Items Nos. 9 and 20 will be debated with item No. 8. A separate decision will be taken on each item.
Single European Act — Neutrality and Protocol No. 30: Motion.
I move:
That Dáil Éireann reaffirms Ireland's position of neutrality outside military alliances, and notes with satisfaction that the provisions in Title III of the Single Europe Act relating to the co-operation of the High Contracting Parties (that is, the Twelve member States of the European Community) on the political and economic aspects of security and the closer co-ordination of their positions in this area do not affect Ireland's position of neutrality outside military alliances.
That Dáil Éireann further notes and welcomes the provisions of Article 23 of the Single European Act on Economic and Social Cohesion, which enhances and strengthens the commitment of the Community to the achievement of the objectives set out in Protocol No. 30 on Ireland appended to the Treaty of Accession of Denmark. Ireland and the United Kingdom to the European Communities.
The debate on this motion is being taken in conjunction with motion No. 9 approving the terms of the Single European Act and with the Second Stage of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, 1986.
Order, please. We are commencing an important debate and I would ask the Deputies, if they wish to leave the House, to do so quietly.
The Bill has two operative sections. Section 1 will make certain provisions of the Single Act part of domestic law. These provisions are those which amend the existing European Community Treaties which are already part of domestic law. Because of the provision of the Single Act which permits the European Parliament to be formally described as the Parliament rather than the Assembly, section 2 of the Bill provides that references to the Assembly of the European Communities in any earlier Act or statutory instrument shall be construed as references to the European Parliament.
The provisions of Title III of the Single Act, which deal with European Co-operation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy, do not amend the Community Treaties and do not, therefore, require to be made part of domestic law.
I have placed a motion before the Dáil in order to permit the Dáil to reaffirm Ireland's position of neutrality outside military alliances and to note with satisfaction that the provisions of Title III of the Single Act relating to the co-operation of the Twelve on the political and economic aspects of security and the closer co-ordination of their positions in this area do not affect our position of neutrality outside military alliances. Furthermore, the motion will give the Dáil an opportunity to note and welcome the provisions of the Single Act on Economic and Social Cohesion which enhance and strengthen the commitment of the Community to the achievement of the objectives of Protocol 30 on Ireland appended to the Treaty of Accession.
The Single European Act as a whole, including the foreign policy provisions, will involve charges on public funds and it is for this reason that I have placed before the Dáil the second motion to approve the terms of the Single Act.
The debate today is of great importance for our membership of the Community, and for our place and role in its further development. Therefore, in considering in this debate the Single European Act, which represents the opening of the way towards the further development of the Community, it would, I think, be opportune and desirable to make some assessment of our experience of membership to date. This I intend to do at the outset in order to set the debate in its proper context.
First, may I say I do not really think that there is anyone in this House who would at this stage of our membership be prepared to suggest seriously that Ireland should leave the Community. The argument that Ireland would be better off outside the Community was, of course, comprehensively answered by the Irish people in the 1972 referendum before our accession. It has also been clearly answered by our experience of membership.
Two fundamental considerations underlay the original decision that Ireland should seek membership of the European Community. These considerations were clearly explained at the time and set out explicitly in the 1972 White Paper on Accession. First, it was considered that membership would provide an opportunity, unprecedented in the history of this State, to participate fully with other democratic and like-minded countries of Europe in the movement towards European unity. Secondly, it was considered that membership would provide the conditions in which we could best pursue our economic and social development; conditions much more favourable to us than any we could hope to enjoy if we were to remain outside the Community. This was the basis on which we applied to join the Community. It was the basis on which the Irish people by an overwhelming majority vote approved our becoming a member and it is the basis on which successive Governments have sought to promote our interests in the Community.
We have accordingly sought since accession, not only to pursue our immediate economic interests, but also to play a constructive and positive role in the movement towards European unity. Such closer European integration among the member states of the Community has rightly been perceived to be in our clear, longer term interests. And I think it is fair to say that this role which we have chosen over the years of membership to adopt has won for this country considerable respect and goodwill.
The substantial economic benefits which have flowed to Ireland from membership are manifest. I shall deal in more detail with such benefits, but before I do so, I wish to refute two misleading assertions which are made from time to time about our membership.
The first assertion, is that we joined an exclusively economic Community for exclusively economic reasons. This is not at all the case. Although there were incontrovertible economic arguments for our becoming a member and although these arguments naturally carried very considerable weight in our decision to join, Ireland's application for membership was clearly made in full awareness and acceptance of the political ideals and aims of the Community.
The second assertion is that Ireland has approached the Community only with a view to what it can get and not with a view to what it can contribute. Again this is not the case, as our record of membership demonstrates. In fact, while seeking to protect and promote our interests and concerns, successive Governments have recognised that the Community means more than a series of deals and that, beyond the negotiations and bargaining which take place, there is a process of economic and political integration under way which it is very much in our interests to be an integral part of. Furthermore, our positive approach to ongoing Community business and to the further development of the Community reflects our position as very clear net beneficiaries from Community policies, and is a significant factor in our negotiating approach to the various issues.
A few simple facts illustrate clearly the extent to which this country has benefited from Community membership. Between 1973 and 1985 this country received, after allowance is made for our national contributions, transfers amounting to £4.7 billion from the Community budget. In 1984, the latest year for which comparable statistics are available, Ireland's net transfers amounted to 4.2 per cent of our gross domestic product. This percentage is almost double that of any other member state. Indeed, relative to our population and share of Community gross domestic product, Ireland receives the highest financial benefit from the Community of any member state. In 1985, net budgetary transfers alone to this country amounted to £900 million, the equivalent of 13.6 per cent of current Government revenue. By way of illustration of the importance of such transfers, I would point out that, if they ceased, the tax bill of the average income tax year would have to increase by 30 to 40 per cent in order to make up the necessary revenue. Since we joined the Community we have received, for example, more than £4.5 billion through the Common Agricultural Policy and about £1 billion from the Social Fund and the Regional Fund. Our receipts from the Community continue at a high level.
But Community membership confers very important economic advantages other than financial transfers. Membership ensures access for our industrial and agricultural exports to a vast market of 320 million people — the largest in the world. This access in turn has been an essential factor in increasing the attractiveness of Ireland as a base for foreign industrial investment — the investment which is so vital for Ireland's economic development.
There is, of course, a wider and a key dimension to our membership. It has enabled this country to pursue its interest and to have its concerns expressed and taken into account more fully and effectively than could ever have been possible outside the Community. It has, moreover, given Ireland a role in Europe and the world which would be unthinkable for us if we were not a member. The positive effects of this role on our national esteem and self-confidence should not, I venture to say, be underestimated.
Of course, membership of the European Community for Ireland has not proved to be a panacea for our economic problems. It could never have been so envisaged by anyone. Our accession represented a great national challenge, certainly not an overall economic solution. By and large, successive Governments have, over the years of membership, faced that challenge successfully. There can be no question but that we have been immeasurably better able, as was anticipated at the time of joining, to protect and pursue our interests within the Community than would ever have been possible outside. This very much remains the case to-day; and will most certainly continue to be so for the foreseeable future.
There have been, as we all know, disappointments in our years of membership. These disappointments have been shared by all or at least some of our Community partners. I would mention in particular the absence still of a coherent and comprehensive regional policy for the Community as a whole. The disparties between the economic development of the regions have really not been reduced. There has been a failure to date to achieve a genuinely united and free market within the Community. Then there are the major problems which are now confronting the Community, particularly in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy and to how the Community is going to provide the financial resources necessary for its continued operation and further development.
I should like to make two points in relation to the disappointments and problems I have mentioned. First, the most important provisions of the Single European Act are designed precisely to overcome the failures which have given rise to such disappointment up to now — in the areas of regional development and the internal market. Secondly, it is only as a committed and constructive member of the Community in the coming years that we shall be able to defend and pursue effectively our national interests, as the Community gets to grips with the major problems I have mentioned, problems, I should say, which will require some radical rethinking and action. The fact is that there is no alternative to our playing an active and positive role within the Community in the testing, but what should prove exciting period ahead.
In order to appreciate fully the significance of the Single European Act for the future development of the Community, it has to be situated against the background of thinking and actions which gave the impetus to its eventual negotiation. It was the European Council in Milan in June of last year which decided to convene the intergovernmental conference which led to the signing of the Single Act. That decision followed several years of debate and preparation. Over many years various attempts had been made to draw up proposals for progress towards European Union. There had been no shortage of ideas as to how progress might be achieved. However, the political will, so necessary to achieve a significant breakthrough, was lacking. The Community, immersed in its internal budgetary and other problems and disputes, was in no collective mood to venture an examination of where it was going. In so far as the objective of real movement towards closer European integration received any attention, it was perceived as a distant vision rather than as an urgent necessity.
However, the growing awareness of the need for progress in the development of the Community reflected harsh reality rather than a vague aspiration to European progress. Two important and incontestable facts had gradually brought home to all concerned that there was an urgent need to address the state of standstill in the Community. First and foremost of these facts was Europe's failure to keep pace with its main trading competitors, the United States and Japan — in terms of economic growth, in terms of job creation, in terms of tackling unemployment, and, in particular, in terms of competing effectively internationally in the areas of research and advanced technology. Secondly, the decision-making mechanisms of the Community, which were originally designed for a Community of Six, were clearly in need of a significant overhaul, especially with the prospect of the admission of Spain and Portugal to make a Community of Twelve.
The Solemn Declaration on European Union, adopted at the Stuttgart Summit in June 1983, committed the member states to a relaunching of the Community and represented the first very limited signs of progress. In February 1984, the European Parliament helped to revitalise the debate on the future of the Community by adopting its Draft Treaty on European Union.
In keeping with the Solemn Declaration at Stuttgart and in the spirit of the Parliament's Draft Treaty, the European Council at Fontainebleau in June 1984 decided to establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs with the task of making suggestions for the improvement of the operation of European co-operation in both the Community field and that of political co-operation. This committee was inaugurated during the Irish Presidency and had as its chairman Senator James Dooge. The final report of the Dooge Committee constituted the principal basis for the discussion at the European Council at Milan last year on the future direction of the Community, the discussion which led to the convening of the intergovernmental conference.
That European Council at Milan therefore had reason for both serious concern and reasonable hope. There was the concern that the Community had not yet demonstrated a capacity to reach levels of economic growth and technological development commensurate with its size and potential. But there was also hope that at long last the necessary political will was being engendered which would enable the Community to establish firmly the basis for its further development and to provide the improved decision making mechanisms which this substantial progress would require.
There was indeed urgent and wide recognition of the need for the Community to move ahead again, but differences of view emerged at Milan on the need to convene an intergovernmental conference. Ireland, alone of the more recent member states, joined the six original members in supporting the convening of the conference. The Government adopted this position in the clear recognition, that, if the Community was to embark on an important relaunching, Ireland should be in the vanguard of this forward movement, and that our best interests, as well as those of the Community as a whole, would thereby be served. In the light of the successful and unanimous outcome to the intergovernmental conference represented by the signature of the Single European Act, it really cannot be questioned that this was the right decision. By aligning Ireland from the beginning with those who supported the convening of the conference and its proposed objectives, the Government undoubtedly generated a significant degree of goodwill, especially from some of the larger member states. These particular member states do, of course, play a key role in relation to the development of Community policies and measures which are of direct interest and importance to Ireland.
But the generation of goodwill, however important, did not constitute the principal motivation for our support for the convening of the conference or for our pursuance of a constructive approach during the course of the conference. Our positive approach to the conference and its work was based on three main considerations. First, the Community was confronted by the increasingly urgent challenges which I have described. Secondly, the time was uniquely ripe, as I have indicated, for the Community to meet those challenges and thirdly, Ireland, having benefited and continuing to benefit substantially from its membership of the Community, the Comunity's well-being and further development was, therefore, very much in our interests.
The contents of the Single European Act have been set out and explained on a number of occasions — most recently and comprehensively in the Government's explanatory guide. The guide has been circulated to Deputies and I shall, therefore, limit my description of the contents of the Act to a brief analysis of its provisions. But before doing so, I want to reiterate to this House that, as a reading of the explanatory guide makes abundantly clear, the Single Act contains no hidden snares nor concealed agendas.
The Single Act is so-called because it brings together in one Treaty two elements which were negotiated separately and which are in fact distinct. There are, first, provisions amending the Treaties establishing the European Communities and, secondly, provisions on European co-operation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy. The amendments to the Community Treaties contained in the Single Act can be summarised under nine headings.
The first set of EC Treaty amendments contained in the Single Act is designed to facilitate and expedite the completion of the internal market in the Community by a target date of the end of 1992. In order to achieve this objective, Council decisions in certain specific treaty areas are to be taken by qualified majority voting in future.
Ireland is a country heavily dependent on exports. Last year almost 70 per cent of our exports went to our Community partners. Two out of every three jobs in manufacturing industry in Ireland depend, to one degree or another, on exports. The provisions of the Single Act aimed at bringing about the early achievement of a genuine and total freetrading market within the Community are of considerable importance for this country and should be of great potential benefit to our exporters.
