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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 8 Jul 1993

Vol. 433 No. 7

Irish Aviation Authority Bill, 1993: Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

I would like to thank all the Deputies who contributed to what has been a most interesting, useful and informative debate. I wish to pay a special tribute to my colleague, Deputy Kenneally, who, as my predecessor, made a major contribution in progressing this important Bill. There were a number of points raised to which I would like to respond now and other points with which I will deal in further detail on Committee Stage. A number of points were made concerning problems in Aer Lingus and elsewhere which are not relevant to this Bill and I do not intend to respond to them in detail.

The aviation industry in Ireland covers a very wide spectrum. Perhaps it was inevitable, therefore, that some contributions strayed into areas not really related to this Bill. I am referring in particular to such issues as Aer Lingus, the Shannon stopover, and the question of general aviation policy, including EC liberalisation. These have been dealt with in other debates and, as I have said, I do not propose to address them in any futher detail, at this stage.

It particularly concerns me that Members of the House persist with the myth that this Government has no aviation policy. I do not want to labour the point, but our approach is based on an aviation policy which is designed to promote jobs and wealth creation in the aviation industry, improve the competitiveness of all our aviation products, sustain a domestically based and financially viable national airline, ensure an equitable regional distribution of air traffic and that we have the aviation infrastructure to meet the needs of the industry.

The Irish Aviation Authority Bill is fully in line with that policy. This Bill is putting in place a semi-state body framework to ensure that we have the regulatory systems and airspace management organisation necessary to meet our present and projected requirements.

I was pleased with the many tributes which Members of the House rightly paid to ANSO staff. They are, as stated by myself and many others, a highly competent and dedicated team. I noted also the many remarks and concerns expressed across the House in relation to staff issues, such as their security of tenure and superannuation arrangements.

I am very aware of the concerns expressed by ANSO staff concerning their transfer to the new organisation. Having personally met the trade unions and staff associations, I have fully recognised those concerns and on Committee Stage I will be moving a number of amendments to this Bill which will confirm the clarifications already given to staff in relation to these matters. These clarifications will ensure that their conditions of employment will be protected and not reduced and I am confident that the staff will be satisfied with the changes which we propose to make.

As pointed out from all sides of the House, the transformation of Civil Service organisations to semi-State status has become a relatively straight forward affair. While we generally wish to use tried and tested formulae for these matters, different circumstances require different arrangements. One prime example of this is in relation to section 41, which deals with superannuation. This section provides for the payments of superannuation to the fund by the Minister for Finance to meet accrued pension liabilities. These provisions recognise the payments made by ANSO's users over the years for the pensions of ANSO staff.

Despite the impression given by some contributions, there have been considerable discussions between the staff and official sides in our Department concerning the transfer of ANSO staff to the new Authority. As I said, I have met the unions, I am aware of the staff concerns, these will be dealt with on Committee Stage and our proposals should be acceptable to the staff. However, I have no doubt that this Bill will provide the framework within which the necessary discussions on all these issues can be satisfactorily concluded by vesting day on 1 January next.

I noted with particular concern the interpretations placed on the provision in section 71 of the Bill which excludes the Authority from the ambit of the Worker Participation (State Enterprises) Act. In this connection, and in the light of the inferences drawn from that about a lack of trust in ANSO staff, an adjustment to section 17, will meet the case appropriately.

On the more general issue, a number of Members questioned the motivation for moving ANSO out of the Civil Service when, by common consensus, ANSO is doing a very good job.

As I indicated in my opening speech, it has been the general trend of policy for all Governments over the past 20 years to separate what are described as policy and executive functions. This is also desirable in the case of ANSO because it is clearly an Executive organisation and is also one with proven commercial capability and potential.

That was not always so. In the mid 1980s ANSO had poor equipment, was seriously under-invested and was not performing as well as at present. This good performance by ANSO belies continuing difficulties across a range of areas, including staffing, where ANSO operates within the constraints of Civil Service staffing restrictions.

Let me give an example of this. In 1989-90, though staffing was very short, it took ANSO 18 months to recruit staff through the Civil Service channels. The reasons for the delay can be readily justified, explained and understood in the context of broader public service constraints. However, to the aviation industry, which pays for ANSO services, unreasonable delays in meeting their requirements are unacceptable, no matter how justified they might be.

As air traffic increases we must commensurately increase capacity to handle it as it arises, not 18 months afterwards. In 1990 Aer Rianta saved the day by providing ANSO with temporary staff within six weeks. In short, with reasonable freedom as a semi-State body, the new Authority will have the capacity to respond, as the industry requires, with staffing and investment strategies to meet its needs in a timely way.

I must also mention that across all the consultative mechanisms which our Department has with the aviation industry, there is universal support for the creation of this new Authority.

