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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 12 May 1981

Vol. 328 No. 12

Nítrigin Éireann Teoranta Bill, 1981: Second Stage.

I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

As Deputies are aware from the explanatory memorandum already circulated, the purpose of this Bill is to increase the authorised share capital of Nítrigin Éireann Teoranta by £50 million, that is from £27.5 million to £77.5 million, and the limit on the company's facility to borrow under ministerial guarantee by £50 million, that is from £100 million to £150 million. The actual text of the Bill is of a standard format and I would not expect that it should give rise to any major difficulty.

It is hardly necessary for me to give Deputies much in the way of background information on NET as the company have been the subject of the widest attention and publicity in recent times. Deputies who are members of the Joint Committee on State-sponsored Bodies, whose report on NET was published on 4 May, will be particularly aware of the company's activities and present difficulties.

NET were set up in 1961 as a State-sponsored company to produce nitrogenous fertilisers at Arklow. The company started in a relatively modest way but have expanded over the years to a point where they are now a major industrial and chemical undertaking, providing employment at their plants in Arklow and Marino Point for over 1,150 people. Total assets are more than £170 million and net sales revenue in 1980 was over £60 million. The Marino Point factory produces ammonia, a raw material for the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilisers, from natural gas supplied from the Kinsale Head field. The ammonia is used mainly to produce urea at Marino Point and calcium ammonium nitrate at Arklow — both straight nitrogen fertilisers. NET have been successful in supplying up to 85 per cent of the domestic market for straight nitrogen and the company's operations ensure national security of supply in respect of this strategic commodity for Irish agriculture, as well as making a valuable contribution to the country's balance of payments.

As Deputies are aware, NET embarked on a major expansion programme in 1974 when the company received Government approval to proceed with the Marino Point project. As everyone is aware at this stage, major problems were encountered in relation to this project which resulted in its being delayed by over 15 months. The final cost of the Marino Point plant is now put at £137.3 million, an increase of 116 per cent compared to what NET regard as the first detailed estimate of £63.5 million. I do not propose to debate the complicated and controversial history of the project as I feel that it is already well-documented, particularly since publication of the report of the Joint Committee, last week.

As the construction of this project advanced it became clear to me that there was reason to be very seriously concerned about the cost escalations and delays involved. I have met members of the NET Board and management on countless occasions during the past three years and impressed on them my deep concern about the way the project had developed. In mid-1978 I set up a system whereby NET were required to submit quarterly reports in relation to the project. By the end of 1978 I felt that the history of the project was such as to warrant a confidential independent consultancy review to discover how the capital costs had increased to such an extent and what lessons could usefully be learned from NET's experience. However, I am afraid the hard facts are that, once a project of this nature is put in train, it quickly reaches a point where it is extremely difficult to abandon it and no amount of monitoring or supervision will alter its basic economics.

The increased expenditure associated with the Marino Point project has had a profound effect on NET's finances. This has been exacerbated by the separate problems affecting the Arklow plant, which has been trading at an increasing net loss in recent years. Losses directly applicable to Arklow have grown from £0.8 million in 1975 to nearly £8 million in 1980. The principal reasons for the losses at Arklow have been changes in production technology in the fertiliser industry which made the company's involvement in the manufacture of phosphoric acid and compound fertilisers unprofitable, increased competition from bulk-blenders of cheap intermediate fertiliser products, general overmanning in NET, depressed price levels for fertilisers which have failed to keep pace with input costs and unfavourable industrial relations and labour practices. These problems have forced NET to engage in a very substantial level of borrowings with associated crippling financing charges. NET's accumulated losses at the end of 1979 amounted to £24 million and the loss for 1980 is expected to be £56 million. The total amount of NET's medium and short-term borrowings at the end of 1980 was over £200 million, with associated annual financing charges of £30 million. The company are now in serious financial trouble as their capital base is completely eroded and they are unable to service their borrowing commitments. NET have proposed a capital restructuring of the company, and has requested additional paid-up equity of £90 million, which it says will enable the company to return to a commercially acceptable debt/equity ratio and reduce the very large burden of bank interest which prevents it returning to a viable position in the long-term.

NET are facing an immediate financial crisis as they are obliged to repay a short-term, non-renewable bridging loan of $80 million — equivalent to £50 million approximately — by 29 May 1981. Unfortunately this aspect of the company's finances was not highlighted in the Joint Committee's report. Furthermore, NET have, at present, up to £50 million in existing medium-term loans which are not the subject of ministerial guarantees under the NET Acts and it is desirable, in the context of any new legislation, that provision should be made for formal guarantees in these cases. These guarantees will also enable a marginal reduction to be secured in respect of the interest rate for the medium-term loans in question.

The Government have concluded that the immediate financial difficulties facing NET must be tackled now and the specific purpose of the present Bill is to enable the $80 million bridging loan to be repaid by 29 May 1981 and to provide formal guarantees for the existing unguaranteed medium-term loans of £50 million. Failure to tackle these problems at this juncture would, in my opinion, inevitably precipitate the immediate closure of the company.

I must stress at this point that the present Bill does not mean that the Government have brought their examination of NET's prospects to a conclusion. In this regard, the Government share the view of the Joint Committee that further study and specialist advice is necessary under a number of headings, before any final decisions can be realistically taken about NET's future. Some analysis has already been undertaken of the possible options open to the Government but it is clear that further work needs to be done as a matter of urgency. With this in mind, the Government have now decided to establish an inter-departmental committee of senior officials to consider in detail all the options for the future of NET with a view to reporting to me as soon as practicable so that proposals can be presented to the Government at an early date. It is my intention that the committee will use independent specialist consultants to advise on specific aspects of this matter where they consider it necessary. Obviously one of the matters which will have to be considered is the dramatic change which has taken place in the energy field since the original decisions relating to Kinsale gas were taken. There may be better uses to which this gas can now be put and the full implications for this in relation to employment, balance of payments, energy efficiency and returns to the Exchequer will have to be examined.

Without prejudice to the future deliberations of the proposed inter-departmental committee, I must say that I have been impressed by the resolute action taken by NET, and in particular the company's new managing director, during the past year in attempting to restore order to the company's operations and finances. I was also glad to see that this action was endorsed by the Joint Committee. As a result, I must admit that I am now more optimistic than I was some months ago about the company's future prospects. The action to which I refer comprises the closure of the unprofitable Arklow Gypsum subsidiary, the retirement from phosphoric acid and compound fertiliser operations at Arklow, a reorganisation of the company's management structure and a general slimming down of excess manpower with a view to increasing productivity. It is, of course, deeply regrettable that action of this nature, involving the loss of a very significant number of jobs, has to be taken. However, it must be recognised that these measures are absolutely necessary if the company are to have any prospect of future viability.

I am confident that the Nítrigin Éireann Teoranta Bill will commend itself to the Dáil and I recommend the Bill for its approval.

The company referred to in this Bill have attracted a great deal of media comment in the not too distant past which has been added to by the publication by the Joint Committee of their findings on the operation of NET. Some of the reasons for this company attracting such media comment are, possibly, the sheer size of the amount of money involved in their losses and their debts and what we know to have been their performance for the past two or three years.

What we are being asked to do here today is nothing less than maintain the integrity of the State in honouring a guarantee given, already signed and sealed, but not yet delivered, a guarantee to underwrite or to give £50 million to NET by 29 May. That is a large sum of money and when one looks at the report of the Joint Committee on their whole operation one cannot but be prompted to ask why this might be so. I do not think that this is the time for a witch hunt in relation to NET. But it is a time to initiate deep scrutiny of this whole operation. We are dealing with the expenditure of public money and therefore the question of public accountability is involved. This House has a duty and a solemn obligation to the taxpayers to, in so far as it can, scrutinise this project, come to a decision on what it might do, and justify its actions in doing so.

This company have had problems from the very beginning and one cannot but look back at the question of their building, their construction, the contracts handed out at the time, the information on which the board at that time worked, which was given to them by their advisers, and the relationship between that board and the Department of Industry and Commerce, as it then was. Also, problems arose in relation to the actual construction; industrial action was taken and there were long delays, all very costly. We ended up starting production in NET at Marino Point long after the date when work might reasonably be expected to have been completed.

The Joint Committee report bears out that the management of NET at this time left a lot to be desired. In the recent past the workers of NET were literally vilified publicly for the performance of this company. I do not think that it is fair, or indeed proper, to take the easy way out and to point the finger at a group of people who themselves need not have been responsible for the poor record of performance which this company had. We are now in a position where, with a new chief executive who would seem to have the capacity to take hard decisions in the interests of the taxpayers and in the interests of the company, things have taken a turn for the better.

It has not been easy as the Minister stated. Jobs have had to be put to one side in the case of Arklow. This was unavoidable in the light of the future of NET. The restructuring of management at Marino Point has been undertaken. The new chief executive is owed a debt of gratitude for his handling of the massive problems which confronted him on assuming office. On the surface options are open to the House in relation to NET but when one gets down to examining the whole project one finds the options are quickly narrowed down to a self-evident option — that of not providing the necessary funding at this time — but by adopting that option one reneges on the guarantee given and one ends up with writing off 800 jobs. That must be costed and we must see what it costs the taxpayer. There is also the social cost of throwing 800 men out of work overnight. This, to save what now seems a large sum of money, may or may not be a wise thing to do. I believe one must come down on the side of being prepared to invest further in this company.