In the Single Act provisions on the internal market, the area of fiscal harmonisation, in relation to both direct and indirect taxation, has been entirely excluded from the move to qualified majority voting, and unanimity will continue to be required. We will thus be in a position, as heretofore, to protect our interests in this area. The Single Act also expressly permits national measures to be taken which a member state considers are justified on grounds of major needs as referred to in Article 36 of the EC Treaty. This takes account of Irish concerns with respect to animal and plant health in these islands and incorporates, at our insistence, the extension of the exception to the area of public morality.
The second set of Treaty amendments provided for in the Single Act is the incorporation of a new Title in the EC Treaty on Economic and Social Cohesion. These new provisions have as their objective the reduction of the disparities between the various regions in the Community and the backwardness of the least favoured regions. These new provisions represent a renewed and strengthened commitment to reducing the differences in economic development and standards of living between the various regions of the Community. The stipulation that the cohesion objective is to be taken into account in the implementation of the internal market and in all common policies of the Community is particularly important from Ireland's point of view. It will greatly strengthen our position when negotiations are under way on moves towards the realisation of the full internal market and towards the strengthening of existing Community policies and the development of new policies. The incorporation in the EC Treaty, for the first time, of a specific basis for the Regional Fund, will serve to intensify the commitment of the individual member states and of the Community as a whole to bringing about an enhanced Regional Policy. The recognition in the Single Act of the task of reducing regional disparities as central to a harmonious economic and social development of the Community will also help towards this end.
The third set of Treaty amendments contained in the Single Act relates to the role of the European Parliament in the Community's decision-making process. This role is to be enhanced although the Council will retain the final say. The provisions represent a modest and overdue enhancing of the role and stature of the directly-elected Parliament in the Community's decision-making process. They will offer the Parliament scope for increasing its influence in that process. But, at the same time, the inter-institutional balance within the Community is preserved with the Council of Ministers retaining the final say.
The fourth area in which the Single Act amends the EC Treaty relates to the management and implementing powers of the Commission. Under existing Treaty provisions the Council of Ministers already confers, on an ad hoc basis, extensive powers on the Commission to implement basic decisions taken by the Council, including very significant powers in the area of the Common Agricultural Policy. The new provisions offer scope for streamlining the Commission's implementing powers by providing a more systematic basis for conferring such powers in the future. This, however, will be subject to continued safeguards for the interests of the member states. These safeguards involve: first the Council's continued right to impose requirements in respect of the exercise of implementing powers by the Commission; secondly, the Council's continued right in specific cases to exercise certain implementing powers itself; and thirdly, the requirement that, in future, procedures for conferring powers on the Commission must conform to certain principles and rules to be agreed unanimously in advance by the Council.
The fifth EC Treaty amendment effected by the Single Act is that the monetary capacity of the Community is given an enhanced profile by the insertion of a new chapter in the EC Treaty. This chapter represents essentially a compromise between the different positions which emerged at the conference and is modest in its implications.
The sixth set of EC Treaty amendments enshrined in the Single Act is the inclusion in that Treaty for the first time of specific provisions dealing with research and technological development. These provisions provide a Treaty framework for the development of a comprehensive Community-based policy in this area. This is of crucial importance for the future economic development of the Community and for enhancing its competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States and Japan in the area of high technology. There should be considerable potential benefit in this development for the smaller member states such as Ireland.
The seventh set of EC Treaty amendments brought about by the Single Act is that a Community policy on protection of the environment is to be brought expressly within the EC Treaty.
There is an eighth amendment to the Treaty contained in the Single Act which provides for the adoption by the Council of minimum requirements with a view to improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers.
Finally, the ninth set of Treaty amendments, consists of provisions to ease the workload and improve the functioning of the European Court of Justice. These are objectives which we, of course, fully share. These then are the amendments to the Community Treaties contained in the Single Act.
The provisions in the Single Act on European Co-operation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy are contained in Title III. In essence, these provisions are largely a formalisation of the existing practices and procedures of European Political Co-operation. This is the process which has been evolving since 1970 by which the member states, operating on the basis of consensus, exchange information, consult together and, where possible, seek to adopt common positions and to take joint action on the main foreign policy issues of concern to them.
The provisions on European Co-operation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy have been comprehensively set out and explained in the Government's explanatory guide to the Single Act which all Deputies will have had an opportunity to study. I do not, therefore, propose to go exhaustively over that ground on this occasion. In summary, the essential characteristic of European political co-operation will remain the joint endeavour of the partners to formulate and implement a European foreign policy by informing and consulting each other on foreign policy of general interest, by coordinating their positions and by taking joint action. In adopting national positions, each partner engages itself to take full account of the positions of the others and to consider the desirability of adopting and implementing common European positions. Furthermore, each partner will endeavour to avoid any action or position which might impair the effectiveness of the Twelve as a cohesive force in international relations and, as far as possible, to refrain from impeding the formation of a consensus. This process has been recognised and practised by the member states since the earliest days of EPC. The core of the European political co-operation process is represented by the meetings of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, together with a member of the Commission, at least, at least four times a year. They may also discuss foreign policy matters within the framework of EPC on the occasion of meetings of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities.
The principle of EPC decision-making remains unchanged: there is no voting, majority or otherwise, in EPC. A consensus continues to be required for a common position to be adopted or common action taken. The machinery of EPC remains the same as before: the political directors are to meet regularly in the Political Committee and working groups shall meet as directed by the Political Committee. The only innovation in all of this is the establishment in Brussels of a light and compact Secretariat for the process, clearly under the authority of the Presidency, to which it will be an administrative adjunct. The Presidency remains responsible for managing EPC business including the drawing up of working papers and for representing agreed positions of the Twelve.
The scope of EPC remains limited to foreign policy matters of general interest. In so far as these refer to security, co-operation is limited to the political and economic aspects. Military and defence matters remain outside the scope of EPC.
The Single Act also contains certain common provisions which provide a formal and long overdue acknowledgement of the existence of the European Council, and provide that the European Parliament is formally to be known by that name rather than as "The Assembly" as stipulated in the original treaties. This represents a formal and welcome treaty recognition of the enhanced status of the Parliament.
The Final Act of the Conference, in addition to containing the Single Act itself, contains a number of declarations adopted by the conference and a number of other unilateral declarations which were noted by the conference. These include a declaration by Ireland that we would, in certain circumstances relating to the insurance industry in Ireland, expect to be able to rely on a sympathetic attitude from the Commission and from the other member states.
I have thought it well to identify, once again, and re-explain the provisions of the Single Act. The Government's explanatory guide set out these explanations and the implications for Ireland of the various provisions in comprehensive fashion. As will be clear to Deputies, there is nothing hidden in these provisions. They are complex but not at all incomprehensible. Their implications, taken as a whole, are significant but not momentous. Some criticise them for going too far, others for not going far enough. In essence, they represent a realistic and imaginative compromise, a means rather than an end, grounds for heightened expectations.
There are many elements of the Single Act which are very welcome from Ireland's point of view. On behalf of the Government, I have put forward a motion relating to two of these elements in particular, namely, the provisions in Title III relating to co-operation on the political and economic aspects of security and the provisions on economic and social cohesion.
I have put forward this motion in order to allow the Dáil an opportunity of taking particular note of these provisions and welcoming them. The relevant provisions of Title III, as I will make clear when I return to them shortly, do not affect Ireland's position of neutrality outside military alliances. The motion will afford the Dáil the opportunity of reaffirming Ireland's position of neutrality outside military alliances. The cohesion provisions of the Single Act enhance and strengthen the Community's commitment to the achievement of the objectives set out in Protocol No. 30 on Ireland appended to our treaty of accession. These objectives, with particular reference to Ireland, are the steady improvement of the living standards and working conditions of the peoples of the member states, the harmonious development of their economies, and the reduction of the differences between the various regions and the backwardness of the less-favoured regions. It is most appropriate that the Dáil should specifically welcome the cohesion provisions.
The Fianna Fáil Party have put down an amendment to the other motion in my name approving the terms of the Single Act. This amendment would require the Government to annex a declaration, on the same questions covered in the first motion, to our Instrument of Ratification of the Single Act. The Government cannot accept this amendment, first, because it would introduce an unacceptable element of conditionality into Ireland's ratification of the Single Act and would, therefore, appear to call into question our full commitment to the implementation of the Single Act and, secondly, because the content of the proposed declaration contained in the Fianna Fáil amendment does not reflect the fact that our concerns both on neutrality and on economic and social cohesion are fully met in the relevant provisions of the Single Act itself.
I now propose to deal specifically with the main criticisms made and concerns voiced about the Single European Act and its possible implications for this country. In doing so I shall be addressing the assertions and statements made in the amendment tabled by The Workers' Party to the motion approving the terms of the Single Act.
The Single Act will not involve any diminution in Ireland's sovereignty. When we joined the Community it was pointed out and accepted by the people that the powers which we would agree to share with other member states would in fact be enhanced rather than diminished by the co-operation involved. Our experience of Community membership has borne out that fact and the Single Act does not alter it. The quotation from the Government's 1972 White Paper on Accession included at paragraph 4.10 of the Explanatory Guide will continue to be as valid as it then was.
The Government are also satisfied that ratification by this country of the Single Act does not require an amendment of the Constitution. The amendments of the European Community treaties are limited in nature. They do not involve major institutional changes. They are directed to giving a new impetus in areas already comprehended by the treaties. The Community treaties expressly envisage the possibility that the treaties may be amended, and establish procedures for that purpose. Such amendments have already been made since Ireland acceded to the Community.
The State is constitutionally entitled, by virtue of the Third Amendment of the Constitution, to play its full part in the operation of the Community treaties, including the provisions of those treaties which permit their amendment by common agreement of the member states. For this purpose the Government are empowered to negotiate and agree to amendments of the kind involved in the Single Act. Having done so, the Government are empowered to present the appropriate legislation to the Oireachtas —such as that under consideration today —and the Oireachtas is empowered to enact it. Once this has been done, the Government are empowered on behalf of the State to ratify the amending treaty —in this case, the Single Act.
There have been criticisms that the change in voting in the Council of Ministers from unanimity to qualified majority voting provided for in the Single Act will severely diminish Ireland's ability to protect and promote its interests in the Community. This is simply not so. As the Explanatory Guide makes abundantly clear, qualified majority voting is being introduced in certain specified areas and this is designed to improve and facilitate decision-making in these areas. This is in Ireland's interest, notably in the area of the internal market. The unanimity requirement for Council decisions is retained in certain cases. Clearly the most important such case is that of the harmonisation of either direct or indirect taxation. Here, we and a number of other member states insisted during the negotiations on the Single Act that unanimity had to be retained.
In the areas where majority voting is being applied we shall be able to protect and promote our essential interests, as we always have done, through the normal negotiating process. Furthermore, it should be quite clearly understood— because this is a point which has been misrepresented, perhaps deliberately— that the "Luxembourg Compromise", or the so-called "veto", is not at all affected by the Single Act. The "veto" is a purely political arrangement and not one covered by treaty provisions. It is not nor could it have been affected by the treaty amendments agreed. It was not even discussed at the Intergovernmental Conference. Member states remain free to invoke the "veto" where important national interests are involved. This is so, both in cases where majority voting already applies in the Council under the existing treaties, and in cases where qualified majority voting is to be introduced for the first time by the provisions of the Single Act.
The completion of the internal market is very much in this country's interest as I have already explained and as is made clear in the Government's Explanatory Guide. However, its completion is likely to be of greater benefit to the more developed central regions of the Community than to those, such as Ireland, on the periphery. The inclusion of a chapter in the Single Act on economic and social cohesion responds precisely to this possibility. It is specifically provided that the cohesion objective of reducing regional disparities will have to be taken into account in all common policies and in the completion of the internal market. Furthermore, by recognising that the task of reducing regional disparities is central to the harmonious development of the Community as a whole, the relevant provisions of the Single Act will clearly serve to strengthen and enhance the Community's regional policy.
The management powers of the Commission will continue to be subject to safeguards for the interests of the member states. Far from threatening our interests, the Single Act provisions in this regard are very much to our advantage and should contribute to a more efficient execution of Community business. The Commission have a key position in the defence of the interests of the Community as a whole and, in particular, of the interests of the smaller member states. Furthermore, adequate implementing powers for the Commission avoid the lengthy delays which would necessarily be involved in referring management decisions to the Council. The Council should not be expected to and, indeed, could not as a matter of practice, adopt the countless measures implementing decisions of principle which it has itself taken.
Moreover, the exercise of management powers by the Commission can be beneficial to Ireland in many ways. The Commission's power to take rapid decisions in the agriculture area, for example, is vital to the efficient functioning of the Common Agricultural Policy. Similarly the workings of the regional fund and the social fund, which involve a significant management role for the Commission, have operated very much to our advantage.
