, the fact that the shares do not enjoy equal voting rights and that the State will be in a permanent minority situation, always being outvoted. How many more such things are there and is it any wonder in this atmosphere of unjustifiable secrecy—and I have demonstrated that it is unjustifiable—the public will continue to be suspicious about the whole thing?

Not on one side.

The Deputy should not interrupt.

I rise to deal briefly with one matter which was adverted to by Deputy O'Malley in passing today but which he raised last week, that is, the interaction between the provisions of the Constitution relating to the promulgating of laws, the present Bill and the agreement referred to in section 1.

The Bill which the House is considering provides for the acquisition of shares by the Minister for Industry and Commerce in the company referred to in section 1 and authorises him to expend sums up to a specified maximum amount in such acquisition. It makes provision for matters connected with and consequential upon such acquisition and expenditure. The Bill, when enacted, will not in any way make the agreement referred to in section 1 law. It is not correct to suggest the Bill proposes to make the agreement the law of the land, or that the Bill ratifies the agreement, or that the President is required to promulgate the agreement when exercising his functions under Articles 13 and 25 of the Constitution.

It is by no means unusual for Ministers to enter into contractual arrangements with outside parties. When they do so, the legal rights and obligations of the parties arise from the agreements and not from any statutory source. Exactly the same situation will exist in relation to the agreement referred to in the section we are now considering. This Bill, when enacted, will confer authorisation to carry out the terms of the agreement, but it gives no statutory force to them. Any legal rights and obligations of the parties will continue to arise from the agreement and not from the statute.

Accordingly, by passing this Bill, the two Houses of the Oireachtas will not require the President to promulgate the agreement. He will be required to promulgate a law authorising the Minister to do certain things specified in it. This is a normal function, of course, and a proper one for him to perform.

Would the Attorney General not agree that the Minister is authorised by this Bill to do certain things and I quote from section 2 (1) of the Bill, "in accordance with the agreement"? Assuming the Bill is passed, and assuming it is signed by the President, the Minister will be empowered by the Oireachtas to do X in accordance with the agreement. If it were to happen that, after the Bill is passed and enacted into law on the signature of the President, a copy of the agreement, which we cannot now find, were to come into the hands of a private citizen, and if that citizen were to read the terms of the agreement and say: "My goodness, the Minister did X all right but he did not do it ‘in accordance with the agreement'", could that citizen not then go to the courts for a declaration that the Minister acted ultra vires in doing X?

Could that citizen not produce to the court the agreement and say: "Under section 2 (1) of this Bill the Minister was entitled to do X but only ‘in accordance with the terms of the Agreement' and here is the agreement and clause 7 (g)"—or some such clause—"is not complied with. Therefore the Minister did not do X ‘in accordance with the terms of the agreement'. Therefore what he did was unlawful." Would that not be the situation, that the terms of the agreement are what determine the validity or legality of the Minister's action? In the circumstances, would the court not have to look for the agreement? On the other hand—naturally, I would like to have time to prepare a reply to the Attorney General—would there not also be the provision that a citizen could go to the court after the Minister did X that he is allowed to do under the terms of the Bill and say: "The Minister is allowed to do that but only ‘in accordance with the terms of the Agreement'. I have not seen the terms of the agreement; the court have not seen it. How does the court know or I know or any citizen know that he has done it in accordance with the terms of the agreement? How therefore do you or I know that he has done it in accordance with the law of the land?" Thereupon he would request the court to request the Minister to produce the agreement so that it could be scrutinised by the court and the citizen concerned to see if the action of the Minister was "in accordance with the terms of the Agreement". If it was not, the court would have no option but to say that the Minister acted ultra vires, beyond his powers, that he did not act lawfully in this matter because he had not complied with the terms of the section which in section 2 (1) are “in accordance with the terms of the Agreement”.

There are many other references— in subsection (3) it says "any right or power referred to in the Agreement" being exercisable by the Minister: in section 3 (2) there is "right or power referred to in subsection (1) of this section or referred to in the Agreement as being vested in the Minister..." Does the Attorney General see in section 3 (2) the two kinds of power that are conferred on the Minister and that may be exercised by him? There is first, the right or power referred to in subsection (1) of this section and secondly, there is a right or power referred to in the Agreement and this subsection seems to give equal validity, equal legality to each type of right or power. The right or power contained in the section or conferred by the section is no greater than the right or power "referred to in the Agreement"— and I am quoting the words "referred to in the Agreement". That is section 3 alone.

Section 4 (3) provides that the Minister for Finance may after consultation with the Minister and subject to the Agreement sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of any shares of the company held by him under this Act. If the Minister for Finance does purport to sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of any shares held by him in the company under the Act, a citizen who disapproves of the sale and says, for example, that the Minister should have held on to the shares or not sold them so cheaply, may say to a court that the Minister did not comply with the phrase or words in section 4 (3), "subject to the Agreement". The court would say: "We have not seen the agreement. The agreement is part of the law of the land because the Minister has to act in accordance with it and it is referred to continuously in an Act of the Oireachtas but we have not seen it. Therefore, until we see it we cannot know whether the Minister complied with it". The court would thereupon make an order, as I suggest they are entitled to do, calling for production of the Agreement to the court for consideration of its terms by the court and by the parties.

Section 5 says that all moneys required from time to time for the acquisition under this Act and pursuant to the Agreement, of shares of the company shall be advanced out of the Central Fund. It is not just the acquisition under this Act; if the proposition were as the Attorney General says, it would stop there; it would be the acquisition under this Act. But it does not stop there. It says "acquisition under this Act and pursuant to the Agreement". There are two conditions with which the Minister must comply. First, he must get the power given him by the passage of this Bill into an Act of the Oireachtas. Secondly, he must also act pursuant to the Agreement. I respectfully suggest to the Attorney General that failure to fulfil the terms of the section, on his own argument here, failure to do so, to buy the shares or get the money from the Central Fund pursuant to the Agreement means that he would be acting unlawfully if he did not do it pursuant to the Agreement. The words are here and the words "pursuant to the Agreement" are part of the law of the land. He cannot be seen to act either in accordance or not in accordance with that law unless the Agreement is actually produced.

If, as seems obvious, the agreement will have to be produced to a court after this measure is enacted, why not produce it now so that the Oireachtas will know where it is going? We may be legislating absolute lunacy for all we know. Why not let us know in advance so that we shall not legislate in the dark? These continuous references such as "subject to the Agreement", "pursuant to the Agreement" and so on make it clear that in practice the agreement becomes the law of the land and the Minister is bound by the agreement. It is not enough for him to spend money and buy shares; he must do it subject to the agreement, in accordance with the agreement, and pursuant to the agreement. How can a court say whether he did or did not act subject to the agreement, in accordance with it, having regard to it, and so on, unless it sees the agreement? If the court has to send for the agreement and have it produced in order to adjudicate on the validity or legality of the Minister's exercise of these powers, any citizen is entitled to see it because any citizen is entitled to go to the High Court and ask the court to make an order in the particular circumstances of this rather unusual legislation.

Therefore, I repeat what I said last week that the President will have to consider deeply the implications of signing or purporting to sign into law a Bill of the Oireachtas which on the face of it he himself will be unable to promulgate as it is his duty to do and which, on the face of it, binds citizens and in particular binds the Minister in a way that the citizens at large cannot be aware of or cannot ascertain.

Apart from the taxing provision of which I spoke last week—the fact that 3.1 million people have to provide £9.54 million—there is also the aspect that the Minister is empowered to do certain things in accordance with the agreement, subject to the agreement or referred to in the agreement or pursuant to the Agreement. Any citizen is entitled to examine the actions of a Minister to see if he acts in accordance with the law. How can a citizen do this when he does not know what the provisions of the agreement are. He does not know if the Minister acted "in accordance with the terms of the Agreement" because he has not the agreement. Is he not entitled to go to the High Court and ask for it so that the Minister's actions may, in a democracy, be adjudicated on for the public to whom he is accountable in the long run and in particular so that his actions may be adjudicated on by the people to whom he is accountable in the short term, the elected representatives of the people in this House?

The matter on which we differ relates to the suggestion made by the Deputy that in some way the President would be acting wrongly in promulgating the law. The point I wished to make—one which, with respect, I do not think the Deputy has answered—is that this legislation is not ratifying the agreements; it is not requiring the President to promulgate the agreement; it will merely authorise the Minister to do certain things and will have certain consequential provisions in it relating to the authorisation given in it.

