As one of the Deputies who has berated the Minister for being tardy in coming forward with legislation, what I have to say now is undoubtedly going to sound very ungracious. My berating of the Minister remains constant because in this instance he has come in with the wrong Bill and it is the very last Bill which should have been brought into this House. The Minister has left the Bill that would address this problem languishing on the shelf for the past three years, and I accept that the Minister has had responsibility for this Bill only for approximately 14 or 15 months.
I have studied the Bill and I have sought professional advice from my colleagues in the engineering profession. Architects do not frequently refer to engineers as colleagues, but in this instance I recognise that it is the engineering profession who uniquely are going to be put into the firing line if this Bill becomes law. It is an unnecessary and bad Bill and it will not solve the basic problem which the Minister thinks it is designed to do so. I do not doubt for one moment the sincerity of the Department of the Environment or of the Minister in coming forward with this measure but I think we should at the outset recognise what is at issue. The issue is not the structural safety of the multi-storey buildings in this State. The history of their construction and performance since 1922, if one wants to take the date of Independence, has been such that there is no need for alarm certainly for any building built after 1950. The only building that collapsed in recent times of natural causes as distinct from an explosion was a building at the corner of Fenian Street and Holles Street of much older age which had, because of the outrageous behaviour of the landlords of the day, become a dilapidated tenement and collapsed during the summer of 1963.
The Bill is an attempt by the Government to try to reassure public opinion with regard to the safety of the utilisation of gas. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the role and functions of the Department of the Environment. I suggest to the Minister that it has been visited upon him by the Government in the recognition that if Dublin Gas in particular do not manage to continue to sell substantial quantities of gas to their consumers then an entire and substantial public investment, with which I thoroughly agree, will be somewhat in jeopardy. I thoroughly support the objective of reassuring the people of Dublin as to the appropriateness, safety and cleanliness of our natural fuel which comes to us at a fraction of the cost of alternative fuels, which does not pollute our atmosphere, which does not cause respiratory illnesses and which can be very efficiently transported around the city. I fully support whatever measures the Department of Energy and the Government are taking to enhance the image of natural gas and reassure the consumer in respect of that commodity which is now in public ownership and at last under the very effective management of Bord Gáis Éireann and Dublin Gas.
That is the background to this Bill. It was the explosion in Raglan House on 1 January 1987 which triggered off the fear, worry and reaction to natural gas. The Government of the day commissioned a group of renowned international engineers, who are based in London and whose credentials in the area of gas, gas handling and gas conveyancing are second to none to carry out a survey. They produced a substantial report in relation to Dublin Gas and the way in which gas is handled in and out of buildings. They are not structural engineers but their terms of reference required them to look at the structure of the two buildings that were subject to explosions, Dolphin House and Raglan House. I should say that I live in Railway Cottages which are situated across the railway tracks from Raglan House. I was not there at the time the explosion occurred but I was there at 12.30 p.m. and during the days and weeks that followed I saw what happened to that building.
Cremer and Warner and the consultants who prepared the report subcontracted in a consultant structural engineer to do the structural side of their report. That section of the report was defective. I am confining my remarks entirely to the structural design of multi-storey buildings. In the Cremer and Warner report there were certain assumptions, a lot of non-sequiturs, no evidence of that kind of work upon which people could evaluate the quality of the conclusion. Running through this report from British based consultants and a subcontracted consultant engineer, there was an implication that Irish engineering standards might be defective. For example, in respect of the Raglan House explosion and the collapse of the building, the conclusion of Cremer and Warner is that because the building collapsed the structure must have been defective. There is no structural analysis in real terms as to why it collapsed. In fact, the building collapsed because a lake of natural gas had been allowed to accumulate in the sub-structure and surrounding area of that building and because of weather conditions at the time the processes of natural ventilation, which would have reduced that lake of natural gas, did not prevail and unfortunately — we do not know what ignited that natural gas but we do know that it was ignited — an enormous explosion took place. In engineering design the threshold of loading or impact of 35 kN is the maximum a building is normally expected to absorb. For example, nobody in the engineering world and no local authority would require an architect or an engineer to design a building that would be capable of sustaining a direct hit from an Exocet missile. There are standards beyond which one simply does not design for because they are outside the reasonable expectation of the kind of wear and tear a building would be expected to endure.
