Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 29 Nov 1990

Vol. 403 No. 3

Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Bill, 1990 [Seanad]: Second Stage.

Minister for Justice (Mr. Burke)

I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time". This Bill is designed to rectify an injustice, and a possible unconstitutionality, in the present law regarding the limitation of actions for personal injuries.

This injustice, and the constitutional implications of the present statutory provisions in this area, are analysed in detail by the Law Reform Commission in their report published in 1987 entitled The Statute of Limitations: Claims in respect of Latent Personal Injuries. This Bill gives effect to that report's recommendations.

Briefly put, the present law is that, with certain exceptions, where a person is injured by the wrongful act or neglect of another, he or she has three years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action in which to commence proceedings to recover damages. If legal proceedings are commenced after the three year limitation period has expired, the defendant can put a stop to them by what is known as "pleading the Statute"; in other words, by invoking the provision of the Statute of Limitations, 1957, which specifies the limitation period.

There is nothing wrong in principle with having limitation periods as such. It is in the interest of society as a whole that, if an occurrence gives rise to legal action, the action should be taken with reasonable promptness. Delay can lead to a denial of justice through the deterioration of evidence or the blurring of witnesses' memories. It can be unjust and lead to a proper sense of grievance if a person finds himself the defendant in an action which could have been commenced many years before.

I suppose it can be said that the law of limitation of actions generally illustrates the tension between justice and certainty which is a feature of any developed legal system. On the one hand there is the argument that litigation should not be unduly delayed and that parties should be clear as to their position under the law. This points to short limitation periods measured from a fixed date, with no possibility of extension. On the other hand, there is the view that such a rigid system will inevitably lead to injustice in particular cases and that this argues for longer periods measured perhaps from an uncertain date as, for example, the date when a plaintiff actually discovers that he has a cause of action.

This is the difficulty addressed by the Law Reform Commission in their report. The commission refer to the instances where injury or damage to a person does not manifest itself at all until long after the act or omission which caused the injury took place. If the normal three year limitation period has expired before the injury becomes evident, then the injured person has lost his right of action even before he knew he had such a right. That is where the injustice lies and the tension to which I have referred is stretched to breaking point.

In looking at the law in this area, the commission considered how the apparent injustice of the Statute stands in the context of the Constitution, and set out three possible interpretations as to what the state of the law is, or might be determined to be given a suitable case in which all of the arguments were opened to the court. The important message of the commission's report is that the law in this area is unclear, and possibly unconstitutional. Some of the doubts were removed in a Supreme Court decision of 8 February, 1990, in the case of Hegarty v. O'Loughran delivered since the publication of the commission's report. In that case, however, the constitutional aspects were not put in issue by the parties and, therefore, not argued before the court. Accordingly, there still remains a substantial degree of uncertainty as to the precise state of the law and the constitutionality of the statutory provision.

The Bill removes the uncertainty and the injustice by providing, at section 3 (1), that the three year period that applies in claims for personal injuries is to run from the date of accrual of the cause of action, which is the case at present, or from the date of knowledge of the person injured, if later. This latter date is known as the date of discoverability of the injury.

Section 2 of the Bill sets out what is meant by a person's date of knowledge. In order for a person to be fixed with knowledge of an injury, and therefore for time to begin to run, the person must not only know that there had been injury but also that the injury was significant; that it was caused at least partially by an alleged wrongful act or omission; the identity of the defendant; and if the defendant is someone other than the person who did the wrongful act, the additional facts supporting the bringing of the action against the defendant. Time begins to run from when a person actually knew all the relevant facts or from when he could, by reasonable inquiry, have found them out, if earlier.

The net effect of these provisions will be to remove the present injustice from the law by giving those who could not have discovered that they had a right of action within the normal period running from the time of the actual injury an opportunity to make a claim. The limitation period of three years which applies to claims of this type will now run from the time when the injured person discovered, or should have discovered, the necessary facts about his injury. The law will still operate, as it does at present, so as to discourage undue delay on the part of potential plaintiffs,

Section (3) (1) which I referred to a moment ago, can be regarded as the core provision of the Bill. The remaining provisions of the Bill are largely concerned with making the changes in the law necessary for consistency with the core provision or completeness of its effect. I will comment briefly on the more important of these.

