Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Bill, 1992: Committee Stage (Resumed).
Debate resumed on amendment No. 22:
In page 14, subsection (1), between lines 41 and 42, to insert the following:
" (c) the accounts, books and other records of any person for a financial year of the person in which the person received any moneys from a person to which subsection (1) (b) applies or from a Minister of the Government or a Department or directly from the Central Fund if the amount or the aggregate of the amounts received constitutes not less than 50 per cent of the gross receipts of the person in that year,
(d) the accounts, books and records of any person for a financial year at the end of which not less than 50 per cent of the equity share capital of the person has been financed by a Minister of the Government or a Department or the Central Fund or by any combination thereof:
Provided, however, that the provisions of section 12 shall not apply to any inspection under paragraph (c) or (d).".
—(Deputy Yates.)
Before we reported progress, the Minister read out a lengthy prepared script which outlined the reasons inspection rights should not be conferred on the Comptroller and Auditor General in regard to organisations, bodies and persons who have received money from State bodies. The Minister gave three principal reasons why this should not be the case: first, semi-State bodies have their own private auditors in the commercial sector; second, semi-State companies should be dealt with by the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Commercial State-sponsored Bodies; and, third, she did not wish to dilute the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General to such an extent that he would have so many things to look after that he could not do his job effectively. If one examines these reasons bit by bit one will find that they can be taken apart very simply.
With regard to the dilution of the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General, there is nothing in the amendments which obliges the Comptroller and Auditor General to look into every nook and cranny of expenditure in all of the 31 semi-State companies. We are saying that he should have this power in the event of a Leader programme in County Tipperary going wrong or a crisis similar to the one involving Aer Lingus Holidays, which lost £70 million. Somebody representing this House should have the power to investigate such matters. I do not think the acceptance of these amendments would dilute the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor General.
With regard to the second reason given by the Minister, we cannot assume that everything is all right with the audit process. I wish to draw the Minister's attention to the fact that the most recent accounts for the National Stud available in the Dáil Library are three years old. If the Minister regards this as acceptable in terms of the auditing process, I certainly do not, especially when the stud is losing over £500,000 a year and losing money on a prime 800 acre farm in the heart of County Kildare. If it was a private company, it would be gone out of business.
With regard to the third reason, the Oireachtas Joint Committee on State-sponsored Bodies is not capable of carrying out the remit the Minister says it is capable of carrying out. This committee has a budget of £30,000, its members are very busy and the most it could publish is four or five reports a year. The Second Schedule lists some 31 organisations which have to be scrutinised by this committee. The committee has no staff to carry out inspections, etc. The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General is an established office with established personnel of the quality necessary to carry out these inspections.
The power we are seeking to give the Comptroller and Auditor General has been recommended by the Committee of Public Accounts and the advisory group. It will give the Comptroller and Auditor General the right, on behalf of this House, to inspect in cases where something has gone wrong — obviously he would not do this in every case — the expenditure of public moneys. I ask the Minister to exercise her authority as an office holder and accept these amendments, and not simply be a mouthpiece for the Government. We have put forward valid arguments for the acceptance of these amendments which will ensure accountability, transparency and value for money.
The Oireachtas Joint Committee on Commercial State-sponsored Bodies is the appropriate body to look at the accounts of semi-State bodies. Where there are allegations of possible criminal activity, or criminal negligence in regard to public moneys, other organs of the State — for example, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Fraud Squad — are empowered to investigate such cases. The Government took the view in the White Paper that a distinction should be drawn between commercial semi-State bodies and non-commercial semi-State bodies. The non-commercial semi-State bodies are included under the terms of the Bill. It was decided that commercial semi-State bodies should, in line with other commercial organisations, be audited by outside auditors, who in turn have rights and obligations under their professional codes of practice to trace what they may perceive to be irregularities and misuse of funds and to outline ways in which procedures could be improved and made more effective. That is what is proposed in the Bill. Therefore, I regret that it will not be possible to accept the Deputy's amendment.
I appeal to the Minister to be true to herself. I have absolutely no doubt that if she was on this side of the House she would, in even more vociferous terms, make the arguments being made over here. I fail to understand why the Minister will not include the commercial semi-State sector and grant the Comptroller and Auditor General the power to inspect them where he deems it appropriate. Deputy Yates made a valid point, there is no obligation on the Comptroller and Auditor General to inspect. Nobody is forcing him to look at all these bodies. However, I have no doubt that a situation will arise when we will all regret the fact that the Comptroller and Auditor General will be precluded from examining some particular situation concerning one of the commercial semi-State bodies.
Because such a substantial amount of public funding goes into this area, it is nearly more important that he should be able to look at those areas. For instance, in regard to Bord Gáis Éireann, NET and IFI, questions have been asked on the subject of value for money spent. If the Comptroller and Auditor General could examine those companies to see what value the taxpayer is getting for above-the-line obvious State subsidies and below-the-line State subsidies we would now be in a fundamentally different position in the context of just those three companies, not to speak of the possibilities that have been outlined by others in regard to other areas.
I have no doubt the Minister is taking the Department line on this as I do not believe it is her own view or consistent with one she would have expressed in the past.
It is a fundamenal mistake to exclude the commercial semi-State sector from inspection by the Comptroller and Auditor General where he deems it necessary. If he feels it is necessary to give most of his time to the non-commercial sector, I have no objection, but let the person who holds the office be the judge of that. We must not lose sight of the uniqueness of that person's position in being answerable to the Dáil as opposed to the Executive. That fact emphasises the need for the Comptroller and Auditor General to be able to investigate particular situations where he deems it necessary without being blocked in the way he is by this legislation. It is not enough to suggest that the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Commercial State-sponsored Bodies covers it as it patently does not. Other than the Comptroller and Auditor General being able to pursue matters that others cannot pursue to the degree that he can because of lack of time or resources, there is no other mechanism. There should be an opportunity for the Comptroller and Auditor General to audit the commercial semi-State sector. I appeal to the Minister to consider this for Report Stage.
I am very disappointed with the Minister's line. I do not think she has responded effectively to the arguments. We have heard long lectures from the Labour Party about probity and trust and all this kind of thing, but now that we have the opportunity to improve our scrutiny of finance there is whitewashing.
I feel that this is a power the Comptroller and Auditor General would want. I do not want to personalise the issue but there is a direct conflict. The Government is deliberately stopping something which it was not intended to do in Article 33 of the Constitution, which is quite clear. I want to state quite strongly that the rights of Deputies should be very significantly taken into account in this debate because of the nature of the Comptroller and Auditor General's role in relationship to this House. In other words, the rights of Members and, therefore, the public interest are at issue.
I fail to see how the right of the Committee of Public Accounts to call someone before it, the right of the Comptroller and Auditor General to carry out an inspection — only an inspection — is unreasonable. To take an example, a company in Tipperary has gone into liquidation; the accounting controls in the Department of Agriculture, Food and Forestry were not adequate. These are matters of fact, not of opinion. Obviously it is a matter for the Fraud Squad to see if there is any criminal involvement, but the system of checks and balances fell down abysmally. This relates to the Leader programme and there may be many more instances. Under this legislation the Comptroller and Auditor General does not have the right to question people who got the money, who could have even been 100 per cent funded by the State. No reasonable person would think that is fair or right.
I ask the Minister to reconsider this on Report Stage. In the case of the Leader programme the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Commercial State-sponsored Bodies does not come into it. It is a case of whether the Comptroller and Auditor General has the power to examine that organisation. Again, I have to conclude that that is perfectly reasonable. I have never been an office-holder, but if I was I would certainly seek to exercise some sort of individual freedom of manoeuvre. I do not wish to delay the House on the matter. I feel that there should be inspection rights into a subsidiary of a semi-State company such as Aer Lingus Holidays.
Since we debated this before lunch I spoke to Members who are on the Oireachtas joint Committee on Commercial State-sponsored Bodies and they told me that what the Minister said does not hold up. I do not know if the Minister has ever been a membere of that committee. I assume she has not. I have never been, but I am told that the committee cannot control that £17 million, they cannot even ask questions about it. If the Minister says she is satisfied with this, it is not a responsible attitude. I rest my case.
The State-sponsored Bodies are responsible and answerable, in the first instance, to their boards who are appointed by the relevant Minister for the Government and it is the board's responsibility, in the first instance, to supervise the operation of those companies. It is through the exercise of procedures within each company, and by procedures in the sponsoring Department in regard to how those boards are run, that that supervision is exercised. The individual State companies can be brought before the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Commercial State-sponsored Bodies. If allegations have been sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Fraud Squad in relation to any company, obviously that puts a lid on discussion because nobody wants to prejudice court cases which may emerge from a particular investigation. That is a separate issue from the general right of the semi-State bodies committee to be involved in the monitoring of the companies concerned.
Is Deputy Yates pressing amendment No. 22?
I am withdrawing the amendment because all of the amendments being discussed now will have to be considered again on Report Stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments Nos. 23 to 26, inclusive, not moved.
Section 8 agreed to.
SECTION 9.
We now come to amendment No. 27, in the names of Deputies Cox and Cullen. Amendment No. 28 is a related amendment. It is therefore suggested that amendments Nos. 27 and 28 be taken together.
I move amendment No. 27:
In page 15, subsection (2), line 41, after "General" to insert "for the purpose of ensuring economic, efficient and effective management of resources, the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General may recommend systems, procedures and practices deemed to constitute best practice in respect of any matters examined under this section".