This is a first rate chemical plant. I believe it has a strategic value because it gives us independence in so far as niotrogenous fertilisers are concerned, because we are no longer dependent on Middle East sources for raw material. We can produce our own ammonia and we can produce urea. We are totally independent of outside factors, even though this is at a cost. It seems to me, from scrutinising the published accounts of the company and examining the report of the Joint Committee, that this company, given the right circumstances and the right economic atmosphere in which to operate are a viable industry. They have shown they can operate profitability. Their major drawback is the massive debt which is now dragging them down. If we decide to withdraw from the operation now we are saying that NET will no longer be contributing to the servicing of their own debt. The question of withdrawing from this project now is really a two-edged sword, the loss of jobs and the fact that the company would not be able to contribute to the servicing of their own debt.

On the plus side, this is a first class chemical plant. We are told it is one of the finest in Europe. It has been suggested that it could very well be the basis for a major petro-chemical industry in the future. We should not lose sight of that asset. We hope when we find commercial oil that this will happen. The plant uses gas from the Kinsale gas field. Some people say this is a wasteful use of gas. The company are getting gas at a cheap rate. Some people say that this is a hidden subsidy but when one looks elsewhere one sees that similar industries in other countries get gas at much the same price. It is a question of the whole gas industry being underpriced in relation to this type of heavy industry. Bord Gáis, who sell gas to NET, are at a net loss of approximately £30 million per annum. If they sold this to the ESB, for example, they would possibly pay twice as much for this gas as NET do.

These are all points which can be made in relation to the poor performance of NET. If this industry has a future we have a duty to back the industry, not indefinitely or not at any price. If we feel that the demands made are reasonable, we have a duty to the taxpayer to follow through the amount of money spent and hope that in the near future this company will become profit making. Mr. Conlon is on record as saying that, having taken on international consultants to investigate the operations of the company and having heard their recommendations and hopefully implemented them, the company will be able to show a profit by 1984 or 1985. This may be over optimistic, but Mr. Conlon should know what the position is. I feel that this particular project is worth a further chance.

While the finger can be pointed initially at the board of NET for the inadequacies which were exposed, particularly in the report of the Joint Committee, there has been no mention made of the fact that those people were reacting to financial advisers. I do not believe anybody has pointed the finger at those people. They were supposed to advise the board on the viability of such an undertaking, and find out what the world trade was in this particular commodity. Those are the kind of things which would normally be expected of them. Whatever advice was given to this board — and I assume they acted on bona fide advice — it was wrong. A great deal of the blame must be laid at the door of the financial advisers on whom the board depended and, in turn, on whom the Department of the day depended.

Taking all these factors into consideration, in my opinion we do not have any real option at present but to do our best to retrieve this situation, which is not healthy by any means but which is receiving the kind of attention necessary to make it healthier and more viable. If this injection helps in that direction — I am sure it will — and if it lessens the burden on the company and helps them put their house in order, then it is money well spent.

The cynics may say that this £50 million could be spent more profitably and beneficially in thousand of other places. That may be so. But if we allow a major project of this type to shut down, we will be leaving ourselves open to pressures over which we have no control, that is international pressures in the fertiliser industry.

At present we are independent, but we must pay a price for that independence and there is no reason why the taxpayer should always be asked to pay the price. I hope this will be the final injection and that the investigation initiated by the company and a further committee now being set up by the Minister will lead to the pruning of deadweight and the eventual viability of this company.

Fine Gael are behind this allocation. As I said, I hope the Minister will not have to come here again seeking further money and that the company will look to the future with confidence and will become viable.

I have some difficulty in getting to grips with the Minister's speech. I suggest that the case which has been presented to this House in a rather scanty form is very serious. In five-and-a-half pages the Minister, with excessive blandness, has asked us to make available £50 million to NET and to give further formal guarantees of borrowings by the State. I do not think the Minister has analysed the case because since he is privy to a great deal of information about this company and received the very comprehensive report of the Joint Committee on State Sponsored Bodies, his response should have been much more detailed. I do not know the reason for his attenuated response. Admittedly the publicity given to the debacle of NET in the 1971-1974 period has done this country enormous damage. That damage was not caused by critical comment; it was caused by the worst case study in the history of Europe in terms of industrial development in technology of this kind. I am a member of the Economic Affairs and Development Committee of the Council of Europe and I have been searching for similar cases. No matter how bad British Steel or British Leyland were, in comparative terms there is no company in Europe which produced a debacle of such magnitude as NET.

I want to make a controversial point. The Minister should have come here today and announced the resignation or the firing of those members who were also members of the board in the 1974-76 period, irrespective of whoever they are. Due to pressure of work I did not have time to check the names of the board membership, and there may be some trade union members on it for all I know. But, whoever they are, they deserve to be fired. There is no excuse for what happened to NET. I will go further: there is no excuse in the Department of Industry Commerce and Tourism, leaving aside the supervisory role of the Department of Finance, for this debacle. The former managing director has retired, but if he had not, he should have been fired when the report of the Joint Committee was published. What happened in Marino Point and Arklow Gypsum, in terms of gross, absolute, total, utter, abysmal and culpable incompetence, is inexcusable. The amount involved, so far as Arklow Gypsum are concerned, is £9 million. I take a very serious view of that because 138 workers were thrown out of work, and that was inexcusable.

I suggest that the situation is far more serious than the Minister said this afternoon, because one has to view NET's projects and current economic and social contribution to this State not just in terms of the Government decision to provide additional capital money but in the context of the feedstock of natural gas used by the company. This is the most serious aspect of the matter.

It has been estimated that NET will lose about £31 million this year. We are in the fifth month and this figure has not been denied. Last year they lost £50 million. If NET had been paying the normal commercial rate for their feedstock last year — I am quoting evidence from outside commentaries — the loss would have been £80 million, and my estimate of the loss in the present year in such circumstances is £56 million. Natural gas is a State resource and could we allow a situation in which fertilisers produced in Cork and Arklow would be exported to Europe, or indeed China or India, and subsidised nationally here for the farmers of Europe to spread on their fields and to compete with farmers all over the Republic through CAP?

The policy ramifications of what is happening at the moment are enormous. I have the greatest respect for the Minister's personal competence in terms of setting economic criteria, and I say to him, at the end of this Dáil term, not to let anybody be under any illusions. Do not let the workers in Cork or Arklow think, even with Mr. Conlon as the excellent managing director, that this injection of taxpayer's money will resolve the issues because the issues are too great and require an enormous amount of consideration in the immediate future.

All this is doing is in effect saying to the receiver: "There is £50 million, and for God's sake stay away from the door for six months, a year or two years". What will be done in the meantime will be of great consequence to the country as a whole. Of course there will be cheering in Cork and in Arklow: "We are getting £50 million. Fianna Fáil are looking after us. We are guaranteed another £40 million. Everything will be all right". Even with the considerable skill of the rescue attempt by the managing director I do not share the optimism expressed in the Minister's speech, though I am more optimistic now than I was a few months ago. The Minister must indicate that he and Deputy Colley are horrified — I know both Departments are horrified — by the real economic assessment of the energy feedstock being used by this company and the extent to which it contributes to our balance of payments situation, and by the extent to which the natural gas feedstock could be used alternatively in other areas, such as petro-chemicals. That situation cannot be dodged for much longer.

That is why I allude to these matters at the outset of my contribution. The Minister made an extraordinary statement at the beginning of his speech. Referring to the Joint Committee, of which I was a member, and which spent so many wearying hours trying to find out what the situation was, the Minister said that unfortunately the committee did not allude——

"Highlight" I said.

I will give one excerpt from the evidence to the Joint Committee meeting on 2 July 1980. Mr. Conlon said: "By 1986 we will turn the corner, that is having charged full depreciation." I said: "You said you would still owe £97 million." Mr. Conlon said: "Yes, we would owe £97 million then". My comment was: "That is still a lot of money". Mr. Conlon's reply was: "Yes, of course. At present we owe £168 million, so that would be a reduction."

At page 33 of the same report, Mr. Crumlish stated: "As of now, in terms of our total debt, more than 60 per cent of it is in currencies other than the Irish pound. Of the 60 per cent that we are talking of about 20 per cent would be in sterling which is both expensive and carries the greatest risk from the point of view of Irish business. We have considerable borrowing in dollars as of now and we have also borrowed in EEC currencies".

I will throw a simple question at the Minister. In making these moneys available have we any insurance, or what action has been taken to stop the further erosion and the haemorrhage to NET? I do not know what kind of Government memoranda are floating around in terms of producing £50 million for NET. I approve of the decision of the Minister to give them the money because it was either that or close the whole place down and fire the 800 workers. From now on we must have a closer look at the future economic viability of this company before we pour good money after bad. I am glad we are taking this decision today. It is an all-party decision: we have agreed to give the money, it is taxpayers' money, but we must express our reservations. As far as I am concerned the true situation will not be hidden from the Irish people.