I rose merely to point out to the House that the legislation we are being asked to enact was not something which would place the President in any particular difficulties. He will be able to do what the Constitution clearly allows him to do, namely, to sign and promulgate this Bill if passed by both Houses.

In relation to the other area the Deputy's main remarks adverted to, I do not wish to speculate on the kind of actions that may be taken by the private citizen if and when this Bill becomes law. I have considerable faith in the common sense of our judges. I do not think the sort of outcome the Deputy envisages is likely to occur.

We had better leave the President and the courts to make up their own minds.

With confidence.

Acting Chairman

Does the Deputy wish to withdraw the amendment?

Not before giving the Minister an opportunity of denying any one or more of the points I made. If he wished to avail of this opportunity it would be quite unfair and improper of me to withdraw the amendment before he had done so.

From the long silence we can assume that the Minister does not wish to demur on any of the points I have made. We are now having legislation by silence. Sixty-five of 67 Deputies will walk through the lobby and say Yes or No as the case may be, and that will be it. We have a silent Minister. This is a situation without precedent, where he is clearly unable to deny the truth of anything I have said. He lets it all go by default; but his contempt for public opinion and for this House is such that it does not matter a damn. It is boots going through the lobbies that will count in the long run. The people will have an opportunity in the not too distant future to express their opinion of the Minister's opinion of the elected representatives of the people.

I set out at length why the non-provision of this information is untenable. The Minister for Industry and Commerce, Deputy Justin Keating, agrees with me, by his eloquent and prolonged silence, that there is no justification for his refusal to publish this agreement. If that is the way he wants it, let it be.

Amendment put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 57; Níl, 65.

  • Andrews, David.
  • Barrett, Sylvester.
  • Brady, Philip A.
  • Brennan, Joseph.
  • Breslin, Cormac.
  • Briscoe, Ben.
  • Brosnan, Seán.
  • Browne, Seán.
  • Brugha, Ruairí.
  • Burke, Raphael P.
  • Callanan, John.
  • Calleary, Seán.
  • Carter, Frank.
  • Colley, George.
  • Collins, Gerard.
  • Connolly, Gerard.
  • Crinion, Brendan.
  • Cronin, Jerry.
  • Daly, Brendan.
  • Davern, Noel.
  • de Valera, Vivion.
  • Dowling, Joe.
  • Fahey, Jackie.
  • Farrell, Joseph.
  • Faulkner, Pádraig.
  • Fitzgerald, Gene.
  • Fitzpatrick, Tom (Dublin Central).
  • French, Seán.
  • Gallagher, Denis.
  • Geoghegan-Quinn, Máire.
  • Gibbons, Hugh.
  • Gibbons, James.
  • Gogan, Richard P.
  • Haughey, Charles.
  • Healy, Augustine A.
  • Hussey, Thomas.
  • Kenneally, William.
  • Kitt, Michael P.
  • Lalor, Patrick J.
  • Leonard, James.
  • Loughnane, William.
  • Lynch, Celia.
  • McEllistrim, Thomas.
  • MacSharry, Ray.
  • Meaney, Tom.
  • Molloy, Robert.
  • Moore, Seán.
  • Murphy, Ciarán.
  • Noonan, Michael.
  • O'Kennedy, Michael.
  • O'Leary, John.
  • O'Malley, Desmond.
  • Timmons, Eugene.
  • Tunney, Jim.
  • Walsh, Seán.
  • Wilson, John P.
  • Wyse, Pearse.

Níl

  • Barry, Richard.
  • Begley, Michael.
  • Belton, Luke.
  • Belton, Paddy.
  • Bermingham, Joseph.
  • Bruton, John.
  • Burke, Joan T.
  • Burke, Liam.
  • Byrne, Hugh.
  • Clinton, Mark A.
  • Cluskey, Frank.
  • Collins, Edward.
  • Conlan, John F.
  • Coogan, Fintan.
  • Cooney, Patrick M.
  • Corish, Brendan.
  • Cosgrave, Liam.
  • Costello, Declan.
  • Coughlan, Stephen.
  • Creed, Donal.
  • Crotty, Kieran.
  • Desmond, Barry.
  • Desmond, Eileen.
  • Dockrell, Henry P.
  • Dockrell, Maurice.
  • Donegan, Patrick S.
  • Donnellan, John.
  • Dunne, Thomas.
  • Esmonde, John G.
  • Finn, Martin.
  • Fitzpatrick, Tom (Cavan)
  • Flanagan, Oliver J.
  • Gilhawley, Eugene.
  • Governey, Desmond.
  • Griffin, Brendan.
  • Halligan, Brendan.
  • Harte, Patrick D.
  • Hegarty, Patrick.
  • Hogan O'Higgins, Brigid.
  • Kavanagh, Liam.
  • Keating, Justin.
  • Kelly, John.
  • Kenny, Enda.
  • Kyne, Thomas A.
  • L'Estrange, Gerald.
  • Lynch, Gerard.
  • McDonald, Charles B.
  • McMahon, Larry.
  • Malone, Patrick.
  • Murphy, Michael P.
  • O'Brien, Fergus.
  • O'Connell John.
  • O'Donnell, Tom.
  • O'Leary, Michael.
  • Pattison, Séamus.
  • Reynolds, Patrick J.
  • Ryan, John J.
  • Ryan, Richie.
  • Spring, Dan.
  • Staunton, Myles.
  • Taylor, Frank.
  • Thornley, David.
  • Timmins, Godfrey.
  • Toal, Brendan.
  • White, James.
Tellers: Tá, Deputies Lalor and Browne; Níl, Deputies Kelly and B. Desmond.
Amendment declared lost.

I move amendment No. 6:

In page 2, after line 28, to add a further subsection as follows:

"(5) At the same time as the laying of the Agreement on the table of each House of the Oireachtas there shall be laid on the table of each such House all documents submitted to the Arbitrators appointed under the Agreement by each of the parties to the Agreement.".

I believe much the same arguments which applied to the last amendment apply to the principle in this amendment. There is, of course, a difference. The last one related to the moving of a motion for the payment of money in the House. It also related to the laying of the agreement on the Table of the House. This amendment seeks, as well as having the agreement laid on the Table of the House, to have the various other documents referred to continuously throughout the debate, when the Minister spoke, which is not today, laid on the Table of each House. It seems to me that my task in this matter must be a simple one.

There was no reply to what I had to say the last time. There was a very minor interjection by the Minister in the middle of my speech saying that he was always very keen to keep the record right and he wanted to correct some words I used which I attributed to him. The Minister corrected my attribution to him of the use of the words "horse trading". Since he was so keen to get the record right so far as the use of those words was concerned, one is perfectly entitled to draw the conclusion that because he said nothing else, even though we waited, perhaps, 30 seconds for him to reply and specifically invited him to do so, everything else I said was right.

The Deputy cannot so assume.

I am afraid that the public are entitled to assume that. If there is no denial of statements made the person not denying, whether he likes it or not, is being taken as unable or unwilling to deny.

The Minister cannot have it both ways. I believe the procedure we are going through now is described in the Standing Orders of the House as debate. Would you, in your capacity as chairman of the Committee on Procedure and Privileges, bring for consideration before that committee at its next meeting the question of finding a more appropriate word for the word "debate" to describe the proceedings on this Committee Stage? It does not seem to me to be debate whatever else it is. It is a constant reiteration of the proof of the badness of this deal, the incompetence of the Minister in relation to it and in relation to the post he holds generally. The Minister's inability to defend himself and/or unwillingness to answer questions is in my approximately nine years in the House the most revealing performance by any Minister I have ever heard. I suppose everyone of us, who held the post of Minister at some time, was in a difficulty answering questions but at least we made a reasonable attempt if it was only for the sake of trying to defend our position or trying to extend courtesy to the House. Neither of those considerations appears to apply to this Minister who by his own actions and his own silence underlines his obvious incompetence and the mess he has made, in the opinion of a great many people in the country, of this whole affair.

The superior genius we were led to believe that existed in the Department of Industry and Commerce for the past four years has now been shown, in the course of this debate, in his true colours. For the sake of the country the sooner he departs from that office he holds the better. He has now demonstrated by his own actions—it gives me no great pleasure to say it— his patent unfitness for the office he holds.

I could go through all the arguments I went through on the last amendment. They all basically apply in principle to this amendment. I can add as many arguments again if that is necessary but I fail to see why I should cause my voice to deteriorate further. There is no point in making the arguments if they are accepted. The Minister has now accepted them. I am entitled to allow my colleagues, if they wish to contribute, to do so or to allow the Minister, who apparently at long last has been provoked into talking——

The Deputy's reasoning is wrong.