Subsections (3) and (4) of section 3 carry the principle of the discoverability provision into other statutes which contain limitation provisions resulting to personal injuries cases.

Section 4 of the Bill deals with the situation where an injured person dies before the limitation period has expired. In such a case, an action arising out of the injury may survive for the benefit of the estate. The Bill provides that the personal representative of the deceased will have three years from the date of the death, or from the date of the representative's knowledge of the injury, if later, in which to commence the action.

This type of action, known as a survival action, can arise in any case where an injured person dies while there is still an outstanding claim in relation to the injury, whether or not the death was caused by the injury. Where the injury did cause the death, the surviving dependent relatives may have a claim under section 48 of the Civil Liability Act, 1961, against the person who caused the injury. This type of claim is distinct from survival action. Both claims may be made in the same case.

Section 6 of the Bill applies the discoverability provision to claims under the Civil Liability Act. It provides that such a claim may be made within three years of the death — as at present — or of the date of knowledge of the dependent relative for whose benefit the action is brought, whichever is later. Where there is more than one dependent relative, the discoverability test will be applied to each; and any person outside the time limit will be excluded from the action unless either there is an agreement not to invoke the defence of limitation or the person comes within the terms of the provision I am about to comment on.

Deputies will recall that when describing the present law earlier in my speech, I mentioned that there were certain exceptions to the present provision which specifies that the three year limitation period runs from the date of accrual of the cause of action. Those exceptions arise when the person injured was under a legal disability at the time of the injury. "Disability" in this context means mainly either being below the age of majority or suffering from a mental disability. Section 49 of the Statute of Limitations, 1957, specifies that in these circumstances, the three year period will not start to run against the injured person until he ceases to be under a disability.

Section 5 of the Bill modifies this provision to take account of the discoverability concept. The effect of the section is that where a person is under a disability, either when the right of action in a personal injuries case accrues to him or at the date of his knowledge, then the three year limitation period will not start to run until he ceases to be under a disability.

Section 7 of the Bill applies the new discoverability test to all causes of action relating to personal injuries, whether accruing before or after its passing and to proceedings pending at its passing. This provision is unusual in that it has retrospective effect, something normally avoided in the introduction of new law. Let us consider what the effect of this provision will be, that is, that some people who did not realise that they had a cause of action because their date of knowledge was more than three years after their injury will now in fact be able to proceed. This is precisely what the Bill as a whole is designed to do. Indeed, the Law Reform Commission, in recommending a provision on these lines, said that to provide otherwise:

...would clearly frustrate in a number of cases the objective of the proposed reform of the law.

That is from page 53 of the 1987 report. While I am on the subject, I would like to take this opportunity to record our thanks to the commission for the production of this report. As with many of their reports, this set out the background to the problem and the various approaches to it taken in other jurisdictions before canvassing the various options and setting down a clear path for legislative action. This is an invaluable service which can ease the work of the Legislature in determining how best to reform the law. I think I can speak for all sides of the House in offering our gratitude to the commission.

I commend this Bill to the House.

Mr. Flanagan

I welcome this Bill on behalf of the Fine Gael Party. We will be supporting it on Second Stage, and indeed in principle, subject to our being able to table and speak on a number of amendments on Committee Stage.

I should like to avail of this opportunity to concur with the Minister in his comments in so far as the Law Reform Commission are concerned. While listening to the Minister replying to the Second Stage debate on the previous Bill before the House I noted he went to considerable lengths to clap himself and his Department on the back for the manner in which they had produced legislation in the area of justice and law reform generally in recent months. I am sure the Minister will acknowledge that the Law Reform Commission played no small part in enabling that legislation be drafted.

Mr. Burke

Willingly.

