An Taoiseach.
Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985: Motion.
Without cutting across the Taoiseach and in the interests of the debate and the proceedings on that debate, might I ask whether it would be possible at this stage, or at the end of the Taoiseach's address, to ask specific questions that would indicate and clarify certain matters that may or may not be contained within what is intended in this agreement?
It certainly would not be in order at this time and, when we reach the end of the Taoiseach's speech — without then giving any commitment — I am afraid I shall have to call on the Leader of the Opposition as the next speaker.
Far from——
Deputy, please.
Far from reducing our time by taking up any time of the House, this is intended to be conducive to a more far-reaching examination of the agreement. That is the purpose of the questions and would be their purpose. I am not pushing it one way or the other. I am just asking for elucidation of certain aspects.
In an important debate, especially one as important as this, I must keep the debate on the rails and make sure that it does not get off the rails.
I am trying to help the Chair to keep on the rails if he but knew it.
An Taoiseach.
I move:
That Dáil Éireann hereby approves the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985, between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom which was signed at Hillsborough, Co. Down, on 15 November, 1985 and copies of which have been laid before Dáil Éireann.
No one in this House, or in this country, is in any doubt about the importance of the matter under discussion here today. Nor can there be any doubt about the importance not merely of the outcome of our discussion of this agreement now before the Dáil, but also about the importance of the manner in which we carry on this debate.
I believe it to be the wish of this House that our debate be conducted in a calm and serious way, that partisan or party political comments be avoided; and that, above all, nothing be said that could in any way exacerbate fears, or arouse passions, in Northern Ireland. It is in that spirit that I shall be approaching this matter. I know that it is the sincere wish of all my colleagues on these benches to follow along this road. I hope, and I believe, that the same is true of those on the other side of the House, even where they may disagree with us in relation to this agreement, or to aspects of the agreement.
Because of my concern that this debate should be carried on in as calm and uncontroversial a manner as is possible, I do not propose to argue the merits of the motion put down by the Opposition, beyond making one comment on the actual proposition contained in the final and operative paragraph of the motion. This requests the Government to call upon the British Government to join in convening, under the auspices of both Governments, a constitutional conference representative of all traditions in Ireland to formulate new constitutional arrangements which would lead to uniting all the people of Ireland in peace and harmony.
This proposal has been made in the past. The conclusive answer to it was given on 10 May 1949 by Mr. de Valera when he said in the Dáil as reported in Volume 115, columns 815-816 of the Official Report:
I have heard it suggested, even in this House, when I was in charge of External Affairs, that the representatives of the Government of Ireland, of the British Government and of the Six Counties should get together and sit down at a table and try to work out a solution. Surely everybody knows what would be the result of that. As long as one member of the Conference is going to say, "No, I will not accept that", the end of such a conference would obviously be worse than the beginning. You cannot do it like that.
I have nothing to add to what Mr. de Valera said on that occasion.
In the days that have elapsed since the agreement was signed, there has, of course, been considerable public debate, between politicians amongst others. Different stances have been adopted, and different arguments put forward, for and against the merits of what has been agreed between this Government and the British Government. These initial reactions now lie behind us. Our task, now, as Members of this House, is to look at the agreement objectively, without attempting to take any political advantage of each other in respect of it, and with only one thought in mind: how best to speak, to act, and to comport ourselves in this debate, in the interests of all the people of our country. The people of Northern Ireland must be at the centre of our thoughts — Nationalists and Unionists alike. It is they who have borne the main burden of the suffering brought about by the violence of the past 16 years. Lives have been lost here too, and in Britain, but the vast majority of those who have died, or who have been mutilated, or psychologically scarred by this violence, are people who live in Northern Ireland.
Moreover, in somewhat different ways, members of both communities in Northern Ireland, whose memories go back beyond the beginning of the present cycle of violence, have suffered over many decades from the situation in which they found themselves following the events of 65 years ago.
Northern Nationalists from 1920 onwards found themselves part of a State with which they could not identify and the institutions of which were alien to them and appeared in many ways to be designed to make them strangers in their own land — in the island in which their ancestors had lived for several millenia. Nationalists suffered from a sense of second-class citizenship, and were discriminated against in housing and employment, in ways that drove many of them to withhold their allegiance from the system of Government and others to emigrate, who might, in different and more equitable circumstances, have been able to remain in their own land.
But Unionists suffered also, in a different way. Of course, for half a century they controlled the levers of power, and these levers were moved so as to ensure for that community a dominant position in the society of Northern Ireland. That this happened reflected however — and we should have sufficient insight to understand this — a sense of fear leading to a siege mentality, arising from finding themselves in a corner of an island in the greater part of which the Nationalist population, after centuries of subordination to external rule, were at last accorded the power to which their numbers entitled them. In a sense, unlike many people in this part of Ireland, the Unionist population of Northern Ireland never really accepted the division of this island; they never felt secure about this division, or accepted in their heart of hearts that it afforded them the protection which they felt they needed against an ethos which to them was alien, and appeared threatening.
These fears diminished them; they led them into ways of thinking and of acting, that did less than justice to the fundamental generosity of spirit which they share with those on this island who belong to the other, Nationalist, tradition.
It is right, as we contemplate in this House the agreement which is submitted here for approval, that we recognise these facts for what they are: in other words, that we recognise that the division of this island, whatever the motivation that lay behind it at the time, had the effect of limiting, albeit in quite different ways, the capacities of the two communities in Northern Ireland to fulfil their human, political and cultural potential.
It is our task, and we now, perhaps, have an opportunity to undertake it in a way that has not hitherto been thought possible, to attempt to heal these divisions, to remove the alienation of one community, and to still the fears of the other. I believe that an opportunity to achieve these aims is one that we should not pass up lightly. It is in that spirit that I approach this debate.
Before proceeding further, I want to thank all those who have contributed to the achievement of this accord. I want to thank particularly those members of my Government who helped to steer the negotiation, and who had at times to participate most actively in it, notably the Tánaiste and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as the Minister for Justice and the Attorney-General. I want to express the debt of gratitude which all our people owe to our negotiators, the Civil Service team, whom convention prevents me from naming, but who have worked with a dedication and skill which history will record as having been without parallel in the annals of the history of our public service.
And I want to thank also the British Prime Minister who, once she became convinced that the direction and path set out in this agreement was the right one to follow, engaged herself courageously and with such full commitment towards its successful conclusion, and also her Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe, and successive Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland — Mr. Jim Prior, Mr. Douglas Hurd and Mr. Tom King — together with their team of negotiators, whose commitment to this most difficult of tasks most amply matched that of our own.
May I also, at this point, express my appreciation, and that of my colleagues for the courteous and effective security provided by the RUC at Hillsborough last Friday.
I must also express my thanks to the governments of so many countries who during the past year have offered us such encouragement in pursuing this path towards peace, and who have been good enough since the signature of the agreement to express their congratulations on the successful outcome of what we have attempted. I want to thank particularly President Reagan, Speaker O'Neill, Senator Kennedy and the Friends of Ireland whose support has been so unstinted, and whose generosity in offering to back this agreement with financial aid is so unprecedented and so heartening.
I want to thank Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Genscher and the German Government for their expression of German support; President Mitterand and Foreign Minister Dumas for their warm messages of support on behalf of France; the Italian Government for their message of support; Prime Minister Lubbers for what he said on behalf of the Netherlands; Prime Minister Martens and Foreign Minister Tindemans who have spoken on behalf of Belgium; Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen who has spoken for Denmark; Deputy Foreign Minister Pangalos who has spoken for Greece; the Government of Luxembourg for their message from their Cabinet meeting; Prime Minister Hawke and Foreign Minister Hayden who have spoken for Australia; the Spanish Government for their words of encouragement; the Portuguese Government for their message on behalf of the Portuguese people; and many, many others, including the Federation of Irish Societies and Council of Irish Counties Associations in Britain, the Committee for a New Ireland in the United States, and the President of the Commodore John Barry Division of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, among others. And at international level I welcome particularly the messages of support from the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the European Commission.
It is, I think, fair to say that no action directly involving a Government of Ireland has ever received such extraordinary and unanimous support from across the world as the action we have taken in entering into this agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom.
And I feel I must add that in the days since the signature of this agreement I have been heartened, and indeed deeply moved, by the quite extraordinary warmth of the reception given to it by men and women of all walks of life and of every political persuasion, whom I have met personally both in Dublin and in Cork, and who have written to me from all over the country, including both Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland. The support from within this State reflects no partisan feeling, and it certainly contains no element of triumphalism; it is quite simply an expression of a deep-seated desire to see peace and stability returned to the other part of our island, and a profound and touching hope that this agreement may, in some way, lead towards this objective.
Before coming to the actual content of the agreement, let me now go back a few years to the origins of the process which culminated at Hillsborough last Friday. I need not recount to this House the history of the years from 1969 onwards, filled with dramatic and tragic events. I shall just take as my starting point the failure of the power-sharing experiment that was the product of Sunningdale. The years that followed the destruction of that unique attempt to bring representatives of the two communities to work together in undertaking devolved executive functions in Northern Ireland led to a vacuum. Repeated attempts were made by successive British Governments to fill this vacuum, but all of them failed. And with each failure the alienation of the minority from the system of government of Northern Ireland, intensified. Faced with the resolute refusal of the political representatives of the Unionist majority to contemplate any form of participation in executive power for the representatives of the minority, an increasing proportion of that minority began to despair of the constitutional process itself. And increasingly those who retained faith in constitutional politics looked towards this State to find some way to break this deadlock.
So much is, I believe, common ground between us.
The present Leader of the Opposition, Deputy Haughey, when he came into office at the end of 1979, clearly identified this problem and decided that it had to be tackled between the two Governments. For myself, I held the view that a solution centred on a participatory or power-sharing devolved government in Northern Ireland remained a viable option until a somewhat later date. These are fine matters of judgement and for the purpose of this debate I have no desire to contest between us the issue of timing in relation to this proposition.
I am content to record that the Anglo-Irish process which has culminated in this agreement was in fact initiated by the Leader of the Opposition, as Taoiseach, in the spring of 1980, and I accept that the basis of what has happened since was laid down then at the meeting in London in May of that year when Deputy Haughey, as Taoiseach, in the communique following that meeting reaffirmed that it is the wish of the Irish Government to secure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace while at the same time accepting that: "any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland".
It is on these twin pillars — the maintenance of the aspiration to Irish unity as a legitimate objective of Irish nationalism on the one hand, and the acceptance of the need for the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland for any change in the status of that area on the other — that progress has been made during the past five-and-a-half years, although not without many setbacks and difficulties.
It was the clear view of our Government from the outset that in the situation now existing in Northern Ireland it would be impossible to end the alienation of the minority from the structures of government and from the security and judicial systems unless there existed within the structures of the government of Northern Ireland a significant role for the Irish Government, towards which the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland look — just as the Unionist majority look to the Government of the United Kingdom.
It was towards this end that we directed a large part of our efforts and the results of this part of the negotiation are to be found in Article 2 (b) of the agreement in which the British Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference, in so far as those matters are not the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. The British Government agree moreover that in the interest of promoting peace and stability determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences. The range of issues that are within the field of activity of the Conference are described in the communique as political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural, that is, most of the matters in respect of which the public authorities of a state exercise responsibility.
This provision — going beyond a consultative role but necessarily, because of the sovereignty issue, falling short of an executive role — provides, in the Government's view, the most effective method by which to ensure the existence of structures capable of eroding the alienation of the Nationalist minority, which has been such a destabilising factor since Northern Ireland came into existence 65 years ago, but more particularly in recent years.
The structure thus established, through which this procedure is to operate, includes, as Deputies will know, an Intergovernmental Conference concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of Ireland which will meet at ministerial or official level as required. When the Conference meets at ministerial level it will be presided over by an Irish Minister, designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative, and by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Deputies will be aware of the decision to designate the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Peter Barry, as the first Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative and Joint Chairman.
Deputies will also be aware that within the framework of this Conference other Irish or British Ministers may hold or attend meetings as appropriate; that when legal matters arise for consideration, the Attorneys General may attend; and that Ministers may be accompanied by their officials and their professional advisers so that, for example, when questions of economic or social policy or co-operation are being discussed, Ministers may be accompanied by officials of the relevant Departments, or when questions of security policy or security co-operation are being discussed, they may be accompanied by the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. And the Conference will, of course, be serviced on a continuing basis by a secretariat to be established by the two Governments, in Belfast, where the Conference itself will normally meet.
The terms of reference of this Conference, as set out in Article 4 of the agreement, are that it shall be a framework within which the two Governments work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland, and for peace, stability and prosperity throughout the island of Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism, and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation.
The responsibilities of the Conference will extend to the whole range of matters mentioned earlier. Both Governments support the policy of devolution of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community, namely, on a basis of power-sharing or participation at executive level. To the extent that devolution on this basis proves practicable, the Conference will obviously not have to concern itself with these matters. But should it prove impossible to achieve devolution on a basis which secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland, or if devolution once achieved is not sustained, the Conference will be, or will once again become, a framework within which the Irish Government may, where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected, put forward views on proposals for major legislation and on major policy issues which are within the purview of the Northern Ireland departments and which remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
It is extremely important to understand that even in the event of devolution the Conference will still have a wide range of functions, concerning matters of particular interest to the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland. These include measures to recognise and to accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions, including measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, measures to protect human rights, and to prevent discrimination — changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form in Northern Ireland. It will consider the security situation in Northern Ireland, both addressing policy issues, and considering serious incidents and forthcoming events, including parades and marches. It will be concerned with the relations between the security forces and the community, establishing a programme of special measures to improve these relations, with the object, in particular, of making the security forces more readily acceptable to the Nationalist community.
And the communiqué makes clear that at its very first meeting the Conference will be considering the application of the principle that the armed forces, which include the Ulster Defence Regiment, operate only in support of the civil power, with the particular objective of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community. The Conference will also at this first meeting consider ways of underlining the policy that the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the armed forces in Northern Ireland, discharge their duties evenhandedly, and with equal respect for the Unionist and Nationalist identities and traditions.
Moreover, the Conference may consider policy issues relating to prisons, as well as individual cases involving prisoners, so that information can be provided or inquiries instituted.
All these matters, together with the possible harmonisation of the criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively and measures to give substantial expression to the aim of ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice, considering inter alia the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences, will be the responsibility of the Conference, and will under the terms of this agreement remain so, even in the event of devolution.
The communiqué makes it clear, moreover, that at its first meeting, the Conference will also consider its future programme of work in all the fields — political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural — assigned to it under the agreement. Moreover it says that it will concentrate at its initial meetings, both on ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments, and on relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland, as well as seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. The communiqué adds that in the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland, the two sides are committed to work for early progress in these matters, and against this background I have said that it is the intention of my Government to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
Other matters covered by the agreement include the functions of our Government with regard to putting forward views and proposals on the role and composition of a number of bodies in Northern Ireland, including the Police Authority for Northern Ireland, the Police Complaints Board, the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Fair Employment Agency and the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights.
Also included is the whole area of cross-Border co-operation, not merely in relation to security, but also in relation to promoting the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years. Provision is made for the two Governments to consider the possibility of securing international support for this work, and this aspect of the agreement has already attracted interest and a promise of tangible support from the Government and Congress of the United States. Other indications of similar interest have come from a number of other governments in Europe — both in the Community and elsewhere in Western Europe — and from other countries overseas.
There are two other matters to which I must refer, before concluding this brief analysis of the agreement. These are the provision for a review by the two Governments of the working of the Conference at the end of three years, or earlier if requested by either Government, to see whether any changes in the scope and nature of its activities are desirable, and the indication, for the first time, of a readiness by both Governments to lend support to an Anglo-Irish parliamentary body of the kind referred to in the Anglo-Irish Studies Report of November 1981. This last matter is, of course, one for this House itself, and Seanad Éireann, to consider.
There are indications of widespread support in the British Parliament for the establishment of such a body and I would hope that in the period ahead our two Parliaments can agree on such an initiative, which I believe will be a constructive development, giving to the Opposition parties and to parties in Northern Ireland, in addition to the two Governments, a role with respect to the whole range of Anglo-Irish relations, including naturally those to which I have just been referring.
I should tell the Dáil that this agreement will enter into force on the date on which the two Governments exchange notifications of their acceptance of this agreement, which will follow shortly after the approval of this agreement by the Dáil and at Westminister, where, I understand, the agreement is to be debated next week. Like all international agreements this one, must, of course, be registered with the United Nations under the mandatory requirement of Article 102 of the Charter of that body.
At this point I want to make one thing absolutely clear. The agreement and the communiqué stand on their merits. There are no secret agreements and no hidden agendas. When we started this negotiation both sides insisted that this was the principle on which they were acting: and both have fulfilled this understanding in complete good faith. Let there be no ambiguity on this crucial point. The transparency of the agreement is an essential prerequisite to its future acceptance by the parties most intimately affected.
I should add that both sides are determined that the agreement will work. I would like all to appreciate this fact.
I want to say also that this agreement is not an end in itself. It is a framework for progress, which must be worked with understanding and goodwill by all parties to it, if we are to achieve the results of which it is capable, namely, an end to the alienation of the minority in Northern Ireland from the processes of government, and progress towards peace, stability and reconciliation between the two communities in this island, which have been for so long so bitterly divided. I have no illusions, and would not wish by any word of mine, or by omission, to convey that I have any illusions about the difficulties that this will entail. In many ways this agreement represents not so much the culmination of a process of intricate and complex negotiation — although it is that, of course — as the beginning of a difficult, and — let us face it — even dangerous, process of implementation.
Many forces will be at work seeking to wreck the process that has now been established. Quite apart from the normal hazards that such a process will inevitably face, given the room for legitimate divergences of views on how various issues and problems should be handled, there may well be deliberate attempts to contrive situations that will test the capacity and the will of the two Governments to agree on how contentious matters should be dealt with. It will require not merely good faith, which I believe exists on both sides, but good judgment and good luck to withstand the pressures to which this process will be subjected. But so much hangs on the joint ability of the two Governments to resolve these issues that, with God's help we shall, I believe surmount all these obstacles.
I want to come back at this stage to the matters covered by Article 1 of this agreement. As indicated at the outset, the process that has led to this agreement was started five-and-a-half years ago at a meeting between the then Taoiseach, now Leader of the Opposition, Deputy Charles J. Haughey, and the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher. The starting point for this agreement has been the section of the communiqué issued after that meeting, in which the then Taoiseach declared that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. This affirmation in a formal communiqué issued jointly on behalf of the two Governments had, as I recall, the assent of all parties in this House. It provides one of the cornerstones of what has now been agreed, even though the word "constitutional" has been omitted from this phrase in the text of the agreement before the House.
I support most strongly this affirmation, to which, indeed, my own party explicitly committed itself as long ago as 18 September 1969. I believe that no sane person would wish to attempt to change the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of its people. That would be a recipe for disaster and could, I believe, lead only to a civil war that would be destructive of the life of people throughout our island. All parties in this House repudiate violence, or the threat of violence, as a means of attaining our national aspiration; and the value of this affirmation in this agreement, when approved by this House and by the Westminster Parliament and then ratified, is not to be underestimated as a stabilising factor in the Northern Ireland situation.
This affirmation involves no diminution of the Nationalist aspiration, which has been, indeed, as I shall have occasion to point out later, incorporated specifically in the third paragraph of the preamble to this agreement and has been given formal recognition there by the Government of the United Kingdom. For our aspiration to the political unity of this island is, as a matter of political and moral principle, conditional on the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. We do not, and could not, seek to attain this aspiration against the wishes of a majority of the people of that part of our island, as was recognised by Deputy Haughey and his Government in May 1980.
But while this provision in the agreement diminishes in no way the Nationalist aspiration to unity, and of its very nature cannot affect our constitutional position, the third clause of Article 1 of the agreement advances that aspiration significantly. For in that clause the British Government, as well as the Irish Government, declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.
The commitment in this clause to introduce such legislation is the first clear affirmation in any binding Anglo-Irish agreement since 1921 that Britain has no interest in the continuing division of this island and that its presence in this island, undertaking the responsibility of government in Northern Ireland, continues solely because this is the wish of a majority of the people of that area and will not continue beyond the point when that consent is changed into consent to Irish unity.
I have to emphasise at this point that the content of the agreement itself represents those things to which both Governments can give their assent; of its very nature it contains no unilateral statements.
What is in fact most striking about this agreement is the extent to which the two Governments have been able to give their common assent to a series of principles which correspond, in the most specific and detailed way, to what the Forum proposed as necessary elements of a framework in which a new Ireland could emerge.
Let me for a few minutes demonstrate the extent to which this agreement is founded directly on these Forum principles, which, because they were drawn up by the Forum in a spirit of openness and generosity, showing equal respect for the two identities in Northern Ireland have been able to command the assent of the British Government as well as of the Government of Ireland.
Thus, in the preamble to this agreement, having first of all stated the common wish of the two Governments further to develop the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Community, the text continues by stating the two Governments' recognition of the major interest of both their countries and, above all, of the people of Northern Ireland in diminishing the divisions there and achieving lasting peace and stability. This reflects the wording of the very first principle laid down by the Forum, namely, that a fundamental criterion of any new structures and proceses must be that they will provide for lasting peace and stability.
The next paragraph of the preamble to the agreement recognises the need for continuing efforts to acknowledge and reconcile the rights of the two major traditions that exist in Ireland. This, together with the sixth paragraph of the preamble, which commits the two Governments to recognise and respect the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland and the right of each to pursue its aspiration by peaceful and constitutional means, echoes the very wording of the fourth Forum principle, namely, that the validity of both the Nationalist and Unionist identities in Ireland and the democratic rights of every citizen on this island must be accepted; and that both of these identities must have equally satisfactory, secure and durable, political, administrative and symbolic expression and protection.
The second part of the third paragraph of the preamble specifically refers to and recognises the rights of those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means and through agreement, words which echo directly the wording of the third Forum principle which refers to the political arrangements "for a new and sovereign Ireland". The simultaneous assertion of this right by the Government of Ireland, and recognition of this right by the British Government for the first time are a crucially important feature of this agreement.
In the fourth paragraph of the preamble the Governments have reaffirmed their total rejection of any attempt to promote political objectives by violence or the threat of violence — a direct reflection of the second of the Forum principles: that attempts from any quarter to impose a particular solution through violence must be rejected, along with the proponents of such methods.
The fifth paragraph of the preamble is also a recognition by both Governments that the condition of genuine reconciliation and dialogue between Unionists and Nationalists is mutual recognition and acceptance of each other's rights. These words are, of course, taken directly from chapter 4, paragraph 15 of the Forum report, which outlines the solution both to the historic problem and the current crises of Northern Ireland. The same point precisely is also made in the fifth principle of the Forum: that lasting stability can be found only in the context of new structures in which no tradition will be allowed to dominate the other, in which there will be equal rights and opportunities for all, and formal and effective guarantees for the protection of individual human rights and of the communal and cultural rights of both Nationalists and Unionists.
In the sixth paragraph of the preamble the two Governments proclaim their recognition of and respect for the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland and for the right of each to pursue its aspirations by peaceful and constitutional means. The wording here draws closely upon the fourth Forum principle: that the validity of both the Nationalist and Unionist identities in Ireland and the democratic rights of every citizen on this island must be accepted.
In the final paragraph of the preamble the two Governments reaffirm their commitment to a society in Nortehrn Ireland in which all may live in peace, free from discrimination and intolerance — just as the Forum in its sixth principle says that civil and religious liberties and rights must be guaranteed, and that there can be no discriminatioin or preference in laws or administrative practices on grounds of religious belief or affiliation.
The incorporation in this agreement of almost the whole corpus of the principles set out by the Forum as necessary elements of a framework within which a new Ireland could emerge, is a tribute to the four constitutional parties which drew up this set of principles on a consensus basis.
In these negotiations it was the task of the Irish Government not merely to present to the British Government, and secure their acceptance of, the principles agreed by the constitutional and nationalist parties — which has visibly been achieved — but to seek the agreement of the British Government to one or other of the structures set out in paragraphs 5.7 to 5.9 of the Forum report or, in default of an agreement on these, to discuss with the British Government other views that might contribute to political development, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5.10.
The Government adhered loyally to this negotiating brief and it was only after exploration of the different models set out in paragraphs 5.7 to 5.9, and after it emerged that the British Government were not prepared to agree to any of these models, that the Government proceeded to seek agreement, on the basis of paragraph 5.10, upon proposals that would in some other way accommodate all the necessary elements of the framework proposed by the Forum in paragraph 5.2 of their report.
The agreement before the Dáil is the outcome of these negotiations, which took place over a period of 18 months, involving two Summits between the British Prime Minister and myself; four informal meetings between us in the margin of European Council meetings; three joint meetings between the Tánaiste and the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Irish Government and the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and Northern Ireland on behalf of the British Government: ten meetings between the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs with the Foreign Secretary and/or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland; and about 35 meetings of the negotiating group led by the Secretaries of the two Cabinets, convening often as frequently as every week, as well as many other meetings of officials in the margin of these structured encounters.
The length of these negotiations and the involvement in them of the heads of the two Governments, of senior Ministers in the two Governments, of the Secretaries of the two Cabinets and of senior officials of a number of Departments of each Government, reflect the extreme complexity of the issues being tackled and the delicacy of the issues at stake. From the outset, and indeed at various points during these negotiations, there were many people in the political systems of our two States, and large sections of public opinion, which frankly doubted the possibility of securing an agreement that would fulfil the objective set out in paragraph 4.15 of the Forum report. As Deputies will recall, this paragraph states that the solution to both this historic problem and the current crisis of Northern Ireland as well as of the continuing problem of relations between Ireland and Britain necessarily requires new structures that will accommodate together two sets of legitimate rights:
—the right of Nationalists to effective political, symbolic and administrative expression of their identity; and
—the right of Unionists to effective political, symbolic and administrative expression of their identity, their ethos and their way of life.
