Skip to main content
Normal View

Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 16 Dec 1987

Vol. 376 No. 10

Restrictive Practices (Amendment) Bill, 1987: Report and Final Stages.

I move amendment No. 1:

In page 8, between lines 10 and 11, to insert the following:

14.—Section 8 of the Principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution of the following subsection for subsection (4):

`(4) If the Commission, in a report to the Minister, recommend the making of an order and if at the expiration of a period of twelve months after he has received the report the Minister has not made the order, he shall, within twenty-one days after the said period, lay before each House of the Oireachtas a statement in writing giving the reasons why he has not made the order.'.".

Amendment No. 3 is an alternative to amendment No. 1 in the name of the Minister and they can be discussed together by agreement. Is that agreed?

(Interruptions.)

There is a lot of disrespect for the Restrictive Practices (Amendment) Bill.

Can we have some order? Deputy John Bruton please.

This amendment arises from a suggestion I made on Committee Stage that there should be a statement from the Minister if he had failed to act within 12 months on the recommendation of the Restrictive Practices Commission for the making of an order in respect of a particular matter. There have been considerable delays in respect of orders recommended by the Restrictive Practices Commission in regard to the ban on advertising and the restrictions on conveyancing by the legal profession and also in respect of the travel trade. The delays in this case arose from the fact that, although orders had been recommended by the Commission to be made by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, the Government's advice on legal aspects was that the matter should properly be dealt with by means of principal legislation sponsored by another Minister. The result was that the matter was passed to another Minister and there has been considerable delay.

This amendment which the Minister is sponsoring would require him to make a statement within 12 months giving reasons for any delay in the making of an order in regard to something recommended by the Commission. This provides some measure of accountability and follow-up in regard to any matter that would fall behind, so to speak. I welcome the amendment by the Minister which is based on a suggestion I made on Committee Stage.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 2:

In page 8, between lines 10 and 11, to insert the following:

"14.—Section 8 of the Principal Act is hereby amended by the insertion in subsection (1) of the following paragraph:

‘(e) amend, after consultation with all other Ministers concerned and with the agreement of the Government, any legislation, whether that be the responsibility of the Minister or of any other Minister, if this is necessary to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission.'.".

This amendment arises from the same problem to which I have just referred. A number of recommendations have been made after considerable debate and examination by the Restrictive Practices Commission which have not as yet been acted upon because the Minister receiving the report — the Minister for Industry and Commerce — was advised that he did not have the means of implementing the recommended orders since these were matters properly to be dealt with, in the view of the law officer of the Government, by principal legislation sponsored by another Minister.

I refer in particular to the delays in getting rid of the ban on advertising by solicitors and also the delays in acting on the recommended removal of the restrictions on conveyancing by solicitors. These matters were referred to the Department of Justice for action in the form of an amendment to the Solicitors' Act which has not yet come before this House. There is no clear indication as to when it will be introduced. The result is that a recommendation of the Restrictive Practices Commission dating back to 1982 remains to be implemented because the Minister receiving the report was unable to deal with the matter by order as envisaged by the commission.

The purpose of this amendment is to give the Minister for Industry and Commerce the power to make the necessary changes by order but there is a safeguard that he must first consult with all other Ministers concerned — in the case of the solicitors it would be the Minister for Justice — and have the agreement of the full Government for the making of the order. Even with that consultation, the matter would be dealt with much more quickly than relying on principal legislation sponsored by another Minister because it would be dealt with as a single issue arising out of a single report. If it were left to other Ministers to deal with the recommendation, they would not do so other than in the context of another Bill which would contain all sorts of unrelated matter in respect of which there might be considerable delays at Cabinet or in drafting. This is, of course, the case with the Solicitors' Act. The problems holding up that Act are not related to the recommendations made by the Restrictive Practices Commission but are related to other matters which the Department of Justice have to consider. The result is that nothing has been done about these recommendations because the Department of Justice are considering other aspects as well. This amendment would allow the Minister, after due consultation with other Ministers and with the Government, to deal with this matter.

On Committee Stage the Minister cited a court case involving the Cityview Press as a reason for his reluctance to deal with the amendment then proposed. The judge said in that case that it was not possible to deal with something by order other than in respect of a matter which had been envisaged in the principal legislation. That is not a problem in regard to the Restrictive Practices Act or orders made thereunder. The potential scope of orders is extremely wide-ranging, so much so that I have had occasion earlier in this debate to criticise it as unduly wide-ranging. There is no basis as I understand it, at least from the extracts of the Cityview Press judgment as quoted by the Minister, for failing to act on this amendment.

This is a problem which will become more and more acute, unless dealt with by this amendment, as a result of other changes made in this Bill. Under this Bill the powers of investigation of the Restrictive Practices Commission are being extended into a whole host of sectors which are currently regulated by Ministers other than the Minister for Industry and Commerce. They are being extended into the entire transport area which is regulated by the Minister for Tourism and Transport by law for which he is responsible, into the banking area which is the responsibility of the Minister for Finance and into other areas which are the responsibility of other Ministers. A Minister who has received a report on air transport, for example, recommending that an order be made may be told he cannot do it that way but must wait for air transport legislation. That Minister and the consumer, who are concerned to see the implementation of the recommendations of the commission, could be waiting for years because such legislation might not be introduced until Aer Lingus next needed an increase in their capital or some other matter arose totally unrelated to the recommendations of the commission.

