I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time".
The purpose of this Bill is to provide remedies in cases where it is alleged that a miscarriage of justice has occurred and the existing appeal procedures have been exhausted so that the aggrieved person cannot resort to the courts for relief, even where there is irrefutable new evidence. The provisions of the Bill arise in part from the recommendations of the committee — known as the Martin Committee after its chairman, Judge Frank Martin which was established in 1989 to enquire into certain aspects of criminal procedure.
Our system at present is not of course devoid of a means by which miscarriages of justice can be remedied; there has always been the power provided by the Constitution under which the President, acting on the advice of the Government, can grant a pardon. Pardons have been granted in rare cases that have arisen. While there is not statutory right to compensation in these cases, that has not prevented the Government of the day from awarding compensation in appropriate cases. As I have said, it is clearly right that the procedure for dealing with these cases should be better regulated by statute. In framing the Bill I have proceeded on the basis that the best agent for dealing with alleged miscarriages is a court and that it is only in rare cases where a court cannot appropriately deal with the matter that other procedures should be resorted to. The Bill, although short, will, I believe, be widely welcomed and I look forward to seeing it on the Statute Book in the near future.
The provisions of the Bill arise in part from recommendations made in Part I of the Report of the Committee to Enquire into Certain Aspects of Criminal Procedure, under the chairmanship of Judge Frank Martin, which was published in 1990. I take this opportunity to thank Judge Martin and the members of the committe for their excellent report. Many eminent criminal lawyers made submissions to the committee, as did several present and past members of this House. That the committee was able to complete its deliberations and submit its report very quickly is a credit to the dedication and commitment of its members. They deserve the sincere thanks of this House.
The committee was also asked to examine whether additional safeguards were needed to ensure that uncorroborated confessions were properly obtained and recorded and they recommended that the questioning of suspects take place before an audio-visual recording device. The Government has accepted that recommendation in principle.
I have established a steering committee for the introduction of audio and audio-visual recording of Garda questioning of suspects on a pilot basis in selected Garda stations. The committee is chaired by Judge Desmond Smyth. I would stress that the committee is not concerned with whether or not to introduce recording devices into Garda stations — that has been accepted by the Government — but rather to make recommendations to me on the necessary features of a pilot scheme. This is a significant development which will complement the legal changes I am proposing in this Bill. It will, I hope, lead to an enhancement of public confidence in the integrity of criminal investigations by providing a verifiable record of statements made in Garda custody. This should greatly assist our criminal courts in their difficult task of assessing evidence and should go a long way towards minimising actual or alleged miscarriages of justice.
To return to the Bill, the proposals fulfil a commitment in the Programme for a Partnership Government to provide for a review of alleged cases of miscarriage of justice and to provide a statutory right to compensation for any actual miscarriage.
While there is an undoubted need for certainty and finality in the decisions of the criminal courts, the paramount objective is that justice must always be done and be seen to be done. An accused person must have every opportunity to put forward his or her case and to challenge a decision or verdict which adversely affects him or her where there is good reason to suggest that the verdict may have been unjust. The recognition of this led in 1924 to the establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal which for the first time gave to a convicted person a right of appeal against the verdict of a jury. It was provided that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal would be final in every case, except where a point of law of exceptional public importance was involved, when an appeal could with leave be made to the Supreme Court. One of the important proposals in the Bill is that the court may re-examine a conviction or sentence where new evidence comes to light after a previous appeal has been dealt with. One of the faults of our present system is that the Court of Criminal Appeal has no power to reopen an appeal already decided, even where clear evidence pointing to innocence comes to light. I think everybody will agree that this needs to be changed.
Clearly, the circumstances where it would become necessary to reopen cases would be exceptional, but we must face that possibility and provide for it. It is possible, for example, to envisage an important witness coming forward after the hearing of an appeal who, for a genuine reason, was unavailable for the appeal or the original trial. Another possibility might be where a new development in forensic science enables evidence which led to the conviction and its affirmation in the Court of Criminal Appeal to be seen in a different light.