I want to conclude my remarks by addressing myself to two themes, one related to the Irish Nationalist community, and the second to the Unionist community.
So far as the Irish Nationalists in this island are concerned, what has been achieved in the last three years has been the fruit of a quite exceptional degree of co-operation amongst parties with distinct and different historical traditions, parties which came together in the Forum, the terms of reference of which were the advancement of peace and stability in this island: that and that alone.
If it had not been for the willingness on the part of all parties concerned to come together in that body, on the basis of these terms of reference, transcending the differences between Government and Opposition and the differences between North and South, and to produce a report which set out the principles upon which we should proceed, we would not be here today debating this agreement.
I know that in the aftermath of the Forum, different views have been expressed and different interpretations given. There is no point in attempting to obscure that fact. I know also, as do you all, that in the weeks prior to the signature of this agreement, as well as in the days since its signature, there have been criticisms of its terms, either as they were anticipated in advance or as they emerged in the actual agreement.
I hope that any differences that have emerged will be narrowed rather than broadened in the course of this debate. It is towards that end that I have directed my remarks here this afternoon — towards that objective above any other. The setbacks to Irish nationalism in the past, and there have been many, have owed much to divisions amongst the Nationalist people of this island — divisions which subsequent generations have often found hard to comprehend, and in respect of which they have at times been harshly critical. The Forum showed us how much can be achieved when we unite towards our common objective of securing peace and stability in this island while holding fast to the aspiration to Irish unity which all of us share. Let us not forget that lesson.
I would ask — indeed I have asked already — all the members of the parties on this side of the House to bear this in mind when speaking in this debate. Let no one, in arguing the case for approval of this agreement, be tempted to claim for it more than it contains or to enter into disputes or wrangles about its contents, about the process of its negotiation, or about its significance. And let us above all avoid any word that might endanger the lives of people in Northern Ireland by claiming that any kind of advantage has been obtained through this agreement vis-à-vis the Unionist population in Northern Ireland.
For that Unionist population have had to live through many months of uncertainty about their future, an uncertainty that has fed fears and hatreds that lie not far below the surface in that unhappy part of this island. Some of their leaders have chosen — whether because they have not been able to, or have not wished to, grasp the real implications of this agreement — to heighten still further these fears and tensions. Let nothing said in this House give any fuel to those who would wish to fan the flames of hatred and discord, for whatever motive.
Towards that end I wish myself, turning towards those 900,000 Unionists, to assert quite plainly and without equivocation that if they read what this agreement contains, and in particular if they read Article 1 of this agreement, they will see that, while as Nationalists we retain our aspiration to Irish unity achieved by free consent and agreement, we repudiate formally, and do so now in an international agreement, any question of seeking the unity of this island otherwise than with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland.
This is not merely an assurance of good intentions. It is a commitment that this State will not be a party to any attempt to constrain the people of Northern Ireland against the will of a majority to any change in the status of Northern Ireland. Unionists who, following the publication of the Forum report, criticised that report because the Forum did not acknowledge the current reality, which is that a majority in Northern Ireland are against change, should be reassured by the acceptance of that fact by our Government in the context of the re-affirmation of the principle of consent being required for any change in the status of Northern Ireland.
I want this message to get through. I want it to penetrate the haze of emotion and the miasma of fear into which some political leaders in Northern Ireland have sought to plunge the Unionist population in the period before and immediately after the signature of this agreement.
And to those Unionists who believe that we are seeking a role in Northern Ireland akin to that of a Trojan horse, I ask them to read those sections of this agreement, which have been included in it on the proposal of our Government, providing that if devolved Government within Northern Ireland can be agreed upon, the Intergovernmental Conference now being established shall no longer have any competence in those areas affected by devolution.
I want to say to the Unionists of Northern Ireland, as someone who has always been concerned for both communities in that part of the island, that what has motivated me, and our Government, most powerfully towards seeking and securing this agreement with the British Government has been the objective of ending the alienation of the minority in Northern Ireland. We have sought this both for its own sake, because that alienation reflects the effects of injustices, but also because, if that alienation can be ended, the terrorists of the IRA whose objective is to maim and murder members of the Unionist community in the hope of bludgeoning them into submission, will suffer such a profound rejection among the minority in Northern Ireland that those terrorists would no longer be able to continue their bloody campaign.
Through this agreement all the people of this island, together with the people of our neighbouring island Britain, can join together, not merely to confront terrorism by measures of security — though this we shall do together by joint action of the most effective kind — but also, and in the long run perhaps more importantly, by undermining the very basis of support for these evil men who seek to destroy society in Northern Ireland. Their objective, as we in this State know well, is ultimately to destabilise our State also, and to establish throughout this island the kind of reign of intimidation and terror which they have already brought to bear in many parts of Northern Ireland. We shall fight the battle against these terrorists to the utmost of our power, for ultimately our survival as a democracy is at stake as well as peace in Northern Ireland. In this we make common cause with all the people of Northern Ireland of both communities who abhor violence and terrorism; and I ask them to make common cause with us.
I make no apologies for addressing my closing remarks towards the Unionist section of the community in Northern Ireland. The Nationalist minority there, led by John Hume, Seámus Mallon, Austin Currie, Eddie McGrady, Joe Hendron and the rest of that courageous team, upon whom the survival of the democratic system in that part of our island has depended for so long, are now sustained by the knowledge that henceforth the Irish Government will be playing an effective role in removing the causes of Nationalist alienation, and will be playing that role not from a distance, but in Northern Ireland itself, in its capital city, Belfast. The leaders of the Nationalist people in the North have given their wholehearted support to what we have done in negotiating and signing this agreement. But they, and those whom they represent, are potentially at risk if this agreement is successfully misrepresented or widely misunderstood amongst the Unionist community, enabling the evil men — and there are just as evil men in that community as in the IRA and INLA — to incite violence against the Nationalist minority in the weeks and months ahead. That is why we must try to convey our convictions, and our sincerity, to the Unionists of Northern Ireland.
I trust that I shall be followed in this debate by others who will reinforce what I have said, and that together we can carry conviction sufficient to ensure that this agreement not merely provides an opportunity to bring peace and stability to Northern Ireland in the medium term, but that it is not allowed to contribute in any degree to violence or instability in the short term.
In conclusion, let us face together the fact that there are few political problems in the world today as intractable and as complex as that which this agreement seeks to address. With such deep-seated fears and passions as exist in Northern Ireland, and lurk also under the surface in this State, we cannot pretend that we know with certainty how these problems may best be addressed. There will, therefore, inevitably be those who in good faith believe either that we have sought and secured too little, or that we have sought and secured too much. Such divergent views must be respected, where they are genuinely held, by people of real goodwill, who have themselves faced the realities both of Nationalist alienation and of Unionist fears, although I must add that the views of those who have refused to face one or other of these realities, or in some cases either of them, deserve less consideration.
The Government, together with the British Government, have sought painstakingly, employing every resource of knowledge and imagination that they possess, to find the optimal way forward between the dangers that beset us on either side: the danger of Nationalist alienation overflowing into such widespread tolerance of or support for the IRA as to risk an escalation of violence by the terrorists of that persuasion; and the alternative risk of so destabilising the Unionist population as to create the danger of an escalation of violence by the other terrorists in the Loyalist camp. I believe we have, together, come as near as is humanly possible to achieving the right balance at this time. And I commend to the House the results of our work, which has been designed with honesty and dedication for one purpose alone: to bring peace and stability to Northern Ireland, and to preserve peace throughout these islands.
I have a feeling that that intense applause was not intended for my good self.
May I at the outset agree with the Taoiseach that this debate should be conducted at a high level and in a calm mature atmosphere without rancour or animosity? In particular I would not wish this debate to contribute in any way to raising tensions in Northern Ireland and I am confident that this will be the case. Anything else would be inappropriate and not in keeping with the dignity of this national Parliament or the far-reaching importance of the matters we are dealing with.
I wish to move amendment No. 1 in the name of Deputy Vincent Brady:
To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and substitute the following:
"having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland;
recalling the unanimous Declaration of Dáil Éireann adopted on the joint proposition of An Taoiseach, John A. Costello and the Leader of the Opposition, Eamon de Valera, on 10 May 1949 solemnly reasserting the indefeasible right of the Irish Nation to the unity and integrity of the national territory;
recalling that all the parties in the New Ireland Forum were convinced that a united Ireland in the form of a sovereign independent state would offer the best and more durable basis for peace and stability;
re-affirming the unanimous conclusion of the Report of the New Ireland Forum that the particular structure of political unity which the Forum would wish to see established is a unitary state achieved by agreement and consent, embracing the whole island of Ireland and providing irrevocable guarantees for the protection and preservation of both the unionist and nationalist identities;
while recognising the urgent need that exists for substantial improvement in the situation and circumstances of the nationalist section of the community in the North of Ireland and approving any effective measures which may be undertaken for that purpose, refuses to accept any recognition of British sovereignty over any part of the national territory;
and requests the Government to call upon the British Government to join in convening under the joint auspices of both governments a constitutional conference representative of all the traditions in Ireland to formulate new constitutional arrangements which would lead to uniting all the people of Ireland in peace and harmony."
In our amendment we make it clear that we recognise fully the need to improve the situation of the Nationalist community in the North of Ireland and we approve and support any effective measures taken on their behalf. We cannot accept, however, the abandonment of our claim to Irish unity or the recognition of British sovereignty over the North of Ireland which is involved in this agreement.
We are deeply concerned that by signing this Agreement the Irish Government are acting in a manner repugnant to the Constitution of Ireland by fully accepting British sovereignty over a part of the national territory and by purporting to give legitimacy to a British administration in Ireland. By confirming what is called the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom in this agreement we will do serious damage in the eyes of the world to Ireland's historic and legitimate claim to the unity of her territory.
It is also our view that the agreement will lead the Irish Government into an impossible political situation, in which they will find themselves assuming responsibility for actions and becoming involved in situations, particularly in the security field, over which they will have no control.
Article 2 of the Constitution of Ireland, Bunreacht na hÉireann, states that "the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas". In 1949, Dáil Éireann, by unanimous declaration, solemnly reasserted the indefeasible right of the Irish nation to the unity and integrity of the national territory.
The New Ireland Forum report states in paragraph 5.4:
Among the fundamental realities the Forum has identified is the desire of nationalists for a united Ireland in the form of a sovereign, independent Irish state to be achieved peacefully and by consent. The Forum recognises that such a form of unity would require a general and explicit acknowledgement of a broader and more comprehensive Irish identity. Such unity would, of course, be different from both the existing Irish State and the existing arrangements in Northern Ireland because it would necessarily accommodate all the fundamental elements in both traditions.
Until now the basic national objective of unity has been reaffirmed time and time again. By giving it a clear and unequivocal expression, the Irish Constitution does no more than reflect the deepest aspiration of the great majority of all the people on the island of Ireland. Dáil Éireann must not accept or subscribe to any course of action which is in conflict with that fundamental aim or which undermines the nation's ability to achieve that aim.
Neither the Government nor the Dáil may disregard the powers and duties conferred upon them by the Constitution or take action in conflict with its provisions. Even by executive action alone the Government may bring themselves in conflict with the Constitution if "the circumstances are such as to amount to a clear disregard by the Government of the powers and duties conferred upon it by the Constitution"— the Chief Justice giving judgement in the Boland case.
If Dáil Éireann were to accept and approve this agreement, they would, by doing so, derogate from the concept of Irish unity by seeking to confer legitimacy on an administration and a political entity the existence of which is a denial of that concept of unity. This is not rhetoric; this is not an appeal to the emotions; I am simply outlining the political, legal and constitutional reality of what is involved in what we are being asked to do here today. A new administration is not being provided for or established in Northern Ireland. What is proposed is that the Irish Government, by becoming involved in the existing British administration there, however tenuously, will afford that administration an acceptance, an endorsement and an approval, which constitutionally, they cannot and should not do.
I must ask the Government to consider seriously the implications of their acting in a manner which is manifestly contrary to the Constitution. They may say that the benefits which will follow from what they are doing are such that they should not be impeded or inhibited by constitutional considerations. But if that is their case they must realise and understand that it cannot be sustained. A lawful Government cannot put the end, however desirable it might seem in their eyes, above the Constituation and the law. If they do that, then they deprive themselves of the moral authority to condemn other groups who seek to do so.
In effect, what is proposed in this agreement, is that the Irish Government, accepting British sovereignty over part of Ireland, will involve themselves in assisting and advising the British Government to rule that part of Ireland more effectively, to help make it more amenable to the authority of the British Government.
The whole basis of this document is an acceptance of British sovereignty over Northern Ireland and Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom and that what must be done is to smooth out the difficulties which the British Government encounter in ruling this part of their kingdom. The new Conference is designed to achieve this smoothing out; to help in particular to reconcile the Nationalist community with a British administration which they have always seen as alien and oppressive. Our opposition to this agreement is that its thrust is in the wrong direction; the whole trend of these developments is toward seeking to bolster up the existing political structure which in itself is the cause of the trouble, the source of violence and instability, and which always will be as long as it remains.
There has been what amounts to a conspiracy of silence by the Government and by the media over the formal surrender of de jure Irish sovereignty over the Six Counties and of the principle that “the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and territorial seas”. Not a single editorial has even alluded to this major concession of principle. Yet there is no doubt or contradiction about the significance of what has happened. The British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, stated at the joint press conference with no contradiction from the Taoiseach that, “this is the first time the legitimacy of the Unionist position has been recognised by the Republic in a formal international agreement”.
The Northern Secretary, Mr. King, on a UTV interview on Friday said that the Leader of the Irish Government was now accepting that rolling progress towards Irish unity was not going to happen, that the position of Northern Ireland was now buttressed by an international agreement and that recognition has now been given in a very formal way to Northern Ireland as part of the UK. The Taoiseach himself confirmed the point in a slightly different way that, "The Northern Unionist community have for the first time a commitment in the form of an international agreement that a change in the status of Northern Ireland, such as would be involved in a move to Irish political unity, would not take place without the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland".
There is not and cannot therefore be any dispute about the significance of what has happened. For the first time the legitimacy of Partition has been recognised by the Republic; the British guarantee to the Unionists has been reinforced by the Irish Government; and the Government are also endorsing the British military and political presence in Ireland. The Irish Government are saying to the world, that Northern Ireland is legitimately part of the British State, that Northern Ireland is no longer part of the national territory. An Irish official is actually quoted in The Sunday Times as saying: “The RUC has now been legitimised by the agreement between our two Governments”. The absolute sovereignty of the British Government in Northern Ireland has now been conceded.
The argument has been advanced in different quarters that it was I and Fianna Fáil who inaugurated this process and that this agreement is the logical outcome of something that we put in train. In these circumstances, it is suggested we must accept what is now agreed as the end product of our own endeavours. I am proud of the fact that I succeeded in initiating a major departure in Anglo-Irish relations in regard to the problem of Northern Ireland. In my first speech as President to the Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis, in February, 1980 I said: "The time has surely come for the two sovereign Governments to work together to find a formula and lift the situation onto a new plane that will bring permanent peace and stability to the people of these islands".
My objective was to raise the issue to a new international level, something that could and should be settled by the two sovereign Governments concerned. It is interesting now to recall that that proposition was attacked at the time, especially by the present Taoiseach. We persisted nevertheless until at the Summit Meeting in Dublin Castle in December 1980, it was accepted and agreed that the problem of Northern Ireland had to be based in the context of Anglo-Irish relations and be discussed and hopefully settled by the two sovereign Governments involved.
I am still convinced that that is right, that it is in this context the problem will eventually be solved. The New Ireland Forum did their work in that context and put forward their views in the report as an input into that process.
It is, however, entirely mistaken to confuse something which was formulated and established as the means of securing a just and lasting settlement of the long standing issue of the British presence in Ireland with what has now emerged. In our view, the present Government have failed to use the bi-lateral international machinery for the purpose for which it was intended and instead have allowed themselves to be talked into something quite different, radically different from and fundamentally opposed to what I and my colleagues intended.
Since the Summit in Dublin Castle in December 1980 followed by the establishment of the Intergovernmental Council in November 1981 it has been accepted that the Irish Government had the right to give expression to their views on matters affecting Northern Ireland. At the press conference which followed the signing of the agreement, the British Prime Minister stated quite categorically: "The Republic has always been able to put forward its views and now has a regular means of doing so."
The present Minister for Foreign Affairs has exercised that right on a number of occasions and has made it clear that he had the right to make his views known. It cannot be argued, therefore, that the Irish Government have acquired a new right to put forward views and proposals. The underlying reality, when the surrounding verbiage is removed, is that a formal arrangement has now been established through which those views can be expressed. No additional validity is conferred on the views. The final decision still rests with the British Government and the Northern Secretary of State. This has been stated several times by the British Prime Minister.
What worries us is that the price paid for this "regular means" is too high. In return for getting this formalised arrangement of an already existing right we have given everything away. We have, in fact, renounced our claim to unity. The impression is conveyed to our friends around the world that we are now fully satisfied about the situation in Northern Ireland, that they need no longer be concerned about us and that we have finally accepted the British presence in Ireland as valid and legitimate.
I wish to make it absolutely clear to the House and to the country that we in Fianna Fáil are anxious to secure at all times any possible improvement in the grievous situation of the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland. If this agreement did in fact bring any guarantee of alleviation or improvement, we would, of course, welcome any such improvement. The second last paragraph of our amendment is designed to remove any doubts in that regard. But the agreement provides no certainty whatever of any improvement or betterment in the circumstances of Nationalists. It is absurd to suggest that we wish to deny the Nationalist section of the community in Northern Ireland any improvement or advance in their position, or that any such developments would be delayed because we want a united Ireland. There is absolutely no reason why the two objectives should not proceed side by side, be pursued simultaneously and with equal determination. They are not mutually exclusive. It is only, in fact, the Taoiseach who has placed these two allied objectives in opposition to each other when he said recently in Brussels that unity must be postponed until peace is established.
This Conference which is being established will clearly have no executive role. In the lead up to the publication of the outcome of the discussions, this was made clear by both the British Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and this was confirmed by the British Prime Minister yesterday in the British House of Commons when she stated: "The Conference will not be a decision-making body". It is again clearly spelt out in the agreement, which categorically states tht the United Kingdom will retain responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction.
There is definitely no undertaking to consult. The agreement specifies that the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals and this is followed by the statement that there must be a determined effort to resolve differences. The agreement does not speak of resolving differences over these views and proposals. If that is what is meant, then one would expect the agreement to say so; but it does not and there is in fact no obligation to consult as the two phrases, in my view, fall far short of an agreement to consult.
What we are concerned with is that this proposed Conference without any executive powers should be put forward as a solution of the basic problem and that Great Britain will now be in a position to turn to the world and say that the problem of Northern Ireland no longer exists, that our friends around the world need no longer be concerned. In this way our national position will be seriously undermined and the case for unity seriously damaged.
One of the principal advantages claimed for this arrangement, one of the main aspects used to promote it domestically and internationally, is the hope that it will help to improve the position of the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland and alleviate their situation.
It is important, therefore, that we look closely at what the arrangement offers in this regard, particularly in the security area. One of the most unpalatable aspects of the administration of Northern Ireland at present is the structure and operation of the security services there, the manner in which justice is administered and the procedures adopted in the courts. It is the administration of justice and the operation of the security forces which press most heavily and grievously on the Nationalist community, that cause most resentment, anger and the feeling of injustice. This resentment, anger and sense of injustice focus particularly on the UDR, a sectarian armed force, which would not be tolerated in any other parliamentary democracy.
The present system of the administration of justice in Northern Ireland is an appalling network of supergrasses, paid informers, mass trials, discredited court procedures, imprisonment without trial, police techniques and methods which are more appropriate to a totalitarian regime than to a parliamentary democracy. It is totally misleading to talk about improving the situation of the Nationalist community or alleviating their position unless there is a radical change in, and a restructuring of, the entire security system.
This agreement, in fact, achieves nothing of substance in this area. In article 7 there are a number of aspirations and statements of intent. There are, in fact, no major specific changes set out in the agreement. On the key question of the existence and operation of the UDR, the basic situation will remain unchanged.
In this area also the position will continue to be that the decisions will be taken by the the Northern Ireland Secretary of State and the British Government. This creates a situation where the Irish Government will be locked into a position where they will have to accept responsibility for an undesirable, an unsatisfactory and an unpalatable security apparatus and its operations without having any real control over them.
Is anyone prepared to make the claim that what is proposed in this agreement will provide lasting peace and stability to Northern Ireland, even in the longer term, or that it will end the alienation of the Nationalist community or that it will even achieve the agreement and consent of the Unionists? Does anyone honestly see this agreement as being capable of bringing violence and instability to an end?
We have been told that the first meetings will concentrate on:
1. relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland
2. ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments.
3. seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public acceptance in the administration of justice
It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the whole purpose of this exercise from the British point of view is to secure Irish Government backing for their security policies and to legitimise the RUC, the UDR, the courts and various controversial security practices. Time will tell.
The Irish Government propose to register this agreement with the United Nations. We are totally opposed to any such action. Such registration would elevlate this very insubstantial document into something of major importance and significance. It would help the British Government to create the impression that the problem of Northern Ireland has been finally solved, that everybody now recognises Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom, that British sovereignty is not disputed and that the community of nations, of which Ireland for so long been an devoted and dedicated member, now accepts and endorses the position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. We must point out also that registration of this agreement will operate to prevent Ireland ever raising the British presence in Northern Ireland in the Councils of the United Nations, should she wish to do so. We believe this is a central issue and our opposition to ratifying this agreement by Dáil Éireann is very heavily influenced by this potentially disastrous sequel.
A formal treaty or agreement registered at the United Nations is different in character from anything stated in a communique. No Fianna Fáil Government have ever concluded a formal agreement, involving recognition of Northern Ireland as a de jure part of the United Kingdom. Registering a treaty of this limited character at the United Nations announces to the world that the Irish Government are happy and contented with a limited and auxiliary role on the sidelines and that they fully accept the British Government as the legitimate sovereign power in Northern Ireland. Repeating the consent formula without any qualification simply ignores the criticisms made of the guarantee in the Forum report. The British Government and the Unionists have never made any efforts to secure the consent of the minority to the state of Northern Ireland, still less to make it a formal precondition of any constitutional arrangements.
I want Dáil Éireann to consider closely and rigorously what the political and legal implications of registering this agreement and the declaration attached to it at the United Nations are. Communiqués, joint statements, political declarations we have had, many of them, but these are to be distinguished from treaties and agreements, on the grounds that they are not intended to create legal rights and obligations. We have in the European Community many examples of intergovernmental accords, the three reports on political co-operation, the innumerable summit communiqués and conclusions of European Councils, and even the solemn European Act adopted at Stuttgart in the summer of 1983, none of which have had any legally binding character. No communiqué, regardless of its language, has this effect.
Mr. Kevin Boyle gave legal advice to the Forum, and has recently written:
Neither State has been prepared to enter into a binding international agreement or to pass internal legislation to establish beyond all doubt the legitimacy of Northern Ireland and to clarify the respective rights and obligations of the communities.
The registration of a new Anglo-Irish treaty at the United Nations, as was envisaged for the Sunningdale agreement in 1973, would confirm its status as an agreement between two equal and sovereign states acting in concord with none of the understones of inequality, duress and discord that characterised the initial Anglo-Irish treaties.
That quotation in my view sets out clearly what is involved — establishing beyond all doubt the legitimacy of Northern Ireland. That is what we cannot accept.
All the indications are that this agreement is intended to have a binding legal effect on the parties in accordance with the generally recognised principles of international law. To the extent that this agreement recognises not only the fact that the British exercise sovereignty over the Six Counties but that they have the right to do so, it is in direct conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, in particular Articles 2 and 3. Nonetheless, an agreement in such terms, once ratified, would be binding on Ireland in its relations with the British Government and indeed the international community generally, including international organisations.
It is a well settled principle of international law that a state cannot plead its own law as an excuse for non-compliance or non-recognition of an international obligation. Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides: "Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from Treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty".
It is clear that the intention of this agreement, and in particular of its registration at the United Nations, is to prevent any future Irish Government from acting in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 in its relations with other governments or international organisations.
There is also the intention to make it difficult if not impossible to withdraw the recognition granted even if the agreement were ultimately abrogated or to fall into disuse. There is no such thing in international law as conditional recognition. The very fact that such an agreement recognising the sovereignty of Britain over the North has been registered with the United Nations in accordance with its charter would make it difficult for future Governments to claim at the United Nations that Northern Ireland was an international issue.
Future British Governments will, no doubt, seek to rely on the general rule of international law that a state cannot plead its own constitution as a reason for not complying with an international obligation. There is however a well-established exception to this general rule which in effect means that it does not apply if what was done was manifestly contrary to a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
In our case there could hardly be a more manifest violation of that law than an international agreement which accepts the right of the British Government to exercise sovereignty over the North of Ireland. Since neither the Government of the day nor the Oireachtas have any authority to act in conflict with Articles 2 or 3, no future Government need unless it so wishes be bound by the provisions of any international agreement which are incompatible with those of the Constitution.
Despite the fact that I explained fully to Dáil Éireann in reporting on the Summit exactly what I meant by the wording of the communiqué of May 1980, persistent attempts have been made by the Taoiseach and Government to misinterpret my position. I do not think I can do better in explaining that position than quote from the report of the New Ireland Forum which states in, paragraph 5.2.3.:
Agreement means that the political arrangements for a new and sovereign Ireland would have to be freely negotiated and agreed to by the people of the North and by the people of the South.
That puts it exactly. It is the new political arrangements that have to be agreed. When we speak of the need to secure the agreement of the Unionist population that agreement applies to the new arrangements for, but not to the concept of, a united Ireland.