The discussion relevant to these amendments was held earlier in relation to a different section. The purpose of the amendment is to give weight to section 9 and it is my hope that the Minister will not have any difficulty with it. Acceptance of the amendment would ensure that the Comptroller and Auditor General had the authority and the opportunity to recommend value for money having regard to his or her experience gained in examination of alternative operations and systems and his or her having recognised an operation that worked extremely well in a cost-efficient way and proved less cumbersome and less expensive than an operation he or she had under investigation.
In tabling this amendment, I recognise that care is needed in the area of policy. Because of the experience of the Comptroller and Auditor General, he or she should be able to recommend systems that are the best practice in a particular set of circumstances. The thrust of the Bill goes very much in that direction. It is my feeling that it is necessary to include a specific provision so that nobody is under a misunderstanding as to the extent of the authority of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Examples provided, whether from the public sector or from the private sector, show that organisations learn from the experience of their competitors and their counterparts. Learning experiences have fundamentally changed the way in which operations take place in various organisations. The "just in time" system was originally developed in one company, it was recognised as working successfully and was adopted by other companies. The adoption of the system brought about phenomenal savings in companies' stock and resulted in tremendous efficiency for both the user and the supplier. Such improvements are welcome. In the role to be fulfilled by the Comptroller and Auditor General the opportunity exists for the Comptroller and Auditor General, without necessarily impinging on policy matters, to at the very least recommend systems, procedures and practices deemed to constitute the best practice in a particular area. Amendment No. 27 strengthens section 9 in making specific the authority of the Comptroller and Auditor General. I ask the Minister to accept the amendment.
I support the comments made by Deputy Cullen. Section 9 is the most important section of the Bill in that it goes very much into the area of value for money. I am not happy with this section of the Bill.
The scope of the Bill allows the Comptroller and Auditor General to examine the effectiveness of departmental management systems. The Comptroller and Auditor General cannot examine the effectiveness per se of public expenditure programmes. The White Paper on the Comptroller and Auditor General debates that issue at some length. I do not accept the arguments put forward.
Appendix 2 to the White Paper, under the heading "Some International Developments in National Auditing", provides information on the powers of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General in other countries. In Australia examination of effectiveness is permitted and the efficiency audit there includes cost-effectiveness as well as evaluations of the effectiveness of the administrative actions and decisions of management in achieving programme objectives. In other words, in the case of a house repair scheme there is ability to examine whether the scheme actually deals with the problem and in the case of a TB eradication scheme there is ability to ask whether the scheme is resulting in eradication of the disease. At present the Comptroller and Auditor General in Ireland does not have that ability.
In a study of the number of jobs created by the business expansion scheme the Comptroller and Auditor General actually went beyond his legal remit. Appendix 2 to the White Paper also advises that in Canada the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General has the authority to call attention to anything considered to be of significance and of a nature that should be brought to the attention of the Legislature. In New Zealand the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General is empowered to carry out discretionary value for money audits and new legislation is promised in that country. In Great Britain the National Audit Office is able to carry out examinations on any aspect other than policy — that office has the authority to state whether it is advisable to have a public housing scheme or a public health policy of a particular kind. Throughout the analysis of the practice in other countries it seems that the authors of the White Paper have tried to justify the Department's view that authorities should be limited to examination of management systems. It is stated that the experience of a particular country is not a good comparison for use in Ireland, for some reason or another.
I was most interested in a paragraph found on the very last page of the White Paper which related to experience in the United States. In the United States the Comptroller and Auditor General carries out effectiveness audits, which can include an assessment of the relative merits of alternative policies. The White Paper, of course, goes on to make rubbish of that practice and say why it would not be suitable for adoption in Ireland.
International experience shows that the way to proceed is to allow the Comptroller and Auditor General to examine the effectiveness as well as the economy, and that relates not only to management systems. In the Department of the Marine, for example, the Comptroller and Auditor General should be able to say whether or not there is a good superstructure. The issue is not that there is the ability to say that the Department accounts well and watches where the money is spent; the issue is the number of harbours that should be built, the effectiveness of the number of ships served, the number of fishermen given assistance, the number of fishing jobs created and the increase in the capacity for landing fish catches. Such examination is beyond the remit of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Even if the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General unearthed the most earth-shattering of conclusive evidence, the Comptroller and Auditor General would be empowered only to examine the management systems.
There is a major gap therefore in the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General as presently constituted and in other public administration offices. I should like to provide the House with specific examples. Investment in computerisation has been made in virtually every Department, yet there has been no analysis as to the number of jobs that have been saved or the opportunities that have been provided for redeployment into the Office of the Revenue Commissioners. Universal experience in the past 15 years in clerical employment outside of the State sector has shown that computerisation has about halved employment requirements. Computerisation could result in huge resources being freed up.
If the Comptroller and Auditor General were empowered to examine the effectiveness of expenditure programmes in computerisation he would be able to point to specific benefits of investment in computerisation, as opposed to being able to say that £400,000 was spent on an IBM computer that was placed in a particular office on St. Stephen's Green. I do not see why the logic of the extensions proposed in amendments Nos. 27 and 28 do not appeal to the Department of Finance given that we evidenced on the last amendment that it is the Department of Finance who decide which amendments are rejected or accepted.
Therefore, I am endeavouring to insert a new subsection to section 9, a most important section, whose whole purpose is to revamp and legally consolidate the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Here we are dealing with examination by the Comptroller and Auditor General of the economy, of efficiency in use of resources and of effectiveness of certain management systems. One is giving on the one hand but the parameters are immediately laid out restricted vis-à-vis management systems. Another example would be public sector costings, a league table as between local authorities, vocational education committees and health boards, who are the most efficient or inefficient. In the Department of the Environment there was a very time-consuming, heavy in administration, housing grants scheme. A former Minister, I think Deputy Flynn, decided on 31 March 1987 to abolish all house improvement grants, on which I think the expenditure in one year amounted to £120 million. That begs the question as to whether there remains a grant section in Ballina, or what actually happened in that case. Let me take the example of the Department of Defence. I am told reliably that virtually all the management and administrative functions to run the Army are undertaken by military personnel within the Army. One must ask then what 300 people are doing in the Department of Defence?
Under the present system all the Comptroller and Auditor General can say is that there are accounting officers; that there is in place a super structure which ensures that all the subheads of the departmental Votes are properly apportioned and spent in the way they are appropriated. I have no doubt that the management systems in these Departments are fine, that there is no real problem with accountability. There is no major allegation of fraud. Therefore, there may well be a case in another area of public administration not only not to increase the pay of those in the public service but, regardless of the 300,000 unemployed, certainly not to recruit any more. If we are to improve our public services what are the opportunities for redeployment? What are the new areas of public service in which we could give people satisfaction while providing a better service?
As far as I am concerned the taxpayer is not getting a good deal. If one examines international experience, particularly in those countries which have recently revised their laws in relation to the Comptroller and Auditor General, one will find they have all opted for the effectiveness of the programmes as opposed to the effectiveness of the management systems. I do not believe the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General can be adapted in any way into meaningful lessons about future and current public expenditure unless we effect such change. I would ask the Minister to give this very serious consideration because it is fundamental to this Bill.
I have sympathy with what Deputy Cullen is endeavouring to achieve in his amendment but we must examine its wording where it reads:
. . . the Comptroller and Auditor General may recommend systems, procedures and practices deemed to constitute best practice . . . .
I do not think that is the kind of terminology we should insert in legislation because there will be disagreements as to what constitutes "best practice". I contend that the wording of the section, as drafted, gives the Comptroller and Auditor General flexibility to investigate and report on systems, procedures and practices employed by the Department, managers or whoever, to evaluate the effectiveness of their operations. Without prejudice to saying whether something is the best, or a better system, that affords the Comptroller and Auditor General flexibility to do what I think Deputy Cullen intends without labelling one particular system which may turn out to be flawed. For example, in six months or six year's time somebody may discover that the "just in time" system does not constitute the best method of control; there may be a better method discovered. Again I contend the flexibility in the Bill affords the Comptroller and Auditor General an opportunity to investigate in a general way and report on practices, systems and procedures. Out of that I contend there will be an interest in organisations in implementing the kind of suggestions made by the Comptroller and Auditor General, indeed other organisations picking up suggestions made arising out of his reports.
In relation to Deputy Yates' amendment it is important to draw a distinction between the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General in relation to audit, value for money, effectiveness of systems and the policy area which, properly is the responsibility of the Minister concerned. All the Members of this House, not only those serving on the Committee of Public Accounts, will have ample opportunity to question appropriate Ministers on the effectiveness of Government programmes and policies. It is not the function of the auditor to comment on policies. We need to draw that distinction. I know it can be difficult, that there are grey areas, but the provisions of section 9 attempt to draw that distinction so that Members of this House can properly question Ministers on policies being pursued within their areas of responsibility. The function of the auditor is not to query policies drawn up properly under our Constitution by the responsible Ministers but rather to question the effectiveness of management systems.
While I have great sympathy with the type of questioning of policy mentioned by Deputy Yates it comes down to: who does one question? Does one question the Minister with regard to the effectiveness of a particular programme or does one question through the audit system? We need to make the Minister responsible for the implementation of policy and the Accounting Officer, through the Comptroller and Auditor General, responsible for ensuring that there are effective, efficient value-for-money systems in place for implementing those Government policies.