Is that right? It must be a great consolation to the Minister in those circumstances that in respect of whatever course the debate takes he will still get 60 or 65 people to put it through. I wish that instead of ten or 20 people, there were a few hundred or a few thousand people to watch this performance. I wish there were more than just a handful of people in the Press Gallery to report this because one gets reports written in some of the daily newspapers by people who are never present in the House during the debate. If more people were there they could see what is happening. They could report what they see. Unfortunately, when they are not here they cannot report what they see. If they were here during the past hour they would have found it interesting. They would have witnessed something of which I know of no precedent in the history of the debates in the House.

I will start by pointing out that we are on amendment No. 6 which relates to the discovery of documents. It would be hard to gather that from the tirade we have just heard. Every time Deputy O'Malley purports to quote me it is done with distortion, imprecision and not with the objective of conveying in an unbiased way what I said. It is done with the idea of putting a distorted gloss on what I say in an effort to validate some sort of lawyer's argument, not by the process of finding out what is true but by making an argument. I, now, not specifically about any recent statement of his or about the last amendment but in general, want to indicate to the House that if I do not repudiate him time after time it cannot be assumed that I agree with him. If I occasionally set the record right, it cannot be assumed that in other cases I do not simply ensure the continuing distortion and put up with it because in the end we are judged by the people at large and we are judged by those reading all the Parliamentary record in an unbiased way. That sort of trick impresses nobody.

We have been repeating ourselves. We were told last night by the Deputy that this Bill could take one, two or three months—he was not sure. Of course, he has been repeating himself. You asked the House to take amendments Nos. 1 and 5 together because they are very like each other. We had a lengthy argument on amendment No. 1 and I decline to go around the horsepond again on something practically identical. Ordinary procedure of the House would have indicated that they be taken together. It was sheer obstruction and a desire to waste time on the part of Deputy O'Malley——

This is a matter on which the Chair makes a decision and the Minister's remarks are critical of the Chair and the Chair only.

It was deliberate obstruction to insist on what was a formal right but which he might well have waived in the interests of respect for Parliament if we had taken Nos. 1 and 5 together.

On a point of order, are we to take it that what the Minister is saying is that, despite the ruling of the Chair, he decided that these two amendments were so similar that they should have been taken together and that, therefore, he decided he need not reply to the argument on amendment No. 5? If that is what he is saying, I suggest it is clearly critical of the Chair and the ruling of the Chair in dealing with these two amendments.

We should get on to the amendment in question, amendment No. 6.

What I am about to say is not something new but I will say it again. The proceedings of the board of consultants were confined to the parties concerned as is the case with arbitration proceedings of this kind generally, as is the norm in such circumstances. The documents prepared by the two parties were submitted on the understanding that they would be confidential to the board and to the two parties. I would be in serious breach of that confidentiality, that norm, if I were to make the documents available now. The principle raised, in a special partisan way, in a special instance, goes far beyond this case. Where an agreement between private interests or between the State and a private interest of any kind provides for arbitration, it must be understood beyond doubt that these proceedings will be confidential. Information of the most confidential nature, the release of which could have serious implications for a commercial company, may be submitted in such proceedings. It is unthinkable that the publication of such proceedings should be required. If we were to make an exception in this case, as we are continuously asked to do, no commercial interest could engage in arbitration or comparable process with a Government Department or an agency of a Government Department in a meaningful way.

The agreements which I concluded last year with eleven offshore exploration consortia provide for arbitration. Those proceedings could involve the submission of information of a highly confidential and sensitive nature. In the circumstances, therefore, it is clear, as it was always clear, that I cannot accept the amendment. The objective effect of this sort of precedent we ought to ponder and on the special attitudes and treatment required in this instance by the efforts of Deputy O'Malley in amending the Bill. This sort of precedent, were it to be introduced, would have an effect because one cannot make particular decisions in one instance and not have them generalised; one has to treat categories of things in a way that is seen to be consistent. What, in effect, this demand that arbitration has its documentation published in toto would do when private companies can carry on their business with normal confidentiality is to hamstring the State in relation to its dealings with private industry and, most especially in dealing with multi-nationals. I am not in a position to judge the internal workings of Deputy O'Malley's consciousness so I do not know whether that is a result he intends or not but that is the result this action would produce if it were acceded to.

The Minister has talked about a precedent being sought to be created in this amendment. In the light of that observation it is necessary that I again point out to the Minister that the precedent being created in this Bill is being created by the Minister. The Minister is bringing in a Bill providing for the Oireachtas to agree to certain actions by him being subjected to an agreement the terms of which the Oireachtas is not aware of. There is no precedent for that. The unprecedented nature of this matter before the House is a direct consequence of the Minister's decision and nothing else. I noted that the Minister made a number of generalised assertions—something that is not uncommon—and he said, more specifically, that the documentation submitted by both parties in this case to the arbitration was submitted on the basis of confidentiality. He implied, although he did not say, that the basis on which it was submitted was that it would be confidential and remain so, even after the arbitration was finished. I should like to ask the Minister whether that specific requirement was laid down either in the agreement or whether it was a specific submission to arbitration or what. Is the Minister referring to a specific matter that was spelt out in relation to this arbitration or is he merely making a general observation?

There was no such specific consideration or specific commitment; it was regarded as the norm.

I rather suspected there was not because of the way the Minister put it. Of course, he was making his usual generalised statements without backing them up. He attempted to suggest that here he was being specific in relation to this case. It now transpires that he was not. Therefore, the Minister cannot fall back on what he alleges is the norm. I suggest he has to justify to the House for refusing this amendment some reasonably concrete evidence—I am not too demanding in this regard— that disclosure of the documents involved in this amendment would be damaging. I concede straight away that I can conceive that some of the documents which might be involved in this could be damaging, particularly if they contained projections of how the mine might be worked and so on.

We are getting somewhere now.

The Deputy may think he is but he should not rush into it again.

It was Deputy Colley who was speaking and maybe he thinks he is getting somewhere.

It was Deputy Esmonde who thought he was getting somewhere.

I said the Deputy was getting somewhere; he is learning.

I can conceive of the possibility that some of these documents, if produced, might be damaging. I do not know if they would or not but it is a possibility. However, there is an obligation on the Minister in regard to any such documents specifically to put it on the record that that is so and not merely to rely on a general assertion, as he tried to. There is a further obligation on the Minister to say in relation to those documents submitted which would not be damaging that he will agree to produce them as demanded in this amendment or, alternatively, give a good reason, not a generalised vaporisation, for not producing those documents.

In addition to the documents submitted, the amendment envisages laying on the Table of the House the agreement referred to in section 1. If there are clauses in that agreement which would be damaging if disclosed, there is an obligation on the Minister to indicate that they would be damaging and to give a general indication as to why that would be so. There is an obligation on him to agree that portions of the agreement which would not be damaging should be laid on the Table of the House, and in particular to justify his stance that this House is not entitled to know the terms of the initial State investment in this company. The Minister may say certain items would be damaging but it is not enough for him to say that. He has got to give some indication of the way in which they would be damaging. If the Minister cannot show that the revealing of the precise terms of the State investment would be damaging he has a clear obligation to the House and the public to produce at least that part of the agreement which would not be damaging.

If he fails to do that, one is left with the situation where, for reasons which he fails to put forward, he wants to conceal all the terms of the agreement, including the State's initial investment, and one can only speculate why he would want to conceal that information. I, for one, cannot conceive why such information could be damaging. Throughout the debate no one on the other side made any attempt to illustrate how it could be damaging, beyond an effort to roll the whole thing up with the day to day business of the company. No effort was made to deal precisely with the question of how disclosure of the terms of the initial State investment could damage the company. I invite the Minister now to do so.

I will not, first, because of the length of the debate; second, because of the length of my interventions on this subject; third, because of the number of times on which this issue has been raised, in my view out of order; and fourth, the fact that the amendment relates to all the documents submitted to the arbitrator. No matter how much the other side may want to prolong the debate, I refuse to cover again matters that have been debated and voted on extensively.

I have pointed out that neither the Minister nor anybody on his side has attempted to deal with the precise points we have raised. The Minister has said he has dealt with them. If so would he point out precisely where and when and how the disclosure of the terms of the initial State investment could be damaging to the company? That is the precise point.