It is suggested that the first paragraph of Article I is taken from the communiqué of May 1980. But what did the full text of the May 1980 communiqué say? It said: "While agreeing with the British Prime Minister that any change in the Constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the Taoiseach reaffirmed that it is the wish of the Irish Government to secure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace." Why does this agreement quote an incomplete phrase? Why does it not give that sentence in full? There is no affirmation in this agreement by the Irish Government of their wish to ensure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace. It is simply not there.
I elaborated fully in the Dáil and subsequently on BBC "Panorama" what I meant and what my Government's policy was. I explained in the Dáil on 29 May 1980:
"We seek an arrangement whereby all Irishmen, no matter what their traditions, would manage the affairs of this island without British participation but with active British interest and goodwill
Ideally, we would like to see the British Government express an interest in the ultimate achievement of unity.
I would like, therefore, to see the British Government modifying the present guarantee by adding a positive element, a new departure that would open the door to progress.
These words "come about" place the emphasis on the practical realities of the situation. This is entirely compatible with our view that while no part of the Irish nation has the right to opt out of the nation, we recognise that unity cannot be imposed by force, and can only come about by negotiation and agreement.
The following month in June 1980 on BBC "Panorama" I stated to a British audience the following:
"The real root of the problem is the guarantee, the flat-footed unremitting guarantee which the British Government extends to the Unionist section of the population of Northern Ireland. I want to, if I can, say to the British Government and to the British public, identify that, isolate that, as the stumbling block, the great big immovable object. Until such time as something is done about that, some modification, some way round it is found, there will be no movement".
That was the policy of the Fianna Fáil Government in 1980, and that remains our policy today. I totally repudiate any effort to take a particular phrase out of a sentence and out of the context of Irish unity in which it was placed.
The argument has been advanced that because the leadership of the SDLP has welcomed this agreement it is not open to us to oppose it. This derives in part from the fact that we have always seen the Northern Ireland problem in very much the same light as they have. In particular, we have agreed with the leadership in identifying the British guarantee to the Unionists as a major stumbling block to progress. The SDLP leader, John Hume, in his recent biography by Barry White, is quoted as saying in America that the guarantee fostered a siege mentality which was a barrier to a real and lasting solution. He put this argument against the British guarantee even more powerfully still in an interview in the book The Uncivil Wars. He states there on page 100:
The whole thrust of our argument on the guarantee is that it is a sectarian guarantee, a unilateral guarantee, and an unconditional guarantee. It is a guarantee of perpetual sectarianism. When the State came into being it was set up on the basis of a sectarian head count.
That having been done, the British Government then said: `We guarantee you can stay with us as long as the majority want to'. By doing that they trapped the Unionist into perpetual sectarianism...
If one is to break down the sectarianism, one has to remove that guarantee, leave people standing on their own two feet.... British policy should be, `There are no guarantees for any section of this community anymore'.
We fully support that view and it is because we do so that we cannot accept article I of this agreement and could have been led to believe that the SDLP would agree with us on that issue.
The Forum report has also been quoted in support of what the Government now propose to us. But the British guarantee to the Unionists now endorsed by both Governments in this agreement was rejected by the Forum Report in the following terms:
In practice, however, this has been extended from consent to change in the constitutional status of the North within the United Kingdom into an effective unionist veto on any political change affecting the exercise of nationalist rights and on the form of government for Northern Ireland. This fails to take account of the origin of the problem, namely the imposed division of Ireland which created an artificial political majority in the North. It has resulted in a political deadlock in which decisions have been based on sectarian loyalties. Sectarian loyalties have thus been reinforced and the dialogue necessary for progress prevented.
That is what the Forum report had to say about the guarantee. I have drawn attention to the fact that the document before us does not contain a statement of the Irish Government's objective of unity and that this is the first time that such a declaration has been omitted. The Taoiseach has refused to agree and has relied on the third paragraph of the preamble to sustain his case.
I have no doubt, however, that any impartial person reading this agreement and the preamble would agree with my statement and that paragraph 3 of the preamble does nothing more than acknowledge the right of one of the major traditions that exists in Ireland to aspire to a sovereign united Ireland. That is what the paragraph states and that is all it states. That cannot possibly come anywhere near a clear statement by the Irish Government that the unity of Ireland is its claim and is objective.
The Taoiseach has tried to make an issue of an acknowledgment that if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, the British Government will introduce and support the necessary legislation. Surely this has always been implicit in the British position, and in any case it would be totally indefensible and unsustainable for them to take any other position.
I must confess to being astonished at something the Taoiseach said in his opening statement to the press conference. In fact, he has today in his opening address repeated something of the same concept. It is completely new to me and seemed to add an extra dimension, hitherto never advanced, to the Unionist veto. He said that the agreement makes provision for the Nationalist aspiration to unity in the only conditions in which constitutional Nationalists seek, or would accept, its fulfilment — without violence and with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland. Does that mean that if the British Government decide to leave Ireland or to legislate for Irish unity, Irish Nationalists could not accept it unless the Unionists consented?
Those who wish to see all the people on the island of Ireland united in peace combining to use their talents for the progress and prosperity of the whole island may try to see this agreement as a step along that road. Regrettably, however, it is nothing of the kind. In fact, the whole thrust of this agreement, certainly in so far as Britain is concerned, is in exactly the opposite direction. As the British Prime Minister has frequently said, it confirms the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and recognises the legitimacy of the union. The agreement also contains the important provisions that both Governments will work for a devolved administration in Northern Ireland and that as its functions and responsibilities are taken over by that devolved administration they will cease to be dealt with by the Conference. This means that the Conference will ultimately self-destruct by setting up a new administration which will take over its functions. These two elements, the guarantee of the status of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom and the handing over progressively of functions to a devolved administration, combine to bring us further and further away from a united Ireland towards a partitioned Ireland in which Northern Ireland, as a firmly entrenched part of the United Kingdom and with a sacrosanct Unionist veto over any change, would be governed by a devolved administration.
Following in the wake of the avalanche of propaganda and the massive public relations exercise which has been unleashed in support of this agreement it has been very difficult for us to make our voices heard. There has been generated an atmosphere of intolerance and hostility towards anyone who seeks to criticise what this Government are about, no matter how seriously or constructively that criticism is put forward. The impression is created that those of us who hold to the ideal of an Ireland united in peace in which all strands of Irish society can contribute to her welfare and her progress must be quiet and that, in fact, we have no right to articulate any such point of view.
It would, of course, be easy politically for us to join the multitude and go along that road, or at least to remain silent. It is often easier to be part of the herd, to keep in line, to keep one's head down and not to incur the displeasure of the media establishment, the commentator and the leader writer. We are not, however, prepared to take that course or seek that bubble of popularity. It is our obligation to speak out for the things that we believe in, not stridently, hysterically or with any element of personal animosity or hostility. We owe it to the demands of parliamentary democracy to which we are totally committed and we owe it to those who believe in the same things as we do, and we owe it to ourselves to do so. We have a duty to point out the dangers we see in what is now being undertaken, the departure that it represents and the abandonment it entails of the national position.
We firmly believe on this side of the House that only Irish unity will provide lasting peace and stability in Ireland. The first step towards this objective is to convene an all round Constitutional Conference under the auspices of the Irish and British Governments. The purpose of this Constitutional Conference — attended, of course, by Unionist representatives— would be to formulate a new Constitution for all Ireland, guaranteeing civil and religious liberties to all the citizens of the state and providing irrevocable guarantees for the preservation of both the Unionist and Nationalist identities.
This agreement represents in our view a considerable triumph for British diplomacy in its efforts to persuade an Irish Government to turn away from unity, reinforce their sovereignty over the North of Ireland and secure their full backing for the implementation of their security policies.
What the Government are putting through the Dáil this week undermines the very basis of constitutional nationalism. No Government, no temporary majority has the right to sign away the rights of the Irish people. Fianna Fáil will continue to champion those rights and to uphold the democratic nationalist tradition throughout this island. If we failed to do so we believe there would indeed be grave cause for concern about peace and stability and not only in Northern Ireland but throughout Ireland as a whole. We are the moral barrier against a violent and abhorrent form of nationalism. We will not be deflected from that role and will continue to work for the reunification of Ireland and the withdrawal of the British presence.
Fianna Fáil have been in receipt of torrents of criticism and abuse from Government spokesmen and the media for standing up for the principles of democratic nationalism, against an orchestrated support for this agreement and contrived messages of support which have sought to impress the Irish public. We will stand for our nationalist ideals, ideals that up until recently we believed were shared by all parties. We are not going to abandon the basic reason for our foundation as a political movement. It would be grossly irresponsible of us to abandon the cause of Irish nationalism, the ideal of a united Ireland and to hand it over as the exclusive property of those prepared to pursue it by violent means. Is it really the position of the Taoiseach and the Government that we should do this? Does the Taoiseach really and honesty believe, do his party believe that it will serve the cause of lasting peace and stability to make a present of the priceless heritage of the concept of Irish unity to violent men?
As a responsible political party, regardless of whether it costs us votes or popularity, we are not prepared to surrender by desertion the constitutional nationalist position. Any other stance would be to turn away from the deepest aspirations of the Irish people and represent a massive psychological blow to their self-confidence and their self-esteem.
Deputies
Hear, hear.
The Taoiseach in his speech referred to the many messages which he has received from people in all parts of the country and representing all persuasions after the conclusion of the Hillsborough agreement. He spoke of these as being messages of congratulation. I think it would perhaps be more accurate, if I might correct him, by saying that they were messages of gratitude and of admiration for the immense effort which he personally has invested in the task of trying to end bloodshed and savagery in the North of Ireland and to reconcile Irish people, ever since the trouble there broke out 16 or 17 years ago.
All these messages are entirely understandable and correct; but, while I join in the gratitude and admiration which they convey, they are very easily confused, and perhaps, in the representation which the Press has given of peoples' feelings, they have become confused with what can very easily be mistaken for euphoria. There is a big difference between congratulating someone on a brave and lengthy effort and jubilating, perhaps prematurely, over its success, because the real reason for the appearance of euphoria being out of place is that it still remains to be seen whether or not this agreement will work. In addition to that, we have the lesson of Sunningdale, which is only 12 years old, to warn us that any demonstrations of satisfaction in Dublin awaken alarm and consternation in Belfast and that anything in this part of the country which gives the appearance that we are satisfied with our progress towards a national aspiration is likely to redouble the determination of people 100 miles from us or less never to let that day arrive. So that anything in the nature of euphoria or jubilation about this very important and courageous but very fragile step is totally misplaced now and will be for some time.
I had to admit that I had misgivings about the process which led to this agreement. My misgivings related to the basis from which the process began, namely the report of the New Ireland Forum of last summer 12 months. That report was the fruit of a very long and high-profile series of meetings in which, ultimately, the four Nationalist parties there represented agreed on a set of options. The report contained more than these options; and with the introductory chapters which set out the very admirable sentiments about respecting the traditions of other people I unreservedly agree, as I hope I do not need to tell anybody in the House. But the options, I am sorry to say — and I have said this in the House before — were taken on board, I think, secretly against the better judgment of many of the people there. Since the Taoiseach has rightly appealed to us to keep the temperature of this debate low, I will not speak about that event as perhaps I would in another setting. But we did, some of us at least, take on board those options against our better judgment. They had to be against the better judgment of anybody who reflected on the matter, because all three of them were totally unacceptable to anybody except the Nationalists. And the one which we labelled as being our top preference was the one most wildly unlikely to be accepted by anyone in the country or outside the country except an Irish Nationalist.
We then looked exceedingly foolish when the British Prime Minister shot down these three options in as many tens of seconds at the Summit in England a year ago. Everybody in the country appeared to be hurt and surprised, although that fate for these three options was absolutely predictable from the day they appeared in print for the first time. The Government were then faced with the task, which I must say they manfully and courageously discharged, of putting their disappointment behind them, trying to take up the pieces, trying to salvage from the New Ireland Forum report whatever scattered pieces of material were still usable, by putting them together into a stage or a platform on which the contacts with the British about the future of Northern Ireland might be resumed.
In due course, the agreement which is today before the House emerged. That agreement does fall far short of providing for joint authority, which was the least drastic of the three Nationalist options. It falls far short of that; but it goes a long distance further than mere consultation. It does provide for an official Irish presence, even with a role which is hard to define exactly, in the governmental structures of the North. If it works, in fairness, that must be recognised as a very substantial advantage to the Northern minority who have no one else to speak for them on the surface of the globe, except the people in this State and the Government in charge of it. If it works it will be a very substantial advantage to them and I would like to hear any lady or gentleman on the far side of the House say otherwise. But, of course, it has built into it the intensely provocative feature of the very thing which the Unionists regard as the thin end of the wedge. It is there institutionalised for them to see and will, therefore, redouble their determination to prevent it from working. I am very sorry that the Leader of the Opposition, in a speech which was centred almost entirely on the legalities, as he sees them, of Articles 2 and 3, did not condescend to consider this aspect of the matter, this aspect of this very fragile agreement which might confer very substantial benefits on the minority for whom I suppose everyone in the House would wish to be thought to speak, and would wish to be thought to have their interests at heart. This agreement is under the very severe danger that even though it goes a few inches only along the road Deputy Haughey says he would like to see us going, it goes far enough along that road almost to guarantee that we will have the best part of one million people trying to block its success.
Personally — and I have said this often — I would have preferred an internal solution, not because I do not want Irish unity in the long term but because I am not so arrogant as to prefer my aspirations, long term or short term, to what are the obvious crying needs of ordinary human beings today. If their lot can be bettered and their hopes for themselves and their children can be given a lift by some solution — even if it is one which does not leave me with a display of flags of the very colour I would like in front of me — I will go along with it. I will leave it to my children, or theirs, to take the thing a step further if they can and want to. Second, I would have preferred that an internal solution had been achieved, not by negotiation with the British but by negotiation with the other million Irish people with whom we have to share this island, and who would still be there if the British left in the morning; who would still be able to make life intolerable for everybody in this island and cause deaths by the tens of thousands, even if the British left in the morning. They are the ones we have to deal with and let us never lose sight of that fact. To give the Taoiseach the credit which he more than anyone in the House is entitled to, he has never lost sight of it even during the periods in which we have been entangled in this intergovernmental process.
Failing the possibility of involving the Northern majority in the achieving of an internal solution the next best thing might have been the reimposition of a power-sharing executive. I think so, but I have to bow my judgment to that of people nearer the scene. I recognise also that the Unionists, by the incredible crassness of their leadership, have virtually disqualified themselves from consideration in this context. No leadership was ever more intransigent, and I say that in the strict sense of the word of being unwilling to compromise or settle. I understand their feelings and their fears but everybody has to settle something some time. Perhaps, as the vice-chairman of the Alliance Party said on radio this morning, it may be that there are, in some places — though certainly not in this House, I hope not in this House — people who are not sorry to see them momentarily discomfited. I hope that feeling will not persist, but it did seem to be the case — and perhaps this is the reason we have an agreement in this particular shape — that nothing was to be achieved from them, that no movement was going to come from them. Then the British, in other words their own sovereign government, ultimately lost patience with them. Therefore, while I feel sorry for their plight — in the sense that they have, I think, a fair point in saying that a settlement has been reached over their heads and without involving them in any consultation — to some extent they must, in fairness, bear the blame for that themselves.
In addition — again I have to bow to local knowledge; obviously I do not claim to have a knowledge of the thing at first hand myself — the Nationalist population would appear to be now so alienated that a merely internal solution would no longer have satisfied them, in particular would no longer have rescued them from the clutches of people who, although flying a green flag, would leave no life worth living for anyone on the island if they got their way. It would not suffice to keep them out of the clutches of such people. Accordingly, we have to make the best of this agreement. It is not the one I personally would wish to see. It is a brave effort, it is deserving of support, and everyone should give it a fair trial. We have to make the best of it, although I must say I have a very uneasy feeling in the pit of my stomach about having to depend on the British for anything in the context of Irish affairs. I would far prefer, if ever we could get that close to them, to establish a standing relationship with the people who differ from us in regard to the destiny of this island, the people who at present say violent and frightening things about the lengths they would go to to prevent the unity of the island from ever being achieved.
It is important that, in the course of this debate, some Deputies at least should express some understanding for the emotional repugnance which the Northern majority feel towards what is — even though they may have to some extent themselves to thank for it — a deeply unwelcome structure which has been wished on them by two Governments they do not trust, one of which perhaps they never trusted and the other of which they no longer trust.
I would ask Members of the House, in order to get them for a second to stand in Unionist shoes, to picture an arrangement — I am not saying that you can exactly swop the terms in this image of speech; of course you cannot — but I would ask the House roughly to picture an arrangement in which the Unionists and the British, between themselves and without consulting us, erected a system or structure under which British ministers would appear, in whatever capacity, in Merrion Street and British police officers in Garda Headquarters. That would be deeply unwelcome to us. I cannot suppose that there is any Deputy in the House so poor in imagination, so contemptuous of others, that he cannot give the Unionists the credit of assuming that their feelings would be at least as strong as his. That is the situation, more or less, with which they feel they are now confronted. We need not go into who is to blame for it. We need not go into the question of where the historical responsibility for it lies, or who will stand judgment for it on the last day. We need not go into who is right or who is wrong. That is their perception of their situation at present. We have to take it like that and try to bring sympathy to bear, so far as we can, on the people who have to share this island with us, many of whom have been here before the surnames of some Deputies in this House were ever heard in this country.
It is against the background of these Northern feelings that I have to ask the House — and I propose not to disobey or depart from the Taoiseach's injunction to be moderate in speech about this — to consider the Opposition amendment to the Taoiseach's motion. How are we to judge the attitude of the Opposition, an attitude which essentially condemns this agreement for not securing unity, or at any rate one of the expresed Forum options, and as Deputy Haughey said for having conceded, as he thinks, formally and legally a position which it is not constitutionally competent for our Government to concede in regard to British sovereignty?
This agreement, which provides for only a relatively mild dose of institutionalised Irish influence in Northern affairs, has by all accounts — accounts which I believe — caused a frightening level of anger among Unionists who, as the Taoiseach said, have not perhaps had the time, the leisure or the atmosphere to consider the agreement deeply enough. I have had public and private reports of this frightening level of anger. What would the reaction be like if that dose were not a slight one but a double dose, an image we might apply to the joint authority option that was the least drastic of the lot? What would happen if it were multiplied by ten, as in the unitary state option which the Fianna Fáil input to the Forum resulted in our putting up front? What would the reaction be then?
I am aware there is an opinion that the Unionists are "bluffing" and that "their bluff has to be called". I cannot see anything in the Unionist record which suggests that they are only bluffing. I know that in the 1973-74 period about 400 uninvolved and innocent Catholics in Northern Ireland fell victim to sectarian murder, not to speak of the fact that 11 years ago 30 people were blown to bits in this city, some of them a few hundred yards from where we are speaking. Where is there anything to suggest bluff? Would we be bluffing if we threatened to fight rather than be reabsorbed into the United Kingdom? Would anybody be justified in thinking we were only bluffing? Why do we credit them with less spirit than we lay claim to? Is the proposer of a unitary state, who faults the Government for not producing it, or for discarding the possibility of achieving it, ready to face up to the consequences of that kind of situation? What forces would be deployed to keep order in six counties mad with rage, when we are barely able to keep order in some parts of the city of Dublin? Does anyone imagine that the Unionist reaction would stop at the Border? I despair when I hear this talk that we ought to have gone for this or that. Does anybody reckon the fallout from getting something and measure against that achievement the cost that would be borne, not by the people in well protected, upholstered offices, but by ordinary people blown to bits by indiscriminate bombs?
As for the Opposition's suggestion of a "constitutional conference representative of all the traditions in Ireland", what would Deputy Haughey's proposal be if, as seems quite certain to me, the entire Unionist spectrum boycotted such a conference? Suppose the two sovereign Governments did call it and suppose we were told by the two Unionist parties to take a running jump at ourselves, what would the fall back position be then? Neither of the two Unionist parties would so much as come to the Forum. How likely then is it that they would come to a table on which they would be expected to lay down for good their present constitutional position? Are we living on the moon or is it that we think our constituents are living on the moon?
The Sinn Féin position has not yet been mentioned this afternoon. I see that Mr. Adams is very displeased with the Government for what he calls the "tearing up of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution". Since when, we may ask, have Sinn Féin and the IRA developed such a tender regard for the Constitution? Have they not themselves repeatedly torn up Article 9, which prescribes loyalty to the state as one of the fundamental duties of the citizen? Have they not repeatedly torn up Article 15, which describes the Oireachtas as the only legitimate body in the country to maintain an armed force? Have they not torn up Article 28, which vests only in the Dáil the right to maintain a war? Have they not torn up Article 40, which contains the right to life? What about Article 41, which proclaims the right of the family, which these sanctimonious butchers have on hundreds of occasions destroyed by robbing wives of their husbands and children of their fathers, bringing grief and desolation into thousands of innocent homes? All this, and we are supposed to take lectures on the constitutional proprieties of Articles 2 and 3 from Mr. Adams. I will return to Articles 2 and 3 if I have time, but the scope of this debate has to be much larger.
I want to appeal to Unionist people, if it is not ludicrous for someone in this House to do so, to accept the assurances which the Taoiseach and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have tried to offer them, which I know they sincerely mean, and to give this agreement even a year's chance to work. Surely the bruise to their self-esteem which I know the institutionalised Irish presence at Stormont will represent will be a small price to pay if in the end their Nationalist neighbours can be reconciled to them and if their province ceases to be a by-word for rancorous hatred, for destruction and for murder.
That is an appeal which many Deputies will make in some form or other during this debate. I beg Unionist people or their leaders, if they read what goes on here, to believe that we mean it sincerely and that we have the interests of ordinary people at heart.
For myself, I am prepared to put Irish unity on 20 back burners if it will save both Catholics and Protestants from the nightmare which they have gone through during the past 16 years. It does not mean I am not a Nationalist still. It does not mean I would not be over the moon it we could have Irish unity and I could think of some way of reaching it. I recall something for which the far side can claim credit when Mr. de Valera made an inspired gesture during the Belfast blitz by sending the entire Dublin fire brigade to help. That was worth doing and it did more to break down hatred and promote understanding than a thousand speeches at Bodenstown.
I want to offer a few impromptu comments on Deputy Haughey's general proposition that the Government have behaved in a manner which is not properly constitutional in, as he put it, acknowledging the sovereignty of the British over Northern Ireland. I cannot read that acknowledgement into the article of the agreement to which Deputy Haughey was referring. It is true that if I were polemicising on the other side during a budget debate or in some tuppeny ha'penny debate on a Bill I did not like the look of, I might rack my brains to try to twist that meaning out of it, but I am damned if I can see it. It is also true that in the whole sphere of constitutional arrangements in this country and in England, and in relations between the two, there is an area which necessarily must be one of subtlety where one does not pursue logic too far and it is best to leave certain questions unanswered. This is one of them.
The Constitution asserts in Article 3 the right of the Government and Parliament established by the Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the North, but the owner of a right or the person who has to articulate it, which means the Government under our Constitution, is entitled to forebear its exercise or its assertion. The owner is not entitled to jettison or disown it, but is most certainly entitled to forbear according to his judgment on a particular occasion its exercise or assertion and to pipe down about it for a while. If the interests of humanity, peace and decency require that that be done in regard to the bit of paper which the Deputy opposite quoted from — because it does not weigh very heavily with me against people's rights — then it is the right thing to do.
It is incumbent on the Government to say as a matter of political policy that they propose to behave in a certain way, that they will not discuss legal rights now, but that they will act in a way which implies forebearing to assert those rights in a particular context, for a particular period, or in a particular setting. If that is the Government's intention, I see nothing unconstitutional about it and, were it otherwise, I would be in favour of freeing a Government from a constriction of that kind.
Before I leave the question of subtleties, let me remind the House that Mr. de Valera, whom I mentioned with respect a few minutes ago, was a Republican. That is how he always advertised himself and I accept that the description fitted him before the phrase was hijacked by murderers. How is it that when he drafted the Constitution, from which Deputy Haughey has been quoting, he did not think fit to declare the state a Republic in that document? Why was he so shy of it? Why did he maintain a fragile link with the Crown with the King accrediting our diplomatic representatives up to 1949? I do not like to press the point. Others did not like to press the point then. I recognise that he had some good intentions of perhaps even maintaining a fragile link with the North which I believe was his motive. That was an area which was perhaps best left unexplored, in which it would have been destructive to push words and logic too far. No more strident example of the point I am trying to make exists in the constitutional history of the State than Mr. de Valera's own performance.
In regard to acknowledging the legitimacy of the constitutional position on the far side of the Border, I cannot see that Article 1 of this agreement does so, but we do it every day in the way we operate our laws. In regard to exchange control, we recognise that there is a different sovereignty on the far side of the Border. None of us in this House can open a bank account in Portadown or buy a house up there without getting the permission of the Central Bank because it is a different jurisdiction. If we are going to be that fundamentalist about the matter, surely exchange control is unconstitutional in so far as acquiring property or moving money around in Northern Ireland is concerned? What about customs offences? Why do we have customs posts along the Border if it is not a different jurisdiction and if we have not formally recognised it as such? What about the area of criminal law in which a prosecution here would depend on the offence being committed within the jurisdiction? If the prosecution could not prove that the offence took place in Cavan rather than Fermanagh, the case would be dismissed. These are niggling legalities but I did not start them. I have been dragged into them by the Leader of the Opposition, as others will be during the next couple of days.
The only thing I see as having any kind of constitutional question mark over it in the agreement relates to the possibility of instituting mixed courts. That is a very tricky matter because mixed courts in this jurisdiction, even if we needed them, are not the same as those existing in Northern Ireland.
If such courts imply the sitting of a Northern judge administering justice or sharing in the administration of justice in the Twenty-six Counties, that will not be constitutionally possible unless that judge simultaneously accepts appointment as a judge under our Constitution. Otherwise we may find ourselves in a difficulty under Article 34.