Mr. Flanagan

Rightly so. Nevertheless the Minister will be very aware of the number of reports of the Law Reform Commission that have not been acted on to date. In view of the speed with which the Minister has acted in recent times — now that the momentum has been built up — let us hope that the decks can be cleared with regard to a number of reports stretching back to the early eighties. Of course, I acknowledge the tremendous input of the Law Reform Commission in this regard.

The Bill before the House essentially is a simple one. Nevertheless its provisions are of considerable consequence, redressing an injustice in the matter of personal injuries and the entitlement of an aggrieved party to sue notwithstanding the overall provisions of the Statute of Limitations, 1957. Quite rightly this Bill seeks to remedy an injustice and, in many ways may pre-empt a Supreme Court ruling at some time in the future to the effect that the Statute of Limitations, 1957 — so far as personal injuries are concerned — is unconstitutional. By enacting this measure we will perhaps obviate the need for the Supreme Court to thrust such a judgment upon us.

The House will be aware of a Fine Gael Private Members' Bill circulated in 1988 prior to the 1989 general election, and what is before us today broadly follows the provisions of the 1988 Bill with some minor modifications. It is clear that the three year limitation period for personal injuries is unsatisfactory, in particular where an injury cannot be immediately or simply detected. The Law Reform Commission in their 1987 report discussed the pros and cons of the various approaches to solving the problem. On balance the Minister has adopted what the commission have recommended, and the Bill represents the most rational and reasonable approach in the circumstances. It is important that the legislation enacted does not allow for a free-for-all which would give rise to claims of a speculative and dubious nature. I agree with the provisions in the Bill that the limitations will run from the time the injured party could have reasonably discovered the injury rather than the date upon which the injury was sustained initially.

Section 2 (1) (b) provides that the injury in question must have been significant. The Minister has broadly followed the recommendations of the commission in this regard, nevertheless there is something here that perhaps we should try to tease out in greater detail. The English legislation, which is broadly similar to what we have before us today and which amended the Statute of Limitations in that jurisdiction went as far as to define "significant" or "significance" in regard to injury as one which the plaintiff would reasonably have considered sufficiently serious to justify the institution of proceedings against a defendant who did not dispute liability and who could be established as being a justifiable mark in terms of compensation or damages. We have not done that. Obviously, the idea is that the court will decide on the question of significance, and I hope the operative date of the significance will not give rise to confusion.

Section 2 (1) (b) says: "that the injury in question was significant". Was that at the date on which it was discovered or a significant injury occurring on the date on which the accident took place? If one were to opt for the latter one would be somewhat defeating the spirit of the legislation. The Minister when replying to Second Stage in the Seanad dealt with the question of significance and made a very reasonable point that an injury could on the date of its occurrence be of a trivial or minor nature and of the type this legislation is not deemed to cover but at a later stage it might become significant. As I said, I hope the question of the operative date of significance will not give rise to undue confusion.

It will be incumbent upon somebody relying on the legislation to be satisfied with the provisions of section 2, and the criteria therein must be clearly established before the court. Sectin 2 (2) (d) is the identity of the defendant. This may give rise to disappointments in certain quarters. I realise the Minister is in difficulty but I thought he would have addressed himself to the difficulties relating to what can be described as hit-and-run accidents where the offending party is never brought to justice because the identity of the offending party never becomes known.

In this regard, it is regrettable that the Motor Insurers Bureau cannot find their way to compensating these injured parties, the bureau being the available body from whom the injured party or plaintiff may be entitled to recover. When the identity of the person is unknown that has given rise to very serious hardship and difficulties. A small number of people would appear to have been left with no form of redress where the identity of the defendant has not become known. I understand there is an appendix to the regulations of the Motor Insurers Bureau which states something to the effect that a form of ex gratia payment might be made in the circumstances, but to the best of my knowledge it is not deemed satisfactory because the fundamental rule under which the body have been established is that they will pay only on the basis of their being in a position to recover at a later stage from the defendant or an offending party. Maybe this is not the legislation under which to look at this problem but I think it is worthy of an airing. If the name of an injuring party in a hit-and-run accident does not become public or at least known to the claimant within the Statute of Limitations period, should that name become evident sometime later following the three year personal injury rule notwithstanding the date of accident or date of injury, is such a person covered? I hope so but I am not entirely clear from the legislation as presented whether that is the case.