I do not accept what the Minister of State has just said. I contend that our amendment introduces a wider and more specific aspect, that of effectiveness and value for money. What is contained in the section, as drafted, is a more technical, abstract view of what may or may not happen. I accept the point made by the Minister, that one can debate what is "best practice". That does not necessarily mean that if the Comptroller and Auditor General makes a recommendation it must be taken on board. The amendment has been carefully worded to say he may recommend such systems. Obviously he would recommend such systems based on his experience of examining other areas. That would not mean necessarily that if the system he recommended was partially or totally implemented this year it should remain in operation forever. Any such system, could be changed and reviewed.
The point of the amendment was to specify clearly that the Comptroller and Auditor General has a role to play in evaluating, seeking to get value for money at the delivery end as well; not that the "i's" are dotted and the "t's" are crossed, in the way in which a structure should have evolved, rather that he should have a more circumspect role in evaluating and questioning value for money, the ability to make certain recommendations, based on his experience and knowledge of investigations and/or audits he would have undertaken in other areas. I know there are aspects of work carried out within the Office of the Revenue Commissioners, some of which are extremely good and efficient, which I contend could be applied to the delivery of services by the Department of Social Welfare.
Within the ambit of the Comptroller and Auditor General — auditing, ascertaining how a service is costed and delivered to the consumer, he should, at the end of the day, be in a position to go the whole hog in terms of value for money. It is not just a question of his operating in an abstract manner. He should be involved in that process and those who deal with him should look on him as a person who is in a position to make sensible and logical recommendations based on the experience he has gained in carrying out other audits and investigations.
I ask the Minister of State to think again about amendment No. 27 to section 9. I do not think it contradicts the section, it seeks to beef up the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor General. This does not necessarily mean that, following every investigation, the Comptroller and Auditor General would have to make a recommendation but it is quite obvious to us — I am sure it is also quite obvious to the Minister of State — that from time to time he would pick up ideas and knowledge that could be applied in other areas. He should be in a position to discuss this with the Department or body concerned.
While I appreciate that the Minister of State is sympathetic I do not think she understood the argument I was trying to make. I would like to draw her attention to page 22 of the White Paper which states:
The Government's decision means that the Comptroller and Auditor General will be required to satisfy himself as to the adequacy of management effectiveness i.e., the management systems, procedures and practices in Departments and other bodies for examining effectiveness. This would include such matters as examining the organisation of the effectiveness, an evaluation function, the system of reporting, the methodology used in effectiveness examinations and the use made of effectiveness evaluation reports.
As indicated above, the Comptroller and Auditor General will not be required to carry out effectiveness reviews himself. This will be left to the Departments and other public bodies whose primary responsibility it remains.
The Minister of State said that I am asking the Comptroller and Auditor General to get involved in policy matters but that is not the case. The White Paper goes on to state that the Comptroller and Auditor General will be specifically excluded from expressing an opinion on the merits of policy. That is not the issue; the issue is that he will deal only with management systems, procedures and practices and have an evaluation function.
If, for example, the Government decide — this would be a noble gesture — that everybody, regardless of whether they are in private or public accommodation, should have a bathroom and toilet, this would be a policy decision and it would have nothing to do with the question of controlling public expenditure or the Comptroller and Auditor General. The role of the Comptroller and Auditor General would be to ensure that every pound provided in this regard was spent for that purpose.
As opposed to asking if the right people in, say, Dublin Corporation, Dún Laoghaire Corporation or Sligo County Council, supervised this activity and if the practice was evaluated to see that proper management systems were in place it should be asked if the cost per house was reasonable, if we had been ripped off in some parts of the country, if we got good value for money or, if the work was carried out under tender by the private sector, if the tenders were inflated. The way to control public expenditure is to ensure that we get value for money. This means that we should review the effectiveness of the programmes of expenditure.
For example, last year the State spent £2 million on the special housing aids for the elderly scheme. However, nobody knows if a particular health board was able to build more houses than another for the same amount of money and, if so, how they did it. I am referring here to grant-in-aid, not grants, in other words, the Comptroller and Auditor General would have full powers in such a case.
The Minister of State should not say I am making the argument that the Comptroller and Auditor General should get involved in policy matters or sympathise with me; I want her to accept that he should review the effectiveness of the programme.
I am reminded of another example by what Deputy Yates said and it also relates to the building programme carried out throughout the country. At present in the Department of the Environment a certain sum of money — I cannot think of the figure offhand — is set aside for a programme under which bathrooms are provided in old houses. For instance, in Waterford — I am sure this is true in other parts of the country — if the council decided to provide a bathroom in one area and did the same in another part of the city the following week it would not be able to build the same number of bathrooms for the same amount of money. The Comptroller and Auditor General would then be in a position to say that the council in Waterford was able to provide 40 bathrooms whereas the council in Limerick was able to provide only 25 for the same amount. He would also be able to review the effectiveness of the decision making process and make recommendations.
I agree with Deputy Yates that this is a separate issue and that we would not be asking the Comptroller and Auditor General to get involved in policy matters; we would be asking him to review the way in which policy is implemented to ensure that we are getting value for money, not only from the point of view of the State but from the point of view of the taxpayer. An enhanced service would be delivered if a sensible decision was taken in the first instance.
Under section 9 (1) (a) the Comptroller and Auditor General will have the power to carry out examinations, as he considers appropriate, of economy and efficiency. This is what the Members opposite are addressing. It is obvious that if one Authority is able to provide 50 bathrooms and another 40 for the same amount of money it is not using funds economically and efficiently.
The Minister of State should read subsection (2) which states that, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), only the systems employed by management may be examined. As the Minister of State said, it is stated in section 9 (1) that the Comptroller and Auditor General may carry out an examination of economy and efficiency but subsection (2) states, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), that only the systems, procedures and practices employed by the Department or the manager of the fund concerned may be examined. Therefore, only the effectiveness of the manager's operations may be examined, not the programme itself. It has deliberately been worded in such a way that the Government decision as contained in the White Paper will be implemented.
The Deputy has got it back to front; the general provision is contained in subsection (1) which states that the Comptroller and Auditor General may carry out an examination of economy and efficiency to see if resources were disposed of economically and efficiently. These are new powers and represent an extension of the value for money audit procedure. In addition, it is being proposed in subsection (2) that without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the Comptroller and Auditor General should examine the systems employed.
To return to Deputy Cullen's point, this section allows the Comptroller and Auditor General to examine, comment and make reports on systems, without indicating the best system. When the Comptroller and Auditor General suggests that a system is not working and should be examined, that speaks for itself. We have a strong watchdog in the form of the Committee of Public Accounts to deal with those points. I understand what the Deputy is trying to achieve but one cannot describe the best practice in legislation. The general way it is worded in the section is a more effective and efficient means of addressing the Deputy's point.
Ministers have a general responsibility in relation to the policies of their Departments and the systems organised in them. If a policy is ineffective Deputies can come into this House and question the Minister. The Comptroller and Auditor General's role is to examine the value for money aspect of policies decided by the Executive. While there are grey areas the Government has made a decision in the White Paper, followed through in this Bill, in relation to where the dividing line should be drawn. Therefore, I do not accept Deputy Yates's amendment.
Is Deputy Cullen pressing amendment No. 27?
I do not accept what the Minister is saying. On my reading of the Bill the Minister is looking at a specific project in an encapsulated way in regard to what applies at that particular time. It does not apply the robust psychological attitude, which can often be so important, to how one approaches one's work and how it should operate. If the Minister is concerned with the words "best practice" I will come back to it on Report Stage. On that basis I withdraw the amendment but I will return to this point on Report Stage.
Lest there be any misunderstanding, am I correct in saying that the Minister is implementing the decision outlined in page 22 of the White Paper? Would that be a correct reading of section 9? I wish to be accurately informed in relation to what the Minister is doing.
The Government has considered the issues. They are not totally black or white but the Government has decided in favour of section 9. Therefore, I am not accepting the amendments tabled by the Deputy.
I would point out to the Deputy that there is provision, under the normal course of questioning Ministers about their responsibilities, for pursuing many of the issues about which the Deputy has a legitimate concern.
I take it that the answer to my question is yes. I only want to know where we stand. This morning the Minister said her salary was paid by the Department of Finance, I assume she has some obligation to taxpayers to obtain value for money. Does she believe that the accounting officers in the Department of Defence will be like turkeys voting for Christmas in proposing that their Department be totally diminished? This matter could be examined by an independent person, I am just using it as an example. My proposal is that the Comptroller and Auditor General needs to identify areas of duplication of effort and expense and inefficiency. Does the Minister believe that if there is not an independent watchdog to suggest changes in public administration it will happen in its own right?
This section provides for an economy and efficiency audit.
Of the management systems?
Section 9 (1) (a) states:
. . . [as] to what extent the resources of the Department, person or fund—
(i) have been used, [or]
(ii) if acquired or disposed of by the Department, person or fund, have been so acquired or disposed of,
economically and efficiently, . . .
Therefore, the use and spending of Government money, whether it is spent economically and efficiently, can be monitored by the independent watchdog. This is a significant change in this legislation. It is a very positive step forward in terms of value for money audits arising from recommendations by the Committee of Public Accounts. It is also a very positive move forward in terms of economy, efficiency and value for money audits and this section provides for such audits.
The Minister is hedging her bets.
The White Paper states that the Comptroller and Auditor General will not be required to carry out effectiveness reviews himself, this is to be left to Departments and other public bodies whose primary responsibility it remains. His role seems to be crystal clear and not in agreement with what the Minister said.
I believe the Deputy is confusing the three concepts of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
Effectiveness is the key one.