It would be helpful to everybody if we did not run this three-day debate on legalities alone. I felt I had to say a word or two without having time to reflect on them in reply to Deputy Haughey's remarks but it is more important to stick to the large, political outlines of the problem which we are up against and which the Irish people as a whole are looking to us to solve. Despite the misgivings which I have expressed, I again express my admiration for the Government's efforts, and my plea to the Unionists to give the agreement a chance to work.
Our political objection to the Hillsborough agreement is that Irish sovereignty over the whole island is not merely shelved but effectively abandoned. Partition has thus been copper-fastened and the credibility of constitutional Nationalists severely undermined. Instead, for an interim period the Irish Government will have an advisory role in helping the British Government to administer the Six Counties. We do not believe the Irish Government have acquired any permanent role of substance in the affairs of Northern Ireland, despite exaggerated claims to the contrary. They have committed themselves to working with the British Government for an internal settlement which excludes Dublin. The only concessions made on the security front are concessions by the Irish Government to copperfasten extradition by acceding to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and to end the Garda Commissioner's boycott of meetings with the RUC Chief Constable. Nothing has been conceded with regard to the disbandment of the UDR. Indeed, from any substantive point of view, the Irish Government have given away the basic Nationalist position in exchange for nothing.
The Taoiseach and other Government speakers over the weekend tried to make an issue of an acknowledgement that if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, the British Government will introduce and support the necessary legislation. This has always been implicit in the British position but it would be totally indefensible and unsustainable for them to take any other position. There is nothing here for which we should be thankful. In any case, it is not as watertight as it appears because the word "clearly" is open to many different interpretations. The British Government could and perhaps would argue that a 51 per cent or a 55 per cent majority, particularly if there was strong resistance from the minority, did not constitute "clearly" wishing. An escape clause has been built in by the word "clearly" so the Taoiseach's boasted achievement is entirely illusory. It is a clause of about as much value as Article 12 of the 1921 Treaty setting up the boundary commission which promised to redraw the Border in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants.
The abandonment of our right to national unity and of our opposition to extradition is based on assumptions about Unionist attitudes which have been proved time and time again to be incorrect and naive. The thinking is based on the premise that, if the Unionists are reassured about their basic position, they will then be prepared to be more generous to Nationalists within Northern Ireland. The Unionist reaction to the Hillsborough Summit shows once again that, no matter how many concessions are made to them, they are not prepared to give an inch. No amount of generosity or sacrifice of every principle which we hold dear will make the Unionist political parties any more prepared to concede equality and justice to Nationalists.
The British Prime Minister and the Northern Secretary are, of course, right in pointing to the major concessions to Unionism made by the Irish Government; but it will not make Unionism any more amenable. It will not advance things even a centimetre towards peace, reconciliation, healing, or whatever the "in" word of the moment is. The Taoiseach is always seeking to urge us to take one further step, to make one further concession, and peace and reconciliation will be at hand. The agreement for the first time gives the Nationalist community in the North official minority status. The aim of both Governments is to reconcile Nationalists to the Northern State and to British sovereignty, or in the ineloquent phrase of the Government Press Secretary, "to buy their consent to be governed" by the British.
I can recall no agreement or communique signed by any Irish Government that refers to Irishmen and women in the North as a minority. But of course it is a logical consequence of the surrender of the whole national position. The role of the Irish Government is to ease them into acceptance of this status and into a renunciation of their national aspirations.
Suggestions have been made that British sovereignty in some way has been diminished by this agreement. The agreement states clearly:
There is no derogation from the sovereignty of either the Irish Government or the United Kingdom Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administrations of Government within its own jurisdiction.
Is anyone suggesting that the British Prime Minister is not serious about sovereignty, and that she will in fact permit derogations from sovereignty? Is anyone suggesting that her much vaunted determination will not see to it that this clause will be implemented to the letter?
It is being suggested that something just short of joint authority has been achieved. The Forum report defines joint authority as follows:
Under Joint Authority, the London and Dublin Governments would have equal responsibility for all aspects of the Government of Northern Ireland. Joint Authority would involve shared rule by the British and Irish Governments.
Is the Taoiseach suggesting that the London and Dublin Governments have nearly equal responsibility for all aspects of the Government of Northern Ireland, or that the Government of Northern Ireland will be nearly or almost equally shared between the two Governments? It is obvious that to make such a claim would be patently absurd. Why is the new body called a Conference? A Conference does not normally take decisions. It is a talking shop.
That is what the British Government intend this new body to remain. Its agenda and decisions, its views will not normally be announced. Do the Government seriously believe that a handful of civil servants tucked away in Stormont, if that materialises, and the occasional ministerial meeting, constitute something just short of joint authority, or joint administration? Is it not the brutal truth that the Irish Government have no authority whatsoever in Northern Ireland, joint, executive, or otherwise, and that they will not have the power to take or to veto a single solitary decision in Northern Ireland? Is that not the truth? Yes, the agreement falls just short of joint authority, some millions of miles short.
The chapter on Joint Authority in the Forum report is quite interesting, in its way. It states that it would accord "equal validity to the two traditions in Northern Ireland" and that "under Joint Authority the two traditions in Northern Ireland would find themselves as a basis of equality". It is very interesting and significant that in the Hillsborough Agreement nowhere is the word "equality" mentioned. There is no suggestion of the fourth or fifth requirement in Chapter 5.2 of the Forum report that "Both of these identities must have equally satisfactory, secure and durable expression and protection", and that "Lasting stability can be found only in the context of new structures in which there will be equal rights and opportunities for all". While there are many references in the agreement to accommodating rights and identities, there is no reference to equal rights. It is indeed obvious that the Unionist tradition will continue to dominate, with some lip service to minority rights.
Some commentators have described the Government's role as consultative, but the reality is less cosy. Nowhere throughout the entire agreement does the word "consultation" appear. Article 2 (b) is very carefully worded. It states:
The United Kingdom accept that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference.
There is no conferring of any right on the Irish Government, merely an acceptance that something will happen.
In particular, and this is a crucial point, the British Government is under no formal obligation to consult the Irish Government under this agreement before taking or implementing any decision. It will be recalled that the British Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons on 29 July 1982: "My Right Honourable Friend, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, made it perfectly clear to the Irish Ambassador that no commitment exists for Her Majesty's Government to consult the Irish Government on matters affecting Northern Ireland". This agreement leaves that formal position untouched. The British Government accept the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals: they do not accept that the Irish Government have a right to be consulted.
The Northern Secretary, Tom King, stated to the Rotary Club in Belfast on 5 November 1985:
Everybody knows that Dublin already raises with us questions and points about the administration of the province. Sometimes the matters they raise are a genuine cause for concern and any responsible Government would wish to know about this. But at other times points raised have been based on misunderstanding and misinformation. Surely it is in everybody's interest that these should be cleared up.
This process dates back far beyond the Intergovernmental Council set up in the autumn of 1981. It goes back ten or more years.
It happens to suit the British to have at this stage a formal mechanism for dealing with it, by which they hope to avoid the periodic rows that have arisen over particular remarks or actions, such as the Hermon affair or Prince Philip's visit to a UDR barracks and so on. Let us not fool ourselves. The British are not conceding anything they have not already conceded, namely, that they will listen politely and non-committally to anything we have to say about Northern Ireland. What they are trying to ensure by these means is that in future Anglo-Irish differences or exchanges will take place in private rather than in public and that in future a united front will be maintained in public at all times. It is entirely premature to see this as a significant advance for Nationalists. What the British Government want to achieve through this Conference is quite simple. It is to muzzle the Irish Government. Presumably, this is the purpose of the provision in the communiqué that the meetings and agenda of the Conference will not normally be announced.
This seems to me to lead to the worst of all possible worlds. Nationalists will not see clearly the effects of the work of the Conference, while on the other hand Unionist paranoia will be fed. The Taoiseach used to be concerned about the evils of secrecy, particularly vis-à-vis the Unionists. He has obviously completely changed his mind.
The Irish Government's brief in the framework of the Conference is explicitly limited to what is termed "the minority community". For example, Article 4 accepts that the Irish Government may put forward views on devolution, in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community. In Article 5(c), in the absence of devolution, the Conference is described as a framework within which "the Irish Government may, where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected, put forward views and proposals for major legislation". The Irish Government no longer have any pretension to represent the best interests of all the people of Ireland — Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter. Their role is confined to representing the views and interests of the so-called `minority'. That puts the Irish Government into an automatic adversarial role with the Unionists and is unlikely, therefore, even on the Governments's own terms, to be conducive to reconciliation.
Much play has been made of the secretariat. It is being suggested that it represented a potential breaking point in the negotiations. Nowhere in the Hillsborough documents is it stated that the secretariat will be based in Belfast. Mrs. Thatcher said at her press conference that it is expected that the secretariat will sit in Belfast, that that is expected, of course, subject to security advice. Presumably if that advice is that Belfast is no longer safe, the secretariat may have to be moved elsewhere at some future date. Even if initially it sits in Belfast, the decision is reversible, since it is not in the agreement.
It is a pathetic commentary on the quality of the current Stormont administration that the presence of a couple of Dublin civil servants in the Stormont complex should be greeted in some quarters as tantamount to the salvation of the Nationalist community. I understand that the Irish Government originally sought an office of their own in Stormont, but this was rejected. All they now have is a secretariat, which presumably will be able to do nothing without the agreement of its British nominated members.
My fear is that the secretariat and the Conference will be powerless and without influence, yet the Irish Government's presence in Stormont will provide blanket approval for the administrative practices and decisions of the Northern Ireland administration. I fear also that the Irish Government are being set up by the British to carry much of the responsibility and unpopularity of the present regime, especially if there is intensification of repression by the security forces, without possessing any positive authority.
As has been pointed out, the role of the Conference is seen by the British as a temporary one. The British Prime Minister stated at the press conference and I quote: "the Inter-Governmental Conference secretariat is in a way an interim to getting acceptable devolved government in which the people of Northern Ireland would take over the decisions". The Taoiseach on the other hand has stated that the Conference would be permanent in respect of certain matters such as security. This is clearly an area where serious differences of opinion have emerged between the two Governments. The clearest reason, however, why this structure cannot be seen as a first step along the road to a united Ireland is that its function is to dissolve after a period of time by handing over most of its functions to a devolved administration.
The Irish Government have now committed themselves to supporting an internal settlement. In fact, the Government have capitulated to the British on this, having opposed since 1982 the basis of the Prior rolling devolution initiative. Article 4 states:
It is the declared policy of the United Kingdom Government that responsibility in respect of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be devolved within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. The Irish Government support that policy.
The loosely worded criteria of widespread acceptance throughout the Community was originally in the 1982 British White Paper, and was rejected by the SDLP and by the Irish Government at the time. Widespread acceptance could be defined in such a way as to exclude the political representatives of the Nationalist community other than Catholics in the Alliance Party. Article 4(b) represents a considerable U-turn even for the Taoiseach. In a Fine Gael statement on 29 July 1982, he said:
We were naturally disappointed that the proposal was for "rolling devolution" making the convergence of a devolved Executive in Northern Ireland dependent on agreement by Parties representing both sections of the community. Such an argument is clearly difficult to secure.
It is now Government policy to put pressure on the SDLP to go into the Assembly and into some devolved administration on an unsatisfactory basis, which might sooner or later lead back to the old majority rule system. The return to devolution is a reversion to old, failed initiatives and a negation, as I pointed out in the autumn of 1981, of the whole meaning of the Anglo-Irish process. It is a rejection also of the Forum report, which required that a settlement that recognises the legitimate rights of Nationalists and Unionists must transcend the context of Northern Ireland.
The differences between the British and Irish Governments over whether the latter's role is self-extinguishing are significant. It is my belief that if the British could achieve some form of devolution they would jettison without a qualm the Conference and Secretariat which are due anyway for review after two or three years, regardless of what is said in the agreement. On the other hand, the notion that the partial extension of Dublin's role will act as an incentive to Unionists to accept power-sharing is another example of the Taoiseach's exceptional naivety. The Unionists will set out to depart from and overturn the whole scheme, rather than have to accept carrots preferred by him. Anyone who thinks the Unionists will be lightly persuaded to accept both power-sharing and a Dublin dimension is lacking in political realism.
The most striking feature, though, of this agreement is the absence as yet of a single tangible concession to Nationalists, not even the repeal of the Flags and Emblems Act as was leaked to us in the papers in the lead up to this Hillsborough meeting. It will be interesting to see if any substantive reforms materialise or whether, as is more likely, the Government have already obtained all the concessions they are going to get. Indeed, they may probably be called on to give more in an attempt to assuage Unionist opinion. That was constantly the pattern in 1973-74 after Sunningdale.
No reforms in security have taken place. The disbandment of the UDR, community policing and mixed courts have all been refused by the British. It appears that only cosmetic changes are contemplated. The Taoiseach has been eloquent in the past on what is needed to end alienation. For example, on RTE on 6 May 1984, he said that if they can not see that the security forces and the political system that finds in one way its authority from an Irish as well as a British sense, it was difficult to see them going back into a consensus and accepting political and security structures solely within the existing Northern Ireland area. The security forces, as we know, will continue to derive their authority solely and exclusively from the British Government.
On radio on 19 May 1985 the Taoiseach stated, apropos of the UDR that, so long as you do not make radical changes in the present structure and method of working in the security forces, it will not end the alienation. No changes, radical or otherwise, have so far been obtained, so on the Taoiseach's own admission this agreement is totally inadequate for ending alienation. In any case of course his argument is based on misconception. The alienation of the Nationalist community is the alienation of a people who want to live in a free, united and independent Irish State, instead of being forced to live against their will within a British one.
The only concessions made on security are Irish ones. Everyone knows that the extradition policy engineered by people who have now gone off to well paid jobs in the European Community was a fiasco and that its future was in some doubt. The Irish Government will now proceed to copperfasten extradition by acceding to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. The SDLP Conference at the beginning of November overwhelmingly rejected extradition to an area where the system of justice was so discredited. Once again the Government have ignored and undermined the position of the SDLP. It is clear that the Conference during the first months will be almost exclusively concerned with security and that Commissioner Wren will now be forced to end his boycott of meetings with the RUC Chief Constable, whose contempt for the Garda Síochána is so ill-concealed. We are told the first meetings will concentrate on relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland; ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments; and seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public acceptance of the administration of justice. If we are to learn from experience and from our history I say that what the British want out of this agreement is security, security and security. They want the Irish Government to legitimise the RUC, the UDR, the courts and various controversial security practices with, if need be, one or two slight cosmetic changes.
It is my belief that when this agreement is ratified and registered the British will have what they want — full recognition for the first time of their legitimate occupation of Northern Ireland. A major security drive will be undertaken while the political role of the Irish Government in the Conference will be minimised to the greatest possible extent. Regardless of what the Forum report says, the British Government will return to their exclusive preoccupation with security and expect the full backing of the Irish Government for whatever measures they take, regardless of their acceptability to Nationalists.
A massive cheer of international support has been orchestrated and even promises of financial aid to Northern Ireland have been given. No doubt this is an attempt to bribe the people of Northern Ireland, Unionists and Nationalists alike, to accept a deal which does little for either of them. The Government and their diplomatic machine have engaged in a vain attempt to impress the Irish public with the importance of the agreement. It was interesting to note that the Taoiseach read out messages of congratulations from a number of Governments. One must wonder where they came from.
We welcome the assurance given by the Taoiseach that he and the Government have not entered into any secret agreements with the British. He said there are no secret agreements and no hidden agendas. This is a necessary assurance having regard to the concern felt by many as a result of an interview given by one of the Taoiseach's backbenchers on a British television programme over the weekend. I accept this assurance and hope it will always stand.
Today the leaders of the two most powerful countries in the world, the United States of America and the USSR, are trying to reach an accommodation on some of the complex and intractable issues that separate them. They go to their summit in Geneva against a background of extreme tension in the relations between them, to deal with issues that have bedevilled those relations, and have defied all attempts at resolution.
It is probable that the most important consequence that could flow from this summit would be a change in the atmosphere between the two countries. It is too much to hope that major agreements can be made about the major issues, like arms control, human rights, and interference in each others affairs; but if they can agree to talk in good faith to each other, there may well be grounds for hope that a start has been made towards the easing of fears about nuclear war.
When you remember that it is not that long since relations between these two powers were at their lowest ever ebb, and when you realise the enormous complexity of the issues with which they are trying to grapple, then it is fitting that anyone who is concerned with the issue of peace in the world would wish the summit in Geneva well. If it can prove to be a turning point in relations between the two countries, it will have been a success.
In many ways the issues being addressed in Geneva are no more complex or difficult then those addressed in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Peace is indivisible, and the search for peace can be as difficult on a small scale as on a large one. And the search for peace in Northern Ireland has been fraught with difficulty and danger.
My qualification for speaking on this motion so does not rest on any special expertise on my part in constitutional law or theory or even on a detailed background of working with Northern Ireland problems. I stand here first and foremost as an ordinary member, so to speak, of the Government which have joined the Anglo-Irish Agreement. That agreement has my ready support, and not just in the obligatory manner required by the collective responsibility of Government. I am committed to the agreement, and to the Government motion before the House, because it accords with deeply held views on the national question which I have formed during my considerable period as a Dáil Deputy and as a member of the European Parliament.
There is consensus around this House that Northern Ireland represents the most chronic and intractable political problem facing the people of Ireland during the twentieth century. Major economic and social problems are, of course, still with us, and in the Labour Party view are not to be divorced from the solution of the national question. But on economic and social problems, it is at least possible to report progress. Historians and social commentators can chart real improvements in standards of living and social services since the foundation of the Irish State. While acute problems may still remain, they are at least very different ones, by and large, from those which Governments were grappling with a generation or more ago. The same does not apply to the Northern Ireland problem and therein lies its particular status and difficulty.
In my experience as a politician, that is, over almost 20 years, this particular status of the Northern Ireland question has, broadly speaking, sustained a proper and an honourable tradition of bipartisanship in the politics of this country. As the Tánaiste has recalled in the past few days, all of the political efforts of Irish Governments in the past 20 years, can be said to have been inspired by the "hands across the Border" initiative of the late Seán Lemass in 1965.
Again, the key new instrument of the new Anglo-Irish Agreement — the Inter-Governmental Conference — is being established within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental Council. This was set up in November 1981, but owes its parentage to the Summit of December 1980, in which Deputy Haughey was a prime mover.
I freely acknowledge these and other achievements of Fianna Fáil Governments, as well as their participation as Opposition in the New Ireland Forum, for their contribution to the national question. They underline the genuine bipartisanship on Northern Ireland which has characterised politics here and which is still, in my view, a principle of first importance.
The Leader of the SDLP, Mr. John Hume, spoke convincingly at the opening of the New Ireland Forum about all parties committing themselves to the principle that we shall not place either the short term or the long term political interest of our parties above the common goal. On the question of the North, he said — and I paraphrase him — there is no room for what is normally understood as "politics"— New Ireland Forum Proceedings, No. 1 page 21.
The new Anglo-Irish Agreement marks an important watershed for Irish politics. All parties have to face it responsibly or be judged in default. In my view, the adversarial system of politics, which serves us well in many other areas, has to be tempered in its application to the Northern question, which has already seen such sacrifice of human life. I trust that, when the heat of the present moment has passed, this will happen.
The search for a solution to the Northern problem has not come to an end because of the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Indeed, in some ways, the agreement intensifies that search. The agreement is intended not as a solution but as a vehicle in the continuing search for a solution. Because the overall commitment of this House is for peace, I believe this House will and should support the agreement.
As a member of the Labour Party also, I believe it is not inappropriate to view this agreement against the background of established Labour policy. Labour have aimed for many years at the voluntary union of all Irish people and territory. Our party programme says this:
The achievement of the voluntary unity of all the people of Ireland clearly implies that the real and profound differences that exist at present must be removed by persuasion, dialogue and communication, and not by the bomb and the bullet.
I can offer no greater assurance to Unionists in the North of Ireland than to say that I am totally committed to this approach. While I believe the differences between us can be removed, I would reject, outright and absolutely, any United Ireland that was based on coercion and violence.
A central and unique feature of the agreement is that it reduces and hones down the pre-conditions for Irish unity to one factor only — that of consent. As the Leader of the SDLP, and others, have pointed out, this amounts to a clear and formal abnegation by the UK Government of any strategic, financial or similar interest in being in Ireland. Since the remaining prerequisite to unity is consent, which by definition cannot be coerced, this removes all justification for violence in pursuit of Irish unity.
Agreement and consent have been cornerstones of the Irish approach to the Northern question over the years. The New Ireland Forum consolidated this approach with the Taoiseach, the Tánaiste and the Leader of the Opposition all renewing their parties commitment to it.
It is easy to understand the need for this approach. The Northern Ireland problem is above all one of competing identities and conflicting loyalties. As such, it is not amenable to solution by violence or by rhetoric of one side or the other. In the words of the Labour Party programme, persuasion, dialogue and communication are the only instruments of progress. This being so, criticism of the new agreement for allegedly conceding some point of principle as regards consent is quite unjustified.
Criticism of the agreement on opposite grounds — that it excessively pressurises Northern Unionists seems to me to be equally confused. I speak with the utmost respect for the Unionist identity, and without any desire to coerce, when I say that Northern Unionists nonetheless have a problem. Their problem, which is reciprocated on the Nationalist side, is that they must live side by side with people professing a different loyalty and a different identity.
It seems to me self-evident that a proper modus vivendi between Unionist and Nationalist communities has to be worked out. I do not see that requirements being served by the view which says that Unionists should simply be left alone.
The agreement in fact has much to offer Unionists. First, this Government recognises the legitimate identity that Unionism represents. That is an entirely honourable commitment for us to make, and one that is totally consistent with the agreed views of all the constitutional Nationalist parties who signed the Forum Report.
Second, this Government commit themselves to ensuring that any change in the status of Northern Ireland can only come about if a majority in the North give their consent. This is an entirely honourable commitment, and one that has been made by successive Heads of Government in the Republic, and by all the Nationalist parties on this island which believe in democratic politics.
The more one examines the record of successive Governments, and the stated policies of all parties in the House, the more convinced one has to be that there can be no grounds for rejecting this agreement because of these commitmtents. There is nothing new in the commitment to seeking consent; and no reason why it should not be enshrined in a formal agreement. Indeed, the agreement would lack something essential if it failed to enshrine this commitment to consent, and it would be a dishonest document if it failed to recognise the reality of the heritage, tradition and identity of Unionism.
It is important also, that we be clear about what the agreement is. It is a genuine attempt to seek a way forward on our island, by putting in place a structure which will facilitate progress on a number of issues, enhance the possibility of dialogue between any parties who want to talk to each other and increase the possibility of devolved Government in the North on a basis acceptable to both traditions. It also, and for the first time, provides an outlet for the resolution of long-held and legitmate grievances among the Nationalist community. It raises the possibility of enhanced co-operation across the Border in a number of areas, with massive potential for development. It commits both Governments to co-operate even more closely in combating terrorism — in combating the forces which have cost lives and limbs, but which have also contributed substantially to the economic problems of Northern Ireland. Above all, it seeks to place the two communities in the North on an equal footing — with equality of respect for their human and civil rights, and equality of commitment to their identities and aspirations.
There is nothing in any of this that can reasonably be objected to. Perhaps it can be argued that it does not go far enough — but if one examines this argument against the background of virtually every utterance by every democratic politician in the Republic in relation to the North, the argument does not really stand up. The one common thread in every utterance in relation to the North has been the recognition that progress in the North can only come on an incremental basis, building step by step towards better understanding.
I would like to say a few words about the constitutionality of this agreement. I do not claim to be a legal expert when I say that I do not consider that it violates our Constitution. Irish Governments have always behaved internationally on the basis that our supposed claim to Northern Ireland was in reality an aspiration of the nation to be united and not an assertion that this State claimed Northern Ireland as part of its territory.
The whole world recognised that we want to see the Irish nation united eventually by consent and peaceful means. When we joined the EC in 1973 that was a major constitutional change for us and for Britian who joined with us. The Irish people voted in the 1972 referendum to join the EC by 83 per cent to 17 per cent who voted against. Labour campaigned against on the basis of the terms then negotiated, but as a democratic party, accepted the wishes of the electorate as expressed in the referendum. Deputy Lynch as Taoiseach signed the Treaty of Accession to the EC for Ireland: Prime Minister Heath signed for an entity called the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We did not object at that time. All political parties accepted the reality of the position then. This new agreement is not different in any way. It simply accepts the reality of the position now which is precisely the same as it was in 1973.
Most moderate Unionists now accept that many of the grievances felt by Nationalists and the overall feeling of a strong and bitter sense of injustice had their roots in the reality of their situation. Discrimination and the lack of any feeling of adequate representation have been real features of the ordinary lives of Nationalist people. In so far as the agreement sets out to redress that situation, it can only be welcome. It will aim to do that in a number of ways.
First, there is the statement in the agreement that Britain is prepared to introduce and support legislation for unity in the event of a majority consenting to that unity. That commitment will be a reassurance to many Nationlists, especially those who have believed that the British presence in the North is related to strategic objectives of their own.
Second, there is the establishment of the Inter-governmental Conference, which will have the competence to deal with a wide range of issues in the political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural fields. This Conference will operate against the background of the absolute determination of both Governments to promote peace and stability and to make determined efforts in the Conference to resolve any differences.
Through the Conference the Irish Government will have a substantial input in the role and composition of a number of important bodies most of whom have a vital role to play in the perception of Nationalists of fair play. These bodies include the Police Authority, the Police Complaints Board, the Fair Employment Agency, and more.
One of the most important tasks the Conference will undertake is the examination of ways and means of improving relations betwen the security forces and the community. Both Governments have already accepted that there is a need for special measures in this area, particularly to ensure greater acceptance of the security forces among the Nationalists. Also in this area, the Conference will be able to take decisions in relations to avoiding the many flashpoints that can occur from time to time.