Under this amendment the particular matters dealt with in the report of the commission, the abuses which are to the detriment of the consumer, could be dealt with on their own by an order after consultation with the Minister for Transport and the entire Government. It could be done quickly under delegated legislation.

It might be said that dealing with it under delegated legislation rather than by a principal amendment to the Principal Act — in this case the Air Transport Act — would deny this House the opportunity of debating the subject. That argument is not valid because any order made under the Restrictive Practices Act must be debated and approved in this House by an affirmative motion before it takes effect.

Within the context of my amendment there is more than adequate protection for every legitimate interest before the order would be implemented. First, the Minister must consult with any other Ministers concerned, second, he must obtain the agreement of the Government and, third, the order itself must be approved by both Houses of the Oireachtas. Therefore, it is almost as extensive a form of consultation as would arise under principal legislation but it can be dealt with much more quickly and orders that would otherwise remain unimplemented can be implemented. Having considered the matter over the last week since conclusion of Committee Stage, I hope the Minister will see his way to accepting this amendment on this occasion.

I have indeed considered this matter since the conclusion of Committee Stage. In this amendment Deputy Bruton is proposing an amendment to section 8 of the 1972 Act which essentially would allow the Minister, with the agreement of the Government, to amend by order any other legislation, whether primary or secondary, if that were deemed necessary to give effect to any recommendation of the commission.

When this amendment was discussed on Committee Stage I said it was very far reaching. I have considered the matter further and have come to the conclusion that I could not accept the amendment without discussing it in detail with my Cabinet colleagues and without formal approval of the Government. I know Deputy Bruton will appreciate the time entailed in going through that procedure.

The proposed amendment has the superficial attraction that it would permit recommendations of the commission to be put into effect by the Minister regardless of the existence of other legislation. However, that other legislation does exist in a number of areas. It would be a recipe for chaos for the Minister for Industry and Commerce to seek to amend legislation which is the responsibility of other Ministers. Indeed it would strike at one of the basic principles of proper public administration that, within the overall collective responsibility of Government, Ministers should have clear and distinct lines of responsibility. I believe it is wrong to approach this subject on the basis that competition law, important though it may be, is superior to any of the other public policy concerns which are expressed in the law. For example, the prudential supervision of banks is provided for in the Central Bank Acts while the Solicitors Act deals with questions relating to the maintenance of adequate qualifications and standards for solicitors. These and other Acts may have provided an undue degree of protection in the past to the providers of various services and may have been used to excessively stifle or restrict competition. However, that in itself does not justify giving the Minister for Industry and Commerce responsibility for promoting legislation which determines the correct balance between these different public policy considerations. Neither the commission nor my Department can claim a particular expertise in any of the various areas which are the responsibility of other Ministers. Other Departments have built up a fund of knowledge and expertise and are responsible for the administration of the functions of Ministers in a wide variety of areas. I could not see how good public administration would be served by the Minister for Industry and Commerce seeking, for instance, to amend the Central Bank Acts, the Building Societies Acts, various Transport Acts and any of the myriad of other items of legislation which might be affected at any stage by recommendations of the commission.

My Department could not possibly hope to master the implications of such legislative changes in the operation of the financial system, the impact on the national housing programme, the implications for international transport agreements or the effect on any other range of issues which might arise from amending legislation such as that to which I have referred.

The amendment accepts the interest and responsibility of other Ministers and the Government as a whole in any proposed legislation. The fact of the matter is that no proposal for legislation can be advanced by any Minister without Government approval. If that approval is forthcoming the most logical and sensible approach is for the Minister responsible to promote the legislation in question. If Government agreement is not forthcoming even the Minister for Industry and Commerce cannot promote the legislation in question.

Deputy Bruton referred last week to the delays which can arise when other Departments decide on the priority to be attached to any legislation recommended by the commission. The fact of the matter is that it is the Government who determine the priority for legislation. Making one Department responsible for all the legislation which might arise from recommendations of the commission will not speed up their implementation. Already my Department have a very heavy legislative workload. Progress in that regard will not be helped by taking on the responsibilities of other Departments.

In the circumstances I cannot accept the amendment however attractive it appears superficially.

The arguments advanced by the Minister do not stand up at all. Let me deal with them in sequence. First, he said that this amendment could constitute a recipe for chaos. Of course, that is not true because the amendment contains a provision for consultation with the Cabinet and other Minister in regard to this matter. Under Cabinet procedure instructions, if the Minister were sponsoring an order, he would be required to consult with other Ministers, in writing, before that matter came to Cabinet. A draft of the order with the memorandum would be circulated by the Minister for Industry and Commerce to all the other Departments for observations, including the Departments directly affected. The matter could not come to Cabinet until the observations of the other Departments had been provided thereon in writing for consideration of the Cabinet. The Cabinet would decide on this matter after exactly the same level of consultation as would occur if the Minister directly concerned were sponsoring the matter. Therefore, the argument that it would be a recipe for chaos is unbelievable and is in direct conflict with what the Minister himself acknowledged to be safeguards built into this amendment in respect of consultation with other Ministers and the agreement of the Government being first required.