The concepts of economy and efficiency will be dealt with by the Comptroller and Auditor General under section 9 (1) and this will extend the value for money audit principle. There are two dimensions to effectiveness, one is the effectiveness of policy which is a matter for the Minister concerned and any Minister may be questioned in the House in relation to what may be considered an ineffective programme. Because it is accepted by the Government that the Comptroller and Auditor General should not be drawn into policy areas, the decision had been made that the effectiveness area of the Comptroller and Auditor General's audit shall be in relation to the effectiveness of systems, that is provided for in section 9 (2).
I wish to facilitate you, a Leas-Cheann Comhairle, in making progress, we have not only ploughed and harrowed but probably also irrigated the territory. The parameters of this section are clear but I fundamentally disagree with this approach. At the next general election I will be seeking a mandate for a new office, an adjunct of the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General — a controller of public expenditure — who will publish reports on the effectiveness of public expenditure, the efficiency of programmes and report to this House independently so that Members can be fully informed when there are debates on public expenditure. At the end of the day politicians may make decisions but I fail to accept that in £10.5 billion of public expenditure there is not some waste. We do not have assistance in this House in tracking down that waste and perhaps very valuable public services might be axed by the Department of Finance because of its failure to obtain the necessary expertise to eliminate duplication and bad management in the public sector. Therefore, the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General needs an adjunct and instead of looking at the historical accuracy of accounting the Comptroller and Auditor General should look at current and future expenditure. The only time we succeeded in pruning public expenditure effectively was between 1987 and 1989 when Mr. MacSharry was Minister for Finance. He only achieved cuts in public expenditure because "An Bord Snip" was established and outsiders came in to put some new thinking into the way we do our business. Irrespective of policy, outside management consultants can highlight where there is waste and can cut through the layers of bureaucracy created by principal officers, Assistant Secretaries and Secretaries who are all justifying the status quo, that is blindingly clear. Unless politicians instigate this change it will not be done. I will return to some of these points on Report Stage. I am not happy that the Minister has grasped the concept of what I am saying but it is a political issue and I will let it rest for another day.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 28 not moved.
We now come to amendment No. 29. Amendment No. 30 is an alternative and it is proposed, therefore to discuss both amendments together.
I move amendment No. 29:
In page 15, between lines 41 and 42, to insert the following subsection:
"(3) The Committee of Dáil Éireann established under the Standing Orders of Dáil Éireann to examine and report to Dáil Éireann on the appropriation accounts may direct the Comptroller and Auditor General to investigate any matter of public expenditure which it considers fit and the Comptroller and Auditor General shall carry out such examination by way of a Project Audit Report and shall present his report to that Committee.".
This is a very simple amendment in which I propose that the Committee of Public Accounts would be able to direct the Comptroller and Audit General to investigate any matter of public expenditure which it considers fit. I do not see any reason that the Minister should not accept this. I am mindful of the fact — Deputy Rabbitte is a member of this committee and I am not — that in the latest report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, the 1991 report which I have here, the Comptroller and Auditor General states in the section dealing with project audit reports that he has dealt with only two areas. I assume this was because of staff or resource limitations, but I am sure there are ten areas at least which he could have looked at. The amendment deals with the situation where the Committee of Public Accounts were of unanimous view that he should examine the effectiveness, for example, of the long term illness scheme — that is where people, irrespective of income, are entitled to free drugs if they have one of the 12 prescribed illnesses — and decide whether this is a good scheme or whether the money should be targeted at those most in need. Under this scheme if the wealthiest person in the country suffers from epilepsy or one of the prescribed illnesses he is entitled to free drugs.
In my amendment I seek to ensure that the Comptroller and Auditor General will have to respond to requests made by the Committee of Public Accounts to examine any such areas. I am not saying there is conflict, as the man in question is most accommodating; but, given the limit of the number of areas that can be probed in depth, I think there is a need for more project audit reports.
This is a very straightforward amendment and I ask the Minister to accept it. The Minister failed to accept any amendment I tabled to date, so perhaps she may accept this very modest one.
The Minister will see that both Deputy Yates and I came to the same conclusion independently of each other and I cannot see any reason that the Minister will not accept it. I believe the Committee of Public Accounts would welcome this. I became a member of this committee in the recent past so I would not have the experience of those who have served for a long number of years. Without doubt this Bill will assist the Comptroller and Auditor General and the committee in their work. The committee for whatever reason should be able to specifically direct and request the Comptroller and Auditor General to conduct a specific audit. This is in keeping not alone with letter but the spirit of the Bill. I hope the Minister will not find reasons for rejecting these amendments.
The amendment is self-explanatory and one does not have to go into it in detail. I believe this amendment is an addition to the section. I have no doubt that the requirement to direct the Comptroller and Auditor General to carry out in-depth examination will arise from time to time and I think it should be prescribed in the Bill.
There has been an excellent working relationship between the Committee of Public Accounts and the Comptroller and Auditor General. Anybody who served on the committee can testify to that. I understand that the Comptroller and Auditor General in preparing his audit plans takes note of the concerns and suggestions of the committee. This has been a good and healthy relationship.
There is a difficulty in accepting the amendments as tabled because constitutionally the Comptroller and Auditor General is an independent constitutional officer and is not therefore answerable to the committee. The present system is working well and I am quite sure that whoever holds the office of Comptroller and Auditor General will continue in the best traditions of that office to have regard to the points being raised by the committee. Because of the constitutional position I do not think it is appropriate to specify this in legislation. I ask the Deputies to withdraw the amendments.
I am a bit disappointed to see that the only reason advanced for not accepting the amendments is the constitutional position. I think it ought to be possible for some arrangements to be arrived at, if the Minister is so minded, to encompass the essence of Deputy Yates' and Deputy Cullen's amendments.
It is true, as the Minister says, that a good working relationship exists between the Committee of Public Accounts and the current holder of the office of Comptroller and Auditor General; but this amendment puts the finger on a very important but underutilised dimension of the work that is capable of being carried out in his office — namely the question of project audit reports — which has been very seldom used. I presume the Minister can confirm that the reason it has been seldom used is because of constraints on staff and resources of the office.
Let us contemplate the significance of this in an era of scandal after scandal in the business arena and the alleged connections to politics and in the context of the cost of the various forms of inquiry that have been set up as a result of decisions taken in this House. If it is the case — and I think it is — that the capacity of the Office of Comptroller and Auditor General to engage in project audit would be limited, surely it would be a very cheap way of providing against interminable inquiries repeating themselves indefinitely into the future?
An area that comes to mind — and I happen to have an interest in it for a very long time — is the question of section 84 based lending. The former Taoiseach at another forum claimed that only about half a dozen people had any expertise to comment on it. In that context he was not numbering himself among that group. While he is right that only a small number know about section 84 loans, I think he is one of them. It was a fascinating study conducted by the Comptroller and Auditor General on what might be seen as a fairly arcane and obscure instrument of industrial policy — a policy that most Deputies in the nature of things had not found themselves in a position to examine. When one considers major questions such as the reform of the tax system and its role in boosting job creation one has to look at the question of tax shelters. Here was an instrument that was never designed as an instrument of industrial policy but evolved that way.
As I said this morning, the Comptroller and Auditor General highlighted what some of us knew for quite a long time: that section 84 based lending was of tremendous benefit to the lending institutions but of significant cost to the taxpayer, averaging about £100 million per annum. It must be remembered that £100 million is a very high proportion of the total IDA budget. The Comptroller and Auditor General was able to run the figures for a number of years, and from memory I recall the sums ranged from £87 million to £113 million over the time span he took. That is a very substantial amount of money, leaving out entirely the complex area of high coupon swap currency arrangements which have been entered into and which have other implications. This study was of immense value in terms of the work undertaken by the Comptroller and Auditor General.
There are, I presume, several other such areas that the Comptroller and Auditor General in this aspect of his work could very productively examine and it could be done a great deal more cheaply than by way of the alternatives open to us. For example, the operation of the inspector system in the current Telecom affair will be an expensive matter for the taxpayer at the end of the day. It will probably cost the equivalent of a year's budget for the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. We have had the recent example of the former Leas-Cheann Comhairle of this House being arraigned before the courts because he made comments about similar costs in the Greencore affair.
I am beginning to wonder what this has to do with the amendment before us.
The Committee of Public Accounts should have power, where it sees fit, to require the Comptroller and Auditor General to conduct project audit reports. That could be done at a great deal less cost to the taxpayer than is the case at present, and probably equally effectively. I acknowledge that the circumstances could not exist whereby every member of the committee felt it would be a good idea to do a project audit on a certain aspect of public spending. One has to operate in this business on the basis that there is a majority of reasonably minded people around the table. As the Minister has said, the system has worked reasonably well and there is a good working relationship between the present occupant of the office and the committee. I do not know how the point can be met about the independent constitutional status of the office of Comptroller and Auditor General. If the amendment does nothing except make the argument for more resources to be allocated to that office to allow the Comptroller and Auditor General, in consultation with the committee, to do more project audit work, it will have well served its purpose.
I agree with the Deputies' comments in relation to project audits. They are a fairly new development in this whole area and they have proved to be very valuable. I would like to see this area of the Comptroller and Auditor General's work developed, as, I think, would the Deputies and the committee. The word I have a problem with in these amendments is "direct". It is not acceptable that a committee of this House direct an independent constitutional officer.
Perhaps "request" would be a more suitable word.
It is important that the constitutional independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General be respected. Perhaps this matter could be considered for Report Stage to see whether some of the suggestions could be taken on board — for example, that the Committee of Public Accounts may put ideas before the Comptroller and Auditor General for which he would have constitutional discretion. That wording might meet the point made by the Deputy, while respecting the constitutional autonomy.