One Deputy referred to the fact that we have had to go outside Ireland to recruit staff. This is true; fortunately, all but two of those recruited are Irish — in short, we are bringing them all back home. We had to recruit trained controllers because of previous constraints on recruitment and because of the danger that our training and replacement programmes were falling too far behind our vital requirements.

On the wider front, ANSO has been offered a range of consultancies and training contracts and, unfortunately, it has to forego most of these very important opportunities.

At present ANSO has neither the spare staff, nor the authority to recruit new staff, to provide these valuable and profitable services.

These are a few brief examples of the type of Civil Service constraints that need to be eliminated. We are eliminating them by transforming ANSO into a vibrant commercial semi-state body which, as I said, is in line with the general trend of Government strategy to separate policy and executive functions. Another major issue which I was first to raise and which the Deputies quickly picked up was the whole question of combining the regulatory and operational roles in the new authority. I was pleased that Deputies rightly share my concern about this matter. However, as I said in my opening speech, having two separate organisations is not the solution.

Contrary to what Deputies may believe, the fact is that many international administrations combine both regulatory and operational functions in the one organisation.

Examples of this can be found in the Civil Aviation Authority — the CAA — in Britain, in the Federal Aviation Administration — the FAA — in the USA and in the German and Danish Administrations.

I raised this issue because I wanted to highlight to this House that, like the situation in the countries which I mentioned, the responsibility for accident investigation lies with independent statutory bodies such as the National Transportation Safety Board in the USA. In our case the Minister will be retaining responsibility for accident investigation.

However — this is the unique feature — we have built into this Bill in sections 32 and 36 special provisions that will enable the Minister of the day to remain appraised of the policy issues in relation to safety matters. We have done this because we believe in all prudence the Minister should monitor the standards of the organisation. I must emphasise that this prudence is in no way a reflection on the competence or integrity of the board, management or staff of the new authority.

Far from showing uncertainty or lack of sure-footedness these provisions underwrite the Government's very strong commitment to safety. It is part of the concept that we should not alone have the highest safety standards, but should be seen to have them.

In the unfortunate event of a major aviation accident, the responsibility of the Irish Aviation Authority, as of ANSO, is to initiate the implementation of the major accident plan. Further participation by the authority would be through the provision of sevices as defined by that plan. Subsequently it is the responsibility of the Minister to have the accident investigated in so far as aircraft are involved. The statutory requirement of the Minister is to investigate and, where possible, determine the cause of the accident and not to apportion blame. This is a well accepted international practice in all navigation matters. The EC is considering a directive in this matter which will ensure the standardisation of this process within the Community.

On the issue of profitability, which was also raised by a number of Deputies, let there is no doubt the Irish Aviation Authority is being established with a clear commercial mandate. However, there are certain key services under international convention, which must be provided on a non-profit basis. There is nothing unusual about this. The ESB operates on the same basis. The ESB mandate on its core business is to break even, taking one year's operations with another. It can, however, operate on a profitable basis on its non-core activities such as consultancies and training. The same general approach will be adopted by the Irish Aviation Authority.

There is a large and growing potential market for consultancy and training services in every aspect of modern life and commercial actitivy. It is important that the Authority be established quickly so that it can assign people to chase up the business and opportunities that currently exist and which will generate new income, profitability and employment.

On the general question of commercial operations there is a further point. ANSO, as part of the departmental and Government accounting arrangements, gets services from other Government agencies on a non-repayment basis. These services include obvious ones like legal advice from the Attorney General's office and not so obvious ones like interest on working capital. All of these are costs borne by the taxpayer, but not directly by ANSO.

The best ANSO can do to recoup these hidden costs is to make broad guesstimates of the amounts involved and recoup them from the users. I need hardly say that this is an unsatisfactory arrangement for all concerned — Government, ANSO and its many users. I am pleased to say therefore that this unsatisfactory aspect will be rectified when the new authority is established. It is important that users are properly charged for the services which they receive and those charges are fully transparent.

Another aspect on which I wish to reassure the House is in relation to the question of privatisation. There is no hidden agenda here. There is no question of the Irish Aviation Authority being some kind of halfway house to privatisation. In this connection I reiterate what I said in my opening speech; if in the future any of the core functions of the new authority were to be privatised, the whole question would have to be brought back to the Oireachtas for both debate and ultimate decision. This is surely democracy at its best.

I wish to refer to an issue which interested Deputies on all sides of the House, the whole question of military aircraft. I have generally used the term Irish airspace in its broadest sense — that is the area which we actually control. However, that area includes international airspace over the north Atlantic and airspace off the south coast in which control functions have been delegated to us by international agreement. When I refer to Irish airspace, I am also including, of course, Irish sovereign airspace.

Of the 320,000 flight movements that came under Irish control in 1992, 4,627, or approximately 1.5 per cent were military flights. For comparison purposes there were more than 8,000 military flights in 1991, that is about 2.8 per cent of the overall total and includes the flights operated under UN resolutions in connection with the Gulf War. Approximately half of the military flights operate through Irish sovereign airspace.