This is the first opportunity the House has had to discuss what has happened in NET. I should like to see the company's current corporate plan. I say this directly to the Minister — I do not regard a three-page press release issued by Profile Public Relations Consultants as a response to the Joint Committee's recommendations. It is a very interesting press release. It is interesting to note also that the board have engaged the service of two firms of highly reputable international consultants. The Minister set up an inter-departmental committee. He is engaging a further clutch of consultants to advise him on the future. Meanwhile, the company operates. Listen to the conclusions of the Joint Committee in relation to the corporate plan of this body, and this report is only a few weeks old:

The Committee concluded that while individual strategic planning exercises are carried out on an ongoing basis by individual departmental heads, overall long term corporate policy and expectations in relation to the Company, its field of business activity, financial and growth objectives have not been clearly defined in a policy document such as a corporate plan approved by the Board of Directors in the past. In addition there appears to have been some serious lack of dimension in the overall planning expertise within the Company which has given rise to continuing and substantial differences in projected costs and profitability over short time intervals. Projections appear to be based on the most optimistic view without proper allowance for contingencies which might arise.

The board is still there. Is the Minister as sanguine and optimistic about the competence of that board which for 1974 to 1981 could not produce a corporate plan? Now because they have a new managing director and have cleaned up some of the operation they say they have a corporate plan. Perhaps. I wish them well. I am an advocate of State-sponsored bodies. I have literally been ashamed of my life at having to indulge in virtually a cross-examination as to where almost £100 million of taxpayer's money went. That has been no great joy for one who professes a desire to see a strong, viable, profitable and effective State sector.

It has given me less joy to have to say to the trade unions concerned that that is the situation within the company. I do not want to belabour the House unduly but I want to put on record some of the conclusions reached by the Joint Committee in relation particularly to Marino Point. I quote from page 37:

Central to the problem has been the substantial escalation in the cost of the Marino Point project which was originally budgeted to cost £63.51 million but eventually cost £137.3 million and which was financed mainly by borrowing.

I know that the Minister in his meeting with the board, both in Arklow and elsewhere, frothed at the mouth, and rightly so, when he spoke to the board about the way they carried on their operations. The Minister was horrified and shocked. I share his concern. The Minister should put on public record that the board and its former managing director, Mr. Jack Hynes, were responsible for that debacle. In so far as there appears to have been officials — I have been very careful in my 12 years in this House in having a go at any Government Department — who failed in terms of monitoring, surveillance and carefully supervising major public capital programmes moneys which were sanctioned by the Government, known — admittedly in part only — to the Department of Industry, Commerce and Energy, that Department must share a degree of responsibility.

We have said in our Joint Committee report that the Committee considers that the submissions and project feasibilities studies undertaken and presented by NET to the Government Departments concerned did not contain a sufficient justification for the project. This seems to the Committee to be the main reason for the delay in obtaining Government approval. That is their comment. One cannot lay all the blame for this debacle at the door of any official. But I have a feeling it was let slide and drift. In so far as at that time Fine Gael and Labour were in Government, there does not appear to have been set up at Cabinet level and between the Cabinet and the Department of Finance and the Department of Industry and Commerce some kind of monitoring mechanism whereby the Minister for Finance of the day would say to the Minister for Industry and Commerce of the day "What in the name of God is happening in NET?" These questions were not asked. Even today it is necessary to have that kind of normal public capital programme monitoring, seeking of formal sanctions and demanding from the heads of some of these bodies, particularly from the managing directors of this company in the 1974 to 1981 period where the memoranda are. I have seen all the documentation relating to the background. It is confused, mishmash documentation. It would drive any civil servant out of his mind trying to divine what the company were up to. In so far as the public accountability of Departments, from Industry and Commerce to Finance, broke down because they were not able to keep total tabs on what was happening in NET, the system of control was not set up, and that also must be a shared responsibility.

I have always been extremely cautious about attacking public servants who are not in a position to defend themselves in public, but I quote another conclusion of the Committee, page 84:

The Committee has established to its satisfaction that there was a serious misunderstanding between NET on the one hand and the Government and Government Departments on the other hand as to the amount of the estimated capital cost of the project during the critical period covering Government approval and NET's authorising of Kellogg to proceed.

I hold the view that, after 50 or 60 years of State investment in State-sponsored bodies, we need to have some kind of controlled mechanism whereby that kind of misunderstanding cannot and should not be allowed to happen.

There are two other conclusions which are of considerable importance. I quote conclusion No. (iii) in relation to the Marino Point Project:

The Committee considers that the time taken by NET management to transmit vital capital cost information to the Government Departments concerned, and on occasions to the NET Board, was too long.

We then came to the conclusion:

From the Committee's examination of the evidence given, it would appear that NET management were premature in proceeding with the execution of the project by issuing the Letter of Intent to Kellogg on 12.12.1974.

The indictment contained in our Committee's report, all of which we can substantiate in documentation data, is positively embarrassing. It is embarrassing for somebody from the Labour Party to have to say this in terms of conclusions. It should go on the record of the House in terms of people's responsibility here.

As regards the contract with Kellogg, the Minister is in a tragic situation. If Fianna Fáil win the election, he will not be Minister for Industry, Commerce and Tourism. If Fianna Fáil lose the election he will not be Minister for Industry, Commerce and Tourism either. If Fianna Fáil win the Taoiseach will probably put the Minister into the Department of Defence——

That is hardly relevant to the debate.

I think the Minister would be quite happy if Fianna Fáil lost the election because he might then be leader of the party. However, I will not dwell on that matter. Whatever else the Minister does he should ensure that his Department examine contracts for civil engineering work. Where the IDA grant money or where public capital programme money is involved, the Department should ensure that the contracts are scrutinised. I should like to quote from paragraph 263 of the committee's report:

It is the Committee's conclusion, having considered the mass of submissions and arguments advanced, that the contract favoured the contractor to a considerable extent. The Committee is supported in this conclusion by its consultants who are of the opinion that the type of contract conditions between NET and Kellogg appeared to be heavily weighted in favour of the contractor.

This was a project where the cost was originally estimated at £63 million and finished up at £137 million. The Department should have demanded to see the contract and they would not be regarded by anyone as excessively bureaucratic or inhibiting the normal progression of State contracts. We know that every month costs escalate through the mechanism of price variation clauses. In all Government Departments there should be constant monitoring of major contracts before sanction to proceed is issued.

As I am a spokesman for the Labour Party, a member of a trade union and a former union official, it might be assumed I am in favour of giving a certain immunity to any development project. However, the Joint Committee on State-Sponsored Bodies is an all-party committee and our report on NET is unanimous. I should like to quote from paragraph 300 of that report:

The site construction workforce, through unofficial industrial action and excessive absenteeism, contributed to delays amounting to £16.5 million. It can be argued that some of the responsibility for this cost can be attributed to Kellogg who were responsible for the management of industrial relations. However, NET have argued strongly that they do not subscribe to this view on the grounds that every single incidence of industrial action was unofficial. Kellogg could hardly be held responsible for this.

It should be said loud and clear that £16 million was attributed to industrial action. As there was no incentive to the main contractor to ensure that they had management on the site to prevent wildcat and unofficial strikes, that should be put on record as a contributing factor in the increased costs.

In the case of Arklow Gypsum, here we have not just a matter of escalation of costs but also a decision to proceed which reflects the whole problem of NET. I should like to quote from paragraph 317 of the report:

The Arklow Gypsum Limited (AGL) project was approved by the NET board in 1973. The project subsequently went ahead with mechanical completion planned for the end of 1974. However, due to various delays commissioning did not commence until more than 4 years later. By early 1980 not only could a breakeven situation no longer be projected but even cash flow projections were negative.

It is incredible that the board, without doing any feasibility study, should decide to go ahead. Between 1973 and 1981 they literally poured down the drain £9 million of taxpayers' money. Some 132 jobs were directly involved in Arklow, north Wicklow and north Wexford. It is incredible that such irresponsibility was allowed to continue. In paragraph 318 the committee reported as follows:

The Committee has not had the opportunity to examine either the original feasibility study, the succeeding ones or the final one on which the decision to close the plant down was made. However, bearing in mind that NET projections have almost always been proved to be over-optimistic and also the fact that on this occasion their final prognosis was made on the basis of "nothing going wrong", the Committee is of the opinion that NET's only course was to close and, if possible, to sell the plant.

The conclusions of the committee with regard to the Arklow project were restrained. The closure of the project was inevitable having regard to the decisions made.

One striking point about NET — and this was evident also in some other State-sponsored companies — was their failure to take account of inflation. Accounts were presented by them with monotonous regularity in current financial terms. In paragraph 322 the committee stated:

Another factor that had an important bearing on subsequent events was the omission of inflation from the original feasibility study. Thus, in the original feasibility study it was assumed that the cost of raw materials, services and personnel would increase at the same rate as the selling price. This assumption was made despite the fact that a sensitivity analysis showed that the project was particularly sensitive to project price. Subsequent events showed that this was a serious misjudgment when in the period 1973 to 1979 raw material costs had increased by a factor of 4.3 whereas selling prices obtainable had increased by a factor of only 2.5

This was a recipe for absolute disaster. What was involved was taxpayers' money. It is imperative that the Minister or his successor insist that the most modern up-to-date accounting methods which take account of inflation are employed by State-sponsored bodies. Firms in the private sector are taken to the cleaners every week by the receiver for failure to adopt this course. The committee have examined 17 State-sponsored bodies and in fairness I must state that most of them do not fall into that category. However, what happened in the case of NET was so expensive that it deserves comment in this House.