Much attention has focused on the provisions in Title III of the Single Act on co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy. A number of criticisms and allegations have been made to the effect that they erode our sovereignty, our independence in foreign policy matters and our neutrality; and that we never contracted to join a Community with a political dimension. The Government's Explanatory Guide has addressed these aspects in a comprehensive way. It has, I believe, demonstrated conclusively that the fears are groundless and that the critical assertions made are false. I propose, therefore, to address four principal points which I consider to be of special importance.
First, as the Explanatory Guide has made clear, Ireland has been committed from the time it joined the Community to the political objectives which give the Community its meaning. Indeed, the political implications of Ireland's accession to the European Community have been well understood by every Irish Government since Irish membership of the European Community first became an option. As far back as 1962, the then Taoiseach, Seán Lemass, addressing the Foreign Ministers of the original six members of the Community stated:
It is natural that we in Ireland should regard with keen and sympathetic interest every genuine attempt to bring the peoples of Europe closer together ... We were happy at the development of a strong movement towards closer European Union...I desire to emphasise that the political aims of the Community are aims to which the Irish Government and people are ready to subscribe and in the realisation of which they wish to take an active part.
Ten years later, when membership of the European Community was about to become a reality, a subsequent Irish Government stated that aspiration to the Houses of the Oireachtas and to the Irish people in a White Paper in terms similarly unequivocal:
Ireland's application for membership of the EEC was made in full awareness of the political ideals and aims of the Treaty which inspired the founding members of the Community. We have declared our willingness to join with the other member states of the enlarged Community in working towards the achievement of the ever closer union between the European peoples which is the first aim of the Treaty of Rome. The Europe envisaged by the member states is one composed of democratic states which, in spite of their different national characteristics, are united in their essential interests. The Government are convinced that these are ideals and aims which will find a ready response in the Irish people. As a member of the Community, we shall participate fully in the work of shaping its future political development.
A ready response was indeed forthcoming from the Irish people — the overwhelming vote in the 1972 referendum in favour of Ireland's joining the European Community.
This understanding of the Community's ultimate political goal and Ireland's commitment to that goal — the achievement of European unity — has been restated and reaffirmed by each and every Irish Government since our accession to the European Community. It has also been reaffirmed by the present Irish Government. By democratic vote, we cast our lot with the European Community and it is my intention to ensure that Ireland makes the fullest possible contribution within that grouping.
Second, I feel it necessary to recall that one of the specific means by which the European Community decided to make practical progress in the political as distinct from the economic sphere of European integration was through co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy —in other words European Political Co-operation (EPC), the practices and procedures of which have evolved gradually over the years with our full participation and agreement.
Third, I think it important to emphasise that Ireland's involvement in EPC in general, and the formalisation of EPC in the Single Act in particular, is of substantial benefit to this country. In the first place, our involvement in EPC has enlarged the scope and content of Irish foreign policy in promoting our essential interests. Far from acting as a constraint on our freedom, our involvement in EPC has afforded us the opportunity to work with our European partners with whom we share basic ideals, to promote, to a greater extent than we could have done in isolation, our aims and priorities.
It is evident, too, that the European Community, composed of more than 320 million people with a combined GNP greater than that of the United States is in a particularly advantageous position to contribute to the promotion of international pace, security, stability, reconciliation and the rule of law in international affairs, goals which have always been of central importance to this country.
Moreover, the development, which we have always favoured, of constructive common positions of the Twelve on the major international issues has led to a situation where the Twelve are an increasingly respected and influential entity in world affairs. This is to the benefit of the Community in general and Ireland in particular. In areas of the world such as the Middle East, Africa, Central America and Asia, the constructive attitudes on international issues taken by Ireland as a member of the Community have served to heighten this country's profile in a way which is only beneficial to our essential interests at every level. political, diplomatic and economic.
The incorporation of foreign policy provisions under the umbrella of the Single European Act is also very much in our interests. We have always argued that the economic and political elements of European integration are interdependent and form part of the same dynamic of European construction. We have argued. too, that progress towards European union, to be successful, must be realistic, balanced and coherent.
The balance, in our view, consists in the realisation that progress in the area of political co-operation should be firmly based on a growing community of interests between the member states in the economic and social areas. The Single European Act strikes that balance, in substance and in form: in substance, because Title III accurately represents the appropriate limit to political co-operation at this stage of the Community's development, and moreover, sets these limits out in a juridically clear fashion; in form, because Title III, by being brought under the umbrella of the Single Act, gives expression to the interdependent nature of political and economic progress towards European union.
Then there is the question of neutrality. As I have stated repeatedly and as the Explanatory Guide makes clear, the Single Act poses no threat to our neutrality. Our neutral position outside military alliances has been fully accommodated by our partners. Article 30.6 confirms that the scope of discussions on security in EPC will remain limited to the political and economic aspects of security. As a corollary of this provision, and for the first time ever, our position is further protected by the provision that nothing in the Single Act shall impede those states who wish to co-operate more closely on security questions, that is on military and defence questions, doing so within the WEU or NATO. We are not a member of either of these organisations and we have no intention of joining them. Ireland will, therefore, neither be involved in nor committed to any co-operation that takes place in those organisations.
I believe there has been some deliberate misrepresentation about that provision which speaks of maintaining the technological and industrial conditions necessary for security. The explanatory guide has set the record straight in this matter. The clause in question is not shorthand for associating Ireland with the weapons procurement of its partners. The reality is much more straightforward.
Security is a broad concept and the level of technological developments of Europe compared to, say, the US or Japan is a legitimate long term concern and an economic aspect of security. The same applies to industrial conditions. Article 30.6 (b) of the Single Act reflects the growing realisation by Europeans, instanced for example in the EUREKA project in which neutral countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland also participate, that we in Europe must face up to the technological and industrial challenges we face internationally, from the United States, from Japan and from the other emerging economic powers of the Pacific area.
Contrary to claims that have been made, the Single Act, in Article 30.6 (b) or in any other provision of Title III for that matter, cannot commit Ireland to co-operation in the production of weapons, nor can it constrain our ability to speak out on issues of concern to us. We shall continue to make decisions nationally in relation to our security. Measures that we take in co-operation with our partners will be situated entirely within the framework of the Community, and hence within the economic aspects of security. Our neutral position, therefore, is totally unaffected by the terms of the Single European Act.
So much then for the criticisms which have been made of the Single Act. It is most interesting and instructive that not one of the main sources and inspirers of these criticisms has attempted to refute or answer the clear and detailed explanations of the provisions of the Single Act contained in the Government's Explanatory Guide and the inevitable conclusions drawn in the guide that the Single Act, far from threatening this country's interests, will serve to promote them.
The amendment tabled by The Workers' Party to the motion approving the terms of the Single Act calls for the renegotiating of its terms, so also does that party's proposed amendment on Second Stage of the Bill. Let me make it quite clear that there is no question whatsoever of renegotiating the terms of the Single Act. It is neither possible, nor is it necessary. Ireland participated fully in the Intergovernmental Conference which resulted in the signing of the Single Act. Indeed, as I have pointed out earlier in my speech, we took a forward position in calling for the convening of the conference. During the negotiations we participated fully. We put forward ideas and proposals of our own, we supported as appropriate proposals put forward by others and we also, again as appropriate, suggested amendments to proposals tabled. At all times the Government were concerned, not only that the outcome to the negotitions would be beneficial for the strengthening and further development of the Community, but also, of course, that our interests were fully protected. The Single Act very much represents what we wished to see achieved.
We have, since we acceded to the Community, joined with our partners on the path towards closer integration, a path which is very much in our interests and which the Irish people have chosen overwhelmingly to be on. The question today is whether to make further prudent progress along that path or whether we turn around and go back. The Irish people, reflecting both common sense and imagination, have chosen Europe. There have always been those who questioned that choice but, I have no doubt, however, that the broad consensus in favour of our commitment to the Community remains.
Claims have been made that the question of whether we join our partners in the Community in ratifying the Single European Act is somehow of little importance. It is suggested that if we did not ratify the Single Act things would continue more or less as before. This is quite simply not true. The fact of the matter is that the Single Act cannot take effect until it has been ratified by all of the member states. If Ireland were to prevent or to delay the coming into effect of the Single Act it would have a long term and probably irretrievably damaging effect on our position, our standing and our influence in the European Community. The Government are determined that Ireland should, in common with all of its Community partners, honour the commitment to ratify the Single Act by the end of the year.
I am, therefore, asking today for the support of the House for ratification of the Single Act. I do so in the certainty that the Single Act not only protects our interests but will serve to promote them. I do so in the belief that it will enable the Community better to overcome the challenges which confront it and I do so in the confidence that the contributions made by Deputies in this debate and the vote which concludes it will reflect both the aspirations and the fundamental interests of the Irish people. There is nothing to fear from the Single Act. There is much to lose by rejecting it, there is much to gain by associating ourselves fully and wholeheartedly with it.
It is dishonest and misleading for the Taoiseach, Government Ministers or anyone else to attempt to put the ratification of this Single European Act across as something of great benefit to the people of this country because that is not, in fact, the case.
In dealing with the Single European Act, Dáil Éireann and the Irish people are faced with a very troublesome and difficult decision. There are clearly from Ireland's point of view many things involved that are not for our benefit or that will not be advantageous to us as a small member state on the periphery of the community. If we had any great freedom of choice I do not think that we would opt for this particular instrument as a means of developing and improving the Community. It weakens our position and it contains inherent dangers and only time will show whether they materialise or not. The alternative, however, of not ratifying the treaty and not accepting the changes is one which would have even more serious implications for us.
It is not possible, now that we have arrived at the ratification stage, to reverse what was agreed during the negotiations. What we must try and do now is preserve what we can in the new situation into which this Government have walked us. Again and again in the last few years this Government have taken the easy way out, deciding not to be difficult but to go along with the popular view. In the cosy diplomatic club of which they are grateful and accommodating members, they adopt a low profile and permit our national interests to be submerged, rather than be seen to be awkward or difficult.
That we are now faced with this agonising dilemma is entirely the responsibility of this present Coalition Government. They cannot resort to their favourite trick of trying to blame somebody else. The damage was actually done by their neglect and ineffectiveness some way back along the line, though we are only facing the consequences now. Our position should have been defined and protected during the proceedings of the Dooge Committee and in the negotiations that took place subsequent to the publication of that report. It was at that stage that Ireland lost out because of the unwillingness and the failure of this Government to stand firm and reserve our position in the areas of vital concern to us. They failed to do that and have thereby been guilty of a grave dereliction of their duty to the people of this nation.
Ireland's commitment to membership of the European Community cannot be questioned by anyone. Fianna Fáil brought Ireland into the Community after a long period of preparation and negotiation. Both in Opposition and in Government Fianna Fáil have been totally committed to and active in developing Ireland's membership. We went into Europe with a massive majority of the Irish voters — 83 per cent — as clear a majority as it is possible to obtain in a democratic society.
At no stage since has membership itself ever been placed in question. Our situation contrasts favourably with other member countries, where major parties have at one time or another been committed to withdrawal.
Britain has renegotiated her membership twice, Greece once and France absented herself from the Council table for a long period. The debate on this Act, therefore, must be seen in the context of our complete commitment to the principle of community membership.
It was particularly inappropriate and irresponsible for the Taoiseach and Government Ministers to attempt to downgrade our membership and denigrate the quality of our commitment to the community. They sought to reduce our membership to the lowest possible begging-bowl level. The Taoiseach tried bogeyman tactics; tried to silence debate and tried to frighten us into believing that we dare not raise legitimate questions about the impact or the implications for Ireland of the Single European Act. There is deep resentment in many quarters at the attempts made by the Taoiseach and by members of this Government to bulldoze the Single European Act through in this way and to suggest that if we did not accept it immediately and without question all sorts of benefits would be withdrawn. Let it be clearly understood that any benefits and indeed disadvantages that accrue to this country from membership of the Community arise from the operation of Community policy and not on the basis of gratuitous handouts. Questions have been raised about the Act in other member states without any question being made that their membership was somehow in question.
Are the Government really saying that if the Germans or the French have some genuine political difficulty with some aspect of this Act, questions would arise about withholding of Community benefits from them or from the Danes whose Parliament actually rejected this Act? Is the Government in effect saying that there is a two-tier Community already — those who have the right to do and say as they please, and smaller states like Ireland that just have to take what they are given and keep quiet?
The Community, as we have sometimes discovered to our cost, is a tough place, where every member state must argue its corner if it is not to be ignored or brushed aside. Bargaining and negotiation are basic to the Community and the way it conducts its business. Let us recall that other member states have adopted positions that we have scarcely even contemplated. Britain held up Community business for about three years over her budget contributions. Italy has imposed temporary import charges on goods coming from other Community countries. Germany has employed the veto while arguing for its abolition.
The Taoiseach tried to treat the Irish people and Dáil Éireann in a very offhand manner by adopting the attitude that our only function was to ratify mechanically whatever it is the Government have agreed to. Why does the Constitution demand that all international agreements must be ratified by Dáil Éireann if the ratification procedure is to be a mere automatic rubber stamp and if Dáil Éireann is not allowed to debate meaningfully this and other important international agreements? We are quite entitled to debate this issue and to demand any additional safeguards or reservations that may be required.