It is important to remember at all times that we have not lost sight of our long term aspiration to unity. Nothing in this agreement can be described or seen as inhibiting that aspiration. The only precondition in this regard is our commitment to consent. That is more than a principle; it is also a recognition of reality. Deputies de Valera, Lemass, Lynch and Haughey have all in their turn recognised the same reality. The SDLP recognise it. The only ones who do not are the men of violence. They have rejected this agreement because there is nothing in it for them.
Provisional Sinn Féin and the IRA have a vested interest in violence. Their extreme reaction to this agreement is based on their clear understanding of it. They know that it can work. They know that it can help to remove from them some of the support which they have got from a community that has been, at times in the past, in despair. The worst thing that can happen, from the point of view of the Provos is an injection of hope into the alienated Nationalist community. That hope can express itself in a number of ways. The area of cross-Border co-operation, for instance, is one which holds out the prospect of real and visible improvements in rebuilding the shattered economy of the North. The fact that a substantial fund will be available to help in this work will enhance those possibilities.
Over the years there has been practical cross-Border co-operation on roads matters and on road safety and discussions at ministerial and official levels have always been constructive and productive. Roads are perhaps the most important physical manifestation of the links between North and South. An adequate road network is a vital component in the development of cross-Border trade and economic co-operation and is essential to the promotion of investment in Border areas. This was acknowledged in the sectoral report on transport of the New Ireland Forum which said that communications were a vital consideration in regional planning and development and that the capacity of an area to attract investment was determined to a considerable extent by the quality of the transport infrastructure. A similar theme was reflected in a report of the Economic and Social Committee of the EC. The new road plan also acknowledges the importance of roads in a cross-Border context when it says in paragraph 2.14 that cross-Border co-operation and the development of the Border areas can be encouraged by the improvement of the road network, which facilitates commercial and tourist traffic.
A good deal has already been done to improve roads in Border areas, much of it with the assistance of EC funds. The EC has shown a particular interest in the Euroroute EO1 which runs from Rosslare via Dublin to Larne because of its importance as a trade route linking the major ports and centres of population. Aid from the EC Transport Infrastructure Fund has been given to two projects on this route — Bray and Shankill by-pass and the Wexford by-pass — and it is hoped that other improvements on the route will attract aid at a later date. I would also hope that any funds which may become available from abroad, in the context of the Anglo-Irish agreement, could be used in part to improve road links and in particular to improve roads in Border areas which have suffered most economically during the period of unrest. Indeed, this general principle is recognised in article 10 of the agreement which pledges both Governments to co-operate to promote the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years and to consider the possibility of securing international support for this work.
One project which is currently the subject of cross-Border consideration is the improvement of the Newry-Dundalk Road, which is perhaps the most important commercial artery linking North and South. Its improvement had been discussed for a number of years and it was eventuallly agreed by both Governments to commission a joint study. This was undertaken by An Foras Forbartha and the Transport and Road Research Laboratory in the UK. The report recommended the construction of a new road between Killeen Bridge in County Armagh and Balbriggan, County Louth, via Glendooey at a cost of about £10 million. Last November I met my Northern Ireland counterpart and we accepted the consultants' technical and environmental appraisal of the proposed line of the road. We also agreed that officials should meet to clarify outstanding financial and technical questions. I hope that these questions can be resolved in the near future.
In relation to sanitary services also, I am glad to say that over the years there has been ready co-operation and agreement between the authorities on both sides of the Border. Water supply in particular is one area that should lend itself to a co-operation approach not only in the problems related to the harnessing of sources, which may be trans-boundary but also in the distribution of supplies in some cases. The authorities concerned in such areas have shown a commonsense approach to joint problems and the continuing co-operation that is entailed on particular schemes is a good practical example of what can be achieved with a co-operative approach to community need on whatever side. Donegal in particular, is one area where there are several instances of co-operation with authorities in the North on water and sewerage schemes. In recent times the solutions to the emergency caused by the pollution of the Ballyshannon water supply was to some extent dependent on an augmentation of supply that was readily supplied, cross-Border, from the Beleek source.
In other areas, too, there has been a ready willingness to co-operate and consult on questions of common interest. In this connection I can cite on-going consultations between officials of my Department and their Northern counterparts in relation to the proposed Dundalk water scheme with its source at Lough Muckno, which is connected, through the Clarebane River to Lough Ross on the northern side, the source of water supply to Newry and environs.
In relation to environment protection and control, my Department have regular contact with the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland in regard to items of common concern. This useful liaison has led to a widening of knowledge and improved co-ordination in such areas as water quality control, waste management and arrangements for dealing with oil pollution. An example of this co-ordinated approach to water management is the Erne River Catchment area. This group consists of representatives of the Departments of the Environment, Dublin and Belfast and of Cavan, Monaghan, Leitrim and Donegal County Councils. I understand the group are now finalising their report which will set out a co-ordinated approach to the preservation and improvement, where necessary, of the water quality of the Erne system. When this report has been completed, it is hoped to carry out a similar study for the Foyle Catchment area. There has previously been contact with the authorities in Northern Ireland on cross-Border involvement of hazardous wastes. My Department will be working with the Northern authorities and the Department of the Environment in London to develop existing liaison arrangements and to bring into effect co-ordinated systems of supervision and control over hazardous waste involvements in these islands in line with an EC Directive on this subject which was adopted last year. I have no doubt that the scope for practical co-operation of this kind in the field of environmental management will increase in the years ahead.
In conclusion, the tragedy, of the North is one involving people — not just territory. The people involved have been surrounded by fear, by hatred and by insecurity. Most of the violence of the last 17 years has been directed against people, both directly and indirectly. It has resulted not just in the loss of life, but in the loss of jobs, of livelihoods, of shelter and of economic security.
We want to bring violence to an end. We do not want to coerce anyone into a relationship with us that they might be afraid of. We want equality of treatment in the North — equality for both communities, equality of respect, equality of rights, equality of aspirations, equality of hope.
I see this agreement as a step forward. One step towards more security, and towards peace. It is a step on which we can and must build, with no malicious intentions towards anyone on this island. I call for its support, and for support in the slow, difficult task of implementing it that will follow.
To me there is only one thing worse than Provos, and that is armchair Provos. I stood behind Kevin Boland's barbed wire and looked out for a couple of years from it — through the medium of Irish, of course — and it left me rather cold in regard to Kevin Boland's commitment to the harassed people of the Six Counties, or the occupied counties as he later began to call them. I also stood before Deputy Haughey's three colonels in the military courts in Collins Barracks. That left me rather cold in regard to Deputy Haughey's commitment to civil rights, later expressed to be very strong. It is a pity that they did not become involved in those days. I mean involved, down on the ground involvement. Had they done so they would know what it was all about. I was involved in the civil rights campaign. I was involved in the discussions a number of years before the civil rights campaign got off the ground in an attempt to get the civil rights campaign organised in 1965, 1966 and 1967. I was involved in the developments which led to the formation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in February 1967. I was involved on the ground here and in the North in the housing action committees; and it was those committees in Northern Ireland that eventually succeeded in getting the civil rights campaign off the ground. Not alone was I in Duke Street in Derry on October 5, which everyone remembers, but I was on the march from Coalisland to Dungannon, the first civil rights march on August 24 1968. That was a much bigger march than took place in Duke Street in Derry.
I was involved before ever John Hume got involved in politics. The primary objective of the civil rights campaign, I might add, was to achieve equality of citizenship with the rest of the UK. That was no Republican or socialist demand but purely a civil rights demand — equality of citizenship with the rest of the UK. I have been through the mill in the North and in the South. I have had ample time to read history courtesy of Deputy Haughey's Government. I have spent more than 30 years acting it out and I have come to the same conclusion as Theobald Wolfe Tone — to put my trust only in the men of no property. Unfortunately, this agreement does not do much for the men of no property. In fact, it does not take them into account at all. Like all such agreements between the ruling classes of different countries it does not do anything for working class people, Protestant or Catholic. The Workers' Party are the only party represented in this House which is organised in the North and in the South. We have public representatives elected in the North and in the South. During the past 16 years our members in the North have had to deal on a daily basis with the problems of sectarianism, bigotry, terrorism, repressive legislation and so on. This has given us a particular insight into the nature of the problem in Northern Ireland which is not available to other parties in this House. My comments here today, therefore, reflect not just the opinions of our members in the South but of our members in the North who have struggled for years to bring about unity between Catholic and Protestant working class. We had a meeting yesterday with the representatives of our party from Northern Ireland and I was most impressed with the strength of their fears about the effects of the agreement.
The agreement between the two Governments which is now before the House had its origins in the New Ireland Forum. It may be said that it had its origins in the Summit between Mrs. Thatcher and the then Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey; but for Deputy FitzGerald it began with the New Ireland Forum. The Workers' Party decided not to participate in the New Ireland Forum for reasons which we outlined at the time, and subsequent events showed that ours was the correct decision. It was clear to us that the preparations for the Forum were rushed and that the Nationalist parties in the South were not prepared to engage in the fairly long and patient negotiations that would have been required to broaden the scope of the discussions beyond the Catholic/Nationalist base of the SDLP.
The Government down here made nothing more than a token effort to involve the Official Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party or the Alliance Party and totally ignored the fact that the most logical way to approach these parties would have been through their own democratically elected political forum, which still exists, the Northern Ireland Assembly. The fact that the Taoiseach chose to ignore the existence of the Assembly and publicly supported the SDLP's boycott of that Assembly cast doubt on the seriousness of his intentions. I outlined that clearly in correspondence with the Taoiseach at the time, letters which were published later.
I fear that many of the mistakes made in the lead up to and in the operation of the Forum have been repeated in this agreement. The greatest and most serious weakness of it is that it is an external agreement and not an internal one. It is an agreement between London and Dublin and, unfortunately, not between the Shankill and the Falls.
No attempt appears to have been made to involve the political representatives of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland in this process at all. Very kind words were said about them here and there in the document but they appear to have been deliberately excluded, and treated in a most offensive manner. Looking with hindsight at it, there was a deliberate arrangement to create confrontation with the Unionists and that is what is happening.
The SDLP, as I understand it, were briefed regularly by the Coalition Government on the progress of the talks. No point was conceded, no agreement was made, without the consent of the SDLP Leader, John Hume. In many respects it looked as if our Government were conducting negotiations on behalf of the SDLP. The Unionists, on the other hand, were deliberately kept in the dark. No attempt was made to brief them, to keep them in touch with the general progress of the negotiations, or even to attempt to reassure them that they were not being pushed against their will into an all-Ireland Republic. Their treatment, and indeed that given to the Alliance Party on Friday, appeared designed to add insult to injury. The fact that they were denied any information on this agreement and were offered a briefing only late on Friday afternoon, well after the press conference was over, was deliberately offensive, and hardly designed to encourage a sympathetic reception for the agreement.
I was briefed on the agreement an hour before that agreement was signed at I p.m. on Friday. That was not extraordinarily helpful, but at least it was in accordance with the conventions and courtesies that one would expect. However, the Unionist parties were offered a briefing apparently at 5 p.m. on Friday afternoon. For almost 50 years Nationalists were excluded from the political process in Northern Ireland. Have we learned nothing? Are we now trying to exclude the Unionists from the same political process? The real danger now is that having been treated in this manner, the Unionists will continue to retreat further into their trenches and that the differences within Northern Ireland will be actually accentuated by this agreement rather than reconciliation resulting, which is what is spoken about.
As I said in my initial reaction to the agreement on Friday last, I was very disappointed at the lack of progress made in the area of civil and democratic rights. It appears that the Inter-Governmental Conference is now being established to deal with matters that it had been expected the two Governments were attempting to resolve. After all, they were in long and detailed discussions at Civil Service level and at ministerial level for a few years, apparently, we understood from various leaks, dealing with the various issues such as the UDR, courts, prisons and various civil rights issues in Northern Ireland. None of these has been resolved and they have all now been put under the Inter-Governmental Conference.
I think it would be a great mistake to assume that simply installing civil servants from Dublin in a well guarded office in Belfast is going to bring civil and democratic rights to the people of Northern Ireland when these long discussions between two Governments were unable to make any progress. A friendly face is no substitute for the sort of legislative framework the people of the North need to ensure that impartial and just systems of administration, employment, political expression, law enforcement and judicial procedures can be instituted and upheld.
I was particularly disappointed at the dismissive attitude expressed in the agreement to the concept of a bill of rights. This was a fundamental demand of the Civil Rights Movement. They published their bill of rights covering every aspect of the civil rights campaign. It remains a major objective for all democrats in Northern Ireland, and it is something for which there is substantial support within both communities. All right, they have different concepts of what a bill of rights should contain but both communities have published a bill of rights and have accepted the need for and are committed to a bill of rights which they expected a British Government would produce. Despite this, the agreement resolves only to discuss "the advantages and disadvantages of" a bill of rights of some sort for Northern Ireland. As far as I can see, this is the only proposal which clearly says the advantages and disadvantages are to be discussed, and I think that it clearly shows that the British Government are determined to resist the idea of a bill of rights to the end.
People in Northern Ireland can also be forgiven if they are less than impressed by a promise that the Dublin Government would protect their civil rights. After all, the record of successive Governments in the Republic is far from impressive as far as civil rights are concerned. If in Northern Ireland they have the Emergency Powers Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, in the South we have had the equally draconian Offences against the State Act. It is not too long since we had in this part of the island internment without trial and special military courts. The legislative power to re-introduce these measures is still there on the Statute Book. There is not much to choose between the non-jury Special Criminal Court in the South and the non-jury Diplock Courts in the North — the conviction rates before both courts are about the same. When the interrogation procedures were at their worst in Castlereagh Barracks, the "heavy gang" was rampaging through the South. The death penalty has been abolished in the North but it remains on the Statute Book in the South. In many respects the prison regime in the North is more progressive than its Southern equivalent. And this is without going into comparisons between the North of Ireland and the Republic in matters of personal rights, such as divorce and contraception.
In my initial reaction to the agreement, I welcomed the emphasis on the need to establish devolved government in Northern Ireland. The need for a democratic devolved government has been a cornerstone of The Workers' Party policy since dirct rule was introduced in 1972. We opposed the abolition of Stormont. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association opposed it. They wanted civil rights, not direct rule. Direct rule was less democratic than the undemocratic Stormont regime. They got direct rule which suited the Proves and nobody else. We constantly opposed direct rule and called for the reintroduction of devolved government. However, it is clear from a closer reading of the agreement and the communique that little or no progress has been made in this area. They have a commitment to it and that is welcome. Both Governments have declared that they are in favour of it and that is welcome, but no details have been agreed as to how devolved government should be established.
We support the clear declaration of both Governments in favour of devolved government, just as we support the declared commitment of both Governments to civil and human rights. But just as we doubt the ability of either Government to deliver on the civil rights issues, so also we doubt their ability to get any measure of agreement on devolved government. This is becoming more evident daily. The exclusion of the Unionists from the discussions over the past few years and the deliberately insulting manner in which they were totally ignored before the document was published leaves little room for negotiation, let alone agreement, on devolved government.
In addition, the experience of the Northern Ireland Assembly does not augur well for the future. The Northern Ireland Assembly was far from a perfect proposal. In fact, when it first came out, we issued a fairly long and detailed document, a critique of the proposal, in which we exposed its weaknesses, but said eventually that, bad as it was, we would try to go along with it, but bad as it was, it had far more potential than this agreement. The Assembly was sabotaged by the SDLP for their own narrow political reasons. The SDLP refused to sit in the Assembly with representatives of Unionist opinion and their boycott was unconditionally supported by Fianna Fáil and the Coalition parties.
The persistent refusal of the SDLP, with the encouragement of the other Forum parties, to enter into political dialogue and compromise within Northern Ireland, is possibly the single greatest obstacle to progress. The SDLP have about 18 per cent of the vote in Northern Ireland. This gives them no right to attempt to exercise a veto on progress, no more than the Unionist majority gives them a right to veto moves towards democracy and civil rights.
The Workers' Party's long term goal is the establishment of a democratic secular, socialist, unitary state — a Republic. It is our belief that the interests of the working class can best be served in such a State. The Republic would have strict separation of Church and State, would guarantee civil and religious liberties for all and would represent the class interests of the working class on this island.
To achieve this we must win the support of the majority of the working class both in the North and South. It cannot be achieved by coercion or by subterfuge. The working class must want it and must demand it. Our party also recognise that progress towards that goal depends on a multiplicity of other factors, both national and international, and, therefore stress the immediate need for the establishment of democratic politics in Northern Ireland and the strengthening of the democratic institutions here in the Republic.
We recognise and accept that our objective is a long term one. But if it is to be achieved, the realities of the present situation must be faced. The existence of the two States, North and South, is a reality and they cannot be bombed out of existence or wished out of existence. The historical, cultural and religious divisions which have given rise to the present situation, including the terror gangs, also cannot be ignored.
The Workers' Party are neither ignorantly optimistic nor cynically pessimistic about the possibility of political development in Northern Ireland. The very real problems which must be tackled within the community, however, demand total commitment from all democratic forces, irrespective of competing ideologies. No account of the current situation can ignore the following problems: intensified religious sectarianism, massive and growing unemployment, ongoing terrorism, the militarisation of certain geographical urban and rural areas, the continuation of extraordinary legal powers and the absence of a major political forum.
In this situation, therefore, the need for local democratic government must surely commend itself to all democratic political parties as the continued political vacuum is only in the interests of those either favouring complete integration with Britain or the forces of terrorism. These anti-democratic forces recognise that their total defeat will come ultimately through the determined exercise of local democratic power.
The Workers' Party believe that the demilitarisation of Northern Ireland society is a critical component in the struggle for peace, democracy and the creation of new viable political institutions. The rights to life, to a job, to a home, to peace, are fundamental human rights which the State must promote and defend to the best of its ability. Northern Ireland has suffered terrorism for 15 years. It is vital that not only should terrorism be defeated, but that we should learn in the process lessons which will enable us to build a strong democracy.
We have stressed a number of aspects of this struggle in the past but they are worth reiterating: the elimination of terrorism and the establishment of the rule of law must be considered a priority for all democratic parties. There can be no "ifs" or "buts" on this issue. The State and all its institutions must be bound by the rule of law. To depart from that principle is not only to demean the State and its servants; it is to place the State on the same plane as the terrorist.
Unfortunately, statements are made by some politicians in the North which carry the message that it is regrettable that the security forces and the police service are bound by the rule of law. They bear a grievous responsibility in providing terrorist organisations with just the sort of excuse which helps to sustain them in sections of the community. The agreement before us seems to understand this——
The Deputy has about five minutes.
A Cheann Comhairle, I would have thought my half hour was up at 7.25 p.m. but I would have hoped that you would have given me something more than the 30 minutes.
I cannot, Deputy. I thought I had made that clear earlier today. The Deputy should not be wasting time. The Deputy must conclude at 7.22 p.m.
The decision on how to vote on this agreement has been one of the most difficult to face myself and Deputy De Rossa since we came into this House. I am apprehensive that it could possibly lead to even more violence in Northern Ireland. It would be the greatest possible mistake for Members of this House to underestimate the strength of feeling that this agreement has provoked among the Unionist population. It is not posturing on their part. It is the genuine fear of a community that this is the beginning of a process of forcing them into a State of which they have no wish to be a part.
Since the agreement was announced on Friday last, I have had lengthy discussions with our members from Northern Ireland. Our members live and work in both Catholic and Protestant areas. They have their finger on the pulse of the community. There has never been such anger and such fear among the Protestant community. If anyone here has any doubts about this, I would invite them to come with us and meet with our members in areas of Belfast, where they can judge the strength of feeling for themselves. They can come around with us to these areas where they will see whether or not it is genuine.
However, the agreement between the two Governments talks of "a commitment to a society in Northern Ireland free from discrimination and intolerance" and "a rejection of any attempt to promote political objectives by violence". If there is any prospect, however remote, that it could achieve this, and particularly that it could lead to a reduction in the level of support for paramilitaries and their terror campaigns, then there is obviously some case for supporting it. We must accept also that these are the only proposals on the political table at present. While they are so seriously flawed they might lead to violence, but the consequences of a rejection of the agreement by the House could be even more horrific.
The elimination of terrorism and the restoration of peace is seen by The Workers' Party as a priority. Without peace there can be no democracy or political progress. Our decision on how to vote on this agreement was based ultimately on the question of whether it would help to eliminate terrorism and restore peace. While the grounds for optimism in this regard are fairly slim, nevertheless, they exist. On the other hand, were this agreement to be rejected by the Dáil, it would be seen as a major boost to the Provos and a mandate by the majority of the people's representatives here in this House for a continuation and indeed and escalation, of terrorist activities. In these circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that the lesser of two evils would be to reluctantly vote for this agreement.
I want to impress upon the Taoiseach, on the Government and on Mrs. Thatcher and the British Government the urgent necessity of trying to undo some of the damage that has been done. Unionists need to be reasured that they are not being sold out. The most effective reassurance that could be given to them would be the establishment in Northern Ireland of democratic devolved government. The Coalition have delivered for John Hume and the SDLP. The Taoiseach must now put it up to the SDLP: tell them publicly to go into the Assembly, to enter into unconditional negotiations with the parties already represented there — the Official Unionists, the DUP and the Alliance Party — on proposals for the establishment of devolved government in Northern Ireland.
This agreement can only have meaning if it leads to peace and the beginning of political dialogue in Northern Ireland. If it replaces alienation of Nationalists with alienation of Unionists then the position will be worse than before. Therefore, the process of political dialogue must commence with the greatest possible speed. The forum already exists in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Now is the time to use it.
I must express my concern at the US involvement in this agreement. I expressed this concern in 1976 when President Jimmy Carter first promised US aid if an agreement was reached. It seems that the American politicians were consulted and advised at the various stages of the discussions over the past couple of years. Now they have promised substantial aid. What form will this aid take? Is it being given out of the goodness of their hearts or is there a quid pro qou? I should like some assurance from the Taoiseach that no agreement has been made with the United States in return for this aid. In particular I would ask for an assurance that there is no commitment to joining NATO or to end this country's neutrality in return for the massive aid which the United States Government are to give.
Last evening when I was informed that I was to participate in this debate I attempted to research some of the debates which took place on momentous events in Irish history in this House and elsewhere. Following initial research I came to the conclusion that most of them were irrelevant in considering the issue before us. This is 1985, not 1948, 1922 or any earlier time. This agreement is unique in that it attempts to deal with a situation which has been seriously in need of attention for quite a long time. It attempts to set out a framework whereby the distrust, suspicion and hatred felt by one community for the other can be removed and ultimately a solution can be found to encourage people of different religious and political views to come around a conference table in an effort to sort out their problems. Politicians in the South should have very serious regard for this issue. It is not something we should treat lightly. We should not become emotional about it or try to arouse the emotions of others. We can see from past experience that the arousing of emotions can lead to suffering, strife and loss of human life.
I do not suggest that this agreement will easily achieve success. The time has come for all constitutional interests to examine their consciences and to ask whether as constitutional politicians they have a role to play in the light of what has happened, particularly in the North, during the past 60 years. They must come down firmly on the side of constitutionality. It bodes ill for us all when a void becomes evident and people turn to means other than constitutional means. That is one of the reasons it was found necessary for the Governments of London and Dublin to involve themselves in this agreement.
These discussions were born from the earlier discussions at the Forum. I was not a member of that body but reference has been made to the fact that Unionist politicians and a number of other interests were not involved. It must be remembered that the Forum gave an opportunity for all those with an interest in the Irish question freely to express their views. We must remember that we live in a time of change. Admittedly when one is used to a particular situation it is difficult to accept change. It is particularly difficult for those who have the reins of power in their own hands to accept that change must come. One must then look at the means whereby change can be brought about. As constitutional politicians we have a responsibility to ensure that those changes are brought about in a fashion which will cause the least possible offence to all concerned.
I would like to address myself to the Unionist population who are obviously those who will feel most aggrieved by this agreement. I have quite a number of friends, both Unionists and Nationalists, in Northern Ireland. I would hope that they are all constitutionalists. I can readily understand the fears that spring up in the minds of Unionists. They were not consulted to the extent which might have been ideal in the run up to the agreement, but it must also be said that an opportunity was offered to all those with a will to resolve constitutionally the problems of this island in the course of the Forum discussions. I will not go over the matter of who did or did not participate, but certainly an opportunity was lost. More views could have been heard and a greater input could have been made to the negotiations which led to this agreement.
I hail this agreement as the first tentative and, perhaps, faltering step towards resolving the problems which have bedevilled politics and Anglo-Irish relations for centuries. Instead of being emotional or indulging in rhetoric we must try to chart a course to explain some aspects of this agreement to those who may feel threatened by it. Down through history opportunities have arisen for people to meet and talk and, if we read our history carefully, we can easily discern where those attempts went wrong. I do not believe we should dwell too long on the past but we need to examine the Sunningdale Agreement in order not to make the same mistakes. The Sunningdale Agreement represented the greatest opportunity in my lifetime, prior to this agreement, to resolve a very difficult problem. It failed for a number of reasons, but primarily because of a group of Unionists felt themselves assailed and besieged by the proposals set out in the Sunningdale Agreement. At that time there was moderate Unionist opinion in the person of the late Brian Faulkner who sought to bring with him and to lead his people towards the conference table. Had he been given the full support of the people in his own part of the country and of all interests in this part of the country, he would have been successful.
Not with a cowardly British Prime Minister.
The Deputy should wait to hear what I have to say next. A major contributory factor to the failure was that there was a change of Government which gave an opportunity to those who did not want Sunningdale to work to ensure that it did not work. It was unfortunate that the then British Government did not see fit to recognise the great sacrifices made by Brian Faulkner in trying to lead his people towards a new recognition of the problems which existed.