In relation to the matter of arbitration, opinions and advice have been given involving detailed information. It seems to me that what the Deputy is asking is without precedent in this country. It must be of very deep concern that two lawyers on the Opposition benches make the case that there should be disclosure of documents placed in arbitration that is not a court of public arbitrators. It would be a very dangerous practice that a client's personal affairs would be disclosed in arbitration. There is arbitration from day to day on all sorts of contracts in regard to which there is no disclosure—personal private matters between the parties.

This is a private matter in the sense that the State is to be a purchaser of shares in a private company and the arbitration was for the purpose of reaching an agreement in relation to the value that should be paid. According to the amendment, the value placed by either side or by their personal advisers should be put on the Table of the House for all the curiosity-killed-the-cat merchants to see. I cannot see the reason behind it. We must look at it in the light of any two parties who seek arbitration to deal with an agreement into which they have entered, to assess the value of what one person is selling and another buying.

My mind boggles at the reasoning, if there is any, that could be applied to the Opposition case. Deputy O'Malley said he had been through all the reasons for this and he referred to the case of the Foyle fisheries. I challenge anybody in the House to point to any part of the agreement in the Foyle Fisheries Act that gives any information of the day-to-day or any other working of the Foyle fisheries. My reading of it is that the price is the only thing mentioned, nothing else.

The Deputy must know what is in it.

Deputy O'Malley today treated us to a long lecture on what a prospectus should contain. For Deputy O'Malley to make a suggestion that the matter should be disclosed as if it were a public company is nonsense. The alternative is that, if Bula did not enter into the agreement, they could refuse to sell and the State would have no say in this valuable mineral deposit. That would be the only alternative.

It is not.

The owner could hold on.

Did the Deputy ever hear of the ministerial order that the Minister did not make?

This is a private company, this is private property, and we recognise that in the Constitution. We must recognise the law and the law for the individual is also the law for a State Department. There is no distinction in relation to rights of private property and I hope the House will uphold that and also uphold the principles fundamental to dealings with private property.

Having heard the Minister and Deputy Esmonde argue it is not in order to publish these documents and the advice available to both sides at arbitration and having heard Deputy Esmonde say more or less: "It is not done and that is all there is to it" may I say I have no legal training but I have some experience of arbitration to determine the value that should be placed on property?

That is public. I made the distinction. This is not a public arbitration. The Deputy is talking about a public arbitration before a public arbitrator.

It is public money.

I did not interrupt Deputy Esmonde. Where local authorities are concerned there are two sides to an arbitration. The local authority is using public money to purchase property on foot of an agreement the owner of the property has been compelled to enter into because of a CPO. Deputy Esmonde knows full well that such arbitration hearings are wide open to the public and to the press. Here we have a situation in which the State is entering into an agreement and going to arbitration to determine the price. The price incidentally is £9.54 million. I see no reason whatever why the documents should not be made available to this House and to the public as they are in any arbitration.

I see no reason in Deputy Esmonde's argument on that particular score. The public are entitled to information since it is public money that is being paid over to private individuals, not into a company. They are entitled to know when this mine will start production. Surely that information will not damage the company. They are entitled to know when jobs will be available and how soon. Surely the Minister could give us that information. Surely he could give it to the public even if he does not want to give it to this party.

We are also entitled to know what arrangements are envisaged to provide the capital necessary for this company to go into production. A sum of £25 million has been mentioned. We have got no information as to how this money will be provided. Will it be provided by the taxpayers? We assume arrangements have been made with regard to the proper management of this mine when it goes into production. We are entitled to know what the arrangements are. The management should have experience and knowledge of mining. That is something the public could be told without damaging operations or future plans. We are entitled to be told about marketing arrangements. Where will the concentrates be sold? Remember, the company will not form part of the cartel. Surely there is some alternative market available. If it is not available then the Minister should not have committed £9.54 million of public money without giving the taxpayers the answers to these simple questions.

Deputy Esmonde very helpfully got the Minister off the hook. For Deputy Esmonde's benefit, though he is not here at the moment, he knows better than most people in the House that many matters relating to the affairs of both public and private companies and private individuals are dealt with every day in detail in the courts, with full access by the public to knowledge not only of the documents filed but of the arguments put forward on both sides. He also knows that there are many arbitrations where, at their conclusion all the documentation available is published. As Deputy Barrett has pointed out, many arbitrations are carried out in public and so it is quite unreal to suggest there is a norm being followed here and that it is ridiculous to suggest there ought to be any disclosure. I repeat I can concede, and I am certain Deputy O'Malley will concede, that if the Minister were to make even an outline case for excluding certain of the documents or certain portions of them because of damage that might be caused Deputy O'Malley would certainly not try to insist on publication of the full terms of the agreement.

Certainly.

The Minister, of course, did not make that case at all. This is a blanket concealment. No aspect is to be disclosed, according to the Minister. Irrespective of whether or not it would be damaging, it is not to be disclosed. I have invited the Minister to answer a precise question. His response was that he had already answered it. I asked him to say where and at what point in the debate he answered it. He did not respond to that invitation.

I would like to give the Minister a precise example of the kind of thing I mean. It has been argued, and to an extent that virtually convinces me it is true, that the agreement contains a provision the effect of which is to have a built-in veto or to give a majority voting right to a minority shareholding other than that held by the Minister.

Whether or not the Minister wants to acknowledge that, let us assume for the purpose of argument that that is in the agreement. If it is in the agreement will the Minister indicate where or how the disclosure of that fact could be or would be damaging to the company and in what way?

Deputy Halligan rose.

Would Deputy Halligan allow the Minister to answer, if he wants to, or indicate that he does not want to answer.

Deputy Halligan.

I am sure if the Minister wants to answer he will choose his own time to do so. It is well to remember that every amendment to a Bill is concentrated around the principle on which the Bill is based. In this case the Opposition oppose the principle of the Bill and every one of the amendments seeks in some way to have that expressed in law. I do not think I am being unfair when I say that they are against State equity participation in the development of our natural resources.

Nothing was said in this debate to justify that conclusion.

I have read Deputy O'Malley's Second Reading speech many times since it was delivered. It was described as the best speech in the 20th Dáil and I thought perhaps the best speech in the 20th Century, but I was misreading it. Deputy O'Malley put forward the proposition that State participation should be by way of production level. Amendments Nos. 5 and 6 must be taken together because they seek to extract information which the Minister argues would be against the very purpose of the Bill—that is, State participation by way of purchasing equity in this particular company. Both Deputy Colley and Deputy O'Malley have argued today and earlier that the commercial interests would not be in any way damaged or need not be damaged. Originally the assertion was that their interests would not be damaged. Today Deputy O'Malley began to concede that there could be areas which could be damaged and there was some ground, therefore, for the suppression of some information.

I want to hear the argument for suppression.

The argument I made previously was that in this case commercial secrecy was a strength so far as the State was concerned and not a weakness. That was the principle the Minister put forward on Second Stage. The commercial interests that are being protected by this element of confidentiality are the Government's interests, the public's interests. That is what is being protected. This amendment, as the previous one which was defeated, would put the State at a disadvantage in the development of our natural resources vis-à-vis private business.

Is it not the position that it could be a political interest?

The situation then would be that where a contract was arrived at between the State and a private company the terms of that contract would remain public but a similar contract between private companies would be kept confidential. That would be the commercial difference and if Deputy Colley cannot see the weight of that argument, since suspicion has been thrown around this House pretty freely I must suspect there are other reasons why the Opposition want to make the information public.

The State cannot possibly be put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis private interests. The Minister has indicated in respect of other arrangements arrived at with regard to exploration of off-shore oil and gas that he must keep an element of confidentiality to preserve the State's bargaining power. I do not want to enter into hypotheses or to give specific cases of how disclosure of confidential terms might be damaging for the reason that the Opposition might then say it was the reason why it was not being disclosed. Deputy Colley has just offered a certain hypothetical circumstance. Of course if the Opposition were sufficiently inventive they could put forward all such hypothetical cases before the House and have the Minister deny them. Then, by a process of elimination they could arrive at what was in the agreement.

I am not asking the Minister to deny it.

That is the reason behind a number of questions that were put to the Minister. Then, the Opposition would be in the glorious situation of saying that what they asserted was true because the Minister had not denied it. Alternatively, they might say he had something to hide and that was why he was staying silent. On the last occasion I said the descent into innuendo was lowering the tone of what should be a very important debate. I regret to say that so far the tone of this debate has reached depths which I do not believe will be beaten in any future debate. Given the important national issues at stake it is highly regrettable.