Section 7 is welcome. The Minister referred to it in so far as he stated that the application of the Bill addresses all causes of action whether accruing before or after the passing of the legislation. A number of likely claims can now perhaps be set in motion on foot of the passing of this legislation, notwithstanding the difficulties the House has encountered in attempts on numerous occasions to introduce legislation that appeared on the face of it to be somewhat retrospective. I am glad the Minister has faced the matter head on and trust there will be no difficulties with this matter in the courts at a later stage.

I welcome the Bill although it is not without its drawbacks. While the legislation addresses personal injury and personal injury claims, the Minister could have availed himself of the opportunity of incorporating claims against property damage along the lines he has suggested for personal injuries. I do not wish to speak on behalf of the Minister, I am sure he will reply to Second Stage, but he will probably refer to the fact that the legislation is based on the Law Reform Commission report of 1987, and that dealt solely with the Statute of Limitations in respect of claims of latent personal injuries. There is a parallel there that will wreak considerable hardship in certain quarters. On the one hand we are allowing an exemption or an extension to parties who suffer personal injuries, yet people who may suffer severe hardship, as has often happened and is continuing to happen as regards likely claims for defective premises etc., are not being accorded similar treatment. That is unjust in manys ways and perhaps we can look at it in greater detail on Committee Stage.

One example might underline the point I am making. If the beam of a house falls on somebody's head and causes injury, that would be covered by the legislation, but should the house fall down and the unfortunate owner of the house escape personal injury but is left without his sole asset, his castle if one likes, that is not covered if he is outside the period of limitation which, I know, is longer than that for personal injuries. Many cases have, however, come to light after the common law rules have expired or, indeed, the period of limitation in the case of defective premises. It is a serious drawback.

The Law Reform Commission did not address the problem. They said that it was perhaps worth noting that in the report they confined themselves to the question of latent personal injuries; and that they had already addressed the complex question of latent defects in buildings in their report on defective premises published in 1982. It is a pity the Minister did not avail of the opportunity to bring forward some of the recommendations of that earlier Law Reform Report as far as defective premises are concerned. Parties have been injured, parties have suffered considerable damage by losing all their possessions due to latent defects in a house coming to light some years later — for example, water pipes leaking beneath a concrete floor, roof problems or damp problems for which the house builder would have been clearly responsible in terms of his duty of care to the buyer. Because of the limitation period being invoked the builder is not liable in law, although the person has suffered severe loss and hardship.

This matter was considered by the Construction Industry Federation in their submission to the Law Reform Commission in 1982 and, if my memory serves me correctly, they recommended that there should be an extension of the limitation period to ten years for defective premises, notwithstanding the various agreements between the parties, the structural defects indemnities or indeed insurance that people may take out. I feel that the entire problem has not been addressed.

A case has been brought to my attention regarding the sale of a house where a substantial defect has been discovered. It is not, of course, possible to obtain a willing purchaser and the situation is compounded because once one willing purchaser pulls out, recognising a serious defect, it is easy for the house to get a bad name and become unsaleable. This sort of thing has happened throughout the length and breadth of the country and gives rise to serious difficulties.

In principle, the argument must be as relevant to cases of material loss as it is to cases of personal injuries where people face extreme hardship and are possibly on the verge of bankruptcy. The legislation should be extended to cover non-personal injury and damage. I would hope that we could discuss that in more detail on Committee Stage. In the Law Reform Commission Report of 1982 to which I have referred, there is a reference to an earlier working paper of 1977 wherein it is provided that:

for the purpose of the Statute of Limitations a cause of action against a person undertaking or executing building work should be deemed to have accrued:

(a) where the work undertaken was executed to the order to any person, at the time when that person notified the person responsible for the work (whether or not he undertook the work in question) that he first accepted the work as conforming to the order or at the time when the first person took possession of the premises, whichever is the earlier;

The Law Reform Commission, having considered the matter further between 1977 and 1982 turned that premise on its head and stated that there was clearly a case for an extension of the limitations as far as property was concerned and that there was need to have such provisions that would not lead to injustice where defects in a building became first manifest long after the building had been completed. It is fair to say that the only course of action available to the Law Reform Commission from a common sense point of view was to determine that it was not uncommon that such defects do remain hidden for many years.