I want to comment on the future studies to be undertaken by this inter-departmental committee aided by the consultants. The biggest single policy decision which will have to be taken relative to NET is the one I alluded to at the beginning, namely, should they be using the gas feed stock resource which they are permitted to use at present. That is a policy decision of the first magnitude. In his attenuated comments today the Minister alluded to this in a most veiled fashion. It was also referred to by the Minister for Energy. Today the Minister said:

Obviously one of the matters which will have to be considered is the dramatic change which has taken place in the energy field since the original decisions relating to Kinsale gas were taken. There may be better uses to which this gas can now be put and the full implications for this in relation to employment, balance of payments, energy efficiency and returns to the Exchequer will have to be examined.

There are questions which will have to be put directly to the Minister's committee and which will have to be answered in a very definite way. I will put them in a media sense and the Minister will know what I am alluding to. Let me take one of the many public comments made in this regard. On December 3 1980 in The Irish Times Paul Tansey claimed that NET were paying almost 10p per therm for gas from the BGE. He went on to say that fuel oil equivalent price, based on the average import price from January to September 1980, of £84 a ton, and assuming 391 therms per ton, comes to 22p per therm, implying conservatively a “subsidy” of 12p a therm. With the annual consumption of NET amounting to 192 million therms, this implies an annual feedstock “subsidy” of £21.84 million, if the estimate of price paid is correct.

In their 1979-80 annual report at page 43 the ESB gave a fuel cost per unit sent out of 1.092p for their Marina gas consuming power plant. The cheapest fuel cost per unit sent out from an oil-fired plant is found at the Poolbeg Station with a cost of 1.697p per unit sent out, which exceeds the gas fuel cost by 55 per cent. Therefore, if we apply the difference, namely, 0.605p to the number of units sent out in the year from Marina, which is roughly 1.066.6 million units, we get a "subsidy" to electricity consumers of £6 million, on a very crude basis.

One of the major questions facing the inter-departmental committee is the altternative use to giving a feedstock to NET, the alternative economic usage at X price to future users of that gas which is being given currently to that economy.

I have not got the competence to do an economic evaluation of that situation. The Minister's inter-departmental committee and the consultants employed should have the economic ability to arrive at a conclusion on that matter. On the basis of information publicly available — and there have been many allusions to the price for gas paid by NET — and so that nobody will feel I am being exclusive, I want to quote some of the comments made during the course of the evidence given. The information is of some considerable importance. In the minutes of evidence taken before the committee in July 1980 Mr. McSweeney said:

We are not permitted to disclose the price of gas and would not do so, but we have studied what is paid by people in our business for gas for major heavy chemical business. Gas is available in some cases at unbelievably cheap prices under old contracts and there are modern prices which are related to today's conditions. The price we pay is within the general range.

On the same day Mr. O'Brien said:

Our information is that our biggest competitor and much bigger than ourselves in England is paying a little less, or if it is more, it is only infinitesimally so, than we are paying. So, I cannot see how we are subsidised in that respect.

Senator Hillery. — What is the duration of the contract for the natural gas?

Mr. McSweeney. — Twenty years.

Senator Hillery.—But it is escalating.

Professor O'Donnell.— There is an escalation clause. I think I said 12 years earlier. The escalation clause is based on the average of the bulk price for 12 months and not 12 years.

As reported on page 32 Senator Cooney said:

Yours is a 20 years contract. What are the provisions in it for renewal?

Mr. Crumlish.—It is related to the life of the field and at the time of signing or drawing up the contract the life of the field was determined as 20 years from the start of production. Our contract runs for 20 years from commencement of production, from 1979.

In that context the data are clearly available to the inter-Departmental committee and the consultants to be employed by the Minister. A major policy decision arises in that regard. On the assumption that the long-drawn out declaration of a general election will finally be made, the incoming Government will have to face the major policy decisions to be taken.

The Labour Party considered this Bill carefully. We received a number of representations in the Cork and Arklow areas and other areas about the Bill and about NET. At times we were accused maliciously of knocking NET for the sake of knocking NET. This is grossly incorrect. When we are about to rescue this company on its death bed we are absolutely entitled, in the national and public interest and to ensure that this kind of situation will not recur in the history of Irish enterprise, to apportion a degree of blame and lay it on the doorstep of the people responsible for what happened, be they former or current Ministers, former or current public servants, or the board of this company from 1974 onwards, those responsible for the taking of these policy decisions.

It is arguable that had the Joint Committee on State-sponsored Bodies been set up when it should have been set up — I remember so advocating when we were in office in 1974 to 1977 — had we got to grips with the situation early on, because in the last couple of years we have examined no less than 17 separate State-sponsored bodies, we might have detected and at least alerted the Houses of the Oireachtas to the development at that time. The Joint Committee should have been set up way back in 1970, when they would have been in a position to tease out in public some of the ambivalence, some of the total over-optimism and, indeed lack of confidence which we found and which the Minister quite clearly found at a later date. That would have obviated the necessity for coming into this House today seeking funds of this magnitude. Above all it would have lessened the appalling air of uncertainty, of depression and the lack of optimism for the future which has permeated the complex both in Arklow and Cork. The least we owe the workers in those plants is that we be totally honest with them in terms of what happened and in terms of their future.

In so far as these moneys and guarantees of borrowing will keep the situation afloat we give our approval here today. We do so without any reservation of the immediate, short-term prospect, subject to examining in the most careful way the future viability of this whole, sorry enterprise as it has developed between 1974 and 1981, as obviously it has a future with the most careful State control and scrutiny.

Much has been said in recent months about the financial affairs of NET and how they got into their present state. There is no need for me to go into that situation as, following the report of the Joint Committee on State-sponsored Bodies, the various meetings and deputations and media coverage, every rational person is now aware of the sad financial state of the company.

I regret that the company's financial state is such as to necessitate the introduction of this Bill but, having said that, I welcome its provisions. I note that it is designed to increase the authorised share capital of the company and the limit on its borrowings which will now be covered by Ministerial order. Indeed the contents of the Bill indicate the Government's confidence in the ability of the company to overcome their current difficulties.

Since the circulation of the Bill there has been an upsurge of optimism amongst workers in the town of Arklow, amongest everybody involved in the economic life of that area. Clearly it is the wish of all concerned that the economic viability of the company be re-established. Hopefully the renewed efforts of management, workers, the Minister and his Department — whom I compliment on this £50 million injection — will ensure that this viability is soon restored. It is essential that this native industry, using in the main indigenous resources, will prove to be successful. Indeed it has had much success to date. After all it supplies up to 85 per cent of the domestic market in straight nitrogen, a basic commodity requirement of agriculture, our main economic component.

When the Marino Point development was introduced in 1974 there were assurances given that that development would compliment the NET development, the parent company in Arklow, that it would cement the viability of that company. Sadly that has not proved to be the case, witness to this fact are the huge number of redundancies that have taken place in the Arklow arm of the company. These redundancies have brought about tremendous personal and financial strains on workers and their families, something which has had an enormous adverse impact on the socio-economic life of Arklow and the South Wicklow-North Wexford region. This £50 million injection has brought about renewed optimism in the area and is essential to the maintenance of the company's functions.

I am pleased to note also from the Minister's speech that he has established an inter-departmental committee to consider the options for the future of NET. This is vital as the company, through its new managing director, confers with his consultants and has his feasibility studies carried out. It is vital also that the Oireachtas be kept informed and involved through this inter-departmental committee. I know that the company's venture into an off-shoot in Arklow Gypsum did not prove successful; in fact it was a disaster and this has been admitted. Nevertheless I sincerely hope a viable, alternative ancillary can be found for NET. The last was fraught with difficulties, saw the loss of many jobs and a lot of taxpayer's money. With a study group examining the options, as the situation continues to evolve, hopefully various ancillary and other projects can be entered into adding to the company's viability.

Therefore I welcome the provisions of this Bill and join the Minister in the optimism I know abounds once again within the community. Certainly I hope that NET will recover very strongly and quickly.

As if we did not know we have now discovered what is wrong with the NET plant company. Sufficient has been said about the faults of this company by everybody in the country over the last three years. It is time we began to ascertain what we can do about it in the future, whether or not it can be rendered a viable fertiliser and ammonia-producing plant and, if not, what we intend doing with the £1,500,000 worth of plant existing at Marino Point, what we intend to do with the 50 per cent of the gas field in the Celtic Sea, the Marathon field and what we intend doing with the 800 workers employed in the plant.

