Limerick East): I move: “That the Bill be now read a Second Time.”
The object of the Bill is to consolidate and amend the law relating to bankruptcy, which is contained in the Irish Bankrupt and Insolvent Act, 1857, the Bankruptcy (Ireland) Amendment Act, 1872 and the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy (Ireland) Act, 1889. These very old statutes were supplemented by Bankruptcy Court Rules which are now incorporated in the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1962, as amended, as well as by a number of statutory provisions relating to bankruptcy which are contained in legislation concerned primarily with other matters.
The Bill is based in the main on recommendations contained in the 1972 Report of the Bankruptcy Law Committee. The report, to which the committee appended a draft Bankruptcy Bill and Rules, was published in 1973 and circulated to Members of both Houses of the Oireachtas at that time. The delay in preparing a Bill on the lines suggested by the committee was due largely to the fact that publication of the report coincided with our entry into the European Economic Community. That required us, among other things, to enter into immediate negotiations with the other member states with a view to adopting an EEC Bankruptcy Convention.
The purpose of the proposed convention, which was already in draft form and being negotiated by the original Six, was to ensure that a bankruptcy or company liquidation once begun in one member state would be recognised and enforced throughout the Community with the minimum of formality. These negotiations have been continuing to date and have now reached Council level. While the negotiations were at an early stage it was considered inappropriate to proceed with the introduction of domestic bankruptcy legislation. However, when it became apparent that the draft convention would not prejudice or be prejudiced by the enactment of new national bankruptcy laws, it was decided to prepare a Bill on the basis of the committee's recommendations. The very complex and technical nature of the subject necessitated a detailed examination and revision of the Bill proposed by the committee before an acceptable text could be arrived at.
This is the first bankruptcy legislation which has been put before the Oireachtas since the foundation of the State. Since it consolidates and amends the main bankruptcy statutes which have governed the law over the past century-and-a-half, it is an extremely complex measure. An explanatory memorandum giving some brief information about the principal changes which are being effected has been circulated to Deputies and I trust that they will find it useful. If any further information of a more detailed nature is required I shall be glad to provide it during the Committee Stage. In what follows I propose to mention only some of the major provisions in the Bill.
There are three main features. First of all, the Bill proposes to alter, in the interests of speed and efficiency, the existing methods of proving a bankrupt's debts, distributing his property, and discharging and annulling bankruptcies. Second, it proposes to give the official assignee, subject to the general control of the court, sole responsibility in bankruptcy matters with specific powers and functions similar to those of a liquidator in the winding up of a company by the court. Third, it proposes to align more closely the law governing the bankruptcy of individuals with the law relating to the winding up of companies. I should like to refer in somewhat more detail to these and other changes being effected in our law.
The conditions necessary to commence bankruptcy proceedings have continued with little or no change up to the present day. For example, a condition precedent to bankruptcy is that the debtor shall have made himself liable to be proceeded against by committing what is termed an "act of bankruptcy", that is, any one of a number of specified acts which are regarded as indicating the precarious state of his financial position so as to justify the commencement of proceedings which may lead to his being adjudicated bankrupt. These acts of bankruptcy or implications of insolvency have been reduced in number and set out in modern form in section 7.
One of the most criticised aspects of the law at present is that the expensive machinery of the Bankruptcy Court can be set in motion for a debt of as little as £40. The committee regarded this situation as untenable. Accordingly section 11, in laying down the requirements which in future must be fulfilled in order to found a petition to adjudicate, provides that the debt owing to the petitioning creditor must not be less than £500. In addition, the time during which an act of bankruptcy will be available to a creditor for adjudication of a debtor has been reduced from six months to three months since the committee considered it unfair that a debtor should be at risk for such a long period. Once this period expires, the particular act of bankruptcy in question ceases to be available as a basis for the court to adjudicate.
Section 16 re-enacts in substance the procedure whereby a bankruptcy is entitled to show cause against the validity of his adjudication. Pending the outcome of his application to the court to this effect, advertisement of the adjudication is deferred. Over the years, and more particularly since the committee reported, a practice has developed of making successive adjournments in these "show cause" applications, frequently for long periods, even where the validity of the adjudication is not in dispute. Such adjournments are granted in exercise of the court's equitable jurisdiction. While they are justified in so far as they enable the bankrupt to enter into a composition with his creditors, the fact that the adjudication is not advertised puts at risk persons who continue to give credit to the bankrupt in total ignorance of his bankruptcy. This is particularly the case where the show cause application ultimately fails.
The Bill does not disturb this "extra-statutory" procedure but it formally recognises its existence and endeavours to ensure that it is only invoked in circumstances where it does not involve risk for potential creditors. Subsection (2) of section 16 therefore provides that where the court adjourns a show cause application it shall be under a specific duty to have regard to the interests of the bankrupt, his creditors and any person who might advance further credit to him. In addition, subsection (4) of section 17 gives the court power, when granting an adjournment, to dispense with publication of the notice of the adjudication on security being given by the bankrupt or on such conditions as it thinks fit.