The Minister claimed also that his Department would not have the expertise to deal with the matter in question. I might say, first, that this would be no ordinary matter with which they would be dealing. They would be dealing with this matter on the basis of a recommendation from the Restrictive Practices Commission which would have published an exhaustive study on the subject. Therefore in drafting the order, there would be a published body of expertise on this matter available to the Minister. In any event the procedures under Cabinet instructions, whereby any such orders to be made would first have to be approved by the Government and, prior to that, would have been circulated for written observation to the Departments directly concerned — who might have the expertise that the Minister's Department would not have — would take care completely of any concerns in that area.

The Minister's third argument against this amendment was that the taking on of responsibility for making orders of this kind could conceivably interfere with the legislative programme of his Department. Of course this is manifest nonsense. As the Minister well knows the position is that, generally speaking, a draft order is provided with the report of the Restrictive Practices Commission. Therefore, the level of drafting required would be relatively minimal. All his Department would be concerned with anyway would be the policy implications of the recommendation. The drafting of the order is done by the draftsman's office and not by the Minister's Department, so there would be no interference whatever with the legislative programme of his Department.

The reality is that the Minister has no arguments against this amendment other than the fact that he has not bothered to consult with the Cabinet in the time available to seek approval for what would be a sensible amendment in the interests of consumer protection and of getting action on this matter. Even at this stage the Minister ought to consider this matter further with a view to introducing amending legislation. Unfortunately, there will be a long process to be gone through now that this opportunity has been passed up to deal with this matter in that new legislation — were it to be introduced — would have to take its place in a long queue.

In his reply the Minister failed to deal with any of the arguments I advanced in regard to extending the scope of this legislation and the fact that, as a result thereof, the work of the Restrictive Practices Commission will be much more in areas where the principal legislation is the responsibility of other Ministers. This problem of not being able to act on orders because it is the responsibility of other Minister will be much more acute in the future.

I consider that the Minister has most unwisely lost an opportunity of dealing with a problem which will be an increasing source of frustration to consumers and I fear that action will not be taken on expensively-produced and widelypublicised reports. It is my opinion that failure to act will do no good for the political process. Furthermore, it is my belief that the Minister will serve to be reminded of his failure to avail of this opportunity.

I can only allow the Minister a brief comment.

I will just make a quick comment. The Deputy's comment that I did not bother to consult the Cabinet is just not acceptable. The Deputy, as a former Minister, knows full well that one has to go through a procedure. One does not go in on a fundamental issue of changing primary and secondary legislation and have a chat at the Cabinet table and expect to get a decision. Deputy Bruton, as a former Minister for Finance, would look very warily at the Minister for Industry and Commerce if he came in and said he was going to amend the Central Bank Act.

Mr. Bruton

I was in the Cabinet and a lot less than a week was necessary to do this.

Not on a fundamental principle of legislation.

On very fundamental principles.

If that be the case, let me ask the Deputy why did he not do it when he was in the Cabinet. This is his Bill.

This matter arose from the debate here in the House and the Minister has the opportunity to deal with it. He is in Government now himself.

I have no intention of dealing with something so fundamental in a very simplistic manner. It would be ideal to do it but it is too simplistic when one has to override——

The Minister will now find that he will not be able to act on the bulk of the recommendations of the commission.

There is only one recommendation that has not been done. That is the one the Deputy is referring to. It is the Solicitors Act and he was there for four and a half years with the Solicitors Act and did not do anything about it.

This is the Report Stage of the Bill and Deputy Bruton was replying to the debate. I have allowed a brief comment from both sides but that must be sufficient.

Amendment put and declared lost.
Amendment No. 3 not moved.

Amendment No. 5 is an alternative to amendment No. 4 and I suggest that they be debated together.

I move amendment No. 4.

In page 10, between lines 7 and 8, to insert the following:

18.—Section 18 of the Principal Act is hereby amended by the substitution of the following subsection for subsection (1):

"(1) The Minister shall lay before each House of the Oireachtas a copy of the report made by the Commission of every inquiry under section 5 or section 9 and of every special review under section 10 within four months of the receipt by him of such report.".

The effect of this amendment is to require the Minister to lay before both Houses of the Oireachtas each report of an inquiry in a special review held by the Fair Trade Commission within four months of his receipt of the report. The Restrictive Practices Commission, which will be renamed the Fair Trade Commission, have already been strengthened by the addition of a third full time member, and this Bill will further strengthened their powers. I think it is fair to expect an improvement in the timescale in which inquiries are held and, as I mentioned on Committee Stage, evidence of such an improvement has already been seen with receipt of five reports from the commission in 15 months.

In the light of this it is probably reasonable to put pressure also on the Minister in relation to the time he takes to publish the Fair Trade Commission reports. When a report is received from the commission the Minister has to have the report printed and he may have to consult with other Departments or other interested parties about the commission's recommendations before he can evaluate the recommendations and assess the report. Bearing this in mind I feel that a period of four months should be accurate and consequently I am proposing the insertion of an amendment to this effect. The Deputy will probably go along with that.

This is a proposal that I made on Committee Stage and I am glad the Minister has accepted it. It is the same proposal in substance as is contained in my amendment No. 5. I obviously will accept the Minister's amendment as it has been officially drafted in preference to my own and withdraw my own.

Will the Minister comment on whether or not this amendment would in any way inhibit or impede the principal work of the body involved? It seems that if there was a system in place whereby there was access to the data and information, I am not sure that it would be reasonable to expect to have a plethora of reports from bodies laid before the House. Provided the information is available I wonder if it needs to be formalised in the way suggested by the amendment, or if that in some way detracts from either attention to or resources for the main job of dealing with abuse, inquiries and so on. In other words, I would not be too hung up about a formalised presentation of reports in the Library provided I can get the information by telephone call or a visit. I wonder if we are adding an unnecessary bureaucratic burden.