I admire the job done by the Joint Committee in relation to all the companies they have dealt with. Of course they have the benefit of hindsight. Another lesson to be learned is how careful we must be of the qualifications of people who are given top jobs in important companies here. I am a strong believer in the necessity for movement out of the civil service to industry and from industry to the civil service but until that has been going on at all levels for a number of years we must be careful about the appointments we make from the public sector to the semi-private sector as in this case. The incompetence of the management, the workers and the board of NET have got them into a financial bind over the last seven or eight years but I would suspend judgment on them having read the report of the Joint Committee some of which is horrifying reading. The inter-departmental committee which the Minister has just now set up is very much too late when the evidence that necessitated this Bill has been with the Minister for 18 months. In their report of 1979 presented to the Minister the chairman of NET signalled a restructuring of the finances of the company and indicated that they would lose £50 million during 1980. At this stage on 12 May we are debating a provision relating to the repayment of the loan before 29 May. That means that this House only got 17 days notice yet the Minister had this indication from the NET report of 1979. It is unreasonable for the Minister to attack the board and the management of NET here for not doing their job properly when this House is being asked to correct the financial structure of this company so that money due for repayment and known to be due for repayment on 29 May for four of five years——

Most of it was not borrowed until last year so how could the date of repayment be known four years ago?

My understanding was ——

It was 12 month money.

Well, it was due for repayment on 29 May for 12 months.

Should the Government and the House make decisions in advance of the report of the committee?

The Minister will be replying in a few minutes.

Of course they could. About 99.9 per cent of decisions are made in advance of the reports of the committee. The fact that this was twelve month money makes it even worse and it is a further indictment of the people involved. If the Minister knew this was twelve month money and waited until a fortnight before repayment was due to come in here and ask this House to pass £50 million there is as much criticism due to the Minister as there is in other respects due to the board of NET. I will put amendments down on Committee Stage of this Bill to ensure that at least in relation to this company this will not happen again. I am sure that the Minister will use his 82 Deputies to ensure that my amendments will not pass but I still do my best. The chairman in his 1979 report signalled that the company would lose £50 million.

Will the Deputy quote these forecasts?

It is from the chairman's statement——

Will the Deputy quote the statement?

If the Minister gives me the 1979 report of the accounts of NET I will quote from it. In those reports the chairman signalled that the company would lose £50 million during 1980. It is quite obvious that a company with a capital base of £17½ million making a loss of £50 million will need extra capital. I cannot understand how the Minister can come in here with only a fortnight to go and expect to get this money passed with only a limited amount of discussion.

I am glad the Minister decided to set up an inter-departmental committee to look into the future of NET. I criticise the Minister for saying that the £50 million is not enough and that we will be having this discussion again at the end of this year when more money will be needed. The Minister was tardy in waiting until now to set up this committee when it was obvious to everybody long before the Joint Committee sat that a serious decision would have to be taken about NET. The Minister says:

With this in mind, the Government have now decided to establish an inter-departmental committee of senior officials to consider in detail all the options for the future of NET with a view to reporting to me as soon as practicable.

This should have been done years ago because this company take 46 to 50 per cent of the gas produced in the Marathon field. To say that there may be better uses for this gas is true but if a decision is taken by the Minister to shut down the NET plant what effect would that have on the contract that An Bord Gáis have with Marathon that requires them to take the entire field at a certain flow over a given period? What effect will that have on the price being paid for the gas by An Bord Gáis which is a State company? That is something which must be considered.

Now, the known best use for this gas would be a domestic use on Inch Strand where it comes ashore. Every mile that it is moved away from there and every other use made of it makes it a less valuable asset. The advantage of the urea plant at Marino Point is that it is within a relatively short distance from the point of coming ashore so the loss in transmission is quite small. Another advantage of that plant is that it helps to make this country totally independent of the importation of nitrogenous fertilisers. This is something of strategic value and possibly could be quantified or guessed at in terms of money. It is said that there is a subsidy for using this gas, because the price which NET are paying to An Bord Gáis is relatively low. If this is so, and Deputy Desmond quoted to this effect from the evidence given before his committee — which I had always understood to be the case — many or most, and probably all, of the companies who make similar use of natural gas for the production of fertilisers sell it at below market price, below the going rate. Therefore, the companies with which NET are in competition are receiving the benefit of this "subsidy".

If the stock of fertilisers being produced by NET were taken off the world market, would supply and demand become more interbalanced, even if only fractionally, and so interfere with the price of, or increase the price at which we would have to import fertilisers? What effect would this have on our balance of payments? On the other side of the equation, what is the advantage to our balance of payments of producing these goods ourselves? Even if all these sums were to come out correctly, if it was decided that one could make something else with the natural gas close to Cork, or even transporting it to Dublin, if there was more beneficial use, how could one quantify the added value by spreading the fertiliser on land, getting it through our cattle and onto the export markets again? Even if that came out wrongly and all these considerations had been taken into account, and we decide to turn off the tap and give no more natural gas to the NET factory at Marino Point, what do you do with one of the most modern and one of the biggest chemical plants in Europe? This plant has a value of probably £150 million and perhaps more, sitting on a prime deepwater frontage in one of the most sought-after industrial parts of this country and you are still stuck with the problem of paying off the debts, because they are Government guaranteed. That is why this legislation is before the House today. The Government have guaranteed the borrowings of NET and this must now be repaid.

Even if NET go out of existence on 29 May — and I agree with the Minister that if this debt is not repaid they probably will go out — I presume, but do not known — the Minister might enlighten me in his reply — that there is no legal obligation on the Government to pay, but there certainly is an obligation on this country to pay money which was borrowed by semi-State bodies under Government control and is guaranteed by them. I do not know what the legal position would be if the company went into liquidation on 29 May, but that is a scenario which we should not even consider. I presume this country would pay their debts. So, we are stuck with the debts of Nítrigin Éireann. If they are guaranteed by the Government, the Government must pick up the tab for all that money. You must pay the money which Nítrigin Éireann borrowed under Government guarantee; you have, I think, £136 million — although £150 million is probably a truer value — of the plant sitting on prime industrial land: you have 800 people on the dole queue, and you must set about immediately redrafting your contract with the Marathon Petroleum Company, because you are not now fulfilling your side of the contract and taking off 50 per cent of the natural gas, as you had undertaken to do seven or eight years ago.

These are the problems which the Government must face and these are the considerations which must be taken into account by the inter-departmental committee. I would hope that some little bit of realism would now come into all our undertakings. I am trying to find the figure I have quoted. Can the Minister find it?

He says in the report dated 23 May that the results would be much worse. He does not quantify them.

I am sorry. I cannot find the figure which I saw, of £150 million. He does say here that the finance changes for 1980 will be of the order of £25 million. Perhaps the figure I mentioned was in the accounts of Deputy Desmond's committee. I understood that a £50 million loss in 1980 had been forecast.

It is time that a little realism was brought into the discussion about natural gas and about the Nítrigin Éireann plant in Cork. The £50 million which we will pass next week, or whenever it goes though this House and becomes law, takes care of only part of the problem. I think I saw a quotation where the debts of the company are now £200 million. Is anybody going to suggest that the Government are going to pay off all the debts of this company, going to put 800 people out of work and be stuck with the plant sitting in Cork harbour with very little marketable value but with an actual value of £150 million? Is it not time that we came clean and said that this plant is to stay in operation and that the workforce will continue to be employed? Their training has been in progress there since the plant opened two or three years ago and they are now competent and capable of producing at prices that are as competitive as those relating to goods produced by workers in other factories in other parts of the world with whom our workers are competing.

This plant is one of the most modern in the world for the production of ammonia and urea but we should ensure that it is managed better and more tightly than was the case in the past. We must do everything possible to guarantee that, even after 20 years have elapsed, we will have the source of producing 100 per cent of the needs of our farmers in terms of nitrogenous fertilisers at competitive prices. This would ensure that our farmers could compete competitively in terms of production and it is the sort of positive approach that is needed if we are to think in terms of the maximum benefit for the national economy.

What happened in the past so far as this plant is concerned is both regrettable and appalling. The report of the Joint Committee was alarming. It was an indictment of many people. But that is all in the past and there is no point now in trying to recoup losses. The money has been lost. We must now adopt a positive approach and agree that we have no option at this point but to fulfil our contract for natural gas. The price is good. Although NET may be buying at what some people might regard as a subsidised price — and I would not so agree — when we realise that 100 per cent of the product will be absorbed inside the country, we realise the importance of this plant to agriculture, which is our most important industry. All of this will be reflected in higher profits for all sectors of the agricultural community. We would be penalising ourselves by failing to fulfil the contract and we must remember that there are 800 jobs at stake.

The £50 million being talked about here is not the all important factor because this is a plant that must not be closed. However, it must be managed more efficiently than has been the case in the past. We cannot afford to put another 800 people on the dole queue in addition to the 126,000 who are unemployed now. Most of the criticisms made by Deputy Desmond and by the Joint Committee are valid. Is mór an trua é sin. But let us not any more make the company, their new management — and I underline the word "new"— and their staff, the whipping boy for every politician and journalist in the country. Let us start today and restructure properly the finances of the company. We are not doing that so far as this Bill is concerned. Today we are catering only for one small part of the problem. A major benefit was the fact of being able to make the deal with Marathan for the gas at a very reasonable price. That was because we were in a position to create immediately a huge "take-off" of the gas. The benefit for this country of being independent of the important of urea and ammonia is collosal in terms of the assurance of supply to the farming community at reasonable prices and of the overall benefit to the economy. Therefore, it is time that we stopped knocking NET and pointed to all these advantages. We must set about obtaining the highest possible value from this plant, not only for the economy but for the workforce and for the agricultural community.