I accept what the Minister has said in good faith. I have visions of some of the more wild-cat members of the Committee of Public Accounts requesting particular studies and the Comptroller and Auditor General being sent in six different directions at the one time. However, this committee is a responsible one. I would be happy to withdraw my amendment on the understanding that the Minister would consider some wording, such as "may request", "may seek" or whatever, that would provide a legislative framework for the committee. The system works very well at present because there is a very understanding and responsive Comptroller and Auditor General in that office, but if a personality held that office who had contempt or a total disregard for politicians the position would be different. This legislation has to stand the test of time irrespective of personalities who serve in any office or on any committee. I will withdraw the amendment on the understanding that the Minister will give the matter serious and positive consideration.
Obviously, the present relationship between the Committee of Public Accounts and the Comptroller and Auditor General is excellent and the person in that office is held in high esteem. The Minister has grasped the spirit of the amendments. The section should include some reference to this matter and perhaps a proper formulation of words will be found on Report Stage, because one never knows what may occur in the future. From my experience of serving on committees the members of committees have always had a tremendous working relationship and I have no reason to suspect that will change in the future. One's political pesuasion seems to be left outside the door when people get down to work on committees and that is a welcome approach. Therefore there is little danger of wild-cat action being taken. The principle behind the amendments is a good one. This very important legislation would be strengthened by the inclusion of acceptable wording on Report Stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 30 not moved.
Question proposed: "That section 9 stand part of the Bill."
The whole concept of section 9, which is the most important section, is to introduce value for money studies and to provide a legislative base for that. If value for money studies are to be effective they must extend to an examination of the effect of State spending. There is intrinsic merit in that point and I would ask the Minister to consider it again. It should not be confined to the White Paper as is the case at present.
Question put and agreed to.
Section 10 agreed to.
SECTION 11.
I move amendment No. 31:
In page 17, between lines 20 and 21, to insert the following subsection:
"(4) Whenever the Committee of Dáil Éireann established under the Standing Orders of Dáil Éireann to examine and report to Dáil Éireann on the appropriation accounts makes a report to Dáil Éireann following its consideration of a report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, the report of such Committee shall be considered by Dáil Éireann as soon as possible after it is laid before it."
This amendment proposes that the annual report of the Committee of Public Accounts be debated in the House as soon as possible after it is laid in the Library. The amendment is self-explanatory. On several occasions the former Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts, Deputy Gay Mitchell, raised with a number of Taoisigh on the Order of Business the question as to when reports would be debated in the House. If we are to give a meaningful response to the work of the committee, of which I am not a member, it is appropriate that spokesperson of the parties respond to reports, especially in terms of particular areas of expenditure and potential improvement. The Whip system has failed in its scrutiny of this area and for that reason I ask the Minister to accept the amendment.
I agree it is important that the reports be considered as soon as possible after being laid in the Library. I hope that with the new committee system it will be possible to find more Dáil time to debate these matters. If such a committee system were in operation today other Government business could have been taken simultaneously with discussion of this Bill.
The question of the regulation of Dáil business is a matter to be dealt with under Standing Orders rather than legislation as provided for in Article 15.10 of the Constitution. The point being made is reasonable. There will be revised terms of reference for the Committee of Public Accounts as soon as the Bill has been enacted. At that stage the points being made could be taken on board in revised terms of reference.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 32:
In page 17, between lines 20 and 21, to insert the following subsection:
"(4) The Comptroller and Auditor General may, from time to time, undertake comparative studies of the control and audit mechanisms which exist in other member states of the European Communities and shall report to Dáil Éireann thereon.".
This is important. Whether in the area of tax evasion or public expenditure control there is no doubt that people are capable of improving their concepts of review. We have a lot to gain from keeping in touch with overseas developments. This is echoed in the White Paper by virtue of the fact that it has an appendix on what is happening in most of the western world in civilised democracies. A small amount of the Comptroller and Auditor General's time should be taken up with comparative studies of mechanisms of control and audit existing in other member states of the European Communities. There is a degree of variation within Europe in relation to methods. In some continental countries there is a system of magistrates through the court of auditors. In Europe we have a court of 12 auditors. We may learn something, not from just aping the British as we usually do, but from taking a wider look at this. The Principal Act which we are dealing with is the 1866 Act. We rarely get the opportunity to legislate in this regard so it would be wise to accept this minor amendment.
The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General is a member of the relevant international bodies — for instance, the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Organisations and the European Group of Supreme Audit Institutions of the EC Member States. There is very extensive consultation through these bodies which carry out research at international level — research in which our Comptroller and Auditor General participates — on audit standards and practices and procedures in each country. These bodies conduct research designed to establish the state of practice in each country and use such information establishing norms and standards which they promulgate for guidance of the State audit institutions. In addition, the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General has bilateral contact with other supreme audit bodies and with the European Court of Auditors through a liaison office and through temporary secondments. The Comptroller and Auditor General's Office is involved in research and legislation. Indeed, there was an advisory group on public financial accountability which is in the course of completing its work. This included looking at the published reports of European and other audit institutions and visiting parliamentary bodies and national audit agencies in Sweden, West Germany and the US.
There are already very extensive international contacts through the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. In the period leading up to the publication of the White Paper and the Bill extensive research was carried out into international audit practices. It is not necessary to include an enabling provision, as proposed by the Deputy, because the Bill provides adequate scope for the Comptroller and Auditor General to refer to relevant international developments as he sees fit. There are very structured arrangements in the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office for liaising with international audit bodies and national audit bodies. We could leave things in this case to the professional competence of the Comptroller and Auditor General and his Office. The amendment is redundant.
I am glad to hear that the Comptroller and Auditor General is so tied into all these international bodies and I will withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 33:
In page 18, between lines 10 and 11, to insert the following subsection:
"(6) Any report of the Comptroller and Auditor General prepared by him under this section or under any other section of this Act shall immediately upon being laid before Dáil Éireann be deemed, without the need for any further motion or act of that House to be available for consideration by the Committee of Dáil Éireann established under Standing Orders of Dáil Éireann to examine and report on the appropriation accounts.".
This is an important amendment on behalf of the Public Accounts Committee to allow for fast track procedures so that they can get on with their work. It is proposed, without the need for a motion of the Dáil, to make available for consideration by the Public Accounts Committee any report of the Comptroller and Auditor General. It is very important for the credibility of the Comptroller and Auditor General and Public Accounts Committee process that there is timely and urgent consideration of reports. At the moment it is April before the accounts are done by the Department, the autumn before the Comptroller and Auditor General has reported on the Appropriation Accounts and it is probably into the New Year before the Public Accounts Committee study his report. There is a huge time lag, and it can be extended further if there is a delay in this House in accepting a motion referring the matter to the Public Accounts Committee. This is the most appropriate place in the Bill for this amendment.
There is merit in ensuring that when the Dáil is in recess, for example, the work of the Public Accounts Committee can continue. There should not be a need for a Dáil motion referring reports to the committee. In future there will be a large number of reports. The Public Accounts Committee will be busier in the future than they are now. There will be more reports and bigger reports and the whole procedure should not be obstructed by motions in this House being required.
I agree with the Deputy's point. This issue will be best dealt with by incorporating it into the terms of reference of the Committee of Public Accounts as soon as the Bill has been enacted. A similar provision was put into the terms of reference of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies. I agree that we want a fast track way of looking at these reports. That is a more effective way of dealing with it than by amending the legislation. The draft terms of reference were set out in paragraph 4.11 of the White Paper. They provide that upon the laying by the Public Accounts Committee of the report before Dáil Éireann the committee will print and publish such reports without need for any motion of the Dáil. We do not need artificial delays. I agree with the point being made and suggest that we incorporate it in the terms of reference.
How stands the amendment?
Everything has been referred to somewhere else. I am a great believer in taking an opportunity to do something when it presents itself. Do I take it that the Minister will have no function in drawing up the terms of reference of the committee? What standing does the Minister's commitment in this regard have?
The terms of reference will be drafted by the staff in the Department and will go before the Ministers in the Department of Finance. The Deputy can take it that a commitment made in this House is a solemn commitment.
Do the committee not have a role in deciding the terms of reference?
The Government will make proposals and any reasonable point made by members of the committee will be taken on board.
I have no doubt that the strong arm of the Department of Finance will win through and that therefore the terms of reference will incorporate my point. Therefore I withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 11 agreed to.
Section 12 agreed to.
SECTION 13.
I move amendment No. 34:
In page 18, between lines 26 and 27, to insert the following subsection:
"(1) (a) The Minister shall, before determining a sum to be recommended to the Government for inclusion in an estimate to cover the charges which will come in course of payment in respect of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General for any financial year, refer the draft estimate thereof to the Committee of Dáil Éireann established under the Standing Orders of Dáil Éireann to examine and report to Dáil Éireann on the appropriation accounts.
(b) The Committee may, after consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General, recommend alterations in the provisions included in the draft estimate.
(c) The Minister shall after receiving the recommendations of the Committee submit those recommendations and his determination of the Estimate to the Government for consideration prior to their finalisation and approval.
(d) Where no alterations have been recommended by the Committee within a period of three weeks from the date of the referral to it by the Minister of the draft estimate the Minister may finalise his determination without further reference to the Committee.".