Is it not obvious that every speculator on the stock exchange would love to have the documents which the Opposition seek to have made public? What an orgy of speculation would result on the publication of those documents which of course, must have information in relation to the entire orebody or information which could be applied to it. It appears that speculation on the stock exchange is rather more widespread than I thought and it is obvious that every speculator would give his right arm to have this information. I do not think the disclosure of the information would be prudent or in accordance with normal arbitration proceedings.

I wonder what is the real reason behind these attempts to extract from the Minister the terms of this agreement? There has been a relentless pursuit by every means possible to extract information in whole or in part. The State engages in many contracts, not just through Ministers or through governments but through its various agencies. Having been involved in one such company I have no doubt that on occasion the best interests of the public are served by information being regarded as confidential and remaining free from public scrutiny. The State must have its own way of protecting itself in commercial life.

Commercial life is tough and ruthless and it is not peopled by saints. Deputy O'Malley spoke earlier about the provisions laid down by the stock exchange with regard to the disclosure of information in respect of public companies and one would think it was second only in terms of probity to a Trappist monastery. There was not a hint of Jin Slater or any such people like that around the place, nothing but the most honest, straightforward people dealing in business. We are not in that world. The world we are dealing with now is the world of the multi-nationals in the development of our natural resources and, as I said on a previous occasion, the State must arm itself with every weapon at its command. We are dealing with companies some of whose turnover is greater than our national income, some of whom employ more people than the entire labour force in Irish manufacturing industry. We cannot give away one of the few weapons at our disposal. That is why we must maintain a certain reserve power and I think the maintenance of confidentiality in respect of an agreement such as has been concluded in this case is one such weapon. Any documents which impinge on the terms of that agreement, as quite clearly the documents sought in this amendment do, must be kept confidential.

The disclosure of the documents is simply the avenue by which one would travel right to the heart of the agreement. That is the purpose of this amendment. It adds the two points together. Having laid the agreement on the table then we must also lay the documents which were placed before the arbitrators and which play a pivotal part in determining the price which is at the centre of the agreement.

I do not know the real motivation here. I hope it is in respect of the public interest but in so far as it would be in the private interests of certain people to have the information disclosed. I think one is entitled to be suspicious on this side of the House also.

As the Minister is not offering perhaps it would be as well if I spoke again to refresh his memory. First, I wish to comment briefly on what was said by Deputy Halligan. He seemed to say almost precisely what he said when this point was discussed before, namely, the usual generalisation about the necessity for confidentiality of State companies in general while avoiding the precise point that was made. The only new point he made was that State companies or the State in its commercial dealings should have exactly the same privacy as a private company. Of course he is overlooking the essential difference, namely, that the taxpayers' money is involved when the State is involved and the degree of accountability to the taxpayers is what makes an enormous difference. He may not like it but it is a fact we must live with.

If the Deputy would forget all the innuendo he might begin to recognise the primary cause of concern on this side of the House where we are faced with a Bill for which there is no precedent in the history of the State. It provides for the expenditure of £9.54 million in connection with an agreement whose terms are being concealed from us. However, I do not want to go back over all that ground. Once more I want to give the Minister an opportunity to deal with the precise point being put forward. If he would deal with the matter adequately from his point of view it would help his case and it would help us. If he can put forward a reasonable answer he would help to reduce our difficulty. On the other hand, if he does not put it forward, there is no point in complaining afterwards that the debate took an inordinate length of time or that we persisted in this point because it goes to the root of the matter.

Deputy Halligan misunderstood the question I put to the Minister. Perhaps he pretended to misunderstand it. One way or the other, he did not get it right. I did not ask the Minister to acknowledge whether or not the agreement contains a provision that the 41 per cent block shares have a built-in veto or majority power.

I did not say that. I said that you put that hypothesis forward.

The Deputy said that the Minister would have to say yes or no and that, by a process of elimination, we would come to what was in the agreement. Without any admission on his part as to what is in the agreement, assuming that such a provision were in the agreement, would the Minister explain in what way the disclosure of such a provision would damage the interests of this company? I have endeavoured to give a concrete example that has been referred to in the debate instead of a new one out of thin air without asking the Minister to commit himself in any way in regard to the contents of the agreement. How can the disclosure of the terms of the State's investment damage this company? This assertion has been made time after time without any evidence to support it.

I am inviting the Minister to give some clarification on this vital point. If he does not like that example, perhaps he would choose another example that would relate to the terms of the State's initial investment and show how it could damage the company.

Deputy Colley has reached the stage of conceding, which reflects his practical experience, that there would be many of what one could call the working documents of a company which, in the jungle of mining, could be extremely damaging if they were revealed. If Deputy Colley will consider my speech, the case that I made against revealing the agreement was on the basis of categories of agreements, of the work of the State, of the proper function of the IDA, of my oncoming relationship with the oil companies and so on. The argument about economic well-being related to the documents on the current practice of the company. They were separate arguments. The effort to confuse them reveals a lack of knowledge of the debate.

If I understand the Minister correctly, he is just shifting his feet again. Leaving aside the documents submitted to arbitration, let us return to the precise point I have been putting to the Minister. The agreement referred to in the amendment is the agreement that this House is faced with, although it does not know what is in it. The Minister is now making an argument, which he made before, that he is not revealing the terms of this agreement because it would create a precedent for future agreements. Am I misrepresenting the Minister when I say that?

The Deputy is not misrepresenting me in that.

I suggest to the Minister that there is no justification for that argument. If we assume from that argument that the agreement, if disclosed, would not be damaging to the company, then the Minister is afraid of the precedent. The Minister is not afraid of a precedent when he introduces a Bill such as this, for which there is no precedent. If any future agreements made by the State with any company contain items which would be damaging, it is open to the Minister dealing with it to ensure that those parts of the agreements which would be damaging are concealed. The case for disclosing those parts which would not be damaging is incontestable. We are dealing with public money and there is an obligation on the Minister to disclose every possible item of information that would not be damaging. When pressed, the Minister said that concealing the agreement has nothing to do with this particular company, that he is afraid of creating a precedent for future agreements.

As I said before——

The Minister did say it before, but when it was pointed out to him that he was on thin ice and that he shifted his ground, he then said it would be damaging to this company.

The Minister will recall my asking repeatedly in what way the disclosure of the terms of the State's initial investment in this company could be damaging. We have not had an answer to that question. It is clear that the Minister does not have an answer. His only answer is the possibility that he might create a precedent. The implication is that this agreement, which provides for the expenditure of at least £9.54 million, is to be rammed through with this legislation; although it is possible but there is not one word in it which, if disclosed, would damage the interests of the company. We do not know whether that is so, but it is a distinct possibility on the basis of the Minister's argument. Because of the danger that at some time in the future there might be an agreement, parts of which, if disclosed, would be commercially damaging and the Minister dealing with it would find himself unable to conceal that potentially damaging information, this agreement is not to be disclosed. That is not good enough. The Minister ought to be reminded that he is dealing with almost £10 million of public money and that he has accountability to this House. Either this agreement, if disclosed, would be commercially damaging or it would not, or part of it would be damaging and the rest would not. It is open to the Minister to say that part of it would be damaging and to give a general outline as to why it is so and then to disclose the rest. If the whole agreement would not be damaging, the Minister is not entitled to talk about a possible future risk as justification for concealing the terms of the agreement.

As Deputy Colley knows, I am not talking about a possible future risk. The 1969 IDA Act spawns agreement month after month with existing companies and none of them is ever revealed. It is not a hypothetical future position; it is a practical position year after year. We have been over this ground in detail. It is a waste of time to go around the horse pond again.

The Minister may not like it, but one of the prices that has to be paid for democracy is that Ministers are accountable and have to be reminded of their accountability. As to that nonsense we have just heard from the Minister. the facts are that there are agreements being entered into all the time by the IDA on foot of the 1969 Act, and I want to put it to the Minister—and I challenge him to deny it— that never has there been a refusal to disclose the details of such agreements if they were sought.

Never has there been a demand for such information.

That is a different thing.

There is no provision in the 1969 Act for revealing such contents. Everybody has known month after month since then that those agreements were being produced in large numbers, and everybody with the faintest idea of the working of the IDA, which Deputy Colley ought to have, knows that many of those agreements would be completely unnegotiable if they were to be revealed or if any demand for their being revealed were to be acceded to. He knows that as well as I do.

I venture to suggest I have at least as good a knowledge of the working of the IDA as the Minister, and maybe better——

That is quite possible.

