I move: That Dáil Éireann approves the following Order in draft:
Finance Act, 1992 (Commencement of Section 15) (Unemployment Benefit and Pay-Related Benefit) Order, 1994;
a copy of which Order in draft was laid before Dáil Éireann on 26th January, 1994.
Section 15 of the Finance Act, 1992, provided for the treatment as income for tax purposes of certain short term social welfare benefits. These are disability benefit, injury benefit, unemployment benefit and pay-related benefit. The section can come into operation generally or in relation to specific benefits or categories of recipients of benefits on such day or days as may be fixed by the Minister for Finance by order. Prior to such an order being made it is required that a draft of the order be laid before Dáil Éireann and a resolution approving of the draft be passed by Dáil Éireann.
A commencement order of 10 March 1993, brought the section into operation with effect from 6 April 1993, in respect of disability benefit and injury benefit. As I announced in the Budget Statement, I now propose to bring the section into operation with effect from 6 April 1994, in respect of unemployment benefit and pay-related benefit. A draft order to that effect was laid before the House on 26 January.
Before I discuss the making of these benefits reckonable as income for tax purposes, I would like to say a few words on the overall issue of tax reform. The Government is committed, through the Programme of Partnership Government, to continue the process of tax reform. Substantial progress has been made in this regard over recent years but further action is required.
Our overriding economic and social objective is to resolve our critical unemployment situation. As I indicated in the Budget Statement the three yardsticks against which a "pro-jobs" taxation policy must be measured are those of assisting competitiveness, promoting the best economic use of our resources while favouring employment where possible, and being, in the broad sense, as employment-friendly as practicable given that revenue must be raised.
Ensuring that taxation policy is proemployment means increasing rewards and incentives for working and reducing the cost of employing workers. By reorienting the income tax and PRSI systems the Government is helping to promote wage moderation and to increase the competitive position of industry. Changes in this area are important for labour intensive industries, particularly those with large numbers of low paid workers. In general terms our tax system no longer stands out as having exceptionally high rates of tax. It is in the area of income tax that there remains considerable need for positive tax reform.
The proportion of all tax which is collected from incomes is very high. Furthermore, the burden of income tax bears heavily on those with modest incomes. This is because of the speed at which individuals enter the tax net and, more importantly, the speed at which the higher rates of tax come into play. It is in these respects that our current tax system impacts negatively on enterprise and employment and where significant changes are essential. I was, therefore, delighted to be able to announce very significant improvements in the income tax position of all earners in the budget. In particular, I was delighted to be able to focus the benefits on low and medium earners.
The budget reduced the overall take from income tax by almost £200 million in 1994 and by £333 million in a full year. It did this first by abolishing the temporary 1 per cent levy. The budget also increased significantly the personal allowances and the standard rate bands, helping to reduce the burden of taxation on the low and middle income earners. In addition, the rate of tax at which marginal relief is charged was reduced by 8 percentage points. This significant reduction in the marginal rate of tax faced by many low paid workers will alleviate the poverty trap and increase the incentive to work.
In addition to the general income tax measures mentioned here, a number of other measures was taken to improve the position of the low paid and to help improve the competitive position of those industries which employ large numbers of low paid workers. Finally, I have introduced a differential employers' PRSI contribution rate structure. From 6 April 1994 a reduced rate of 9 per cent will be levied on incomes up to £173 per week. Above £173 the normal rate of 12.2 per cent will apply on all income subject to a weekly ceiling of £496 equivalent to £25,800 per annum. It will cost £28 million in 1994. Secondly, an exemption from the health and employment and training levies has been introduced for those earning less than £9,000 per annum. The obligation for employers to pay the cost of these levies for those with medical cards has also been removed. The total cost of the changes in PRSI and these levels is £63 million in a full year. This represents a very significant boost to the cost structure of firms with large numbers of low paid employees and should improve significantly the competitive position of those firms.
Of course, tax reform is not simply a matter of tax reduction. The overall level of taxation is primarily determined by the level and quality of services which we as a society decide should be provided or financed by the State either directly or indirectly. As I said, the strategy behind the tax changes involves a reorientation of the income tax and PRSI code to be more employment friendly. Focusing reliefs and reductions on the lower paid inevitably involves trade-offs elsewhere in the tax code. In the income tax area the base broadening measures which I have taken this year involve confining tax relief for mortgage interest and VHI to the standard rate and making unemployment benefit reckonable for tax purposes. While I will explain the specific equity arguments which point to the fairness of making unemployment benefit reckonable for tax purposes in a moment, it is essential to recognise that this change is part of the ongoing tax reform programme. Furthermore, the significant improvements in the tax position of the low paid made in this year's budget will, of course, apply to those claiming unemployment benefit.
Returning to unemployment and pay-related benefits, I should stress that making these benefits reckonable as income for tax purposes is essentially a matter of equity. The reason for treating unemployment and pay-related benefit as income for tax purposes is merely to treat people in similar circumstances, with similar amounts of incomes in a tax year, in the same way. It is to ensure that for two people in similar circumstances having the same level of income, one does not pay less tax than the other simply because one person's income contains unemployment benefit and the other person's does not.