In their report Cremer and Warner are defective in their logical analysis in terms of the extent of the explosion that took place at Raglan House. The net point, without being technical or boring the House, is that if the level of the explosion from that lake of gas was in excess of 35 kN then the design, defective or otherwise, of the building is irrelevant, because even if it had been a superbly constructed Rolls Royce, belt and braces granitefaced building, it would have been substantially damaged by the force of that explosion. In relation to Dolphin House, which was constructed in breeze block and not in solid masonry walls and reinforced planks as was Raglan House, the level of the explosion that took place there appears to have been far less than that which took place at Raglan House and consequently the damage was less. Cremer and Warner conclude that because the damage was less at Dolphin House, it was a more robust building than Raglan House.
There are many contradictions running through the structural side of the analysis of the Cremer and Warner report. For example, they use the phrase "progressive collapse" right through the entire documentation, but when the task force which the Government set up looked at this they recognised there was no reference to the term "progressive collapse" in the codes of standards used by engineers in Ireland or in the United Kingdom. Therefore, the phrase "disproportionate collapse" was used.
The reason I am making this introductory point is, without any pun intended, to challenge the validity or veracity of the foundations upon which this ultimate legislative response rests. The Minister in his speech said:
The Government considered that a statutory requirement to appraise these buildings and to take any necessary action was needed to reassure both the users of such buildings and the public in general. The Bill I have now brought before the House reflects a response to that need.
This Bill is an attempt to reassure people. It is well motivated — that is not disputed — and is a genuine response to a wave of fear caused in the minds of many people who were using natural gas in their homes and which is now being effectively dealt with. Anyone who walks around the streets of Dublin knows very well that it is being dealt with effectively because one might as well be having a stroll in the Alps due to the way the pavements have been dug up to reinstate the entire network of distribution of natural gas.
The fact that there is so much surface disruption around the city of Dublin is testimony to the fact that we are renewing and replacing defective sections of the gas distribution system throughout our city and hence the fears that people had are not longer justified. This Government are using a sledgehammer to crack a peanut. They are imposing on the construction industry generally, on the professional engineers in particular and on the owners of certain buildings, a sequence of unnecessary costs and procedures which will not make their buildings any safer.
If this Bill becomes law it will not make these buildings any safer. We are talking about buildings built since 1950. Georgian Dublin is exempt from this legislation. We are only talking about buildings over five storeys built since 1950. None of these buildings were built by owner occupiers or jerry builders or do-it-yourself extension builders. We are talking about elaborate construction since 1950. These buildings were constructed and supervised under existing design criteria, the bulk of which will be in accordance with the standards set out in relation to this legislation. The Minister recognises that in some cases if a building requires to be reinforced the cost of reinforcing it would not be economically justifiable and that other measures recommended by the task force can be implemented.
There is an element of panic here. We are walking towards a tragedy and not without the benefit of hindsight, because the same thing happened in Britain. A system of construction borrowed from the Danes who used it for seven and eight storey constructions in the sixties was adapted by the British to build up to 20 and 22 storeys. This system is essentially like a pack of cards house — a panel for the wall, a panel for the floor and a panel for the roof and it was as vulnerable in effect as a house of cards. In Ronan Point, because of an accumulation of gas there was a blow-out at the 15th or 16th storey; it blew out two of these panels and everything above and below them started to shred. There was a great outcry at the time.
We in Ireland have no buildings similar in construction to the Ronan Point buildings. The response to that tragedy, because there was a lot of local authority housing built on the same system, was a massive structural reinforcing of those buildings at enormous cost. Yet, the statistical probability of another Ronan Point happening, once the management of the gas appliances was properly adhered to was very low. The engineers calculated that for one life saved approximately £20 million of taxpayers' money in Britain was spent. That was the kind of ratio. It was very expensive and it was not cost effective, although it is not easy to attempt to put a price on a life. This legislation is setting into law a number of costs and requirements, the full consequences of which the Minister has not thought out properly. I will be interested to hear the Minister's response to this debate.