——and to my knowledge there was never any agreement entered into in my time which needed to be concealed from the public or which would have been concealed if anybody had sought the details. Maybe there is a new form of agreement being entered into now that I am not aware of. I certainly have not been aware up to now that there was any form of agreement entered into by the IDA the disclosure of which would create any problem or be in any way damaging. The Minister has not denied what I have put to him, that is, that never has there been a refusal to disclose the details of any of the agreements that he is now relying on. He said he was not talking about anything in the future; he was talking about something that is going on now, but he had to admit when challenged that in relation to what is going on now there has never been a refusal to disclose any information relating to any of these agreements.

The relentless pursuit for information continues and obviously it is going to do so for quite some time. I want to go back to Deputy Colley's favourite trick of misrepresenting you and then demolishing you on the basis of the misrepresentation. I want to go back to the point at which he started, where he conceded there was a possibility that some information might be so damaging that it should remain confidential. In that let me say he reflects the good sense which normally characterises his contributions here and which separates him from most of the contributions made from that side of the House.

None of us has ever denied that point.

I am very glad to see he has conceded this point in principle. He then makes the point that, perhaps, we should proceed by a different principle, that we should conceal that which is damaging and reveal that which is not. He put forward by way of hypothesis a certain point that might be contained in the agreement and that the Minister could say whether this was something which should or should not be revealed. Of course, if the answer to that question is yes, the assumption could then legitimately be made—and Deputy Colley is great at making assumptions —that it is in the agreement——

No, that was not the Deputy's argument.

——and if you put forward sufficient hypotheses you can get at everything which is in the agreement. You could put forward hypottheses from one to infinity and have sufficient of them there that by the end of the time you could put together on a jig-saw basis what was in the agreement.

I was involved in the publication of information in a public company, and I cannot say that we ever pursued the policy that all of the information should be divulged; it certainly was, of course, to the Ministers responsible. The Ministers responsible did not take great exception to the fact that information which might be judged prejudicial remained confidential. The important issue is that the State must retain unto itself whatever strength it has in dealing with these companies. The principle should be laid down that if the Minister of the day believes that a document should remain confidential in toto in the public interest, that is the situation which should be upheld. We cannot put the State in the position where it is weakened in comparison with its competitors in the private enterprise world. It is wrong that the State in reaching a contract with a private company must divulge all the details of the agreement while the agreements of private companies remain totally confidential, despite the fact that there could be a clash between the two. That is the important principle which is at stake here. No series of hypotheses should be permitted by the Minister to undermine that principle and no amount of assertions that because he is silent on a particular point such a situation exists should persuade him to deviate from this principle.

Certainly there is an element of precedence in this, and it would be unwise of us all to ignore that fact. If I recall, the first speaker from the Opposition benches to make this point was Deputy Lalor. Perhaps that is not unreasonable as he was the Minister responsible for this area of policy in the last Government. We should have such respect for precedent that we create it whenever it is necessary. We have not had policies in the past in the development of our natural resources because we had none to develop. Now we have got them, and the duty of the Government of the day is to judge for themselves what is in the public interest in terms of the development of those resources, not on the basis of giving the maximum away but of giving the minimum away and of retaining the maximum for the State.

That is the principle which animates this Bill and animates the total policy of this Government of which this Bill is, perhaps, the first legislative example but just one specific aspect of it. For that reason it is important that what is laid down here should reflect the totality of that philosophy, the philosophy, whether the Opposition like it or not, that the State will have the maximum amount of participation in the development of those resources, the maximum amount that is compatible with the system under which we live.

It is a pity we are not getting a majority shareholding.

In so far as I understood the Opposition when this debate began, they did not even want a minority shareholding. Deputy O'Malley used the phrase that we were "locked into" the situation. I would prefer that than to be locked outside, as the Deputy would have us, at the top of the Mineshaft with a counter in our hands tipping our caps every time a ton of concentrates went past.

And getting paid every day.

That is what the Deputy wants. Yesterday on Committee Stage there were 21 Fianna Fáil Deputies at one point behind Deputy O'Malley. I am not too long here, but I have been around this House for quite some time and have viewed the proceedings from the Gallery. I would lay a bet that it is a long time since 21 Deputies, of all parties, never mind from one Party, were together here on Committee Stage for any Bill. I wonder why that should be so. I think the Deputies opposite have got a message, that they were given a job to come in here this week and clean this up before their Ard-Fheis next week-end. They have tried valiantly, but the point that remains at issue is this, that this side of the House want maximum State participation in the development of our resources, and the provisions of this Bill are a means of securing that. That side of the House are opposed to it, and this amendment here which we are now debating seeks to weaken the application of that principle, in fact, to render it absolutely meaningless. That is the real reason behind the amendment. Perhaps there are other reasons, too, which are not of a political nature but that is an area into which I need not go now.

The Deputy would be wise not to proceed in that way.

I was disappointed but scarcely surprised to hear the Minister revert to his old argument of a week or two ago regarding the question of trying to make comparisons with the IDA. I thought we had disposed of that argument but the fact that the Minister finds it necessary to use it again is indicative of the situation in which he finds himself.

When the State gives money to a company through the IDA, whether by way of grant or by way of equity participation, the State invests money in the company. The IDA invest in this way only when they are satisfied that the company concerned is a viable undertaking and that the risk involved, so far as public money is concerned, is kept to an absolute minimum. There was discussion in this House a year or so ago regarding the failure rate of IDA investments and we were told then by the Minister that the failure rate was 14 per cent. At the time I expressed the view, and I repeat it now, that that was a very creditable performance from one point of view, that is, that the IDA are so extremely careful in their investment of public money. But I thought that they might be justified in taking more risks particularly in relation to Irish industrialists, Irish entrepreneurs or small Irish firms who did not have what the IDA refer to as proven track records. The attitude of the IDA is that extreme prudence must be exercised in respect of every penny invested, that each investment must show a return in terms of jobs and national output and if there is any doubt, the investment is not made.

Let us contrast that attitude with the view of the Minister and, in particular, contrast the fact that the IDA are investing in the companies concerned. The Minister is not investing in the case we are talking about. On the contrary, he is handling over, tax free, £9.54 million to four individuals. It will be seen, therefore, that there is a total and fundamental difference between this situation and the situation that prevails in regard to the IDA. To my knowledge the IDA have never handed as much as a pound tax free to an individual or individuals. Every penny of the large sums that the IDA have invested in industry down through the years has been actual investment. They have never given money to a private individual who was not forming a company or who was not doing something to create employment or to maintain it or who would not use the money to modernise or make a company more efficient in some way.

Does the Minister think that Members of this House or members of the public are so silly that they cannot appreciate the fundamental difference in this instance compared with the situation in regard to the IDA? However, we had disposed of that argument but the Minister has found it necessary to repeat his hopeless and discredited statement in that regard.

The Minister went on to talk about oil agreements. He should look at the situation in regard to oil, the guidelines in respect of which were set out by him in a lengthy document, a document of more than 100 pages and which was published, so far as I recall, about 18 months ago. This document set out all the guidelines under which oil exploration could be carried out. No doubt individual agreements are reached with individual consortia or companies in relation to particular blocks.

Should these be private or public?

The broad guidelines that apply to the entirely of oil exploration have been made public.

Should the agreements be made public?

That would depend on the circumstances in respect of each agreement.

Is the Deputy saying that there may be circumstances in which the agreements would not be made public?

I would point out that 75 or, perhaps, 90 per cent or even more of the terms that applied to these agreements are already public property.

But there would be circumstances in which the agreements would not be made public?

Possibly. That is the point Deputy Colley has been making on and off during the past half hour. Should there be small areas of this agreement which, should they be published, might be damaging commercially, we would be happy to have laid on the table of the House an agreement from which, say, one or two paragraphs had been deleted.

Is there a situation in relation to the oil agreements in which a handout is being given to any shareholder or group of shareholders in an oil consortia? I should hope not. Therefore, the comparison which the Minister seeks to make is invalid. What is involved here is a handout to four individuals. Not a penny has gone into this cash-starved company. Yet, the Minister relies on what he calls a precedent, invalid as that argument is, to justify the secretiveness with which he is approaching this whole matter. This secretiveness is not due to the possibility of commercial damage being caused. Rather, it is due to a combination of two factors, one of which is ignorance. The Minister does not know the answers to many of the questions he is asked and the other factor is that there are certain provisions in this agreement, one of which has been discussed by us in detail. It refers to the voting rights situation which, if published, would result in the Minister being hounded in every newspaper for his foolishness in putting himself and the taxpayer into this situation. He has bought himself into and locked himself into a minority situation but he is still adamant that he is paying more than £9,500,000 of public money to get into this situation, out of which he can never get.