This is only on the question of publication and it is normally published within three months. I have no objection to an extra bit of discipline on the Minister.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 5 not moved.

In regard to amendment No. 6 in the name of Deputy John Bruton, I observe that amendment No. 7 is related. Amendment No. 9 is an alternative to amendments Nos. 6 and 7. I suggest, therefore, that we debate amendments Nos. 6, 7 and 9 together.

I move amendment No. 6:

In page 15, between lines 42 and 43, to insert the following:

"31.—Section 26 of the Consumer Information Act, 1978 is hereby amended by the deletion in subsection (4) (a) of `and the order shall not be made until a resolution approving of the draft has been passed by each such House' and the substitution therefor of `and the order shall not be made until the following provisions have been complied with:

(i) Dáil Éireann has not passed a resolution annulling the draft of the order within twenty-one sitting days of its having been laid before that House, and

(ii) Seanad Éireann has passed a resolution approving of the draft.'.".

Again this is a matter that has been discussed on Committee Stage. There has been some delay in obtaining parliamentary time for the debate and approval of orders under the Consumer Information Act. In particular, an order made last March in regard to the true rate of interest on consumer credit transactions was not put into effect until last month because of difficulties in obtaining time for its debate here in the Dáil. However, there was no difficulty in obtaining time for its debate in the Seanad. My amendment would allow debates to continue in the Seanad where the legislative programme is less pressed but remove the requirement for an affirmative motive and debate on the orders here in the Dáil.

My amendments differ from the Minister's in that his simply requires that the orders are laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas without any required debate in either House. My amendment would provide for debate in the Seanad. I prefer my amendment because there is value in any consumer protection legislation getting a measure of publicity in the press and among legislators who are dealing with consumers as part of their work. The debate in the Seanad, which my amendment would retain, would meet the publicity requirement while the removal of the requirement for a debate in the Dáil would speed up the making of the orders and avoid the type of delay which occurred in the recent case. I hope the Minister can accept my amendments as I think they are preferable to his. However, I am not prepared to oppose his amendment in the event that he cannot accept mine.

On balance, I prefer the Minister's amendment. First, the thrust of Deputy Bruton's amendment, to remove the need for an affirmative resolution but nevertheless allow the Seanad to debate and pass such a resolution, may be appropriate as of now in certain circumstances. But we are passing legislation here for decades and there is no certainty that either the timescale of the Seanad or, if some parties had their way, the existence of the Seanad will continue.

Second, there is something a little unhappy about a situation where what I would see as the principal legislative forum does not have the obligation to pass a resolution but it has to be, according to Deputy Bruton's amendment, passed in the Seanad. I am not happy about that slightly anomalous juxta-position.

On the other hand, the Minister's amendment, if I read it correctly and am interpreting it correctly, seems to say that he can get on with the job of making orders and that they shall be laid before the House as soon as possible unless there is an annulling resolution introduced here, and that seems sensible. I argued earlier in the debate for freeing the Minister's hands to get on with the job without having to wait for a debate in this House on a thing like making an order which I see as a subsidiary element of the Minister's work. I would be for giving the Minister greater freedom. I am not sure if Deputy Bruton's undoubtedly well intentioned and well orientated amendment is not a little more circumscribing than what the Minister is proposing. For that reason the Minister's is probably more correct.

Deputy Bruton proposed two alternative amendments on Committee Stage. The purpose of these amendments was to speed up the process for enacting orders under the Consumer Information Act, 1978, and the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 1980. On Committee Stage I agreed to take on board the first of the amendments which would speed up enormously the enactment of these orders. The amendment which I am now proposing provides that an order made under either the Consumer Information Act, 1978, or the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 1980, would be laid before the Dáil and Seanad and that the order could be annulled by resolution of either House within 21 sitting days after the order had been so laid.

The current procedure is that a draft of any proposed order must be approved by resolution of both Houses. This arrangement has given rise to delays in making orders. For instance, as pointed out on Committee Stage and referred to here by Deputy Bruton, the most recent such order relating to consumer credit was approved by the Dáil earlier this month, over 13 months after it had been first laid before this House. Delays are caused by difficulties in finding time on the Order Paper for debates on these matters, which are generally straightforward and non-contentious. The procedure which I am now proposing is a standard provision in many Acts, including some in the consumer protection area such as the Prices Act, 1958, and the Merchandise Marks Act, 1970.

As the House is aware, the object of approving orders by negative clearance is to speed up the process of enacting legislation and at the same time to give Deputies and Senators a chance to propose a motion to annul the provisions of an order if they feel that this is necessary The result of the amendment proposed by me is that when the Minister signs the order it will have effect from that date of signing and continue to have effect unless it is annulled by a motion in either House. Deputy Bruton's amendment proposed that a draft order should be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas. In this case the order would not have the effect of law until 21 sitting days had expired and a resolution approving the draft order had been passed by the Seanad. This arrangement would be almost as cumbersome and time-consuming as the present one. For instance, if the Minister makes an order any time between midMay and July, it would be mid-December before 21 sitting days would have expired because the Dáil does not normally resume after the summer recess until about mid-October. This would mean a delay of almost six months before the order would take effect. Admittedly, it is better than what happened to the last order but still not as good as the amendments I propose. I would stress again the this amendment will give immediate effect to a ministerial order, whereas Deputy Bruton's amendment could continue to prove cumbersome and delay introduction of these orders.