This section provides for an audit by outside accountants of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. This amendment relates to the amount of money that should be given to the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. While one would agree that the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General should be audited by outside accountants he must be given an adequate budget to do his job. As has been said repeatedly in this debate, he is an independent constitutional officer. Therefore, he can be neutral in relation to the discharge of his functions if his budget is not commensurate with the demands of his office.
This amendment, in the names of Deputies Gay and Jim Mitchell which should be supported, states that the draft Estimate of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General should be the subject of consultation with the Committee of Public Accounts. I understand this matter was referred to extensively in the White Paper which stated that no organ of the State, whether your office, a Cheann Comhairle, the Ombudsman's Office or the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General can be immune from public expenditure constraints. It is accepted that we cannot independently segregate any activity. However, a special case can be made in the case of the Comptroller and Auditor General in view of the unique constitutional organ he provides. As the function of the Comptroller and Auditor General is to report to the Dáil, the Dáil Members, through the Committee of Public Accounts, should have the power to make alterations to the draft Estimate and play an advisory role.
The Minister emphasised the need for consultation between the Comptroller and Auditor General and a member of the committee and Deputy Gay Mitchell referred to the role of the Secretary of the Department of Finance and his willingness to act. The best way to secure the independence of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General is to allow an independent means of securing his or her budget. I would ask the Minister to accept the amendment.
The amendment proposes that before making a recommendation to the Government on the Estimate for the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General the draft Estimate should be submitted to the Committee of Public Accounts for its recommendations. Any such recommendations would be submitted to the Government by the Minister together with the Minister's own recommendation.
Under the Constitution the initiative in regard to financial matters is entrusted solely to the Government. Article 17.2 and Article 28.4.3º of the Constitution make this absolutely clear. It is the sole responsibility of the Government to prepare Estimates of the expenditure of the State for such financial year and to present them to Dáil Éireann for consideration. The involvement of a committee of the Dáil in the preparation of the Estimates would clearly anticipate the constitutional consideration by the Dáil of the Estimates.
As regards the referral of an Estimate for consideration after its presentation to the Dáil to a committee of the House, this is a matter for the Dáil under Standing Orders rather than for the Government. The issue of the referral of Estimates in general has been raised in the context of Oireachtas reform in the programme for Government. The question of a role for the Committee of Public Accounts in that process is one which, if necessary, could be considered in that context having regard to the proposed changes in the committee's terms of reference.
It should be pointed out that members of the Committee of Public Accounts, as Members of the Dáil, can participate in the Estimates debate. The Estimates provision for the Comptroller and Auditor General is thus subject to public scrutiny and debate. However, in this legislation it is not the Government's intention to stifle the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General. It is the Government's intention that a reasonable amount of resources would be available to the Comptroller and Auditor General to carry out the functions, including the new functions assigned to him under the legislation. Indeed, the section we are discussing provides that the Comptroller and Auditor General, no more than other officers of the State, would be subject to review and a value for money audit.
I acknowledge the accuracy of what the Minister of State said in relation to the Constitution, the control of expenditure and the proposal for expenditure. The Comptroller and Auditor General is a constitutional officer, as stated by Deputy Yates and others. We have to find some means of ensuring that the intent of the Constitution under both headings is met. Additional responsibilities are being given in this Bill to the Comptroller and Auditor General and he has been given additional responsibilities in the Acts which established the regional technical colleges. If he has these additional responsibilities and is not allowed to fill vacancies, the intention of the Constitution and this House can be easily frustrated by the Executive. Under the Constitution, the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Committee of Public Accounts are established as watchdogs.
There has been a delay in filling a number of vacancies in the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Recently there was an improvement which brought the establishment up to 80 but the number of personnel required is in excess of 100 if the job is to be done expeditiously and properly. It is conceivable that an Executive who was slipshod in the way money was expended might want to frustrate its exposure by not allowing the Comptroller and Auditor General sufficient staff to audit on time.
Would the Minister accept that there is a case for a percentage of the budget earmarked for the Comptroller and Auditor General each year not being altered by the Government except by a vote of the House? Does the Minister see merit in such a proposal?
I should like to quote the following from the White Paper:
The Government would not accept nor has there been any evidence to suggest that the Executive's attitude towards providing resources for the Comptroller and Auditor General is in any way influenced by the fact that his role involves reporting on some aspects of the Executive's activities.
It is important to recognise in times of difficulty with regard to public expenditure — I do not know when we did not have difficult times in regard to public expenditure — that the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General cannot be immune, no more than any other office, from scrutiny in terms of trying to keep a reasonable balance on public expenditure. It is not the intention of the Government to frustrate the current legislation by denying reasonable resources to the Comptroller and Auditor General. In his reports it is open to the Comptoller and Auditor General to comment on the adequacy of the resources available to him.
Section 17 proposes the transfer of staff from the local government audit service to the Comptroller and Auditor General's office in order to bring new bodies into the audit system. As I stated there are constitutional difficulties in the way the proposal is formulated. However, the Government is examining the possibility of referring Estimates introduced in this House to committees for consideration. It is a matter for further review whether the Committee of Public Accounts is the appropriate committee for referral of the Estimate by the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office.
The Minister has given various commitments to the House. Will she now give a commitment on behalf of the Government that there will be ample expansion of the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General in terms of resources and personnel to meet the requirements of this legislation and to ensure its constitutional independence?
In the White Paper the Government acknowledged the implications in regard to the level of resources required by the Comptroller and Auditor General and stated that, as the legislation is brought into effect, the Comptroller and Auditor General's requirements will be reviewed by the Minister for Finance, in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General. I will give that commitment to the House.
Amendment put and declared lost.
Section 13 agreed to.
NEW SECTION.
I move amendment No. 35:
In page 19, before section 14, to insert the following new section:
"14.—(1) The Government shall prior to the recommendations of a person to Dáil Éireann for nomination by it for appointment as Comptroller and Auditor General seek the views of the Committee of Dáil Éireann established under the Standing Orders of Dáil Éireann to examine the report on the appropriation accounts.
(2) The Committee shall within one month deliver its opinion to the Minister for submission to the Government.
(3) After considering the opinion of the Committee or where no opinion has been received from it within the period specified in subsection (2) the Government may proceed to recommend the person for nomination by Dáil Éireann.".
I propose that we insert this new section in the Bill. The amendment proposes to give the Committee of Public Accounts a consultative role in nominating and appointing a new Comptroller and Auditor General when a vacancy occurs. It does not propose that the committee should take the place of the Government in its nominating role but seeks to give it a consultative role. In the case of constitutional offices, including that of the Comptroller and Auditor General and judges of the High Court, we should take the Constitution literally and allow the President to make such appointments, possibly with the advice and consent of this or the other House. Those appointments should be taken out of the political system, particularly the appointment of High Court and Supreme Court judges. I hope the Minister will accept the spirit of this amendment which would not go that far, but would give the Committee of Public Accounts a consultative role in such appointments.
Article 33.2 of the Constitution provides that the Comptroller and Auditor General shall be appointed by the President on the nomination of Dáil Éireann. To elaborate on this straightforward provision by statute would not be desirable. Essentially, the nomination of the Comptroller and Auditor General is a constitutional prerogative of this House and the statutory preferment of a committee of this House to receive prior notice of proposals could be seen as interfering with the constitutional privilege of other Members and the right of every Member to participate in the process of such a nomination. Members of the Committee of Public Accounts, as members of this House and in common with other Deputies, have a right to participate in the nomination procedure and can express their views on any nomination. One would not like to create a situation whereby officers of the Comptroller and Auditor General's office, who might be potential nominees, would be perceived as favoured because of their experience. That could create strains on the working relationship between the Committee of Public Accounts and the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office.
However, there is nothing to prevent formal contacts when the position of the Comptroller and Auditor General's office becomes vacant — or even before that — including the Public Accounts Commitee making its views known to the Government of the day. It is better not to formalise something in legislation in this regard because, constitutionally, it is a function of all Members of the House.
Is the Minister too naive to realise when it is stated that the Dáil will nominate a person to an office, effectively, it means the Government will nominate such a person because a majority in the Dáil comprises the Government. A political hack could be put forward by the Government of the day who might indulge in nepotism. There could be a variety of options in that vein. The Department of Finance could nominate a totally unsuitable person. In other words, the Committee of Public Accounts might take the view that, for example, somebody with experience in the private sector should be appointed. A certain standard is required in regard to the individual's curriculum vitae. The people who have to work with the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Committee of Public Accounts who represent all parties in this House, would give a much more balanced view than the Government. To say that all Members of the House have a view because it is a nominee of the Dáil is not the point. The Taoiseach or Minister for Finance could propose a Deputy as Comptroller and Auditor General and, regardless of the views of the Opposition, that person would be appointed. The appointment is political, a level of consultation would not entail a constitutional problem but would guarantee the independence of the office.
I reject the use of the phrase "political hack" by the Deputy in regard to the present Comptroller and Auditor General——
——or any previous occupant of that office. I am sure future occupants of the office will uphold the high standards with which we are familiar. The only thing that has been kept in the family is the position of chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts and I wish Deputy Jim Mitchell every success.
I take it the reference to a "political hack" was simply a political statement and did not refer to the present incumbent of that office.
The present incumbent who has been there for ten years is a man of impeccable character and worked previously in the Comptroller and Auditor General's office. The Minister grossly distorted and deliberately misrepresented my comments in that regard.
I reprimand the Minister for her references to keeping the position of chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts in the family. I assure her it was not my choice.
The Deputy would prefer to be leader.
He aspires to higher office.
I am determined to discharge the functions of that office for as long as I hold it.