In that connection perhaps I could have the Chair's indulgence to refer briefly to a statement made by the Minister during his reply to the Second Stage debate and when he went into a lot of small detail in an effort to point out what he referred to as the inaccuracies of what I had said. He said that in my contribution there were a number of small inaccuracies but that there were big ones, too. An example he picked of what he described as one of the small inaccuracies on my part was that I said that the Minister would be entitled under this agreement to appoint two directors out of a potential board of ten. The Minister stood up and smiled as only he can and said "This is another of Deputy O'Malley's little inaccuracies, it is not two out of ten; there can only be seven directors of the company." I have since got a complete copy of the memorandum and articles of the company, Bula Ltd. Article 6 says that the number of directors shall not be more than ten. It also says that two is the minimum, and the quorum is two. I make no great point of that, I just point it out as an example of these so-called corrections made for the pettiest of reasons, not having a great deal to commend them. The Minister is now reduced in respect of his argument on the point of the publication of this agreement, to the argument we had a fortnight ago about the IDA and oil companies. It has been clearly shown how invalid and inappropriate that argument is. If the Minister wants to justify himself he should seek to do so in a more convincing way.

Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 58; Níl, 66.

  • Allen, Lorcan.
  • Andrews, David.
  • Barrett, Sylvester.
  • Briscoe, Ben.
  • Brosnan, Seán.
  • Browne, Seán.
  • Brugha, Ruairí.
  • Burke, Raphael P.
  • Callanan, John.
  • Calleary, Seán.
  • Carter, Frank.
  • Colley, George.
  • Collins, Gerard.
  • Connolly, Gerard.
  • Crinion, Brendan.
  • Cronin, Jerry.
  • Daly, Brendan.
  • Davern, Noel.
  • de Valera, Vivion.
  • Dowling, Joe.
  • Fahey, Jackie.
  • Farrell, Joseph.
  • Faulkner, Pádraig.
  • Fitzgerald, Gene.
  • Fitzpatrick, Tom (Dublin Central).
  • French, Seán.
  • Gallagher, Denis.
  • Geoghegan-Quinn, Máire.
  • Gibbons, Hugh.
  • Brady, Philip A.
  • Brennan, Joseph.
  • Breslin, Cormac.
  • Gibbons, James.
  • Gogan, Richard P.
  • Haughey, Charles.
  • Healy, Augustine A.
  • Hussey, Thomas.
  • Kenneally, William.
  • Kitt, Michael P.
  • Lalor, Patrick J.
  • Leonard, James.
  • Loughnane, William.
  • Lynch, Celia.
  • McEllistrim, Thomas.
  • MacSharry, Ray.
  • Meaney, Tom.
  • Molloy, Robert.
  • Moore, Seán.
  • Murphy, Ciarán.
  • Noonan, Michael.
  • O'Kennedy, Michael.
  • O'Leary, John.
  • O'Malley, Desmond.
  • Timmons, Eugene.
  • Tunney, Jim.
  • Walsh, Seán.
  • Wilson, John P.
  • Wyse, Pearse.

Níl

  • Barry, Richard.
  • Begley, Michael.
  • Belton, Luke.
  • Belton, Paddy.
  • Bermingham, Joseph.
  • Bruton, John.
  • Burke, Joan T.
  • Burke, Liam.
  • Byrne, Hugh.
  • Clinton, Mark A.
  • Cluskey, Frank.
  • Collins, Edward.
  • Conlan, John F.
  • Coogan, Fintan.
  • Cooney, Patrick M.
  • Corish, Brendan.
  • Cosgrave, Liam.
  • Costello, Declan.
  • Coughlan, Stephen.
  • Creed, Donal.
  • Crotty, Kieran.
  • Cruise-O'Brien, Conor.
  • Desmond, Barry.
  • Desmond, Eileen.
  • Dockrell, Henry P.
  • Dockrell, Maurice.
  • Donegan, Patrick S.
  • Donnellan, John.
  • Dunne, Thomas.
  • Esmonde, John G.
  • Finn, Martin.
  • Fitzpatrick, Tom (Cavan).
  • Flanagan, Oliver J.
  • Gilhawley, Eugene.
  • Governey, Desmond.
  • Griffin, Brendan.
  • Halligan, Brendan.
  • Harte, Patrick D.
  • Hegarty, Patrick.
  • Hogan O'Higgins, Brigid.
  • Kavanagh, Liam.
  • Keating, Justin.
  • Kelly, John.
  • Kenny, Enda.
  • Kyne, Thomas A.
  • L'Estrange, Gerald.
  • Lynch, Gerald.
  • McDonald, Charles B.
  • McMahon, Larry.
  • Malone, Patrick.
  • Murphy, Michael P.
  • O'Brien, Fergus.
  • O'Connell, John.
  • O'Donnell, Tom.
  • O'Leary, Michael.
  • Pattison, Seamus.
  • Reynolds, Patrick J.
  • Ryan, John J.
  • Ryan, Richie.
  • Spring, Dan.
  • Staunton, Myles.
  • Taylor, Frank.
  • Thornley, David.
  • Timmins, Godfrey.
  • Toal, Brendan.
  • White, James.
Tellers: Tá, Deputies Lalor and Browne; Níl, Deputies Kelly and B. Desmond.
Amendment declared lost.
Question proposed: "That section 2, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

On the section as amended I would like to say that it is the key section in this Bill. It is the one which authorises the purchase of these shares and the payment by the Minister to the small group of individuals concerned of this very large sum of public money which it is proposed to give them.

I would like to emphasise again, because I am afraid there are a lot of people who do not appreciate the fact yet, that not one single penny is being invested under this section in the company. This section, although it refers to the acquisition of shares and the payment of £9.54 million, still does not put one penny into the company and it retains the position that the State is in a permanent minority situation in a private limited company and has therefore no rights and no control at any level in respect of any matter. In particular it should be borne in mind that if the directors and general membership of this company were to decide that, because of difficulties they were encountering or likely to encounter, they were not really interested in going into production and they were prepared to live, as it were, on their £9½ million now being proposed to be paid to them, there is nothing the Minister could do about that because of the nature of the shareholding and the lack of control which he has in this situation. He has made the case, apparently, that if he did not do what he is doing and take a minority interest, at a very high cost indeed to the taxpayer, in this company he would have even less say. What he has failed to do is the obvious thing, to make a further order under the Minerals Development Act, 1940. He says that he thinks that this would be unconstitutional and the order would be upset if he did.

It seems to be forgotten by the Minister and a lot of people that much of the minerals in the mine which has been operating for quite a number of years at Tynagh in County Galway were privately owned but orders were made back in 1960, or whenever it was, that that mine was discovered, under the 1940 Act acquiring the rights for the State and enabling a mining lease to be made. An effort was made by Deputy Lalor to do the same in respect of these minerals which are now owned by Bula Ltd. As the House knows, Deputy Lalor's effort failed because there was some technical deficiency in the wording of the order he made but the courts spelled out what the deficiency was. It seems to me and to all of us, not least to Deputy Lalor, that, the courts having found a technical defect and saying precisely what it was, the obvious move the following morning was to go and make another order. However, the Minister chose not to do that. If he had done so the State would control these minerals and could do what it liked with them and would not find itself in the rather appalling situation in which it is today, that it is a permanent minority bloc in a private limited company.

Deputy Halligan spoke on the last amendment as if this were something commendable. It is obvious, of course, in fairness to him, that Deputy Halligan does not realise the legal and commercial consequences of being a permanent minority in a private limited company.

Whether or not he realises it today, certainly the Minister did not realise in legal and commercial terms the significance of what he was doing when he made this agreement originally. This is one of the reasons why it has been accurately and truthfully said about him that he was out-manoeuvred and out-negotiated in the negotiations which led to the agreement. From the point of view of those who are now getting £9.5 million they are in an incredibly good situation. They have this huge amount of money and they are still in control of the whole operation. The like of it I do not think has ever been done. It certainly was never done by any Government here and I doubt if any Government in any country would have been foolish enough to walk themselves into this position.

That is what this Government and this Minister in particular have done and that is what this House is now asked to ratify and give the seal of approval to. It is regrettable that the House shows every inclination, in a somewhat mindless fashion, to walk the provisions of this Bill through section by section, line by line, even though reason does not appear to arise. Every financial commentator on these matters seems to regard this whole operation as rather extraordinary.