Fianna Fáil have already compelled the Government to produce, if very reluctantly, the equivalent to a White Paper on the Single European Act. The Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed that such a document was unnecessary, pointing by way of excuse, to a few pages in the twice yearly Report on Developments in the European Communities which provided only a list of contents of the Single European Act. The booklet produced under pressure from us does not answer all the questions but at least its publication made the Government attempt to face up to some of the doubts and arguments.
The Government have now belatedly decided to put down a motion which asks the Dáil to reaffirm our neutrality. But surely that is precisely what Fianna Fáil are seeking in our declaration? The Government should now have no difficulty acceding to our proposal. If Dáil Éireann explicitly declares that we adhere to our policy of neutrality, as requested by the Government, then it is a natural and logical extension of the process to attach that declaration to the Single European Act and bring it specifically to the attention of the other signatories. It is not sensible for Dáil Éireann to make such a declaration and not let the other signatories of the Single European Act know about it.
We have doubts and fears about aspects of this Act. They arise in the context of our commitment to Europe and they are legitimate. It is foolish to ignore the disadvantages for Ireland that will arise from the changes that the Single European Act will bring. The days of starry-eyed enthusiasm are long gone. For some time now it has been a question of realistically measuring the balance of advantages and disadvantages of membership of the Community.
I would like, at the outset, to deal with the constitutional issue because in a sense it hangs over the entire ratification process like a cloud and introduces a major element of uncertainty to the whole procedure. It is very likely to lead to serious difficulties in the future. It will immediately, in a number of areas, give rise to doubt and uncertainty. The Dáil must look very carefully into this issue and satisfy itself, if it can, that the assurances it is being offered by the Government are satisfactory. It is however, the Government's responsibility to decide whether a referendum is necessary. It is they who must accept the outcome of that decision.
This Bill proposes to incorporate into Irish domestic law those parts of the Single European Act which change in a major way the original Treaties which established the Community. That was the procedure incorporated in our domestic law followed in the case of the original Treaties when we joined. But the 1972 referendum and the Article it inserted in the Constitution ensured that as part of our domestic law, the treaties could not even be challenged as being unconstitutional. The question we now have to face is whether this new Treaty, when it is incorporated into our law, will also be above constitutional challenge. If it is not, then it is only a matter of time until some person or corporation affected by its provisions will challenge it in our courts.
This Bill sets out to confer new law-making powers on the Council of Ministers. The Council would be empowered to establish a new court with jurisdiction to hear and determine in the first instance certain classes of action and proceedings in Community law.
Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution vests the sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State in the Oireachtas. Article 34.1 of the Constitution provides that justice shall be administered in courts established by law by judges appointed in the manner provided by the Constitution. If there were nothing else involved then this legislation would clearly be repugnant to both those Articles. But of course there is the other factor, which is the change made in our Constitution by the referendum of 1972. That referendum inserted a new provision in the Constitution, namely Article 29.4.3 which authorises our membership of the Communities and goes on to declare:
...No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions, thereof, from having the force of law in the State.
The terms of that paragraph are wide but the question is: are they wide enough to cover what is actually a new Treaty? Is ratifying this new Treaty something which is "necessitated by the obligations of membership"? In the explanatory guide the Government express the opinion that the incorporation of this new Treaty into our law by this legislation, comes within the terms of Article 29.4.3 because this new Treaty is an obligation of membership of the Communities as it contains limited amendments of the Treaties by the common agreement of members states. In this regard the explanatory guide refers to Article 236 of the EC Treaty and the corresponding Articles of the other Community Treaties which expressly envisage the possibility that the Treaties may be amended and establish procedures for that purpose. However, unlike previous amending Treaties, the Single European Act before us, in its text does not refer at all to Article 236 of the EC Treaty or the corresponding Articles of the other Community Treaties.
In the absence of an authoritative interpretation by the Supreme Court of Article 29.4.3 it is difficult to assess whether the opinion of the Government is correct. Given that this Article may infringe the citizen's right to invoke the fundamental rights guaranteed by other provisions of the Constitution the courts may take a strict view of what is meant by "obligations necessitated by membership of the Communities".
A finding of unconstitutionality after the enactment of this legislation would have serious consequences for this State. The State would be in breach of international obligations. An embarrassing conflict would arise between the Irish courts and the European Court of Justice which is obliged to ensure the uniformity of Community law in all the member states. In these circumstances the question must be very seriously posed if it is wise for the Government to proceed with this Bill without putting the matter beyond doubt by way of referendum. The Government are apparently prepared to take that chance. That is their decision, but it is a very casual attitude to adopt on a matter of very great importance and significance. Surely a far better and wiser course would have been to hold a referendum earlier this year and put the matter beyond doubt or challenge.
Many people are deeply concerned about the implications of the Single European Act for the protection of the fundamental rights recognised in the Irish Constitution. A clear case has been made, and the Government have not answered it.
These fundamental rights are enunciated in Articles 40 to 44 of the Constitution. These articles cover personal rights, the family, education, property and religion. The common preamble to the Single European Act refers for the first time to the fundamental rights recognised in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms under the auspices of the Council of Europe. It is argued that the Single European Act can, therefore, be taken to authorise the European Court of Justice to regard the Human Rights Convention as providing that court with the principles to which it should adhere in the field of fundamental rights. While Community law overrides not merely domestic law but the Constitution as well and has the force of law, the Human Rights Convention does not have direct force of law in Ireland at present.
The argument is that the fundamental rights set out in the Convention where they are in conflict with the fundamental rights laid down in Articles 40-44 of the Irish Constitution may well prevail. This would mean in theory at least that the European Court of Justice could overturn fundamental rights as enshrined in the Irish Constitution in favour of principles set out in the European Convention. The Government fail to deal definitely or satisfactorily with that issue in the explanatory guide. There is a case to be answered so that the Oireachtas can decide whether an appropriate amendment is needed to the Bill or to the instrument of ratification.
Fianna Fáil are concerned, and this concern is widely shared, about the changes in the institutions of the Community proposed by the Single Act. The influence which we can exert as a member state depends on a proper balance being maintained between the various Community institutions. It would be in the interests of Ireland, as a member state, to maintain the central position of a unanimous Council of Ministers in Community decision-making. In that Council, Ireland has the same representation as any other member state. Our Minister as a member of the Council of Minister is responsible to Dáil Éireann — our member of the Commission is not. Political and legal requirements of unanimity on the Council of Minister permit small member states like us to protect their essential interests in the Community through that Council. The proposed changes in the procedures of the Council of Ministers which permit voting by qualified majority rather than by unanimity of certain matter covered by the Treaty, without doubt are to our disadvantage and put us in a position where we will certainly not be able to defend our interests from as strong a base as we can now do.
It is also proposed to establish a new co-operation procedure between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The explanatory guide concedes that this co-operation procedure offers scope to the Parliament to increase its influence. One may question whether this rather cumbersome co-operation procedure will contribute to the efficient disposal of Community business. Again this must diminish our position. No matter how able our parliamentary representatives may be in the European Parliament, their relatively small number will militate against their having a very significant role to play in what has become a consumer-interest parliament.
The Single Act proposes to permit a more extensive delegation of power by the Council of Ministers to the Commission. Article Ten of the Single European Act states that the Council shall confer on the Commission powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays down.
It is clearly the intention, particularly in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy, to delegate increased management powers to the Commission. This is an important shift in the power mechanisms of the Community which can hardly be to our advantage especially where our agricultural interests are concerned. The Commission has a wide range of responsibilities and priorities which are totally different from the very special function of the Council of Agricultural Ministers. The Commission is increasingly concerned about the budget and its preoccupation is with monetary budgetary constraints and constrictions. Agricultural Ministers meeting in Council on the other hand have clear responsibility to their national parliaments to secure and protect the interests of their farming sectors. The change here is significant and must be fully appreciated and understood.
Given the vital part agriculture plays in the Irish economy, we must be concerned that increased powers to the Commission may be exercised to cut off essential supports to farmers with no debate or even notice. The 14th report of the Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities on the Spinelli Draft Treaty which established a European Union stated that increased powers for the European Parliament and the phasing out of the national veto were areas of particular difficulty for Ireland.
We signalled well in advance our serious concern about the wording of Title III of the Single European Act in relation to political co-operation. That concern was expressed before the draft took final shape in a series of debates going back to the summer of 1985. It will be recalled that I directed the attention of this House to the implications of the Dooge report, the Franco-German drafts and then the Single European Act. The Government, as usual, paid no attention.
The first sentences of Articles 6 (a) and 6 (b) of Title III can certainly be interpreted as posing a challenge to our neutrality. These state first that "The High Contracting Parties consider that closer co-operation on question of European Security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters", "The High Contracting Parties are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security".
The Government's claim that the Single European Act protects and recognises Irish neutrality for the first time cannot be sustained. On the contrary, it commits us to a position of closer co-operation on questions of European Security, and that term "Security" is unqualified in any way and presumably is used in the same manner as in Clause 6c where there is reference to closer co-operation in the field of security within the WEU and NATO. It seems likely that there will be increased pressure on us in the future to co-ordinate on all aspects of security including the military ones.
The outcome of the European Council in London last weekend is a vivid illustration of the pressures that are likely to arise in future. That European Council attempted to draft a statement on behalf of the Community referring explicitly to the Western Alliance and no matter what the Taoiseach may have said or done, it was nonetheless incorporated into the Presidency notes.
Of course, European leaders assembled at the European Council can informally discuss any matter they choose. There are, for example, bilateral Anglo-Irish meetings on matters in which the Community does not have competence. The crucial requirement however is that they should not involve Ireland in any statements they may wish to make about NATO matters. Unfortunately, there is a persistent and worrying tendency to try to blur the distinction between the Community and the Western Alliance.
Thus, last weekend once again there was an attempt to include a statement covering military aspects of security. What in fact was involved was a hybrid statement, the first three paragraphs were on behalf of the European Council as a whole and the last paragraph was to be on behalf of the Heads of State and Governments who are members of the Western Alliance. The whole statement was to have been presented as a European Council statement, even though the last paragraph only committed the eleven.
The Taoiseach has repeatedly claimed that military aspects of security are excluded from the practice of European political co-operation. How can that be reconciled with the proposed statement of the European Council which deals explicitly with arms control and nuclear weapons, and solidarity within the Alliance?
The Taoiseach, Fine Gael and Labour Minister have misled the public, and misrepresented the Single European Act by claiming that military aspects of security are specifically or categorically excluded. They are not and all that can be said is that they are not specifically included. It should be noted that a British spokesman was able to argue last weekend that it is "just not possible to distinguish the military from the political aspects of security".
Article 6c says that "Nothing in this Title shall impede closer co-operation in the field of security between certain of the High Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance". The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office interpret this in a manner that is not reassuring either. The British Foreign Office states: "The third paragraph establishes clearly that close co-ordination among the Twelve is not intended to cut across the work of either the Atlantic Alliance or of WEU". In other words, in the British view, the Twelve are precluded from taking any position through the Community that cuts across NATO. If this interpretation were correct it would introduce an entirely new and unacceptable principle into European political co-operation.
It is obvious that once this Act is ratified Ireland will be under acute pressure to go some further distance. Our partners, many of them unconcerned with the minutiae of the Single European Act, will take the view that they can now discuss and issue statements on all aspects of security, including defence if they so wish, on behalf of the Community, whether or not Ireland subscribes to them.
On each occasion there is an inching forward, and the stage reached is used as a springboard to go further. We have now reached the situation where we can and must go no further. We have reached, perhaps gone beyond, what is strictly compatible with Irish neutrality. It is absolutely incumbent on us to make clear to our partners at this stage that Irish neutrality is going to be maintained, and that we will not allow any further erosion of it.
The declaration that Fianna Fáil have proposed is a statement of position, a statement of intent that Title III does not and cannot affect our long-established policy of neutrality. The declaration makes it explicit that the co-ordination of positions does not include as far as we are concerned the military aspects of security or procurement for such purposes, and does not affect Ireland's capacity to act or refrain from acting in any way affecting our status of neutrality. That is how we propose to interpret the ambiguous language of Article 6.
Let me point out that the all-party Oireachtas Joint Committee adopted the same position as Fianna Fáil, when they called on the Government to append a formal reiteration of our position of military neutrality to the act of ratification. The Government should respect and respond to the view of that all-party committee and agree to our motion, which exactly expresses the wishes of the committee.
The insertion of our declaration is not an issue of confidence in the Government, but it is in the national interest, that Ireland's position be clearly understood. We should avail of this process of ratification to signal that we are prepared to make a stand on the matter, and are not going to be pushed further and further along the road that leads directly into membership of NATO.