It is important that Deputies and Senators he aware of all legislation being introduced. I am satisfied that with regard to these orders this will be the case. These orders must be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas. Notice of intention to make an order under the Consumer Information Act, 1978, must be published two months in advance of making the order together with a statement summarising the effect of the order. Notice of the making of an order must be published in at least one daily newspaper and in Iris Oifigiúil. There would also be a certain amount of press coverage relating to the introduction of such order and Deputies and Senators would have an opportunity to study the order and propose an annulment if necessary.

In relation to Deputy Bruton's proposal that orders should be debated only in the Seanad, as I have indicated on Committee Stage, I would not be entirely happy with that concept. My Department have examined this question further in consultation with the Attorney General's Office and although the proposed amendment may not be expressly outlawed by the Constitution, there is no precedent in legislation for an arrangement such as this. This is the primary House and if the matter is to be discussed it should be discussed in both Houses. As regards publicity coming from the Seanad, unless the Seanad is sitting when the other House is not, it does not get much publicity. On balance, my more appropriate amendment would, it is hoped, meet the wishes of the House and Deputy Bruton in that we are all agreed that we are trying to speed up the procedure and get our business done properly in a more expeditious manner.

Deputy Bruton to reply to his amendment No. 6.

As I have said, I am not going to press my amendments. The case has been made on either side. I prefer my approach, but I see merit in what the Minister has said also in favour of his amendment. There is just one point that I should like to raise. This speeds up the provisions for the making of orders under the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act and also the Consumer Information Act. The order-making powers under the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act have hardly been used at all. In particular, it is necessary, for provisions in regard to the giving of a certificate of road worthiness for a motor vehicle that has been sold to take effect, that the Minister should make an order under that legislation. I understand that the provisions of this 1980 Act are not effective in the absence of such an order having been made. This matter was referred to in a recent publication on the subject of law and social policy. I ask the Minister to have a look at that matter and see if there is a problem there. It is hoped that this provision will allow him, if he makes such an order, to get it into effect more quickly.

I have started on that area in consultation with the Attorney General's Office. We are working on it.

When will the Minister be expecting the order to be made?

There are legal implications to be worked out. It could not be dealt with now.

Amendment No. 6, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 7:

In page 15, between lines 42 and 43, to insert the following:

"31.—Section 5 of the Act of 1980 is hereby amended by the deletion in subsection (2) of `and the order shall not be made until a resolution approving the draft has been passed by each such House' and the substitution therefor of `and the order shall not be made until the following provisions have been complied with:

(a) Dáil Éireann has not passed a resolution annulling the draft of the order within twenty-one sitting days of its having been laid before that House,

and

(b) Seanad Éireann has passed a resolution approving of the draft.'.".

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 8:

In page 15, between lines 42 and 43, to insert the following:

"31.—Section 20 of the Act of 1980 is hereby amended by the insertion in the Table thereto of the following new section:

35A.—(1) If the buyer—

(a) has the right to reject the goods by reason of a breach on the part of the seller that affects some or all of them, but

(b) accepts some of the goods, including, where there are any goods unaffected by the breach, all such goods,

he does not by accepting them lose his right to reject the rest.

(2) In the case of a buyer having the right to reject an instalment of goods, subsection (1) above applies as if references to the goods were references to the goods comprised in the instalment.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, goods are affected by a breach if by reason of the breach they are not in conformity with the contract.

(4) This section applies unless a contrary intention appears in, or is to be implied from, the contract.'.".

This is an amendment to the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act. At the moment, if goods are not of merchantable quality the consumer is entitled, if he is acting as a consumer and buying the goods as distinct from acting in trade, to reject the goods and he is entitled to get his money back. In practice, there are difficulties in enforcing this legislation because of the absence of a small claims court. If a trader refuses to give the money back, the consumer is reduced to waving the Act at him if that consumer happens to know about the provisions therein, which in most cases he will not. If he does know about them, he must go to a solicitor and initiate legal proceedings. In practice, the legislative protections are not sufficiently effective.

The most effective thing that a consumer can do to get his rights under the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act is to make enough noise in the shop in the presence of other customers so that the shopkeeper will be obliged to do something about giving him his money back although that could lead the consumer into conflict with the law in other areas. In practice, the protection contained in the Act is not very strong. Most reputable businesses do abide by the law voluntarily.

This amendment would improve the provisions as far as the consumer is concerned. At the moment, if the consumer accepts as of merchantable quality some of the goods that are part of a series of goods being supplied under the same transaction he must accept the rest. Under this amendment he would have the right of partial rejection. If some of the goods were not up to standard he could reject those and accept others and pay the bill pro rata. This is an improvement in the law that has been recommended by the Law Commission in Britain and the Scottish Law Commission. It amplifies and improves our existing protection and I hope that the Minister can accept it. In case he has any worries about the drafting, it is based on the report of the Scottish Law Commission and the Law Commission in Britain. It is not based on any feverish activity of my legal imagination. While I am not sure which form of drafting the Minister would prefer, he might be safer with the recommendation of the Law Commission in Britain and I hope that he can accept this amendment, which would be a modest improvement on the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act.