The principal question that comes up on this section, as now amended, is the valuation. While we touched on aspects of this in the course of the debate on various amendments, it is no harm to consider the valuation again and the circumstances in which it was arrived at. If we have not the advantage of the agreement on which the whole thing is based, at least we have the advantage of the report of the chief of the Minister's various advisers which has been made available to us by courtesy of several newspapers who have published all or parts of it from time to time over the past three or four weeks.

The first thing which should be borne in mind in connection with the valuation and the preparation of the valuation—and the one I am referring to, of course, is the Lazard Brothers one—is that the whole operation by Lazard Brothers had to be carried out in a period of six weeks which, to put it mildly, must have been extremely difficult for them, considering that this agreement was originally arrived at in principle as far back as June, 1974, and was signed formally and finally on 12th December, 1975. The 20th October, 1976, was fixed as the closing date for submission to the arbitrators. Apparently Lazard Brothers were not instructed in the matter until early in September, 1976.

The director who was involved, Mr. Fraser, indicated that the time period was about six weeks, which would indicate instructions some time early in September. They submitted their report to the Department on 18th October, 1976, which means they had six weeks in all to consider a matter which was complicated, to say the very least of it, which was riddled with imponderables and which would require infinitely longer if they were to be able to do the kind of thorough investigations which they themselves would like to do.

It appears that they did not have the opportunity to obtain independent, in-depth, technical reports. They were able to get one short report only from one mining expert who did not carry out his own survey but based his remarks on the survey and production plan of Bechtel who had been commissioned by the company concerned. Lazard's drew attention to the reservations expressed by the technical consultants about the technical data available. They also drew attention to the various reservations expressed concerning environmental and planning matters generally and the failure of the submitted plan to deal at all with the very crucial question of the diversion of the River Blackwater.

Lazards are quoted in relation to the technical aspect of the matter in the newspapers as saying that the technical data available now—that is, when they wrote in October, 1976—are insufficiently detailed to enable a purchaser to have complete confidence in the mine development plan and hence in the projected capital and operating cost. They said that substantial changes in the method of one extractions may prove necessary in the light of more detailed investigations. The diversion of the River Blackwater over a two mile length through undulating country with complex geology is a major engineering undertaking in its own right. All the indications are, they said, that much more study of this aspect of the project will be necessary before its final cost can be estimated reliably. The attention of the Assistant Secretary of the Department, presumably, to whom it was addressed was drawn to the Kilborn Report dated June, 1976, which indicates in outline that the total cost of river diversion may be as high as 17.2 million United States dollars. For our cash flows, they said, we have, however, used the much lower cost estimate of B.E.M.R.A. which totalled £2.6 million. The obvious and substantial risk of escalation from this lower figure has been taken into account in our discount rate. That is the end of the quotation on the technical aspect of it.

It is certainly damning from the valuation point of view that the Minister's own principal financial advisers, one of the leading banks or advisory companies of this nature in the world, had to express caution and reservations in those terms. It is almost without precedent that that should be so. The degree of caution urged is exceptionally high for advice of this kind from a company of this kind.

The newspaper accounts of the Lazard Brothers report go on to show that Lazards attempted to describe, for the benefit of the Minister, the likely planning permission problems in their valuation and the many enormous imponderables which exist in relation to it. They are quoted as saying:

planning consent for the initial development of the mine has not yet been granted. We are advised to expect that it will be granted but not before October, 1977.

This was written in October, 1976. In the light of planning application history since then one ventures to think how essential it would be for planning consultants and for Lazards to revise that estimate. They go on to say:

We have included the consequent delay in the ore production schedules for our cash flows. The Bechtel Report takes some account of the operational restrictions being applied to Bula by the planning authority but we have been advised that more onerous restrictions may be imposed. For instance, the scale of the open pit permitted by the planning authority may well be smaller than that assumed by Bechtel. This casts fundamental doubts on the implementation of Bechtel's plan.

I will stop the quotation there to draw the attention of the House to the significance of that sentence written by the Minister's chief advisers. "This casts fundamental doubts on the implementation of Bechtel's plan." I wonder would any prudent, knowledgeable businessman who got advice which contained a sentence like that go ahead with a proposal to pay out more than £9.5 million. Bechtel's plan is based on the maximum possible open-cast mining being allowed. The whole thing would have to be revised very radically if maximum open-cast mining were not allowed or if, as is quite conceivable, open-cast mining were not allowed at all in this instance.

The quotation continues:

Furthermore, operating costs may be higher than anticipated in order to meet environmental standards.

If there is no permission for river diversion where does the Minister stand in regard to this which is clearly one of the things essential and basic to the whole operation? I think this indicates the speculative nature of the share purchase by the Minister. Lazard Brothers are quoted in the newspapers as summarising their report in the following terms to which I think the House should pay particular attention. They say:

We have therefore concluded that a knowledgeable potential purchaser would view an investment in the equity of Bula with considerable caution. He would recognise that the mine will come into production as it has a sizeable reserve of ore and is important to Ireland. He would however recognise that the mere ownership of ore by no means itself generates a return. He would regard Bula as having very real problems facing it. He would be worried by the proximity of the ore-body to the town of Navan and the difficulty of moving the river and indeed being allowed to do so at all. He would be concerned at delays in bringing the mine into profitable production and increases in the cost of so doing might exceed those he has allowed for. He would see considerable interference from the authorities on his freedom to mine the ore in the most economical way. The depressed state of the world economy would not enable him to make predictions about margins with assurance. Even if all went well and these problems were overcome he would take into account the possibility that the Government of the day would take a larger share of the rewards. Taking all these uncertainties into account we consider that the appropriate discount rate to apply for cash flows is 14. Thus we advise you that our valuation of Bula's mining venture at 12th December, 1975, in accordance with the terms of reference is £7.75 million.

That is the end of the report and I want to emphasise that the valuation of Bula's mining enterprise in accordance with the terms of reference is for the entirety of it £7.75 million and not for 24 per cent minority interest. It is evident that Lazard Brothers were never asked to value a 24 per cent minority interest. It seems quite likely —in fact it must be inevitable in the circumstances—that it was already a term of the agreement signed on 12th December, 1975, between the Bula shareholders and the Minister that they had agreed in advance that all that would be asked for was a 100 per cent valuation by the arbitrators and that the 24 per cent purchase would then be worked out on the mathematical basis. There is no other explanation for the wording which Lazard Brothers used in their report as quoted in the newspapers as it would be entirely illogical for them to have reported in this fashion and stopped there without going on to say: "We value 100 per cent of this undertaking at £7.75 million and we will now go on for a page or two to explain why we will value 24 per cent of it at perhaps £5 million or £1 million or whatever it might be." They would go on to explain in some detail, although it is not necessary for anybody who knows anything about these matters, that 24 per cent of a private limited company is not worth 24 per cent of what the company is worth and could in certain circumstances be practically valueless because of the total inability of the holders of a very small minority holding like that to exercise any influence within the company.

I think the percentage of 24 is significant because it is the maximum minority holding which gives absolutely no rights to the holders of it. If you had 25 per cent you would have some little right; you could stop a special resolution being passed. That is not a great deal of good but you have some very minor control over the situation. It stops the majority doing some limited number of things they might otherwise do. But with 24 per cent you have no say whatever and, therefore, 24 per cent is worth very much less for example, than 25 per cent. It is not just a 1 per cent difference. There is a huge and fundamental difference between the two. Even 49 per cent or any minority holding is not worth the mathematical proportion which it bears to the value of the entirely or anything approaching that. One is entitled to feel that if Lazard Brothers had been asked to advise the Minister as to what 24 per cent in these circumstances was worth their advice would have been to the effect that it was worth, perhaps, less than £1 million. It would be an interesting exercise for the Minister now to write and ask them what do they consider 24 per cent worth in these circumstances.

What we know and need not speculate about is that Lazard Brothers, possibly one of the outstanding companies in this field in the world, valued the entirely at £7.75 million and the Minister ends up paying £9.54 million for 24 per cent of that. If that is not damning a man out of the mouths of his advisers I do not know what is.

The Minister is constantly talking about what he describes as the necessity for secrecy on the capital plans of this or any other company and it is worth considering what the law is in this regard. The Companies Act, 1963, requires the details of the authorised issue share capital be notified to the Companies Registration Office at the time the company is registered. Any changes from the amount notified must be notified for inclusion on the company's file. This must be done by completing form No. 45 and all of this information at all times is freely available to any member of the public. Any changes which are made in the company's capital structure or in the issuing or holding of shares by members of the company must be notified on this form and it must be done within one month of the change being made.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again.
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