The extent to which taxation will actually arise in a given case as a result of this change will, of course, depend essentially on the amount of other income that the recipient of unemployment benefit or the recipient's spouse has in the same tax year. I would like to draw Members' attention, in this context, to a paper entitled "Income Tax and Welfare Reforms" published by the ERSI in 1991. As I indicated when the commencement order on the taxation of disability benefit was being discussed last year, the ERSI paper demonstrated the flaw in the argument that taxation of short term social welfare benefits would impact unfairly on those on low income. The study found that most of the benefit from the non-taxation of certain short term benefits, including unemployment benefit, went to those on higher incomes. In particular it found that 70 per cent of those tax units affected by the taxation of short term benefits are in the upper half of the income distribution range and that in removing the exemption fewer than one in ten of those affected would be in the lower income ranges. These figures are based on a study carried out in 1987. The increases in the income tax exemption limits since then and the introduction of substantial child additions to them should mean that the effect on the lower income groups would be even less now.
The change to making short term social welfare benefits, including unemployment benefit and pay-related benefit, reckonable as income for tax purposes has been recomended by a number of groups, including the Commission on Taxation, the Commission on Social Welfare, the National Economic and Social Council and the Industrial Policy Review Group — Culliton. The change now being made should ensure that persons are not better off because portion of their annual income arises from unemployment benefit than they would be if the same overall income arose from being employed. It will help to reduce the replacement ratio of those affected and make it more attractive for them to remain in or take up employment.
A number of other PRSI benefits are already reckonable as income for tax purposes. These include, for example, invalidity pensions, disability benefit, injury benefit, retirement pensions, widows pensions and old age pensions.
Social welfare payments in general and unemployment benefit in particular have improved significantly in recent years. For example, in 1987 the personal rate of unemployment benefit was £42.30 per week. Following this year's budget the rate will be £61.00. This represents an increase of 44 per cent or over 20 per cent after the effects of inflation have been allowed for. The new £61.00 per week rate will come into operation from July of this year and will ensure that those on unemployment benefit will be receiving a payment which is above the priority rate recommended by the Commission on Social Welfare. Further progress in improving the unemployment benefit rate will be made in future years as economic conditions permit.
When the House was debating the commencement order for disability benefit in March last, I indicated that when unemployment and pay-related benefits were brought into taxation in 1994 they would be taxed at source by the Department of Social Welfare. This would mean that in addition to paying the unemployment and pay-related benefits the Department would also make refunds and deductions of tax where appropriate. This is still the intention for the permanent system. The necessary preparations for the introduction of the permanent system of tax are currently being undertaken by the Department of Social Welfare with a view to its implementation in 1995. Consequently in the short term an interim taxation arrangement will be operated by the Revenue Commissioners.
The interim system will involve the Department of Social Welfare continuing to pay unemployment and pay-related benefit gross, that is, without deduction of income tax. Any tax due in respect of the benefit will be collected essentially through Revenue restricting tax refunds to take account of any unemployment and pay-related benefit received.
I want to indicate how the proposed arrangements will operate in practice in some situations. Where a person ceases work during the tax year and goes on unemployment benefit, the person will continue to claim refunds of tax previously paid in the tax year from Revenue at four-weekly intervals as at present. However, Revenue will take the amount of unemployment and pay-related benefit received into account in computing the amount of any refund due. If the person's weekly receipt of benefit is less than their weekly tax-free allowance some tax refund, but at a reduced level, will still be due. If the benefit received is greater than the person's weekly tax-free allowance then no tax refund would in future be due. Of course if a person has paid no tax since the beginning of the tax year no refund would arise. This is what happens at present also.
When a person resumes employment or takes up employment for the first occasion during the tax year, having been on unemployment benefit, the following arrangements will apply. Where the person's unemployment and pay-related benefit is less than their weekly tax-free allowance Revenue will instruct that the cumulative basis of PAYE will be operated in the employment, with the unemployment and pay-related benefit being taken into account. The operation of the cumulative basis will give the employee immediate benefit of any unused tax-free allowances for the period of unemployment in the tax year which are not required to cover the unemployment and pay-related benefit received.
Where the person's unemployment and pay-related benefit is greater than their weekly tax-free allowance the benefit received will not be taken into account on resuming or taking up employment for the first time in the tax year. However, the employer will be instructed by Revenue to operate the non-cumulative basis of PAYE, which is generally known as the "Week 1" basis, in respect of the person's further taxation. Normal cumulative PAYE takes account of the employee's cumulative tax position from the beginning of the tax year up to the pay week that is being dealt with. "Week 1" non-cumulative PAYE, on the other hand, looks only at the employee's tax position in the week that is being dealt with. "Week 1" in this instance will, in order to prevent possible hardship to the employee, prevent collection of the undercharge which has arisen because the benefit was greater than the tax-free allowances. It will also deny the person any access to the tax-free allowances for the period of unemployment, thereby preserving such tax free allowances to be offset against any tax due on the unemployment and pay-related benefit received.
The arrangements I have outlined are those that will apply in the great majority of cases, which are straight forward. In non-straight forward cases where the employee does not permanently cease work with the employer but is in receipt of benefit — for example, systematic short-time workers — the Revenue will, where appropriate and possible, restrict their tax-free allowances by the amount of their expected unemployment benefit. The employer will continue to operate PAYE on a cumulative basis in respect of their earnings from employment.
In the case of undercharges of tax arising from this measure Revenue will, in general, follow the usual procedures which normally apply in respect of other tax undercharges.
I must again stress that the extent to which taxation will arise under this measure will essentially depend on the amount of other income which the person or the person's spouse has in the tax year. If there is no other income in addition to unemployment and pay-related benefit, the exemption limits will generally ensure that there is no tax to pay. The yield that it is estimated will arise from this measure is £18 million in 1994 and £30 million in a full year.
I wish to share my time with the Minister of State at the Department of Finance, Deputy Eithne Fitzgerald and with Deputy Ó Cuív.