The commission went on to recommend that time should not begin to run, for the purposes of the Statute of Limitations, until the prospective plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the injury or damage suffered, and that is remarkably similar to what the Minister has brought forward in section 2 of this legislation as far as personal injuries are concerned. If it is sufficient to bring forward legislation as far as personal injuries are concerned, then it should have the same force as far as property is concerned. If we are bringing forward legislation to pre-empt a decision of unconstitutionality by the Supreme Court, then perhaps we might consider what would be the perspective of the Supreme Court in regard to property, having particular regard to the passsing of this legislation.

It has been remarked that the Bill might have an effect on the insurance industry. While I again submit that this is a matter more suitable to another debate, I believe there is general consensus throughout the country that the Government must tackle the many problems being experienced by the insurance industry, in particular where costs are concerned. On the publication of the legislation, the Insurance Industry Federation were cautious about any increases in premiums that this legislation might bring about. They did not foresee any great influx of claims. The reality, however, must be that, particularly in the area of employee liability cases and also in cases of medical negligence, there will be a number of cases brought. The Minister and his colleague, the Minister for Industry and Commerce must make every effort to deal with this problem.

Medical negligence insurance for people engaged in the medical profession is alarming, something in the region of £10,000 per year. That is not going to decrease without some action being taken by the insurance industry. Claims are on the increase. We seem to be following the line of the United States of America as far as that is concerned. Similarly, from an employer's point of view the exorbitant cost of employer liability insurance is something that is certainly impeding job creation and expansion, particularly in small industries.

While on balance one must look to justice rather than cost, the legislation gives us an opportunity to examine the other side of the coin, that is, the very high cost of insurance and the fact that this legislation will certainly not help in that regard.

I welcome recent comments by the Minister for Industry and Commerce on the Fair Trade Commission report on the legal profession. That is another important and eagerly awaited piece of legislation that will ultimately be brought forward. The Solicitors Bill is also something which we have been promised on numerous occasions in the past number of years. I hope the legislation is at a very advanced stage, having regard to the publication of the Fair Trade Commission's report earlier this year and the discussion on it at Cabinet level which I understand is taking place. When dealing with insurance and the cost of insurance, the recommendations of the Fair Trade Commission and the legal profession are very important. I hope we will debate that matter at the earliest opportunity.

The Bill is welcome. While the question of cost may well be a factor as far as the legislation is concerned, I believe that the balance between justice and cost must be weighed. Justice must be done and must be seen to be done. The people who are suffering because of the absence of this legislation will ultimately have their case adjudicated by a court of law. This measure will put the minds of many sufferers at ease. It is extraordinary that a technical statute like the statute of limitations should deny somebody with a significant injury access to justice. I await the Minister's comments in regard to property. That is the one serious omission from the Bill, and I hope we will give further consideration to that aspect on Committee Stage. Nevertheless I welcome the legislation as it stands.

Mr. McCartan

I propose to be brief in respect of this legislation. It is fully supported by The Workers' Party both in principle and in content. It is a very welcome amendment to the Principal Act of 1957 with regard to the limitation of statutes. It seeks to correct an anomaly that developed from the 1957 Act. Even subsequent to the publication of the report, the case Hegarty v. O'Loughlin and Edwards in February 1990 was dismissed by the Supreme Court because under the 1957 Act action could be taken only at the time the injury was inflicted or the accident occurred. Consequently any latent or non-discoverable injuries that would emerge after the three year period had expired could not be the source of subsequent action. That was clearly unfair, and is being rectified in this legislation.