I wish to say a word in support. This is a very commendable step and I can think of many situations in which a person is being presented with goods where it is the good side of the deal that is being proffered. I hope that the Minister can take this on board.

An amendment similar to this was tabled by Deputy Bruton and withdrawn by him on Committee Stage following debate. In the course of that debate, I outlined the reasons for my not being disposed to accept this amendment. The amendment proposed the introduction of a right of partial rejection in relation to the sale of goods. Where under existing law the buyer has a right to reject goods because of a breach of contract by the seller, he could under this amendment accept some of the goods but would not by so doing lose his right to reject the rest. On Committee Stage I indicated that I felt there might be some merit in Deputy Bruton's suggestion. However, as it based on only one of several recommendations made in the United Kingdom recently by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, I suggest that it might be unwise to isolate this one recommendation from others which might be relevant. However, I suggested that the situation to which the amendment related might not in fact be a real problem in practice. I did, however, agree to look further at the suggestion before Report Stage.

In the course of further examination of the matter it was noted that the UK Commission in their report emphasised that they do not intend that the buyer should have the right of partial rejection unless he would have been entitled to reject the whole. They point out that the right to reject the whole may be lost by virtue of the rules on acceptance contained in their Sale of Goods Act. It should be pointed out that those rules on acceptance differ from the law on acceptance here and obviously the implications of such a difference would have to be examined in greater depth. Also, in discussions with the UK authorities they have indicated that it has been represented to them that there may be difficulties with the right of partial rejection in particular cases and those authorities are currently considering whether such a right as recommended by the Law Commission is appropriate. In general, therefore, while there may be much merit in the Deputy's suggestion it warrants a much wider and fuller examination than has been possible in the time since the amendment was tabled.

In practice what normally happens to a great extent is that if the buyer rejects only a part and if there is no agreement to take it back the seller will lose business as a result. There would be no return orders.

That applies where dealing with traders but not so much when dealing with consumers in that they would not be interested in return orders as much.

They would not go back to the same place again. There may be exceptions but if you go into a high fashion store in Dublin and find that you have to return part of what you bought there and the store are not too interested in dealing with you you will not go back a second time. In practice it can be different from what we are talking about and I have set out fairly and squarely the reasons. This is only a recommendation which was not been implemented in the UK. Our situation is different. I think that is a fair response.

I accept what the Minister has said about the difficulties in coming to a decision on the implications of this amendment in the light of the differences between the laws governing acceptance in the two jurisdictions. However, I point out to the Minister that the opportunity for introducing amendments of this kind will pass with the passing of this legislation because the Minister will face considerable difficulty in getting another Bill concerning the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act onto the list of Government priorities.

The original set of amendments in regard to the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act originated in the report of a commission set up by the National Prices Commission who reported in 1972. The actual legislation did not become law until 1980, eight years later. The same type of delay is likely to arise in this case. It is a pity the Minister is unable to use this legislative vehicle to tidy up any difficulties there are in the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act and in the Consumer Information Act rather than put the matter on the long finger, which could be a very long finger indeed.

All that I can say in response is that the matter will not be put on the long finger. I am prepared to do the job but I want to be absolutely sure of what I am putting into legislation. I remind the House that the UK commission had been considering their recommendations for eight years. I accept what the Deputy has said, that this legislation gives us an opportunity of making changes but one should not rush headlong into making changes such as those without being fully aware of the consequences. If one is amending the law one should do it in the proper manner.

Is amendment No. 8 withdrawn?

In the light of what the Minister has said I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment No. 9 was discussed with amendment No. 6.

I move amendment No. 9:

In page 15, to delete lines 43 to 50, and in page 16, to delete lines 1 to 4 and substitute the following:

"31.—(1) The Consumer Information Act, 1978, is hereby amended by the substitution for paragraph (a) of subsection (4) of section 26 of the following paragraph.

‘(4) (a) Every order made under section 9, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act, or under paragraph (b) of this subsection, shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after it is made, and if a resolution annulling the order is passed by either House, within the next twenty-one days on which that House has sat after the order has been laid before it, the order shall be annulled accordingly, but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder.'

(2) Section 5 of the Act of 1980 is hereby amended by the substitution for subsection (2) of the following subsection:

`(2) Every order made under this Act shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after it is made, and if a resolution annulling the order is passed by either House, within the next twenty-one days on which that House has sat after the order has been laid before it, the order shall be annulled accordingly but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder.'.".

Amendment agreed to.

We now come to amendment No. 10 in the name of Deputy John Bruton. Amendment No. 11 is an alternative, so I am suggesting that we discuss amendments Nos. 10 and 11 together. Is that agreed? Agreed.

I move amendment No. 10:

In page 20, Second Schedule, Part I, third column, opposite "Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983", to delete "and 52 (1)" and substitute ", 52 (1) and 88".

Under the section which this amendment seeks to repeal Telecom Éireann are exempt from the civil law in regard to any damage or loss caused by their failure to provide an adequate service. Obviously, for such a claim to succeed the consumer would have to be able to show that Telecom Éireann were negligent in causing the loss or damage. Therefore, removing the protection would not throw Telecom Éireann open to claims by consumers against them through their failure to provide services which genuinely were beyond their control but if Telecom Éireann had been negligent, or their servants acting under their direction had been negligent, and if as a result a consumer of the services provided by this statutory monopoly suffered a loss then the consumer should have the same access to the civil law for remedies and for damages as he would have if he had suffered a loss with some private, nonmonopoly supplier of services. Given that Telecom Éireann's monopoly in this area is protected by law, they have a greater, not a lesser, responsibility to provide a good service and remedies for those who suffer a loss because of their deficiencies arising from negligence.

