There are three separate elements in this group of amendments— the travelling community, sexual orientation and ridicule or contempt. I will deal with these three elements separately in my reply.
On Second Stage I said that I would be favourably disposed towards amendments which would explicitly include the travelling community and I now have before me for consideration several amendments proposing different solutions to how the travelling community should be so included. Having examined these amendments I have come to the conclusion that the simple approach is the best one and accordingly I propose to accept amendments Nos. 8, 17 and 24 and I will now give my reasons for so doing.
The term "the travelling community" is now a well known and much used expression. As Deputy Colley said on Second Stage, everyone knows who is being referred to when the term is used and there is no confusion. If I was to define the term I would immediately come up against two difficulties. The first is finding a definition which excludes persons who travel around a lot either as a way of life or as part of a job but are not members of the travelling community as commonly understood. If I came up with such a definition I would then come up against a second difficulty, that is, how to include travellers who have settled either completely or for part of the year. There would always be a danger when attempting a definition that some person would be inadvertently included or excluded. That is a risk that would have to be considered if "the travelling community" was not such an accepted and well understood expression. I have had discussions on this point with the Parliamentary Draftsman and the Attorney General and the consensus of opinion is that, as with the other terms such as race, ethnic origins and national origins, no definition is necessary.
The other approach I would have difficulty with would be to define "ethnic" as including the travelling community, regardless of whether it was confined to the purpose of this Bill. For a start it would not give travellers one with of protection more than they will get anyway. Indeed it is ironic that some of the people who would most like to see this approach are the most constant proponents of the theory that travellers are an ethnic minority. If I was sure of this I would be saying that as the travellers are already covered by the Bill there is no need to mention them by name. To do so would be tautological and that would be bad drafting. However, I am not so sure, and on the basis of present knowledge about the history of the travellers there may be certain indications but little proof of their origins. I could not agree to a definition now that would tie the hands of the courts and could one day turn out to be factually wrong.
One day the courts may be asked to decide on whether the travellers are a distinct ethnic group. If that happens, which in the context of this legislation it cannot if the amendments I am accepting are made, the courts will make their decision in the light of prevailing knowledge of the history and background of the travellers. That knowledge may well be at a far more advanced stage than it is today.
Accordingly, I am happy to accept amendments Nos. 8, 17 and 24. I am satisfied that these will give the travelling community the maximum protection afforded by the Bill with no qualifications brought about by definitions or other extraneous matters. This is one of those all too rare occasions when there is unanimity as to what we are trying to achieve and I might add that, any disagreement there may be is on matters of detail. I hope that I have managed to convince Deputies that the amendments in the name of Deputy Barrett which I am accepting are the correct ones, both in drafting and policy, and fully meet the intentions of the other amendments I do not propose to accept.
I come now to the question of including "sexual orientation" in the definition of hatred. I am not accepting the amendments that include this proposal. In my Second Stage speech I referred to the various international human rights instruments which provide the background to the Bill now before this House. This Bill was prepared in the light of the recommendations of an interdepartmental committee which was established to identify the legislative changes necessary to enable this country to ratify the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. What we have before us today is a Bill which gives effect to one of the recommendations of that committee. In other words, and I would like to stress this point, this Bill is aimed at removing one of the obstacles in the way of ratifying the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant provision in question refers only to "national, racial or religious hatred". In the Bill this has been broadened to cover also the expression used in the corresponding provision in the UN Convention on Racial Discrimination, which refers to "race, colour, or ethnic origin". The category of person now covered by the definition of "hatred" in sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Bill is accordingly very wide — it covers "race, colour, nationality, religion or ethnic or national origins".
This legislation breaks new ground. The ambit of this legislation is very wide as can be seen from the very broad categories covered by the definition of "hatred"— a definition that is now being extended by the inclusion of "members of the travelling community". If I appeared to hesitate over the inclusion of the travellers in the definition of hatred, it was to some extent in the knowledge that specifically mentioning them would be seen by some almost as an invitation to redouble their efforts for the inclusion of other categories. It may be one particular group that is pressing now — next month or next year it could be another group and so on. The case for inclusion of the travellers has been made, and accepted, the case for sexual orientation has not.
I want to make it very clear that I do not condone the use of abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or the incitement of hatred, directed against any particular section of the community. However, as with all legislation, this Bill has certain objectives and I am satisfied that they have been met. A point is invariably reached beyond which it would not be reasonable to go and it is my contention that that point has been reached and any further additions to the definition of "hatred" would be to the detriment of the Bill as a whole.
The third element in this group of amendments is the question of ridicule and contempt. I appreciate the Deputy's intentions with this proposal but I have to say that it is neither practical nor desirable and I am opposing it.
Under sections 2, 3 and 4 it will be an offence for a person to act or speak, as set out in the sections, in such a way as to be threatening, abusive or insulting with the intent or likelihood of hatred being stirred up. These words, "threatening". "abusive" and "insulting", are well known and have been included in legislation both here and abroad for a long time. They appear in the Dublin Police Act of 1842, section 14, where there is an offence of using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned.
They are strong words, as indeed is hatred. They mean more than "annoying" or, "ridicule" or treating somebody with contempt. They are undefined — but are clear in their meaning, a meaning which any ordinary citizen can understand. I think our ordinary citizen would, for example, know an insult when he or she saw one. However, it would not be appropriate to penalise those who say or publish something in bad taste.
To ridicule a group of persons may not be ideal human behaviour but it is certainly not a crime and I do not intend to make it one. In its ordinary meaning, to ridicule is to mock or to laugh at and to have contempt for someone is to be scornful. To accept the Deputy's amendment would leave the legislation so lacking in the type of respect and sense of fairness that all legislation needs in order to be acceptable that it would be worthless. Also, as I have said on more than one occasion when explaining this Bill, we have had to be very careful not to include anything that might infringe the constitutional rights of free speech. I submit that the amendment we are now discussing could well upset the balance we have achieved in the Bill in this respect.