Section 17 deals also with the fixing by the court of a statutory sitting which the bankrupt must attend and at which he must make a full disclosure of his property. This replaces the two such sittings required under the present law and reflects the intent of the Bill and of the committee to expedite proceedings and to reduce the number of formal sittings, not only in bankruptcy proper but also in compositions after bankruptcy—section 39—and arrangements under the control of the court—section 90(b).
Under existing law bankruptcy administration may be said to be divided between the assignees, that is, the official assignee and the creditors' assignee, and the court examiner. The committee considered that this system was archaic and cumbersome and lent itself to unnecessary duplication, in particular as regards the division of functions between the official assignee and the examiner. They recommended that the minimal role of the creditors' assignee should be reduced still further and that the examiner's functions in bankruptcy should cease.
Under section 44, where a person is adjudicated, all property belonging to him will on adjudication vest in the official assignee alone and not as hitherto jointly in the official assignee and the creditors' assignee. Section 61 sets out the official assignee's duties and functions and implements the committee's view that the official assignee should have complete freedom in administering bankruptcies subject to the overriding control of the court and the right of a creditor or other person to apply to the court in relation to the exercise or proposed exercise of the official assignee's powers. The specific powers and functions of the official assignee will be similar to those of a liquidator in the winding up of a company by the court.
Section 76 and the First Schedule provide a new procedure for the proof and admission of debts under the supervision of the official assignee, the underlying basis of which is that creditors will normally prove their debts by sending the required evidence by post to the official assignee and by attending at his office where necessary.
A major recommendation of the committee was that the system of preferential payments in bankruptcy should be abolished. Under this system certain debts, including arrears of tax, wages and social welfare contributions, are payable out of the bankrupt's estate in priority to the claims of ordinary creditors. The committee were concerned because one of the main objectives of bankruptcy law was being eroded, namely, to secure equality among creditors so that one creditor would not obtain an unfair advantage over another. They pointed out that the State and public authorities were the main beneficiaries of the system and that there was no justification for preferring them to ordinary commercial creditors. As regards wages and salaries, the committee thought that a preference was no longer necessary, because in modern conditions trade unions would not allow substantial arrears of pay to accumulate. As regards social welfare contributions and so on, the committee considered that, instead of making these preferential, employers should be required to keep them in a special bank account which would not vest in the official assignee.
As against the committee's view, a system of preferential payments, very often more extensive than ours, is an established characteristic of bankruptcy law in most jurisdictions. It is also a feature of company law here and elsewhere. If preferences were to be abolished in bankruptcy it would be difficult to justify the retention of the provisions in the Companies Act, 1963, relating to preferential payments on the winding up of companies, and it is in that area rather than in a bankruptcy that the effect on State revenue would be more significant. As regards wages and salaries, bankruptcies involving arrears of these still arise, while in relation to social welfare contributions it would be difficult to ensure that employers would pay them into the special bank account as recommended by the committee. For these reasons, the view was taken that the present system of preferential payments should be retained and this is being effected by section 81. Some amendments are being made to bring the preferences into line with company legislation.
In so far as arrears of pay are concerned, the existing ceilings of £50 for clerks and servants and £25 for workmen and labourers are being raised to £2,500. This is the same preference as that given to those employees by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1982.
The list of preferences has been extended to include all accrued holiday remuneration and remuneration in respect of absence from work through good cause as well as to pension fund payments. These preferential payments have been taken over from the Companies Acts. The closer alignment of bankruptcy law with the law governing the winding up of companies is also reflected in sections 56, 57 and 80, which deal with the disclaimer of onerous property by the official assignee, the avoidance of fraudulent preferences and the priority of expenses.
I should like to draw attention to two further aspects of the Bill which should make for a speedier and more efficient system of administering bankruptcies. These are sections 82 and 85, which provide for a simpler method of distributing a bankrupt's property and for the early discharge or annulment of his bankruptcy. Finally, Part V implements the committee's recommendation that the estates of persons dying insolvent should be capable of being wound up in bankruptcy. This is also the position in Northern Ireland and England.
The Bill is, of course, a consolidation as well as an amending measure and it contains many provisions which simply repeat existing requirements with little or no change. In accordance with the major recommendations of the committee it re-enacts those elements of existing law which are still relevant, while it discards provisions which have become obsolete or have fallen into disuse. The latter category includes the provisions in the 1872 Act known as the trustee clauses. These allow a bankrupt's estate to be wound up by a trustee and committee of inspection rather than by the assignees.
Furthermore, the Bill does not reenact the Local Bankruptcy Ireland Act, 1888, from which the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the Cork Circuit Court originally derived. In future the High Court — subject to appeal to the Supreme Court — will alone have bankruptcy jurisdiction.
As I mentioned earlier, this is the first Bankruptcy Bill ever to be introduced into the Oireachtas. Therefore, not simply because of that but because of its very complex and technical nature, it might be better to refer the Committee Stage in due course to a special committee. I am in the hands of the House in that respect. If the House agrees, I will move the necessary motion at the appropriate time.