I am not impressed nor would any Member of the House be terribly impressed with the reason the Minister has just given for not adopting our declaration. The Government are doing no more than saying that if we put in this declaration it would introduce an element of conditionality into our ratification of the Act. Surely that does not stand up. A multitude of declarations have already been made by other signatories. Does the Minister for Foreign Affairs suggest that those other declarations by other signatories introduce an element of conditionality? The Danes put in a very specific political declaration about their ability to engage in Nordic co-operation. Does the Minister's argument apply to that declaration? The Minister cannot legitimately maintain that because we wish to add another declaration to the many declarations that are already there we are introducing any possible element of conditionality into our ratification. The other point the Minister seemed to be making in his speech was that the insertion of this declaration would not take note of what was already in the Act in satisfaction of our wishes in regard to neutrality. That is not a persuasive argument either. What may or may not be in the Act about neutrality is certainly open to different interpretation but surely that should not inhibit us or prevent us from making it absolutely crystal clear by way of the declaration which we propose to introduce.
Fianna Fáil are satisfied that the declaration which we are seeking to have annexed to the instrument of ratification is in accordance with the established principles of international law. Customary international law permits a State to make an interpretative declaration on one or more of the provisions of a treaty at the time of ratification. An authority in international law for this practice may be found in the advisory opinion in the International Court of Justice on the Reservations to Genocide Convention, ICJ Reports (1951) 15.
In the opinion of the International Court of Justice such declarations are admissible where the declaration is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty in question.
I take it that the Government will not attempt to argue that the declaration of our position either on the economy or in respect of military neutrality is not compatible with the terms of the Single Act. Many instances can be cited in recent State practice where such declarations have been made on the ratification of a treaty. In 1972 the Republic of Austria included a declaration with the instrument of ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
In 1975 the Republic of Italy made a declaration on the deposit on the instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Although Ireland has not ratified the Vienna Convention and the law of Treaties, jurists have cited the provisions of this convention as evidence of international law. Article 19 of the Vienna Convention permits a state in signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty to formulate a reservation unless the reservation is prohibited by the treaty or the treaty provides that only specified reservations which do not include the reservation in question may be made or the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
The Single Act does not prohibit reservations or permit only specified reservations. The declaration we propose, therefore, is clearly compatible with the object and purposes of the Single Act. The declaration deals, first, with our economic development needs and recites the terms of Protocol 30 of the Act of Accession of Ireland to the European Communities. Our declaration simply reiterates the existing principles which govern our economic relationship with the Community and our special situation which was recognised at the time of our accession and which is enshrined in Protocol 30 attaching to the Treaties. As such, it is of course compatible with the object and purposes of the Single Act.
The declaration goes on to state that the provisions of Title III do not affect Ireland's long established policy of military neutrality and that co-ordination of positions on the political and economic aspects of security does not include the military aspects of security or procurement for such purposes and does not affect Ireland's capacity to act or refrain from acting in a way which might affect Ireland's international status of military neutrality.
I argue that the inclusion or annexation of this declaration to our instrument of ratification is absolutely in accordance with normal practice of international law. I mention that because the Department of Foreign Affairs, apparently in an excess of zeal when we first published our declaration, rushed out hurriedly with a statement that such a declaration would not be in accordance with good international practice. There is absolutely no reason, as we understand it and as we are advised, in international law why this Dáil should not annex this declaration to the instrument of ratification. I do not think the Minister in his speech attempted to suggest that we would in any way be in breach of normal practice by inserting or annexing this declaration to our instrument of ratification.
Government spokesmen have argued that there is an implicit recognition of Irish neutrality in the provisions of Title III of the Single Act. I do not think there is but whether there is or not it is clearly necessary and desirable in view of the fundamental importance of this policy issue from our point of view, to have an explicit reiteration of our long established policy of military neutrality included by way of declaration as other countries have done in regard to matters of special importance to them.
As I have said, the Danish Government annexed a declaration to the final Act which stated that conclusion of Title III and European political co-operation in this sphere of foreign policy would not affect Denmark's participation in Nordic co-operation. That is a very clear political declaration and it is also clear that it is not incompatible with the objects and purposes of Title III of the Single Act.
We reject any suggestion that other member states might refuse to accept our declaration. There are no grounds for such doubts. Article 20 of the Vienna Convention states that when it appears from the limited number of the negotiating states and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties. It is difficult to understand how the other member states could refuse to accept this declaration when a substantial number of similar declarations were made by the Governments of member states on the signature of the Single Act.
Therefore, I cannot see from any direction what objection the Government have to our amendment and to the annexation of the declaration we have proposed to the instrument of ratification. As I have said, it is entirely in accordance with international law to annex a declaration of this kind which is compatible with the purposes of the treaty, with the instrument of ratification. Our declaration is not incompatible with the terms and objectives of the Treaties. The Government are asking Dáil Éireann to confirm what in effect are the essential elements of our declaration. Therefore, I cannot understand why the Government will not accept our amendment and our declaration. If their only remaining argument is that it is not necessary to make this declaration, surely that is not valid? Whether it is necessary or not, can there be any objection to inserting a declaration for the benefit of those who may think something of this kind is necessary?
I want to make it clear to the House that Fianna Fáil are fully conscious of the many benefits that membership of the Community has brought. The Minister has elaborated on a number of them. At political level membership of the Community brought a valuable new dimension to our national life making us more outward looking, conscious of our European heritage and establishing a whole range of new relationships, contacts and experiences. A new confidence became part of our political and economic life when we joined. It is quite reasonable to argue that while in a strictly legal sense we sacrificed some element of national sovereignty on becoming a member it is also true that politically we have enhanced our independence and sovereignty through our active membership of the Community.
Community membership has also had a major impact on the structure of our economy. During the late seventies and early eighties particularly, the pace of industrialisation was quickened. New high technology industries have been established in all parts of Ireland and for two or three years our growth rate and level of investment were the highest in Europe. The exports from these industries have done something towards sustaining the economy through the long recession we have been experiencing.
Our agriculture has been transformed by Community membership. The standard of living of farmers has steadily improved, at least until recently. Even though the CAP is now coming under severe pressure the basic support systems it provides are indispensable to our agricultural industry. For instance, we have had the headage payments scheme, a common policy for sheep, and a western package to assist farmers in some of the least developed parts of the country.
On the other hand, it can be argued that insufficient attention was paid to the fisheries question during the negotiations. A major programme for the development of our marine resources is now an urgent national priority and an initiative scheme could be undertaken to secure full Community backing for such a programme.
In the past 13 years Ireland has undertaken major infrastructural investment, some of it funded by the EC. The EC has acted also as a spur to improve our range and telecommunications system. The Social Fund, from which we have substantially benefited, has helped greatly with the training of our young people. The research policy of the Community has given valuable contracts to scientists working in our universities and other research bodies.
The European Community has undeniably had also a positive impact on raising both our industrial standards while on the whole the pressure to improve our environmental standards has been helpful as has been the full impact of the EC on social legislation, for example, in the area of the protection of workers.
It is not possible in this debate for me to explore the complexities of the monetary area and the relative merits of membership of the EMS and a fixed link with sterling. It is, however, necessary to say that for whatever reason we have not fully availed of the opportunity in the financial area that membership of the EMS at least in theory opened up for us.
Let us, therefore, acknowledge the positive aspects but admit the existence of negative ones as well. After 13 years of EC membership we have massive unemployment and a resumption of emigration on the scale of the 1950s. Unemployment is now four times what it was when we entered the EC. Membership may not be, probably is not, the cause of the present level of unemployment and emigration, but what we can say is that membership did not prevent it happening.
Undoubtedly, many traditional industries and even industries that came here in the fifties and sixties have closed down, as a result both of competition from within the EC and the constant pressure of the liberalisation policies pursued by the EC with third countries. It is, I believe, an indictment of the EC that unemployment has been allowed to rise to such a devastating level, not merely in Ireland but in other countries as well, without any serious effort being made to combat it.
Quite clearly, monetarist objectives have been given clear precedence over jobs. Partly as a result, about 16 million people are now unemployed throughout the Community. Here in Ireland we have an unemployment rate of close to 240,000, with emigration at over 30,000 a year. This was certainly not a situation that we expected to find ourselves in, 13 years after joining the Community.
Our farmer's per capita incomes have fallen below the 1983 level in real terms. Whatever is happening to the hundreds of millions of receipts from the CAP, they are not even succeeding in sustaining a steady level of farm income.
The latest census figures show an increasing flight from the land. There are 100,000 or one-third fewer people working on the land than there were when we joined the EC. This accelerating flight from the land, despite conditions of high unemployment, is contrary to one of the main principles of the CAP; a fair standard of living is not being ensured for Irish farmers, and their individual real earnings are decreasing, not increasing. It is important to make that point when Government Ministers and commentators tell us about all the great benefits we have received from the Community and keep repeating the figures of the transfers of money from the Community to this country. There are two sides to the whole process of our developing membership.
A study carried out by the NESC in 1981 showed that in the first seven years of Community membership when, in comparison with the present depression Ireland was actually progressing, no progress of any kind had really been made in closing the gap between the poorer and the richer member states.
It is time another study was carried out now, several years further on. It would very likely show a marked widening of the gap rather than any catching up. This represents a failure of the Community to achieve one of its stated aims, which to quote the preamble of the Treaty of Rome was "to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions".
There is either some flaw in the basic concept or the instruments to achieve it are inadequate or there is a plain refusal by the Community, or at least by the richer members, to take it seriously and implement the necessary policies. What we must do is examine this Single European Act on the basis of whether it purports or is likely to make any worthwhile difference to this major defect in the economic and social life of the Community. That defect is, of course, the continuing growth in disparity between the more favoured and the less favoured regions of the Community.
No one, of course, can exclude some share of responsibility by ourselves for failing to make as good use as we might have of the opportunities of membership, and I include in that the social partners, Governments, industry, trade unions and farmers. Some of the gains of membership, especially the windfalls in the years following 1973, were frittered away on immediate consumption rather than trying to build a solid and lasting base for future progress.
I have long called for the drawing up of a balance sheet of the positive and negative impact of EC policies, so that we can get away once and for all from simplistic slogans about £900 million transfers or begging bowls. We should also compare our performance with that of other member states. It is essential that we should have a comprehensive basis from which to argue our case in Brussels. I regret we do not have such a balance sheet for the purposes of this debate. Every time we exaggerate the positive effects of EC policies we artificially play down our case in Brussels. The Government should have used this opportunity to conduct a fundamental renegotiation of our position within the Community. They have not done so, preferring apparently as much for personal kudos as anything else to posture as good Europeans while Ireland's legitimate and urgent case went by default.
The background to the Single European Act is well-known. On the other hand it represented a final effort by the political forces that brought the European Community into being 30 years ago to fulfil the promise of European union. Altiero Spinelli before he died was the moving spirit in the European Parliament. Converging with this, but with very different ideological motivations, were the free marketeers who wanted to complete the internal market without barriers by the early 1990s. This seems to be the mission of the British member of the Commission, Lord Cockfield. There are also, generally, but not exclusively, right-wing forces who would dearly wish to see the Community become totally and completely involved in defence matters.
There is always a difficulty when confronting European agreements and declarations of knowing how literally they are to be taken. Very far-reaching language in the past has often led to very little, for example the commitment in 1972 to political, economic and monetary union by 1990. If one were to have believed all one read about the principles of the Common Agricultural Policy or cohesion, convergence and reducing regional disparities, one would have to be very disappointed at the lack of progress.
I think it is fair to note that some of the very committed Europeans are extremely disappointed with the Single European Act and regard it as likely to be largely ineffective. Judge Pescatore, formerly of the European Court, wrote a scathing analysis of the Act earlier this year, pointing out that there were a large number of loopholes in the clauses concerning the realisaton of the internal market, allowing an increased resort to national protectionism. The judge pointed out that in the monetary area progress is effectively blocked. In the foreign policy area he noted that "for the first time in such a context European security is mentioned, without, however, outlining any commitment whatsoever. All these erratic formulations only serve unfortunately to demonstrate the political incoherency of Western Europe".
He said the type of the Act is characterised by grandiloquence and ambiguity, and considered that Governments and the European Parliament were imprudent in the extreme to launch the whole process leading to the Act, as he felt that elements of regression outweighs those of progress.
A German Professor, Professor Weidenfeld, writing in the semi-official German bulletin Foreign Affairs is of a similar opinion. He points out that the increase in qualified majority voting is balanced out by a wide range of exceptions and concludes: “It would thus be wrong to speak of a far-reaching correction of the decision-making procedure. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the onus of completing the internal market by 1992 should be taken more seriously than previous commitments and deadlines, which the European Community set itself — and rarely abided by: and, as a matter of piquancy this includes the internal market itself”. He points out that Britain and Greece went along with the Intergovernmental Conference but acted as brakes, and that “Denmark formulated its rejection of the prospect of a political union with downright brutality”.