The agreement before us now differs from the Sunningdale Agreement in a number of ways. While we do not have political leaders of moderate Unionist opinion, nonetheless there is a distinct commitment from the British Government who set out quite clearly in an international context their proposals for dealing with the problem. Those who feel aggrieved or are worried about the consequences of the agreement should remember that two Governments are involved. The Unionists have nothing to fear. If a subsequent Government decide to change their mind, it must be remembered that this agreement will be lodged in an international forum and that any changes will have to be taken up in that forum. Despite what is being said in other quarters, that is a positive element in the agreement and it should be noted particularly by the Unionist community.
In relation to Nationalist opinion, those of us who have read our history — and we have had ample opportunity to do so having been fed a fairly liberal diet over the years — realise that the situation was far from ideal from the Nationalist point of view. It behoves us all to try to find a means of resolving the problems of the Nationalist community. However, a great deal has been done and great credit is due to all on the constitutional Nationalist side who were involved in discussions leading up to this agreement. They deserve our congratulations on their efforts because they are now doing what the late Brian Faulkner did in relation to the Unionists in 1973 and 1974. They are attempting to lead their people, through constitutional means, to the conference table and to prove to them that they can achieve changes by constitutional means much more easily and with fewer sacrifices than by adopting other means which have been tried and proved to be an abysmal failure.
If this agreement is given a chance it can work to the advantage of the Nationalists who do not have the forum they deserve to voice their opinions and to express their fears. They do not have the confidence that they should have in the institutions of State and which they would have if those institutions had been more benign to them over the years. It is a time of change, but the Unionists have nothing to fear because the agreement is as flexible or as rigid as is required or dictated by the various bodies involved. It is easy for those involved to allow it to go ahead at whatever speed they wish, or to slow it down to meet their requirements at a particular time. That is essential in the sensitive area with which it deals.
There are those who say it does not go far enough and others who say it goes too far depending on which side of the political divide they stand. That has been the essence of the question down through the years with regard to Irish history. There were always those who said that it did not go far enough and others who said it went too far and the twain never met. Until we accept that there must be compromise on both sides and until institutions can be found in which people of different religions and political affiliations can learn to trust each other, we will never make progress. The agreement which we have read and studied carefully presents the best possible opportunity to set out ways and means of arriving at a constitutional solution to the problems. It sets out a framework whereby people can regain each other's trust and remove the situation which has been allowed to develop over the years in which suspicion, hatred and emotion have prevented them from seeing the wood for the trees.
The Irish are an emotional people and we are all too ready to respond to fiery and emotional statements. Now is a good time to take stock, to hasten slowly and to listen carefully. We should not make speeches or do or say anything which might be the cause of jeopardising a first, tentative, faltering but definite step towards resolving the problems of this island.
I referred to the opportunities in the past and to the fact that one of the stumbling blocks was that either too much was expected or too little received and that that was the crux of the problem. If anyone, North or South says that an ideal situation has existed for the past 15 years in particular, I would have very serious reservations about such a statement or belief. Public opinion, especially in the South, can be very fickle.
If one goes into shops or pubs and listens to conversations one will readily hear people saying that they do not want to hear any more about the North, about whether the problem will be resolved, because they are fed up to the teeth with it and want to wash their hands of it. That kind of apathy is dangerous because the problem which has existed for the last 15 years in particular affects every man, woman and child in some way or another. We have been affected by it socially and economically and, whether we like it or not, we would have been far better off socially and economically if the problem could have been resolved by peaceful means. Unfortunately that has not been the case. Whether the public generally are concerned about the resolution of our problems is immaterial. This still affects every one of us and if we do not face up to it, it may be too late by the time we come to realise it.
I referred to the fact that Nationalist opinion in Northern Ireland has been seeking a means whereby they could have their grievances resolved. This agreement does not present a panacea but it represents an attempt to deal with those grievances. There is an old saying that it is better to have tried and failed than not to have tried at all, and one of the most important things now is for all politicians in the South to give the agreement a chance and to show that they have a commitment to see it through.
The institutions proposed to be set up in Stormont may be too much for the Unionists and too little to meet the desires and wishes of the politicians in the South, but they represent a means whereby people can be brought to the conference table. Otherwise the people will have no say in decision making except by the bomb and the bullet, and any attempt to avoid them must be lauded by all of us. Unionists in the North have had a privileged position for many years. Particularly in the last ten or 15 years they have been under attack. They will always be alarmed and they will not succumb to this agreement readily. It is our duty in the South as reasonable people to try to set out for them the benefits to be derived from this agreement so that they may give it their support.
The country cannot go on as it has been going on, the continuous strife, bombings and carnage that have continued for almost two decades. We have a duty to try to come to grips with those things, and the duty of all of us is equal in what we do and say and how we do it. If we in the South take sufficient time to explain to the majority in the North how their interests are safeguarded in the agreement I think they will ultimately say they will give it their support. There are in the arena Unionist politicians of stature who are of a moderate nature. Many other Unionists of a moderate nature may not be among the political Unionist leadership. It is our duty as constitutional politicians to nurture the people who are well disposed, and from my discussions with the few contacts I have in the North I am convinced there is a will there to achieve by peaceful means some of the things envisaged in the agreement.
I will refer briefly to some of the things said by the Leader of the Opposition today. I am not a legal eagle or a constitutional lawyer but I am convinced that nothing in the agreement is harmful or repugnant to our Constitution. I do not think the Government here have given away too much in this agreement, which strives to recognise the position of the majority of those in the North. If our Government had refused to do that what other means would there be to resolve our problems, particularly those in Northern Ireland? I believe that our Government did just as much as they had to and that they did it well.
This document is short and simple and it can be adapted to the requirements of the population of the North as they demand. It is flexible enough to be able to cajole the people to come to some kind of general understanding. A speaker before me said that no agreement could have coercion because if there is coercion there will only be further and worse disagreement and we will be back where we started. That would not be any solution.
I believe that the document has in it sufficient safeguards to ensure that those who represent the majority will not be put under siege, but at the same time the minority will have access to the institutions of State which they have not had. Another element in the agreement is that the British Government apparently intend to follow it through as set out. That is a major factor which will contribute to its success. Past experience has shown us that unless there is sufficient commitment to resolve those problems the agreement will not be a success. Let us hope we have achieved that this time.
I congratulate the Taoiseach, the Tánaiste, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and all others involved in the difficult negotiations. No problem can be resolved unless there are involved people with vision. This agreement is the culmination of a vision on the part of the Taoiseach. If one has regard to political events down through history, one must recognise that very often problems are solved by people who have political vision.
I offer my congratulations to the Taoiseach for the work he undertook in regard to this issue and for the manner in which he has carried out that work. That applies to his colleagues also. The Taoiseach's vision will become a reality if all of those who are in favour of resolving, by constitutional and peaceful means, the problems that have beset this country for so long.
Many people have referred to the problem of the Six Counties in the north-eastern part of our country and to how that problem has been with us for a long time, even from before the setting up of the artificial statelet known as Northern Ireland. That statelet was established against the wishes of the vast majority of the Irish people. As was noted at the time it did not have the democratic approval of any section of the people of Ireland nor did Carson nor Craig believe that it would persist as a political entity or that it would survive.
The first speech I made in this House, that was on 8 May 1973 was about the problem in the Six Counties. I said, as reported at column 666 of the Official Report for that day:
Having being born in a planted county, having been brought up in a rural parish where no distinction was made socially or economically, between Catholic and Protestant, I think we should say straight from here that we want the people of the Six Counties, that we want Unionists and Nationalists, Ulstermen all, that we want their skill, their expertise, commerce and trade. We want their long experience in industry. We want their hard-headedness and we want them as part of our society. We do not want them as bosses or as putting themselves forward as superior to any type of Irishmen either by reason of economic wealth or by reason of being in power for a long time in their own area. We do not want them as subjects or inferior to us in any way. We want them as independent, free, hard thinking citizens of a 32-county Ireland.
We should say that and we should say that we are willing, ready and able to co-operate with them, that we are anxious to do so, that we regard them as a great treasure in our land and that when they, as they eventually will, share a common citizenship with us, then this country will be on the right road to economic prosperity and political peace.
At that time we were debating a British White Paper on Northern Ireland and there was a motion before the House in the name of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy FitzGerald.
I was pleased that I had an opportunity to address the House on this problem in my maiden speech. I addressed the House as an Ulsterman. The people who sent me here from Cavan would accept no definition of Ulster other than one which would include County Cavan and also Counties Monaghan and Donegal. Those three counties are represented in this House by 11 democratically chosen TDs and for that reason it is important to say that there is a different definition of Ulster from the one that may be read of in many Six County newspapers, in many newspapers in Britain and, due to the power of the media there, in many other countries where the British news hand-outs are received.
I support the amendment in the name of our Chief Whip, Deputy Vincent Brady. The amendment is too long to read now. Suffice it to say that it takes cognisance of a declaration of this House proposed by the then Taoiseach, the late Mr. John A. Costello, and seconded by the then Leader of the Opposition, the late Mr. de Valera. The amendment takes cognisance also of the New Ireland Forum on which many people laboured for a long time and from which an agreed report emerged. We call attention to the unanimous conclusion of that report. The second last paragraph of our amendment in that regard reads:
While recognising the urgent need that exists for substantial improvement in the situation and circumstances of the nationalist section of the community in the North of Ireland and approving any effective measures which may be undertaken for that purpose, refuses to accept any recognition of British sovereignty over any part of the nationalist territory;
And requests the Government to call on the British Government to join in convening under the joint auspices of both governments a constitutional conference representative of all the traditions in Ireland to formulate new constitutional arrangements which would lead to uniting all the people of Ireland in peace and harmony.
We are committed to that. It is represented in our amendment and it is on that amendment that we are speaking on this side of the House.
Deputy Mac Giolla said that the Unionists were not enticed into participation in the Forum for a New Ireland. The attempt was made to have them included and some Unionists did attend unofficially at the Forum. It is wrong to say, as Deputy Mac Giolla said, that the Forum should not have gone ahead when the Unionists did not participate in it. The fruits of the Forum discussions were the agreed report of all the constitutional Nationalists in Ireland and that gave that report a validity and substance which this House should disregard at its peril. I am afraid that the agreement under discussion here has disregarded substantively the results of the deliberations of the Forum.
Deputy Mac Giolla said also that he had contacts with the workers of the Six Counties and that he had been in discussion in the past few days with his representatives from that area. As a representative of the party who get more workers' votes than The Workers' Party and the Labour Party combined, I should like to say that I, too, have been in touch with people in Belfast, people from the deprived areas of that city and also from an area where there are so many people out of work that they would be delighted to be able to say, "We are workers in Belfast." But 40 per cent of them are without work and 40 per cent of them, if that is not understating the position, will, so far as they can see now, be without work all their days in that area if nothing happens to improve the economic situation in the Six Counties. I will be referring later to some of the criticisms voiced by those people.
In my county there are Protestants who are members of all the political parties and they are good members. By tradition when they undertake something they do so actively and they are workers. For that reason I should like to foresee a time when the people who speak now so virulently as Official Unionists and Democratic Unionists as they call themselves will participate in the political life of this country, not with any political tag such as Protestant-Unionist attached to them, but giving of their best to whatever political party they chose, one which they should set up themselves but which has not the kind of sectarian tag the parties have in the North.
We in County Cavan fail to understand this because we do not have any sectarian political organisation in our county, and that is something of which we are distinctly proud. Not all the three counties can say that. The fact that we do not have a sectarian political organisation is due to the strong leadership given by a Church of Ireland bishop in the past.
The first point I want to make deals with the Constitution. Deputy Durkan said we should not have any fears about this, but I am not so sure. In an article in last Saturday's Irish Independent Mr. John Murray, former Attorney General of our party said it was inevitable that as a result of the registration of this agreement with the United Nations—
...the British Government will, in the future, seek to rely on a well established principle of international law that a state cannot plead its own domestic law as an excuse for non-compliance or non-recognition of an international obligation.
The Fianna Fáil Leader mentioned that today, and he also mentioned a possible way out of that situation. People can be sure that if and when political situations harden, it suits the realpolitik of the time such internationally registered agreements will be used against this country in pushing its legitimate claim for a united Ireland.
I mentioned already the 1949 Declaration and the New Ireland Forum. If this agreement is the only result of the Forum, it is a question of parturiunt montes nascetur ridiculus mus, the mountains are in labour, a ridiculous little mouse is born. I am afraid that is what it amounts to when one looks at the substantive suggestions made in the New Ireland Forum, the results of those deliberations and what is incorporated in this agreement.
I would like to mention the SDLP in passing. Deputy Mac Giolla mentioned them on a number of occasions. I decry the attempts being made by various journalists — I mention a journalist in yesterday's Irish Press— to drive a wedge between Members of Fianna Fáil and Members of the SDLP but I do not think they will succeed in doing that. I took the trouble to telephone Senator Seamus Mallon yesterday and we had a discussion about this agreement. He told me that the journalist who wrote in yesterday's Irish Press had not contacted him before he wrote the article which took up a prominent page. I know that a fruitful relationship will continue to exist between the SDLP and the Fianna Fáil Party.
Deputy Mac Giolla mentioned the possibility that we were being elbowed towards NATO. I did not see that implication in the agreement, in the hype about the United States or in the various articles that led up to the publication of the agreement, but a member of my constituency telephoned me this morning and asked me to raise this in the House. He is a member of the organisation and is also an elected representative at local level. I am mentioning this so that a member of the Government, of the Taoiseach, will be able to make a comment on it when replying.
I am going to do an analysis of the agreement which will be based on thoughts, ideas and suggestions submitted to me from the heart of the most deprived territory in the Six Counties. The first criticism made of the agreement is that in many parts it is far too vague. It is much too vague to give any kind of solace to people who are "workers" who have no work, "workers" who have been deprived and "workers" who have been deliberately deprived through a policy of de-industrialisation in their areas. The agreement assumes that the primary problem in Northern Ireland is that of antagonism between two communities. This analysis is not acceptable. The primary problem is the unwillingness of those who are in a majority there to rule democratically.
I said that in my constituency we are blessed with having no sectarian political organisation. I cannot understand how people who at the beginning of this century were virulently anti-Home Rule, as it was then, who would not in any way condemn the gerrymandering which took place in the Six Counties over the years, who would not condemn discrimination with regard to housing or jobs, who would not condemn the de-industrialisation of an area because it had a Nationalist majority, who would not condemn the kind of thing that happened when the Coleraine New University of Ulster was established, when obviously history, tradition, location and so on pointed towards Derry city and not towards Coleraine, have now accepted the democratic process in their own area.
The thrust of any agreement must be, first, to enforce democratic rule. There is no new structure or arrangement proposed by which this will be done; there is nothing more than an aspiration towards just rule. I am firmly rooted in the Six County scene in the criticisms I am making. The agreement is based on assumptions of goodwill on the part of the British Government. This is an insufficient basis for any agreement between two sovereign governments. Goodwill, easy words, but it is very difficult to persuade the people I am talking about, the "workers", that that goodwill is something they can bank on. I accept the Taoiseach's assurance that there are no hidden or secret agreements, that there is nothing except what is up front, but this is one of the suspicions that exist in parts of the Six Counties.
The Sunningdale communique of 1973 showed that when the British Government talked about the possibility of a majority in Northern Ireland consenting to change — that is to a change to Irish unity — they meant not a simple majority of the inhabitants but a majority of the Catholic-Nationalists plus a majority of Protestant-Unionists. This was clear from paragraph 5 of the Sunningdale Agreement where British and Irish delegates gave their different versions of the circumstances in which radical change might come about. It was clear that the British would require the consent of the majority, that is, of the Protestant Unionist.
In the present agreement there is insufficient clarification of what the word "majority" means. If it means a majority of Nationalists plus a majority of Unionists, then the Irish Government should say so. Otherwise trouble is being created for the future and the Unionist veto is reinforced. The British have already introduced what amounts to a 70 per cent majority idea for important change by requiring this kind of majority for certain major developments through the Northern Ireland Assembly. In the course of the decision to create or not create a few years ago, a Scottish Parliamentary Assembly, the British Government required a majority not of those voting but a majority of the whole electorate so that if only 70 per cent of the electorate voted they required a majority of 100 per cent. This would have meant in effect that if the Scots wanted a subsidiary parliament of their own they would need to secure about 70 per cent of those actually able to vote. What a majority means when British or Irish Governments speak of unity by consent is left vague and unsatisfactory in the present agreement. I invite the Government to define it.
The use of the word "terrorism" without definition is hard to understand and is unacceptable. The British Prime Minister made it clear on a number of occasions in her press conference that the primary purpose of the British Government in entering into this agreement was to defeat terrorism. Defeating terrorism will not necessarily bring peace or justice to Northern Ireland. How does the Prime Minister define terrorism? For the most part, when the British press write about terrorism they write about the IRA and its atrocities which will find no support from this side of the House, but we would point out that there are other sectarian terrorists in that territory, and there is no use denying it. There are other terrorists in the Unionist camp and the institutions of State there have not a good record with regard to terrorism. There is also such a thing as institutional terrorism.
The possibility of some changes is left to discussions in the Conference. Yet structural changes in the Judiciary, the police and the Army are clearly required if injustice in that part of the country is to be cured. The Irish Government now find themselves supporting the creation of devolved government in the Northern Ireland community. The criticism from Belfast is that the terms are too vague. "Widespread support" is too vague a term to use in such an agreement. It could mean support from the two main Unionist parties and the Alliance and from The Workers' Party. The huge numbers supporting the SDLP could be left out if "widespread support" is not more tightly defined. If the SDLP can be shown to be unreasonable in refusing co-operation, widespread support could be scaled down to mean support dangerously near to the old Stormont regime and nobody wants that back except the most extreme of the DUP. The agreement provides no safeguard against this. It could be argued that in important matters the agreement is pushing us back towards the Stormont position. I liked many of the speeches made by the Minister, Deputy Barry, in relation to the Six Counties and I am just saying this to put the Minister on notice of the dangers in which he could find himself as a member of this Conference. We could be back to a position where we could have devolved government in which the majority of Nationalists would have no power and no say, and policing in which the RUC, unreformed, would have political power and fire power backed up by the British forces, including the UDR. We would be back to the Stormont position except that the UDR would be another name for the B Specials.
The Deputy has five minutes left.
Twenty-two minutes past is my time.
The Deputy's time is from 7.50 p.m. to 8.20 p.m.
I wrote it down as 7.52 p.m. to 8.22 p.m. and that was in agreement with the Ceann Comhairle who wrote out the times. Anyway I am wasting time.
The present agreement could well be a step back to the pre-1968 position before Stormont fell. This step would be seen to be with the connivance of the Irish Government. "Connivance" is not the right word but the Irish Government could find themselves in a position in which they could be seen as conniving with that position. The safeguards against this danger are the skill of Irish members of the Conference and the goodwill of the British. Neither of these safeguards is sufficient for an international agreement. The Government are now committed to bringing about a devolved government in Northern Ireland in which Nationalist inferiority could be permanent. This is unacceptable. In this, as in other matters the Government may be seen as having responsibility for future evils. Article 4 (c) is quite chilling:
The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the modalities of bringing about devolution in Northern Ireland,
I have not time to go into the detail of that. "Modalities" is a fine word but there is no substance in it. I would also point out that it puts the Irish Government in the position of acting as spokesman for Nationalists in the North and we do not know how the Nationalists in the North may continue to vote. The Government are in a very odd position. The possibility of alienation between Nationalists in the North and the Irish Government which are inherent in this Article are so serious that they should be given minute examination. What influence will an Irish Government have? "Modalities" is an inexplicable word which is meant to convey something when the reality may mean little or nothing. The Minister and the secretariat may find themselves in a position where they will have to say whether they approved of the use of plastic bullets, strip-searching of women, Diplock courts, supergrasses or of the activities of the UDR. At 9 o'clock on Sunday night last in County Fermanagh the UDR were out without the RUC despite the fact that the Taoiseach was assured that this would not happen in the future.
I already mentioned the policy of de-industrialisation. There are no safeguards here. The Irish Minister may provide safeguards for people suffering under the policy of refusal of industrialisation in certain areas or of de-industrialisation in certain areas in which Nationalists live. That is another serious thing. I would like it to be covered in the Conference and to get some assurance that there will be protection for such areas in the agreement.
The Deputy has two minutes.
To make the security forces more acceptable within the Nationalist community is not an acceptable aim. The only acceptable aim is to ensure that the Nationalist community have sufficient control over the armed forces and the police that abuses are less likely to occur.
I would like to have been able to give more time to the de-industrialisation scheme but I will mention it just in reference to the moneys that are supposed to come from Canada, the USA, the EC and Australia. Could we get an assurance in this House that those moneys and where they will be invested will be monitored carefully through the means of this agreement? I am afraid that this has not happened in the past. Investment in the area has not been monitored properly, and I am here making the statement to the House in the hope that cognisance will be taken of that and that if moneys come — I do not know whether they will — there will be careful monitoring of where and how that money is spent. Also the whole area of the Republic of Ireland on this side of the Border should be taken account of when decisions on the investment of moneys are being made.
Deputy, would you conclude?
I am about to conclude with just a word on the Euro Convention. This European Convention on the suppression of terrorism is going to be signed. I want to read one sentence out of it before I conclude. It is from the French paragraph of reservation:
..."tout homme persecute en raison de son action en faveur de la liberté a droit d'asile sur les territoires de la République."
Every man persecuted by reason of his action in favour of liberty has the right of asylum in the territories of the Republic. That is the French Republic.
Deputy, you have gone away over your time.
I would like if such were put into the agreement to sign this Convention. I am sorry, a Leas-Cheann Comhairle that you are cutting me short. I have much more to say on the subject on which I feel very deeply and which I live with from week to week.
I rise to speak on this motion realising the honour it is to speak to a motion ratifying an agreement between the two sovereign Governments. I congratulate the Taoiseach and his Ministers on achieving this agreement and I would like to acknowledge the assistance given to them by their public servants.
I welcome the Anglo-Irish agreement because it represents progress towards a political solution of the Northern Ireland problem. For too long we have witnessed murder and violence in that part of our country and I believe the agreement provides the Irish people with a way to back out of what has become a bloody culde-sac in the North and to find a road forward. The causes of violence which have alienated a minority in the North have been addressed in the only manner consistent with civilised behaviour. We for our part want for the minority the rights, respect and consideration now accorded to the majority. In order to achieve this, the agreement provides for the setting up of an Inter-governmental Conference which is to be the framework within which the two Governments will work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland.
I take great confidence from the passage in the joint communique which states that the Conference will concentrate at its initial meeting on relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland, ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments, seeking measures which would give substantial expression to an aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice.
The key issues which would have to be dealt with in this area are the role of the UDR and the RUC, the impartiality of the judicial system, the elimination of job discrimination and putting in its place job creation and the creation of structures and procedures towards further political developments. The RUC and armed forces in Northern Ireland must be seen to discharge their duty in an even handed manner with equal respect for the Unionist and Nationalist traditions. Security policy will have to be sensitive to the existing alienation of the minority community. This means that if the security forces over-react, the Conference will have a sufficient response in terms of disciplining the members of the security forces involved and in terms of procedures to ensure that there will not be a recurrence of such over-reaction.
Confidence in the judicial system needs to be restored, and I am pleased to note that the Conference will have the function of seeking measures that will give substantial expression to the aim of ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice. Conditions in the prisons are a continuing source of alienation. In the first place many people now in prison could be released as a token of good faith on the part of the Conference. The remaining prisoners should be kept in conditions which reflect the principle that the only penalty imprisonment should impose is the loss of liberty.
A primary source of alienation among the Nationalists is unemployment and poverty, examples of which are alarmingly high in the Nationalist working class communities. The issue of job discrimination cannot be avoided either. If you are an Ulster Catholic today you are far more likely than a Protestant to be out of a job, particularly a skilled job. The Conference should ensure that positive anti-discrimination policies are introduced in all State and State assisted enterprises to increase the proportion of Nationalists to a level corresponding to their proportion of the population as a whole.
As these achievements are met the minority will realise that they are indeed receiving the same treatment as the majority without having to forego their allegiance to their ideals which are part and parcel of their lives. Their rights are recognised and their Irishness is protected. In time we hope that they will begin to co-operate with the institutions among which they live and by arriving at that position they will no longer have reason to support or tolerate destructive elements among them. Then life will become safe again and the killing will have stopped. After all, it is life that is sacred.
Of course, it would be irresponsible and naive of me to think that this will happen overnight. The killers and the destroyers will continue with their destruction and their task of murder. Peace runs contrary to their cause. However, as they find that the minority who supported them in the past are becoming less tolerant of their activities, they will have to recognise the new reality and start to lay down arms. I am sure the Unionist population in Northern Ireland will agree with me that some kind of political arangement must be found that will accomodate peacefully the different identities with all their confusions and that the present tragic chaos cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely.
The agreement has much to offer the Unionist population. In the past they have suffered both physically and economically at the hands of the IRA. The present arangement will bring to an end the Catholic minority's tolerance of the IRA and that could bring significant security and political advantages. Safe houses will be more difficult to conceal from the security forces and IRA movements will become more haphazard. I hope that the Unionists will see in this document a way out of the state of siege in which many communities exist and out of the apprehension felt by men and women as they go about their daily lives waiting for the bomb to explode and the bullet to strike. A welcome outcome also will be that the economy will prosper and flourish to the benfit of the Unionists who have so rightly enjoyed a reputation for conpetence in business. The financial incentives promised by the American Government could act as a stimulus to the economy of Northern Ireland.
Finally, I appeal to the majority in Northern Ireland not to base their views on hearsay, rumour and total fiction, but to understand fully and accept that the agreement, which will be registered with the UN, has enshrined in it in the most unambiguous terms their right to remain part of Britain if they so desire. While the overriding majority in the North want to remain part of the UK, they will remain part of the UK. Nothing could be clearer than that. The Government here have signed a document which explicitly offers them international protection. It has spelled out clearly for the whole world to see that no change will be imposed by force. Indeed, may I say to the Unionists that unity without consent is as repugnant to us as it is to them.