In this connection I must make it absolutely clear that we fully observe the terms of Article 35 of the Chicago Convention which provides that "No munitions of war, or implements of war may be carried in, or above the territory of a State, engaged in international navigation, except by permission of such State". I can assure the House that the Irish Aviation Authority will continue to observe this very important requirement. Under the Eurocontrol En-Route Charging System neither we nor the other states directly charge the military authorities for the costs involved. They are borne directly by each administration on a reciprocal basis.

A number of Deputies mentioned the problems posed by air traffic congestion in Europe that the EATCHIP Programme is designed to solve. The upsurge in air traffic in the 1980s was acutely felt in Europe through the necessity to impose long and widespread restrictions on flights. The result led to delays, losses and inconvenience suffered by travellers and business people. During 1989 and 1990 we had difficulties ourselves, but nothing compared to those of our European partners.

The difficulties in the 1980s were a compound of the relatively sudden and unforeseen nature of the upsurge in traffic combined with inadequate investment systems and people. In response to this crisis, like many other administrations, we in Ireland are giving the required commercial autonomy to those providing air navigation services.

As I said earlier, in 1988 the European Ministers for Transport devised a broad strategy to deal with delays. The success of that strategy depends on many factors, not least of which are ensuring compatible equipment and systems being used in each state. There are also factors such as national concerns about sovereignty, military airspace areas and other similarly contentious issues.

Though progress in resolving the European air traffic problem is being made through the EATCHIP Programme, that progress is slow. It is little comfort to us or to our airlines, that we do not have the kind of problems here that exist in European airspace. The European problems occur mainly in the central regions over Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and northern Italy.

We are aware of the pressure that exists in certain quarters for an integrated European air traffic control system. It is a practicable concept — after all the USA has a similar single system. Ireland, as a partner in the Eurocontrol EATCHIP Programme, is well placed to exploit opportunities for expansions and development of air traffic services.

We have a modern, flexible and cost effective system on which the new aviation authority can build and broaden its future strategy.

If the European system or even a major part of it were to be located here we would have no objection. Indeed, if the issue arises, the Government and the new authority, would certainly press very strongly for it. However, such possibilities are speculative at this stage.

Deputy Carey picked up the reference to Prestwick, Scotland, in my opening remarks. However, I was referring to the Prestwick Air Traffic Control Centre and not to the airport. Prestwick, in conjunction with our aeronautical radio communications station at Ballygirreen, is the main air traffic control centre for the North Atlantic on this side of the ocean. However, the importance of the Prestwick Air Traffic Control Centre has had no bearing on the fate of Prestwick Airport.

In the Shannon context, I assure the House that our Shannon air traffic control centre will continue to be our main en-route upper airspace control centre. Our strategy for the Shannon air traffic control centre must be to maintain and operate our existing airspace with the maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Our policy will be to endeavour to extend the operational functions and responsibilities of the Shannon centre. Indeed, investments now in hands will further increase and enhance the capacity of the Shannon centre.

With regard to the reference made by Deputy Kenneally to the ECA pilot training school in Cork, in the mid-1980s after a period of relative stagnation the world aviation industry entered a period of rapid substantial growth characterised by many factors, including air traffic congestion, expansion of airline fleets and the need for more airline pilots. The European College of Aeronautics, a private limited company, was established in 1989 whose purpose was to provide approved flying training for pilots to commercial licence and eventually airline transport licence standard. The success of the school obviously depended on having sufficient pupils. However, it was also important that the schools courses be officially recognised as being of the standards set and monitored by ANSO in our Department. In 1991 ANSO approved the college's course for integrated training for pilots to commercial pilot licence standard.

All Ministers encourage as far as possible ventures such as the European College of Aeronautics. However, such ventures must, as private sector enterprises, stand or fall by their own commercial standards. Sadly the Cork venture failed. This was not because of the initiative in Waterford, and I wish that project every success. Following the failure in Cork a task force was established to consider the potential for pilot training. The task force has not yet finalised its report and it would be presumptuous of me to prejudice the outcome. Beyond its normal regulatory functions I see little role for the aviation authority in relation to such a school.

I noted the concern expressed by Deputy Shortall about the cost of meteorological services supplied to the authority. I will have that examined and will report on it on Committee Stage. The Deputy, and the meteorological staff who have expressed such concerns, do not put sufficient weight on the Minister's role in this matter.

In conclusion, I reiterate that the Bill is entirely compatible with the Government's policy to ensure that the aviation industry has an effective, efficient and enabling infrastructure and regulatory environment. I thank the House for its consideration and contributions on this Bill and look forward to participating in the Committee Stage, on Tuesday July 13, with the Members of the new Select Committee on Enterprise and Economic Strategy.

Question put and agreed to.
Sitting suspended at 2.05 p.m. and resumed at 2.30 p.m.
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