I regret that due to unreasonable pressure of time an important question like that raised by Deputy Walsh had to be dealt with in this way. I also regret that because of the Government's failure to present this kind of legislation earlier we have to rush through the debate and do less than justice to the presentation of the case and the issues involved.
It is clear from what the Minister acknowledged before we adjourned that this unprecedented situation — and I insist on calling it that — arises because of the direct intervention of the Minister for Finance in trying to ensure that the Central Bank would not operate independently as required under the Currency Act, 1971. The Minister has acknowledged — and one must give marks for honesty — that he has been in direct contact with the Central Bank and as a consequence of that direct contact we find ourselves in this extraordinary and unacceptable situation, where this House is being asked to pass emergency legislation which in our opinion should be of limited duration, for that and other reasons. We are not satisfied to give the Minister, who is the direct cause of this extraordinary situation, unusual and exceptional powers under this Bill which when passed into law will be a permanent feature of our legislation. Having regard to the circumstances we could not in all conscience give the Minister the power he seeks under section 2 which we are trying to amend. Under the Bill as drafted it all depends on when the Minister is satisfied and on special circumstances of a temporary nature. I do not have the time in 30 minutes to go into all the gaps in that type of general provision but under this Bill the Minister can take unto himself these exceptional and unprecedented powers. For instance, he would be able to delegate any institution to act. That we cannot accept.
Everybody wants a return to the normal role discharged by the Central Bank, which is a very special and crucial role in monetary control and regulations, and the Minister would be the last person to deny that. It is because we want a return to that normality that we are not prepared to legislate permanently for a situation which would suggest that on any occasion the Minister sees fit, and on his own terms, he can implement this type of legislation. He might say that neither he nor his successor would do this frivolously, but the chances are that in the near future the Minister's successor will be faced with this situation rather than the Minister. Nevertheless, I do not want to see any Minister taking unto himself the type of authority in this Bill.
The Minister went on to say that these powers are outside the normal function of the Minister for Finance of the day. There is no point in pretending otherwise. They are not to be found in the normal discharge of his duty, although he may see it necessary now because of circumstances he has created by intervening directly in what would have been normal consultation with the staff associations and the management of the Central Bank. This Bill will merely ensure that the national accounting system will not collapse. Payments in and out of the Exchequer on a global basis will be pursued. That is the only effective exercise which will result from this. One could say the national accounting system must be protected from total collapse and to that extent we are in agreement.
Unfortunately we do not have time to discuss the matter in detail but it is clear that the Minister cannot, in the circumstances of the ineffectiveness of the Central Bank due to this dispute, comply with the provisions of the 1886 Act. This Bill is clearly an attempt to get around that. The Minister said that this is not interfering with the statutory function of the Central Bank——