On the consumer end, if a person has bought a flat or an apartment in a building of five storeys, that is four storeys with a penthouse, and wishes to sell it, that person as the owner will not be required to get a certificate of compliance. In many cases the construction company which built the block of flats no longer exists, because most companies, on completion of a building project go into self-liquidation. In that case the owner will be required to try to get from the engineer who originally designed the block of flats a certificate to comply with this Bill. The Bill does not require the engineer to certify that the building was designed so as to comply with the necessary standards of safety. It requires an engineer to certify that the building was constructed so as to satisfy standards of safety in accordance with the codes. The onus falls on the person who is certifying that this compliance has been met and it is very substantial. If he or she gets it wrong, he or she is liable to fines and in some cases to three years in prison.
All professional engineers have to carry indemnity professional liability insurance and the first thing that will be affected by this is the cost for professional engineers of professional indemnity. Secondly, it will make the owners of apartment buildings who wish to sell them or who want to get insurance face additional costs because the certificate will have to be acquired, presuming one can get an engineer who is prepared to lay his head on the block to certify that the building has been constructed in accordance with the regulations under this legislation.
Even where an engineer supervises a building, he may not be 100 per cent sure that the work had been carried out in accordance with the design drawings. No team of professionals can be 100 per cent sure. Most of the time one is sure but when one comes to the point of formally certifying it to the extent required here there can be a reasonable doubt. Whatever about a building which one designs and supervises at construction stage, there is no way in which one can certify that an existing building complies with the regulations, with the degree of certainty and authority that this Bill requires. It would be a bit like asking some of the best chefs in the world to certify that a cake, for example, has been made strictly in accordance with the recipe. One cannot retrospectively unscramble an egg and examine its quality and testify that the eggs were pure and organically produced before they went into the cake.
These difficulties are not particular to this Bill. They relate to the whole question of service certification. If we had the Building Control Bill in place at this stage this issue would have been resolved. The points I am making about certification generally and about self-certification are not specific to this Bill. They are general to the whole area of self-certification.
The Minister in his opening speech said that the regulations would prescribe the form of the certificate. I hope when we get to the relevant section on Committee Stage we will have a draft of the form of that certificate. I am giving the Minister notice now that I will be opposing that section unless we have a draft. With no disrespect to the Minister here present the way in which our business is done in this House is that we never get to debate the regulations of much of the legislation that is enacted. From the point of view of the concern that I am addressing at present — that of competency, engineers and certificates, their signing and their availability — it is the precise legal wording of the form of that certificate, it is the extent of the commitment you are asking an engineer to undertake in terms of profession liability costs and in terms of what they will have to answer for in a court of law should something go wrong.
The Minister's very able civil servants here and in the Department of the Environment are familiar with this entire field. There have been numerous draft forms of certificates submitted by the professional bodies and agencies during the last three, four and five years, so I am not asking for something to be pulled out of the hat. There are forms that have been drafted by the relevant institutes that have been discussed with groups like the insurance companies, who handle insurance, which would go a long way down the road to satisfying requirements of legislation on the one hand and fears from self-certifiers on the other. We should see it here on the floor of this House. I should like to say to the Minister that I could not vote in the relevant section, unopposed, unless we got sight of the kind of draft certificate that he had in mind so that we could talk about it. Out of courtesy and out of fairness I am duty bound to signal that at this stage.
I should now like to cite some of the sources and some of the assistance I got. I should like to quote from a report which was prepared by an ad hoc committee formed by the Institution of Engineers of Ireland, the Association of Consulting Engineers of Ireland and the Institution of Structural Engineers (Republic of Ireland Branch).
This ad hoc committee was set up as an appraisal of the official reports on the Raglan House and Dolphin House incidents by Cremer and Warner Limited with regard to aspects relating to structural engineering design of buildings to prevent disproportionate damage in the event of an accident. The reason I am taking the trouble to read some of these conclusions into the record is important. We do not often get an opportunity in this House to debate something like this.
What is implicitly at issue here is the technical and professional competence of our building design and construction design institutions. If you look at the level of our investment as a community, in the education of engineers and at the part now which the building industry is beginning to play abroad — and will increasingly play in other member states of the European Community — it is absolutely essential that no suggestion of second rate performance, or inferior standards of professional design or competence, is implied or attached to Irish institutions. It is very much in our interest as a community, as a nation and as a group of taxpayers that the high standards that have been consistently achieved in the education of engineers — and in the administration of their affairs by engineers and by the local authorities be maintained, and the evidence of the adherence to those high standards is the fact that the number of buildings that actually collapse, as distinct from falling in on themselves, as a result of an enormous explosion in this country is very small. It is important to nail the Cremer and Warner report so far as it addresses itself to structural performance of Irish design. Section 3 of the report states:
3. The committee consider CWL should be congratulated for producing their Reports in such a short time. However, several aspects of the CWL Reports were of concern to the committee in its attempts to see what if any lessons can be learned from the Raglan House and Dolphin House incidents in relation to structural design of buildings.