I had hoped the Minister would have been more open to accepting at least the basic idea contained in this amendment. It would improve the image of the Government if such appointments were taken out of the political realm. I would be happy if there was a cross-party mechanism for agreement on this type of appointment in the future. When the first Ombudsman was appointed there was informal but effective cross-party consultation. I recall that the Opposition front benches were consulted on that occasion. That was a step in the right direction. There is no guarantee that there will be consultation the next time a vacancy occurs in the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office, the Ombudsman's Office or the Supreme Court or the High Court. I am not aware of any consultation in regard to appointments in the past to the Office of Comptroller and Auditor General or to the courts. These areas should be detached from Government. If people have to ingratiate themselves with Government in order to get these jobs there are obvious dangers. I do not think it is entirely implausible to think that people who want to become High Court judges, who want to go from the High Court to the Supreme Court or who want to become Ombudsman or Comptroller and Auditor General might ingratiate themselves with the Government. There will be human failure in this respect.
It would be infinitely better if the Constitution was put into effect in these matters so that the President would make the appointments, that the Dáil and not the Government would make the nomination and that the initial forum for teasing out the Dáil's nomination would be the Committee of Public Accounts. I do not think one can ignore the reality outlined by Deputy Yates — in this case the phrase "on the nomination of Dáil Éireann" means on the nomination of the Government of the day. The Comptroller and Auditor General is independent in the exercise of his functions so that he will be dependent on the Government. In view of this the Minister should take this amendment on board.
I become weary when the Government in debates start to hide behind the Constitution. We are making a simple straightforward request to the Minister. It is nonsense to suggest that the Government of the day could not consult with the appropriate committee — in this case the Committee of Public Accounts — on a matter of great importance. The Minister has more or less said that if it is suitable consultation will take place and if it is not suitable, for whatever reason, there will be no consultation. The reality is that the Government will not consult because, as has been rightly said, it is a Government appointment and it is not going to consult with anybody; it will decide when and where the appointment will be made.
Given the excellent relationship and tremendous track record between the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Committee of Public Accounts, it would be beneficial to all concerned if the Government listened to the views of the committee. This could be done in an informal way to get over the possibility of impinging on the Constitution. This is a reasonable point. I do not understand why the Government should operate in such a way that it would not take account of the views of the Committee of Public Accounts. Perhaps the amendment could be altered in some way to ensure that the Committee of Public Accounts would have the opportunity to discuss with the Government of the day its views on any future appointment to the office of Comptroller and Auditor General.
Is Deputy Mitchell pressing his amendment?
Amendment put and declared lost.
Section 14 agreed to.
SECTION 15.
I move amendment No. 36:
In page 20, subsection (4), lines 17 to 29, to delete paragraph (a) and substitute the following:
"(4) (a) The Minister may make a scheme providing for the granting of pensions to the spouses and children of deceased persons who have held the office of Comptroller and Auditor General and who—
(i) were not, at the time of appointment to that office, persons serving in established positions in the Civil Service.
(ii) being at that time such persons, did not elect to have the provisions of the Superannuation Acts, 1834 to 1963, applied to them, or
(iii) are not persons to whom a provision contained in a scheme under the Superannuation and Pensions Act, 1976, by virtue of section 2 (2) (h) of that Act, applies.".
This amendment deals with the superannuation arrangements for the Comptroller and Auditor General. It is a straightforward amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 37:
In page 20, subsection (5), line 33, to delete "in respect of pensions under" and substitute "under or by virtue of subsection (1), (3) or (4) of".
This is a technical amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 15, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 16.
I move amendment No. 38:
In page 21, subsection (2), line 11, after "Act", to insert "or by or under any other enactment".
This is a technical amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 16, as amended, agreed to.
NEW SECTION.
Amendment No. 39 in the name of the Minister. Amendment No. 1 to amendment No. 39 and amendment No. 40 are related. I suggest that we take amendment No. 39, amendment No. 1 to amendment No. 39 and amendment No. 40 together.
I move amendment No. 39:
In page 21, before section 17, to insert the following new section:
The Minister, after consultation with the Minister for the Environment, may designate for the purposes of transfer under this section such and so many officers of the Minister for the Environment whose duties, immediately before the designation, consisted of or included the audit of accounts or duties relating to such audits, as appear to him to be requisite to enable the Comptroller and Auditor General to perform the functions conferred on him by this Act, and a person so designated shall, upon such date as may be specified in the designation, become and be an officer of the Comptroller and Auditor General.
This amendment is designed to provide for flexibility in the transfer of staff from the local government audit service to the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office. The previous draft section 17 proposed that the people working on a particular audit would move en bloc with that audit. This amendment provides for greater flexibility in terms of the movement of staff. For example, staff working on a local authority audit who wish to move to the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office will under this amendment be able to make that transfer. The section deals with the legal powers and other matters. The transfer arrangements will be a matter for negotiation between the staff and office concerned.
I move amendment No. 1 to amendment No. 39:
In the last line, after "General" to insert "but shall thereafter hold office and be employed by the Comptroller and Auditor General on terms relating to pay and conditions of employment not less favourable than those terms which applied to them prior to such transfer".
The Minister's amendment is an improvement on the original section 17, but it still does not go far enough. All the people in the local government audit service auditing the books of vocational education committees and health boards are scattered throughout the country. At present the Comptroller and Auditor General's offices are located in Dublin. I am specifically proposing in this amendment and in amendment No. 40 that regard should be had to the people working in an area — in other words, that it would be unreasonable to ask somebody living and working in Edenderry or Moville in Donegal to move to Dublin.
I suggested earlier in the debate that the two offices should be amalgamated and decentralised. It is possible that people in these offices may be asked to move to other offices if there is a further diminution of the local government auditors' role in the future. These workers, who are represented by IMPACT, have made representations about this matter. Notwithstanding the assurances given by the Minister, I ask her to give a commitment to the House that no one will be moved to a different area. In other words, will the people in my constituency of Wexford be able to continue to work out of their existing offices? I would imagine that for the Comptroller and Auditor General to hire new offices would put him to additional cost. The existing leasing and property arrangements he has around the country should be retained and that, since there is a move from the Department of the Environment, there would be an absolute understanding that there would be no diminution of the status, rank, pay, conditions or location of the staff concerned.
First, there is no question of downgrading any existing officer. That simply does not arise. There is a number of factors which would support moves towards regionalisation of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office. Quite apart from the provisions of the Bill in bringing in some locally based bodies such as vocational education committees and health boards, there has been some decentralisation of Government offices to different areas — for example, the move of the Department of Social Welfare to Sligo and Letterkenny — which suggests that it might be sensible to locate some of the Comptroller and Auditor General's staff in the north-west where they could deal with ordering the offices concerned.
Do not forget the Land Registry.
I understand that the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office has been giving very serious consideration to the question of regionalisation and when the provisions of this Bill are enacted it is probably inevitable that we will see changes in that direction.
The Civil Service in general is not an unreasonable employer and factors such as current location and family circumstances are generally taken on board by managements when making their staffing dispositions. To date the decentralisation programme has been operated in the public service with a degree of humanity and flexibility. I would envisage a similar level of humanity and flexibility being taken on board in making any of the changes.
I myself met with the audit people from Wexford that Deputy Yates has expressed concern about. Having listened to what they have to say, the changes have been made in section 17 in the amendment I have put down, amendment No. 39. There is a need to balance the wishes of the staff and the requirements of the work and I do not think it is possible to give any absolute guarantee to the House. However, the Deputy can be assured that, in accordance with normal, good industrial relations practices, the changes made as a result of the Bill will be discussed with the staff concerned and every effort will be made to mimimise disruption.
Amendment No. 1 to amendment No. 39, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 39 agreed to.
I move amendment No. 40:
In page 21, between lines 28 and 29, to insert the following subsection:
"(2) In designating officers for transfer under subsection (1), the Minister shall have regard to the needs of such officers as regards proximity to their workplace and may, for that purpose, direct the Comptroller and Auditor General to establish regional branches of his Office.".
Amendment put and declared lost.
Sections 18 and 19 agreed to.
SECTION 20.
We now come to amendment No. 41 in the name of the Minister. Amendment No. 42 is cognate. I therefore suggest that we take amendments Nos. 41 and 42 together.
I move amendment No. 41:
In page 22, subsection (3), line 27, after "statute" where it firstly occurs, to insert "or charter".
This is a technical amendment. For example, bodies such as Trinity College coming in are established under charter rather than under Statute.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 42:
In page 22, subsection (3), line 27, after "statute" where it secondly occurs, to insert "or charter".
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 43:
In page 22, subsection (3), line 28, to delete "or fund" and substitute ", or fund, to which any provision of this Act applies".
Amendment agreed to.
Section 20, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 21.
Question proposed: "That section 21 stand part of the Bill."
Under what circumstances would the Minister see an amendment being made to the Schedules? A great deal of debate has taken place here in relation to the number of State companies that are excluded from inspection rights under the Second Schedule and the number of new groups that are to be audited. If a new semi-State body is set up does this section empower the Minister to change it by order or can the Minister actually change the effect of sections 8 and 9 by ministerial Order? For instance, if a scandal developed overnight in Bord na Móna could the Minister by order change the points we debated this morning? Would the removal of a company from the Schedule overcome our point of substance in relation to the Schedule, or would it require further legislation?
Before dealing with that point, let me say that the purpose is to insert a standard provision that would empower the Minister for Finance by order to add or remove bodies or agencies from the First, Second and Third Schedules. This is likely to arise in general when new bodies are established, when bodies are abolished or renamed, or when the nature of a body is changed so that it is no longer appropriate to the Schedule concerned.