In my lifetime I want to see an end to the killing and peace established in our country. I see in this agreement a potential for peace, peace in our country. Peace is not an abstraction or something for the few. It is for people and about people and it is the creation of people, the creation of individuals, families, communities and countries. Peace has many faces. If one takes peace away what does one get but death and destruction. The lesson of history is that violence is always disastrous, always wasteful, always cruel. It is never the solution to a problem. The perpetrators of violence do not attend the funerals.
Over the last 16 years our country has been torn apart by violence, death and destruction, but I take consolation from the words of Pope John Paul II, himself a victim of violence, when in his message for world peace he said:
To all of you who are builders of peace; to all of you who are leaders of nations; to you, brothers and sisters and citizens of the world; to you, young people who dare to dream dreams of a better world; to all of you, men and women of goodwill, I address myself in the great cause of peace. I do so from a powerful conviction that peace is possible.
I believe that peace is possible in our country and that the agreement before the House can be the instrument of that peace and I call on Almight God, the Prince of Peace, to bless this agreement to which will enable Irishmen and women to live in peace and reconciliation with each other.
Friday, November 15, 1985 in my opinion was the most important day for Ireland since the signing of the Treaty. I welcome this debate but I am sorry that Deputy Collins in his contribution through innuendo made an attack on a judge and judges of the Supreme Court in regard to their judgment in a particular case and said that a judge had to move to the European Community. I must state that that judge moved to the EC on promotion and no person was better entitled to it. No relation of that man with his illustrious name of O'Higgins ever ran away from anybody or anything. His grandfather and uncle were murdered when they, as real republicans, were trying with the trowel in one hand and the gun in the other to build up this little country of ours.
The Chair appreciates that the Deputy is saying complimentary things about judges but if we are to discuss judges at all it is impossible then to rule out of order people who may be saying derogatory things about them or discussing them or their judgments in a way that is certainly not permitted by the Rules of the House.
I want to say that the judgment given was in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the country. I will not say anything more about that.
The Chair would prefer if the Deputy got away from that topic. From the way the Deputy opened his remarks I fully appreciate why he intervened on these lines, but if somebody comes in and says that a judgment was a sound judgment then the next speaker may get up and start ballyragging the judgment. Judgments of courts may be quoted in the House without comment.
The agreement entered into on Friday can now be used as a stepping stone to the attainment of the full freedom for which all true Irish men and women long. It has been hailed at home and abroad as an historic pact, a courageous step forward, a ray of light through an opening door. All logical peace loving and rational people have lauded the courage and ingenuity of the Irish and British negotiators. I should like to pay a special tribute to the Taoiseach, Deputy FitzGerald, the Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Peter Barry. They are men of ability, men of integrity and innovation who put nation before party or person. They are nation builders and, certainly, not nation wreckers. Deputy Garret FitzGerald is a man who puts country first, party second and himself a poor third. It is a good omen for Ireland's future that we have such responsible, caring and diplomatic men at the head of our Government. I wish to pay tribute to the officials and advisers who worked so assiduously to ensure that the Anglo-Irish talks would bear fruit. They are all to be heartily congratulated for negotiating so skillfully and producing such a comprehensive and hopeful package.
We have no illusions that the agreement heralds the immediate end of the bitter problems of Northern Ireland. This is the beginning of a new era. The State is made for man, not man for the State. After so many years of bloodshed, bitterness and stalemate no one could expect that all divisions could be wiped out overnight and a Utopia created. The agreement, if it gets the support it deserves — and I have no doubt it will — will change the face of Northern Ireland.
The main constitutional Nationalist party in the North, the SDLP, have welcomed the agreement as a start in the business of reconciliation. Their sentiments have been echoed throughout the world. The optimism felt by all who support the agreement is an echo of the optimism and even euphoria expressed after the first Anglo-Irish Summit in 1980 when the then Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey, said that everything was up for discussion. The communique spoke joyfully of the unique relations of the two Governments and the need to further "this relationship in the interest of peace and reconciliation." The laudable sentiments expressed in Deputy Haughey's communique and in the subsequent Dáil debate are brought to fruition in the agreement before us. In the course of his speech on 29 May 1980 Deputy Haughey said:
...the people who regard their tradition as being far removed from ours would be surprised at the length to which we would be prepared to go ...to accommodate them...to protect and safeguard their interests and traditions.
Those guarantees and undertakings are contained in the agreement which Deputy Haughey now dismisses. What price Deputy Haughey's assurances?
The recognition of the principle of unity by consent alone is the safest and most concrete guarantee the Unionists could have. It is also the safest assurance to the Nationalist population that this Government will protect their interests and will not plunge this country into a bloody war in which there can be no victor. Already a war is raging in the North — a war of propaganda and dissent, fostered through hatred, fear and suspicion, fuelled by injury and death in villages and towns, in fields and streets, homes and churches. Neither Unionists nor Nationalists can have anything to fear from this agreement. What they have to fear is those who would seek to undermine any initiative, to emasculate any agreement, or to cripple any step forward.
This agreement is the tiny mustard seed of hope from which may grow the tree of harmony and peace, under which all people of this island may shelter. In 1980, Minister Haughey asked that their deliberations — and I quote —"be carefully considered away from the strident voices which in the past have blocked the way to progress in Ireland". Has he afforded this calm consideration to the Unionists and the Nationalists, or even to the members of his own party? It is sad that he has not. The shepherd of Fianna Fáil demands of his followers the submissiveness of sheep. He has preempted calm consideration by a concerted attack. He spoke of the sad day for Ireland. It is, indeed, a sad day for Ireland when he cannot trust his friends and must make their statements for them. He has used the flag of this country — or rather, the green flag of his own brand of nationalism — to muzzle the voices of assent within his party. He should remember that you have not converted a man because you have silenced him.
What price unity in Ireland when the one voice of Fianna Fáil is the voice of criticism, bitterness and dissent? What example is this for the war-weary people of the North? How can they who have suffered so long from the bitterness engendered by fear trust the politicians in the South when the elected representatives cannot trust each other? The Loyalists are often said to have a siege mentality. Deputy Haughey is the finest example of this mentality since he sees every movement towards agreement as an attack on himself and his party. He is like a blinkered horse who goes through the stalls and has made off and is running before the length of the race has even been decided upon.
He did not fall on that.
Left unattended, the future of the North would be, at worst, deeper and further division and destruction, at best, stagnation, suspicion and pessimism. The agreement is committed to "a society in which all may live in peace, free from discrimination and intolerance". Can the Deputies opposite not even be allowed to express the spirit of the agreement away from the strident voice of misplaced suspicion? Does Deputy Haughey really believe that all those outside Ireland who have welcomed this agreement have been forced into submission by the Government? He has accused the President of the United States and senior politicians of being part of a Government propaganda and public relations exercise. Is he saying that they have publicly expressed views which they do not hold? Is he measuring them by his own standards? What a sad day for Ireland, indeed. Must we all be out of step except our Charlie?
As I have said, this agreement has already attracted considerable support throughout Europe, Canada, the United States, the European Community, our own country and Britain. In the United States, President Reagan and Mr. Tip O'Neill, Speaker of the House of Representatives, appeared on television together to endorse and seek support for the agreement. It also has the full support of Senator Edward Kennedy and many other leading members of the American Senate and the House of Representatives. The Americans are so confident that this agreement will work that they are willing to back financially the new structures with the money so badly needed in Northern Ireland to help to rebuild the economy and provide jobs for both Catholics and Protestants.
In Britain, it has the support of the majority of the Conservative Party, of Neil Kinnock of the Labour Party, David Owen and David Steele of the Liberal SDP Alliance. Even the British press, which is usually hostile to Irish views, has come out in favour of the agreement. Here in Ireland it has the support of all the parties except part of one, the Fianna Fáil Party. Mr. Jack Lynch, a Taoiseach and a man who always committed this country to unity and to a peaceful solution to Partition, has welcomed the agreement "as positive and constructive". When did Deputy Haughey change his views? They are, indeed, now much different from those which he expressed when he gave Mrs. Thatcher the silver teapot. When we consider the views of Deputy Haughey and watch his manipulation of the Fianna Fáil Party, it is a sad day, indeed, for Ireland. His idea seems to be, one leader, one voice. If by any mischance he became Taoiseach and continued with that idea it would be the end in this Republic of democracy so dearly won for each and everyone of us through the blood, sweat, toil and tears of past generations.
Deputy Haughey now finds himself against this agreement with strange bedfellows such as Dr. Paisley, Mr. Molyneux and Gerry Adams. God help Ireland if men like Gerry Adams ever have power in the 26 Counties. We should remember that the Provos are committed to bringing down the political processes in the North with the ballot box in one hand and the rifle in the other. They are further resolved — let all Irish men and women remember this — to bring down the Government of the Republic. I certainly do not want to see the bombing, maiming and kneecapping of innocent people either in this part of Ireland or in the North. Since 1969 over 2,000 people have been murdered in Northern Ireland and I think between 6,000 and 7,000 injured and maimed, many for life.
I happened to be in Dublin when the bomb exploded not 100 yards from here. I went down immediately to see what help I could give, along with 40 or 50 other people who appeared on the spot, not thinking of the dangers lurking in another car perhaps with a bomb in it, and the civic guards and the military who appeared immediately. I hope that neither I nor anybody belonging to me, nor any man's child here, nor fathers nor parents would ever view this sight in this part of Ireland again. I hope that nobody sees destruction and loss of life such as happened at that time.
It is sad and unfortunate that loyal Republicans and men of goodwill like Jack Lynch, Deputy O'Malley, Senator O'Donoghue and many other members of Fianna Fáil are out of step with the party leader in support of the agreement. Men like Alderman Seán McManus, a Sligo Fianna Fáil man, in the Evening Press of 18 November 1985 called on members of Fianna Fáil to support the agreement, to express their views. He said, “My views are those of the grassroots.” He continued to say:
Different views can be held by members of the party and they should be expressed.
Are they allowed to be expressed in this democracy of ours by this party which calls itself a democratic party? They are not. They are holding their party meeting tomorrow a day after the commencement of this debate. Alderman Seán McManus re-echoes the views of the vast majority of Irish people when he states:
I welcome any move which will stop the killing and bring peace to Northern Ireland...
In this spirit let us all work and co-operate to bring what each and every one of us longs for, both North and South — peace, happiness, stability and employment for all our people from Mizen Head in Cork to Portstewart in County Derry.
At the very outset let me say I am very disappointed that one of the most senior members of the Fine Gael Party, Deputy L'Estrange, a former Minister, should choose a very serious debate like this to introduce and attack personalities——
I was replying to——
Order.
As far as I am concerned it was not the tone expected in this debate which the Leader of the Government, confirmed by the Leader of our party, requested should be a reasoned debate. It is very sad that personalities should be introduced into this debate, one that is so important at this time.
I rise to support the Fianna Fáil amendment to the motion put before the House. I do so as a member of the biggest political plarty in this country, recognising that it is my duty to speak on behalf of the vast majority of Irish people whose ultimate desire is the total unity of the island of Ireland as a sovereign, independent, democratic State.
This Anglo-Irish Agreement clearly states in article 1, that there can be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. That article also recognises the present wish of this self-imposed, protected majority for no change at present. The article further states that if that majority clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland then the Governments on both islands will introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to these consented wishes. From the three paragraphs of Article 1 it is quite obvious that the Unionist majority in Northern Ireland have a clear veto on the unity of this State. How can we reconcile this position when clearly the majority of the people living on the island of Ireland aspire to the unity of this island? How can the sovereign Government of this island bind themselves to an international treaty which is in direct conflict with the stated and accepted Articles 1 and 2 of our Constitution? As a constitutional Nationalist, I could not accept this situation. My fundamental political duties are fidelity to this nation and loyalty to this State. Consequently I expect that every constitutional Nationalist should ensure that this Constitution is supported at all times.
Article 1 of this Anglo-Irish Agreement indicates clearly that there is no desire on the part of the British Government to create and stimulate the unity of the island of Ireland. They have made no declaration in this regard. Throughout the agreement there is no hint whatever of acknowledgment by Britain of the legitimate right of the people of the island of Ireland to decide their destiny, politically, economically or socially. The British Government have not even looked to the majority in Northern Ireland to reconsider their position, to work in a humane, democratic manner with the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland. The British Government have failed to recognise that Northern Ireland, as a political entity, has failed abysmally in 65 years. The alienation of the Nationalist community has continuously deprived them of their democratic rights, to work, to housing, to justice and even to life.
The British Government have failed to recognise these serious matters. They have failed to recognise that the imposed, corrupt Stormont regime of 65 years ago, which they continuously supported politically and financially, is the root cause of the tragedy that is Northern Ireland today and that had been so cruel for so long to the Nationalist community and internationally and economically damaging to the rest of this island governed by this democratic Parliament.
We saw the total breakdown of the Stormont regime in 1972 and direct British Government rule then take over in Northern Ireland. All we have seen since then is further alienation of the Nationalist community under British administration and further support and confirmation of continuous British support for the majority in Northern Ireland to the exclusion and isolation of the Nationalist community.
I acknowledge the tragedy that is Northern Ireland and has been for both communities, especially over the past 20 years. There have been terrible atrocities inflicted by both sides on innocent people and similar atrocities inflicted by the security forces especially on the Nationalist community. I know it is the desire of all constitutional politicians and law-abiding citizens to bring peace and stability to Northern Ireland. I salute the efforts of every Government in this democratic State to make their contribution to a peaceful solution.
The main difficulties in Northern Ireland stem from a British presence there and from the corrupt administrations imposed on the peoples of our six north-eastern counties for decades. The big vacuum in this Anglo-Irish Agreement is the failure of Britain to acknowledge these historical facts which have bedevilled this island for far too long.
The tragedy now is that our Government have signed an agreement accepting the status quo in Northern Ireland, the right of the British presence there, the ultimate veto on unity by the majority of people in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, our Government are now to register this agreement with the United Nations, thus rendering it virtually impossible for any future Irish Government to move to bring about the ultimate unity of the island of Ireland. I could not accept this situation thereby condemning this island to a continuance of the present tragic situation.
This agreement is in direct conflict with the report of the New Ireland Forum. Just over two years ago the constitutional Nationalist parties sat down together for the first time on this island and, representing all the island, examined the Northern Ireland situation in great detail. That report had widespread acclaim as a document that could withstand any scrutiny. It was forthright and fair-minded in its identification of the problems of Northern Ireland. Having considered the realities, the New Ireland Forum proposed that the fundamental criteria for any new structures must be that they would provide lasting peace and stability. We all desire that to happen.
This Anglo-Irish Agreement proposes new structures which are totally under the control of Britain even within the Inter-governmental Conference. We welcome the Irish presence in Belfast and I wish all members of the Conference and the secretariat well in their work and deliberations. The British Government recognise the right of the Irish Government to put forward their views within this Conference, but this has been the position at all times throughout our history. Our rights as a sovereign State are equal to those of Britain and it is recognised internationally in the democratic free world that we have equal powers and rights.
Where Britain has an imposed presence on the island of Ireland, surely it would be only fair to expect that within the Inter-governmental Conference our Government representatives would have the right to achieve a consensus within which the Conference could make decisions which would be legally binding on the people of Northern Ireland. Clearly this is not the position. The British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, was very emphatic at the joint press conference on Friday when she stated categorically several times that all decisions north of the Border would be made by Britain. This is clearly illustrated in Article 2 (b) of the agreement which states:
There is no derogation from the sovereignty of either the Irish Government or the United Kingdom Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction.
That clearly ensures that Britain is totally in control of the six north-eastern counties of this country and does not recognise the right of the sovereign Government in this part of the island to have any say or any power to make decisions in consensus and co-operation with the British Government. That would be only a minor advance. The established entrenched position of Britain is maintained and basically the theme seems to be that they respect our views but they are rulers of the territory although it is historically ours. This is the old imperialistic attitude.
Article 5 (a) of the agreement states:
The Conference shall concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland, to protect human rights and to prevent discrimination. Matters to be considered in this area include measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form in Northern Ireland.
I welcome this position but what guarantee has the House that the Conference can achieve these aims if Britain has sole and ultimate control in Northern Ireland? We have seen over the years the terrible corruption within the system of justice and the terrible discrimination against the Nationalist community. Mass trials have been frequent and surely that is a perversion of justice. The supergrass system is the most inhuman and degrading system operating in any modern democracy. Proven criminals are being induced to incriminate innocent victims who are condemned to life imprisonment on uncorroborated evidence. This must be the most unjust system in any open democracy, the bottom of the Diplock barrel. Then the proven criminal is moved out of Northern Ireland to a far distant land to live in luxury at the expense of the British Exchequer.
There is the unnecessary and degrading strip searching in women's prisons in the North. There is a total lack of respect for human rights and dignity. There is also the great problem of unfair detention within the North where innocent Nationalists are held awaiting trial for anything up to 15 months, yet in mainland Britain a trial must be held within 112 days. What varying standards from our friendly neighbours and partners in the European Community, the terms used at the beginning of the agreement. As we debate this agreement, are we aware that no member of the Unionist majority in Northern Ireland is awaiting trail on uncorroborated evidence? Is it any wonder that we demand that the constitutional rights of the citizens of this nation and of those who aspire to be part of this nation should be protected?
Article 7 (a) states:
The Conference shall consider—
(i) security policy;
(ii) relations between the security forces and the community:
(iii) prisons policy.
Yet Article 9 (b) states:
The Conference shall have no operational responsibilities; responsibility for policy operations shall remain with the heads of the respective police forces, the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána maintaining his links with the Minister for Justice and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary his links with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
Surely there is some contradiction here if the Conference can involve itself in security and prison matters and yet, at the end of the day, ultimate control rests with the agents and servants of the British Government in Northern Ireland. Surely there is some major conflict and no guarantee that there will be justice in the application of the law.
Under Article 9 there is to be cross-Border co-operation on security matters. The Border has cost this country millions of pounds in security over the years. There is no indication that Britain realises this situation, which is a direct result of the British-imposed territorial partition of this island. I am disappointed that there is no indication within the agreement of bilateral co-operation on cross-Border matters under the European Regional Development Fund. In this House today the Minister for Finance confirmed that no application has been made to Europe for funds for economic cross-Border co-operation, even though the fund is designed to stimulate cross-Border co-operation on an economic scale. Surely this would be a major opportunity for both Governments to involve themselves in trying to redress the terrible economic problems for both northern and southern areas resulting from Partition.
I have a fair understanding of the problems of Northern Ireland. I have been there on many occasions and I spent 15 years doing business five days a week with Northern Ireland people, most of them from the majority community. We did much business with them until Sunningdale Agreement of 1974 and the Ulster workers' strike. Since then I have noticed that the number of people from the majority community coming south to do business has been diminishing. It is sad that those people who have been in a privileged position in Northern Ireland could not recognise the rights of the majority community in an open democracy to do business in a fair and open manner and do not recognise the fairness and protection available to citizens of this State under our Constitution and in our open democracy. This agreement does not pinpoint any desire by Britain to illustrate clearly to the majority in Northern Ireland that they must reconsider their position. They must accept that the people desire unity. This has been clearly borne out by the Forum report but Britain has failed to acknowledge or to indicate to the majority in Northern Ireland that they too should aspire one day to be part of the whole island.
In view of the total corruption and discrimination imposed on the Nationalists over the years, particularly on law abiding Nationalists who went about their business and who promoted the traditional pastimes and culture of this country, and in so doing were victims of discrimination by the security forces and the judicial system in Northern Ireland, I thought that this was a major opportunity for Britain to indicate that there would be respect for the Nationalist community who aspired to the traditions and the way of life of Southern Ireland. As a gesture from Britain I expected that at least an immediate removal of the Flags and Emblems Act would be incorporated in this agreement. That would have been a de facto commitment by Britain of their position and of recognising the desire of the Nationalists to be part of the whole island. The fact that the Constitution has been flouted with regard to this agreement and that it will be internationally binding on this and future Irish Governments copperfastens the position of the majority community in Northern Ireland. Therefore, I support the amendment to the motion and I expect that all constitutional Nationalists in the House who aspire to the ultimate unity of the island will also support this amendment.
Ba mhaith liom fáilte a chur roimh an Chomhaontú Angla-Éireannach, 1985, agus tá áthas orm go bhfuil an deis seo agam bheith páirteach san díospóireacht seo — ceann de na diospóireachtaí is tábhachtaí atá sa Teach seo ó bunaíodh an Stát. Ba chóir dom agus ba chóir dúinn i nDáil Éireann ár mbúiochas a ghabháil agus comhghairdeas a dhéanamh leis an Taoiseach, leis an Aire Gnóthaí Eachtracha agus na hAirí eile, agus le Príomh Aire na Breataine chomh maith leis na hAirí Briotanacha a bhí páirteach sna hidirbheartaíochtaí a bhí ar siúl ar feadh na mblianta. Tá ard-mholadh tuillte acu agus níl aon amhras ar chor ar bith gur dul chun cinn an-mhór é ó éirigh le Rialtas na Breataine agus Rialtas na hÉireann comhaontú a dhéanamh maidir leis na fadhbanna móra agus na trioblóidí a bhí ar siúl agus atá ar siúl fós i dTuaisceart na hÉireann. Tá súil agam go n-éireoidh go han-mhaith leis an chomhaontú agus go mbeidh toradh maith as. The Anglo Irish agreement, 1985, represents the most important and significant development in relation to Northern Ireland since the Sunningdale agreement. The Taoiseach and participants on both sides who were involved in the protracted and difficult negotiations are to be sincerely congratulated. No agreement in the lifetime of this House has evoked such a widespread and favourable response.
The Taoiseach said that no action directly involving the Government of Ireland has ever received such extraordinary and unanimous support from across the world as the action taken in entering into this agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom. The Taoiseach is correct in referring to the warmth of the reception given to it by men and women in all walks of life and of every political persuasion throughout the length and breadth of the country. We all experienced this in our contacts with people in our constituencies over the weekend. Those of us who are privileged to be Members of the European Parliament are well aware of the widespread interest, hopes and prayers which were expressed during the European Parliament session in Strasbourg last week for a successful outcome to the negotiations. This week we have been the recipients of congratulations and messages of goodwill from colleagues in the European Parliament.
The extraordinary aspect of this reaction was adverted to by the Taoiseach this afternoon. From talking to people in my constituency and in attending party meetings, it is clear that the reaction is not one of triumphalism, boasting or an attempt to get political kudos. It reflects the deep-seated and strong desire to see peace and stability restored to Northern Ireland. The overwhelming reaction is one of relief that at long last, after years of debate, discussion and argument, something tangible has emerged and that steps are being taken to do something practical about the appalling tragedy that has been enacted in Northern Ireland for so many years. The reaction to this agreement could well be summed up by the old saying that it is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness. A very large candle has been lit, I hope it will lead to many more candles being lit and that the darkness which has prevailed for so long will be eliminated. I hope we can look forward to brighter times ahead.
There is no doubt that this agreement, given the goodwill and support which it deserves, provides the framework and the opportunity to achieve a new era of reconciliation, peace, economic development and social progress in Northern Ireland. As the Taoiseach pointed out today, this agreement is based on two fundamental principles which should not give rise to controversy. One of these is the maintenance of the aspiration to Irish unity as a legitimate objective of Irish nationalism.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that, given the good will and support it deserves, the agreement provides the framework for and the opportunity to achieve a new era of reconciliation, peace, economic development and social progress in Northern Ireland. As the Taoiseach pointed out today, the agreement is based on two fundamental principles which are absolutely defensible and should not give rise to controversy. One of these is the maintenance of the aspiration to Irish unity as a legitimate objective. The other is the means to a consensus of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland for any change in the status of that area.
As has been pointed out by many commentators in the past few days, the negotiating and signing of an agreement is but a first step. The application of this agreement will be in the months and the years ahead. I am particularly pleased that the range of issues coming within the competence of the Conference covers politics, security, legal, economic and cultural matters. Within this framework there is enormous scope for progress in the economic, social and cultural fields.
While the agreement is of enormous significance to the people of Northern Ireland and to relations between the peoples of Britain and Ireland, it has special significance in the context of the EC. In this respect there is the statement by the President of the European Commission, which I should like to place on the records of the House.
In his statement the President of the European Commission, congratulating the Irish and British Governments, said that the development is clearly of great significance. He pointed out that underlying the establishment of the European Community was the determination to create a European framework of common interests. He quoted from the Treaty of Rome and the provision on the resolution to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of essential interests, by establishing an economic community to create the basis for a broader and deeper community among the peoples long divided by bloody conflicts, and to lay the foundations for institutions to give direction to a destiny henceforward shared.
His communique on this occasion is of significant relevance, reflecting a great depth of understanding. It represents a very acute analysis of the terms and the implications of this agreement. He pointed out that Europe has learned from its past that violence is not the answer to difficult problems: it negates efforts to create jobs and improve living standards. He said: "Violence, from whatever source, is against all we stand for and must be condemned. The creation of the European Community has demonstrated that a credible alternative exists in the process of negotiations between democratic states".
The Taoiseach's speech this afternoon, in different words, pinpointed the fundamental philosophy behind the agreement. As I have said, signing an agreement is one thing but its implementation is entirely a different matter. In the economic and social fields the agreement provides a formula for exciting possibilities — for imaginative thinking in relation to economic development, particularly cross-Border co-operation.
As the European Commission's President pointed out, the communication to the European Parliament in November last year summarised the impact of present EC policies and sections. He pledged on behalf of the Commission the support of the Commission for the creation of cross-Border development and co-operation.
Deputy Noel Treacy referred to the European Regional Development Fund. In 1980 a certain proportion of the fund was allocated for cross-Border projects. I did not hear a reply today by the Minister for Finance at Question Time. People have expressed their disappointment at the progress of projects, but the concept has been accepted of practical cross-Border co-operation, and substantial grant-aid from the ERDF has been supplied since then.