In this country debate was concentrated more on possible far-reaching effects of the Act rather than fears about its inadequacies, but it is as well to be aware of those other views to help put the Single European Act in perspective, particularly as the Minister seems to wax quite lyrical about it, its potential and its benefits. We, too, are concerned about inadequacies in the Act in some areas and I would now like to outline in some detail what our principal concerns are.
One of the stated purposes of this new Act is to enable the Community to perform more effectively. There is general concern that the Community's economic performance is falling behind not only that of the United States and Japan, but even of smaller European countries outside the EC, such as Austria, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden. The prescription for this, as contained in the Single European Act, is nothing more than the completion of the internal markets, in other words, the removal of all the various barriers to trade which still remain. I think something more than that is required to re-launch the economy of the Community.
Theoretically, we should be in a position to benefit from the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. Whether we will in practice benefit more than we will lose from these changes depends on many factors, including our own ability to cope with the greatly intensified competition which we can anticipate from partners much more favourably situated than we are.
We must have misgivings about the completion of the Common Market. Our economy in its present weakened and depressed state is vulnerable to competition, especially unrestricted competition from powerful cartels in Europe. The Single European Act offers no special safeguards, even of a transitional kind. Many supporters of the completion of the internal market forces foresee difficulties for some countries and regions. The Act itself speaks of "the extent of the effort that certain economies showing differences in development will have to sustain during the period of the establishment of the internal market". That is as clear an admission as any that the process will be easier for the more developed central economies than for the less developed ones. A starker way of putting it is that on its own, completion of the internal market could actually aggravate or accentuate disparities between different regions of the Community, making, in fact, the rich richer, and the poor poorer.
This is spelt out somewhat more clearly in Lord Cockfield's Commission Paper on completion of the internal market. This report states that one of the three main objectives is of "ensuring that the market is flexible so that resources, both of people and materials, and of capital and investment flow into the areas of greatest economic advantage". This can hardly be reconciled with the objective of promoting harmonious development in the Community. The scenario presented is that economic activity and industry would concentrate in the central areas of the Community — south east England, northern France, the Benelux countries, Germany and northern Italy. Lord Cockfield goes on to say: "We recognise that many of the changes we propose will present considerable difficulties for Member States but the benefits... are so great that they should not be denied to its citizens because of difficulties faced by individual Member States". Adam Smith could hardly have put it better.
One of the more disturbing features of the Government's explanatory guide to the Single European Act is that it hardly refers to any difficulties that may be faced by Ireland. The Government, with the exception of a reference to the insurance industry and some comments about indirect taxation, did not admit to there being any difficulties. Some of the foreign advocates of the Act are being more realistic about this matter than the Irish Government.
At a seminar in the summer at the European University in Florence a German professor stated that the realisation of the single market would sometimes imply heavy economic and social costs, with the elimination of weaker firms and a temporary increase in unemployment.
Our question is whether the burden of realising the internal market is going to be borne disproportionately by the least developed countries on the periphery of Europe, such as Ireland. This Government and the Department of Foreign Affairs are scarcely prepared even to recognise that there may be a potential problem. If doubts are genuinely expressed from any quarter they are met with supercilious and irrelevant references to our need for all the benefits the Community is supposed to have conferred upon us.
In one particular area, the harmonisation of indirect taxes, even though it will require unanimity must inevitably give rise to difficulties, and present "acutely difficult problems for Ireland". Article 17 states that ‘The Council shall, acting unanimously... adopt the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation'. The Government's attitude, quite different from the Commission's again, is that this poses no problem at all for Ireland, as unanimous voting is required. I must say this shows an astonishingly superficial attitude to a serious commitment that we are supposed to be making. Having accepted harmonisation in principle, we are hardly going to be allowed to block it indefinitely in practice. Not only would the harmonisation of indirect taxation involve an estimated loss of £1 billion pounds from our budget, it would make it very difficult to sustain our current tax policies. Rates on houses and VAT on food and drink would be involved and it would make the maintenance of the 10 per cent rate of corportion tax virtually impossible to sustain. Nobody doubts, of course, that our indirect taxes are too high and that they ought to be reduced, but the drastic reduction envisaged would leave a huge hole of about £1 billion in the public finances.
The Ministers of this Government, before their gross mismanagement of the public finances brought us to the present state of deep crisis, were in the habit of preaching about financial and economic independence. That, of course, was before they sent for the IMF. It all sounds very hollow now as we contemplate the implications of the completion of the internal market of the Community and harmonisation of taxes.
The Government do acknowledge that harmonisation would create serious difficulties and could only be envisaged in a situation where there was much greater harmonisation of the level of economic development and transfers of resources on a scale several times larger than at present. Unfortunately, the Single European Act does not contain any comment of that kind. A future Irish Government may well find themselves in some considerable difficulty and under a lot of pressure in this area.
It is absolutely vital and imperative that Ireland be in a position to retain flexibility in regard to tax incentives, particularly where investment is concerned. The Community recognised that at the time of our accession to the EC, and I think it important politically that member states whenever they open the Single European Act should be reminded of their commitment to support Ireland's industrial development policy as set out in Protocol 30. For this reason Fianna Fáil have proposed that this vital national interest be put forward now by way of a declaration so that our position and approach are absolutely clear to our partners. Our position on this has also been endorsed by the all-party Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities.
The Government have set great store by Article 23 which relates to economic and social cohesion, pointing out that it writes the Regional Policy into the Treaties. The only commitment under this section is that the Commission shall submit a comprehensive proposal to the Council to clarify and rationalise the tasks of the structural funds so as to increase their efficiency. There is absolutely no commitment, however, to increase the funds on the part of the Commission, still less of the Council. No amount of clarification or rationalisation will make all that much difference, if the fund remains strictly limited in size. Unfortunately, words come cheap and we have had many declarations and communique's all on much the same lines as this part of the Single European Act. Indeed, there is virtually nothing new about it.
I note moreover that precedence is given in this section to the co-ordination of economic policies, and the belief expressed that this of itself should strengthen cohesion and reduce regional disparities. There is no suggestion anywhere that the Regional Fund is inadequate. The Government have negotiated badly and ineffectively. The Taoiseach in London last weekend made empty noises, for home consumption of course, about the Single European Act having to be balanced with strong measures to help peripheral regions of the EC, like Ireland, cope with the challenge of the removal of all barriers to trade in goods and services. He is too late saying that in London. That should have been negotiated when the Treaty was being formulated and specific undertakings included in it.
The strategy behind the Single European Act misses out completely what could be the biggest factor in stimulating European recovery, a concerted effort by EC Governments to tackle unemployment. Instead, what has been experienced over the last few years has been more like a concerted deflation with a correspondingly magnified impact. An official in the European Investment Bank writing in The Guardian last week explains the state the EC has got itself into — I quote:
"It is in the national interest of each Member State to rein back expenditure while hoping that other Member States will reflate and in this way to achieve export-led growth. But if every Member State acts in this way trade would not grow, the EEC region would stagnate and all Member States would be left worse off. This is precisely what has happened.
He goes on to argue that the EC should reflate led by France, West Germany, Britain and Italy. I argued that as far back as 1981-82, and I believe the present Taoiseach has on occasion done the same. I think the Government should point out to their partners that the Act itself does not really indicate any solution to the economic problems of the Community particularly the problem of unemployment, and that it does not diminish in any way the need for a concerted policy approach to this central failure in the economic life of the Community.
The debate on this Single European Act will naturally concentrate on Ireland's national interests and whether its adoption will contribute to the advancement or otherwise of those interests in the European Community. But there is another dimension which should also be kept in mind and that is our international standing and our relationships in the world outside the European Community.
We must not forget the fact that we do stand very well in that outside world. Over a period of decades we have done a great deal to enhance that status. In particular, we are respected as a neutral nation and, accordingly, we have been in a position to play an important part in the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. By and large, we have taken stands of principle on the important world issues, particularly where human rights are concerned. All over Africa, and indeed in other parts of the Third World, there is a tradition stretching back for over a century of service given to education and medical care in even the remotest parts of Africa, Asia and South America.
This is something far flung, widespread and important. It may not be exactly measurable in economic terms, but that does not detract from its ultimate value. We should be conscious of it and proud of it. In particular, it is a contribution that we make to a better perception of the European Community in the world, a Community which consists largely of nations with a colonial past. Our presence can do nothing but good in so far as the relationships of that Community with the outside, and particular the Third World, are concerned.
The question that must be asked is whether our international status in this regard can be maintained and made consistent with our membership of the new Community that will emerge if and when this Single Act is ratified by all the member states. There is very good reason to doubt it. In the new situation all the member states will be required to coordinate their foreign policy to a very considerable extent. This is not something vague or indefinite. Looking ahead we can see that it will only be a matter of time until some important issue will arise in some troubled spot around the world about which a majority of the members of the Community will wish to take a particular attitude. This attitude may or may not be inspired by their membership of NATO. At that point our position will come very sharply and clearly into focus. We will have no alternative, whatever our feelings may be, our neutrality may suggest or public opinion may favour, but to act upon the decision of the Community acting through the political co-operation machinery.
This Single European Act originated and grew out of a mood which had become prevalent throughout the Community in recent years. There was considerable disappointment about the failure of the Community to develop and to be more successful, to have a greater influence internationally and to become a more powerful economic entity. As a result of this general air of disillusionment, a commitee was established. During the Irish Presidency the Taoiseach designated Senator Dooge to chair that committee. It duly reported and the report gave rise to this new treaty, this Single European Act with which we are now confronted. It is because of the Dooge Committee report that we are now faced with the dilemma of whether to ratify this treaty with all its unfavourable aspects or to choose not to do so with the correspondingly difficult implications that course would involve.
I think the report of the Dooge Committee was a most unwelcome development from this country's point of view. It was an exercise in escapism. The European Community is essentially an economic one and should concentrate on its economic and social objectives, seeking to improve the economic situation of all the citizens of the member states, those who live in the peripheral regions as well as those in the prosperous centre. It has failed to do that. Any disillusionment or disenchantment with the Community that exists among the people of the Community is because of the simple fact that the Community, as an economic Community, has done badly. It has not succeeded in keeping up with the rest of the world. Other small European countries who are not members, like Sweden, Norway, Austria and Switzerland, have fared far better and survived the ravages of the world recession with much less damage than the member states of the Community.
The Government propose that Dáil Éireann leave the issue of constitutionality hanging in the air and that we proceed to ratify the Single European Act without reservation of any kind. We cannot see that in the situation this Government have created there is any alternative to ratifying, even though we fully appreciate all the detrimental implications involved for Ireland in the future. What we are doing however, and we can do no more at this stage, is to ask Dáil Éireann to build into the instrument of ratification a declaration which will seek to have our neutral status internationally and clearly acknowledged in the Community and preserve our original right to the recognition of our special economic needs which is an integral element of our membership.
Most of the agitation which this Single European Act has generated, and which was reflected in a large part of Deputy Haughey's speech, relates to its supposed threat to our so-called traditional policy of neutrality. This phrase has by now acquired a sort of sanctity. It ranks with what used to be called piously "our twin national objectives", although there has never, I think, been a proper objective public debate on this subject. Whenever the phrase is used, although we are not allowed to inspect its credentials, it is usually simply for the purpose of embarrassing political opponents. I am not saying that is the reason Deputy Haughey dwelt so long on it. I can see there are people who genuinely believe in a policy of neutrality, but I deny that this State can be described as having a traditional policy of neutrality.
We have no traditional policy of neutrality if the English language is to mean anything. This phrase, in any country but ours, would imply a steady course of conduct over a long period in which the State had consciously abstained from a whole series of conflicts in which it might very well be become involved. The truth is quite different. There was only one moment in the history of the world when it mattered a damn to ourselves, or to anybody else, whether we were going to be neutral, and that was the period of the Second World War, and in particular the years 1940 and 1941. The decision taken in 1939 by Mr. de Valera's Government, and which was then concurred with by Fine Gael and Labour, was taken by men all of whom could remember very well the First World War which they rightly considered to have been no concern of ours. They could also remember, because only 17 years had elapsed since the British walked out of Portobello, the Black and Tan period and many of them could remember further back. That must naturally have heightened their disinclination to become involved in the Second World War on the Allied side. I understand those things. I also understand why my party, with the distinguished and the honourable exception of James Dillon, unanimously agreed with the then Fianna Fáil Government that the best interests of the State would be served by remaining neutral.
In hindsight I am not so sure we can be proud of having stood aside from that struggle. Many excuses can be made for the parties of those days. I have just given one or two of them. Another is that the true dimensions of the Nazi menance in Europe were not understood in 1939 and had not unfolded to their full size and horror at that time. The exterminations, the nightmares which make one wonder whether they could have happened in Europe at all, date mostly from the middle of the war to the end of the war. When they were spoken of here, although I was only a very small boy as far as I remember they were written off as Allied propaganda. While there was every excuse and justification for people to say that the Government's policy in those days and the Opposition's policy in supporting them was, in the light of their own time, a correct one, if the Dáil of 1939 could have foreseen that the stand it took then on a particular war which had then just begun to rage would be interpreted as committing the State for good to a miserable form of neutrality which 50 years later would be taken as forbidding us to enter even a purely defensive alliance with other European democracies, democracies which not only share our values but contribute through the European Community very substantially to our material welfare, Mr. de Valera, Mr. Cosgrave, and other leaders of those days, would have regarded such a development with amazement and contempt. I do not remember Mr. de Valera enunciating a traditional policy of neutrality. That was not his style. I say that, although my evaluation of his contribution to Ireland is different from that of the gentlemen opposite. That was not his style, nor was it the style of Willie Cosgrave. They dealt with problems as and when they arose. They abstained from the early commitment of the State to policies which had never been discussed or debated in the abstract and could not have been debated in the abstract because every new day represents a new set of circumstances.