I am quite sure that there is agreement in the House as to the necessity for this Bill. There can hardly be any reason for political conflict in regard to it. However, while Deputy Peter Barry may have spoken as a truly patriotic Corkman——

That was not the reason. The plant is not in my constituency.

I wonder if a handful of the workers might not live in the Deputy's constituency or within half a mile of it.

Let us forget about Corkmen for the moment, be they patriotic or otherwise.

Surely they are all patriotic down there.

Cork's idea of patriotism does not often coincide with that of the rest of the country.

That is a pity because the country would be a lot better off if the rest of the people agreed with us in this regard.

It would be very fragmented.

Is the Minister lecturing me on fragmentation?

The Chair would hope that Deputy Deasy would be allowed to continue his speech.

I should like to speak to the Bill from a totally objective point of view. I expect that all of those here who have read the report of the Joint Committee relating to NET have found it frightening and realise that the question of the future of the company raises many important issues. Primarily, we must ask how best we can utilise our resources, whether these resources be natural resources in the form of gas or straightforward hard cash resources.

Could the money we are being asked to agree to here today be spent better in the building of hospitals or in the provision of employment or by way of grant-aids for industry and for farmers? We must ask ourselves whether this money might be put to more productive use. We must ask also whether the gas might be used in a more productive manner. It is not good enough to say that because the industry is there it must continue as it has continued during the past couple of years.

The information that we garnered during the course of the Joint Committee's investigations would make one's hair stand on end. This was a case of gross mismanagement of State funds. Let us not take the easy way out and be nice about it. Neither let us be unnecessarily ugly. We must be fair and straight in this matter. I am reasonably happy that there has been a big improvement in the whole structure of the NET company and especially in the management there particularly during the past year and a half. I would be hopeful — but no more than hopeful — that the change in management and the general outlook will make things more palatable in the future and that the results will not be as dreadful as they have been in the past.

During the course of the sittings of that Joint Committee we learned time and again that the projections put forward by the company were far too ambitious and did not at all keep in line with reality. It is because of that fact that I am not too confident that the future is as rosy as has been predicted this evening by some speakers. We must take a hard, long and objective look at the whole case. It is obvious that mistakes were made and this is the place where it should be stated that mistakes were made. The finger should be pointed in the direction of the perpetrators of those mistakes and the reasons for them spelled out. We must ask ourselves if the people who originally thought up the idea of manufacturing urea fertiliser really knew what they were doing; if they had sufficient expertise to know what was involved or if they were just playing around with an elaborate toy which, as it turned out, was a very costly toy?

As a member of the Joint Committee it seems that the people involved originally did not know the extent of the financial involvement. They did not know the cost to the country and were not sufficiently qualified to decide whether this venture should be undertaken. Initially it seemed a very attractive proposition that we should be independent as regards the provision of nitrogen fertiliser. It seemed a very praiseworthy objective, but I hate to think of what would have happened if we had to rely on naphtha or fuel oil as a source for the production of that nitrogen fertiliser. In the event NET were blessed that there was a discovery of gas off Kinsale in 1973 because that put at their disposal a very cheap source of raw material. With the explosion in oil prices in subsequent years it is obvious that if they had to use naphtha or fuel oil as the raw material the cost we are now experiencing would be multiplied. If there has been any saving grace in this economic catastrophe it has been that NET were able to avail of an extremely cheap source of energy. The cost of that energy has been a closely guarded secret. We were told that because of industrial competition NET did not want to permit their competitors to find out the real price, but obviously it is less than the going rate in Europe for similar sources of energy. NET have had this advantage all along and it cloaks the real losses, which are obviously considerably more than those which have come to the public notice.

If the gas was being sold at the going rate which industry is paying for oil or which the Dublin Gas Company is at present paying for naptha, then the losses incurred by NET would not be of the order of £200 million to date but probably a multiple of that sum. We can be thankful for small blessings in that regard. The other great element of worry in regard to this was the manner in which the contract with the main contractors was set up. The Kellogg company of America, the main contractors on the site, got an open-ended agreement, the type of contract that everybody in the construction business or any form of business would love to have. There were virtually no penalty clauses. The extent of the penalty clauses came to £650,000 whereas they were being paid a fee to the extent of £6 million and probably greater due to additional costs. They were handling materials which cost in the region of £100 million. How anybody could have agreed to such an open-ended contract is beyond my comprehension. Surely the whole idea of a contract is that if the contractor does not live up to expectations he should have to bear the cost of his failure. In this case that did not happen. The contractor was immune in regard to the normal penalty clauses associated with such a contract. The word "contract" in this case is a misnomer. The word "fee" is nearer the truth. I fail to see how the company could have agreed to such a loose-ended contract or fee arrangement. There was no initiative needed from Kellogg to see that the job finished on time. If it did not finish on time they would not be penalised and surely the whole basis of such a contract is to see that people live up to their obligations.

When the building of the Marino Point project went behind time the only person who suffered was the Irish taxpayer. The loss was estimated at £2 million per month. From our questioning of the management of NET on that Joint Committee it appears that the delays for one reason or another during the course of the construction of the Marino Point project amounted to something like 15 months. Straight away that creates a loss of £13 million, an astronomical figure for one project. That was a major mistake, and the consultants who advised the Joint-Committee in their investigation of the affairs of NET made that point sharply. The consultants felt that the open-ended form of the contract was not conductive to the work on the project being finished on time. The delays listed were mainly due to industrial disputes. Another reason was the delay in Kellogg providing the final design plans. We were also told there were delays due to bad weather in the winter of 1977-78. I do not know if that is correct but it is what we were told by the management of NET. It seems a little far-fetched that the weather could have caused delays to the extent mentioned, virtually six months.

The causes of delays are listed in the report of the Joint Committee and the cost of those delays are put down as follows: the delay in design and procurement of the plans cost £5 million; delays due to industrial action cost £10½ million; delays due to bad weather cost £8.7 million and delays due to excessive absenteeism amounted to £6 million — overall a total loss of £30 million. If a contractor were tied to a finishing time the delays would not have happened to an extent anywhere near that mentioned in the report as I have just listed.

We deduced during the hearing that in the course of construction of the Marino Point project there were 79 industrial disputes and every single one of them was unofficial. Again a large amount of blame must lie with the Kellogg Company who were in charge of the construction of the plant itself because they were responsible for industrial relations on the site and seemingly they did not have the proper personnel to manage things properly, and that is borne out by the fact that during the course of the construction — unfortunately much too late to have any real effect — Kellogg's chief men on the site, their project manager and his assistant, were both replaced, which would indicate that NET were right when they objected to the manner in which the work was being prolonged. I have seen the comment by one of the consultants we employed to give his views on the project and it was, to say the least of it, uncomplimentary.

When that is the standard of management provided on the site by the Kellogg Company initially the blame must lie with the NET management and board for allowing such a state of affairs to arise. They were the people who called the tune, who were dishing out the Government's and the taxpayers' money in the long run, and if they allowed themselves to be conned in the drawing up of the contract they must take the blame. I believe that when the contract was being drawn up many of the conditions were not acceptable to the Kellogg Company and they changed something like 60 different points in the contract presented to them by the NET company. In other words, a lot of the trouble arose from the fact that Kelloggs got their way when it came to drawing up the contract, if you can use such a word. Eventually that type of open-handed arrangement led to industrial chaos, lengthy delays and a colossal loss of money. It teaches us a lesson and I hope it has taught us that semi-State bodies must be supervised much more strictly, and I am glad to see from the Minister's statement that he is doing just that.

The Minister makes reference to the fact that he was at numerous meetings with the board and management of NET and he has told them that he expects a better performance and that he is keeping a financial check on them once every three months, because obviously the proper types of restrictions and checks were not kept by the relevant Government Departments during the construction of the project in question. It brings up the whole question of accountability by State-sponsored bodies to the Department of Finance or to the Department of Industry, Commerce and Tourism or whatever Department they responded to or to whatever Department is in charge. In this case we saw a form of looseness which should not be tolerated and I hope that the tightening up which the Minister, Deputy O'Malley, has brought about is not restricted to NET and that it goes right across the whole field of State-sponsored bodies in this country. There is too much money involved and, as I have said, perhaps the money being lost in these companies could be used to better advantage elsewhere and we in this Parliament are here to see that that is done. Up to now it has not been done. I go along with the Minister if he can see that the money is spent properly and prudently.

Those are some aspects of the deficiencies in the set-up of the semi-State body involved, Nítrigin Éireann Teoranta. Of course, it is questionable whether the project would ever have got off the ground if there had been proper consultation between the company and the Departments directly involved, the Departments of Finance and the Department of Industry and Commerce. It would appear from the evidence that we listened to at that hearing that there is doubt as to whether the Departments were deliberately denied information about escalating costs. I remember asking the former managing director, "Did you not inform the Departments of the escalation in costs in good time because you were afraid that if you did they would not allow the project to go ahead?" and he almost jumped down my throat. He said, "No, that is not so". However, I have doubts. I think that, due to proper tabs not being kept on the progress at the tendering stage, the project was allowed to go ahead when it might not have been. Initially the cost was estimated to be something like £30 million, when the idea was first mooted back in 1972, using naphtha and fuel oil. By 1974 it had increased to £42.5 million and the Government of the day, in November 1974, were told that the project would cost £42 million. On 2 December 1974 the board of NET decided to go ahead with the project on an estimate of £63.5 million and that decision was reinforced by the management of NET the following day, who again decided to proceed with the project at a cost of £63.5 million. Therein lies a story because, despite the fact that the decision was made on 2 and 3 December 1974, we are told that the first the Department of Industry and Commerce knew about the increased and amended cost was in early April 1975, some five months later, and the Department of Finance maintain that they did not know about the escalation in cost until the end of April 1975.