In the case of a private enterprise provider of services, the consumer if he is not getting adequate satisfaction at least has the opportunity of going elsewhere and in the case of a private enterprise supplier there is perhaps a greater case for exempting the supplier from the full rigours of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act. However where there is a statutory monopoly and the consumer has no options but to use the services provided by that statutory monopoly, there is a greater, not a lesser, case for ensuring that the consumer has full rights to claim against that statutory monopoly, Telecom Éireann in this case, for failing to provide a service through negligence, but only if that negligence can be demonstrated and if it causes actual loss.

Under section 88 of the Postal and Telecommunications Act any failure or delay in providing, operating or maintaining a telecommunications service which causes loss to a consumer cannot be the subject or the basis for an action for damages no matter how negligent Telecom Éireann were in failing to provide, operate or maintain a service and no matter how great the loss suffered by the consumer as a result. Likewise, if through negligence there is a failure, interruption, suspension or restriction of a telecommunications service which causes major loss to a consumer, he is not allowed to claim damages from Telecom Éireann because of section 88 of the legislation. Likewise if, by reason of section 88, a consumer suffers loss because through negligence Telecom Éireann make a false entry in a telephone directory containing information about that person's business, the private individual has no access to the civil law to claim damages against Telecom Éireann.

In all of those cases there should be the normal access to the civil law. We are not asking that any special or exceptional responsibilities be placed on Telecom Éireann just because they are a statutory monopoly. We are simply asking that they be subject to the same legislation in regard to being sued for negligent activities on their part as would any other corner shopkeeper or small business person. It is worth noting that section 88 (3) also exempts Telecom Éireann from the application of section 39 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act. That section states that anybody supplying a service in the course of business is presumed to have the ability to supply the service with due skill, care and diligence. If he is using materials — in the case of Telecom Éireann, telephone appliances — those materials should be sound and reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are required. That applies to any person providing a service in the private sector. I understand that it also applies to An Post and most State enterprises. They are open to be sued under section 39 if they fail to supply a service with due skill or with sound materials.

However, Telecom Éireann, as far as I can see alone amongst the State companies — I am open to correction on that; I checked in regard to CIE and An Post and I could not find a similar exemption for those companies but that is not the main point — cannot be sued. I do not see any reason why, if I can sue a small shopkeeper who is supplying me with a service if he does not exercise the necessary skill, if I can sue a barber who does not exercise the necessary skill and causes me an injury as a result of that failure, I should be prevented from suing Telecom Éireann if they fail to exercise the necessary skill in regard to any service they are providing.

Why should Telecom Éireann, just because they are a Government monopoly, be exempt from the ordinary law that applies to other people? I see no reason for that exemption. It is not because the taxpayer has poured insufficient resources into Telecom Éireann. There has been a vast investment of public funds in Telecom Éireann and that company have not provided the State with any dividend as yet on that huge investment. The company are not in a position to provide dividends or profits to the State which I understand An Post are in a position to provide although Telecom Éireann have absorbed huge quantities of capital.

Telephone charges here — this was referred to by the Minister when dealing with the generally negative cost environment here — are 50 per cent or 100 per cent higher than they are in most continental European countries. If Telecom Éireann were to say that they would have lower telephone charges than other countries if they were allowed to be exempt from the civil law because that would save them money, one could understand that as a fair deal. However, our telephone service is charging a higher price and enjoying privileges in regard to exemption from the normal civil law in regard to damages that other services fail to enjoy. I see no reason why that exemption should not be removed. I should like to tell the Minister that my party will be making formal proposals on that subject in the near future. Those proposals will have regard not just to this aspect of consumer protection concerning Telecom Éireann but also to other aspects. This is a matter that will be the subject of considerable public pressure from my party in the months ahead.

In my view, there is a compelling case for the Minister to accept one or other of our amendments. The first amendment seeks to remove all the exemptions from the normal civil law for negligence which Telecom Éireann presently enjoy. The second amendment seeks to deal with the question of directory entries, with which the Minister indicated in an aside there might be less of a problem. I accept that the Minister requires to consult with the Minister for Communications before accepting such amendments. I hope he has been able to do so and is now in a position to accept one or other of those amendments. If I had considered the matter as fully as I would have wished I would have also proposed an amendment to remove the exemption contained in section 88 (3) of the Postal and Telecommunications Act, 1983. That provision states that Section 39 shall not apply until the Minister for Trade, Commerce and Tourism by order provides that it shall apply. To my knowledge such an order has not been made. If the Minister could indicate that he intends to make an order applying the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act to Telecom Éireann in the near future, in the next three months, that would go a considerable distance in the direction my amendments are seeking to go. It would not remove all the problems because it would amount to a protection for people who are consumers. It would not provide any similar legal protection to trade customers of Telecom Éireann. It would be a step in the right direction and I hope the Minister can indicate that he is in a position to announce an order under that section in the reasonably near future.