3.1. The committee noted that CWL apparently had no powers of discovery. This may have limited the availability of information and consequently the thoroughness of the Reports.
3.2. CWL's terms of reference (Main Report, page 2.1) restricted examination to similar types of buildings and occupancy. However, it is noted that their recommendations extend to buildings of varying occupancy, height and forms of construction. No information is given on what studies were undertaken to encompass other types of buildings.
3.3. The report does not set out the following important information concerning Raglan House:
—The full design team for the project. The Architect and Consulting Structural Engineer are named but the other members, if any, are not referred to.
The other members would include the mechanical engineer who would have responsibility for the installation of the gas fittings among other things.
The terms and date of appointment of the design team including the Consulting Structural Engineer and the areas of authority and responsibility retained by the Client/Developer.
The House will recall that this was a developer project where the builder was also the developer. That alters considerably the relationship in professional terms between the contractor on the one hand and the design team on the other. The report goes on to state:
— The brief for the design team.
— The actual design and supervision process.
— The legal requirement for approval under the Local Government (Planning and Development) Acts and Building Bye Laws at that time.
The apparent absence of this information to CWL may have implications for their assessment of Irish design practice.
It is incredible that a study on the structure of the building could have been undertaken without this basic information being obtained, studied and evaluated. I am aware from one of the engineers involved that a very perfunctory attempt was made by the people involved to contact him in relation to this. I am looking at the validity of the foundations upon which this Bill rests. I am reading into the record some of the observations by representatives of the three engineering institutions in our society. The report further states:
3.4 The CWL Reports do not list what information they sought or obtained and what discussions they had with the building designers to ensure the information they were working with was correct and to confirm as far as possible the correctness of any assumptions they might be making. The Reports present little by way of technical description or sketches of the building structure of Raglan House (e.g. details of structural screed/floor units, control joints in masonry, strength and other details of blocks and bricks used, mortar type, type and spacing of wall ties, bearing details of slabs on walls, beam details or the general structural arrangements). This information would be necessary to carry out a complete appraisal of the building structure.
3.5 The CWL Reports present no detailed structural analysis of Raglan House or Dolphin House, nor do they imply that such analyses were carried out. The Main Report as it relates to building structure appears to accept the premises that because Raglan House collapsed, it was not structurally adequate by normal standards.
That is incredible. That means that if a bomb were to hit — and some people in the city would not be sorry if it did — the civic offices down in Wood Quay, they were structurally inadequate because they had collapsed. The logic of that is something that should not be let out of kindergarten schools and yet this is in the report of Cremer and Warner. Section 3.6 of the Report states:
3.6 The description of the damage after the first critical explosion appears contradictory. Comparing Fig. 5.1., Fig. 6.2 and the text, it cannot be determined from the Report exactly what sections of walls or floor slabs on each floor can be said to have suffered immediate primary damage. For instance, it is not clear how much of the outside wall of the lounge in flat 1 was damaged to the extent that it could not perform any structural function. The first paragraph of section 5.2 in the Main Report is particularly confusing.
However it seems clear that several lengths of wall at least, probably all of the loadbearing walls in the front area of flat 1 (i.e. all of the loadbearing walls around the kitchen and bedrooms), were demolished by the immediate effects of the first explosion. This is damage far in excess of that allowed for in normal design procedure and the subsequent collapse of the section of the building over this area could not therefore be considered disproportionate to the initial incident.
This implies that the extent of the explosion on the one hand and the perceived performance of the building on the other were such that you could not deduce or conclude that the building was structurally faulty or badly designed.
3.7 It is not pointed out in the CWL Reports that the occurrence of a second explosion shortly after the first main explosion would not be considered in the design of a building.
—another important consideration—
3.8 The incident was the result of an unlikely combination of circumstances. The primary cause was accumulation of gas in the building without which no accident could have occurred. The report presents substantial evidence that the source of the gas explosion was a major factor on the external gas main.