The people nowadays who shout the loudest about our traditional policy of neutrality — the Irish Left — are the very people in whose vocabulary the word "fascist" is the worst term of reproach they can think of. Nonetheless, by committing themselves to what they call a policy of Irish neutrality — perhaps they do not realise it — they are involving themselves in the avowal that if they had been alive and in this House and had any influence on the course of affairs in the period 1939-45 they would not have lifted one finger, even with the benefit of hindsight, to put down the horrors which the Nazi version of fascism wished upon Europe or to rescue our cousins from what they had to endure in those days. I hope the people who talk and who send circulars to this House about the traditional policy of neutrality are willing to live with that interpretation which logic enforces on us. If they are not willing to accept that, in other words if they are willing to say that the Second World War was different, then there were the fascist beasts to deal with and naturally we would have been anxious to play our part in putting down the Nazis, then it means we have not got a traditional policy of neutrality. It means, and this is a far more rational position to take, that every constellation of political external circumstances in the world we have to face changes like the sky every day or every month. Everyone is different. The consideration which seemed valid, and I do not deny that by all appearances they were valid in 1939-45 for our neutrality, do not necessarily apply now. If the converse is true, then that must be true.
I would have imagined that the attitude of a State which talks about its traditional policy of neutrality, where the logic of that position requires us to suppose that even with the hindsight of 45 years we would not have lifted a finger to put down the Nazis in central Europe in 1939-45, disqualifies us from being associated with free European peoples at any level. I would have supposed that kind of attitude must justify them in regarding us as lepers. But no, we are supposed to be valued members of that Community. How can we be valued members of a Community of free peoples when we proclaimed a traditional policy of neutrality which involves us, even with hindsight, abstaining from the conflict I have just described?
I consider our neutrality to be an unworthy sham, lacking in generousity towards our friends, towards the people we would be first to call on in the event of aggression or of some national catastrophe overtaking us. It is ungenerous towards them and, what is more serious, it is lacking in self-respect towards ourselves. Unhappily, it is part of the posturing which comes so easily to us. It is a very cheap indulgence because we do not spend on our defence forces as the Minister for Defence pointed out a couple of weeks ago although the Left fell on him naturally like a lot of hyenas assuming that he was selling out our neutrality. He was merely pointing out in the sober way which is native to him that neutrality demands the capacity to protect it.
I am not an international lawyer but I believe I am right in saying that the old and traditional rule of international law is that a State can only expect its neutrality to be respected if it is in a position to defend it. The reason for that is obvious. If there are two belligerents, X and Y, and if it might be an advantage to either of them to possess our territory, the only conditions on which these people who are fighting for their lives can be expected to abstain from standing in our territory is if they can be convinced that we are in a position to deny possession of it to the other belligerent. It is not a rule of morality; it is a rule of common sense. It is a rule arising from the consideration that you either kill or be killed in warfare. You cannot be expected to abstain from making use of somebody else's territory if that person, in a pious posture on his knees, says, we are too holy to get into a defensive alliance but neither will we spend 6p on fitting ourselves to deny access to our territory to all comers. It may be that in conditions of the late 20th century it is unreasonable to expect the application of that principle in full. I do not suppose even the Swedes who spend three or four times in terms of proportion of GNP on defence as we do are in a position to be certain of denying their territory to all comers. That certainly is the traditional rule and our respect for and observance of that rule is only a token one.
I do not enjoy seeing articles in international journals describing our defence forces as no better than a gendarmerie or a militia. If that is the objective judgment of people who measure an army not by the standard of training or morale or the quality of the men but by the amount invested in its equipment, I do not enjoy it but I have to accept it. In other words, we want to have it, as usual, both ways.
That is another dimension of the lack of self respect which is less serious than the first one, the unwillingness to defend our friends, but it is not a negligible one. Although I dissent radically from the idea that we have a traditional policy of neutrality, and even if we had such a thing I would still dissent from it, I realise that I am in a small minority in the House. I am not entirely alone. I know there are some not only in this party but one or two others who agree, or half agree, with what I am saying. They have said it themselves from time to time. Seán Lemass when he was Taoiseach 20 years ago and who was not a man to conceal his thoughts all that carefully — I respected him for that — said things that were not too far away from what I am saying now. He did not lacerate his fellow citizens for lack of self respect but he did on occasions say things which implied an inner willingness on his part to take up his part and play his part and, so far as his influence would go, to encourage the country to play its part in defensive arrangements with other states.
I should like to make it clear that I am not arguing for any particular format in that regard. I am not arguing for membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, I do not know enough about that group, and I am not a military expert or any other type of expert in that field. I am not arguing for membership of the Western European Union but I am arguing for us dumping at least this small item of cant and shame and saying, "that is a lot of the old foolishness, the old junk, let us get rid of it and be willing in principle in whatever format is financially and militarily possible for us and is reasonable to expect us to accept, to share the defence of this part of the globe of which we get all the benefits". I am long past military age but I have sons of military age. I hope I will not be accused of being blood thirsty but I am not trying to encourage the State into a condition where people are going to be involved in war. I hope I do not need to labour that point. I need only say that I do not expect that the people of Denmark, Holland or Belgium are any more blood thirsty either. I do not believe that the average Danish or Dutch socialist is a blood thirsty creature any more than Deputy Quinn or Deputy Mervyn Taylor, or one of the gentlemen on the far side who believe in our traditional policy of neutrality is. I do not suppose that the Danes or the Dutch are anxious to see their sons march off to war, to see devastated families and weeping mothers. They are not anxious to do that. Yet, in 1939 they thought they could avoid it all by being neutral. Like ourselves they thought that by declaring neutrality after France and Britain declared war they could avoid involvement in the war. Bitter experience showed them otherwise.
All those small countries started off neutral and it was only the big guys who got into the Second World War voluntarily. The Danes, the Dutch, the Belgians, the Norwegians, the Yugoslavs and the Greeks were neutral but they were not able to get away with it because their geographical position denied them the possibility of staying neutral during the war. The Spaniards and the Portuguese were a bit luckier. The Swedes were a bit luckier although the Swedes did collaborate in a way that the wretched Irish never would have been forgiven by the British for doing. We have to put up with enough old nonsense from them as it is about our neutrality in any shape or form. Those unlucky countries learned their lesson and when the war was over, even though they were no more blood thirsty in 1945, 1946, or 1950 than they had been in 1939, they saw that the days of isolation and neutrality for small countries which everybody else would respect were over. They voluntarily collaborated in a defensive alliance and so, naturally, did the French and Italians and the West Germans. I put emphasis on the smaller countries, the ones that are not able to defend themselves because they too wanted to stay neutral but had learned their lesson.
Deputy Haughey a short time ago — apart from his general thesis in this regard I must contest this point particularly — advanced our neutrality, perhaps inadvertently, as the basis for our participation in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations. That is one of the more pitiable of the corollary myths attached to our policy of neutrality, the idea that it gives us a standing in the world which otherwise we would not have. Does anybody seriously think that a message or a note or a posture struck by the Irish Government is going to deflect the bigger powers in the world by one inch from what they intend doing? They are people who are not blood thirsty either and I make the same assumption I made about the Danes and the Dutch about the British, the Russians, the Americans and the French. They do not want their homes and their countries devastated but they most certainly do not pay any attention to a leprechaun sitting on a fence bleating about how his knowledge of the world is superior to theirs and how he has an insight into the value of peace and values of a transcendent kind which if given two minutes to explain will make them climb down from their projects of nuclear expansion or rearmament. That is a shaming illusion. They do not take a blind bit of notice of what this country says.
With regard to the peacekeeping force Deputy Haughey spoke of I should like to know how it is, if it is a condition of being a member of a peacekeeping force that one's State be neutral, that in the peacekeeping force in the Lebanon there have been very substantial French, Italian and Dutch contingents. Undoubtedly, the Canadians, the Danes and the Norwegians have been in other countries as part of peacekeeping contingents. Those states are either members of NATO or, as in the case of France, while not being members of it are for practical purposes a part of a Western defencive alliance. I cannot see that there is anything in this policy for us except contempt from others. We can play our part in trying to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in trying to encourage a peaceful solution of disputes and earn more respect from the outside world by being ready in the first place also to defend the people we would be expecting to defend or help us.
It is, therefore, as an opponent of what is called our traditional policy of neutrality that I approach this Single European Act. Since I have certified myself as being as an opponent of this so-called traditional policy of neutrality I hope I will be believed when I say that although I wish the Act did commit us to some kind of defensive co-operation with the other free nations of western Europe I cannot see one line of the Act which does. I cannot see one line of it which tends one inch in that direction. One can split hairs and go in for political theology until one is black in the face about how it is hard to separate political co-operation or military co-operation and how one thing leads to another, we know that as part of life, but so far as my reading of this goes there is not one line which commits us to any military dimension of co-operation. I wish there was but there is not.
The reference to political co-operation seems to me to be without military dimension. That comes through explicitly in the provision which allows what it calls, certain of the high contracting parties, i.e. the European Community member states, but not the Community as a collectivity, or all the member states together, to have closer co-operation on security matters within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance. That perfectly plain provision — it seems plain to me — was misrepresented, and I hope not deliberately so, in a document from the Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which sights this provision leaving out, however, the vital words, "certain of the high contracting parties". Here is the passage from the tract I got from the Irish CND in October:
Finally, the fact that the Single European Act states specifically that nothing in it shall inhibit closer co-operation within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance, gives implicit recognition to the validity of the NATO block by the European Communities...
There is no word about the recognition of the permission for this to happen only as between certain of the five contracting parties, which clearly is intended to exclude those who are not members of those two organisations. Perhaps I should not say this about a piece of paper but if it had come from some source in here I would say it was the arrogance of people who are not members of NATO and who do not want to be members of NATO. They must be anxious to keep this country friendless, so far as they can do so on the military level. Those people do not want to give recognition to the validity of the NATO bloc. Is it not there whether we recognise it or not? Is it not a fact of life? They go on to say:
Effectively, this means that nothing done within the European political co-operation can be directed towards the dismantling of NATO, a course of action which an Irish Government may very well wish to follow in the future.
What Irish Government in the future would want to dismantle NATO? Who would take a blind bit of notice of us if we said we were anxious to dismantle NATO? Would we cop ourselves on, and that goes as much for Fianna Fáil as for the CND? Would we get a measure of our status in the world and have self-respect for ourselves in the process?
A few days ago CND organised some sort of seminar or meeting and they wheeled on a well known English controversialist on this subject. He was introduced as Professor E.P. Thompson, an English historian. I saw him on television news and he got coverage in the newspapers: perhaps one should not complain about that, we all depend on coverage. I wonder how much coverage would be given in Britain to an Irish professor of history who went over there bleating about how they should get out of NATO, about how their stance on some policy issue was being endangered. We had this man coming over here to interpret our foreign policy for us. He was asked by an RTE reporter, "Do you think that the Single European Act endangers Irish neutrality?" I would like to have asked that reporter if he had read the Single European Act — it would have been a question worth hearing the answer to. This man said: "You can answer it one way or the other, but when the chips are down I say it would endanger Irish neutrality."
That is the level of investigative journalism that is applied to CND and others who for whatever reason — there may be sincere and respectable reasons — would like to see this country militarily — possibly in other respects as well — isolated. Even if there was a military dimension to this thing, what in the name of God has it got to do with nuclear disarmament? It is possible to have a whole range of understanding of a defensive kind with one's neighbours without being committed to any form of nuclear undertaking.
The second scare which has been generated by the Single European Act is an idea which I will refer to by summarising a letter sent to me by a group called The Christian Conservative Council — I cannot lay my hand on the letter. It stated that "the adoption of this Act means among other things the introduction of abortion and divorce, already rejected by our electorate, into our country". I cannot imagine other European countries having the faintest interest in forcing upon us their patterns of behaviour in these or similar areas. Apart from the fact that European integration will always have to leave room for national differences based on cultural diversity, such powers will still be preserved in cases of a country's vital interests being involved, and I presume that that power would be employed by an Irish Government if an attempt were made, which I think highly unlikely, to trespass on our rights and our own line in such matters.