Earlier in the day we discussed other legislation based on a report from the Law Reform Commission. Again I take this opportunity to commend the commission on the thorough way in which they go about their work. I would not have learnt so much about the laws of Canada, Australia and America were it not for their reports. The commission carry out very exhaustive studies on our behalf. As I said earlier, it took upwards of two years to produce the legislation we discussed this morning. In this case it took three years to present the legislation to the Seanad, the report having been delivered by the commission to the Attorney General on 19 August 1987. The Minister did not respond to my question at the conclusion of the last Bill and therefore I will ask him again whether it is satisfactory that periods of between two and three years should elapse before the House acts on reports that are comprehensive, well researched and detailed, and which provide a basis for legislation. I do not want to be unduly critical about this but it is a matter that should be considered. Why should it take so long for legislation to be produced?

The principles contained in the Bill are very much to be welcomed and will be supported by The Workers' Party. The introduction of a provision whereby people who have been injured by way of accident or neglect can take an action from the time it was reasonably possible to discover the injury has to be welcomed and supported. In an age when products are becoming more sophisticated and we are learning far more about the pollutants in the community generally that affect the individual and are capable of causing injury that might take years to develop or become apparent, it is only proper that our legislation should reflect these changing circumstances. People who were unable to realise the injury that has been inflicted on them or the deteriorating process that was developing within their bodies should be allowed the opportunity, after a certain period, to bring action and to have recourse to the law. I welcome the fact that the legislation requires a certain degree of prudence on the part of individuals, requiring them to take all reasonable steps and to act on information that could have been known or available to them. I do not believe it would be useful in our system to have an open-ended process whereby action could be taken at any stage on the whim of the individual.

I also welcome the fact that we are addressing the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 1980. The provision in regard to the sale of motor cars free from defects is being amended and brought into line with the general principles of the statute of limitations. In the case of the death of a person who has taken an action, the personal representative of the deceased person will be allowed to bring the action. That again is a fair and reasonable proposition and should be supported.

It is to be particularly welcomed that the provisions in the 1957 Act in regard to a disabled person or a person of unsound mind are being amended to allow the person to take action some time after he has been cured of the disability. Also to be welcomed is the fact that the provision is to be implemented in a way that would have regard to the capacity of the person to discover the disability from which they suffer.

The provision in regard to retrospection is a reasonable one. I would like to ask the Minister a question in this regard. Where an action has been initiated, the case has been pleaded successfully by the defendant and the action struck out or dismissed, will that person have the opportunity to go back to court by reason of this legislation being passed? To put it succinctly, would Mr. Hegarty, the plaintiff in the action that was dismissed by the Supreme Court in February 1990 on the basis that the injury became known after the three year period, have the right, as a result of this legislation, to go back to court? Perhaps the Minister would clarify that matter because it is not absolutely clear in the Bill.

I would like to refer to one item that is mentioned in the report. The EC Directive on Product Liability published by the European Community in 1985 has, as is illustrated in the Law Reform Commission's report, direct relevance to this whole area of liability and subsequent action. The directive required member states to have the relevant legislation passed into law by July, 1988. The Oireachtas Joint Committee on Secondary Legislation, of which I was then a member, considered the directive, prepared a final report and presented it to Government in late 1987, if my memory serves me correctly, but certainly in ample time to meet the July, 1988 deadline. It is regrettable that no legislation has been brought forward by the Minister to date and it shows us up in a very poor light. When do the Minister or the Government intend to bring forward legislation to meet the EC Directive?

In debating the whole question of compensation to people who suffer injury in our community we should highlight the very recent remarks of the Fair Trade Commission report in this whole area which said that we should be questioning whether the courts and the taking of civil actions are the best vehicles for ensuring that people are properly compensated and whether we should be debating or considering at this stage a State run nationalised scheme of no fault liability. In short, while the rules we are introducing here are fair and will help to redress a certain imbalance in favour of the beleaguered and injured person, we must look at some stage at the overall context in which we are bringing in this legislation. Are we simply amending, trying to put right and improve on a system which is fundamentally and basically flawed?