I wholeheartedly endorse Deputy Bruton's sentiments. There is a fundamental principle involved in this issue, that is, the principle of natural justice that no area of the public or private sectors should be shut off from action by the citizen. One consequence of this Bill becoming law would be that the statutory monopoly of our national communications network will remain where it has been, with BTE, while that company's subsidiary and ancillary services would be subject to open competition. That lack of any defective monitoring, independent ongoing assessment or regulator capacity to look at BTE's monopoly is deplorable. It does not assist in assuring adequate performance of service, value for money and efficiency. Abuse of monopoly power can arise. What is being suggested is not necessarily that that be interfered with though some of us might wish to see a more open approach to it, but that there would be an assertion in law that there is no sweetheart arrangement between Government and areas of the public service providing essential services which shuts them off from access by the citizens in terms of pursuing their legal rights. I have no doubt that instead of in any way encouraging people to higher standards or standards of excellence or unusual performance, the psychology of absolute security from redress can only assist in diminution in the quality of service, complacency in the context of any form of competition and an inferior deal for the consumer. If a Bill which retains that inviolability for a body is to proceed there is an absolute obligation on the Minister to justify the reason for that being allowed to remain intact. That should be cleared up, not because anyone does other than wish BTE well but because a sense of natural justice dictates that people should have at least the same redress against that large, monopolistic operation as they would have against their neighbour over the back garden wall. It is just unthinkable that we should allow that situation to prevail, particularly where that organisation have a monopoly that effectively secures them against open competition and market forces which might themselves be an incentive to be very responsive to public need so on.

Nobody wishes to cast aspersions or reflections of any kind on the job and the genuine improvements that have come about in BTE's performance recently. We are saying simply that the citizens whom we represent here should have a right of legal redress. Deputy Bruton is seeking to obtain that and we support it as a principle to be embraced, we hope, by the Minister in this Bill.

For the information of the House, An Post enjoy exemption under section 64 of the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983 and CIE under section 40 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 1980.

That is two more to go.

In relation to the points made, I do not accept what Deputy Bruton says, that a huge investment was made in Telecom and is not showing results or paying dividends.

They are paying no cash dividends. I did not say no dividends.

Give them a chance. They must creep before they can walk. We are leading to one of the best telecommunications services in Europe with more digital technology in our telecommunications infrastructure than any country in Europe except France. If we had not that sort of foundation we would not even be talking about the establishment of a financial services centre in Dublin. However, that is not to say that the consumer and the State are not entitled to value for money. We have gone over this and I have subscribed to that they should be as efficient as possible. This was fully debated by the Oireachtas when the reorganisation took place in 1983 and the Oireachtas were firmly of the view that that this immunity should be extended for quite some time into the future, and I do not think the situation has changed all that much.

However, in relation to directory entries, it is not an advertisement. It is purely an alphabetical index for reference and no charge is involved in putting one in. I would not like to think that this House would put not alone Telecom but any State agency in the position of being open to huge claims as a result of an insertion for which they do not charge in a telephone directory. I have consulted with the Minister for Communications on the matter and he is firmly of the opinion that the repeal of section 88 would have major implications and that it ought to be considered only after full, careful and authoritive review of all aspects of the question.

However, as Minister for Industry and Commerce, I have a statutory function in this area. Under section 88 (3) (b) of the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983 the Minister for Industry and Commerce may, after consultation with the Minister for Communications, make an order applying the provisions of section 39 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 1980, to the provision of telecommunications services within the State. The effect of such an order would be that the implied terms set out in section 39 — mainly that a service will be supplied with due skill, care and diligence as Deputy Bruton said — would be implied in contracts between Telecom Éireann and their customers. These implied terms would facilitate the taking of an action against Telecom by a customer dissatisfied with the company's service — for instance, the matter of directory entries mentioned by Deputy Bruton on Committee Stage which is also the subject of one of the Deputy's amendments.

It is considered that the making of an order such as that described above, and here again today in the House by Deputy Bruton, would greatly enhance the protection available to the consumer while still safeguarding the competitive position of Telecom in relation to their international services. It would be inappropriate to remove it on one and not on the other. I am prepared, therefore, to examine fully the question of making an order as provided for in section 88 (3) (b) of the 1983 Act, in consultation with the Minister for Communications, as required by the Act and I will institute that consultation immediately.

I welcome the fact that the Minister has given the assurance that he will consider making an order under section 88 (3) (b) of the 1983 Act. While I believe that this will not satisfy business customers of BTE who should have the same right to sue BTE for damages——

Sorry, the order will apply to trade as well as consumers.

I stand corrected. I am glad the Minister has indicated he is prepared to do this. The fact that these amendments were put down on Committee Stage has served to bring this about. I thank the Minister for the consultation he is undertaking with his colleague in order to facilitate this improvement being made. I take it from what he has said that while he is consulting about the matter he will be making this order within a reasonable time. I welcome that.

I might say also that I appreciate the fact that a constituent of mine from near Drogheda was the person who brought this matter to my attention and I will be happy to name the amendment after him when the Minister eventually makes it.

Keeping in touch with the grass roots benefits us all.

Sorry, he is from County Meath.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 11:

In page 20, Second Schedule, Part I, third column, opposite "Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983", to delete "and 52(1)" and substitute", 52(1) and 88 (1) (c)".

Amendment, by leave withdrawn.
Question, "That the Bill, as amended, be received for final consideration" put and agreed to.
Question, "That the Bill do now pass" put and agreed to.

As the Bill is considered, by virtue of Article 20.2.2º of the Constitution, to be a Bill initiated in the Dáil, it is to be sent to the Seanad.

Top
Share