The last thing I want to deal with — Deputy Haughey gave it much prominence when he began — is the relationship of the Single European Act with the Constitution. This is the only area about which I would raise a question. I am not being positive about this, not just out of tenderness towards colleagues but because it is a very complex matter. It is something about which lawyers could very well disagree, and I could imagine the Supreme Court dividing three-two on it. It is not about the wisdom of our adopting the Single European Act but about the procedure we are using to do so.
I hope the Minister will be able to reassure the Dáil specifically on this matter. In view of the fact that Deputy Haughey made such a meal of it, it would be no harm if the Minister were to incorporate a section on this in his reply to the debate to set at rest any misgivings that may exist here about it. It is well to voice these doubts because we should not skate over a point, no matter how unmeritorious it turns out to be in the end, which relates to the power of this House to do what it is setting out to do.
The amendment to Article 29 of the Constitution which was adopted by the people in 1972 in order to enable us to join the EC gives a sort of blanket cover of immunity from attacks on constitutional grounds to "laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities." I would remind the House that the expression "necessitated by" was inserted by a Fine Gale amendment: the original phrase used in the Fianna Fáil draft was a much looser, weaker expression, "consequent on". The Government of the day accepted the Fine Gael amendment.
In a legal document such as the Constitution, and above all in a context so important as the conferring of immunity from constitutional attack on a certain category of laws, it would be reasonable to read the phrase "necessitated by" as meaning legally necessitated, and to read the word "obligations" as meaning legal obligations. I imagine it would be true to say that the expression "obligations of membership of the Communities" should be taken to mean obligations which legally arose from the treaties to which we at that time were committing ourselves and to which we were permitted by the 1972 referendum to commit ourselves. If that were not so, if the obligations of membership of the Communities meant obligations of any kind whatever that might arise in the future and of which then we had no idea, the voters in the 1972 referendum would have been taken to have consented to an open-ended process, the future shape and details of which were not naturally then visible, and were resigning all control in future over the obligations even though they might make the most drastic inroads on the traditional sovereignty of the State. I do not think that can be argued. I doubt if we can argue now that because the political objective of progressive integration was then understood and accepted at a political level, that this sufficed to carry an indefinite extension of strictly legal dimensions of community membership so that any such extension of legal dimensions would be immune from scrutiny whether compatible with the Constitution or not.
I have not gone back and read through the library full of speeches and scripts of the time, but my recollecton is that both Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil reassured the voters at that time that they were not being asked to buy more than they could see in black and white in the treaties as they existed in 1972. If I am right in that, and I may not be, the question must arise whether the passage of the Bill now before us is legally necessitated by the obligations of membership which we took on in 1972. If it is, no problem arises. In that event the House ought to be instructed in what way exactly our 1972 commitments could have been then foreseen to involve this new set of commitments. If the passage of the Bill this evening before the House is not legally necessitated by what we did in 1972 — and that I think is the more likely answer — if we are not literally and legally obliged to pass this Bill, however desirable its passage is, and I agree that it is, then the Act which will result from this Bill does not fall under Article 29.4.3 at all and does not get the constitutional protection or immunity for which that subsection of Article 29 provides.
Let me just take one example, and I may be quite astray in taking this example because neither the Single European Act itself or the Government's explanatory guide makes it clear. Let us take the provision of Article 11 of the Single European Act which empowers the House to create a new court with jurisdiction in "certain classes of action or proceeding brought by natural or legal persons". I do not know whether the action or proceeding envisaged there — and neither the Act itself nor the Government's guide makes it clear — is an Act or proceeding only of the kind which now falls within the jurisdiction of the European Court to which we consented back in 1972, or whether it is envisaged that causes of action which are not now compulsorily cognizable by the European Court should be cognizable compulsorily before this new court, and thus remove from the cognizance of the High Court here in Ireland.
I have no problem about the substance of the thing. I am willing to make a certain act of faith about it. I would like to be told what exactly is envisaged in the expression "certain classes of action or proceeding". I raise this now and I may be wasting the House's time, but I feel I should do it. If by any chance it is envisaged that certain classes of action will go now to this new court, subordinate only on points of law to the main European Court, if that means that a person who is now within the jurisdiction of our own High Court can be sued before this new European Court and if it means that the Irish High Court's jurisdiction is thereby ousted in that case, this seems to me to conflict with Article 34.3.1. of the Constitution, and always on the hypothesis that the passage of this Act is not legally necessitated by community membership as of now it would not be protected by the immunity of Article 34.4.3.
I hope the Minister will be able to reassure me. He could do so in a very simple way if he says the only action or proceeding here envisaged — and if he can produce documents to make this plain — are actions or proceedings which are already in Europe; then the matter I have raised is irrelevant. But if by any chance it is envisaged that a person who now will not be amenable for a particular course of action to any court except the High Court in Dublin, may tomorrow find himself compulsorily amenable to the jurisdiction of the European Court in a course of action which up to now was cognizant only here, then that is not consistent with Article 34 as it stands and it is not covered, for the reasons I have explained, by the immunity of the special section in Article 29.
The explanatory guide to the Single European Act argues — and again I think there could be several views about this and I do not at all put mine forward with a certainty, but I feel it should be raised — that Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome permits the member states to agree to amend the Treaty itself and that this provision should cover the changes provided for in the Single European Act. I imagine most treaties provide for their amendment by mutual agreement of the people who are party to them. There is nothing strange about that, nor does any problem arise where the change envisaged does not impinge on the clear rules of our Constitution. Note that Article 236, the amendment article in the Treaty of Rome, itself gives effect to amendments only after they have been ratified by all the member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. But if any such amendment, to which obviously when it is first proposed no member state is legally obliged to agree, — we are not under any obligation to agree to an amendment proposed by even every one of the other members — if such an amendment is proposed and if it does conflict actually or potentially with any part of the Constitution however harmlessly or indeed however benefically, I doubt that that article in the Treaty of Rome will dispense us from the laborious necessity of amending the Constitution yet again.
It was not I that invented a rigid Constitution, although I think a rigid Constitution such as we have has a lot of advantages. Some countries do not have Constitutions quite as rigid as ours and I think it is a pest to be faced as often as we have been faced with the need to go to the country with constitutional amendments. But we have got a rigid Constitution and it has been fairly rigidly and no doubt properly interpreted by our courts, particularly in the last 20 years — it used not to be taken so seriously in the fifties. I would like to be assured by the Minister — and again I am willing to be assured by him if he would go through these clauses — that there is nothing in them that substantially goes beyond, in terms of infringing on the structure of the State set out in the Constitution, what was agreed to be acceptable in 1972.
My problem about the Minister's argument in this guide is that although he talks about limited amendments, he says that for this purpose the Government are empowered to negotiate and agree to limited amendments of the kind involved in the Single European Act. I cannot find the word ‘limited' anywhere in Article 236. Article 236 just says "amendments". I say this with diffidence and I am willing to be proved wrong about it, but it seems to me that the argument advanced on page 34 of the Government's explanatory guide would equally cover a far more drastic set of amendments, equally ones to which I might have no objection in substance. I am just anxious that we would not trip ourselves up over this.
I know I have heard it suggested that this Bill, if enacted, should go to the Supreme Court under the Article 26 procedure. Even that would be a nuisance and very time-consuming. The Supreme Court have to give a decision under that procedure within 60 days. But 60 days is two months, and if a Supreme Court were to say at the end "we do not take alarm at the Single European Act but it is potentially outside what was meant by the amending power of Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome, and there are things in it which potentially are not compatible with this or that Article in the Constitution", we would be back here where we started. We would first of all have to draft an amendment to the Constitution — presumably we are not ging to incorporate the entire Single European Act in the Constitution — and we would have to go to the people, and that takes time also; then we would have to come back here to this House to re-enact this whole thing or something like it all over again. I do not want to raise hares. I am most certainly not looking for a headline about how I have doubts or misgivings about this thing. I just feel that the arguments here are complex and there are two sides to the argument. I accept that. I am not at all as sure about it as I have been about other things that were done here in years gone by. But I think it would be right to mention these points so that it will not be said that this House overlooked them. I heartily support the further European integration which the Bill implies, and I sincerely hope the Minister and his advisers will be able to set at rest definitively the few legal questions I have raised.
The Single European Act, first of all, alters the whole institutional balance of the Comunity. It is important to remember that. Articles 6 to 9 of the Single European Act provide for a new co-operation procedure involving the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council of Ministers. This procedure will effectively reduce the present powers of the Council of Ministers. There is no question about that. We must look at where Ireland's national advantage lies in considering that alteration of the balance of the institutions in the Community where, from now on, under the Single European Act the Council of Ministers on which we were equally represented with every other member state would be effectively reduced in its powers and there will be increased and more effective powers residing with both the Parliament and the Commission.
Under this procedure, called the co-operation procedure, the Parliament may approve, reject or propose amendments for a common position to be adopted by the Council of Ministers. Where the Parliament amends this common position, already adopted by the Council of Ministers — where they now proceed to amend that position which will have been achieved by Ireland as part of a consensus with the other member state Governments — the Commission is required, under the Act, to submit a re-examined proposal to the Council — taking into account the amendments proposed by the Parliament. Now there will be going from the Parliament to the Commission a common position reached by the Council of Ministers, by all the member countries, which will now have to be re-examined on a proposal by the Parliament, looked at by the Commission and resubmitted to the Council.
The Council can then adopt the re-examined proposal by a qualified majority. The serious aspect is that unanimity is required of the Council to amend the re-examined proposal of the Commission which comes from the Parliament in that manner. If the Parliament re-examines a consensus decision in which Ireland has participated, submits it to the Commission and it comes back in that amended form to the Council of Ministers, it means that the Council of Ministers can only reject that proposal amending their common position by unanimity rule. On the other hand, they can adopt an amendment coming up in that manner by a qualified majority. But, in order to reject the amendment, amending their decision, which comes up via the Parliament and the Commission, they must do so unanimously.
That means that the co-operation procedure I have just outlined represents a very significant change in the institutional balance that existed in the Community heretofore. While the new co-operation procedure leaves the final decision-making power with the Council of Ministers it is obvious, in the type of situation I have outlined — in which the Parliament and the Commission act in concert on the re-examined proposal — it would be very difficult for the Council of Ministers to adopt a different position. Obviously this procedure will diminish the influence that Ireland has always exercised in the direction and development of the Communities, particularly on the Council of Ministers. In the Council of Ministers we can exercise substantial power as an equal State with other member countries. As Deputy McCartin knows, in the European Parliament and Commission our national interests, as a small State, can be effectively buried by reason of the small numbers involved. For example, we have 15 Members in a European Parliament that must now be comprised of over 600. Similarly within the Commission, our interests can be equally and effectively buried. The Council of Ministers, now being diminished in stature and status, has always represented the main thrust of benefit to small countries, such as ours, that can exercise a power there as an equal member Government.
That position is aggravated considerably by the new voting procedures on the Council of Ministers which will now permit a qualified majority voting instead of unanimity over a whole range of areas. It is proposed to introduce voting on a qualified majority basis on decisions concerning the internal market, economic and social cohesion, research and technological development. A whole range of areas will now be the subject matter of qualified majority voting. The only subject now specifically retained for unanimity voting henceforth is that of tax harmonisation. But over the whole range of areas of economic and social interest to Ireland we will now have qualified majority voting. Not alone is the power of the Council of Ministers diminished but it is further diluted by the introduction of qualified majority voting over a very wide range of areas.
It has been pointed out by some members of the Government and other people who have argued in an uncritical manner in favour of the Single European Act that what is called the Luxembourg compromise remains unaffected by the Act and that member states will be free to invoke what is called a vital national interest in exceptional circumstances. I would suggest to people who argue in that manner that there is a certain lack of political realism in that argument, as the ability of member states to invoke the Luxembourg compromise is now being diminished substantially by the proposed agreement under this Act to extend the whole area of majority voting by the Council of Ministers. Therefore, the area within which the Luxembourg compromise can be invoked is narrowed by the increased area in which qualified majority voting will obtain. That is the political reality.
These factors represent very disturbing trends in the Single European Act as regards future institutional balance within the Communities and undoubtedly will be detrimental to the national interests of small States such as ours. Our main interest lies in maintaining the pivotal role which has always existed of the Council of Ministers acting unanimously. That is our main national interest in the week to week voting process of the Communities. There is no doubt that this new co-operative procedure, as it is called — set out in Articles 6 to 9 — does provide the Parliament and the Commission with increased powers, increased influence, an increased power of initiative, all at the expense of the Council. This has very serious implications for an area such as the transfer of resources in which we have vital interest, which we require under the FEOGA Social and Regional Funds and the very effective transfer of resources we receive from the CAP generally. This new type of increased power for what is now largely a consumer-orientated Parliament and a Commission that will be in discussion with them — to take the initiatives — will place a qualified majority Council of Ministers in an invidious position as far as our interests are concerned in regard to the transfer of funds under the headings I have mentioned such as the CAP, FEOGA and the Social and Regional Funds. It is clear from reading the Single European Act that once the funds are established the amount of the funds and the nature of the allocation will be entirely a matter for qualified majority decision.
Debate adjourned.