Therefore there was a major breakdown in consultation and, although meetings were held and we are told that officials from both the Department of Finance and the Department of Industry and Commerce were present on 3 December 1974, there is no documentation to the effect that they were told on that date of the escalation in prices from £42 million to £63.5 million. There was a colossal breakdown in communications, and whether the breakdown meant that the project went ahead when it might not have gone ahead is a question which we were not able to answer. The key question in this whole episode is: would the project have gone ahead if the Government of the day had been made aware that the cost was going to be £63.5 million, which of course in turn escalated to £137 million? It is a classical example of lack of control from central Government over State-sponsored bodies and should not be allowed to recur.

The Arklow Gypsum plant was another catasthrophe within the NET framework. It cost something like £9 million. From beginning to end it was destined to failure. Again, we must question the grounds on which that company was set up and we must question the qualifications of the people who allowed it to be set up, because it would appear from reading the reports and from taking evidence from witnesses, including the workforce at Arklow Gypsum, that the company did not really have much hope of success for the word "go". The projections were way off course. There just did not seem to be a market for what they were producing. That again raises the question as to the capabilities and qualifications of the management.

Let me raise the question of the board of NET. Are these boards really necessary? Are they competent to make decisions of the magnitude required? The boards of State-sponsored companies generally meet about once a month. The people involved are involved on a part-time basis. One must question whether they are aware of the complications involved in major companies. I have come to the conclusion that boards should not be made up of people who have just a passing interest in the venture involved. They should be people who are highly professional and highly qualified in that specific project and not people with a broadly based interest. Perhaps one or two members of the board could have a broadly based interest. A board which is going to make decisions on a project involving hundreds of millions of pounds should not consist of people who meet once a month for a couple of hours — perhaps some of those members would not be present at the relevant meeting. Boards should be established on a fulltime basis and should have senior officials from the relevant Departments involved in the project. The day of part-time boards is gone. The day of the old family firms which had relatives, uncles and aunts, brothers and sisters on the board is gone. That was all very fine when dealing with an annual turnover of a couple of thousand pounds. But when one is dealing with projects running into hundreds of millions of pounds we should see that a more professional approach is adopted.

If nothing else the investigation of the Joint Committee highlights the difficulties we have in the present State-sponsored structures. That is a glaring difficulty. I do not wish to go outside the scope of this Bill, but let us take other State companies where the chairman of the board is part-time and works at it only a couple of days a week. These are companies spending hundreds of millions of pounds and the boards only meet once a month. These are large undertakings and it should not be left to people to do this work on a part-time basis.

There should be much more control at Government level. If there was we probably would avoid a lot of the heavy losses which are presently being endured, and certainly the NET losses would never have escalated if that type of control had been there. I do not wish to make this a political matter. The Minister may come back and say that it was the previous Government who were involved at the time. But the structure was there from time immemorial, from the time the State-sponsored bodies were set up. It just happened to happen during that period. The Minister himself would have to agree that he would have had difficulty in spotting the escalations involved if they had not been pointed out to him by senior members of his Department. This apparently was not the case with regard to NET.

I mentioned at the outset that I agree with the need for the passing of this Bill but I have reservations as to the viability of the company in the long run. That is what we are here for. We are here to question the advisability of spending large sums of money on projects whose feasibility is in doubt. The Minister may have read the report of the Joint Committee. I would like to draw his attention to one of the conclusions arrived at by the Committee. In relation to the Kinsale gas field and its use as a raw material for NET, we asked if it was the best way of using limited resources of natural gas and could the gas be used by the Dublin Gas Company, the Cork Gas Company and other town gas companies throughout the country, or by industry, to better advantage. We also asked if there was a need nationally to secure the fertiliser requirements of the agricultural sector of the economy.

There is a strong case to be made for retaining NET because it makes us independent of imports. But there is a degree beyond which one cannot go. We have not an unlimited amount of finance. We cannot sustain unlimited losses by NET. There must be a balance and the cardinal question is where the line should be drawn with regard to the future financing of NET. That line must be drawn. It is not enough to say that we should be independent of fertilisers from abroad. As it is, there is an over supply of nitrogen fertilizers on the world market. That is all the more reason why we should, as the Committee recommended, see that a study is undertaken to determine our strategy in this regard in the short-term, in the long-term and in the medium-term. A study is needed. We are lay people. We are not professionals and it is not for us to adjudicate on these matters. But a study is definitely needed.

I know the Minister has made the point that he has already set up an inter-departmental committee to look into the matter and they are to report to him as soon as practicable on the proposals so that the Government can make a decision as to NET's future role. But we found that the Government Departments must not have been sufficiently qualified to adjudicate on matters such as this. We obviously need international experts and we need our own experts in chemical engineering to tell us what are the long-term prospects of this company. It is a matter of great national concern. Those of us who spent a lot of time on that Committee were appalled at the sequence of events right from 1970 to 1973. We were appalled to see money, which we all know was so badly needed for other purposes, literally going down the drain due to a lack of proper management, lack of proper qualifications and proper control. It made us all feel a bit sick because we all needed it for housing or hospitals and so on in our own parts of the country. I have no compunction in saying that this matter must be studied very closely. It is just not good enough to hand people a blank cheque and say "spend, spend, spend". It cannot be done. We must be more prudent and more responsible in our overall attitude.

This debate has been remarkable, in particular for the speech of Deputy Desmond. I would like to acknowledge its uniqueness. It bears study. It was not easy for him to say some of the things he did. One must recognise that fact. I have a different sort of inhibition. As Minister I cannot have the sort of swinging freedom which might be open to other Members of the House. I can only reiterate the type of concern I have expressed on many occasions over a long period in relation to this company, in relation to their past activities and the concern I have in regard to the future.

There is one statement Deputy Desmond made which I would like to draw the attention of the House to, because I fully concur with it. He said that, bad and all as the situation is in relations to NET generally, the worst aspect of this whole sorry affair was the Arklow Gypsum affair. He is right. It is the worst aspect because they "only" lost a little over £9 million, which seems to be relatively small here but in fact is the more serious aspect of it. I was not aware of anything even approaching the true situation in Arklow Gypsum Limited until March or April 1980. After I was alerted to what might be the position I had urgent inquiries made and, believe it or not, it took some months for me to get the full information. That is a very disturbing aspect of the whole series of difficulties in relation to this company. Deputy Desmond was right to draw attention to that particular aspect.

A great many points were made and in the present circumstances it might be better if I did not follow them all. I will, however, deal with some of them. When Deputy Desmond spoke about the question of resignations or firings from the board he made the point that anyone who was on the board for the 1974-75 period should be fired or asked to resign. There are only two members currently on the board who were on it in 1974. I want to emphasise that point. I have not anything else to say in relation to the board at the moment.

The question of exports was raised by Deputy Desmond and other Deputies. I would like to point out to the House that to seek to prevent the company exporting would only add to their difficulties. I do not believe any additional loss is caused by their exports. Their exports of CAN are very small. I have not got the exact figure, but as a percentage of their total output of CAN from Arklow it is a very negligible percentage and it is mainly to Northern Ireland. On the other hand, their exports of urea from Cork are fairly substantial. I believe they amount to more than 50 per cent of the production of urea. As the House will appreciate, urea is an inevitable by-product of the ammonia plant and one cannot cut down the output of urea unless one cuts down the output of ammonia. It would not be economic in the circumstances for the company to reduce their output of urea at the present time. The company have calculated — I hope this is one of their correct calculations — that within five years the Irish agricultural market will take up the total output of urea. Irish farmers have not been traditionally big users of urea and NET and An Foras Talúntais in recent years have tried to educate them in that direction. If the rate of increase in the use of urea is as projected, there will be no exportation of it in four years' time. That would be a satisfactory situation.

In the meantime the company, who are inevitably producing a surplus of urea, are quite right to export it. I do not believe it could be stock-piled. It would be far too costly to stock-pile it and it would be impossible for a company in as weak a situation as this company are to carry such stocks for a period of some years. There seems to me to be an implication in Deputy Murphy's contribution that the present problems in Arklow were attributable to Marino Point exclusively. I said before, and I want to make it clear again in case there is any misunderstanding on it, that, notwithstanding the appalling escalation of costs at Marino Point, Arklow quite independently are in serious difficulties. They are making very substantial losses.