I fully support the report of the Fair Trade Commission on this point and I hope that, in time, the Minister will act on it. It is stated at page 309 of the report, paragraph 17.50, that:

More fundamentally, the Commission suggests that the received wisdom should be questioned, that is that an injured party is only entitled to receive compensation if it is possible to prove negligence against another party or parties, and that this negligence must be proven in a court. In many cases, there is no doubt that a person has suffered an injury, and deserves compensation, but the person against whom negligence has been alleged, for example, finds it necessary to defend himself against the charge in order to protect his professional reputation or his career, and any insurance company bearing the loss finds itself obliged to defend the proceedings. This has led to very lengthy and costly adversarial proceedings, involving, at times, a hearing in the High Court, an appeal to the Supreme Court, and a further trial in the High Court. The Commission believes that there must be a better way of resolving issues of this kind. We are aware that, in some other countries, there has been introduced an annuity insurance system of no fault compensation for personal injuries, where negligence does not have to be proved. Bearing in mind that such a system could be abused by the unscrupulous, the Commission recommends that the introduction of such a no fault compensation system in Ireland be examined as a matter of urgency, with emphasis upon its practicality and the methods by which it might be funded.

While the legislation is welcome in putting right a wrong highlighted by the Supreme Court in their 1990 decision, there is a more fundamental job to be undertaken by the Minister in the whole context of ensuring fairness and a proper system of compensation for people injured, a system of national "no fault" liability which would get over many of the difficulties which this rule is addressing and would also get over many of the difficulties which the courts and their administrative processes cause at present.

Nonetheless, I welcome the Bill and, for the second time, I congratulate the Minister on bringing in useful legislation. Well done to the Law Reform Commission for doing much of the work for us. The fact that we not only acted in the wake of the report of the Law Reform Commission but closely followed their recommendation is welcome.

Mr. Bell

On behalf of the Labour Party, I join other colleagues in welcoming this Bill. It is a simple one but it deals effectivley with an injustice and anomaly in the law which has existed for a considerable time. I also agree with the comments of other speakers in relation to the Law Reform Commission and it must be gratifying to them to see that their report and recommendations are being acted on. We should thank them for the work they have put in as they obviously effectivley teased out many of the problems encountered by the lack of effective legislation in this field.

This Bill will also be welcomed by the trade union movement, in particular the Irish Congress of Trade Unions who have lobbied in respect of this subject for many years. Solicitors and barristers who deal directly with the trade unions will be well aware of the large percentage of cases in this area which go through the trade union movement because of the fact that the largest proportion of claims under this heading will, obviously, come from the workplace. The trade unions have performed a very important function in this field because of the lack of effective legislation in so far as they have policed the operation of this subject in the workplace. Most of the trade unions have their own legal department and legal advisers who provide a service for workers who are injured in the workplace. They do this very effectively but, unfortunately, thousands of workers are not covered by trade union organisations and do not have the facilities and service within the workplace or industry generally to assist them when they are injured at work by way of direct accident or by illnesses directly attributable to the industry in which they work.

While welcoming the Bill, I suggest that this type of legislation could effectively be dealt with by way of committee and brought into the House by all-party agreement on Committee Stage. If corrective Bills of this nature were to be dealt with in future, perhaps the Minister would consider having them dealt with by committees instead of using the time of the House which could be used to deal with equally important legislation?

I should like to refer to two points the Minister might consider on Committee Stage. Two forms of accidents have created problems in industry and for workers generally. For example, where there is excessive dust and lack of proper ventilation in certain industries, many workers contract industrial diseases — illnesses caused by dust. After much lobbying by the trade union movement, especially those in the bakery industry, the former Deputy Barry Desmond highlighted the question of baker's asthma which is a very difficult illness to detect and has created problems for a number of workers. I have knowledge of a recent case where the person concerned was out of work on a number of occasions due to illness directly caused by inhaling flour and because of bad ventilation in the workplace. Unfortunately, as in certain aspects of the textile industry, it is difficult to detect and very controversial medically because specialists will consistently disagree on the cause of the illness.

Debate adjourned.