I want to deal with points that were raised in the House this morning on which I was not then fully briefed. There was a point raised this morning about the Central Bank which I want to clarify. The Central Bank is audited under its own legislation by the Comptroller and Auditor General, but the reports do not go to the Committee of Public Accounts. There will be a review in general of Central Bank legislation arising from the new European Central Bank which will be set up following the completion of the Maastricht Treaty process. Therefore, that will be looked at again in that context. I just want to confirm that the Central Bank is one of the bodies audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General under the Central Bank Acts. Similarly, Temple Bar Properties, which we discussed this morning, is audited under its own Statute by the Comptroller and Auditor General and this has moved to the Department of the Environment in recent weeks. Temple Bar Properties is regarded as a commercial body. If it is no longer audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General it will not then be subject to inspection. Temple Bar Renewal — we are dealing with policy issues there — is audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General and it is not regarded as a commercial State-sponsored body.
The First Schedule lists bodies which are entrusted to the Comptroller and Auditor General by this Bill. There are some 43 other bodies which the Comptroller and Auditor General audits, including the Temple Bar bodies and the Central Bank, by virtue of specific enactments under their own legislation. The position of those is unchanged by the Bill, except that the value for money audit would now apply to them and to any subsidiaries they now have, and I can supply the Deputies with a list of those bodies.
The Deputy raised a point in relation to changes.
The point was in relation to changes. If one wanted to investigate a semi-State company under section 8, could that be done by changing the Schedule?
The Minister may, by order, amend the Schedule. In theory he could delete bodies from a particular Schedule which would change their status under the Bill.
Would that allow inspection rights?
That would allow inspection rights. As I said this morning when we were dealing with the whole question of the commercial State-sponsored bodies, there is a general provision, which has never been exercised, for the House to call for a report in relation to any particular body.
In relation to the special, unused provision, who would prepare that report?
I would need to check my notes on that aspect and I shall report to the Deputy later.
Did I understand the Minister to say that if a scandal or a problem arose in relation to a company listed in the Second Schedule the Minister could make a deletion order, thereby requiring the Comptroller and Auditor General to carry out an inspection? Is the procedure to be followed as simple as that?
There are two procedures open. First, there is the provision that has not to date been used under which the Comptroller and Auditor General would prepared a report on behalf of the House. The second possibility, technically, is for the Minister to make an amending order under the First, Second or Third Schedules.
Under which legislation is the unused provision to be found? As I understand it, I could, for example, put before the House a motion calling on the Comptroller and Auditor General to investigate a certain impropriety in a particular semi-State company or Government Department. For instance, if I were not satisfied with the operation of the Leader programme I have available to me the option of putting such a motion before the House.
There is provision under the Comptroller and Auditor-General Act, 1923.
Question put and agreed to.
Sections 22 and 23 agreed to.
SECTION 24
We now come to amendment No. 44 in the name of Deputy Jim Mitchell. Amendment No. 46 is an alternative amendment, so amendments Nos. 44 and 46 will be discussed together.
I move amendment No. 44:
In page 23, subsection (3), line 9, after "provision" to insert "but, in any event, not later than 5 years after the passing of this Act".
I would have preferred to have moved my amendment, No. 46, first. In it I suggested that the legislation shall come into effect not later than 1 July 1993. Amendment No. 44, Deputy Mitchell's amendment, which is similar, provides that the legislation shall come into operation not later than five years after the passage of the Bill which is expected to occur in the next few weeks.
After the passage of the child care legislation, to which I tabled more than 200 amendments, I promised that I would not allow legislation in which I was involved to be passed without a specific date being set for its commencement. Some years ago I had a protracted debate on this issue with Deputy Noel Treacy, who was Minister of State at the Department and had responsibility for the child care legislation. The Minister of State gave numerous commitments that provisions relating to care, to control and to supervision of children, among others, would be implemented without delay. To this day, that has not happened. I also was involved in the processing of the legislation on private nursing homes, for which Deputy O'Hanlon, as Minister, had responsibility. The provisions of that legislation have still not been implemented.
We have a hopeless record when it comes to implementing legislation. We are great at passing legislation and then forgetting about it. Once legislation goes beyond the scrutiny of the House it tends to sink into a hole and then be forgotten. If the Minister is taking the provisions of this Bill seriously, I advise her not to pay too much attention to assurances she might be given. She might find that she is no longer a Member of the House, is retired and drawing the pension before the provisions are implemented.
The timetable I suggested in amendment No. 46 is short and would result in the legislation being implemented. The Minister may wish to set a different date, but I suggest that she decide on a date no later than 1 January 1994. If the Minister were to decide on that date the accounts for the Estimates of 1994 would then be an issue and the legislation would not come into operation for some time. Failure to set a date or to include a clause under which the Minister may later specify a date, would provide a facility to longfinger the provisions. If the legislation is not implemented the House will have wasted its time. I ask the Minister to come back on Report Stage with a suitable date. It is important to set a specific date because with pressing political issues there is a tendency for legislation to lapse. This is an important issue of substance.
I sympathise with the Deputy's anxieties in relation to the implementation of this legislation. I hope it will be operational quickly. The Comptroller and Auditor General, and the Department of Finance, are as anxious as Deputies opposite to have the Bill enacted and implemented as soon as possible. Certain aspects of the Bill require consultation with staff, and I am keen to have those consultations concluded before bringing under the ambit of the Comptroller and Auditor General the vocational education committees and health boards, for example. I hope there will be no undue delay in bringing those negotiations to a reasonable conclusion. In that sense, the setting of a definite time limit would not be possible. It may take a little time to bring into audit bodies such as Trinity College, for instance.
Would the Minister accept the time limit in amendment No. 44?
The setting of a five year time limit would be too wide a target. I hope the legislation will be well and truly in operation in my time in the House——
One never knows, many a Minister has said that.
——and certainly before I draw a pension. The setting of a five year timespan would send the wrong signals. The Bill was introduced early in the life of the present Government. It was ready for debate about five weeks ago but had to give way to the emergency Bill in relation to the Office of Public Works. It was then expected to hold the debate a fortnight later but for various reasons that was not possible — I seem to recall that some Opposition Deputies who were anxious to participate in the debate were not available at that time. The attention given to this Bill demonstrates the Government's commitment to have this legislation enacted and operational as soon as possible. I know the Comptroller and Auditor General is very anxious to have the Bill enacted and has been examining how he will bring sections of it into operation. He wishes to begin this work soon.
Members on all sides share a desire to have the value for money audits and an upgraded late twentieth century auditing system brought into effect. I can give the House that assurance without setting a specific date, for the reasons I have given. I realise that there is a huge price tag involved in the implementation of some legislation but that is not the case with this Bill and there is no reason that it should be held up. The Government has this year set aside £4 million for the implementation of the private nursing homes' legislation. I am happy that the new Government secured that change. It is hoped that progress will be made on the implementation of various sections of the child care legislation. Section 5 of that legislation is in operation but I am not sure which other sections have been implemented. Implementation of those provisions carries a specific cost. There is no huge cost involved in implementing this Bill and there should be no undue delay in making it operational.
It seems that the Minister virtually agrees with me. I agree it is necessary to have time for consultation, that five years is too long a period and could send out the wrong signals. However, the record shows that operation dates can be delayed. The Minister on Report Stage should suggest a date that she considers feasible and would send the right signals. The Minister can give no assurance to the House about an operation date if she is not in office. We are all just passing through, the institutions will long outlive us.
I must point out that there are other Bills on which the Minister could make that point about certain health legislation. There are other matters in which I have been involved which have been long-fingered. I believe there are valid grounds for concern here. I would ask the Minister to say whether she envisages this will be enacted, say, within a year, by January next or whenever. I contend that some date should be laid down so that people will know we mean business.
I will withdraw amendment No. 44. I would ask the Minister to sit down with the Comptroller and Auditor General and her officials and agree some date for Report Stage. Failure to do so will mean an ultimate lack of accountability. There will be no use my meeting the Minister of State, say, shopping in Stillorgan in 1997 and talk to her about the Bill we discussed one day in the Dáil whose provisions still have not been implemented because there will be damn all she will be able to do about it then.
I can assure the Deputy that since it has taken me a long time to get into this House, now that I have arrived I mean business.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 45:
In page 23, subsection (3), line 12, to delete "to different Departments and".
This is a technical amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 46 not moved.
Section 24, as amended, agreed to.
FIRST SCHEDULE.
Question proposed: "That the First Schedule be the First Schedule to the Bill."
One of the points that arose this morning had to do with An Bord Pleanála about which I gave an undertaking. I have since checked the matter and have ascertained that An Bord Pleanála is already audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General under its own Act. I can arrange to have a list of all the bodies audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General circulated to Deputies.
Could the Minister of State please also circulate the part of the 1923 Act containing provisions to the effect that the Dáil must investigate?
Question put and agreed to.
Second, Third and Fourth Schedules agreed to.
Title agreed to.
Bill reported with amendments.
May I ask whether the Minister of State wishes to propose a date for Report Stage?
I hope it will be next Wednesday so as to have it completed.
Not at this stage. It is a matter for the Whips.
Actually it is not. Can it be included next week?
I have not been in contact with the Whips office.
Can we set a date, subject to agreement between the Whips.
Tuesday next then, subject to agreement between the Whips.
Report Stage ordered for Tuesday, 6 April 1993.