There is a point which has been made to me on numerous occasions about extraordinary work practices which operate in Arklow. Unfortunately I have to confess to the House that they are pretty hair-raising but the existence of those work practices today and over the last few years is a direct result of bad management and nothing else. A competent management would never have allowed those practices in the first place. The fact that they are there today is not the fault of the present managing director. He can not snap his fingers and eliminate things which have grown up over the years and have been regarded almost as a constitutional right in some respects. The fact that there are practices of that kind in this or any company can in the last resort be attributed to weak and inefficient management. That certainly was the position in the Arklow fertiliser factory for quite a number of years. It is wrong that such practices are there. The workers concerned would not be human if they did not take advantage of the weak management which existed there for so long.

Several Deputies quite rightly raised, as I did in my opening speech, the question of possible alternative uses of gas and of what is the optimum use in present circumstances. Present circumstances are quite different from what they were some years ago in terms of energy availability and energy prices. There may be some misapprehensions in regard to it.

The natural gas in the Kinsale Head field is very pure methane and is rather different to the bulk of the gas in the North Sea. As a feedstock there are basically only two uses for methane natural gas: first, the manufacture of ammonia and, second, the manufacture of methanol. We are very heavily into the manufacture of ammonia — we are all lamenting how heavily we are in — and we are using roughly half the output of the field in the manufacture of ammonia. The only other alternative where we could use methane natural gas as a feedstock — I am not talking about power generation, heating and so on — is methanol.

Over the past few years I looked long and hard at the possibilities of methanol and it has definite uses. It is an additive to petroleum; we could add up to 15 per cent in volume of our petroleum. It is itself a feedstock for a number of plastics and synthetic glues and things of that kind for which there is a level of demand in this country and abroad. If we were to divert into methanol I was faced with the choice of having to expend in 1980 pounds over £100 million to build a methanol plant which would provide employment for 55 people. Given the history of building plants to process this gas, I am sure the House will appreciate that I did not rush with any enthusiasm into building a methanol plant in 1980 in those circumstances.

Methanol is becoming more valuable in some respects and recently I had discussions about it. In the longer term it appears, and I am advised, that it is likely from, say, the early nineties onwards methanol, or a substance very close to it, can be derived from coal and that the possibilities of building plants in situ over large shallow coalfields in countries like the Soviet Union and Australia show obvious possibilities.

In terms of non-feedstock use of this gas, there are two ways of using it: first, to generate electricity and, second, to use it directly for heating and cooking. Unfortunately the demand for domestic gas in Ireland is minute. The Cork demand is tiny and the Dublin demand is the biggest in the country, but still very small by comparison with other European countries, and it is dropping in all cases because of the tremendous cost of gases based on naphtha. What municipal gas companies could take up would be only a very small fraction of what would be available if this gas were not used for the production of ammonia.

When the pipeline to Dublin is built we will open up other possibilities because while the direct use in Dublin may be quite small, in the early years particularly, it would be possible, for example, to pipe it to the ESB in Dublin and let them convert some of their oil-fired stations to burn natural gas. Purists, and people who are less than purists, are not enthusiastic about that. It is a complicated equation, in which the various figures are changing all the time, to try to work out the balance of advantage. The criteria we should look at are things like the value which is added in this country, the amount of imports we avoid, the amount of employment of good quality given and various other factors of that kind.

That is why we set up this interdepartmental committee. I was accused of not doing this earlier but I do not think any company had more committees, more consultants or more experts looking into their affairs in the last three or four years than NET. As far back as 1978 I set up a committee to inquire into why things went wrong. I was resisted very strenuously at the time but I had to press ahead with it and I am glad I did. There were, and are, various firms of consultants looking at these questions. It is worth saying that the correct answers three years ago would not be the correct answers today and it is possible that the correct answer today will not be the correct answer in three years' time, depending on how energy crises move in the meantime.

The ESB are not in a position at the moment, and would not be before early 1984, to take up any significant further quantities of gas. For that reason it is, on balance, in the national interest to do what we are doing, that is, keeping this company in existence producing ammonia. It has been easy for some years past, and it is easy today, to buy nitrogenous fertilisers based on ammonia on the world market; but there were times in the past when it was not easy, and there may be such times in the future. The importance of agriculture to this country and the importance of fertilisers, particularly nitrogenous fertilisers, to agriculture is such that when we have the opportunity to be independent in this regard, provided the cost is not too high, we should try to avail of that opportunity within reason. I emphasise the words "within reason" and "provided the cost was not too high" because it would be tragic for Irish agriculture in, say, five years' time if, as a result of world developments we did not have access to nitrogenous fertilisers at a reasonable price.

Much play is made, not so much in this House as sometimes by commentators outside, about the allegedly cheap price at which NET are getting the gas. They are getting gas cheaply in the sense that it is much below the oil related price but NET are right when they say the price they are paying is not out of line with that paid by their competitors. Obviously you cannot expect a major user taking 55 million cubic feet a day to pay the same as a domestic user taking perhaps half-a-cubic foot a day, or a small industrial user who is taking perhaps 500,000 cubic feet a day.

In terms of other users, as long ago as three years ago I asked the IDA and BGE to look for industrial users. I have been somewhat surprised at the fact that they have not come forward as rapidly as one would have expected. In terms of feedstock for industry, where gas is more than just a different form of power, heat or lighting, the glass industry would be an obvious one, but there is not any prospect of setting up a major glass industry here. At present there are only two soda glass manufacturers in Britain and it is questionable whether the British and Irish markets between them, of nearly 60 million people, can support two such manufacturers. In these circumstances it would be a foolish man who would get into glass manufacture here on such a scale.

A number of Deputies strongly made the point that there should be greater control by the Departments of Industry Commerce and Tourism and Finance of the semi-State bodies. I would ask the House to reflect on a report of the NESC published about six or seven months ago in which the NESC, representative of a very wide range of interests, came out very strongly against what they regarded as the excessive level of central control of these bodies. There is a fair amount of public and political acceptance of that recommendation.

Everything we have heard here today is directly contrary to that point of view. It is difficult to know where to go. Perhaps there should have been greater control, and with hindsight we might all say there should have been greater control exercised here, because it was needed. On the other hand there are other companies where perhaps even less control is needed. A lot depends on the calibre of the management and on their sense of accountability to the Department concerned. They vary greatly. Criticism of that kind of Departments can lead the Departments to the situation when instinctively they will say no to everything. If the Department of Finance said no all the time they would be right at least one third of the time. However, that is not of much use to the national effort at investment and wealth creation. It is difficult at times to assess some of these projects, and the Departments concerned need the fullest continuing co-operation. I do not think that on all occasions the Departments get the fullest continuing co-operation.

The Minister is hedging a bit.

The question of accountancy or accounting was raised. I am in sympathy with the views expressed in this respect. It is noteworthy that the accounts of NET were audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General. For a number of years the Comptroller and Auditor General qualified the accounts of this company. In 1979 he qualified them on the basis that he was auditing the accounts as those of a going concern and assuming that the company would remain solvent by the injection of State funds, but he had other qualifications in that year and in several other years. He drew the attention of the Oireachtas and the public to what he regarded as a serious misdemeanour. The company were paying their then managing director £2,500 a year more than Devlin allowed. That qualification was put into the audit every year as long as I have been dealing with the matter and perhaps it was there before my time. It probably was.

It reflects the type of accountancy that was involved when an overpayment of £2,500 a year was made to an official, a major misdemeanour in so far as State accounting in this country is concerned. At the time when all that fuss was being made about £2,500 a year, tens of millions of pounds were going down the drain. I am not blaming the Comptroller and Auditor General or his staff who are there to audit in accordance with guidelines laid down about public accountability for money, and only that. Their concern is that Dáil Éireann vote the money and that it is spend in accordance with the general purposes laid down in the Act and with the authorisation of the proper officers in the company. After that, how it is spent is immaterial.

To my mind it is very disturbing that we had our attention called constantly to the overpayment of £2,500 but that our attention was never called to the way things were going, particularly to the situation which existed in Arklow Gypsum Limited. Deputy Desmond was right to highlight that as the most serious of all, even though it only—I emphasise "only"— amounted to £9.2 million. There was a company with a complete workforce recruited for four years before they ever went into production. That is the type of situation that would keep one awake at night when one thought of how that could have happened and how it was concealed effectively from the Oireachtas and the Department concerned.

Deputy P. Barry was highly critical of those who went back into the past because, he said, we should look only to the future. I find it necessary to go into the past when asking the Oireachtas to vote a substantial amount of money. I did not go back very much, I did not analyse the matter fully for the reasons I have set out. This has been one of the most analysed problems of all and I waited deliberately with this Bill until the Joint Committee's report had been published because it would have been wrong of me to bring a Bill of this nature before the House in the absence of that report. Deputy P. Barry criticised me violently for waiting and said I should have gone ahead. It would have been discourteous to the Committee and not very useful to the House if I had done it.

In the time available I cannot cover every point. I think I have covered most of the points. I have not gone as far in relation to many of them as I might wish to do in certain circumstances. I have given my views to those who cared to listen to them. This House, the Government and I are faced with the problem that NET are a State company and if we do not pick up the tab for this company we will put every State company who are losing money in jeopardy. That is a very sad situation, but it is a reality. Since the Government and the taxpayers have to pick up the tab for this we might as well pick it up and have our company rather than pick it up and not have it.

Question put and agreed to.
Agreed to take remaining Stages today.
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