There are great prospects now under the new regulations governing the regional fund which came into effect on 1 January last, particularly the provisions for the formulation and implementation of multi-annual integrated regional development programmes. This concept is tailormade and ideally suited to the problems of Border areas here. It is possible now, under this agreement, with the assistance that will be available from the EC, to formulate comprehensive integrated multi-annual regional development programmes for cross-Border areas. This must be a major element in the implementation of this agreement. Anois caithfimid beart a dhéanamh de réir ár mbriathair.
I hope that at their early meetings the Conference will try to formulate pilot projects on an integrated basis for cross-Border co-operation. I hope this will get a very special priority. There is enormous scope for progress here. During my time as Minister for the Gaeltacht I was involved in the Donegal Gaeltacht. There were suggestions in those days of a north-west development corporation involving cross-Border areas. In the promotion of tourism, industry, developments of various kinds, there is a very strong case to look at projects of that kind. I understand a study was commissioned and was carried out with aid from the EC on the possibility of a north-west development agency. This would be beneficial to the people on both sides of the Border. Cross-Border co-operation must be a major element in the implementation of this agreement. This could create goodwill and the breaking down of barriers and so forth while encouraging progress that would be of mutual benefit. The very comprehensive Haagerup report, adopted recently by an overwhelmingly majority in the European Parliament, indicates the desirability and the goodwill that exists in Europe for practical across-Border projects.
The Haagerup report was significant. Some of its recommendations bear a striking similarity to the agreement. For example, paragraph 13 of that report calls on the British and Irish Governments to re-examine their individual and collective responsibilities for expanding and enlarging their mutual co-operation. The Haagerup report was drawn up on behalf of the European Parliament in March 1984. Its conclusions are very significant and very relevant to the debate taking place here this week. One of the conclusions of that report was that those living outside Northern Ireland carry a great responsibility for development in Northern Ireland. The report states that this applies in particular to the Governments of the UK and of Ireland but that it extends also to the whole European Community and to the institutions of the Community and particularly to the Parliament whose majority had asked for a report on Northern Ireland.
In the context of cross-Border co-operation, I have been aware in a general way for some time of the work of the group known as Co-operation North, a voluntary organisation composed of people from North and South. Looking through their annual report for 1984 I have been astonished at the extent of the work the organisation have undertaken. Co-operative projects in business, in the area of youth and in education have been the main focuses of the group's energies in the past year. In 1984 alone Co-operation North have involved either directly or indirectly some 15,000 people and almost 2,000 groups, organisatons or companies in their activities.
Last year, too, the Lord Mayors of Belfast and Dublin visited London, Brussels and Amsterdam under the auspices of Co-operation North in a joint effort to promote tourism and industrial investment. This is the type of activity that should be encouraged. The work of Co-operation North has received international recognition. In a comment on the group's activities, the EC Commission said that the spirit of Co-operation North is both practical and visionary, that above all it is courageous, that they have proceeded on the principle that it is better to light a candle than to cross the darkness. The practical idealism of the organisation has led to a series of carefully planned and executed initiatives which, taken together, amount to a telling contribution. President Reagan has said that the high level dialogue between Ireland and Britain has been renewed and that groups promoting reconciliation and economic co-operation such as the group, Co-operation North, are also bearing fruit.
I commend to my colleagues the work of Co-operation North. Any area of practical co-operation which can be promoted jointly by the two Governments and by the EC such as integrated development programmes and also the work of Co-operation North or of any organisation involved in a practical way in promoting goodwill, understanding and contact between North and South and between the two communities in the North is worthy of the greatest praise and of the maximum support.
I do not wish to detain the House because I am conscious that many other Members wish to contribute. I will sum up by saying that this agreement is an historic and a very important one. It behoves all of us to ensure that its implementation will meet the objectives envisaged in the agreement.
Tá súil agam go n-éireoidh go han-mhaith leis an chomhaontú seo. Níl aon amhras agam ar chor ar bith go bhfuil seans anois nach raibh ann roimhe seo chun comhoibriú agus síocháin a bhunú arís i dTuaisceart na hÉireann agus guím rath Dé air.
I support the amendment in the name of our Chief Whip which calls on the British Government to join in convening under the joint auspices of both Governments a constitutional conference. This has been Fianna Fáil policy for some time. Some may have got the impression in the past number of days that Fianna Fáil are opposing this agreement merely for the sake of opposing it. Fianna Fáil have adhered strictly to Fianna Fáil policy and that policy is referred to in the amendment. It seems to be popular to welcome the agreement and to think that if we welcomed it, the Government might be under the impression that they had the consensus of all the people of the country to go along with the agreement. In the agreement we are giving a lot but receiving nothing. I regret very much that, having studied this Anglo-Irish agreement, I am not in a position to support it.
The agreement will not assist even in any minute way in resolving the real problem of Northern Ireland. The only solution to that problem would be a declaration by the British of an intent to withdraw and the setting up of a unitary state as agreed by all four constitutional parties to the Forum — Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour and the SDLP. The consensus of the Forum was that there should be a unitary state but it is strange that, in the intervening short few months, some of these parties could deviate so much from that consensus view. This agreement is not even as acceptable as Sunningdale was when there was an agreement to devolve Government and when there was a second tier in the form of a council of Ireland. That would have given us some power, unlike the present arrangement. It carried the objective of all the people of this country — the objective of reunification. There was no question in the Sunningdale Agreement of the recognition of the Six Counties as part of the UK.
So far as this agreement is concerned there might never have been a New Ireland Forum report. Mrs. Thatcher's threats at the last Summit held in London ring as emphatically today as they rang then. We recall her famous rejection of the three options presented in the Forum report. The Forum report was the result of the deliberations of the four parties. It was the basis for a real solution to the Northern Ireland problem. Now we have a Government prepared to accept this agreement. I wish the agreement well but I am afraid it is doomed to fail.
This proposed conference has no function. It is just another talking shop. We can make proposals at this Conference but we have no part in decision making. It appears to be a treaty of friendship between two countries, not a solution to a problem where one country occupies the national territory of another a situation we have had for too many years and if we accept this agreement the present situation will continue for many more years.
This conference was described as an Inter-Governmental Conference. One would expect that where we have an inter-governmental conference we would have a say in decision making, but this is not true. The Taoiseach said it is consultative, not executive. In my view it is not even consultative. It is a unique inter-governmental agreement where one Government will listen to proposals but will not allow the country making those proposals to take any part in the decision making.
There is no merit in this if we do not spell out the basis on which we are going to act as it affects the Six Counties. This should be spelt out fully but unfortunately it is not. The agreement is much too ambiguous. We have to be suspicious of this agreement because of the vagueness of the terms of reference. The British Government have not committed themselves in the agreement to being answerable or responsible to the conference for their conduct in the Six Counties. The initiative is left to whichever party wish to be consulted, and there is no prior commitment to consult. Part of the agreement seems to suggest that if a devolved administration with broad community support was to evolve, then the role of the Conference would diminish and if a devolved system came about, then the Irish dimension would disappear completely. This document is vague about the way forward in Northern Ireland. It does not contain any commitment to the achievement of Irish unity, except to state that we must have the consent of the majority. We knew that. It was an unwritten rule that if the majority wished for a united Ireland, then both countries would agree to it. Now they are telling us the British Government are agreeing that if the majority consent to a united Ireland, both Governments will introduce legislation.
The traditional national view has been that the British presence is a major part of the problem. I believe there is only one solution, and that is a declaration of intent from the British Government. The British presence in the North over the last 65 years has caused the Unionists to go to any lengths to keep Britain there, and the Nationalist parties have tried by peaceful means to make Britain aware that Partition was at all times unacceptable. The reaction to the use of force by the British in Northern Ireland has been a campaign of violence for too many years. Many parties opposed to violence, such as Fianna Fáil and the SDLP, have insisted in the past that a declaration of intent to withdraw is an essential part of the process of bringing about lasting peace to Northern Ireland.
The agreement proposes to make the British administration in the North the main vehicle for the process of reconciliation. This is impossible, especially because of the ambiguity of the agreement. The British will remain in control. All the agreement has done is to set up a mechanism for the British and Irish Governments to talk, as has been the practice over the years. Mrs. Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, referred to that in her press conference last weekend.
The basis of the Anglo-Irish discussions initiated by the leader of our party was that the British would consider the legitimate interests of the Irish Government in the affairs of the Six Counties. Those talks were on the basis of a relationship between Britain and Ireland, but this agreement now proposes that the talks will be based on an agreement between the two countries, in which Ireland bows at all times to the wishes of the British administration in the North and puts the aspirations for unity so far on the long finger that unless there is a further initiative, many more generations will witness the partition of this country.
I believe that, from the Unionists' point of view, the treaty copperfastens the Unionists' position. How can we give recognition to the British administration in the North and at the same time hope to persuade a majority that we are serious about a united Ireland? This agreement has received a favourable response throughout the world, but those Governments do not fully appreciate the problems of Northern Ireland and the aspirations of our people. We are asking Northern Nationalists to co-operate with the British administration because the British have signed a treaty to talk to us about the North. The British had to talk to us about the North, and have done for many years. A large percentage of the Nationalist population have repudiated the intransigence of the British who set up a Northern Assembly not many years ago on terms which, at that time, were unacceptable to the Nationalist parties in the North, who decided not to take their seats. If that agreement was inadequate in the eyes of the Nationalists at that time, can this Conference prove to be any better, a Conference which will listen to the proposals of this Government and the proposals of the Nationalists which our Minister will put forward but which will not allow them to take any part in any decision making no matter how unimportant those decisions may be? Will our Government urge the Nationalist parties in the North to take their seats in the Assembly? Will we ask the Nationalists in the North to give full support to the RUC and the British army? Will this happen overnight? Will our Government ask them to do this, remembering how much our people have suffered at their hands? Can we accept that if the UDR are accompanied on patrol by the RUC it will make one iota of difference? I put it to the Government that it will make absolutely no difference. In relation to the courts, will we now have more extradition cases relating to political offences, involving the law here in a highly emotional situation?
Given the fact that years of Anglo-Irish discussions have been going on, it is a great disappointment that this limited and ambiguous agreement is all that has resulted by way of political initiative. It is unfortunate that the months of serious talks at senior level have resulted in an initiative which counts for nothing. We have given everything and received nothing in return. How can we expect a sufficient degree of progress to convince our people that we are vindicating and upholding their position in Northern Ireland? It is clear that British intransigence is the major problem and there is no way forward until that problem is overcome. There is absolutely no change since the summit last year when the British Prime Minister said "out" to a unitary state, the federal option and the joint authority option. She has not budged an inch since but we have stepped back completely from Sunningdale, from the Council of Ireland and the executive powers of that council. The Government are accepting exclusively British administration in the North.
After the publication of the Forum report the joint authority option seemed to be the most acceptable to the British. We have not even achieved that. We are now proposing for the first time recognition by treaty that the Six Counties are part of the United Kingdom, an unprecedented step to be taken by any Government.
The British Government have out-manoeuvred us in these talks. They have manipulated the recent round of talks by a series of leaks. Do I take it that the problem of rumours will continue when the Conference is established and that it will be nothing more than a rumour factory, producing nothing in the end?
As a result of this treaty this part of the country could be exposed to greater dangers. Mrs. Thatcher no doubt held her ground firmly. We in this part of Ireland could be the target of a loyalist backlash, something that will never help to advance the cause of peace and stability.
Article 2 of the Constitution states:
The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas.
I suggest that this agreement is completely contrary to Article 2 and completely opposed to the stance adopted by successive Governments over the years. If the Government can get this agreement to work by exerting a real influence on policy in the North, I and my party will be the first to congratulate them. I believe we are in an impossible situation, but I hope and pray that the agreement will work.
I must also refer to the cost of this agreement. During the months leading to the summit there was a build-up of Army personnel and gardaí along the Border. I wonder how much this will cost. The troubles in Northern Ireland have caused serious economic problems for this country. We are not in a position to expend huge amounts of money on security. I suggest that the amount expended in the past will be at least doubled because the British Government have accepted that we will seal the Border for them.
It was wrong to suggest that the consent of the majority would decide on the unification of the country. I regret this because I believe no Government had the right to do it. Many people seem to have a favourable reaction to the idea of this Conference but I suggest that in six months' time the situation will be very much worse and it will be necessary to go back to the British and talk about another initiative, if they will talk to us then.
If I believed that this agreement could be of some benefit in resolving the problems of Northern Ireland, I would be the first to accept it.
We are talking in a vacuum. I am sure there was a similar type of debate over 60 years ago at a more critical stage in our history. Earlier in the century attempts were made to reconcile the difference which existed between North and South. We went very close to doing it on occasions but it never seemed to work out. The year 1921 has resurfaced in the context of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Opposition would like to feel that the debate is of a similar nature. They are adopting a wait and see approach to the agreement. I know they want to come in behind it. Innately they feel that this is a good agreement and they want to support it, but because of ideological differences between the leadership and perhaps the membership of their party generally a great section of the party cannot just do that. A sort of half-hearted, faint-hearted contribution is what I have heard from the Opposition so far. I would have liked to see the main Opposition party commit themselves totally to supporting this new initiative. They played no small part in it at different stages, and I recognise that. It is a pity, perhaps even a tragedy, that their leader chose to take a different view, and I will develop on that as I proceed.
The agreement must be considered as a document merely to set in motion a process for the extension of the political aspirations of a sizeable section of the Irish people. It must be considered further as a new beginning in the process of reconciliation between all Irish men and women. Only by that reconciliation and that unity of purpose can this island of ours regain its respect within the community of nations. Bloodshed, suffering, human misery, degradation and carnage have bedevilled our existence for long enough. If we are to survive as a self-respecting nation the need for this new beginning was never more evident measured against the background of human misery and holocaust since 1969. None of us, no matter what his political views or feelings, wishes to see that situation continue and we must do anything we can to stop it. As constitutional politicians we are committed to that.
This State was instituted by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. The North's right to opt out made that Treaty unenforceable at the time. It was difficult for the negotiators then and, looking back through the pages of history, one can only sympathise with their great efforts to bring peace and stability to the island after a long period of human suffering, conflict and division and so on. However they knew coming back from London that perhaps some of them had signed their death warrant. The great variety of political thinking, then as now, did not enable that Treaty to be harmonised and used as a stepping stone for final unification of this island. It was a great tragedy then that so many Irish people should have had such differing views. Perhaps each one held these views very sincerely and believed that what he or she was doing was the right course of action. The Boundary Commission associated with that Treaty offered possibilities but it was never followed through because of lack of commitment, division and inability to use it. The Treaty then was a stepping stone to Irish freedom. Michael Collins said that it was just freedom to achieve freedom.
The permanency of the Civil War ethic will be exceedingly difficult to eliminate from the minds of the Irish people. Considering their very nature, background and origin and the history that has been taught in our schools for so long, a history of war, battles and destruction, it is about time that we sat down and took from that great history a great culture and demonstrated to our young people what is beset in it. Perhaps in that way we can prepare the minds of the different traditions — Catholic, Protestant, Dissenter, Nationalist, constitutional or otherwise, and Unionist — for the view that we can live together on this island in peace and harmony.
The present Taoiseach, perhaps more so than any other politician in our time, has shown a great urgency in trying to bring some initiative that will just prepare the way for eventual peace and reconciliation. I had great fears on the days leading to the conclusion of this pact about the effect it might have on his political career. I would be very sad if the debacle that we witnessed at Chequers a little over 12 months ago was to occur again. It was not that there was a lack of ability or capacity to understand the great complexity of the problem he was trying to disentangle and resolve but simply because an area of political thought was not directed properly towards what we would all like to achieve — peace and stability on this island. We have suffered so much in terms of human misery, human loss, loss of life and the breaking up of a families, apart from economic loss, social deprivation, loss of jobs and employment and inability to attract industry and business people into this country simply because they feel that we are still a barbarian race and that we cannot sit down amicably without hostility and resolve our differences. The roasting which the Taoiseach received after the Chequers Summit was most humiliating to all of us who believed in what he was trying to achieve. However, it has been said that many other ideas were conjured up since then; but perhaps his dedication to the job he was about to do, his sincerity and his insistence that it had to work and that something had to be done brought world opinion to bear on the issue and consequently may have opened up a new area of Irish relations. I hope and pray that that is so.
The paths to Irish freedom, even to negotiation, are fraught with great political danger and serious political consequences. That is evidenced in this debate already. The Opposition are only waiting to pounce on the least slip and perhaps destroy the minds of young people who want to live in peace and harmony. They do not want to go back the long journey to civil war politics. I was born outside that era but I learned a lot about it and I do not want to have any part of it. The way forward is the route that has been chartered for us in the last week. Perhaps it represents a humble beginning but it is a beginning. It has to be worked on and reinforced and all shades of opinion, North and South, must be seen to be endeavouring to make it work.
There are some unique features about last Friday. In the history of the State there have been five Anglo-Irish agreements ranging from 1921 to 1985 but up to Friday they were all signed outside the country. The insistence of the Taoiseach that Friday's agreement should be signed within Ireland demonstrates the greatest ray of hope for the nation. That may be a small thing but I regard it as important. What has happened is of great historic significance. It does not represent a final solution to the Irish problem; it is a minute beginning but it is an important step in the process of reconciliation, a necessary prerequisite before any solution is found.
Political commentary since Friday regards the agreement as a novel way forward which can provide a new hope for all shades of political opinion, North and South. The 60 years of alienation cannot be wiped away overnight. Some may go further and say that there have been eight centuries of warfare, conflict, division and suppression. It has to come to an end sometime if we are the sort of people we make ourselves out to be.
For the first time the minority in the North are provided with an institution never considered possible in the 63 years existence of Northern Ireland. The ultimate political and economic viability of the North can be secured only by both traditions recognising the loyalties and aspirations of each other and endeavouring to accommodate their differing traditions with respect. Unionists, to whom I appeal more than to the Nationalists, appear to be adopting the most single level of intransigence in this area. They succeeded after Sunningdale. Perhaps Sunningdale tried to move too quickly but a lesson has been learned from it. The carnage which followed brought a new sense of direction into Friday's agreement.
Unionists and Nationalists are now offered incentives in a way never before conceived by any Government. They can assume direct political responsibility by a new power-sharing arrangement. The power-sharing arrangement set out in the Sunningdale Agreement failed because the British Prime Minister of the day did not have the thrust and determination to make it work in the same way as Lord Asquith, British Prime Minister in 1913 and 1914, did not have the ability or determination to take on what was a Unionist minority then.
Fianna Fáil by their protestations to date make it exceedingly difficult for me to understand their political philosophy and aspirations towards a united Ireland. Are they of the view that our country can be united in ten years, as suggested by Deputy Lenihan in 1981 in the lead up to an election, or does he believe that he can con a section of Irish people into the belief that a totality of relationships was something unique and worth committing ourselves to? We all knew what the gimmickry was about. Subsequently we found that the totality of relations from the joint studies would deal only with institutional matters in the North. There is a great difference in that and what was achieved on Friday although Fianna Fáil are suggesting that there is a measure of a sell out in so far as the constitutionality of Northern Ireland is concerned.
I always assumed that all political parties for a long time have had the view that political freedom and unity could only be achieved by peaceful methods. We always agreed that the Unionists could only reflect on a united Ireland in a majority situation. I regarded that as something sacrosanct to the whole North-South relationship. After 1981 we saw a major growth in violence in the North. It was a very sad period and for many people it marked the beginning of the end of constitutional Nationalism. Thankfully that has been reversed. John Hume took over the leadership of the SDLP in the mid-seventies and nobody in my view resembles the great constitutional Nationalist of the early part of the century, John Redmond, more than John Hume. Deputies opposite may decry the virtues of John Redmond but the history of that man has never been accurately or fully recorded. When it is, I have no doubt that his place in Irish history will be a formidable one. Equally, John Hume's place in history will be a formidable one because he has created a climate in which the agreement under discussion has been achieved. His intellectual ability, inspiration and commitment made the agreement necessary and possible. No man in modern history so genuinely and passionately believes in the survival of constitutional Nationalism. He is aware of the growing influence of left wing politics in Northern Ireland which masquerades as constitutionalism and democracy but at the same time has a clear determination for destruction.
I should like to draw the attention of the Opposition to the Dublin Summit of 1980 and what the then Taoiseach set out to achieve. He believed then in a piecemeal approach and if he was Taoiseach today I am certain he would support this new initiative. Henry Ford once said "I believe in it and I support it if it is of my own invention". Deputy Haughey argued then that the North as a political entity had failed and we agree with him on that. He argued that any purely internal settlement could not succeed and we agree on that. He said that consequently a broader, wider framework was required and that is what we have witnessed in the last week.
The difference in approach to Northern Ireland was witnessed in the Forum report. The unitary State concept we all would welcome and work towards and I see myself as much a Nationalist as anybody else, either inside or outside this House. Whether you call yourself a Republican or a Nationalist makes no difference as far as I am concerned. However, the permanent involvement for the first time by the Government of this State in Northern Ireland affairs is unique and under no circumstances must that involvement be underestimated. The role of the Secretariat through the Conference is perhaps the most formidable task facing any Government. We will have that task for as long as we want it, provided that the Government of this State wish it to be. We have heard so much about the breach of sovereignty and quotations from Article 2 of the 1937 Constitution. Let me say something for which I might be severely criticised. Articles 2 and 3 are merely statements of aspiration by an Irish State towards one outside our jurisdiction at that time. What we agreed there did not have any significant bearing on the situation in the North. Why does what is agreed now have a significant bearing? The sovereignty of the North of Ireland vis-à-vis Britain is broken for the first time. Mr. Roy Bradford on hearing the early role of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was the first to recognise that. He saw it as a foot in the door, as did Seámus Mallon, a basis on which we will build and develop.
As far as the Nationalists are concerned, North and South, I do not see anything here that destroys the thrust of the aspirations for Irish unity by peaceful means. What about 1972 when we signed the EEC Agreement? The former Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, signed that on behalf of the Irish people amidst great pomp and ceremony and it was hailed as a great step forward. Mr. Ted Heath, British Prime Minister, signed on behalf of — yes, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. There was no objection then about a breach of sovereignty and nobody told him that he should not involve himself in Irish affairs.
Mr. Austin Currie, on television, has agreed that British sovereignty has been breached. Mr. James Molyneaux said that it was the end of Unionism as we know it. Dr. Ian Paisley called it the beginning of rolling Irish unification. The Leader of the Opposition regarded it as the abandonment of Irish unity and the copperfastening of Partition. It is extremely difficult to reconcile these views. We can be carried away by extreme rhetoric which will do absolutely nothing to secure peace and stability for so many who are crying out for them in Northern Ireland. Political solution is one thing and that can be achieved only by improving the economy, creating jobs and building the environment for investment in industry. In that way we can achieve an enduring peace in Northern Ireland.
I have seen the growth of the European Community. Very shortly we will be joined by Spain and Portugal and it might not be so long before Norway and Sweden join. They now say no, but circumstances could change. When that happens, there will be a great western alliance on economic, social, cultural and perhaps defence lines.
Chun deireadh a chur leis an méid atá le rá agam faoin chomhaontú stairiúil seo iarraim ar Dhia cuidiú le gach aon deaiarracht chun gach a bhfuil a fháil san chomhaontú seo a chur i gcrích chomh tapaidh agus is féidir. Cuireann sé iachall ar gach duine dínn ár gcion féin a dhéanamh le síocháin agus níos mó ná sin suaibhmeas aigne a chur ar fáil arís i dTuaisceart ár dtíre. Tréaslaím leis an Taoiseach agus le chuile dhuine eile a raibh aon pháirt acu i gcur i gcrích an chomhaontaithe seo.
Ba mhaith liom cúpla focal a rá faoin chomh aontú Angla-Éireannach a fuair oiread poiblíochta le cúpla lá. Sílim sul má fhéachaimid le athbhreithiú a dhéanamh ar an aontacht féin agus ar gach gné dí go gcaithfimid ar dtús súil a chaitheamh siar ar stair na tíre agus ar stair na haontachta. Ní thig linn an cás a réiteach ná a fháil amach i gceart céard atá in ann don chuid seo den tír gan smaoineamh ar an chaoi a dtáinig an aontacht chun tosaigh at dtús. Tá a fhios againn gur cheannaigh Rialtas Shasana an aontacht agus gur sheas siad leis an aontacht riamh ó shin. Sheas siad leis na hAontachtóirí nuair a bhí Rialtas Shasana ag iarraidh Home Rule a thabhairt isteach anseo, mar a bhí An Teachta Dowling ag caint faoi ansin scaitheamh ó shin. Sheas siad leis na hAontachtoirí nuair a síníodh an conradh idir an tír seo agus Sasana i 1921 agus tá siad ag seasamh leis na hAontachtóirí riamh ó shin i dTuaisceart Éireann. Tá siad ag seasamh leo san am i láthair níos tréine ná mar a rinne siad riamh.
Nílimid ag cur dallamullóg ar mhuintir an Tuaiscirt agus go mór mhór ar na Náisiúnaithe sa Tuaisceart má táimid ag iarraidh a chur ina luí orthu go bhfuil rud ar bith ag tarlú san aontacht seo a bhfuilimid ag caint faoi i láthair na huaire. Tá sé deimhnithe arís agus arís eile ag an cumhdaitheoir i féin, Príomh Aire Rialtas Shasana, go bhfuil na Sasanaigh ag dul ag seasamh leis na hAontachtóirí arís, agus fhad is atá sé sin ag tarlú ní bheidh réiteach ar bith ar an fhadhb seo agus ní fhéadfaidh sinne ná duine ar bith eile dul chun cinn ar bith a dhéanamh.
Debate adjourned.
The Dáil adjourned at 10.30 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 20 November 1985.